DNA is made up of nucleotides. — SonJnana

Yes, and they perform directed actions. And it is not understood exactly why they perform directed actions. My point is that there is no living body without such directed actions, so the formula which directs is prior to the body.

But just because we don't know doesn't mean we never will. — SonJnana

My claim is that the day of understanding comes around as soon as we consider the immaterial. Failure to consider the immaterial will likely produce the "never will" option.

At some point we could ask why physics is the way it is. We may never know. But how do we go from asking that to assuming there is an immaterial soul inside of us? And then we would ask is there then a soul in other animals? In plants? In bacteria? In viruses? In atoms? Where do we draw the line, after assuming there even is an immaterial soul inside of us? — SonJnana

This is why the study of philosophy is important, it gives us direction toward understanding the immaterial soul, and this is necessary to properly understand reality.

Just to clarify, is your argument that there has to be an immaterial formula for physics? — SonJnana

I don't quite understand your question. Aren't all formulae immaterial, and doesn't physics use formulae?

It doesn't mean that we conclude there is some immaterial force that leads to why living organisms are the way they are that goes beyond our knowledge of how atoms work. — SonJnana

I think quantum mechanics demonstrates that there is an immaterial force behind the way atoms work. Do you understand Pauli exclusion? The concept of "force" is quite useful in physics, and despite assumptions that forces may be accounted for with material particles this approach, is enveloped in uncertainty. Uncertainty indicates flawed principles.

SO in all that time we were talking about how bishops can only move diagonally, you missed the bit that said within the game of chess. No wonder you were confused, thinking Sam and I believed that a bishop stuck to the diagonals under any circumstances. — Banno

I went through this Banno, I told you your "game of chess" analogy is not applicable. That's when you accused me of being disrespectful. The game of chess does not allow that the players change the rules, but language and knowledge allow for this. Our subject is "knowledge", and if you insist on comparing it to a "game", then consider it a game with evolving rules, where the players decide the rules as they go. But then it's not really like playing a game at all. However, because this really is the nature of knowledge, then it's unreasonable to insist that any of the rules are beyond doubt.

My only excuse is that it had until now not occurred to me that someone might miss the part about rules being part of a game-like activity. — Banno

Do you agree with me then, that to describe things like "knowledge" and "language" as "game-like" activities, is not an acceptable description? It is not acceptable because "game-like" implies that there are pre-existing rules which one must follow, and this would lead to an ontology of Platonic Realism, where the rules pre-exist the players. This description misses a large and very important part of the activities which are knowledge and language, and that is the creation and evolution of the rules.

So the game-like description is really false, it misses the mark because it implies that one ought to follow the rules, to be properly engaged in the activities, when in reality a large part of that activity involves doubting, questioning, and changing the rules.



It is this, describing language and knowledge as game-like, which leads Wittgenstein astray in the end, as demonstrated in On Certainty. The analogy is only good so far as it compares to the part of following rules. But in metaphysics we have to give credence to "the rules". What kind of existence do the rules have? If they always existed, then they are eternal platonic Forms. If they are not eternal Forms, then we have to allow for them to come into existence. If they come into existence, then they are most likely created by the human beings playing the game. But then the game analogy gets lost because the players really do not have to follow the rules, they use their free will to decide, and create the rules as they go.

So I think that Wittgenstein saw the problem of infinite regress in justification. This problem occurs if we refer to the rules for justification. This problem normally would normally be resolved by assuming eternal platonic Forms, necessary rules. Wittgenstein didn't want to go that way, but he also didn't want to admit to the claims of the skeptic that everything is doubtable. If you take my position (the skeptic's) that the rules are simply created by the human beings as they go, then nothing is certain and everything is doubtable. So he proposes the hinge-props as bedrock, to form a kind of compromise solution. But in my mind, this is just a vague, ambiguous proposal which doesn't resolve anything. If the hinge-props are not completely certain, necessary and undoubtable, then we must give in to the skeptic's position that all is doubtable. If they are necessary, they are nothing other than platonic Forms. So he just leaves vagueness and ambiguity as to what the hinge-props really are, such that we can go either way with them.

So I think that Wittgenstein has taken two world views which are completely incompatible and attempted to establish compatibility between them with the proposal of hinge-props. In my opinion it fails because the two world views are incompatible, and so the attempt is misguided.

Frame of reference?

In some, it most certainly does. — creativesoul

If you believe in that frame of reference bull shit, then take your geocentricity, and make yourself the centre of your universe. (Hmm, my spell check changed "geocentricity" to "egocentricity")

want to say that a belief is justified or not prior to the believer offering the account. The justification is the offering. — creativesoul

Yeah, you want to say that the belief is justified (past tense) prior to the act of justification. You ought to give that up. Why don't you just say that the belief is true? Then you have a proper distinction between true and justified, and you follow more closely to traditional philosophical principles. A well-grounded belief is one which corresponds, it is true.

Is their belief that touching the fire caused the pain unjustified until they tell someone? Of course not. It is knowledge. It is true. It is well-grounded. It needs no account be given to another. Justification is for proving to another that one's belief is well-grounded and true. The act doesn't ground the belief. — creativesoul

See, you are describing the belief as "well-ground", "true", but now you want to hand to it "justification" as well, without an act to justify it. The act of putting words to what you have experienced, and expressing it in a way which is comprehensible, and acceptable to others, is very important to epistemological knowledge because this provides the means for temporal persistence of the belief. Your memory, my memory, and especially Banno's memory, are each very limited (just kidding Banno). We get old, forget things, die and forget everything. So, what you and I "know" (in that sense of the word of personal memory), what we remember, our true beliefs cannot enter into the communal "body of knowledge", which is what epistemology deals with, without that act of justification. This act of justification gives your true belief, and knowledge in general, its temporal extension, instead of just being a flash in the pan.

Did Sam say that? I'm pretty sure I did not.

I think Sam and I said that there are propositions that are taken as certain within a given language game. — Banno

The argument has been that it is unreasonable to doubt specific fundamental propositions. This implies that these propositions cannot be reasonably doubted under any circumstances. That is what is supposed to form the foundation of justification. It prevents the infinite regress of asking for justification of a proposition, then asking for justification of the justification, etc..

Will you say there are no leaves because they attached to trees? Do they only come into existence when they fall? — Janus

I'm saying that leaves have no existence independent from the tree. The fact that they fall to the ground does not negate their dependency on the tree for their existence. So any proper explanation of their existence would attribute their existence to the existence of the tree.

We can either say to Jimmie that it is certain that the sun will go down; or we can change the conversation from when he should be home to one of astronomy or induction. The spade is turned when we hit the bedrock that the sun goes down each day. — Banno

This is a false description though, the sun does not go down each day. That description involves the sun as the active subject and going down as the predicate. The true description involves the earth as the active subject and spinning as the predicate. The earth turns such that where we're at on the earth spins toward the sun each morning and away from it each afternoon. That is what Jimmy learns in astronomy.

If everyone always accepted as bedrock, and undoubaible "the sun goes down each day", then no one would have ever discovered that this is a false description. The phenomenon cannot be properly described with the sun as the active subject, going down each day, it must be described with the earth as the active subject, spinning. It is only by doubting the fundamental descriptions of what we sense, that we discover the true reality.

which bedrock will turn the spade depends on where you dig; which propositions are to go unchallenged depends on the language game, depends on the conversation, depends on situation, depends on the practicalities.

Are we so far apart in our ideas? — Banno

We are still far apart, because you, as well as Sam, believe that there are certain fundamental propositions which it would be unreasonable to doubt under any circumstances. I believe that it is circumstances which make it reasonable to doubt propositions, and no proposition is beyond doubt in all possible circumstances. Therefore I think it is unreasonable to assume any proposition will go unchallenged

I disagree with this because DNA is the formula that directs biology. — SonJnana

DNA is made up of smaller parts which themselves carry out directed activity. Biologist have not found the bottom.

Why don't you address the logic of my reply rather than referring to some conflicting opinion which you hold?

Particular objects are existents; if we can reliably identify something then it exists. We say it exists in virtue of the fact that we can identify it. That is what 'existence' means. — Janus

Yes, now the identified object is the person, the person exists. The hands are not identifiable as distinct particular objects, they are identified as property of the person, so why do you think that they exist?

This is exactly what I pointed out to you, that if you insist that we must follow the rules, in the case of language and knowledge, instead of freely doubting the rules, you apprehend knowledge as "following the principles which work to get the job done". Only if you respect the need to doubt the rules will you apprehend the aspect of knowledge which is "the seeking of better ways of doing things"

To which you replied "I feel quite disrespected by such a trivial response."

So I'll just repeat myself. If you want to keep on representing knowledge and language as a set of rules which must be followed, as if we were playing a game of chess, then I think you're wrong, for the reason stated. And if you think that it's trivial that I think you're wrong, then no one cares. But if you would like to demonstrate why you think I am wrong, then that's your problem so get on with solving it.

This is not to the point. If the person is using hands then the person has hands, no? — Janus

Actually this is the point. Existence is given to the object, it is what we assume individual, particular objects have, existence. We describe objects by naming the object (subject) and assigning properties to the objects (predication). The attributes, properties, are universal, such that we predicate the same properties to numerous individuals. Since numerous individuals are said to have the very same property, then the property cannot actually be a part of the individual itself. That is why we have a categorical difference between particulars and universals, such that if universals have existence, it is a completely different type of existence from the existence of particulars, individuals.

When you say that a person has hands, then "person" is the subject, and "hands" is predicated of the subject. We could assume that the "person" as an object may have existence. But "hands" referring to the property being predicated, signifies a universal. Unless we assign independent existence to universals, then "hands" cannot refer to anything with independent existence. And if "hands" has existence as a universal, this is a concept, not the active part of the person doing the work. So the identified object is assumed to have existence, but there is no principle whereby "what the object has" might have a similar type of existence.

What reason do you have for thinking that this will you speak of is immaterial and not dependent on the physical brain, or that there is some sort of immaterial soul? — SonJnana

I came to learn this from my study of philosophy, many years of reading. It is a difficult subject requiring much study. Here's something to consider though. A living body consists of parts which are active, and the activity is directed. The activity must be in such and such a way or there would be no living body. The living body would not exist without these parts carrying out their specified activities. If this is the case, then a living body could not come into existence without these parts each carrying out their specific activities. Therefore the formula, or direction (and this is immaterial), as to which parts must carry out which activities, must be prior to the existence of the living body. So we can conclude that this immaterial formula must be prior to the living body. The living body is dependent on the immaterial formula, and follows from it, not vise versa.

That’s why I say that it would be animal-chauvinist to say that the only abstract facts that are valid are the ones that are in someone’s experience. That would only be so if you define validity as “experienced by someone”. That would be distinctly un-objective, It would also be something made true only by a special definition that says that it’s true. — Michael Ossipoff

When you demonstrate that animals other than human beings understand abstract facts, then we might proceed in this direction. Regardless though, this wouldn't help support your assumption that the world prior to the existence of life consisted of abstract facts.

at least comprehend that your meaning for “is” and “are” contradicts a meaning for them that is routine and standard in mathematics and logic. — Michael Ossipoff

Mathematicians and logician who use "is" and "are" use it to refer to what is the case, now. It is only metaphysicians who extend this principle, through extrapolation, to make the claim that what mathematicians and logicians assume to be true right now, is an eternal truth. That is Platonic Realism, which I do not agree with. I think that mathematical truths are principles invented by the human mind, which are dependent on the human mind for existence, and therefore cannot be eternal.

…and I’ve been answering your disagreements.
.
Whether they’ve been adequately answered isn’t for you, me, or any advocate of a position on the matter, to judge. It’s for outside observers of the discussion to judge. — Michael Ossipoff

You answer my disagreements by reasserting the things I disagree with.

The point is that these inevitable abstracts are absolutely, timelessly, true for anyone anywhere. … — Michael Ossipoff

I disagree. If the person cannot interpret the symbols, or misinterprets the symbols, then the abstracts are not true for that person. And even if they were true for anyone anywhere, this does not make them eternal, which would require that they are true when there is no people, or anything to interpret the symbols. Since the abstracts are expressed as symbols, and symbols require interpretation, and truth is attributed to the interpretation, then there can be no truth without interpretation.

feel quite disrespected by such a trivial response. — Banno

Fine, I'd offer an apology if you could demonstrate the disrespect. I'm very accustomed to your tact at avoidance of the issues, and that's all I see here.

If you want to belief that knowledge is solely involved with following the principles which work to get the job done, and not at all involved in the seeking of better ways of doing things, then I think that's your problem.

Certain propositions have at their core something basic, foundational, or bedrock, which makes doubting them nonsensical. — Sam26

I think I've satisfactorily demonstrated that this is not the case. It is reasonable to doubt any proposition when the circumstances make doubt reasonable. I've identified three important factors which play a role in whether or not any proposition ought to be doubted, One's understanding of the language, one's trust or faith in the speaker, and the appearance of ambiguity

What is unreasonable is the assumption that a proposition could be removed from all context, and claimed to have a meaning which cannot be doubted.

Correct usage can be seen in particular contexts, but it's not the context itself driving correct usage. If this were true (and I'm not necessarily suggesting that you think this), then any word would have an arbitrary meaning based on whatever context I choose to use it in. — Sam26

Yes, this is pretty much what I argue is the case. We are free, by the nature of free will, to use words however we please. I see adolescents showing this off, quite often taking random words and giving them whatever meaning they want. The problem is that this is generally not conducive to good communication which is what we mostly want. So unless our intent is to show off, or deceive, then we mostly attempt to use words in consistent ways.

Whether or not any particular usage is "correct" is another issue altogether, because this requires a judgement. So anyone making a judgement as to whether particular instances of usage were "correct" or not, would have to refer to some principles in order to justify this judgement.

So if I use the word car to refer to the moon, then it would be correct, because meaning is driven by a context. However, this is not the case, it's the implicit rules of usage within a wide range of cultural driven language-games, that provides the logic behind correct usage. — Sam26

Referring to "implicit rules" does not qualify as justification. To justify you need to make those rules explicit. If I want to use "car" to refer to the moon, there is no rule that says that I cannot do this, and this is what the kids demonstrate. There is no such thing as "implicit rules", you're making that up, it's all in your mind, all imaginary. Each person decides, on the spot, which words to use for the situation at hand, and we do not refer to any rules in making those decisions.

If you really believe that there is such a thing as "correct usage", and that the judgement of whether a particular instance of usage is correct or not is not just a figment of your imagination, then you need to demonstrate this, set out some standards which we could agree on, as to what distinguishes an instance of correct usage from an instance of incorrect usage.

So is there a general principle that dictates whether some statement is doubtable? — Sam26

Try this Sam26. For the sake of argument, let's assume that if it is possible that the person making the statement did not follow the rules of correct usage, then the statement is doubtable. Does this sound reasonable to you? How are we supposed to know whether the person making the statement followed the rules of correct usage?

There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism. — Sam26

How is this not Platonic Realism? If it is necessary that triangles have three sides, then this is an eternal truth, it cannot in any way be otherwise, and that is the very thing which Platonic Realism refers to. These Ideas exist eternally whether or not they are described by human beings.

There are two principal uses of "necessary" which need to be distinguished. One is a logical necessity which states that by the principles of logic, things cannot be otherwise. If we hold fast to this definition, then things which cannot be otherwise are necessarily eternal truths, Platonic Forms. However, there is another use of "necessary", and this is that it is needed for some purpose.

If we allow that logical necessity is reduced to this second form of "necessary", such that logical necessity is just produced because it is needed for some purpose, then we can dismiss Platonic Realism. However, now when you say that triangles necessarily have three sides, "necessary" here means needed for some purpose. So this is what you imply when you say that you can make this statement without implying Platonic Realism. But now it is a matter of free choice, human beings choose that triangles must have three sides, because they apprehend this as necessary for some purpose.

So, we have a proposition, "triangles necessarily have three sides". I have demonstrated ambiguity with respect to "necessarily". The ambiguity has far reaching consequences in relation to ontology. Since I have demonstrated this problem, do you not believe that I am justified in doubting this proposition?


.

The second is that Theaetetus ends inconclusively. — Banno

An important thing to note, I think, is that Socrates ends the Theaetetus with an explanation that they've actually been looking for the wrong thing. They went into the inquiry with the preconceived notion that to be knowledge, it must be true. But then when they looked at examples of how knowledge could actually exist, they found no way to exclude the possibility of falsity, and "must be true" could not be supported by actually existing instances of knowledge.

So they appeared to approach a paradox which would deny the possibility of knowledge. Knowledge must exclude falsity, but there is no way to actually exclude the possibility of falsity. At the end, Socrates suggests that their notion of what knowledge is, and therefore their description of what they were looking for in the first place, was probably wrong. It turned out to be a case of looking for something (knowledge) but having the wrong description of what they were looking for.

Such revolutions might be interesting and grab our attention, but they do so because they are extraordinary. Should you base your understanding of knowledge on the extremes rather than the mundane? — Banno

Here is the question then. What do you consider is the most important aspect of knowledge, that we continually progress toward a better and better understanding of reality, and therefore better our ways of being, or that we stay fixed in our understanding, and way of being, forever? If you believe that we ought not doubt the rules, then you opt for the latter. I opt for the former.

The hinge proposition was not that time is absolute, but that the laws of physics must be the same for all observers. — Banno

Have you read Einstein's special theory of relativity? He specifically states that he is providing a new way of understanding "time", that until this point "time" has been understood as absolute. He explains that in order to provide compatibility between the relativity theory which existed before him, and the postulate that the speed of light remains constant, all we need to do is to understand "time' as relative rather than absolute.

And the Copernican revolution came from the hinge proposition that the simples explanation of the orbits of the planets was to be preferred. — Banno

Sure, but the introduction of this hinge-proposition required doubting the prior hinge proposition, that the planets and sun orbited the earth. Introduction of a new hinge proposition, to describe a specific phenomenon, can only follow after doubting the hinge proposition which presently describes that phenomenon. Proceeding with the attitude that our eyes see the sun rise up in the east and go down in the west, and therefore this must be what is the case, because we ought not doubt what our senses show us, is not conducive to progress.

Are you saying that the hands you perceive every day doing all the kinds of things that hands do; preparing food, washing the dishes, swinging a hammer, typing on the key board, and so on, might not be hands at all but actually might be something else? Are you saying that they might be, for example, oranges, dogs, cars, feet, tennis racquets, pumpkins, snakes, rivers, boiled eggs, pin cushions...? — Janus

Yes, I am saying that it might actually be a person who is doing these things, for example, rather than hands which are doing these things, and the person is just using the hands to do these things. If an individual lost both hands, that person would probably still find a way to get those things done, so I don't think it's really the hands which are doing these things. And if you want to insist that it really is the hands doing these things, why not give recognition to how much of this is actually being done by the fingers, rather than the hands?

Unless you've changed your position, I suspect that your view regarding what it takes for a belief to be justified includes justification in the sense of offering one's grounds for said belief to another. — creativesoul

OK, I've been reading back over some of your posts. I see your still stuck in the same rut which you were in when we last discussed justification.

Moreover, on my view, a justified belief does not necessarily require justification(providing one's grounds to another). — creativesoul

How can you not see that this position is untenable? "Justified" is past tense, implying necessarily that an act of justification has occurred.

The thing is, you can give examples, of another person's beliefs as justified, but you are another person passing judgement on the other's belief. If you give an example of your own belief as justified, then you are simply trying to justify your belief. If you sit there by yourself, thinking about your own belief, telling yourself this belief is justified because I think it is justified, then you have nothing more than a simple belief. So a belief must be expressed to another person in order to obtain the status of being justified. If it is not, it can't be anything more than a true belief.

Edit: that came out wrong. I have respect for Meta because of his capacity to engage in discussion. That is entirely absent here. So is that the difference between a crackpot and a philosopher?) — Banno

Remember Kwalish Kid at philosophyforums.com ? When I fist engaged with him I really frustrated him. He said I can't quite place you, you're not like a normal crackpot (as if there's any sort of normalcy to "crackpot").

My question is more about the difference between the crackpot and the serious eccentric. — Banno

The problem is that some crackpots are really quite serious.

Belief is a model that generally permits the ignorance of evidence. — ProgrammingGodJordan

I'll give you a similar reply to what I gave Banno in the other thread; in the inverted form, because what I argue there is the importance of doubt.

That the ignorance of evidence is possible, does not necessitate that we ignore the evidence. So what belief does is allow us to ignore evidence it does not necessitate it. This is a good thing because it lets us get on with what we are doing, in an efficient way, without having to assess all the evidence as to whether we are or are not proceeding in the most appropriate way each time we go to do something.

But if your claim is that belief forces, compels, or necessitates, us to ignore evidence (as it appears to be), then you have misrepresented belief by ignoring the reality of free will, choosing a determinist perspective.

You know, it occurs to me that I would be proud of a thread such as this, with no content and a few hundred replies. — Banno

Crackpot, eccentric, or plain old genius?

He was banned... — jamalrob

What? You discontinued my source of entertainment.

edit: I take that back jamalrob, it's more like a waste of time than a source of entertainment, as bad attempts at entertainment are.

Your chess game comparison is not a good analogy. We are discussing knowledge here, and knowledge is a changing, evolving, progressive object. Contrary to the game of chess, it is fundamental and essential to knowledge that the rules change. This means that doubting the rules is a very important aspect of knowledge. It is evidenced by things such as the Copernican revolution, and Einstein's revolution. Einstein for instance doubted the idea that "time" is absolute, and replaced it with the notion that "time" is relative. That's an obvious instance of doubting a "hinge-proposition".

If every statement may be doubted, then every justification may be doubted. You have no grounds for certainty. — Banno

That is exactly what the inquiry concerns here, what are the grounds for certainty? According to what I've argued it is impossible that hinge-propositions give us the grounds for certainty because these are just ancient relics, phrases from days gone by, when knowledge was far less developed; phrases like "the sun rises in the morning", which really don't give us any cause to be certain about the way things actually are.

This is why I turn instead toward "certitude" as the grounds for certainty. Certitude is an attitude of confidence which instills the feeling of being certain. Certitude, as the grounds for certainty, is often rejected for being subjective (of the subject), because many have the attitude that certainty must be objective (of the object, i.e. "it is certain that..."), but it really doesn't make sense to say that anything other than a subject is certain.

However, reality doesn't seem to be the same sort of thing with regard to epistemology. When I attempt to make good sense of this parallel between the rules of chess and reality, I can only surmise the following... — creativesoul

Hi creativesoul! It's been a while, I missed you. It appears like we may be on the same side of the coin (so far) this time around.

So you are certain of it?

Here is an odd contradiction, since previously you said — Banno

I don't see the contradiction. I have no reason to doubt that the bishop moves only diagonally because I know the rules. But this does not mean that the statement cannot be doubted. And doubt is an attitude of the individual, such that every individual must decide for oneself whether or not to doubt this. As in my example, for the person who does not know the game, nor knows whether to trust your authority on this matter, it is reasonable for that person to doubt this.

SO, it seemed to me that each time you moved a piece, it was incumbent on you to first whether or not it is reasonable to doubt that the bishop moved only diagonally. — Banno

No' that's not what I said, nor implied. I was talking about considering statements. In the consideration of statements it is incumbent on me to decide whether or not I ought to doubt the statement. If I were playing chess, I would be considering which moves to make, not considering statements, so the example is not relevant. Though there would still be doubt involved as to which move I ought to make, there would be no doubt in my mind concerning the rules. Any such doubt would have been dealt with when I first encountered, and learned the rules.

There is an issue here that we ought sort through. For if, as you say, we must start with the assumption that every statement can be potentially doubted, then we must also suppose that any justification offered in the form of a sentence must also be doubted. So if we doubt that the bishop moves diagonally, we must also doubt that the my authority on the issue, as well as the authority of such Chess Federations as one might choose. — Banno

You seem to be refusing my distinction between "may be doubted", and "ought to be doubted". So you represent my position as claiming that any justification in the form of a sentence "must" be doubted. But that is not what I am claiming, what I claim is that it may be doubted. Do you recognize the difference between what one may do, because it is possible to do that, and what one ought to do because it is the rational decision?

Further, it is my claim that statements which would be unreasonable for me to doubt, could be reasonably doubted by someone else, and vise versa. So I think it would be very difficult to support a position like Wittgenstein's, which seeks to cast a net on certain statements, saying that it is unreasonable to doubt these particular statements, in a generalized way, because for some people, uder certain circumstances it would be reasonable to doubt them.

For you must doubt any such decision. — Banno

Why must you doubt something just because it is possible to doubt that thing? This does not make sense. Do you think that you must do everything which is possible for you to do?

The will is the cause of our free choices. It's free from the temporal existence which we know of as the chain of causation, because it is immaterial, like the soul.

Is there any sort of certainty you are happy with? — Banno

Certainty is an ideal, just like justified true belief is an ideal. There is nothing wrong with assuming ideals though, they can be very useful, like the numbers.

If you define determinism as just acting on what you want to do as most compatiblist say, then that's fine. I have no disagreement. However it's just redefining the word free will. If people's choices is an effect of the cause of their desires and their desires are also part of cause and effect, then their choices are still part of the cause and effect chain. — SonJnana

The point with free will though, is that the particular choice is not caused by any desire, it is caused by the will, which is free from that chain of causation. This is why the nature of time is so important to free will. The causal chain exists as a continuity between past and future. That is what we know as temporal existence. The will exists at the present, and breaks the continuity, i.e. it breaks the causal chain.

Abstract facts are timelessly true. — Michael Ossipoff

I don't agree with this principle. That's Platonic Realism and I do not agree with it. I believe in an ever changing world where human beings have free will, and if there is anything which is outside of time (timeless), it is not abstract facts.

Your confusion is linguistic. — Michael Ossipoff

That's right. You and I use the same words in completely different ways, so I haven't the capacity to really comprehend what you are saying. I understand enough to get a gist of what you are saying, and I disagree with it.

But what about certainty, without the obtuse adjective? — Banno

That depends on how you define "certainty". As I said I associate doubt with ambiguity. Do you distinguish "certainty" from "certitude"? If so, then when someone states "this is a certainty", how would you know that it is not just a case of certitude?

You have to know what 'existence' means in order to be able to coherently ask the question as to whether any thing exists. — Janus

That's not true. If we learn the meaning of words through demonstration, then to know what "existence" means requires an example or demonstration of existence. If one has not been provided with any examples of what existence looks, sounds or feels like in any way, yet people talk about existence as if it were a property which things have, then that person can coherently ask whether anything really exists.

When Moore shows his hands as an answer to skepticism; I take him to be pointing out that our idea of existence comes from perception. For an object to exist is to be perceptible; so when Moore shows his hands he is showing that they exist, and there can be no coherent skepticism about that. The answer to "How do I know my hands exist?" is " You can see that they are parts of your body". — Janus

The problem with this is that we perceive objects as particular things, and we are sometimes wrong in our perceptions. This is what validates the skeptics position, the fact that we are sometimes wrong in the judgements concerning our perceptions. For this reason we cannot say that to be perceptible is to exist, because hallucinations and other wrong judgements are things perceived. So as I said, when Moore shows his hands, it only serves as proof of existence if they really are "hands". If they are not hands, then our perceptions have failed us, because we have perceived them as hands. And if our perceptions may fail us in this way then we can't rely on them to determine existence. Therefore in order for Moore's argument to work, it is required that there is necessity that what he holds up actually are hands. Language, due to ambiguity doesn't give us that necessity.

On the language game involved? — Banno

Yes, that would be a part of the judgement, a judgement as to what is the language game involved. For instance, earlier in the thread I had to judge whether Sam26 was joking or not. Because I didn't have certitude, I had doubt as to what Sam meant.

it seems you have committed yourself to doubting that the bishop only moved diagonally. — Banno

Why would you say that? I've made it very clear that whether or not one ought to doubt, is dependent on a rational decision of the individual involved, according to the circumstances. I have no reason to doubt that the bishop only moves diagonally, I've played the game before.. But a person not at all familiar with the game of chess would not know what you meant by "the bishop", and "only moved diagonally", so this person would have no certitude with respect to your claim, and it would not be unreasonable for this person to doubt that the bishop only moved diagonally. Doubt is directly related to a person's certitude, and just because one person might doubt what you think ought not be doubted, doesn't mean that the person is unreasonable.

If the person were unwilling to accept your authority, you might have to show them a copy of the rules. But if the person didn't know you at all, why would it be more reasonable for the person to have faith in your authority, than to not trust you, and therefore doubt you? If you met someone on the street whom you had never met before, and this person made a statement about something you knew nothing about, wouldn't it be reasonable to doubt that person, even if to that person, what was being said was an obvious truth.

That is exactly why I deny that universal forms have any real independent existence, it becomes contradictory in the way that you describe here. The independent universal must be a unique individual, as I described, and this makes it a particular. But as you explain, it doesn't make sense to say that the universal is a particular. So it becomes necessary to dismiss the notion that universal forms have existence independent from the human minds which conceive of them. That is why the Neo-Platonists, and Christian theologians moved on to describe the independent Forms as individuals. The Neo-Platonists described a procession of individual forms emanating from the One, and Aquinas described God and the angels as independent Forms.

However, it's important to keep in mind what Moore is responding to, and it doesn't seem to be about linguistic justification. — Sam26

The issue is linguistic right from the start. The skeptic's point is that we do not know what the word "existence" means, to the extent that we can justify the claim that there is such a thing as existence. This, having no clear and concise knowledge of what it means "to exist", is what supports the skeptic's position that there may not be such a thing as existence. Until we can say precisely what existence is, then the skeptic has reason to doubt that things exist.

What Moore does is simply transfer the doubt concerning this generality, "existence", to a particular object, which he identifies as a "hand". He says look, this particular object which we call a hand, clearly has existence, therefore it is unreasonable to doubt, in a general, overall sense, that things exist. It is similar to Descartes' I think therefore I exist, but it says, a hand exists therefore there is existence. But now we have the question of what does it mean to be a "hand". Only if we can show what it means to be a hand, have we demonstrated that hands exist, and therefore refuted the skeptics concerns.

So the issue is linguistic through and through. The skeptic has a concern with the meaning of "existence". Moore transfers the skeptic's doubt from "existence" to "hand". Wittgenstein picks up on the linguistic issue implying that what it means to be a hand, is to be the thing referred to by "hand". This assumes that there is a thing referred to by "hand". The skeptic would be refuted if we ought not doubt whether the thing referred to by "hand" really is a hand, because this would confirm that there really is an existing thing called a "hand".

As I stated, my concern is with ambiguity.

A fact is a state of affairs, an aspect of the way things are. — Michael Ossipoff

There is a big problem with this definition. "The way things are", refers to a moment of time at the present. But time is passing, and things are changing. So there is really no such thing as "the way things are", because this would require a stoppage of time, and that would create an unreal situation.

But if any of the above-stated definitions are wrong, in the sense of being strongly-contradicted by standard philosophical usage, then of course I’ll use the standard definitions instead. — Michael Ossipoff

Your definition of "fact" is not only wrong in the sense that it is inconsistent with the standard definitions, that I gave in my last post, but it is also wrong in the sense that it describes something which appears to be physically impossible, (the way things are), as I explained above.

Not to argue for determinism, but it doesn't seem like that to me. It seems more that the things of the future are necessary because they are part of the causal chain of events or else they wouldn't be the future. But yes, I do experience the contingency. — SonJnana

So this is the issue right here, the difference between free will and determinism. The determinist sees things in the future as necessary because they are part of a causal chain of events, and that causal chain is already in motion. The free willist experiences the capacity to interfere with that causal chain of events, to bring into existence what is desired, and to avoid what is unwanted in the future.

Now we have to account for each of these two apparently different ways of seeing reality, and this requires an ontology. We need to describe what it means to exist, what it means to be a part of a causal chain of events. The causal chain of events describes a continuity of existence, and this continuity is assumed to extend right from the past, through the future, such that the present has no real influence. The free willist sees a break in the continuity, at the present, and this allows that a causal chain of events can be started or stopped at any moment of the present, by an act of free will.

So "every statement is inherently doubtable" is doubtable? — Banno

Of course. Absolute certainty is impossible, and the request for absolute certainty becomes circular as it revolves around a requirement for the impossible. Doubt on the other hand may become an infinite regress, and that's why Wittgenstein insists on putting an end to doubt at hinge-propositions. My argument is that whether or not it is reasonable to doubt a particular proposition is not a function of the proposition itself, it is a judgement made by the rational human being, a judgement based in the particularities of the circumstances.



I think I see more clearly now, what you mean by "hinge-propositions", and why you assume that they are bedrock, or foundational. Is it correct to say that hinge-propositions would demonstrate, or show the use of the individual words, such that the hinge propositions act as fundamental justifications in themselves? Moore's "here is a hand" acts to demonstrate the meaning of "hand". If this is the case, then the hinge-proposition would take the place that definitions hold in formal logic, or axioms in mathematics.

What remains is our difference as to whether or not it is reasonable to doubt such things. In philosophy it is often said that a proposition is beyond doubt if it is self-evident. But self-evidence requires that the meaning of the terms be already known, and therefore taken for granted. If hinge-propositions are beneath this, demonstrating the meaning of terms, then they cannot be self-evident.

The reason why I claim that hinge-propositions are not beyond doubt, is the issue of ambiguity. If the hinge-proposition acts to define the term, then if there is ambiguity in the hinge-proposition, doubt is called for, just like if there is ambiguity in a definition. So the issue I see with hinge-propositions is ambiguity, and ambiguity calls for doubt.

Just remind me about how you deal with the obvious circularity: should you doubt that you ought doubt every statement? — Banno

I didn't say that you ought to doubt every statement. I said that every statement is inherently doubtable, that is the nature of statements in general. Whether you ought or ought not doubt any particular statement is a decision which must be made according to the circumstances of the situation. But since every statement is inherently doubtable, then we ought to make that decision as to whether or not to doubt the statement, with respect to every instance statement.

Yes, it's important to understand what it means to justify a belief, and I'm not sure we can come to any agreement on a general definition. — Sam26

I find it very interesting that the word "justify" is quite similar to the word "just", and "just" is the word which Plato had extreme difficulty in finding any consensus of meaning in The Republic. They are both very difficult words because what they refer to is a very important social relation, correctness. That this relation is important, produces the inclination within individuals to ensure that they have it their way. When something is important to me, I want to make sure that I make it go my way.

I think we might agree that "justify" relates to "the correctness, or rightness of", in a general sense. Whereas "just" refers to correctness in a more restricted sense, a moral sense. Do we agree, that both "just" and "justify" refer to human actions? The former, "just" refers to morally correct actions, but a human being who is prone to carrying out just actions might also be called a just person. So we'd also use "just" to refer to a person who would likely make just actions. The latter, "justify" refers to an action which is carried out in order to show the correctness of something, in our case, a belief. So "justified" refers to a belief which has been shown, and therefore judged to be correct.

Where we seem to disagree is with respect to what qualifies as justification. I believe that a demonstration, a "showing" must be carried out in order that a belief may be justified. You seem to think that a person may be justified in one's belief without any such demonstration. So to take your example, the person drinks some orange juice, judges it as sweet, and is justified in this belief, without any "showing" of the correctness of this belief. The person is justified simply by judging it according to one's senses.

I would say that this person has a true belief, truth being dependent one's own sincerity, such that the person truly believes that the juice tastes sweet. That the juice is sweet is a true belief. And so I would differentiate between true and justified in this way. Justification requires the social aspect, the confirmation that what I truly believe, based on my sense observations is consistent with what others truly believe. This confirmation can only be produced from the "showing", the demonstration, which I call justification.

The problem with this is that you're not following closely what I'm saying, and that's part of the problem. I answered this a few posts back. Wittgenstein points out, and I believe correctly so, that Moore statements are outside the purview of epistemological concerns. And of course, if a statement is outside of epistemology, then it doesn't concern itself with JTB, and that's the point. Moore's propositions are nonsensical, it's not about knowing, it's about something that's bedrock or basic, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them as hinge-propositions. Think of the door as the language-game of epistemology, and the hinge allows it to swing. Without such basic beliefs there would be no epistemology. The door wouldn't swing, so to speak. — Sam26

These propositions cannot be bedrock, or basic at all. They must be considered to be completely outside epistemology, a completely different language-game. Describing them as bedrock implies that epistemology is structured on them as if they were a foundation, but we cannot consider them in that way. They are simply figures of speech, implements of communication, and unrelated to the epistemological structure. If I taste the orange juice and say "I know that the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it", this is simply know-how (knowing how to judge the taste of the object), and is not related to knowledge as epistemology is concerned with, knowing-that, because the "I know that it is sweet" has not been justified. So it is not a true case of knowing-that. The use of "know" here is no different from its use if we were to say that the dog knows how to bark. "Know" is not used in the epistemological sense, which requires justification. Justification is required in order to prove that what I perceive with my senses is consistent with what you perceive with your senses. So simply perceiving something with my senses doesn't provide justification, corroboration is required.

So I would not even relate these so-called "hinge-propositions" to epistemology at all, they are in a completely different game. Since they are not justified we should not allow ourselves to fall for the illusion that they are actually related to epistemic knowledge. We must create a separation between them and epistemic knowledge, such that real knowledge can only be based in properly justified principles.

I see these other different ways, and I accept them. Sam's way of seeing things is not incompatible with mine they are actually very similar. The problem I have is that Sam wants to draw an absolutely arbitrary line between what is and is not reasonable to doubt. And since this line is arbitrary I see no reason to respect it. In fact, the line seems more hypothetical than anything else, and I see it as hindering rather than enhancing understanding.

The way I see it is that we have to decide with each instance of usage, whether or not it is reasonable to doubt what has been said. This requires that we start with the assumption that any statement is potentially doubted. If we start with the assumption that some statements are not doubtable then we approach with a prejudice, and will not be inclined to decide with each instance of usage, whether or not the statement ought to be doubted.

Sure there were, before there were humans on the Earth. There were facts, but there were no utterances made about facts, because there were no animals with speech. — Michael Ossipoff

A "fact" is a thing known to have occurred, and this implies a knower. What makes you think that there was a knower before there was animals with speech?

No, they're just propositions. — Michael Ossipoff

A proposition is a statement. There is no such thing as a proposition which is not a statement.

Again, you could truly say that, for any proposition, there's a potential statement. I don't deny that.


I agree that, for any fact, there's a potential statement of that fact. But I'm talking about facts instead of statements. — Michael Ossipoff

Sorry, but a proposition is an actual statement, not a potential statement, and a fact is an actual thing known, not a potential thing known. You are using words in an unacceptable way, and that's why I disagree with your metaphysics.

The physical world consists of facts, and I agree that, for every fact, there's a potential utterance about that fact.

But the facts are what the world consists of. — Michael Ossipoff

As far as I know, there are two principle ways that "fact" is used. One is to refer to a thing known, and this requires a knower. The other is to refer to a truth, and a truth is something which is true. True means to correspond with reality. If you are using "fact" to refer to something which corresponds with reality, rather than to refer to something which is known to have occurred, then how is this not a statement?

I'm interested to hear this. So how do we go from our understandings of past and future to free will? — SonJnana

Do you recognize that things of the past (whether or not they've been observed or recorded), have a fixed, determined existence, i.e., that they cannot be changed? And do you recognize that things of the future are not absolutely necessary, that they may or may not occur, depending on whether or not they are caused to occur, and this is why we say that the existence of temporal things is "contingent"?

What I said about statements was that any fact about our world can be stated as an if-then fact.

I didn't say that every fact about our world is a statement. A statement is an utterance about a fact, and I never said that the world consists of utterances. — Michael Ossipoff

I don't see how there could be a fact without a statement as to what that fact is. What is an "if-then fact" without the "if" and the "then". It doesn't make sense that there could be an if-then fact without the "if-then", and these are utterances. Since I conceive of a statement of the fact as necessary for the existence of any fact, then what you say, to me, necessarily implies that the world consists of utterances.

I agree, but we generally all take what we say seriously, though we tend to lighten things up now and then with jokes. For some reason though, if someone's joke is taken seriously, we brush it off as a mistake of misunderstanding, but if someone's seriousness is taken as a joke, it turns out to be an insult.

Not that this refers to you, but some people like to hover along the division between being serious and being joking. If they are always joking then they should never get offended, but they are never always joking, so they always end up getting offended.

The PTSD comment was a joke. lol — Sam26

Thanks for the reassurance. I was pretty sure that it was meant solely as a joke, but it would have been very poor etiquette for me to have laughed if it wasn't completely a joke.

As usual we're just too far apart on these issues. — Sam26

Don't you see this as a big problem for any epistemology? What "justify" means for me is completely different from what it means for you. Isn't it absolutely necessary to have some form of agreement on word usage in order to have any success in epistemology?

It appears to me like you want to take such agreement for granted, "here is a hand", "I live on the earth", etc.. That we agree on these things, you want to take for granted. My argument is that we ought not take such agreement for granted, that in reality this agreement must be created, established, maintained, and this is not a simple thing. The Catholic Inquisition (as misguided as it was) was begun as a direct attempt to restrict language usage; belief and word usage are closely tied. Sure, the epistemologist might be inclined to take some fundamental principles of word usage for granted, as you are, but my argument is that this "taking for granted" creates an illusion of necessity, and behind this illusion hides the true nature of language use and knowledge, as contingent. The claim that some things cannot be doubted creates the illusion that they are necessary, when they are not.

It is natural that the epistemologist will seek something "necessary" as the foundation of knowledge, which would ground and support all the conceptual structures of the human mind, but that necessity is not to be found in language use, by the very nature of language use.. So we must push deeper into the habits of the human mind in order to locate this fundamental necessity.

I copied all of the conversations from philosophyforums and I was getting PTSD reading MU's responses. - roflol - I had to take some meds. — Sam26

I'm sorry for any unnecessary stress. From my perspective though, I see that sometimes people get very stuck in their own way of seeing things, and you need to hit them over the head with a brick or something to make them see that there are other ways, completely different ways, of seeing the very same thing. Each of the different ways may be true and valid, though they appear inconsistent at the fringes. But that they are different, yet true, indicates that no one single perspective is complete. So we must approach the different perspectives of the different human beings, as if each perspective is as valid as our own, despite the inconsistencies at the fringes.

The point is that we need to be able to distinguish between the two, viz., those that are understood in terms of justification, and those that fall outside any need for justification. — Sam26

So this is my problem right here. Why ought we assume that some statements fall outside the need for justification? We are talking epistemology here, and knowledge is assumed to be justified true belief. So if a statement falls outside justification, then what that statement says cannot, by definition, be considered to be knowledge.

The answer to this question lies in another question, "Does it make sense to doubt the claim?" — Sam26

Since these statements fall outside the need for justification, and therefore are not knowledge, then it clearly makes sense, to doubt them.

If you follow my argument, then you ought to see that Wittgenstein has gone wrong at this point. The statements which are "outside the need for justification" cannot be knowledge because knowledge requires justification, and since they are not knowledge, doubt concerning them is warranted. If we do doubt them, then they may in fact become justified, and be admitted as knowledge. But we cannot allow that something unjustified, or unjustifiable, is the foundation of knowledge, when knowledge specifically requires justification. If those things are outside justification, then they are outside of epistemology as well, and cannot be allowed within until they are justified.

So no statement is beyond doubt. And if in common usage we allow such things, and we allow people to say "I know this", or "I know that", without proper justification, then they are using "know" in a less restrictive way than the epistemologist would use "know" as defined by justified true belief.

How do you know there is a planet in such-and-such a place? I observed it, and you can observe it too, look and see. These are not subjective observations. They can be objectively verified. — Sam26

It appears like you haven't really considered what I said about justification. To say "I observed it" does not justify the claim. To explain where and how it was observed, such that another person can observe it as well, is to justify the claim. The statement "I observed it" adds nothing more to the claim, and therefore cannot possibly justify it. To justify it requires a demonstration, explanation, or description of exactly what you observed, which is used to support your statement of claim.

Moore is standing before an audience raising his hand and makes the statement that this is a hand, i.e., that he knows it's a hand. But what would a doubt here look like? — Sam26

Now consider this example again. Moore stands before the audience, holds up his hand, and says "this is a hand". He is not making a statement of claim, "I know that this is a hand", he is making a proposition, and supporting it with a demonstration. This thing I am holding up is what I call a "hand". If the audience accepts this proposition, without objection, then he is justified in calling that thing a hand. If he was holding up a foot, the audience would probably reject the proposition.

However, it is not necessary that the audience accepts Moore's proposition, "this is a hand". They may, for one reason or another reject this proposition, and that's the point I'm trying to make. You would say, following Wittgenstein, that there is no reason to reject, or doubt this, but I disagree. We might for instance ask Moore to be more specific. He is holding up his entire arm, and saying this is a hand. Is his arm a hand? His wrist? His fingers? What exactly is he referring to with "hand"? We don't ask these things because in this example it is unimportant, we take it for granted that there is a hand there somewhere, exactly where it begins and ends, we might not really know, but we do not care. If he is to proceed forward with this knowledge though, of what a hand is, and apply it toward logical proceedings, to gain further knowledge, he may need to address these questions.

Suppose he starts talking about the bones in his wrist, as if they are part of his hand, and some people are confused because they are trying to locate these bones in the palm. That is why I argue that as a principle of epistemology, the usage of the terminology must be justified for each application according to the circumstances of the application. We cannot just assume that there are some words whose meaning we take for granted, and therefore the meaning of these words does not need to be justified, because this will result in ambiguity and very sloppy epistemology.

I am trying to understand what you mean by this. Each universal form or concept is "particular" in the sense that it is unique relative to other concepts. If it was not, then they would fail the principle of indiscernible; and to this, I agree. But if you mean that concepts are particulars in the same sense that this rock is a particular, then this cannot be. As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars.

If you still mean the latter, then what reason do you have to support the claim that the ideal is necessarily a particular? — Samuel Lacrampe

You agreed with me that our descriptions of the universals are imperfect. You have your description, I have my description, and there are differences between the two. But we assume that there is what you called "the real universal", the correct conception of any concept, and this is what I called the perfect conception, or the ideal. Do you agree that the perfect conception, or ideal, must be a particular? This means that it must be unique in its existence. If you had one tiny aspect of the conception wrong, then you wouldn't have the perfect conception, And so the conceptions that each of us have are riddled with these minor deficiencies and are not the "real universal".

So the "real universal", due to this perfection, is necessarily a particular. As you say, a rock is also a particular. But your suggestion is that a rock is a particular in a different way from the way that the "real universal" is a particular. How can this be? A particular is a particular. What defines the particular is that it is a unique, one of a kind ,individual. In the sense of being a particular I see no difference between an immaterial particular and a material particular. Your claim appears to be that an immaterial particular is different from a material particular. I'll agree with you on that difference between immaterial and material,.but as a particular there appears to be no reason to believe that there is any difference, one is a material particular, the other an immaterial particular.

As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars. — Samuel Lacrampe

There appears to be something confused in this statement. The universal form, without matter, is the ideal, the perfect, and is therefore necessarily a particular. Human minds, and their conceptions are corrupted by the material nature of the human body, and so human conceptions do not obtain the level of the ideal, they are imperfect. So the difference in conception, of the same concept, between you and I, and others, is due to our material nature, and this is why we do not achieve the perfect conception, the ideal. However, if we are to assume that there are such perfect forms, without matter, then by the very assumption that they are perfect, ideal, then they are necessarily individual.

On what grounds do you disagree with it and claim that it's speculative?

As I've pointed out, anything that can be said about this physical world can be said as an if-then fact. — Michael Ossipoff

You've described the world as consisting of statements of fact (if-then facts). I don't think that the world consists of statements. I think that a statement is a representation of how people perceive the world, and there is a lot more to the world than what we perceive.

Well, actually we justify beliefs in this way all the time. Do you mean to say that I can't claim to know that the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it? Or, I can't claim to know that a particular tree is in a specific spot in the woods because I saw it? That would be a bit bizarre. — Sam26

Take a look at what you're saying with these examples. "The orange juice is sweet". You've tasted the orange juice, but you've given no indication that you know what "sweet" is, to back up your claim. So you've given no justification for your judgement that the juice is sweet, only a statement of judgement. A statement of judgement does not constitute justification for that judgement. How can you accept any such statement of judgement as justification for that judgement? I might taste the juice and claim that I know the juice is tart. Then we have two conflicting descriptions of the juice, each, according to your sense of justification is justified.

Look at your other statement, "a particular tree is in a specific spot in the woods". You haven't identified the tree or the spot. To do this you would have to produce a picture, drawing of the tree, or otherwise describe or identify the tree, and then a map of some sort, showing that the tree which you saw was in a particular relationship with other land marks. Or, you could say that you walked in the woods, and walked past this and that object in these relative locations, and came across a specific tree which looks like this, and describe the tree in its relationship with the other ojects.

Notice how justification of something which was sensed, requires a description. The claimed statement of fact "the orange juice is sweet" requires a description in order to justify it. For example, I tasted it and it was comparable to the honey which we agree is sweet.

I don't know where you come up with such a limited definition of justify. Moreover, this problem is something I see quite a bit. If you do a careful study of how we use the term justify, it doesn't just apply to logical arguments such as proofs. — Sam26

We are not talking about "justify" in its common use. We are talking about a very specific use of "justify" in a particular field of study, epistemology. Words such as this, which play a very specific role within a field of study have very restrictive definitions within that field of study, and these definitions must be upheld to maintain the principles of that field of study. I think it is very clear, that in epistemology, "justify" requires a demonstration, explanation, or description. You cannot justify a statement simply by saying "I've sensed it to be so".

There is a difference between the concept of justification, and actually being justified. One may think one is justified based on whatever method of justification one is using, but that doesn't mean you are justified. Obviously if it turns out that what you thought you saw wasn't in fact a tree for example, then you're not justified. Simply saying you're justified doesn't mean you are. Saying you're justified and being justified are quite different. That said, our sensory perceptions are generally correct, if this wasn't the case, then much of what we believe wouldn't be justified, which I assume you believe. Besides we often make claims based on strong inductive arguments that such-and-such is the case, and we are perfectly within our rights based on the rules of good inductive arguments; but that doesn't mean that we're necessarily correct. — Sam26

The point is that "to justify" is to demonstrate the correctness of. This means that the people who you demonstrate this to, must accept the demonstration, as a judgement of "correct" is required. So justification is an action, a procedure, which is not necessarily successful. You can attempt to justify something, and fail. Also, you can think that you have justified something when you have not.

In relation to our sense perceptions, the issue of justification is not necessarily a matter of whether or not our sense perceptions are correct, it may be a matter of how we put words to our sense perceptions, how we describe them. If a person does not have the capacity to adequately describe what was sensed, then the claimed sensation cannot be justified. This is where words fail us, in describing new things. Some might argue that this presents us with the limits to knowledge, where words cannot go, but that's not true. What we must do is figure out ways of expressing the new sensations, and new feelings, and that's how knowledge expands, language develops and evolves.

So if you ask me how I know the orange juice is sweet, and I say I know it because I tasted it, what kind of claim am I making if it's not a knowledge claim? Is it a mere belief, an opinion? — Sam26

Yes, that claim "I know it is sweet because I tasted it" is a mere statement belief or opinion. The use of "know" here only indicates your personal certitude, or conviction in your belief. It is not supported by evidence that you know what "sweet" means, and that you are qualified to make that judgement. The problem is that we, your auditors, take it for granted that you know what "sweet" is, and because of this assumption we are inclined in common vernacular to say that you are justified in your statement.

This points directly to your beliefs concerning foundational propositions. Remember in Wittgenstein's "On Certainty", if we keep asking for justification, we get to the bottom, where justification can go no further. This bottom consists of the things which we take for granted. We know what a "hand" is, we know what "the earth" is, we know what "sweet" is, etc.. But I do not agree with Wittgenstein, that we can go no further in our request for justification. I believe that even these fundamentals need to be justified. In some circumstances it is reasonable to ask individuals to demonstrate that they know what these words means, like Socrates asked for a demonstration of "just" from the participants in Plato's "Republic". How we each understand each word may need to be justified because if it comes about, through evolving practises, that "sweet" means something different for you than for me, or "hand", or "earth", or any other words, then our epistemology, the entire structure of knowledge starts to become compromised.

For example. Look at what "justify" means to you, in comparison with what it means to me. I have a much more restricted definition than you. Suppose we apply our competing definitions toward a scientist justifying a theory with reference to what occurred in the lab. Under your definition, the scientist says it's true because I saw it in the lab. Under my definition the scientist must account for exactly what was seen in the lab, such that we can properly judge what is being claimed.

As to your last sentence in that paragraph, "To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen." So if a botanist comes out of the woods, and makes a claim that they know they saw an oak tree, you would say to them - "You don't know it, you only believe it." That would really be strange. You're perfectly justified based on the general accuracy of your sensory perceptions. — Sam26

You are just making an appeal to authority here. And an appeal to authority, when the authority is verified, qualifies as justification. The person says "I saw an oak tree". You ask for justification. The person says "I am a botanist, I know what an oak tree is". You may ask for credentials, etc.. But as Wittgenstein indicates, there is no real bottom to justification, we get to the point where we just take things for granted.

The one question that seems to separate statements that are outside our epistemological language-games, and those that fall within these language-games, is the question of whether it makes sense to doubt the statement. — Sam26

This point, which Wittgenstein suggests, "whether it makes sense to doubt the statement", is just an arbitrary line, a division which Wittgenstein seeks to impose. In reality, "whether it makes sense to doubt", is just a decision which we all must make, and a decision which is specifically formulated for each particular instance of usage. There is no general principle, of this or that statement ought not be doubted, as Wittgenstein might appear to imply. In reality any statement might be reasonably doubted under the right circumstances. So your claim that there are foundational statements which are outside the epistemological language-games cannot be supported. Otherwise we would have to admit that there are statements which are "necessarily correct". But the correctness of statements is contingent on how the statements relate to the world, and this contingency denies the possibility of "necessarily correct" statements. If you go that route, toward necessarily correct statements you validate Platonic Realism.

Metaphysician Undercover says "I do not believe that Moore has justified a his belief simply by referring to sensory experience"

What do we make of this? Does Meta not understand what a hand is? Does he not understand how to use the word "here"? — Banno

If Moore says "this is a hand", or "here is a hand", and holds up a hand, he is performing a demonstration. If I agree, that what he holds up is a hand, then he has demonstrated to my satisfaction, that he knows what a hand is, and I conclude that he is justified in saying that. He might then proceed to say "I have two hands", and I'd be inclined to say that he is justified in saying this because he has demonstrated that he knows what a hand is.

If, on the other hand, he makes the statement "I have two hands", without demonstrating that he knows what a hand is, then this is a simple statement of claim. This statement needs to be justified unless I am prepared to take it for granted that he knows what a hand is.

In the former case, he is making a demonstration, I except the demonstration as successful, therefore he is justified. In the latter case he is making a statement of claim and unless I am ready to accept his claim on faith and trust, a request for justification is warranted. Sam26, following Wittgenstein, would say that such a request for justification is not warranted, it is unreasonable because I ought to accept on faith the foundations of our knowledge. .

All I said about that was that I can't prove that the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in doesn't superflously exist, as a brute-fact, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, alongside, and duplicating the evens and relations of, the inevitable logical system that my metaphysics describes. — Michael Ossipoff

I don't see how this is a metaphysical statement. You have stated that you are incapable of proving something.

Yes you have. I've posted a long version of it in these discussions with you. You acknowledged how long it was. Remember? — Michael Ossipoff

Oh now I remember, I couldn't make sense of your metaphysical proposal.

Well, the statement that there's inevitably a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, that comprises a story whose events and relations are those of your experience, — Michael Ossipoff

This is a speculative assumption. And I disagree with it.

Its disproving by the fact that they are not merely rooted by your physical needs, they are rooted in your psychological needs as well, I find this to be blatantly obvious. You are not just a physical creature, you possess an intellect and higher faculties and they are heavily influenced by society. — Fumani

As far as I can tell, my intellect and society present me with choices, they do not present me with needs. My physical body presents me with needs and desires, while my intellect and society present me with options (choices) for fulfilling those needs and desires.

Cutting off all other possibilities and focusing on one does not imply free will, the decision you made could have just be an unconscious trigger driven by a desire that you cant really say is yours. — Fumani

I can't fathom what you are saying. You are suggesting that I might make an impulsive, non-consciously driven decision, and that decision is driven by someone else's desire. How is that possible? The other person's desire would have to get inside my body (not my mind because it's a non-conscious decision), and cause my body to make this decision. That's nonsense.

Negation also means and implies an absence of all other potential choices that you had, if you say yes to something your invariably saying no to something else, even if there is an absence of investigation or conscious awareness. — Fumani

This is not true, and you don't seem to be able to grasp it. Saying yes to a particular option does not mean that you have said no to the other possibilities. You see a favourable option and you say yes. You are not saying no to all the other possibilities because they remain unknown to you. To say no to them you must consider them and reject them, but when you see a favourable option and accept it without considering other possibilities, this is not the same thing as saying no to the other possibilities.

First, we use sensory experience to justify a belief. For example, you might ask how I know the orange juice is sweet, and I may respond with, "I know it's sweet, because I tasted it." — Sam26

I do not believe that one can justify a belief simply by referring to sensory experience. This is because "to justify" means to demonstrate or prove something. If I could justify a belief simply by saying I know that it's the case because I saw it, then many mistaken perceptions and lies would qualify as justification. To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen.

One doesn't doubt the foundation of our world any more than one doubts the pieces in a chess game. Just as the game of chess is built around the pieces and the board, so too is our language built around the reality in which we have our life. There are certain fundamentals that are generally not doubted. — Sam26

I would not agree with this either. Just like we can ask the person to justify "I know it's the case because I saw it", we can ask for justification of the fundamentals. The fundamentals are mostly derived from our sense perceptions, and the descriptions of what we perceive all need to be justified. That is why science uses repetition and comparison in experimentation, rather than simple observation. If the reasons for maintaining the fundamentals cannot be justified then we have reason to dismiss them.

The very real problem here is that the most fundamental aspects of knowledge are the oldest, and knowledge evolves. So the time may come when the rapidly expanding body of knowledge with newly established principles, starts to be inconsistent with the foundations. That is why we need to revisit the foundations, and see if they remain strong in light of newly discovered principles. For instance, "the sun rises in the morning" could be such a fundamental principle. But if we revisit it, we can see that it isn't really correct to say "the sun rises". This is a relic left over from an ancient world view, which should really be replaced because it isn't conducive to proper thinking about the relationship between the earth and the sun. We turn toward the sun in the morning, and away from the sun in the afternoon.

Yes, most metaphysicses seem speculative, or to need assumptions.

The metaphysics that I've been proposing isn't speculative, and neither makes nor needs any assumptions, and doesn't post any brute-fact.

And it doesn't say anything that anyone would disagree with. Though several people have expressed vague grumbling disapproval, no one has named any statement in that metaphysical proposal that they disagree with. — Michael Ossipoff

Actually, I think that all metaphysics is by definition speculative, so I don't know what you're talking about here. I haven't seen your proposal, but judging by what you say about it (it isn't speculative, has no assumptions, and no brute facts), I assume it's a little bit of nothing.