There is a continuity of usage which makes any term comprehensible.
In the case of "final cause", that continuity can be followed from Aristotle through Christian theology. It is this continuity which I adhere to. And this understanding of "final cause" is completely distinct from any contemporary sense of "cause". Your accusation is unjustified.

You, on the other hand, are introducing a narrow contemporary sense of "final cause" which renders "final cause" in the traditional sense incomprehensible.

The contemporary sense of "cause" wouldn't say that an intention is a cause of something in vacuo, but that's not what you're saying either. — Terrapin Station

What you mean by "vacuo", I don't know, but the traditional understanding allows that final cause is prior to any material existence, and that is what I'm saying. And, in theology they demonstrate that prior to material existence there was necessarily final cause, the Will of God. I think you should reconsider your accusation.

Broken record time: That's because you're grafting a contemporary, narrow sense of "cause" on to this. — Terrapin Station

No, I'm offering a reasonable interpretation of "final cause", as intention, exactly as it is described by Aristotle. The contemporary narrow sense of "cause" excludes intention as a cause, that is what supports determinism. And, this reasonable interpretation of "final cause" which I put forward is far more charitable than the incoherent, incomprehensible, nonsense interpretation of "final cause" that you've put forward, which is completely inconsistent with Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics..

The One can be pretty much be read as the argument for vagueness or Apeiron as the foundation for dichotomous or dialectical being. — apokrisis

We need to respect what the argument demonstrates though, that the real existence of unity, represented as "One", throws confusion into our understanding of reality, if we maintain the traditional categorical separation of universal/particular. The conclusion to be drawn is not that "One" is some sort of unintelligible vague being or existence, but that our defined categories, particular and universal, are inadequate for understanding the nature of reality.

And note that the quandaries presented in Parmenides were resolved in the late Sophist in fully triadic fashion. Both sameness and difference, generality and particularity, have being. Dichotomies are separations towards mutually logical limits and so where there is distinctive being, it is the result of a successful process of division. Being needs the emergence of the two ends that thus bound a concrete spectrum of possibility. — apokrisis

I think that what is demonstrated in those Platonic dialogues is that this dichotomy, between universal and particular cannot by maintained at the most fundamental level. The world becomes unintelligible at this level, in terms of these two categories, because there is something which violates the boundary between them, something more fundamental.

You'll notice that in the Timaeus, Plato introduces a completely new dichotomy, that of matter and form. "Matter" is a new term, and it has taken the place of the particular, as the possibility of a particular.
Form is what gives actual existence to the particular. This allows Aristotle to develop "form" as a category which includes both particulars and universals. The form of the universal is the essential properties, the form of the particular is the essential properties as well as all the accidentals. From this perspective both universals and particulars are intelligible objects.

Matter itself has been excluded from this category of intelligibility, in order that particulars and universal can both be included, as intelligible. Matter is still very real, as that which bridges the boundary between the possibility of a particular, and the actuality of a particular, but the categories have been redefined, such that particulars can be brought in with universals, as intelligible. The new categories as defined by Aristotle are "actual" and "potential". This validates what you say: "both sameness and difference, generality and particularity, have being", because both are in the category of "actual", as two distinct types forms.

For contrarieties to constitute existence, then there must be some deeper symmetry state that they break. The dialogue makes that (triadic/developmental) argument. For there to be flux and stasis, etc, there must be a "prior" state that is neither yet has the potential to be so divided. — apokrisis

I don't think this "triadic/development" is the right direction. What you propose only reinforces the designated status of matter (potential) as unintelligible. it asserts the position of the unintelligible (matter) as more fundamental than the intelligible, placing it out of reach of the intellect. A more appropriate approach, I believe, is to redefine the categories again, similar to what Plato and Aristotle did, but now to bring matter into the category of intelligibility. Plato and Aristotle made the particular intelligible by providing the principles necessary to bring it into the same category as the universal. Now we need to provide the principles necessary to bring matter into the same category, as that which separates a particular from a universal, within that category. This will bring matter (potential) out from the designation of vagueness, the apeiron, into the category of intelligible.

It seems to me that an elementary particle is also a compound of the particle plus some property that it has. Or is that just a property of language imposed on the thing described? — jkop

I think that to understand the elementary particle we have to relate it to the field. But now the particle appears to be a property of the field. So it may not be truly elementary, as it is the property of something else. But fields are completely conceptual, and no one knows what "field" refers to in reality, it just mathematics which describes the conditions under which elementary particles appear. The elementary particle now appears to be just a part of a larger whole. I think this is what Wayfarer is referring to. But this raises the possibility that "whole" could be something completely different from what we think.

It's difficult to discuss this when you won't accept a simple, familiar example like the outcome of a coin toss. Of course there can be states in an active system, just as there can be frames in a movie. — Andrew M

For sure, there could be states like frames in a movie. But this is a completely different premise, not consistent with QM, it's a completely different ontology. If this is the case, then we have to account for a completely different type of activity, the activity of exchanging one frame for the next. This implies that the whole world would be in state X at one moment, and in state Y at the next moment. There would be no "movement" as we now conceive of it, "activity" would be a switching of one frame to the next. The mathematics of QM describes activity as motion though, it doesn't describe a switching of one frame to the next.

The uncertainty principle does not demonstrate this. It shows that an object can't have a precisely-defined position and precisely-defined momentum at the same time. — Andrew M

Have you ever considered that according to relativity theory, "at the same time" is relative, and, everything is moving. Therefore it's impossible that anything has a precisely defined spatial-temporal position. The uncertainty principle demonstrates this in practise.

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Isn't an elementary particle suppose to be like that?

What is an example of an existing object without parts? — jkop

Anything which is simple, not compound.

Which is you not caring that you're grafting a contemporary, narrow sense of "cause" on to this.

You think I'm misunderstanding it. I think you're misunderstanding it. Will either of those change? — Terrapin Station

There's one big difference between my understanding of final cause, and your understanding of final cause. Yours allows that any non-existing thing, and even a thing which never has, or will exist, ever, past or future, could be a cause. This renders "cause", in this sense, as incomprehensible, incoherent nonsense. Can you make sense of the idea that something which never has, nor never will, exist, is a cause? My way of understanding final cause allows that a real existing thing, with observable effects, intention, is a cause.

Simply put, my way of understanding is reasonable, and clearly consistent with what Aristotle wrote about "final cause". Your way, while it may be consistent with what Aristotle wrote, is unreasonable because it renders this sense of "cause" as nonsense. Therefore my interpretation is reasonable while yours is unreasonable.

First, in Aristotle, intention isn't necessarily implied by ends or goals, because objects that have nothing to do with sentient creation have ends or goals, too--Aristotle buys the notion of telos in general. Sentient beings are the only ones with intentionality, however. In fact, intentionality is often taken to be a mark of sentience. — Terrapin Station

Have you seen the way that Aquinas demonstrates that Aristotelian principles are consistent with Christian theology? These instances in nature, in which non-sentient beings are observed to have ends, or goals, purposefulness, are attributed to the Will (intention) of God.

To win the World Series" is identical to the goal. It's the goal under a different name. — Terrapin Station

Right, "to win The World Series" is the identity of the goal. It is the goal identified, the object identified. Now, we can use your switch tactic, and switch "goal" with "intention", without changing the meaning of the statement. "To win The World Series" is the identity of the intention. It is the intention identified, the object identified.

"To intend to win the world series" isn't identical to the goal. The goal is not to intend to win the World Series. — Terrapin Station

This doesn't make sense, only because you use some odd sort of phrasing, "to intend to win". Of course "to intend" is not identical with "the goal". To intend is an action, a verb, "the goal" is an object, the noun. You need to maintain consistency "the intention" is the same thing as "the goal"

"Goal" is the "directed-towards" in this situation. It's not the what's doing the directing, in other words. — Terrapin Station

This demonstrates your misunderstanding of "final cause". Under the concept of final cause, the goal is doing the directing, not vise versa, that's how the goal is a cause. You apprehend "goal" as a "directed-towards", but the concept of final cause requires that we apprehend "goal" as what is doing the directing, that's why its a cause. This is the central principle of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. When we come to understand the reality of the situation, that the goal is doing the directing, rather than vise versa, then we set good goals, ones which are conducive to good behaviour.

It's not true that our intention to win the World Series is the end or goal. — Terrapin Station

You're wrong here, it is true that the team's intention to win The World Series, is the very same thing as the team's goal, or end. Why would you say that it's not true? It's just different ways of saying the very same thing. "Our intention is to win The World Series", "Our goal is to win The World Series", and "Our end is to win The World Series", all mean the very same thing.

The word substitution is meant to break the associations you're making with the word "cause," because that's resulting in a mental block. — Terrapin Station

If, when you put the word back in, the result is nonsense, then clearly the exercise has failed. Your exercise demonstrates that any non-existent thing could be a cause. That's the nonsense meaning you're trying to associate with "cause". It's nonsense and should be rejected.

Right, the goal itself, and not the intention prior to the object in question. — Terrapin Station

What are you talking about? Intention is necessarily implied by goal. There is no goal without intention.

The real issue here comes about when you consider the logical relationship between "whole" and "part". The part is necessarily a part of a whole. If it is not a part of something, it is no longer a part, it must be a whole. A whole can exist without parts.

So when we consider the existence of an object, and specifically the coming into being of the object, it is necessary to conclude that the whole is prior in time to the parts. When the parts come into existence, they are necessarily parts of a whole, so the whole is necessarily prior in time to the parts. This is why the whole is something other than (greater than) the sum of the parts, because the whole may exist even without any parts.

It's not impossible that it's the final cause, however, because all that "final cause" refers to is the end or "that for the sake of which" something is done. The final cause doesn't have to be realized. — Terrapin Station

Excellent, now you're catching on, the final cause is the goal, what is intended, and that's why it doesn't matter if it's realized or not, it still is the cause. There is no necessity of realization, because the cause is the goal itself, not the realization of the goal. According to aletheist's understanding of final cause, it is the realized thing which is the cause. But this is impossible because the caused activity occurs regardless of whether or not the goal is realized.

What's throwing you off is the word "cause." Think of "cause" as simply a name in this context--like if we'd call it "Joe" instead. If the "Joe" is the end or goal of something, then the "Joe" in this case is "winning the lottery." The "Joe" isn't "your intention to win the lottery." You're not buying the ticket with the end or goal of your intention. — Terrapin Station

We're talking about a cause here. Do you not understand this? The word "Joe" could refer to any non-existent thing, a pink unicorn, or me winning the lottery which never happens. How could these non-existent things be a cause of anything? All you are doing is making "final cause" into some sort of nonsense. But if the concept appears as nonsense, then surely you have misunderstood the concept. That's what I am trying to demonstrate to you. The way you understand "final cause" renders it as nonsense, my understanding does not. Surely you have misunderstood the concept, especially if you can switch out your understanding for mine, and have the concept make sense.

Not at all - generality is opposed to particularity, and not singularity; the particular is what is replaceable, interchangeable, amenable to generalization, while the singular is not. Singularity (and it's natural 'pairing', universality, which is in turn not generality) cuts across the general-particular dichotomy, such that a general regime may itself be particular. — StreetlightX

This is an important principle, but I prefer to express "singularity" as "unity", or in the old fashioned way, "One". There is an interesting dialectic on this principle near the end of Plato's Parmenides, I believe. It may or may not be decipherable, but the uninterpretability of it may be intentional, actually what makes the point. "One" is demonstrated to dissolve the categorical boundary between universal and particular, and complete confusion ensues.

Let me see if I can remember the basics. Same is opposed to Other. "Other" is the name of the category of particulars, difference being what constitutes other, and this is the determining factor of particulars. Same is the determining factor of universals, so "Same" is the name for the category of universals . Now we introduce the name "One". Each particular is a unit, a one, so each other is itself a unit, and in this way "One" participates in the category of Other, particulars. However, "One" is what "same" refers to, meaning that everything in the category of Same is by this means, one, the same thing. But "one" designates a particular.

There is no apparent way to resolve this. So when we use "one", or "unit" or "singularity", there is no resolution to the question of what is being referred to, a universal (Same), or a particular (Other). And since same and other are opposing terms, we are open to an infinity of possibilities with the name "One".

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Consider this example. My goal is to win the lottery, that is my intention. The means to this end is to buy tickets. It is impossible that winning the lottery is the cause of me buying tickets because I never win. The cause of me buying tickets is the intent to win, my goal of winning. This is "cause" in the sense of "final cause", "that for the sake of which a thing is done".

Which comes first in time, the end or the means? I am not referring to any thought about the end, or the desire for the end, or the decision to adopt a particular end as a goal; I am talking about the end itself. — aletheist

As I said, "end" is defined as "a thing one seeks to attain; a purpose". So the goal, or end is first in time, prior to the means That is "the end itself". Then the individual brings into effect the means which have been determined necessary to achieve the end. The end itself (which is the goal), may or may not be achieved. You seem to be forgetting that the end itself is an object in the sense of "objective", goal. Despite the fact that it may or may not be achieved, it is still the object. You know, in the rules of games, there is "the object" of the game. That is the goal. The object is the goal, which is "the end itself'. So your question is only contradictory. You ask me about "the end itself", yet stipulate that it is something other than the object which is known as the end.

The end or goal isn't an intention. The end or goal is to drive in nails. — Terrapin Station

As I said "to drive nails" implies intention. Intention is implicit in that phrase. You even indicate this with "goal". The goal is to drive nails. As the end, driving nails is the objective, the goal. Having that goal, one must obtain a hammer as the means to that end.

These are really simple words, "goal", "end", "purpose", "intention". How is it that the two of you do not understand them? Are we not learning the simple words in school anymore? I don't think that's the case. You all use these words, you just don't know how to relate them to causation. It's not these words that you don't understand, it's final cause you don't understand, so you don't see how these words refer to a cause. That's what Aristotle taught. Clearly, as per your definitions, these terms, "end", "goal", "telos", "purpose", describe what final cause is. Do you not understand what "final cause is the goal" means? You know a goal is something sought, an aim, don't you? Final cause is the goal, the purpose, telos. How many times must I repeat what is written in your definitions before you dispel your misunderstanding in favour of understanding?

The amplitude is a complex number associated with a quantum system. It's about the ontology. Whereas the probability (a real number between 0 and 1) is the predicted likelihood that that quantum system will be observed if a measurement were made. It's about the epistemology. — Andrew M

I don't understand your distinction between ontology and epistemology. It's all mathematics, therefore it's all epistemology. You have arbitrarily singled out a part of the mathematics to say that this is the ontology. But I think you're going in the wrong direction. Instead of following me towards the fundamental principles, which the numbers refer to, and this is where you will find the ontology, for some reason you believe that you will find ontology in some complex mathematics. But that is backward.

I'm referring to a coin that has already been flipped, where there is a single state that is unknown (e.g., it's hidden under my hand). Whereas a coin held in a superposition of heads and tails has two superposed states. — Andrew M

This is a misrepresentation though. What is being referred to is an active system. So you cannot represent this as a case of the coin having been tossed, and the result is hidden under your hand. The system is an active system, so there are no states, there is no result. The ontology of the system must be represented as if the coin is in the air. That is your mistake, you want to represent states, talk about states, when there are no real states in an active system, it is inherently active. The idea that there are particles moving within the system makes you think that the particles must have definitive spatial-temporal positions, and the mathematics represents this. The uncertainty principle demonstrates that this is not the case, there are no definitive positions of particles. So you'll propose "superposition", and desire to assign some ontological status to this.

However, you're not addressing the true ontology of the active system, that it is active, and this is inherently incompatible with states. Consider that under special relativity, electromagnetism is pure energy. There is energy which moves from A to B, but it is impossible that a physical object moves from A to B, because an object cannot move at the speed of light, and this energy moves at the speed of light. The photoelectric effect demonstrates that energy leaves A and gets to B as particles, objects. The question is, how should you represent that energy which is moving from A to B. If you assume a particle, then you look for intermediate states, the positions of the particle. But there is no need to assume a particle. If the energy leaves A and appears at B as a particle, moving at the speed of light, and special relativity states that it is impossible for an object to move at the speed of light, why would you believe that a particle moves from A to B? This is the ontological question, why is the energy within the system represented as moving particles, that makes no sense.

Do you believe that everyone else has this wrong, too--for example, the definitions/explanations I quoted re final causes earlier in the thread? — Terrapin Station

What are you talking about? The definitions you've provided are all clearly consistent with my interpretation, and inconsistent with aletheist's. Look what is referred to, a "goal", an "end" in the sense of "what one seeks to attain", "that for the sake of which", which must be interpreted in a way which is consistent with Aristotle's usage, which I've already described.

In any case, the first definition refers to "the end/goal", which is consistent with what I said, and not what aletheist says. The second definition refers to "end (telos)" and again is consistent with what I say, "intention". The third definition refers to "end or purpose", and the fourth refers to "the end, that for the sake of which".

Notice how final cause is equated with "end" (what one seeks to attain), "goal", "telos". Final cause is not, as aletheist claimed, the thing which is brought about by the goal. It is the goal itself. And, as I explained in my last post, in the context of Aristotle's writing's, what is referred to by "that for the sake of which", is the goal, the objective, not the thing brought about by the person who has that goal, it refers to the goal directly.

So, I suggest that you are misinterpreting these definitions. Or am I missing something? How do you make words like "goal", "telos", "end", disappear from the definition?

Keep at it, philosophy is great fun, useful too. If you ever can't get to sleep at night (being anxious, stressed out, or just too high), pick up some Aristotle - problem solved!

It depends on exactly what you mean by "purpose" and "intention." I associate both of those terms with intelligent willfulness and agency. In that sense, seeds do not "seek" anything, and birds and bees do not have "purposes" even though their nests and hives indeed have final causes. — aletheist

There is no necessary association there. It is habitual usage which has made you believe that purpose is necessarily associated with intelligent willfulness. Clearly the beaver builds a dam with purpose, and the bird builds a nest with purpose. Our habitual usage of "purpose", to associate it only with intelligent willfulness has made us forget that things act with purpose without intelligent willfulness.

[ Go ahead, keep your eyes closed shut and exclaim "I can't see it! I can't see it!"

No, the final cause is not the intent to do something. The intent to do something is not the end or goal with respect to the hammer. — Terrapin Station

It seems like you're simply ignoring the facts of what Aristotle wrote, to make an unsupported assertion. If you ask me, "why did you make that hammer?", I could answer "to drive nails", or I could answer "I want to drive nails". In the former, intention is implicit, and in the latter, it is explicit. But each phrase refers to the intent to drive nails, I think that is undisputable.

When the hammer is built, there is an intent to do something with it. Aristotle is very explicit on this, and that is the final cause. He expands on a principle described by Plato, the crafts people who use the tool ought to have some say in the production of the tool. You'll find this just before the other passage I quoted, 194a-194b:
"The helmsman knows and prescribes what sort of form a helm should have...".

"In the products of art, however, we make the material with a view to the function, whereas in the products of nature, the matter is there all along.

And this is not the only place where Aristotle describes "that for the sake of which". It is very prominent in the Nicomachean Ethics. He starts by saying that actions aim at some good, "an end". He establishes the difference between an action and a product, and talks about a hierarchy, as products are intrinsically higher than actions, but still, some products are produced for the sake of actions. So there is subordination, some things are designated as for the sake of other actions, and those actions for the sake of producing other things. If this is the case, then we can look for something "which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this)". He then proceeds to question what this is, that which is desired for the sake of itself, and comes to a preliminary conclusion that it could be happiness.

It seems like you're trying to necessarily read "cause" in the contemporary sense. Aristotle didn't use the idea that narrowly, especially not when it came to the concept of final cause. — Terrapin Station

I have full respect for the way that Aristotle used "cause", and understand it quite well. You, on the other hand are trying to assign a meaning to "final cause" which would render it incomprehensible, having the cause of the thing posterior to it in time. But this is natural, because you do not believe in immaterial causes, such as the free will. So until you release this prejudice, final cause will remain inherently incomprehensible, as a cause posterior to the effect.

If you see any evidence that Aristotle is using "that for the sake of which", in some way other than the way I describe, in his physics, then you should bring this to my attention. Until then I'll keep insisting that you are making uneducated assertions, and I'll keep bringing more evidence to support this judgement. And believe me, the evidence is plentiful, because "that for the sake of which" is a common theme in Aristotle.

As I said before, I find your questions very vague and irrelevant. You asked me one question, I replied, and now you go off in a completely different direction. I'm not a mathematician, nor am I a physicist, I'm a metaphysician. Perhaps you could explain what you are trying to get at. Or, if you think that I am wrong in what I have said, maybe you could explain why. Then you could help me learn something.

I have suggested that driving nails is the final cause of the hammer, the end for the sake of which the hammer exists, which is subsequent to the making of the hammer as a means to that end. — aletheist

"End" in this sense means "the thing one seeks to attain".

Final causes cannot be confined to human desires or intentions, because things that have nothing to do with humans have them - teeth, seeds, balls, etc. - and they are likewise subsequent to the coming-into-existence of those things. — aletheist

Don't jump ahead of yourself, first obtain a strong grasp of what final cause really means, then move to see how it relates to all these other things. Don't dissuade yourself from understanding by referring to preconceived notions that may or may not be relevant.

In any case, final causes are not limited to human intentions. Why would you think that the seed does not seek to attain being a plant? And why would you limit intention to human beings? Do you realize that anything done for a purpose is done with intention? The birds and the bees are building their nests for a purpose, and this is final cause in action. But there are different ways in which intention relates to things. The hammer is driving the nails, but the intent is not in the hammer, it is in the one swinging the hammer. Likewise, the components in my computer are performing functions, they are acting for a purpose with respect to the whole, and this implies intention. We don't find the intention in the computer though, but in the one who built it.

So, the "Hamiltonian operator describes the system in terms of probabilities". How does it do that? Where in the Hamiltonian operator are the probabilities? I'm particularly interested as, having applied the Hamiltonian, typically in systems of interest, one obtains a scalar quantity, not a probability distribution. — tom

Try Google, it's very helpful, but let me try, maybe I can describe it. The Hamiltonian operator describes a system in terms of the energy of all the particles within the system. There is a time-energy uncertainty, so any derived time evolution is inherently probabilistic.

How do YOU think the Schrödinger equation achieves that? More pertinently perhaps, why do you think the Schrödinger equation does that, particularly as no one else does? — tom

Clearly I don't believe that, that seemed to be Andrew M's position, which I objected to.

So again, in the case of a hammer, "Why have we made a hammer?" "To drive in nails." We haven't made a hammer to desire to drive in nails. "To drive in nails" is the final cause. — Terrapin Station

Right, "to drive nails" is the final cause. Intent is implicit in the phrase "to...". "I intend to...". So we haven't made a hammer to desire to drive nails, we've made a hammer from the desire to drive nails. Remember, the intent to drive nails is the cause, not the effect. Now explain that to aletheist. Aletheist thinks that the act of driving nails is the cause of the hammer .

I must admit, I don't really understand what you are asking me. I've had that problem with your posts in the past. If I can't somehow relate what you're saying to what I said, then a simple one sentence question without any context doesn't explain to me what you are looking for. I can't find the relevance of your questions.

You really should read Aristotle because I can see that you completely misunderstand the nature of final cause. Here's what he says, Physics 194b:

" 'Why is he walking about ?' we say. 'To be healty', and having said that, we think we have assigned the cause."

Notice that the cause of him walking about is "to be healthy". It is not the case, as aletheist claims, that when he has actually come to be healthy, this is the cause of his walking in the past. It is the case that right now when he is walking, the end, the goal, or objective, "to be healthy", was the cause of him walking.

But isn't that what he said--that the final cause of a hammer is driving nails? — Terrapin Station

Exactly. My whole point is to call attention to the fact that when I make the hammer, its final cause is something in the future, not the present or the past. — aletheist

Did you not read "the desired 'end'"? The final cause of the hammer is not the act of driving nails, it is the desire to drive nails. If you really think that the final cause of the hammer is the act of driving nails, then explain to me how the act of driving nails could possibly cause the existence of the hammer. That makes no sense. It does make sense though, to say that the desire to drive nails causes the existence of the hammer.

This concept of final cause is integral to the concept of free will, the will acts as a final cause, and is free from efficient causation. But understanding final cause in that way, your way, leaves free will incomprehensible, as it renders the will as an efficient cause, rather than a final cause and this denies freedom to the will. The act of willing, which brings the hammer into existence is the final cause of the hammer. It is a freely willed act because it is free from efficient causation.

And this happens instantaneously — aletheist

It's not instantaneous though, that's why there is a need for the concept of "acceleration". The motion of one object is not instantaneously transferred to the other object.

The Hamiltonian tells you how a quantum state will (deterministically) evolve. When it is applied in the Schrodinger equation, it produces a superposition of states which are expressed as probability amplitudes (complex numbers), not probabilities. — Andrew M

Yes, you can use the magic of mathematics to turn possibilities into realities if you like, but I think that if the magician is convinced my the magic, that's a problem And I am not convinced by that magic. Logic, of which mathematics is a type, cannot produce anything contrary to its premises. The Hamiltonian operator describes the system in terms of probabilities due to the reality which the uncertainty principle is supposed to represent. How do you think that the Schrodinger equation converts these probabilities into realities? Even the Wikipedia article you referred me to clearly discusses probability amplitudes in terms of probabilities. It says in the first line of the article: "The modulus squared of this quantity represents a probability or probability density." Then the entire article discusses things like probabilities, probabilistic laws, and probability densities.

This matters. If states in a quantum superposition were merely probabilistic, with only one state being real as with a coin flip, then they could not constructively or destructively interfere with each other to produce interference patterns. That is why all of those states must be real. — Andrew M

I don't see the premises whereby you make this conclusion. If we have a coin toss of 50/50 probability, and add another coin to the toss with a 50/50 probability, the fact that the two coins could interfere with each other in the air does not produce the conclusion that our description of the toss is not probabilistic.

But you seem to be missing something fundamental in your reference to "one state being real". When the system is described in terms of probabilities, this does not imply that one state must be the real state. There is no such thing as a "state" within a system, it is an active system. A "state" and an active "system" are two incompatible descriptions. Consider the coin toss, the 50/50 probability refers to the outcome of that activity. It is describing the activity, the coin in the air, with reference to the outcome. There is no "state" being referred to, except the outcome, but the outcome has not yet occurred, so it is probabilistic. It is not a "real state", it is a future potential state. The activity described, being the coin in the air, is an activity, it has no real states. To represent the activity as a state is to stop the activity, and this negates the essence of "activity".

So in our quantum example, the Hamiltonian operator recognizes that the system has no real states. What is real is the activity. So now we can produce a wave function, and the wave function is assumed to be a description of the activity of the system, the activity of the system being what is real. That description describes something real, but the something real is an active system, not a state. Specific spatial temporal positions of particles is a description which refers to a state. So there is an inherent incompatibility between describing an active system and the possible states of that system.

You could ask, which is real, the active system, or the states of the system, and the answer depends on your perspective. The term "energy" refers to the activity of a thing, so if energy is believed to be real, and the system is described in terms of energy, the activity of the system is what is real. The wave function describe the reality, the activity, the coin in the air, and any states are just possible states, produced if we stop the activity. But if the activity is stopped, then the wave function is no longer real. The problem being that there is no principle whereby we can represent both as real.

However, one could take an alternative perspective, and claim that energy, activity, is not real, it is merely conceptual. Activity and energy are how we describe changing states. From this perspective, we would say that "the system" is just a conceptual representation of what is real, and what is real is particular definitive states, which change from one moment to the next. Then we could say that the reason why these states must be represented as possible, or probable states, is that the reality of the system is being represented as energy, activity, and this representation is incapable of reproducing the states, due to the incompatibility expressed above. We do not have the means to say that both of the descriptions, the activity, and the states, are real, because the incompatibility between these two has not been resolved.

No, it is the driving of nails - something that is in the future when the hammer is made, not the present or the past. That is why we call it the final cause, or the end. It is the result; it comes last in the temporal sequence. — aletheist

I don't agree. I think you misunderstand "final cause". It is contradictory to think that the cause of something is posterior in time to that thing. That is contrary to the definition of "cause", so this is clearly not what Aristotle refers to in his description of final cause. It is called "final" cause because we are referring to the desired "end", having the nails pounded. The efficient causes, which are the act of making the hammer, and hitting the nails, are the means to that end.

Do you now agree that force simultaneously causes acceleration? — aletheist

No, I don't think force causes anything. "Force" refers to the power which one thing exerts on another thing. It is conceptual. Concepts only play a causal role in the case of final cause, the way I understand final cause, not the way you understand final cause. But in the case of acceleration, we are not talking about final cause, we are talking about efficient cause, so to say that force is a cause would be a category error. One thing causes the acceleration of another thing, and we refer to the power which the one exerts on the other during this causal process, as force.

I intend to drive some nails. I make a hammer accordingly. The final cause of the hammer is not achieved until I actually drive the nails with it - after I have made it. — aletheist

The final cause of the hammer is your intent to drive nails. How could you actually driving nails, be the cause of the hammer? The hammer already exists at this time? Final cause is "the reason why", and the reason why the hammer exists is that you intended to drive nails. What about if you intended to drive nails, so you made the hammer, but never got around to driving nails? The hammer exists, and there's a reason why it exists, so it has a final cause, but it never drives any nails.

The final cause of teeth is biting and chewing food. — aletheist

I agree that there is final cause, intent behind the creation of teeth, that they were created for this purpose, like I also believe there is intent, or purpose, behind the dam which the beaver builds, but many people don't agree with this, so it is a contentious issue. So I actually agree with you that there is final cause in things other than human actions, I think final cause can be found in the actions of living things in general, including the growing of teeth. But you and I have a slightly different idea of what final cause actually is.

But that intent is not realized until the object exists and is employed for that — aletheist

As I understand final cause, it always precedes the thing brought about, as the intent to bring that thing about. I don't understand what you mean by the intent is not realized until later, the intent is real, as the cause of the free will act which causes the thing to be brought about.

Besides, human purposes are not the only kind of final cause. — aletheist

Could you give me an example of final cause which is not human intent?

No, the (instantaneous) acceleration is simultaneous with the application of the force; F=ma at any given time. — aletheist

F=ma is not an expression of causation though.

Someone could say, "What's the cause of the ∃ symbol in logic?" Where what they're asking is for an explanation of it: "It's the existential quantifier--you can read it as 'there exists a(n)'" — Terrapin Station

That really appears like a misuse of the word 'cause' to me, and a real stretch of the imagination on your part. If someone used cause in that way, to ask for the meaning of a symbol, how would you know what the person was talking about? If I asked you what's the cause of "3", or what's the cause of "sun", would you know that I was asking you for the meaning of these symbols?

Could you explain why probability is "inherent within the Hamiltonian? — tom

I told you this already, the energy of the system is expressed as probable locations of particles.

Could you explain how the initial measurement is made in say a two-slit experiment, and what difference the result makes? — tom

There is an amount of energy introduced into the system, as you say, a photon particle or number of particles are "fired". The energy of that system is expressed as particles. This expression is used in the Hamiltonian, and therefore the Schrodinger.

If probability is "the energy of the particles", why are different words used to state the same thing? — tom

Have you ever heard of wave/particle duality? Two different words to express the same thing.

No it is easy enough to visualize three groups of four or four groups of three, and to see that it equals twelve. — John

Say you visualize such groups, how would you know that there was twelve there without counting them or performing the math?

What about final causation, which is often subsequent (temporally) to the effect? — aletheist

I don't think final cause is subsequent to the effect. "Final cause" refers to the intent which brings about the existence of the object. Otherwise you would have the object being the cause of itself.

Even most efficient causation is really simultaneous with the effect, rather than prior to it; e.g., application of force to a mass causes acceleration, which ceases when the force is removed. — aletheist

The acceleration is subsequent to the application of force, this is evident from the way that physicists describe this as the kinetic energy of the object which acts as the force is converted to potential energy and this is converted to the kinetic energy of the object which accelerates.

Some people use "cause" as a synonym for "reason"--a la "what's the reason" for something, where they're looking for an explanation or simply for something to be put into other words. That's different than a cause in the other sense. You seemed to be conflating the two at times. — Terrapin Station

Yes, there are times when people use "reason" to be synonymous with "cause", but not all uses of "reason" are synonymous with "cause". When "reason" is used as synonymous with "cause", then a temporal order is implied.

With common objects, that it is a chair and that it exists are much the same. With humans, that they are and what they are differ - at least while they have the capacity for choice. — Banno

Since many different objects exist, and the chair is only one of them, how is it that you can say "that it is a chair and that it exists are much the same"? The table exists, and it's not a chair, so clearly, that it is exists, and that it is a chair, are completely different things, or else the table would also be a chair, because it exists.



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We can easily observe that three sets of four trees equals twelve trees, for example. — John

How would you observe that? Wouldn't you have to actually count them, as one group of twelve, to reach that conclusion?

I mean some guy just said we're all a monumental waste of time and all he could elicit was a "Yeah? Prove it." — Hanover

Didn't Wittgenstein say the very same thing? But he wasted a lot more time saying it. I guess that's the point, "proving it" is a waste of time. I guess what lambda points to, is that proving something is itself an absurdity.

(1) People have a tendency to have inflated assessments (these things are the best, the smartest, the most worthy of devotion, etc.) of an extended personal identity--their selves, their families (and especially their kids), their homes, their neighborhoods, their ethnicity or "tribe," their cities, their states/countries, their sports teams, etc. etc. are the best, combined with a tendency to deflate others outside of their extended sphere of personal identity--those things are inferior and even sometimes demonized. This probably stems from evolutionarily needing to look out for one's own, so to speak, while defending against competition for limited resources. — Terrapin Station

Yes, I believe there is an innate tendency in living creatures to look out for oneself. It extends to "look out for one's family", as is evident in many species. Human beings have developed moral principles whereby they extend this to "one's neighbour". Next comes the difficult aspect. Some want to extend this moral principle to all of humanity, and even all of life in general. But if we look at extending this moral principle to all of humanity, then we must establish principles of acceptance for those people in all corners of the world. These people will have different world views, different principles, and different ways of thinking. Some people do not agree to such principles of universal acceptance, believing that some of these differences constitute a real danger, an enemy.

Now we have a difference in moral thinking, some what to extent "look out for one's family" to "look out for all of humanity" and beyond, while some think that this is a bad idea, you are inviting in the enemy. This difference of opinion creates a divide between an individual and one's neighbour, and even divisions within a family. So there is a difference of opinion as to how we should look at strangers, as people to respect, or people to fear, and this difference penetrates to the very core of morality such that it disturbs the harmony of existence between an individual and one's neighbour, and even the harmony within one's own family.

No, I don't agree with that at all. For one, you're committing a category error by trying to read it temporally--you're talking about cause in a temporal sense, in the sense that we talk about causality in physics. — Terrapin Station

As far as I know, there is no type of cause other than temporal. Cause is a temporal concept, the cause is necessarily prior (temporally) to the effect. If you don't agree, then maybe you could describe a type of causation which is not like that.

Aside from that, you seem to be imagining that there's some default state of randomness where nonsense could obtain so that something might not be itself if there isn't something to prevent that possibility. I have no idea why you'd believe this, though. What evidence, empirical or logical, would suggest such a default to you? (And re logical, I'm talking about entailment/validity, not loose heuristics that seem intuitively right to you.) — Terrapin Station

The way that people use the terms "chance", "random", and "stochastic" suggests this to me. Referring to scientific theories, people talk about chance, or random mutations of living beings, and stochastic systems. If the entire universe went to a complete state of randomness, where it was impossible to predict what would be, from one moment to the next, there could be no objects here because the existence of an object requires a temporally extended stability (sameness for a period of time). In that universe it would be impossible for a thing to be itself because being itself requires that temporal extension. So this idea, "where nonsense could obtain" is science based, empirically based, it is the progress of science itself which has suggested this to me.

Perhaps you simply believe that "everything must have a cause," or "everything must have a reason that isn't itself," but I don't believe either, both obviously lead to infinite regresses, and neither has any empirical or logical support. — Terrapin Station

I believe that if things exist in an orderly fashion, there must be a reason, or cause for this. I think that it is definitively true, necessarily true, in the same sense that it is necessarily true that an object cannot be other than itself, that order cannot come from disorder, without a cause. Consider randomly placed objects strewn about in a disorderly way. If they are going to take on some sort of order, they must be moved, and this movement requires a cause. Any type of disorder requires movement before it can become ordered, and this requires a cause. A moving disorder will continue forever to move disorderly, according to the law of inertia, unless caused to move in an orderly way. I observe that things exist according to order, I know that there must be a cause of this.

I read it as "understanding ideas as <<I haven't the faintest idea what the hell we might be referring to>> is the most simple and straightforward way to understand ideas." — Terrapin Station

You're really self-contradictory here Terrapin. You use the word "idea", saying "I haven't the faintest idea", of what you mean by "idea". Don't you see that this is most likely some sort of lie, or deception, or at best contradiction, to say "I haven't the faintest idea what you mean by idea". Clearly you are using the word in a comprehensible way, so you must have some idea of what it means, yet in the same sentence you are claiming that you haven't the faintest idea of what it means.

What I'm looking for is some explanatory clue with respect to "what the hell we might be referring to." — Terrapin Station

Wow, I can't believe you are saying this, when my entire discourse with you for the last few days has been exactly that explanation. Do you not remember how I described that "what the object is", is separable from the physical object itself, and how I can talk about the house that I will build despite the fact that it hasn't been built yet, because I refer to what it is, rather than the physical object itself? And you said that this is a case of referring to the "idea" of that house? Do you always close your eyes when someone is trying to show you something? That's why I compared you to a whiney baby! You keep your eyes closed tight while I show you over and over again, and you exclaim: I CAN'T SEE IT! I CAN'T SEE IT!