Why does anyone still continue to study this nonsense? — lambda

Judging by what you say here:

- Philosophers are still unable to determine whether they're dreaming or not.

- Philosophers are still unable to provide a non-circular justification for the reliability of their cognitive faculties (senses, memory, reason, intuition, etc.)

- Philosophers still can't offer any reason to believe in free will.

- Philosophers still can't offer any reason to believe in the existence of other minds.

- Philosophers still can't offer any reason to believe in the existence of a mind-independent external world. — lambda

I'd say we need a lot more philosophy.

The notion of "substance" is really not at all clear in Aristotle, and I'd say non-existent in Plato. In his logic, The Categories, I believe, Aristotle described a primary and secondary sense of "substance".

Remember, Plato separated mind and body, and posited a third thing, passion or spirit, which acts as a intermediate between these two. You can find this in The Republic, he modeled his republic on this, with three corresponding classes of citizens. I don't believe Descartes has any such third aspect. This third aspect, which constitutes the relationship between mind and body is a useful defense against some modern criticism of dualism which insist that if mind and body are radically different there would be no possibility of interaction.

And another problem is that "it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is," doesn't make any sense in my opinion. I wouldn't say that was possible. As I noted, it might at least appear to make some sense on a view that substances are some sort of mysterious, amorphous somethings that are later bestowed with properties, but I don't really think that view makes a lot of sense in the first place, and there's definitely no reason to believe it in my opinion. — Terrapin Station

OK, so we're in agreement here. As I said, it is necessary that the object comes into existence as the object which it is. Otherwise, "it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is", and this doesn't make any sense to you nor to me. So we have complete agreement on this necessity. The one is necessary because the alternative is nonsense.

Now we can ask, what makes this a necessity, what makes it so that it does not make any sense to me nor you, that the alternative could be the case. That the alternative is nonsense is what makes the first a "logical" necessity. But it is not the fact that we agree, which makes this actually the case, that this is true, It is the fact that it is a truth, which makes us agree. So, the object necessarily comes into existence as the object which it is. Why? It is not because the alternative is nonsense, that may be what makes us agree, but it's not our agreement which makes this the truth.

That part I don't agree with at all, however. I'd have no idea where you're getting a notion from that "necessarily" implies a cause. For example, if necessarily A = A, presumably then you'd think that there must be a cause for that. I just don't know why you'd think that. I suppose you see modal logic as significantly resting on causes then? That would be an unusual view. — Terrapin Station

You don't agree that if A = A there must be a cause of that? I would say that on both the right side, and the left side of the =, there is the same symbol, A, and the = sign represents some form of sameness. That is "why" A=A, or the cause of that necessity. When something is necessarily the case, this means that it is impossible to be otherwise. This is the exact opposite of a random or chance occurrence, which is said to be an uncaused occurrence, so there must be a cause of what is necessarily the case. If it were uncaused, it would be a random or chance occurrence, and not something which is necessarily the case. So do you agree, that when something is necessarily the case, such as "when an object comes into existence it is necessarily the object which it is, and not something else", it is very reasonable to ask why this is the case? It is reasonable to ask why because the necessity of the occurrence implies that there is a cause of it.

One option for you is to try to explain how the idea of nonphysical existents makes sense. — Terrapin Station

I think we've already been through this. We've talked about ideas. To me, ideas as non-physical existents makes sense. That's the most simple and straight forward way to understand the existence of ideas, i.e., as non-physical existents. It doesn't matter that the humanly produced concept, or idea, depends upon, or is created by the physically existing human being, the idea itself is still non-physical. Likewise, it doesn't matter that the physical object depends upon the non-physical as its cause of existence, it still exists as a physical object. I really don't see how you can make sense of reality without referring to non-physical existents.

I'd say that it's simply a matter of identity (that is, A=A) and non-contradiction (that is ~(P&~P)). I wouldn't say that has any cause. — Terrapin Station

Don't you see that things like identity and non-contradiction must have a cause? If there was no reason why A = A, or why contradiction was unacceptable, then we wouldn't accept these as fundamental principles. It is because these are reasonable, i.e. there is a reason why they are acceptable, that we do accept them as fundamental principles. It is not because we accept them, and agree on them that they become fundamental principles, it is because they are acceptable. Therefore there is a reason for identity, and non-contradiction, and that is that they state something real and true about the world, and this is why we accept them. So these principles have a real cause of existence, the cause is the way that the world is. The way that the world is causes the existence of these principles. If the world were otherwise, such that it were not describable by these principles, we would not have developed these principles.

The Hamiltonian operator is an integral part of the Schrodinger equation. There is no Schrodinger equation without it. It represents all the energy within the system. Probability is inherent within the Hamiltonian and therefore inherent within the Schrodinger.

Probabilistic language relates to the measurement of the system, not its ontology, which is what the Schrodinger equation describes. — Andrew M

In order to apply the Schrodinger, there must be some initial measurements of energy which is attributed to the system. Probability is inherent within the way that this energy is represented in the equation, it is the energy of the particles. The entire system is described in "probabilistic language". That is inherent in the Hamitonian operator which is an essential part of the description. It may be true, as you say, that the Schrodinger describes the evolution of the wave function, but it describes it in terms of particles, which is a probabilistic description.

The Schrodinger equation employs a Hamiltonian operator which is a description of particles within a system. According to Wikipedia: "Its spectrum is the set of possible outcomes when one measures the total energy of a system."

You'd have to copy and paste the argument you're referring to. — Terrapin Station

All this time, I thought we were discussing the results of that original argument I presented. Now I see that you've totally forgotten it. Here it is.

The argument from Aristotle is that all objects are particulars. Each and every object exists as the particular object which it is, and nothing else. When a particular object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the particular object which it is. It is impossible that it is other than what it is. Therefore what it is, or the object's essence, must precede the object's existence. If it did not, it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is, and this is contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is your reply:

There's a problem with this argument.

"All objects are particulars."

I agree with that.

"Each and every object exists as the particular object which it is, and nothing else."

I agree with that.

"When a particular object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the particular object which it is. It is impossible that it is other than what it is."

I agree with that, too.

"Therefore what it is, or the object's essence, must precede the object's existence."

I disagree with that however. First off I disagree with saying that what the object is has anything to do with "essence." You could, however, be saying that you're just defining "essence" as "what an object is," without any of the other typical associations that "essence" has, and that would be fine, but in that case, saying that what an object is must precede the object's existence makes no sense. The object can't be whatever it is prior to it being something (existing) in the first place.

"If it did not, it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is, and this is contradictory."

This seems to me like it's probably buying that substances separate from properties can make sense (which is something I disagree with). — Terrapin Station

So, your primary objection had to do with the word "essence", which we've replaced with "haecceity". Your second objection is that it makes no sense to you, that the properties of an object can exist prior to the physical object itself. But you have not backed this up with any logic. And, despite the fact that I've given you numerous examples now, of how it is so, that the properties of an object exist prior to the physical object, you keep whining like a little child, claiming "it doesn't make sense", "it doesn't make sense". But I see through your childish attitude, and what you are really saying is "I don't want it to be like that, therefore I refuse to accept the reality of this". You know, when a child can't accept that things are not the way that it wants them to be, it gets whiney.

With respect to this second objection, in order to quell your dissatisfaction with the idea that properties exist prior to the object, I suggested that we switch things around, such that physical existence is a property. In this way, the non-physical haecceity can exist as the object, and then receive its physical properties. But now you go back to your whining, saying that anything non-physical existing doesn't make sense.

But I don't at all buy that the fact that a particular is the particular it is implies that there's some prior determining factor for that. I don't think that's been established at all. — Terrapin Station

Well you seemed to agree to this in the initial argument. See, it states that when an object comes into existence it necessarily comes into existence as the object which it is, and not something else. That word "necessarily" implies a cause. If there were no cause, then the object wouldn't necessarily be the object which it is, it could be absolutely anything. But it's not anything, it is the object which it is, and therefore there is a cause of that, and this is what I now call the determining factors, if you like that better than haecceity.

C'mon, man Don't start to get patronizing. I could easily be patronizing to you, but that's not something I'd do unprovoked. — Terrapin Station

OK, now I've compared you to a whiney child, does that provoke you? Or is it impossible to provoke you?

This is all fine, but it has nothing to do with the idea that an object could somehow be something other than the object it is. You'd need to support that particular idea (that it could even make sense). A suggestion as to how you might support it is by giving an example of it (that hopefully makes some sense). — Terrapin Station

That's the whole point, an object cannot be other than what it is. We totally agree. So we have a premise which we both agree upon, now let's proceed. I ask, why is this the case, and see that it can only be the case if the object is caused to be the object which it is. If there were no cause of it being the object which it is, it could be absolutely anything. It is not absolutely anything, it is the object which it is, and nothing else. Therefore there must be a cause of it being the object which it is.

Are spatial and temporal relations the only relations that you consider to be real? — aletheist

That's a good question. I don't think I've ever considered it before. It may be that we attempt to reduce all relations to space and time relations. That might be physicalism. But if there are non-physical existents, which I claim, then there are likely to be non-physical relations as well. As I implied in my last post, I don't believe that our present concepts of space and time are adequate for a full understand of the existence of objects. This would mean that there are aspects of reality which are not properly represented by these concepts, so if there are relations here, these may not be space or time relations.

In Christian theology they revere the father/son relation, represent it as Father/ Son, and this relation is sometimes called the Holy Spirit. Whether this relation can be represented completely in terms of space and time is questionable because there is a material element, content, which is the continuity of life, or some such thing, within the father son/relation. "Father" and "son" refer directly to a formal aspect Space and time are formal aspects, terms of essence. But there must still be another type of relationship which relates the formal to the underlying material aspect.

Are they? That seems more like nominalism than realism. I lean toward the latter, as I believe you do, and was merely suggesting that there is a distinction between haecceity and essence. It may be just another Peircean terminological preference on my part, like limiting "existence" to actuality. — aletheist

The way I see it, we perceive objects. We have developed the concepts of space and time to assist us in understanding the existence of these objects. The concept of space helps us to understand relative positions, size, etc., and the concept of time helps us to understand change. I do believe that these concepts are substantiated by something real, or else they wouldn't be helping us to understand the existence of objects, they would be producing a misunderstanding of the existence of objects. That said, I think there is a fair degree of misunderstanding of the existence of objects, as is evident from my discussion with Terrapin. Therefore, the exact nature of the real things which are represented by these concepts, space and time, I don't believe is very well understood, and this is evident from the fact that the existence of objects is not well understood. So there is an issue of dispelling the misunderstanding, and redeveloping the concepts of space and time, before we can truly say that "space" and "time" refer to something real.

A big "Huh???" there. That seems like quite a non sequitur. — Terrapin Station

Obviously, I included the conclusion of the earlier argument, which demonstrated that the haecceity of the object is prior to the physical presence of the object, as a premise. Your claimed non-sequitur is because you conveniently forgot this conclusion, and didn't include that premise.

I suggested that "the haecceity" and "the object" refer to one and the same thing, and you claimed to accept this. But I can see now that you do not really accept this. You have not released the idea that the object is necessarily a physical thing. Haecceitty refers to what the object is, and there is no necessity that what the object is physical. This is an unwarranted assumption if you agree to that proposal.

I don't buy that there are immaterial, nonphysical existents period. In my view, the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent. — Terrapin Station

OK, you do not really agree then, you insist that an object must be physical. Therefore you do not agree that "the haecceity" and "the object" refer to one and the same thing. "The object" is necessarily physical for you, and since I described the haecceity as non-physical, the haecceity is not necessarily physical. If you say that the haecceity is necessarily physical, then we have no agreement.

We will have to resolve the issue of the original argument in another way then. Remember that the argument demonstrates that there is something prior to the physical object, which determines that the physical object will exist as the particular physical object which it is, when that physical object comes into existence. So by inductive reasoning we can say that there is a "determining factor", or "determining factors" which are prior to each and every physical object, and therefore prior to all physical objects. Clearly this is something other than a physical object. Since your claim here is that only physical objects exist, then we have to assign something other than "existence" to the "determining factors".

At T1, X wouldn't be anything if it has no material presence. — Terrapin Station

But we have to respect that argument, which assumes that a physical object cannot be anything other than the physical object which it is, and therefore there must be a determining factor, or determining factors which are prior to that object, ensuring that the object is the physical object which it is, when that physical object comes into existence. This is T1, it is a time prior to the existence of the physical object. We cannot say that the "determining factor" is nothing, because if it were really nothing then it would not have the capacity to determine the particularities of the physical object.

That's due to the simple fact that what properties are in the first place is identical to (dynamic structures and relations of) matter. Properties are simply what matter/those dynamic structures are relations of matter are "like," the qualities they have, the way they interact with other things, etc. You can't have that if you don't have the dynamic structures and relations of matter in question. — Terrapin Station

I think you are misunderstanding something here. You say that properties are what dynamic structures and relations of matter are "like". So "properties" aren't the very same thing as dynamic structures and relations of matter, they are some form of similitude. You observe that the human mind creates these similitudes, as ideas, descriptions of the real dynamic structures and relations of matter. However, you do not take the necessary steps to advance your understanding, to see that the dynamic structures and relations of matter only exist because of the determining factors, and in fact, the dynamic structures and relations of matter are themselves just a similitude of the determining factors. As much as you say that we cannot have ideas about the dynamic structure and relations of matter without the dynamic structures and relations of matter to copy, there cannot be dynamic structures and relations of matter without the determining factors which create these.

There's no reason to wonder why something comes to be as some particular and not something else unless we can even make sense out of that idea. — Terrapin Station

I really don't see the issue here. The world is the way that it is. We notice the contingency of objects, and because of this we can change the world to an extent, to make it be more the way we want it to be. Due to the nature of contingency we can see that it was not necessary that the world came to be in the way that it did. Therefore the question of why the world is the particular world which it is, and not some other world, is a very reasonable question.

Agreed, I was just suggesting an example that is more familiar to most people than haecceity; especially since I tend to think of the latter as the distinct property that only actual things have, so that I am not inclined to equate it with essence myself. Instead, it is the brute "here and now" aspect of any individual thing that reacts with other individual things. — aletheist

Let's assume that the haecceity is as you say "the brute here and now" aspect of any individual thing. We can ask, what constitutes "here and now". Doesn't that particular spatial-temporal position simply define what the object is, in the most simple way? The object which has this very particular position. But space and time are completely conceptual, so how does this conceptualization of the object coexist with the object itself, such that the object has an actual, and real haecceity, rather than just a conceptualized spatial temporal positioning.

Quantum interference effects are real and are predicted by Schrodinger's equation. You won't find any mention of possibilities or probabilities in the Schrodinger equation. — Andrew M

I don't think you describe this correctly. I believe that the Schrodinger equation is an interpretation of interference effects, which expresses the possible positioning of particles. Therefore the equation does represent possibilities. It is produced as an interpretation of the real phenomenon, interference effects, which renders that phenomenon as epistemic possibilities, the possible positions of particles. If a possible position is observed, it can be claimed to be actual. Otherwise there is no principle which allows us to affirm that possible positions are actual.

Okay, but it's important to clarify that nothing belonging to the object exists prior to the object, nothing that's at all a property of the object, because the object in no way exists prior to the object. — Terrapin Station

This is where we disagree. I think that the haecceity, which belongs to the material object, and is specific to that particular object pre-exists the material object. I've produced my argument for this. You haven't yet supported your claim that nothing which is a property of the object could be prior to the object. That X is a property of Y at T2 does not exclude the possibility that X existed at T1 and Y did not.

So then we could say that the essence or haecceity of an object can exist prior to the object, in this particular, idiosyncratic sense of those terms, as long as people exist and they imagine that there could be something like a particular object (and then once an object obtains, people count it as that particular object), but this would only go for a very small percentage of objects (people don't pre-imagine most of the objects in the world), and it would only be the case that essence or haecceity exist prior to the object in question relative to the object in question. That is, essence or haecceity wouldn't precede existence in general/unqualified, because it turns out that people have to exist in order for them to imagine things. So existence comes first in general. In the history of the world, there's nothing like this sense of essence or haecceity until life begins and people evolve, so that we can have people who imagine objects and then who count objects that obtain or that they become aware of after their imagining, as the objects they imagined — Terrapin Station

That an idea of the object is prior to the object, was an example that I used, to show how "what" the object is may be prior to the object. All these things, "idea", "essence", "haecceity", are instances of "what" the object is. I am not saying that the haecceity is an idea, because clearly ideas depend on human existence, as you explain, and the haecceity precedes the existence of the object , as per the argument, so these two are not the same thing.

The issue though, is that the haeccity of each particular object is necessarily prior to that particular object, so by inductive reasoning we can conclude that haecceity is prior to all objects, in a general, and absolute sense.

As for existence in general, I would say that the haecceity exists, prior to the object, though altheist suggested that I switch "being" for "exists" here, which I explained, I think is a mistake. So existence in the most general sense might precede the haeceity of the object. (This is what allows theologians to say that God exists). But the point of the argument is to demonstrate that the haecceity, which is an immaterial, non-physical existent is prior to the physical existence of the object.

Here is a suggestion by which we might resolve the disagreement expressed at the beginning of this post. Let's assume that the haecciety is properly called "the object". "The haecceity" and "the object" refer to one and the same thing, object X. Then the object exists as the haecceity prior to having a physical presence as a material object. The material existence Y, is the property. Then we have a continuity of existence of the object, and at T1 the object X, has no material presence, but at T2 the object has a material presence, Y. At T1 X is only a haecceity, at T2, X has the property of material existence, Y.

Was Aristotle even a substance dualist? He thought the soul and body were of the same substance, so he couldn't be? — AcesHigh

I think Aristotle had the soul, which is a type of form, as the substance of a living body, and matter as the substance of an inanimate body.

No. The words refer to the idea you have, your imagination of it. — Terrapin Station

Call it what you like, "idea" of the object, "essence" of the object, "image" of the object, "what" the object is, it's all the same thing, just different names. The object does not yet exist, but its idea does. This exemplifies how it is not nonsense to say that the haecceity of the object exists, when the object itself does not yet exist. It exists prior to the object's existence in the same way that the idea of the object may exist prior to the object's existence.

Only real superposition states can cause real interference effects. — Andrew M

The interference effects are phenomenal. The phenomenon is described as possibilities. So the possibilities are epistemic. The possibilities are the epistemic representation of the phenomenon. We cannot invert this and say that the phenomenon is the actual existence of these possibilities, because the epistemic possibilities are simply a representation of the phenomenon. There is no principle which allows us to say that the phenomenon is the actual existence of the possibilities.

For example, we have an activity, a phenomenon, which is the flip of a coin. We can represent that as possibilities, one possibility of heads and one possibility of tails. We cannot invert this now, to say that the phenomenon which is the flipping of the coin, is the actual existence of both these two possibilities, such that in the flipping of the coin there exists the actuality of heads and also the actuality of tails. The fact that one cannot devise the means to determine the outcome, heads or tails, does not justify the claim that the phenomenon itself consists of the actuality of both the possibilities.

That's not what you're saying with "essence precedes existence," though, is it? — Terrapin Station

No, it's clearly not what I am saying, it's just an example of how it is not nonsense to talk about a thing prior to that thing's existence. In order that this is not nonsense, the words must refer to something, but the object itself does not exist. So the words refer to the object's essence, "what" the thing is. This indicates that what the thing is, is something other than the thing itself.

The haecceity of the thing, as a "what" the thing is, is also something other than the thing itself. And according to the argument presented earlier, the haecceity of the thing is prior to the thing itself.

It's unintelligible how the human mind skips the 99% of bad moves - without doing any calculation - and focuses on calculating just the 1% potentially useful moves. And yet, what the human mind does when it does this is intelligent - even though it appears foolish. — Agustino

I don't believe this to be unintelligible, it's a matter of habituation.

Yes it appears intelligent to me because I think it is good, even though I can't specify how it is good. — Agustino

I disagree with this. If a potential act appears good to you, and you can't say how, or why it is good, then I think it would be false to say that it appears like an intelligent act. That is exactly what separates an act which appears like an intelligent act, from one which just appears like a good act. if there is reason for the act, then it appears as an intelligent act. if you cannot find reason for the act, then it might still appear good, but it cannot appear as an intelligent act.

Not really. For example, I believe that Jesus Christ was resurrected from the dead as specified in the New Testament, and yet I maintain that such an event is incomprehensible and entirely unintelligible to me. Yet it appears intelligent to me to believe in it because it resonates with my soul - there's no real rational reason for it. — Agustino

Again, that "resonates with my soul" is not a matter of it appearing intelligent, it's a matter of emotion or some such thing. I think it is contradictory to say that an act, decision, or believe, appears intelligent, if there is absolutely no discernible reason for that act. On what basis would you say that it is an intelligent choice?

So what about MW does not make sense, or is mistaken, on your view? — Andrew M

It's a contradictory notion that all possible worlds are actual. In my understanding of possibilities, any possibility must be actualized before it can become an actuality. If all possible worlds are assumed to have actual existence, without a cause (source of actualization), then this is contradictory to my understanding of "possible".

I don't see any difference there. What you seem to be stuck on, is the fact that we can talk about properties which an object will have, prior to the object actually having those properties. So if I am putting new windows in my house, I can talk about my house's new windows, before I install them, or even order them. You want to make it sound improper to talk about my house's new windows prior to the time that the house actually has the new windows. But how would we ever get anything done if we can't talk about the thing to be done prior to doing it?

Is this for real? Is this for example about deception: — Agustino

Yes, that's exactly it. Kasparov is capable of deceiving the computer, the computer is not capable of deceiving Kasparov.

Explain this to me please. The act may be intelligent to me, but not also intelligible. For example, I don't understand how specifically it will help me, but yet I still believe it will, and hence it appears to be intelligent to me. — Agustino

If there is nothing to make the act appear intelligent to you, then the act is not intelligible to you. In that case, the act does not appear intelligent to you. If something makes the act appear intelligent, then by the very existence of this thing which you apprehend, the act is intelligible. So any act which appears intelligent to you, must appear so for some reason, and by virtue of this reason the act is intelligible.

Okay, but if the object in question only comes into existence at T2, then that particular object doesn't have its essence (or haecceity) at T1, right? — Terrapin Station

Correct, but the object's haecceity exists at T1. Now, you've told me that this makes no sense to you, the possibility that the haecceity of the object could exist prior to the object itself, so let's just refer to it as X. So at T1 X exists, and there is no object. At T2 there is an object which has X. At T2 you might call X the object's haecceity. But X at T1 is the very same thing as X at T2, so despite the fact that it doesn't seem right to you to call it the object's haecceity, because the object doesn't exist, nevertheless, it is the same thing as the object's haecceity, so why not call it what it is?

The haecceity doesn't come into existence as an object, the object comes into existence having a haecceity. What we are referring to is the object's haecceity. At T1 the haecceity exists, at T2 the object exists with that haecceity. The haecceity doesn't come into existence as an object, it's something the object has.

You are having difficulty because you refuse to consider the haecceity as something other than the object itself. But it is something other than the object, that is why one is called the object, and the other is called the haecceity

How does this follow? Nietzsche and me are challenging precisely this - that something has to be intelligible in order to be intelligent. I disagree - it doesn't. — Agustino

I was responding to this:

But acting unintelligibly isn't necessarily acting unintelligently. — Agustino

Along with your examples, what is being described here is deception, acting intelligently in a way so as the actions appear unintelligible.

This has nothing to do with hiding your true motives at all. I don't see how you'd draw that conclusion... In fact I do see how it follows. It follows only if we both accept the premise that what is intelligent must also be intelligible. — Agustino

Your conclusion only follows if there is a form of deceit which is impossible to be determined as deceit. If it is possible that the deceit may be exposed, then the intelligent act which appears to be unintelligible really is intelligible, and your claims are wrong.

And, as I said, the intelligent act is inherently intelligible to the one who is acting or else it would not be an intelligent act. Therefore the intelligent act is necessarily intelligible.

.

Tom especially, and even Andrew M to a somewhat lessor degree just don't seem to get this.

How is it deception? Why is it that an action is deceptive if it's not intelligible? It's deceptive only for the person who expects and demands that you act intelligibly, but to say so, is merely to assume that one should be the kind of logician Nietzsche criticises. — Agustino

You describe the act as "intelligent". Therefore it is inherently intelligible, even if it is only intelligible to the one carrying out the act. To present this act to another human being as unintelligible, is therefore to misrepresent it, and this is deception.

It is quite clear that what is at stake here is the issue of hiding your true motives from others, in your dealings with these people. Generally speaking (except in situations like I mentioned), this is morally reprehensible.

Ah--so you're just getting at the idea of platonic forms, basically? I don't at all buy that ontologically. Only dynamic structures/relations of matter exist, and they're all particulars. (I'm using "exist" there so that it encompasses everything there is in any sense.) So if there was haecceity, or essence, or anything like that, it would necessarily be dynamic structures/relations of matter. Or it would BE a particular object. In my ontology there are no (real) abstracts. Abstracts are concrete mental occurrences--that is, particular concepts held by individuals. — Terrapin Station

OK, so you're saying that the haecceity is dynamic structures/relations of matter. There's one peculiar problem with this perspective. Matter only exists as objects, and the haecceity of the object is necessarily prior to the object. This means that these relations which matter will have, when it comes into existence as objects, have some sort of existence prior to the matter itself. The relations which the matter will have when it comes into existence must exist as some sort of formula, which determines how the matter will exist, prior to the matter itself existing.

You can relate to this by referring to the so called "laws of nature" as describing these relations. In order that it is true that matter always, and necessarily behave according to the laws of nature, it is necessary that the laws of nature precede matter itself. Otherwise, when matter comes into existence, there would be no pre-existing laws of nature, and matter might not behave according to the laws of nature at this time. But this possibility must be ruled out if it is true that matter always, and necessarily behaves according to the laws of nature.

Which is what I'm referring to by (1) (It was my formulation after all!--you can't tell me what it was referring to contra what I had in mind!). There is no object to have haecceity prior to the object ___ing to have haecceity. (I used a "blank" because I don't want to fill in a word that you'll misunderstand--whatever you call it. The object has to ____ in order to have haecceity) — Terrapin Station

Right, we agree that there is no object to have haecceity prior to that object ___ing. Now, what necessitates your claim that the haecceity which the object has, is not prior to the object itself? My argument necessitates the conclusion that the object's haecceity is prior to the object itself.

As a nominalist, what's inexplicable is that anyone would have difficulty with why an object is that particular object versus whatever else it could be in their view.) — Terrapin Station

Well, we notice that objects exist as the particular objects which they are, and being philosophically minded, we want to know why this is the case. Perhaps as a nominalist this does not interest you?

There can't be a something of an object prior to there being the object in question. — Terrapin Station

When the object exists, it has something. We are calling this its haecceity. Why does it make no sense to say that the haecceity exists prior to the object having it? In fact, the argument presented proves that it is necessary to conclude that the haecceity exists prior to the object having it. Your only objection to the argument is that this "MAKES ABSOLUTELY NO FRIGGIN SENSE WHATSOEVER". Does it not make sense to you that my computer existed prior to me having it? Please, explain to me what I am missing, because it's you who's not making any sense whatsoever.

Right, you're saying that (1) obtains prior to the object coming to be, which is what makes it contradictory. There's no object to have an essence prior to the object coming to be. — Terrapin Station

No! (1) is the existence of the object., the object with essence, or as you say "haecceity". Prior to the existence of the object (object + haecceity) there is only the haecceity of the object, which is necessary in order that the object comes into being as the object which it is, and not something else. Where's the contradiction?

That's better known as haecceity. If in your definition, "essence" is the same as "haecceity" I'd say that there is "Metaphysician Undercover 'essence'," but I'd add that's it's incoherent to say that it's anything other than the object itself, so it can't exist (or subsist, or whatever tortured verbiage we'd need to use to refer to it) aside from the object, and I'd also add that it's every single property of the object itself (which makes it not map well to "essence" in its conventional definition rather than your definition). — Terrapin Station

OK great, we have a term we can agree on then, haecceity (my spell-check doesn't like that, but I'll go with it). You can assert that the haecceity is nothing other than the object itself, but go back to the argument I first presented, replace "essence" with "haecceity", and tell me how it is not necessary to conclude that the haecceity of the object precedes the existence of the object itself.

That I don't at all agree with. I wouldn't say that we reproduce it at all, and we certainly wouldn't reproduce every single property of it. Rather than reproducing it, we perceive it (from a particular reference point only), we either file it with respect to concepts we've already formulated and/or we formulate new concepts about it, etc. — Terrapin Station

Do we perceive the haecceity, or do we perceive the essence?

You'd not be able to reproduce every single property of it. — Terrapin Station

Yes, that's exactly the case, and that's why the essence of the object (which is what exists within one's mind), is not the same thing as the haecceity of the object, which is inherent within the object. Now the question is, is it not necessary to assume that the haecceity of the object is prior to the existence of the object itself? If the object comes into existence in time, which is what the argument assumes, then it is necessary to conclude that the haecceity precedes the object in time, in order that the object will come into existence as the object which it does come into existence as, and not something else. If you remove this necessity, then there will be no object coming into existence, only randomness.

Take other examples. Someone falling prey to his cognitive biases may consistently perform action X better than someone who doesn't. Yet this seems befuddling and strange - indeed unintelligible. But acting unintelligibly isn't necessarily acting unintelligently. This raises a significant problem. We typically consider our actions, and plan our life whether in mundane affairs, or in more daring goals - at least in modern society - by attempting to be intelligible at all costs. But if what is unintelligible isn't necessarily unintelligent, then does it not follow that we are cutting ourselves off from options which may be intelligent? How must we change the way we operate in order to profit, rather than be harmed from unintelligibility? — Agustino

What you describe here is nothing more than deception, and we should all be very wary of any claim that deception is good. Any time we act intelligently, but our actions are made to appear unintelligible, this is an act of deception. Yes, this procedure is acceptable in strategies of some game playing, and also strategies of war, where there is a real enemy. But the moral status of profiting from unintelligibility in our day to day communion with others is very suspicious, if not downright wrong.

Again, I don't want to quibble over Descartes - it's really not important, that's not the topic of this thread. Descartes served merely as an example - merely as the representative figure for modern philosophy - he's not known as the Father of it for nothing is he? — Agustino

When your examples fail to exemplify what they are intended to make example of, then it's time to reassess that principle which the example was meant to elucidate. Perhaps the principle was produced from a misinterpretation, if the relationship between the example and the principle demonstrates a misunderstanding.

This is akin to saying that the heliocentric model makes accurate predictions but it's an ad hoc assumption to suppose the model implies that the earth orbits the sun. — Andrew M

This is a good example, the model follows from the success of prediction. So let's say that the successful predictions lead to a Many Worlds model. Now, it's when the model which is necessitated by the successful math, does not make sense, as is the case with MW, that we have to turn back to the principles whereby the mathematics is applied, to see where the mistakes are.

The geocentric model followed from very successful mathematics and predictions. Yes the mathematics was more primitive at that time, but the predictions were very successful. However, the model did not make sense. There were too many issues which could not be worked out to complete the model. The model was missing many aspects necessary to be complete and coherent, as is the case with MW. So we have to go back to the principles which underlie the application of the mathematics to determine why the very successful mathematics produces an unacceptable model.

(1) is the object being something--an object with an essence. So (2) contradicts (1). — Terrapin Station

Sure, if I am referring to the same time, that would be a contradicton, but I'm not. That's the whole point of the argument. It was stated in the argument: "When a particular object comes into existence..." So it is very clear that I am assuming a time prior to the existence of the object. It is a temporal argument, assuming certain things about time and objects, namely that objects come into existence in time.

I'm an anti-realist on essences. Essences are merely a way we think about objects--basically they're our conceptual abstractions, our universals/type categories. So yeah, that's different than an object itself, since objects themselves have no essences. — Terrapin Station

OK, this is why you're having difficulty understanding, you are not apprehending that an object itself necessarily has an essence. I didn't realize that you didn't grasp this necessary part of the argument. In fact, the whole argument refers to the essence which inheres within the object, not an essence within someone's mind.

Do you agree that each and every object is distinguishable from every other object? There is something, or some things, about each object which makes it other than every other object. This is "what the object is", and we call that its essence. The essence is inherent within the object itself, and this is what makes the object itself, what it is, and not some other object.

When we come to know the object, we reproduce that essence within our minds, then we claim to know what the object is. But this is a reproduction of the object's essence, just like the visual image of the object, within your mind, is a reproduction. This reproduction of the essence is not the same thing as the essence which inheres within the object, or else we'd have to conclude that the object is within the person's mind when the person knows the object. But there must be an essence within the object or else there would be nothing which would allow us to distinguish one object from another.

Well you sure haven't succeeded. Where's the contradiction? You clearly refer to "an object with an essence". Do you, or do you not agree that the essence of the object is something other than the object itself?

Of course directly shared experience might be nonsense, but experience is obviously shared via language or we would be unable to communicate effectively about anything. — John

Ok. now you introduce a thing called language, and language is related to ideas and universals, as well as the experiences of individuals. But language is not experience, nor is it ideas. or universals. So you introduce all these different terms as if one is supposed to resolve the meaning of the other, but the way you introduce them is just mumbo jumbo.

Personally I think your analyses are anything but true, but if you are happy with them, that's up to you. — John

What do you mean by a "true" analysis? Analysis is to break something down into its composite elements. If the thing is simple, and cannot be broken down, then the attempted analysis is misguided. But to claim that things like inter-subjectivity, and shared experience, are fundamental and cannot be broken down for analysis is simply ridiculous.

Yes, now do you see the point? An object is always an object with an essence, so the essence is separable from the object. Now go back to the argument, where you originally engaged me, to see why it is necessary to conclude that the object's essence exists prior to the object itself.

There is no point continuing this, I think. You insist that something must be either internal or external; subjective or objective. I don't think in those terms; for me objectivity consists only in inter-subjectivity; which is neither external nor internal. I don't see knowledge as merely the "experience of subjects" that is your prejudicial reading of what I have said; I see knowledge as the shared experience of subjects. — John

You're just refusing to justify you terms, inter-subjectivity, and shared experience of subjects. I do not think that it is possible that my experience is shared by you. You bring up these notions in order to avoid a true analysis, and then make the unwarranted claim that a true analysis of things like ideas is impossible. These things are just a "shared experience". But shared experience is incoherent nonsense.

What I will say though is that the idea is not rightly thought of as an object, the ideas cannot be objectified, because then this leads to the familiar silly questions about 'where they exist', 'is the idea of green itself green', 'is there a perfect form of ugliness' and so on. The point is we can talk about beauty, goodness and truth in terms of how they are in our lives, how we think about them, how we feel them, what kinds of experiences they are associated with, an so on, without having to explain what they are in themselves, or worrying about the question as to whether they are in themselves; without, that is without objectifying them. — John

The problem is that these ideas do become objectified in epistemology. Most epistemologies hold that some knowledge is objective, and therefore certain ideas such as mathematical and geometrical principles are objective. Whether one justifies this objectivity by referring to some Platonic Forms, or by referring to some conventions, rules, or agreements, these both are assumed to have some sort of existence external to the human mind, and that's what justifies knowledge as objective.

In the next paragraph you go on about a "difficulty" with the very idea of "the way we use words", which I presume would be extended to 'how we experience things', and refer to this idea as an "unjustified generalizations". All this seems to completely contradict what you were saying in the first paragraph. — John

The difficulty is that you made these generalizations, "the way we use words", yet you didn't seem to allow for any objectivity to such generalizations. So the point was to show the difficulty in your position. I have been allowing for real objective existence of these universals, so the difficulty does not apply to my position. This generalization, "the way we use words", may be a real objective idea, if you allow that ideas exist as objects.

Now I do agree that we are each unique and that there are differences in how we use words and experience things. But there are also commonalities, and when we refer to conventional usage we are certainly referring to "something outside our individual minds"; I haven't anywhere denied this. The point is that the phrase "the way we use words" as I intended to use it refers to just theses conventional usages, so it seems you have completely misunderstood what i have been saying. You say the conventional ways we use words, being external to our minds, do not reflect the "way we think about them" because the latter is "something within our minds". I think this is greatly mistaken. We learn languages consisting of conventional usages; we introject these languages, and so, of course, they come to mediate, if not completely determine, what and how we think. There is no clear and coherent delineation between what is 'outside' and what is 'inside' our minds. — John

By conflating what is inside and what is outside of our minds, you deny the possibility of establishing good epistemic principles for separating subjective and objective. So, back to my original point. Once we establish that these things, ideas, have real objective existence, and this is demonstrated by the existence of objective knowledge, then we can analyze them as real objective things, objects, and that means more than just experience which is purely subjective. You however seem insistent on the notion that they are nothing other than how individuals think. Until you release this notion, and see them as real objects, which form the basis of objective knowledge, you will not be able to see knowledge as anything more than the experience of subjects. You have no grounds for an epistemology of objective knowledge.

If there's an object with an essence, than the object is something (an object with an essence). — Terrapin Station

Yes, all objects have an essence. That's what makes any particular object intelligible to us, its essence. And each particular object has a particular essence, which makes it the particular object which it is. The argument is meant to demonstrate that the essence of the object necessarily precedes the existence of the object.

I still suggest that using the term "existence" in these two different senses is counterproductive. I would say, instead, that the essence of the object has being separate from the object prior to the object's existence--i.e., esse in futuro. This also avoids the objection that the essence of the object must itself be an (existing) object; the mode of its (real) being is not actual, it is potential. — aletheist

I agree that it may be confusing to some, to conceive of two distinct categories of "existence", but I don't see how using "being" instead of "existence" helps. In fact, the ancient Greeks contrasted being with not being. Then there was "becoming", and becoming was excluded from reality by logic and the law of excluded middle. This gave great fuel to sophistry. So Aristotle allowed for exceptions to the law of excluded middle, such that becoming could be allowed entrance into logical reality. In Latin, "existence" became the more general term, such that being and becoming are different modes of existence, just like actual and potential, and this allows that there are existents which are immaterial as well as existents which are material.

So I think that the move to insert "being" instead of "existence" is a step in the wrong direction due to the fact that being is often opposed to non-being. Then becoming is of a different category from being, and this is a category which does not consist of opposing terms. If we have being and non-being, as well as existence and non-existence, and also becoming, then it all gets more complicated than necessary..

First, that's just a claim--it's not really an argument. — Terrapin Station

Sure, all definitions are claims, you have to start somewhere with your argument, it's called a premise. If you don't like what I refer to as the essence of a particular thing, then don't accept it. That's fine, we don't really have anything to discuss here then.

If essence is "what an object is," then it's contradictory to say that "what an object is" obtains prior to the object existing. — Terrapin Station

No, that's not true at all. There's a difference between an object's essence and an object's existence. This difference allows us to talk about non-existent things. We refer to what that thing is, without the thing existing. So if I'm planning to build a house, I can talk about that house even though it doesn't exist. You are just attempting to make syntactical difficulty by not respecting tense, in the sense of "what will be".

An object can't be something prior to that object coming to be. That would be the case just as well under strong determininsm. — Terrapin Station

That's right, an object can't be anything prior to coming to be. That's not what we're discussing. What we're discussing is the essence of that object. The essence of the object is known to be separable from the object itself, that's what we do in abstraction, separate the essence from the existence of the object. Since we know that the essence of the object is separable through abstraction, there is nothing inconsistent, nonsensical, or incoherent, about the proposition that the essence of the object has existence separate from the object prior to the object's existence.

"What object x is prior to object x existing" is simply incoherent nonsense. — Terrapin Station

It isn't what "object x is prior to object x existing", it is what object x will be. You're just making a misrepresentation so that you can say that it's nonsense. But clearly it's not nonsense to speak about the house I will be building, before it's built. if you don't have respect for the fact that we can speak about an object prior to that object's existence, then we clearly have nothing more to discuss.

What would be the motivation for positing additional subsistents (or whatever you want to call them), one per particular, that existents then fulfill by existing? In other words, why in the world would anyone believe that? — Terrapin Station

I think it's quite obvious to anyone with formal training in philosophy, that we understand things by understanding the form, or essence of the thing, what the thing is. That's what comes to the mind as a visual image, a form of the object. If there wasn't something particular about each thing, its essence, which we could abstract, and hold within our minds, how would we ever individuate between one object and another?

I disagree with that however. First off I disagree with saying that what the object is has anything to do with "essence." You could, however, be saying that you're just defining "essence" as "what an object is," without any of the other typical associations that "essence" has, and that would be fine, but in that case, saying that what an object is must precede the object's existence makes no sense. The object can't be whatever it is prior to it being something (existing) in the first place. — Terrapin Station

Yes, that's how I define "essence", basically as what the object is. It is the traditional way, from Aristotle. Each object has it's own particular properties, and this is its essence, referring to exactly what it is. In a different way, we use "essence" as the essential properties of an object, for classification. So in abstraction we separate essential from accidental properties to produce the essence of "a book" for example. But any particular book, to be the book that it is, it is necessary that all its properties are essential, this is the essence of that particular book.

I am not saying that the object exists as what it is, prior to its own existence, I am saying that its essence exists prior to its existence. So the argument is that the something which the object will be, and this is its form or essence, must be prior to the thing itself. It's a simple principle, well adopted by determinism, what the object will be when it comes into existence is predetermined. But we can ditch the determinism when we give reality to this form or essence which must precede the object, and analyze the existence of this pre-existent form.

This seems to me like it's probably buying that substances separate from properties can make sense (which is something I disagree with). — Terrapin Station

I think that what is the case here, is that you disagree with the idea of separate forms. Because of this you deny the argument which demonstrates the necessity to assume separate forms. You will probably continue in your refusal to understand the argument because it proves wrong, what you currently believe.

How do we analyze beauty, goodness and truth other than by analyzing the way we think about them. which includes the way we use the words, as you already said? The way we use the words reflects what we think about them, that is how we judge them to be in our lives. Can you think of any other way to analyze them? — John

Analyzing the way that we use the words is only the beginning in Platonic dialectics. From this analysis we can come to the conclusion that there must be a real object referred to by these words, to validate their use. This object is the idea. Have you read Plato's Symposium? Once we come to understand the ideas as objects, we can analyze the objects themselves, attempting to understand what type of existence they have.

Here's a brief explanation of the difficulty involved with the way you are describing things. You say "the way we use the words", and "what we think". By using "we", you have already made an unjustified generalization. In reality, I use words, and I think , and so do you. There is no such thing as "the way we use words", because we each use them in our own ways. In order to make this generalization which you propose, we must assume some conventions, rules, agreements, or some such thing, to justify the claim that there is such a thing as "the way we use words". But if this is the case, then "the way we use words" refers to these agreements, and that is something outside of our minds, in between us, and therefore not "what we think about them" which is something within our minds.

But the point of naturalism is to try to explain things without the use of other-worldy, "supernatural" forces. There is no supernaturalism required to explain the existence of planes - humans created them. All x must come from not-x. So far so good. So "LIFE" cannot come from life. It had to start somewhere. And so Life came from non-Life. And yet what is this non-Life? — darthbarracuda

I follow a traditional definition of "natural", which opposes natural to artificial. Therefore an artificial thing is not natural. If someone wants to say that all things which a re not natural are supernatural, this would make artificial things supernatural, for me. I would prefer to allow more than one class of non-natural things, artificial and supernatural.

The naturalist will say it came from inorganic matter. The supernaturalist will say it came from something else, like a god or something. But this is a clear case of simple ignorance. Naturalism doesn't have to know everything, it merely has to say "I don't know" and try its best to figure it out. Whereas alternatives are simply god-of-the-gaps arguments. — darthbarracuda

The point I was making is that the quote provided by Wayfarer boldly stated "Vitalism is plan wrong", and offered that woefully inadequate proof. To say vitalism is wrong, is not the same thing as to say what you claim here, "I don't know". It is to "I know" your position is wrong.

Aristotle identified what he called the potencies of the soul, or the powers of the soul, some of which are the power of self-nutrition, the power of self-movement, the power of sensation, and the power of intellection. Lower level living things have only developed some of these powers, higher level ones have them all. He produced demonstrative argumentation for why these must be considered potentialities rather than actualities. Furthermore, he produced argumentation as to why such potentialities must be supported by something underlying, substantial, actual, and this he called the soul. I believe it is Aristotelian biology which supports vitalism.

To dismiss vitalism in the manner proposed within the quoted article would require demonstrating how such potentialities could come into existence naturally, without requiring the underlying actuality, the soul. Another way would be to demonstrate that these potencies are not really potencies at all, they are actualities disguised as potencies, which Aristotle misinterpreted as potencies. The problem with naturalist arguments is that they are very confused, without clear premises or logical proceedings. They are generally. as the one quoted above, appeals to emotion.

The Aristotelian arguments are much stronger than modern naturalist arguments, because they begin from clear premises of categorical separation between potentialities and actualities. The need for this categorical separation is well explained and documented. Then he proceeds to classify things according to these principles, and follows clear logic when coming to conclusions.

Lamarck's not done for yet - he passed some of his characteristics on to later generations ;). — Wayfarer

Lamarck's "Zoological Philosophy: Exposition with Regard to the Natural History of Animals" (1809) is a very good read. I'd recommend it to anyone with an interest in life on earth; that should include most people. Unlike Darwin, who concentrates on physical features, Lamarck includes detailed descriptions of the activities of living things, and being a "philosophy", the book persistently questions "why?". "Habituation", in the context of the Aristotelian/Thomistic concept of habit, as what a living being has, its properties (check the etymology of "habit"), becomes a central theme.

There is a principle of inversion required to understand Aristotelian biology. In hie physics, matter makes up the underlying substance. Matter is passive, but it necessarily has form, and form is active. We find the properties of matter within the form. When we proceed to his biology, we go to a further level of substance, beneath matter, which is explained in his metaphysics as necessary to substantiate the existence of matter itself.

The underlying substance in his biology, is the soul, which is an active form. The properties of the soul are potencies, powers, which are inherently passive, inactive, material, but are activated by the living soul, in the activities of living. So there is a very important inversion. In physics, matter is the substance and its properties are the active form. In biology, the soul, as an active form, is the substance, and its properties are the passive matter which comprise the habits of the soul. The inversion is necessary to account for the fact that the principal source of activity in the living being is within, while in physics we describe activities in terms of external causation.