Oh sorry Augustino. I missed the whole interview. I read the first part, thought it was the end of the article, and lost interest. I'll read the rest and get back to you.

Damn, I liked that vulture. I thought it represented the new (and improved?) you.

The point of the article was that "words" are actually physical sounds. So they are not representations at all. — Agustino

That's not at al what the article actually says:

So, direct perception of sights and sounds in the world outside the body are very quickly ordered and colored by language inside our heads. “Once a thing is conceived in the mind,” wrote the poet Horace in the first century BC, “the words to express it soon present themselves.” And we call this thinking. All our experience can be reshuffled, interconnected, dissected, evoked, or willfully altered in language, and these thoughts are then stored in our brains.

Notice in particular the phrases "language inside our heads", and "we call this thinking".

So when I hear "apple", I experience the idea of apple - because there is a constant conjunction, due to habit, between hearing apple (experience 1) and feeling the conjoined properties of an actual apple, however vague (experience 2). So we're back to the Humean understanding where there are impressions and ideas (which are nothing but copies of impressions). Otherwise, we have the problem of explaining how it is that a sound can represent a taste + a sight + all the rest. — Agustino

This is actually where the obfuscation is, because the article is talking about words within our heads. Now you have jumped immediately to what the words are associated with in our minds, instead of considering what the author wants us to consider, and that is the existence of the words themselves within our minds.

The rest of your post, concerning individuation is irrelevant now, because individuation is already implied, as a necessary condition, for the existence of words in our heads. The words exist as individuals within our minds, and we can scramble them around creating different combinations in the process of thinking. What any particular word is associated with, what you call the "impression", is dependent on the combinations which one creates by scrambling the words around in one's head.

Memory itself is another obfuscation. All that I mean by memory is precisely the habit of experiencing an actual apple however vaguely, everytime I hear the sound "apple". So memory is formed precisely of this constant conjunction - that is what memory is. Now the real question is why is there such a constant conjunction through time? Just cause our mind associates impressions that occur together with each other? And if so, what is this "mind" of ours, and why does it happen to have this property to associate impressions? — Agustino

You don't seem to apprehend the fact that the mind creates these associated impressions. So any such "constant conjunction through time", is just what the mind has created, and it need not be constant. This is very evident from the fact that an individual's memory of a certain event will change as time passes, such that an event from last week will be remembered in a particular way, but if the person still remembers that event in thirty years from now, the memory will most likely not be the same. That is because to remain the same, the memory must be recollected in the exact same way each time.

The description of memory as "a constant conjunction through time", therefore is not accurate. Memory is better described in terms of repetition. We repeat to ourselves, often using words, over and over again, what has happened, and this is the act of remembering. So memory is really an habitual act. The fact that our memories change over time indicates that memory is not a case of putting something somewhere and later recollecting it, it is a case of knowing how to reproduce that activity of recollecting.

I don't really see the point. Words in the mind are representations of the physical things. This makes them memories. If the question is where are memories, or how do memories exist, then this is a larger issue, one without an adequate answer. And it's not even close to being answered because we have no adequate understanding of the difference between the past (memories) and the future (anticipations).

So the use of words within the mind is an application of the past (memories) toward the future (anticipation). And we really have no idea of how memories differ from anticipations because we have no idea of how the past differs from the future. Focusing on the existence of words in the mind, which is clearly a unity of memory and anticipation will only enhance the ambiguity and confusion which exists in relation to this issue.

For example - individuation. Individuation - that we see experiences as individual, and separate from one another, that we can even make such distinctions as red, blue, etc. - we don't get this concept from any one experience, or any multitude of experiences. Instead, in order to have more than one experience in the first place, individuation already must be possible. — Agustino

I agree that individuation, or the capacity to individuate, is necessarily prior to the capacity to use words, and therefore prior to language in general. This is evident from the fact that in order to understand a statement we need to be able to individuate the words. Despite the fact that the statement is understood as a comprehensive "whole", this is a synthesis which only follows from analysing the parts individually and their relations to the other parts.

This appears to be a reflection of how we understand the world around us in general. We recognize, and come to understand individual things, objects, which though they are recognized as individuals, we still apprehend them as parts of a whole, so we proceed to understand their relationships with other individual objects. Since we apprehend the individuals as parts of a whole, we are driven to recreate that whole, as "the world", or "the universe", in synthesis, to further our understanding, just like we recreate "the statement" as a whole.

What people often fail to grasp is that the whole "the world" or 'the universe", which is referred to by these words is synthetic in this sense. We always understand composites by breaking them down into parts, then rebuilding the relationships in conceptual form, so that our understanding of such unities is always backward to their natural occurrence. It is always based in an analysis or deconstruction of the object, and this is backward to the creation of the object.

If two different things experience time in two different ways, this does not mean that one of them does not experience time at all. If we know that different types of living things experience time in different ways, why not allow that inanimate things also experience time in a different way? It comes down to a question of what do you mean by "experience"? If you mean "to observe and remember", then I don't think that rocks experience duration. But if you mean "to be affected by", then I think that rocks experience duration.

Notice that if you are hard determinist then "observe and remember" is reducible to "to be affect by" and then there is no real separation between the way a rock experiences duration and the way that a human being experiences duration.

No, I mean why wouldn't you think that a rock could experience duration but not be able to tell you about that experience? We would think that other animals experience duration but can't tell you about it. Probably even plants experience duration, and can't tell you about it. So why not a rock?

What about that vulturing image of you? That's pretty dank.

Only the mind can experience duration, unless you have communicated with a rock who told you otherwise. — Rich

Why would you have to be able to communicate to experience duration?

Then in the Enlightenment rejection of religion and metaphysics, a lot of what was fundamental to that spiritual - or really 'sapiential' dimension- was also rejected. The baby was thrown out with the bathwater. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is a problem isn't it? There is wholesale rejection of religion, and along with that, a rejection of the spirituality and metaphysics which supported the religion.

On the contrary, metaphysics isn't a vague, speculative, relativist subject. Definite uncontroversial statements can be made. Definitions need to be well-specified and consistently-used. Statements need to be supported. — Michael Ossipoff

I think the problem is that metaphysics is a very specific field of study, which like any other field of study requires proper training. The trend today is to have people with little or no training in metaphysics venturing into metaphysical speculations, so many of these speculations, though they may appeal to the whims of the public, have very little real metaphysical value. This appears to coincide with the phenomenon of mathematicians and physicists who can't make sense of the reality of quantum mechanics, seeking metaphysical principles in an undisciplined way.

Ahhh...New Year resolutions...we'll see... — Janus

Wayfarer says stuff like:

I am taking an extended break from Philosophy Forum.... — Wayfarer

all the time

Sure,in Aristotelian physics, for Aristotelian physics, but what is that to the baseball player who is concerned with the matter of the bat, the ball, the glove, the grass? — tim wood

To the average person, (that is unless one starts to think about exploding elephants and things like that), the concept of matter has no relevance.

Is this Aristotle's definition? Why not? I'm sure it worked for him, although I am convinced he recognized its deficiencies as well as anyone. — tim wood

If you think that you can account for the temporal continuity of existence, in a way that is less deficient than the concept of matter, then be my guest. But I suggest that this has already been approached with the concept of energy. And since "matter" and "energy" are both derived from the same fundamental assumptions regarding temporal continuity, they both suffer from the same deficiencies. Simply put, we do not understand the temporal continuity of physical existence.

But it says really nothing about what matter is. — tim wood

That's the thing with matter, there is no such thing as what it is, as we must allow that the same matter can be something different at each moment of passing time, to account for the fact that things change as time passes. Matter itself doesn't have a "what it is",so any attempt to say "what matter is", is a mistaken enterprise right off the bat. But we can start to glean an understanding of matter by studying the existence of forms in space and time. For example, in the exploding elephant clip, you can see that when expressed in terms of amount of energy per area of space, it requires a exponentially larger amount of energy to maintain material existence (temporal continuity) of a small object, as it does to maintain the material existence (temporal continuity) of a large object.

Matter is not a well-defined term, and it's probably useless to try to reconcile differing definitions/understandings of matter. — tim wood

Matter is actually quite well defined in Aristotelian physics, as the underlying thing which persists through time, when change occurs. It allows that continuity is real. Modern definitions are just branchings from the original which have emerged following Newton's first law of motion, inertia. Newton's first law, leaves that underlying thing which doesn't change, matter, as something mysterious, because it creates the illusion that all aspects of matter can be understood in terms of motion. But the existence matter itself (under the Aristotelian definition) is taken for granted and therefore left unexplained, and mysterious.

The issue that the video is discussing is one of the most important in physics - classical physics, in this case, not quantum - the scaling relation between geometry and force or energy. It's simple because it all comes down to basic geometry. — T Clark

The issue is that we scale and practise geometry with immaterial concepts. And we apply the immaterial concepts to material existence. There is something missing in our applications, which is demonstrated by the difficulties of scaling in actual practise. What is missing is a proper understanding of matter.

Of course, proponents of this view would not be much discouraged by your exploding elephant - they would just push "matter" to lower, sub-cellular scales (as, of course, has long since been done in the normal process of scientific reductionism). — SophistiCat

This is exactly the problem, how is matter scaled? By its defining terms, it cannot be scaled because an object's form is always what is measured.

And what role does this inert, formless "matter" play in all this? It seems like a useless kludge, and we should rid our thinking of it. — SophistiCat

As I explained, "matter" accounts for the temporal continuity of existence. You can replace "matter" with "energy", but this does not make the problem go away, it just reaffirms it, as is evident in quantum mechanics.

The idea is this: that form and function are intimately related, and that form cannot be thought about in any way separately from the immanent conditions which shape it. The 'form' we're talking about here of course, is size. — StreetlightX

My opinion is that what is at issue here is the nature of matter. It is not properly an issue of form, though it may be best described as an issue of the relationship between matter and form. Matter, or energy, is how we understand the temporal continuity of existence. The common place perspective seems to be that matter is some sort of tiny indivisible particle which make up all objects. But this is a misunderstanding, because matter is really the thing which allows any size of an object to have temporal continuity, as the object which it is. Since matter is just this one fundamental principle of temporal continuity, then all the matter of a big object, and all the matter of a small object, must be exactly the same in relation to the object's form, which is what the object is.

What the video clip shows is that there is a strange relationship between the inside of an object, and the outside of an object. The matter of the object is an internal property rather than external, so temporal continuity (which expresses the existence of an object) is different from where there is no object (no expression of temporal continuity). Now when matter is expressed as a quantity, a size (a form), an exponential relationship develops between what is of the object and what is not of the object, due to the fact that real temporal continuity is of the object, and not of the surrounding "space" which is a conceptual construct. So, when this relationship with respect to a big object is compared to this relationship with respect to a small object, the difference is revealed significant, and very strange, by the exponential values. The difference referred to here, being the difference between the temporal extension of a real object, and the temporal extension of the assumed surrounding space (conceptual temporal extension). But the exposed strangeness here, in this relationship, is completely the result of quantifying matter (temporal extension), representing it as a form.

What we can conclude is that although we can refer to temporal continuity with the one term, "matter", or "energy", the temporal continuity of a very tiny object is completely different from the temporal continuity of a very large object. The relationship between these two is very strange. And when we try to express this relationship in terms of form, (quantify this relationship), we do not have the tools necessary, because we do not properly understand how the temporal continuity of a large object relates to the temporal continuity of a small object.. And this is exactly what quantum mechanics has already demonstrated to us, that how we understand the temporal continuity of a larger object is inadequate for understanding the temporal continuity of very tiny objects..

I'm not sure how to precisely articulate my thought about this, but I will try.
I will start with an assumption: We evolved or were designed for a certain kind of environment; a hunter gatherer lifestyle, and for sake of argument, I say that is how we ought to be as it means to be more "human", "one with nature". (not going to try back that up, just an idea) — ehnicma

I think there is something wrong with this premise. You are describing "human" as something evolved. But then you are suggesting that there is definable state "being human", which is the state that we ought to be in. This implies that you think evolution ought to end at this state. It appears like you think that what you define as "human" ought to be the end of evolution. Why would you believe this? Do you think that the human being is the best possible being?

if God is the being that than which nothing greater can be conceived, the implication is the God must be infinitely great, so infinity does exist. — The Curiorist

I don't agree with this. To say "that than which nothing greater can be conceived", is to limit conception, and this is to deny infinity. So that stated premise is a premise which limits conception, denying infinity. It says that infinity cannot be conceived.

The argument is over what kind of mathematical relation defines a logical dichotomy - a dichotomy being a relation that is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.

MU wants to treat is as simple negation. A and not-A. The presence of some thing, and then its absence or its erasure. But that is question-begging as it doesn't go to any mutuality that could form the two poles of being, nor to the way the two poles then demonstrably exhaust all other possibilities. — apokrisis

Wow, I see you really don't read my posts.

Time is not a separate thing we have deduced from empiricism, it is the description we have attached to our observation. — The Curiorist

But that is not at all the case. We describe things. We describe things changing. We do not describe time. And from those descriptions we make deductions about time.

It is evident that change occurs in the world and this we call time. — The Curiorist

Change is not what we call time Change is change, and time is time, these are two different things. Take for instance a case when you would use "time" and try replacing it with "change". What time is it? How much time until we leave? Take your time. Etc.. To replace "time" with "change" is nonsense, and so it is nonsense to say that change is what we call time.

Symmetry-breaking is clearly categorically different from symmetry. But asymmetry is nothing other than a weak-ass negation of symmetry.

So the metaphysical question would be what kind of a thing is "symmetry-breaking", which allows it to be completely different from both symmetry and asymmetry?

can watch things change right now. Time at the very least is empirical. — Marchesk

I don't think that's the case. You watch things change, and you deduce that time has passed. In that case time isn't strictly empirical, it's theoretical, "if things change then time has passed".

It's very difficult to have any rational discussion with you because you show no respect for conventional use of the English language. Asymmetry is as simple lack of symmetry. It is nothing other than a weak-ass negation. Therefore, there's no sense to your claim that you're talking about something other than a weak-ass negation.

This is what I meant in the last post. You keep insisting that you are talking about something beyond negation. So I suggest category difference. You agree, yes we're talking about category difference. But instead of proceeding to talk about category difference, you attempt to bring category difference down and stuff it into a category of negation (asymmetry). So you continue to insist that you're beyond weak-ass negation, while all you do you is use terms of weak-ass negation, instead of using terms of category difference, which would indicate that you actually were thinking beyond weak-ass negation.

These examples you've chosen are weak and easily reversed differences. They are symmetry-breakings of the same scale - anti-symmetries - and so can quickly erase each other. A metaphysical dichotomy is a full-blown asymmetry. The outcomes look to be orthogonal and as unrelated as possible. The relationship is reciprocal or inverse, not merely additive/subtractive. — apokrisis

I was just going by what you said. You said a categorical difference is a difference of opposition. Orthogonal is a completely different concept from opposition.

No. It is the separation that produces the familiar list of metaphysically opposed types.

Aristotle's categories were a bunch of dichotomies - quality~quantity, active~passive, time~space, symmetry~symmetry-breaking, particular~universal. — apokrisis

But none of these differences are differences of opposition. How can you call quality~quantity a difference of opposition?

This is your typical mode of argument. You'll insist that dichotomies are oppositions. I'll say that they are categorical differences. You'll give a bunch of examples, like this, which clearly demonstrate that dichotomies are not oppositions, but categorical differences. Then you'll go back to talking about dichotomies as oppositions, ignoring everything we've discussed.

Minds have purposes, life has functions, and physics has tendencies. — apokrisis

So if minds have purpose, and physics has tendencies, how do you get to your principle, that purpose regulates dynamism?

"Imagine" being the operative word.

That's exactly the question. And it remains unanswered. But you might also ask how does a plant remember anything when it doesn't have a brain.

Actually MItchell is correct, in the early Church there was no tolerance for individual opinion - the believer was expected to accept the dogma and to participate exactly according to the rules of the orthodox — Wayfarer

In the early times, as today, there were different branches of Christianity. The fact that there were attempts by some to establish orthodoxy, such as the councils of Nicaea is clear evidence of this. These attempts were driven by some members who saw a need for a higher degree of unity. That the result of these attempts was a plurality of creeds and a plurality of orthodoxies, indicates that this need was not a top priority.

I think the concept of the individual person was barely developed in the ancient world. — Wayfarer

Of course you know, from previous discussions, that I strongly disagree with this. The "individual person" was very important to Plato. He developed the concept of the tripartite soul. Prior to Plato there was a dualism of body and soul. Plato saw that the mind had the capacity to rule the body. An example he uses is that a thirsty man will not drink the water, if the water is not known to be good. But the separation between mind and body, eternal Forms and temporal existence, cannot be absolute. As modern monists argue, with such an absolute separation, the eternal cannot interact with the temporal. So Plato posited "spirit" or "passion" as the intermediary. Under Plato's design, the spirit can go either way. If the person is well-tempered, it will ally with the mind, to control the body according to principles of reason. But if the person has a corrupted soul, the spirit allies with the body to taint the mind.

The point being that Plato designed his Republic according to his description of the individual. He produced this description of the tripartite soul, the individual, then modeled his state to be a representation of a well-tempered individual. The state has three classes corresponding to the three parts of the individual, the rulers (philosophers, intellectuals, thinkers) the guardians ( nobles, army, police), and the providers (tradespeople, craftspeople, farmers).

If you read Plato's Republic, you will see that he goes through a progression of different forms of government. He provides an understanding of the form of government by comparing it to a type of person. So Plato's understanding of governance is derived from an understanding of individuals. This is important, because an understanding of morality in general must be derived from an understanding of the individual. So the best forms of governance are the ones based in the best understanding of the individual. If you read St. Augustine, especially "On free Will", and "On The Trinity", you will find an understanding of the individual which is far more comprehensive than anything in modern philosophy. Morality is something which of late has been simply taken for granted. But at the time of early Christianity, the mindset was totally different, morality was something which urgently needed attention. This is what inspired delving into the depths of "the individual".

Incidentally, Augustine's "On The Trinity" was in some part a response to the councils of Nicaea, and contains some fundamental differences especially concerning a key term "substance". What is evident though, is that an understanding of God the Trinity is derived from an understanding of the individual as tripartite, God being the ultimate individual.

There is evidence from NDE's of consciousness seeming to persist even when the brain itself has no measurable activity. — Wayfarer

I just received "Living In A Mindful Universe" by Dr. Eben Alexander. Check it out, I can't wait to read it.

Well we do know the nature of the relationship. It is a dichotomy. We arrive at it via dialectical reasoning. Metaphysics has been operating this way since it began. — apokrisis

A dichotomy is a separation. The nature of how the two separate things relate to each other is not described by "dichotomy". To arrive at the conclusion "there is a dichotomy" is only the beginning of the metaphysical procedure. It is how the two elements of the dichotomy are related, which becomes the basis for classifying the type of metaphysics. For instance a monist would say that the two elements of the dichotomy are fundamentally the same, while a dualist would say that they are fundamentally different.

A categorical difference is one in which two categories stand absolutely opposed. — apokrisis

I believe that this is incorrect. two things which are opposed are necessarily in the same category, as defining each other. You'll see this with any opposing terms negative/positive, hot/cold, large/small, etc. The two opposing terms may be seen as defining the limits of the same category. A categorical separation is a separation between types of thing.

Again, already accounted for. Constraints regulate dynamism. The purpose of a thing maintains its identity despite all material changes it might undergo. You can't pretend this is a great mystery. — apokrisis

Actually that's very mysterious to me. You have a categorical separation here between "constraints" and "dynamism", two distinct categories. You have mentioned a relationship between the two with "regulate". This is mysterious in the sense of what is a constraint. Is it a rule, is it a law, is it a physical barrier, or is it just another dynamism? If it is the latter, then the dichotomy dissolves. I don't think it is a physical barrier, because I do not sense such a barrier to activity. I don't think it's a rule or a law, because then dynamism would have to know how to interpret rules to be able to act according to constraints. So "constraint" appears to be something you just made up, a word which has nothing underneath it, no substance, just mystery.

Then, you enhance the mystery by mentioning "purpose". Are you suggesting that constraint is equivalent to purpose? Then you would be saying that dynamism is regulated by purpose. The problem I have with this is that I see purpose in the activities of living things. And, I see a categorical separation between living and inanimate such that the inanimate is excluded from acting with purpose. But the inanimate is still active, it still contains dynamism, and that dynamism is also constrained. So I can understand how purpose regulates dynamism in human beings to the extent that they use their power of free will. And also to some extent it is evident that there is purpose in the activities of other living things. But I think the claim that purpose controls dynamism in inanimate things is unjustified. So this appear to be nothing more than a monist attempt to dissolve the categorical separation between animate and inanimate. Mystery solved.

These statements I take to be contradictory:

Hence the Peircean process view. Now being is emergent and so an eternal state of becoming. You only have degrees of definiteness.
...
So the Peircean view fixes things with a hierarchical structure. — apokrisis

The problem being that Peirce's "eternal becoming" as you describe, renders definiteness incomplete. Therefore things cannot be properly fixed, and the claim that the Peircean view "fixes things" must be contradictory. This is the problem with vagueness as a first principle, it is intelligibility compromised.

Then definite being emerges as the concrete action that arises between these two bounds. — apokrisis

You've already constrained definiteness to degrees, such that you cannot validly refer to anything as "definite being", you only have degrees of being.

Being and becoming must have some relationship. You can't have it both ways - that as "different categories" they are related and they are not related. — apokrisis

I don't deny that there is a relationship between being and becoming. What I would say is that the nature of this relationship is not well known. It is a deficiency in our knowledge, just like the relationship between the past and future is not well known, it is a deficiency. Still, we know enough to say that the past is categorically different from the future, like we know that being is categorically different from becoming.

It is pretty clear that if something can change to become something else, then something can stay the same by not becoming that something else. — apokrisis

This is not as clear as you might think. If that thing doesn't become that particular "something else", it might still change to become a different something else. That is the nature of possibility. So "not becoming that particular something else" does not necessitate that the thing stays the same. Therefore staying the same is not related to becoming something else in the way that you suggest here.

In reality, when we talk about a thing staying the same thing, it does so despite changing. So I stay the same person despite undergoing changes. It might be that some aspects of me stay the same while others change. This brings us back to the issue of unity.

The point I made before, though, is that there may be no intermediate state between two contiguous states of yourself. — Janus

Yes, I understand this point that you made. The point I made is that if there is no intermediate state, then there is no such thing as "change", as we commonly use, and understand the word. That is because two distinct states, does not constitute change.

The point I made before, though, is that there may be no intermediate state between two contiguous states of yourself. Indeed, how could there be; if there were intermediate states or even just one intermediate state between contiguous states then there would have to be infinitely many intermediate states between any contiguous states. — Janus

Yes, we went through this, that's why Aristotle concluded that it is necessary to consider that change is something completely different from a describable state, to avoid having to describe it as an intermediary "state", thus leading to the infinite regress. If we remove the nature of "intermediary" from change, then how can we relate it to being?

To say that an individual does not adhere to our faith, and is therefore heretical, and may be ostracized depending on one's actions, is not the same as saying that the person is faithless.

This sounds to me like revisionist history. — Mitchell

According to what I posted, I believe "history" itself to be perspective dependent. So to say that this is "revisionist history" is not very meaningful because the original "history" which is being revised is produced to justify a perspective in the first place, so the "revision" may be more accurate than the original was in the first place.

There is a reason why the concept of orthodoxy developed, and it had nothing to do with allowing any "freedom of thought". — Mitchell

Even amongst "the orthodox", there has always been a variety of creeds. If orthodoxy was designed to restrict freedom of thought it would not accept such a variety. Orthodoxy was developed as a means of maintaining faith, not as a means for restricting freedom of thought. As I tried to describe, it is quite difficult to maintain faith without restricting freedom of thought, because the articles of faith (things taken for granted) commonly form the foundations of thought. To maintain faith without restricting thought is almost a contradiction in itself. So to do this requires a separation between the articles of faith and the objects of thought. This allows thought to proceed rationally without the influence of faith.

The fact that even the unorthodox are accepted in their own right, is evidence that orthodoxy is not principal. Faith is what is principal. Orthodoxy is the means by which the orthodox maintain faith, while the unorthodox maintain faith in their own way. The intent of orthodoxy is not to exclude the unorthodox as faithless, or any such thing. I think that if some acted to impose the rules of orthodoxy as if the unorthodox are faithless, then this is an abuse derived from misunderstanding.

Populations do not adapt TO their environment, but FROM it. Variations have to precede selection. — charleton

I think you are making the category mistake of associating what is said of "a population", with what is said of "an individual". Variations occur in relation to individuals, and precede selection. Changes to "a population" are posterior to selection. It may be that you have difficulty understanding what is meant by "a population", but this is collective terminology which is common in evolutionary theory.

Here's an example to help you understand. An individual will vote yes or no in a particular referendum, and this vote is prior to the decision of the population. After the vote is counted, we say that the population has voted in such and such a way, according to the count. Notice that the individual's vote is prior to the count, and the population's vote is posterior to the count.

To suggest populations adapt TO their environment is to suggest that novel variations emerge because of that change; that is absurd. — charleton

Variations in "the population" may emerge because of that change in the environment, but this does not mean that variation to the individuals are due to that change in the environment.

That gave rise to a kind of neo-gnostic movement, with figures like Stephan Hoeller, Richard Smoley, and Elaine Pagels, who argued that some essential aspect of Christian teaching had been suppressed at that time. — Wayfarer

It is evident that in early Christianity there is all sorts of disagreement on principles, especially concerning the divine nature of Jesus. So of course there would have been attempts to produce agreement. But even "The Creed" is not singular, and we'd be more accurate to call them the Creeds to indicate the variations in belief.

We have odd ways of looking back at history such that our history is very perspective oriented. If people holding a particular ideology become more influential over time, we do not necessarily know the reason why they became more influential, so the reasons we ascribe are quite speculative. We, looking back having the ideology which became more influential, will at first be very biased, thinking that the good, or the correct ideology won out over the incorrect. But if we look back from the other perspective, that the better ideology is the one that got dropped, we would tend to argue that the better was suppressed. But these terms of "force" don't really do justice to the activities of the mind which are going on.

In actuality, it is very difficult to determine why one ideology becomes more prevalent than another. What I described in the last post, is that I believe it a fundamental principle, that the ideology which allows for maximum freedom of thought is the one which has the greatest capacity for persistence. But freedom of thought runs contrary to faith, and faith is the element which provides coherence within the ideology, through the reinforcing of the same principles in different human minds. And without this principle of coherence, there is no ideology.

I used the term "reinforcing" instead of "enforcing" here, because I think that the essence of faith is that it must be willed, and cannot be forced. So we have two distinct possible perspectives here, a certain ideology became prevalent because it was enforced, and suppressed others, or a certain ideology became prevalent because it was freely chosen over the others. My belief is that the very nature of faith is such that it cannot be forced. To be true faith, it must come from within, being supported by what's within. Therefore a pretense of faith, such as the claim to support the principles of an ideology without having a freedom of choice in that matter, cannot actually support that ideology and it will dissolve.

This leaves the principles by which an ideology that promotes the freedom of thought supports itself, as very delicately balanced principles. There must be some fundamental articles of faith to provide coherence, and maintain the sustainability of the ideology, but these articles of faith must not interfere with the capacity for freedom of thought, so that the articles of faith are in a sense, irrelevant to the thinking activities. The articles of faith are not important fundament ontological, epistemological, or even moral principles, they are more like objects of distraction. Unity is provided by a common diversion, instead of agreement on fundamental principles, thus allowing free thought in relation to fundamental principles.

If the two states are not exactly the same, then there is, by definition, change, I would say. — Janus

But that's not what "change" means. It means that one state becomes another. To have two distinct states is to have two distinct states, and this does not imply change. "Change" indicates that there is a certain type of relationship between the two states, a relationship of becoming, which is not indicated if the word is not used.

Maybe the two what you term "incompatible" ways of looking at things, in terms of either states or processes; are logically incompatible, and cannot be combined in one view. But it would seem, nonetheless, that we need both to understand how things are in the world. If this is so, then it would seem to be a dialectic with thesis and antithesis, but lacking a unitary synthesis. Perhaps the synthesis consists in holding in one's mind two in seemingly compatible views, and valuing each for their own unique insights, while refraining form demanding that either one or the other must be absolutely the case. — Janus

This is why I believe that dualism provides the only coherent approach toward understanding reality.

Everything he suggests point to evolution being the NATURAL consequence of necessity. In fact the whole point of his work is to remove it from the out-of-date notion that there is an underlying cause. — charleton

Do you understand what the word "cause" means? When something is the "consequence of necessity", then that thing has a cause. Something can only be necessitated by a cause. So your statement here is completely contradictory. You say that the description of evolution, as the "natural consequence of necessity", removes the notion of underlying cause. But all that the notion of "consequence of necessity" does, is reinforce the notion of causation.

There is no active process for the selection of traits that the false assertion that evolution is causal would suggest. In terms of evolution, selection is passive. Death is the real mover in evolution, as it removes negative traits. But selection is blind. IT has no direction or goal. THAT is why evolution is an effect; the result of change and not a cause. — charleton

Selection and death are both aspects of evolution. To deny that selection is causal, and introduce death as a cause, does not prove that evolution is not causal.

What if change from one state to another is instantaneous? Do you have an argument for why it could not be so? — Janus

Then, as you say change is nothing. There is one state, then the next state. This is not change. Change is the act of becoming different. But in this description we have difference with no act of becoming different, and therefore no change. To describe things in this way is to say that change is not real.

Then we can just say instead "It is X, and then it is Y". 'Transition' is the wrong word then, and there is no "process of change" between the two states. The change then is nothing other than the difference between the two states. — Janus

Right, under this description change, becoming, is not real.. That's the point Aristotle was making, if we describe the world in terms of states, then becoming (change) is not real. And if we describe the world in terms of becoming (change), then the states of being are not real. the two are incompatible.

But then scholasticism buggered this up because of the need to bolster Christian dualism. Existence became about material/effective cause alone - the world experienced through the senses. The world of material accidents. And essence - the formal/final cause of being - became split off and associated with the separate realm of mind, spirit, nous, the ideal. The world known through the human intellect. And then ultimately through beatific vision. Men could know God just as directly and surely as they knew the world. — apokrisis

I think dualism was already inherent in the premise of "existence". To exist was to be a duality of being and becoming, (form and matter in Aristotelian terms). What "buggered this up", was the Neo-Platonist, and Christian, principle that Form (essence) is prior to existence. This principle dictates that there is a pure Form, or pure essence, without becoming (or matter), which is existence in a non-temporal, eternal sense. This pushes the need for a more radical dualism. The real problem is that being and becoming are so fundamentally incompatible, that it was a mistake to attempt to put them in the same category under the name existence, in the first place.

So that anti-becoming is happening continuously while actual change is failing to take place. — apokrisis

I wouldn't call being "anti-becoming", it is simply different. These are two distinctly different ways of describing reality. We can describe reality in terms of what is, and what is not, or we can describe reality in terms of activity (becoming). What is not, is anti-what is (being), but this is categorically different from becoming, which is activity. So being is not anti-becoming, it is anti-not being. That becoming and being are two distinctly different ways of describing reality indicates that reality consists of these two distinct aspects. We need this categorical separation to allow that a thing which stays itself, as that thing, through time, such as myself, is also changing. It is not the case that part of me is not-becoming (anti-becoming), and therefore does not change, while another part of me can change. What is the case is that I refer to distinct aspects of reality, and relative to one aspect or principle, I stay the same as myself, but relative to another aspect or principle, I change. These two principles, one that allows me to say that I am the same person as I was, and one that allows me to say that I have changed, are completely different, and are validated by completely different aspects of reality.

Show me how evolution is the cause of anything. — charleton

Show you? How about you take a look at all the wonderfully varied species of life which exist all around you everywhere. Then read Charles Darwin's "On the Origin of Species". If you still wonder how evolution could be the cause of anything, get back to me.

Here's a line from the Wikipedia entry concerning "On the Origin of Species" :
"This slowly effected process results in populations changing to adapt to their environments, and ultimately, these variations accumulate over time to form new species (inference). "

Notice how the theory of evolution states that the process of evolution "results in" (meaning 'causes') the formation of new species.

I see, science rather than philosophy is the authority on what "causality" is. It seems that the teaching of science where you are is very poor.

Glad you agree, but I just want to add one point, albeit a crucial one. Which is that, ultimately, I blame religious orthodoxy for this problem. And the reason for that goes right back in history to the emergence of the dominant orthodoxy in the Western tradition. After all, 'orthodoxy' means 'right belief'. And the Church put such an enormous premium on being correct, on conformity to dogma, on Correct Belief, that they left many in the intelligentsia with no choice but to rebel. After all, you either believed correctly, or you were shown the door (or much worse). That rebellion against orthodoxy manifests in many forms, of which scientific materialism is one example, but a very influential one. So in a way, I certainly respect the rejection of religious authority, with the crucial caveat that this can't involve the outright rejection of spiritual reality, which we are getting dangerously close to. — Wayfarer

The development of a religion is an odd thing. If we take Christianity as an example, you can see that in the early days, it needed to promote free choice, and free thinking, to attract members. This freedom is crucial to the development of a progressive ideology which sets the religion apart from others making it attractive. In Christianity you can see this trend, right up until after the scholastics. At this point there is a shift, it's almost as if the Church leaders believed that all the important metaphysical questions had been answered. Following this, the Church perceives a stronger need to protect its members from the infiltration of wrong ideas, so the problems of orthodoxy which you describe, prevail.

The central issue is the way that we, as individual people relate to the nature of free will, freedom of choice. If we whole-heartedly embrace freedom of choice we afford the same respect for others to choose as we do ourselves. We recognize clearly, that with respect to the foundations of knowledge, and first principles of ontology, the individual will naturally select what appears to be closest to the truth, when provided with the information. The individual will naturally select the truth because these principles are not useful for anything else other than determining the truth, so when given the choice, the only guiding principle is the desire for truth. Therefore, when it is the truth which we seek, there is no need to hinder anyone's freedom of choice.

Faith of course plays a very important role. It allows us to take what is granted by others, as fundamental and true. So there is no need to question fundamental principles, we take them and build on them, enabling the rapid growth of knowledge. But there's a delicate balance to the role of authority. The individuals being given the principles, from the authorities, must trust and have faith in the authorities, to accept them unconditionally and move forward. And this faith is inspired by the actions of the authorities which demonstrate the good of the principles. When the principles are enforced by the authorities, the need for force draws suspicion as to whether the "good" of the principles is really the truth.

What about philosophy that you can't understand? Is that the basis of rejecting a philosophy? On whether you can understand it or not? — Purple Pond

No, I don't think such rejection would be justified. That would be like if you meet someone speaking a different language, and you reject what they say because you don't understand it. To understand requires the will to understand.

Between two contiguous determinate states of being of any entity there is a seamless transition which does not consist in a determinate state of being (it does not because if it did this would lead to infinite regress). — Janus

The problem with this perspective is that the two determinate states cannot be contiguous, because change occurs between one and the other, and change takes time. So if they are contiguous then there is nothing between the two states, and no such thing as change

There is either nothing at all between two determinate states of being of any entity or else there are other determinate states of being. If there are other determinate states of being between two determinate states of being of any entity then those two states of being are not contiguous.

A "seamless transition" cannot consist of determinate entities, but must that mean it is "nothing at all"?

Whatever the case may be the change from one determinate state to another is a becoming, so becoming is either nothing at all (or in other words it is merely formal) or it is 'something' real (a seamless transition) which does not consist of determinate entities. — Janus

OK, so let's say that the change from state X to state Y is either nothing at all, or a seamless transition. I think we can assume that it is not nothing at all, change is something real. So what's a "seamless transition"? We can't saying that X ceases to be, and then Y begins being, because that implies a point of nothing, so this would not be seamless. On the other hand, X cannot overlap Y temporally or this would be contradiction.

Where does Aristotle do this? — Mitchell

I believe there is a couple different spots where he argued this, one in his Metaphysics. I paraphrased the argument, above.

It's very clear that "evolution" referrers to a process of change. Check your dictionary if necessary. You can reread my posts if you have something meaningful to add, but I don't see any point in repeating everything I've already stated.