So Smith used to know the event, but when it happens, he no longer knows that?

I don't know, spell it out.

Try this. Gettier is describing the situation. From his description, Smith was never justified. Gettier lies when he says Smith was justified.

How do you define justified?

As implied earlier, as sound.

So you're saying a sound guess can be knowledge? It would be sound that a die is thrown and the result is 6, but believing that prior to the throw wouldn't be knowledge.

I thought we were working on the assumption of knowledge as JTB?

Well, I'm arguing against it, but the conclusion in my last comment did have the assumption that you're arguing for it. If justified means just sound, correct guesses are knowledge by JTB.

How is a guess sound?

Are they not? Ok, how do you define sound, then?

This is pointless.

I've demonstrated how the Gettier problem described in the op is just a deception. What more do you want?

I disagree with the demonstration because I disagree with you on the definition of justification, and thus on whether false beliefs (or knowledge) can be justified.

Does your definition of justification allow that an individual can believe that a particular belief is both justified and false at the same time?

I've actually been using two different definitions in this thread. The first one is to consider justified to mean well and sufficiently justified, to the extent that the belief is certain. This is of course unpractical so I'm also using justified in a more colloquial sense, which I'd define so that a belief is justified if there's evidence for or a reason to believe in it or if it's a logical consequence of some reasonable thought process. The second definition does allow one to believe a justified belief is false.

The best definition you have given of "justified" so far is "sound". As I understand it, soundness is a logical property of arguments. An argument is sound if and only if it is valid and its premises are true.

So what you are asking is whether it is possible for me to believe that I have a sound argument for P and yet not believe that P. I'm not sure whether I can coherently do that.

In Gettier's coin case, Smith infers that a man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job using a deductively valid argument from premises which he is justified in believing. One of those two premises turns out to be false, and yet his conclusion is true.

Smith doesn't have a sound argument because one of his premises is false. So, by your definition, Smith isn't justified in the 1st place. This was an account offerred by Russel years before Gettier even published, and also pursued by Lehrer, Klien and Mcgrew. Is that your solution?

This is of course unpractical so I'm also using justified in a more colloquial sense, which I'd define so that a belief is justified if there's evidence for or a reason to believe in it or if it's a logical consequence of some reasonable thought process. The second definition does allow one to believe a justified belief is false. — BlueBanana

I don't see how it could be the case that one could believe that a belief is false, yet also have reason to believe in it. Believing it to be false would negate any reason to believe in it.

So what you are asking is whether it is possible for me to believe that I have a sound argument for P and yet not believe that P. I'm not sure whether I can coherently do that. — PossibleAaran

It's not so much to "not believe that P", because I think one one could still take an agnostic stance, as the skeptic does, holding the possibility of mistake. But more concretely, it is to have a sound argument for P, and also believe that P is false.

Smith doesn't have a sound argument because one of his premises is false. So, by your definition, Smith isn't justified in the 1st place. This was an account offerred by Russel years before Gettier even published, and also pursued by Lehrer, Klien and Mcgrew. Is that your solution? — PossibleAaran

That's right. Smith looks at his conclusion as justified, because Smith does not know that the premise is false. From our perspective though, we know that the premise is false, so it would be false for us to say that Smith's conclusion is justified. Therefore Smith is not justified.

I don't see how it could be the case that one could believe that a belief is false, yet also have reason to believe in it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I said "... or a reason to believe in it or...". One can have an opinion but recognize it as a subjective opinion while accepting that other opinions are reasonable.

I don't see how it could be the case that one could believe that a belief is false, yet also have reason to believe in it. Believing it to be false would negate any reason to believe in it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps someone has been framed for a crime, and so although the belief that they committed the crime is justified, I don't believe that they're guilty.

Perhaps someone has been framed for a crime, and so although the belief that they committed the crime is justified, I don't believe that they're guilty. — Michael

If you do not believe that the person is guilty, and you believe that the person has been framed, how can you also believe that it is justified to believe that the person committed the crime? Do you think it's justified for a person to be convicted of a crime which they were framed for?

said "... or a reason to believe in it or...". One can have an opinion but recognize it as a subjective opinion while accepting that other opinions are reasonable. — BlueBanana

But if you thought that it was just an opinion, and other people might have contrary opinions which were reasonable, you wouldn't designate the belief as false. A false belief is not a reasonable opinion.

The fact is that for whatever reason Meta cannot see his own mistake, no matter how many times it has been pointed out to him.

Truth is not justification.

A belief can be both justified and false. We can know that if we know that truth is not equal to justification. We can believe that another's belief is both false and justified, because the criterion for justified belief changes along with what one believes to be the case, whereas the criterion for true belief does not(if it is appropriately temporally qualified).

Folk back then did not know that the sun revolved around the earth, because it doesn't, and one cannot know a falsehood. It was not knowledge because it was not true. It was justified because it did not conflict/contradict what they thought they knew.

I've shown how Meta's notion of justification fails in at least three different ways...

If that doesn't suffice, nothing will. The worst kind of faith is that which is had despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Some folk take pride in maintaining false belief in such circumstances. Some communities of people call such a thing admirable.

I do not, and I'm done here. You folk have fun...

Truth is not justification. — creativesoul

I know truth is not justification, and I'm far from claiming that it is. We've been through this already. I am just pointing out that one cannot believe that the same belief is both false and justified.

We can believe that another's belief is both false and justified... — creativesoul

This has been claimed over and over again, but no one has given an acceptable example. And, if you took the time to think about what you are saying, you would notice how ridiculous it is. So go ahead and think about it. When would you ever say that another person has a false belief which is actually a justified false belief. That's nonsense.

It was justified because it did not conflict/contradict what they thought they knew. — creativesoul

I'm not talking about what "they knew", I'm talking about what you believe. If you believe a belief to be false, then it is because it contradicts something you believe to be true. So a false believe does contradict, and therefore cannot be a justified belief. Besides, you appear to be defining "justified" as non-contradictory, and that in itself is nonsense.

I've shown how Meta's notion of justification fails in at least three different ways... — creativesoul

All you've given is nonsense.

If that doesn't suffice, nothing will. — creativesoul

Yes, nothing will, because it is blatantly obvious that if anyone claims that a particular belief is false, and also justified, that person is simply lying.

You might think "they were justified in believing X". But this does not mean that you think that X is a justified belief. So if you do not think that X is a justified belief, yet you think "they were justified in believing X", but you state "X is a justified belief", then you are not telling the truth.

They believe X. X is justified. I believe that X is and was a justified belief based upon what they thought that they knew at the time.

That's all anyone can ask for out of being justified.

Measuring the justification of another's belief requires considering the reasons that another holds such belief. That requires considering what the conventional wisdom of the time was.

If you do not believe that the person is guilty, and you believe that the person has been framed, how can you also believe that it is justified to believe that the person committed the crime? Do you think it's justified for a person to be convicted of a crime which they were framed for? — Metaphysician Undercover

There's evidence that they committed the crime but no evidence that they were framed. However, they're a friend of yours and you don't believe that they're the kind of person who would commit such a crime, and so infer that they were framed.

People quite often believe things that are contrary to the evidence, and so believe that justified beliefs are false.

Also, we can talk about other people's beliefs being justified even if we have evidence that their belief is false (e.g. if I was with the accused at the time the crime was committed). So even though it wouldn't be justified for me to believe that he's guilty, given the evidence available to everyone else, their belief that he's guilty is justified.

I can not only most certainly believe that their belief was justified, I can state that I know that it was.

How?

Because conventional wisdom at the time shared that particular belief.

Meta must think that his current belief system determines whether or not people prior to Copernicus had justified belief.

:rofl:

Sing it with me kids...

"'J' stands for justified"
"'T' stands for truth"
"'B' stands for belief"

They are three different qualifications for the JTB criterion of/for knowledge. A belief can be justified and false, justified and true, unjustified and false, and unjustified and true. To the JTB'ers it is only belief that is both justified and true that counts as knowledge. That's why Gettier's paper has a bit of bite. He offered two examples. He argues for how they qualify as JTB but not knowledge. That is, he offers counterexamples to what is/was considered the criterion for S's knowing P when P is a proposition.

There's evidence that they committed the crime but no evidence that they were framed. However, they're a friend of yours and you don't believe that they're the kind of person who would commit such a crime, and so infer that they were framed. — Michael

If you think that the person did not commit the crime, then you believe that the conclusion that they did commit the crime is unjustified.

People quite often believe things that are contrary to the evidence, and so believe that justified beliefs are false. — Michael

Evidence may be used in an attempt to justify a belief, but producing evidence does not necessarily lead to justification.

So even though it wouldn't be justified for me to believe that he's guilty, given the evidence available to everyone else, their belief that he's guilty is justified. — Michael

You are making the same argument as creativesoul here. Here's my reply:

You might think "they were justified in believing X". But this does not mean that you think that X is a justified belief. So if you do not think that X is a justified belief, yet you think "they were justified in believing X", but you state "X is a justified belief", then you are not telling the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

They believe X. X is justified. I believe that X is and was a justified belief based upon what they thought that they knew at the time. — creativesoul

If you believe that X was a justified belief, but is no longer a justified belief, then it is still a lie if you state "X is a justified belief".