It's a soundness/validity kind of thing. Reasons that actually support the conclusion, if imperfectly, are what we want, not just any old stuff.

We distinguish between how well a claim supports a conclusion and whether that claim is itself factual.

Do you not understand the distinction, or do you reject it for some reason? — Srap Tasmaner

That tells me nothing. What we're talking about is falsities which support the conclusion. If someone is going to use a falsity to support a conclusion, they''ll probably use one which supports it well.

So we can never state that any belief is justified or reasonable because we can't be sure about hwhether they are true or not? — BlueBanana

Why would you say that? We can always make those claims, and often do. What I am saying is that if one makes such a claim, and is later proven wrong, then that person ought to admit to having been wrong, admit that the belief was unreasonable and unjustified, instead of trying to claim that the wrong belief really was "justified" or "reasonable", supported by other wrong beliefs. Such a failure to admit to having been wrong creates contradiction in what is meant by "reasonable" and "justified", and this allows deception to be reasonable and justified.

Being reasonable isn't the same thing as having reasons. — BlueBanana

Then we ought to differentiate between these two. But Michael seems to be arguing that if there are reasons for a belief then the belief is reasonable. I think that a belief which is known to be incorrect cannot be reasonable.

Earlier you agreed though that in the medieval times it was reasonable with the given evidence to believe that the Earth was flat. — BlueBanana

If I said that, then I misspoke. I don't think that it's reasonable for anyone to believe that the earth is flat. I probably implied that they thought it was reasonable, and that's why they believed it. They thought it was justified, so for them it was justified. I do not think it was reasonable for them to believe this, because I think that it is not a reasonable thing to believe, so I do not think it was justified. They are a different people from us.

In that situation you'd present the evidence to that person, after which the belief would no longer be reasonable. The person is justified in believing what they believe, but the belief itself is not within the knowledge you have justified, so you change the circumstances so that the person is no longer justified in believing what you think is a false belief. — BlueBanana

That the person does not have the evidence to demonstrate that the incorrect belief is incorrect, does not make the incorrect belief justified. So it is impossible for us to say that the incorrect belief which the person holds, or held, is justified. The person, and others may have held the belief as justified, but we now see this was wrong, and they were not justified in holding that belief.

You're conflating moral justification and epistemological justification, and also jumping into unjustified conclusions regarding what actions to take with unreasonable beliefs considered. — BlueBanana

These moral and legal examples were Michael's examples of justification. I find Michael's argued position to be downright abhorrent. Michael is trying to deny the true nature of mistake; that to make a mistake is to do something wrong; and to do something wrong is inherently irrational; by arguing that it may be reasonable and justified to do something wrong, if the incorrect beliefs which lead to the wrongdoing, the mistake, can be supported by evidence. So for example, if a police officer shoots an unarmed, innocent civilian, this mistake might be reasonable and justified, if the reasons for officer's incorrect belief that the unarmed civilian was an armed criminal, can be supported with evidence.

But this is simply to not face up to the fact that a mistake is a mistake; and that to make a mistake is to do something wrong; and to do something wrong is to do something which is inherently irrational. So instead of facing up to our mistakes, we might try to rationalize them, insisting that the irrational belief which lead to the mistake was really rational and justified. But this is nothing but contradiction, and so this entire argued perspective is nothing but an abhorrently detestable attempt at deception.

Please state the criterion for both, what it takes to be true and what it takes to be justified... on your view. — creativesoul

I cannot state any such "criterion", but I'll say that truth is based in honesty, so a true belief is an honest representation of what one thinks. Justification is a demonstration of the correctness of one's belief. So if I make a true representation of what I think, concerning a particular issue, and I manage to demonstrate the correctness of this belief, that is a justified true belief.

Oh, sorry noAxioms, my mistake. I somehow misread your comment as saying that such a discussion doesn't belong in this thread. Read too fast sometimes, and miss some words.

I am interested in observation and see a bridge between the view of something has to be this or that rather than potentially something.. — Edmund

This is the age old difference between being and becoming. Parmenides and the Eleatics insisted reality is described by being, and not being, what is and what is not. The natural philosophers of ancient Greece, like Heraclitus claimed that all is flux, and described reality in terms of becoming. Plato exposed a deep chasm separating these two world views. Aristotle demonstrated that being and becoming are fundamentally incompatible, and suggested an exception to the law of excluded middle to allow for the reality of becoming, under the concept of potential, in relation to the logical categories of being and not being. He insisted that the law of non-contradiction be upheld, but some modern schools such as dialectical materialism, adopting the principles of Hegelian dialectics, promote dialetheism which allows the law of non-contradiction to be violated.

It is not an explicitly metaphysical attitude, but it is one that has deep metaphysical consequences. — Wayfarer

Metaphysical differences produce epistemological consequences.

It isn't reasonable for me to hold that belief, but it's still reasonable for him to hold that belief. — Michael

So you're saying that if a person has reasons for one's belief, even if those reasons involve falsities, then that belief is reasonable? The problem is, that I always have reasons for my beliefs, and I think that others do too, but that doesn't make the beliefs reasonable. If those reasons include falsities then clearly my belief is unreasonable, despite the fact that I have reasons for that belief.

A belief is justified if it would be reasonable for the believer to hold the belief given the evidence available to him. — Michael

I don't agree with that. If I hold evidence that makes your belief unreasonable, then it's very clear that it's not reasonable for you to hold that belief. This is what justification is all about, discussing these beliefs and working out the unreasonableness which lies there. If I had the attitude that it was reasonable for you to hold false beliefs, then I would never be inclined to convince you of the reality of the situation. It is through confronting such unreasonableness that beliefs get justified.

If John doesn't know that the ID is fake then it would rational of him to believe that Sarah is 16. It would be wrong to say that because I know that it's fake that John's isn't being reasonable in committing to such a belief. — Michael

Not only is John being unreasonable but so are you. John is committed to a belief which you know is false, and is proceeding in activity which you know is wrong. You are claiming that it is reasonable for John to hold such a belief, and therefore reasonable for him to be proceeding in a wrong activity. If you do not designate his actions as unreasonable you will not be inclined to prevent him from proceeding with the wrongful actions. If you designate his actions as wrong, then to prevent him from proceeding, you will need to back this up with reasons, showing that his beliefs are unreasonable. If you truly belief his beliefs are reasonable, you have no recourse. So it is completely counterproductive, and unreasonable to think that John is being reasonable by committing to such a false belief. And I don't believe that anyone can honestly say that committing to a false belief is a reasonable thing to do.

If the truth is exposed to us but not to him then his belief is still justified. — Michael

No it's not, that's the point, once the belief is exposed as false it cannot be considered reasonable to hold that belief. Furthermore, it would require withholding evidence, and deception to say that his belief is justified. The judge has evidence that the documents are false, and saying that his belief is justified without revealing this evidence constitutes deception.

It is reasonable for him to believe what I know is false. — Michael

I disagree that you can honestly say this. If you know it's false, then you know that his belief is unreasonable. If you were honest, you would either let him go on with his belief which you know to be an unreasonable belief. or act to convince him that the belief is unreasonable. But I think it ought to be quite clear to you that to say that you know his belief is false, and to also think that it is reasonable for him to maintain this false belief, is to be dishonest. It is similar to what we call "rationalizing" which is a form of dishonesty, coming up with reasons to defend what one knows is wrong.

We might clear up the issue if we revisit the time factor. I submit that the judge might say "you were justified in your belief". But now, the truth is exposed, and that belief no longer qualifies as a justified belief. That's the point with the op. The falsity is exposed, yet the belief is still referred to as a justified belief.

I agree that "justified" does not mean certain. However, demonstrating that a belief is "not wrong", does not demonstrate that it is correct. Nor does it demonstrate "good legitimate reason" to believe it. Therefore I reject your argument which assumes that demonstrating a belief to be "not wrong" qualifies as justifying that belief.

I'm not equivocating, because I've already said that your definition of "justified" is unacceptable. We ought to adhere to an acceptable definition of 'justified". If you check your dictionary you'll find that "justify" requires demonstrating the correctness of.

If a belief is false, then one could believe that belief to be false. Yet, if the belief is justified, one can also believe it to be justified. — BlueBanana

So how could one believe the same belief to be both justified and false?

I'm not saying that the man was right to have sex with the girl. I'm saying that the man was justified in believing that she was 16, given the evidence available to him. — Michael

Clearly he wasn't right in believing that she was sixteen, so he wasn't justified in believing that she was sixteen. Justification requires demonstrating that one is right.

I'm not considering them both, I accept both as justified beliefs. — BlueBanana

So you have contradictory justified beliefs then. "God exists" and "God does not exist" are both justified. I think that an individual would necessarily be lying to claim them both as justified.

How does it matter what time we're talking about? Does it change with time whether a false belief can be justified? If we were having this discussion in the medieval times, it'd have clearly been possible to have a justified false belief. — BlueBanana

Things change. We're discussing predication, whether "justified" mat be predicated of a specific belief. In all matters of predication, time is important due to the reality of change.

And we're not discussing whether a false belief can be justified, we're discussing whether one can believe that a belief is both false and justified.

Then "compelling" might not be the right word. But my point stands with the example of you being accused of having sex with someone underage. It would be entirely appropriate for the judge to accept that your belief that she was 16, although false, was justified, and so to find you innocent of the charge. — Michael

I don't agree, because there is a difference between being held not liable, and being justified. Being found not liable is not the same as being justified. To be justified is to be demonstrated as being right. To be not liable is to be demonstrated as being not legally responsible for something which is wrong. One involves rightness, the other wrongness.

So the judge would not say that the man was "justified" meaning "right" in having sex with someone underage, just because she showed him false id. The false id. might be considered as a mitigating factor, but it cannot negate the fact that the act itself was wrong. The judge might leave the man as unpunished, but that does not mean that the judge thinks that the man was justified (right) in committing the wrongful act. This would be contradictory, to say that the act (sex with a girl under 16) is a wrongful act, and also that the man was justified (right) in committing it. And this is evident in drinking establishments which get their licenses revoked for serving alcohol to minors even though the minors were using false id.

Whether or not your belief is justified depends on whether or not the evidence available to you is compelling, which you admitted it is. — Michael

I think that's a very strange definition of "justified". If we go with "compelling evidence" as you suggest, then justification cannot be, as you suggest, a matter of the evidence being compelling to me, or else all my beliefs would be justified, because I only believe something when the evidence compels me to believe.. This would be a completely subjective Justification and justification is meant to bring objectivity to the belief. Therefore justification cannot be defined as "compelling to me", or "compelling to you", it requires more than this. So your claim, rather than being a lie, is just based in a misunderstanding of what it means to be "justified".

I don't believe that you believe my belief is justified. You know that the documents are falsified so you know that my belief is not justified, and you are lying by telling me that you think my belief is justified. it's called "deception".

You're conflating my belief with your belief. The point is that the same person cannot hold these two beliefs. That's what is stated in the op.

I may comment on the free will thing separately. Doesn’t belong in this post. — noAxioms

I disagree. How one views free will is a reflection on how one views the passing of time. And that is central to this issue.

If you believe it to be a forgery then you do not believe it to be conclusive evidence. This is irrelevant to my point, which is that you cannot believe it to be false (a forgery), and justified at the same time.

If I meet someone and she tells me that her name is Sarah then I'm not justified in believing that her name is Sarah because it isn't certain – she might be lying? And even if she shows me her passport and driving license then I'm still not justified because it still isn't certain – they might be forgeries? — Michael

I don't see the relevance. Showing her id. seems like conclusive evidence to me, so you'd be justified in believing her name is Sarah. The point I made is that not just any piece of evidence serves to justify.

Requiring certainty for justification seems unreasonable. — Michael

I agree with this. What I don't agree with is the idea that one could think "her name is Sarah" is both a justified belief and also false. So after checking her id, you honestly believe that her claim to be Sarah is justified, but you also honestly believe it to be false.

A conclusion is justified if there's evidence for it. There's evidence for it; therefore, it's justified. — Michael

That's not true, evidence supports a theory, it doesn't necessarily justify the conclusion. It is false to say that any time there is evidence for a particular conclusion, then that conclusion is justified. The evidence must be conclusive. And if the evidence is conclusive then falsity of that which is justified, is ruled out, in the mind of the one making the conclusion.

An opinion can be reasonable but false, so I would designate the belief as false.

Example: both believing in God and not believing in God are reasonable and justified beliefs and there exist valid arguments for both. I still have an opinion on that that I believe to be objectively true, but still objectively recognize as a subjective opinion. — BlueBanana

If you are considering both options, to believe in God, and to not believe in God, then you allow that one of these is false, but you are not believing that a particular one of them is false.

Yes but you could say it was a reasonable belief. It was justified to believe the Earth was justified in the medieval times. — BlueBanana

You could say that it "was" a justified belief, but notice that (1) in the op requires that it "is" a justified belief. Because knowledge is said to be justified true belief, we are not concerned with belief which was justified, but no longer is.

Another example of the qualitative difference is this: In relativity we can always find a rest reference frame for massive particles, but for massless particles the concept of "rest frame" becomes meaningless. I find this point under-emphasized by physicists. In fact it means that - ultimately - we can speak about "flow of time" thanks to mass. If there were no mass, then temporal measurements could not be made (this is why it is said that photons are "timeless"...). — boundless

I think that this is the most important aspect of the subject, how we relate to temporal continuity. We see that mass has a tendency to persist, to continue its existence in time, and this is what inspired Newton's laws regarding mass and inertia. But how we actually understand the temporal continuity of existence is not so straight forward. It's best to go right back to Aristotle's hylomorphism to get a firm understanding of these principles.

Plato had exposed the difference between those who believe in the logical principles of being and not being as fundamental to reality, and those who believe in becoming as fundamental. According to Aristotle, sophists could argue that becoming, and change, are not real. What is real is describable by "what is", and when change occurs, there is a new "what is". But Aristotle demonstrated how this leads to infinite regress. If "what is" at one moment is other than "what it was" at the last moment, then to account for the change between them, we must posit an intermediate "what is". This would create an infinite regress of always needing to posit an intermediate "what is" between any two different states to account for the change which occurs between them. This is similar to Zeno's paradoxes. So Aristotle allowed for a special category of "potential", to account for becoming and change, and "potential" was designated as having exclusion from the law of excluded middle. He also used "potential" to refer to future things which may or may not occur, and said that it is incorrect to say that there is truth or untruth concerning these things.

In his physics, he describes a world of changing forms (what is), and posits matter as the underlying potential for change. Matter, having the character of potential, is what persists, or remains the same, when change occurs. So matter is what gives reality to temporal continuity between one state and the next changed state, as that which persists through change. Without matter, change becomes unintelligible, due to the infinite regress described, as one state distinct from another changed state, with no connection of "becoming" between them. But "matter" is just assumed, and the term may be applied to whatever is observed to be unchanging in the changing world, to account for temporal continuity. So if we take a tree, and describe the different things we can do with the wood, in this case, "wood" is the unchanging thing, the matter. But we could break the wood down to molecules and in this case the molecules would be the matter. And so we can go further, to atoms, fundamental particles, or energy, and these would be "the matter". "Matter" signifies a concept which accounts for what persists, unchanged, as time passes.

Newton attempts to attribute fundamental properties to matter, like mass and inertia, but this is problematic, because it is to say that matter has some necessary form, mass, and inertia. That matter has a necessary form is contrary to the conception. So even though mass and inertia are the fundamental principles by which we observe temporal continuity, these concepts are not necessarily representative of the reality of temporal continuity. They represent how we observe temporal continuity. And observations are of forms, while temporal continuity is represented by "matter". With the current conception of energy, based in Einsteinian physics, physicists deny mass and inertia as the necessary properties of matter, attempting to strip it down to its true conception of simple temporal continuity.

Now we have the issue of formless matter, pure energy. But this is strictly denied by Aristotelian metaphysics as inherently unintelligible, because the form which matter has is what is apprehended by us. So our observations of temporal continuity is what is provided for by the concept of matter, but if we remove all form from matter, then temporal continuity becomes unintelligible because it's unrelatable to any observations. As much as "matter" represents temporal continuity, and is apprehended by us as such, without a particular form, (what it is), it becomes unintelligible to us. Now under the precepts of special relativity theory we get the claim "time is just an illusion". The problem though is that time is very real, so if we're working under a theory which renders it as an illusion, this will only hinder the progress.

There's evidence that they committed the crime but no evidence that they were framed. However, they're a friend of yours and you don't believe that they're the kind of person who would commit such a crime, and so infer that they were framed. — Michael

If you think that the person did not commit the crime, then you believe that the conclusion that they did commit the crime is unjustified.

People quite often believe things that are contrary to the evidence, and so believe that justified beliefs are false. — Michael

Evidence may be used in an attempt to justify a belief, but producing evidence does not necessarily lead to justification.

So even though it wouldn't be justified for me to believe that he's guilty, given the evidence available to everyone else, their belief that he's guilty is justified. — Michael

You are making the same argument as creativesoul here. Here's my reply:

You might think "they were justified in believing X". But this does not mean that you think that X is a justified belief. So if you do not think that X is a justified belief, yet you think "they were justified in believing X", but you state "X is a justified belief", then you are not telling the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

They believe X. X is justified. I believe that X is and was a justified belief based upon what they thought that they knew at the time. — creativesoul

If you believe that X was a justified belief, but is no longer a justified belief, then it is still a lie if you state "X is a justified belief".

You might think "they were justified in believing X". But this does not mean that you think that X is a justified belief. So if you do not think that X is a justified belief, yet you think "they were justified in believing X", but you state "X is a justified belief", then you are not telling the truth.

Truth is not justification. — creativesoul

I know truth is not justification, and I'm far from claiming that it is. We've been through this already. I am just pointing out that one cannot believe that the same belief is both false and justified.

We can believe that another's belief is both false and justified... — creativesoul

This has been claimed over and over again, but no one has given an acceptable example. And, if you took the time to think about what you are saying, you would notice how ridiculous it is. So go ahead and think about it. When would you ever say that another person has a false belief which is actually a justified false belief. That's nonsense.

It was justified because it did not conflict/contradict what they thought they knew. — creativesoul

I'm not talking about what "they knew", I'm talking about what you believe. If you believe a belief to be false, then it is because it contradicts something you believe to be true. So a false believe does contradict, and therefore cannot be a justified belief. Besides, you appear to be defining "justified" as non-contradictory, and that in itself is nonsense.

I've shown how Meta's notion of justification fails in at least three different ways... — creativesoul

All you've given is nonsense.

If that doesn't suffice, nothing will. — creativesoul

Yes, nothing will, because it is blatantly obvious that if anyone claims that a particular belief is false, and also justified, that person is simply lying.

Perhaps someone has been framed for a crime, and so although the belief that they committed the crime is justified, I don't believe that they're guilty. — Michael

If you do not believe that the person is guilty, and you believe that the person has been framed, how can you also believe that it is justified to believe that the person committed the crime? Do you think it's justified for a person to be convicted of a crime which they were framed for?

said "... or a reason to believe in it or...". One can have an opinion but recognize it as a subjective opinion while accepting that other opinions are reasonable. — BlueBanana

But if you thought that it was just an opinion, and other people might have contrary opinions which were reasonable, you wouldn't designate the belief as false. A false belief is not a reasonable opinion.

Like, what would unpatterend or unstructured information be, exactly? Would it just be unspecified? — Moliere

It wouldn't be information at all if it were unpatterned or unstructured. That's the problem with this theoretical structure, the concept, "information", itself presupposes order. If there is no order, there is no information. So as information dissipates, it can never rid itself of the character of "information". Likewise, information cannot come into existence from a randomly unpatterned, unstructured existence, because something needs to "inform" it, giving it the character of "information".

All this does is obscure the "something coming from nothing" problem.

This is of course unpractical so I'm also using justified in a more colloquial sense, which I'd define so that a belief is justified if there's evidence for or a reason to believe in it or if it's a logical consequence of some reasonable thought process. The second definition does allow one to believe a justified belief is false. — BlueBanana

I don't see how it could be the case that one could believe that a belief is false, yet also have reason to believe in it. Believing it to be false would negate any reason to believe in it.

So what you are asking is whether it is possible for me to believe that I have a sound argument for P and yet not believe that P. I'm not sure whether I can coherently do that. — PossibleAaran

It's not so much to "not believe that P", because I think one one could still take an agnostic stance, as the skeptic does, holding the possibility of mistake. But more concretely, it is to have a sound argument for P, and also believe that P is false.

Smith doesn't have a sound argument because one of his premises is false. So, by your definition, Smith isn't justified in the 1st place. This was an account offerred by Russel years before Gettier even published, and also pursued by Lehrer, Klien and Mcgrew. Is that your solution? — PossibleAaran

That's right. Smith looks at his conclusion as justified, because Smith does not know that the premise is false. From our perspective though, we know that the premise is false, so it would be false for us to say that Smith's conclusion is justified. Therefore Smith is not justified.

Another very interesting point, indeed! to tell the truth I find the usual interpretation of E = mc^2 a bit "wrong". Strictly speaking it does not say that energy and mass are the same, but only that there is an associated quantity of energy to the mass of an object. — boundless

Right, and this association is made through the constant called the speed of light. That is why "length contraction" is such a counter-intuitive concept. Mass is related to density. But under the concept of length contraction an extremely fast moving object would appear to be contracted and therefore more dense, the same mass in a smaller area. What happens to the mass if the object reaches the boundary, the speed of light? I think it's more intuitive to think of an extremely fast moving object as covering more area in the same period of time required for measurement, and therefore being less dense. If a tiny object, such as an electron, or even a photon, actually has some mass, that mass might be spread out over a large area due to the velocity it has.

And in fact, as you say the basic definition of energy is after all "the ability to produce work" - we can say the ability to cause some kind of change - and it is a potentiality. If we take the usual interpretation then everything is a potentiality and nothing is actual. The usual solution of this is to "actualize" energy, while in fact "our" model is maintaining the idea that energy is a potentiality and that mass is an actuality. This is indeed a very interesting point! — boundless

The concept of energy is actual quite complex. It is defined as the capacity to do work, so it is inherently a potential. A potential must always be attributed to something actual in the form of a property of that thing, or else nothing substantiates, or grounds that potential. That's what differentiates a logical possibility, as imaginary and fictional, from an actual possibility. In the case of energy, the potential is attributed to the activity of an object, as kinetic energy. So activity is a potential, called energy. Beyond this we have potential energy, and this is the potential for a potential. If I understand correctly, potential energy is modeled by fields, so in this case the field mathematics represents the potential for a potential.

As you say, the usual approach is to simply actualize energy, but this is not to stay true to the conceptual foundations and the result is misunderstanding. The problem being that energy was conceptualized as the property moving mass. A moving object has energy, mv^2. When the speed of light was introduced as the limit to velocity, in the way that it was, then energy became simply the property of motion. With the transmission of electromagnetic energy, it is not possible that there is any "thing" which is moving from A to B, there is simply energy that is transmitted. But logically, conceptually, energy is the property of motion, and if there is motion from A to B there must be something moving from A to B. So we say that it's "energy" which moves from A to B, making the predicate into the subject. That is of course, circular logic. If energy gets from A to B, it must be the property of something which moves from A to B. What moves from A to B? Energy. The concept of energy is not really designed for describing what is transmitted by wave impulses.

Does your definition of justification allow that an individual can believe that a particular belief is both justified and false at the same time?

I've demonstrated how the Gettier problem described in the op is just a deception. What more do you want?

This is pointless.

How is a guess sound?

I thought we were working on the assumption of knowledge as JTB?

This incompleteness is not incoherent. Energy is acting, but the unpredictable novelty is not what either of us mean by 'creative'. Or is it exactly that same creativity of the mind, but mindless? I'm not sure. — unenlightened

I don't think it's the same because breaking the glass is a matter of breaking down a complex structure, while creativity produces complex structures. So I think applying energy to randomly break something apart, and applying energy to create a complex structure, are two different types of actions.

As implied earlier, as sound.

Try this. Gettier is describing the situation. From his description, Smith was never justified. Gettier lies when he says Smith was justified.

I don't know, spell it out.

Yes, now look at the op. We must disallow 1). Gettier cannot say that (b) is justified, all he can say is that (b) was justified.

Well yes, the caterpillar does exactly the same thing in millions of cases and over millions of years. Not mum and dad, but their genes are rearranged to make a 'new' individual. In that sense, a fully deterministic system allows for change, and if you add a salting of randomness, evolution in the full sense can get going, producing not only new individuals but new species. — unenlightened

I suppose there is an issue of what differentiates a "rearrangement of parts' from a "creation of new parts". If you are one to insist that everything new is just a rearrangement of old parts, then you'd be inclined to insist that all new creations are just rearrangements. Consider "energy" though. To break things down into parts, energy is required. And sometimes when things are broken down into parts, energy is freed. That released energy may ne used in creating new parts. So the rearranging of parts is only a part of the story because there is a matter of the act of rearranging. The rearranging requires energy. Furthermore, there is also evidence that parts, physical things, can come into existence from energy. So the issue of creating something new is much more complicated than the description of rearranging parts.

An account is a story. 'A caterpillar turns into a butterfly' accounts for a butterfly in terms of a prior caterpillar. So the mystic is pointing to creativity, and saying that if there is creativity, there can be no account of it, because all accounts are of how the past became the present, or projections of how the present will be in the future and creativity simply is what is not accounted for by the past. Hence 'it comes from nothing' does not count as an account, but as a denial of accountability. — unenlightened

Do you agree that the coherency of the story is a function of continuity? If you are telling the story of how a butterfly comes to be from a caterpillar, for example, and there is a break in your continuity, something unaccounted for in that break, then there is a problem with the story at that point. A critical analysis of the story will indicate that something has come from nothing at that point in the story. The new part is not accounted for by a rearrangement of the old parts, perhaps it's an electron or something like that, which has come from energy, and energy is not a part of any particular thing. A part comes into existence from energy and this cannot be described as a rearrangement of parts.

So we have a new part, which does not come from the rearrangement of old parts, nor does it come from nothing, it comes from energy. But in the story, energy is only supposed to account for how the parts are moved around, rearranged, to create new parts through this rearrangement. Now it becomes evident that energy actually creates new parts. The whole story of "rearrangement" is suspicious. Why would we think that energy is rearranging parts, when the evidence is that it is annihilating old parts and producing new parts?

I think we need to decide what is 'order' to be honest — JJJJS

That's a good point. You used it first, or more precisely you used "disorder", so do you have a definition?

What if a justified belief turns out to be false? Does that change whether the belief was justified? — BlueBanana

No, when the belief turns out to be false it's no longer justified.

But I can be perfectly responsible in belief even if the argument I have for my belief is logically unsound. — PossibleAaran

The issue is whether you believe your argument to be unsound or not, so your example is irrelevant. If you belief the argument is unsound, you are irresponsible if you accept the argument as justification anyway.

Every fact has a possibility of being false, in which case they would be unjustified according to you. — BlueBanana

No, what I am saying is that it is impossible to believe that X is false and also believe that X is justified. I am not saying anything about whether or not something believed to be justified, might be proven false in the future.

Look at the op. According to what is stated, Gettier believes that (a) is false, and that this false belief (a) can be used to justify (b). That is what is contradictory, Gettier's claim that the belief is false, and that it justifies. Something designated as false does not serve to justify, because it's been designated as false.

'X' was justified and false at the specified time. 'X' is still justified(for the people at that time) and false.

Your claim that it is impossible for someone to believe that 'X' is both justified and false is itself... false. — creativesoul

Are you saying that the people who believed X to be justified, at that specific time, also believed X is false? That's clearly not the case. So unless you are claiming that you now belief X is justified and that you also believe X is false, your argument is irrelevant. And if you are claiming that you believe X is false and that X is justified, I think you're lying.

So, you can assert all you want, that it is possible to believe X is false, and also believe X is justified, but those assertions are contradictory.

No, I'm saying that you cannot honestly claim that you belief a specific belief to be both false and justified. If you belief that it is false, this denies the possibility of you believing that it is justified, because a false belief is known to be unsound and this contradicts "justified".