For clarity: I do not question the existence of presuppositions. When they constitute answers to questions - that is, when they are propositions - then they're fair game for interrogation. As presuppositions, they're not, and it is a mistake to think they are. — tim wood

I don't question the existence of presuppositions, I recognize that they are common place.

Where it gets interesting is when the presupposition is a) buried so far down that it is never made explicit, and b) is foundational to the thinking that presupposes it. — tim wood

My claim is that no matter how deeply buried the presupposition is, or if it is merely implicit (as most are), the task of the metaphysician is to root them out and determine the validity of each. Therefore the attitude of the metaphysician is that nothing ought to be presupposed.

One such is that every effect has a cause. In many areas of science, this is still a fundamental presupposition of that science (i.e., not proved but presupposed - there is not proof of the presupposition).. But not all sciences, physics being an example of a science where the study of cause and effect has yielded to "field" theories and the like. — tim wood

That science is based in presuppositions is irrelevant to whether or not metaphysics is.

So, same question - or, please try again. Please exhibit a piece of "metaphysics" or a "first principle" that is free of presuppositions. — tim wood

I already answered this. The thought procedure of metaphysics is free from presuppositions, or else it would not be "metaphysics" by definition. This is because metaphysics is a thought process which aims at determining first principles where "first" means free from presuppositions.

If it is your argument that there is no such thing as "metaphysics" as defined, as the search for "first" principles, free from presuppositions, and that pure metaphysics is impossible, then that's a different argument. However, we could take the definition as an ideal. We, as metaphysicians are always trying to free ourselves from all presuppositions, to search for the first principle in the most unbiased way possible, but like all ideals, it is something striven for but never obtained in an absolute way. Nevertheless, the attitude of the metaphysician is to reject all presupposition which become evident as presuppositions, whether explicit or implicit. Epistemology and science on the other hand accept presuppositions and use them as foundational.

I'm educated in high school chemistry, biology, and physics. The existence of lipids is not caused by "atomic forces". You really don't seem to know what you're talking about.

That was your claim. Mine was that clocks measure physical time (duration), and they do so accurately. Furthermore, I assume (cannot prove) that human experience is a physical (natural) process that measures time similar to clocks, so what we experience is physical time, not metaphysical time. — noAxioms

OK, so it is exactly as I argued, there is absolutely no difference between what you call "physical time" and what you call "metaphysical time". What human beings experience as the passing of time, and what physicists measure as duration are each, both the exact same thing, under different names. You choose to call this "physical time". But, that these are both the same is a metaphysical principle, so it is really "metaphysical time", and you are improperly calling it "physical time".

Agree that they're measuring the very same thing, but none of it is metaphysical. — noAxioms

This is where I think the root of your mistake lies. Duration is not a physical thing. Therefore if there is something which is measured as duration and it is called "time", time is not physical and so it must be metaphysical.

I think we are talking past each other. — noAxioms

I don't think it's the case that we're talking past each other. I am insisting that "time" is a metaphysical subject, and you are insisting that "time" is a physical subject, and we are both giving the reasons for our respective beliefs.

What confuses me though, is that you allow that there is both a "metaphysical time" and a "physical time". For the sake of argument, let's suppose that both physics and metaphysics may each study, in its own way, the subject of time. This does not mean that there are two distinct subjects, metaphysical time and physical time, it simply means that there are two distinct ways of studying the same subject, time.

That means there is no metaphysical time in eternalism. — noAxioms

I don't see how you can say this. Eternalism is itself a metaphysical view of time, so you cannot say that there is no metaphysical time in eternalism, that doesn't make sense. It seems like what you are arguing is that time is really a physical subject, and there is no such thing as "metaphysical time", i.e. time as a metaphysical subject. You are arguing that any metaphysician who thinks that time is a metaphysical subject is actually wrong, because real time is a physical subject and there is no such thing as time as a metaphysical subject.

But I think that you are actually wrong. Time is not a physical thing, we cannot observe it with our senses. We observe change and motion and abstract the concepts of time and space, so time and space are not physical things at all, they are metaphysical. So I think that time is really only a metaphysical subject, having no empirically observable existence, and there is no such thing as "physical time".

No i don't agree that concepts or abstractions are metaphysical, if we only use them because they have utility, and don't believe they literally exist. And I think that platonic realism is a prime example of metaphysics because there the concept are seen as real. — ChatteringMonkey

But even if you assume that concepts are not "real" in the sense of Platonic realism, this is still a metaphysical assumption. So no matter how you approach the existence of concepts and abstractions, this is a subject of metaphysics. Whether you affirm or deny that concepts "literally exist" you are taking a metaphysical stance.

And i don't think that concepts in physics are metaphysical for the same reason, because they don't pretend to make claims about what is real. They only really care, or are supposed to anyway, about models having predictive value. The models are just equations, and like a map, they are not the world itself. — ChatteringMonkey

Perhaps, a well-disciplined physicist will never claim that the concepts utilized in physics make any claims about what is real, and respect that only metaphysics does this. That is actually the point I am making, that we must turn to metaphysics for claims about what is real But most people do think that the concepts used in physics make claims about what is real. So for instance, when No Axioms talks about the physicist's concept of time, and the measuring of duration, I think that No Axioms believes that "duration", as that which is measured, is something real. Otherwise "duration" and "time" refer only to something metaphysical, and this would undermine No Axiom's argument.

Have we put to bed the issue of whether lipids and lipid membranes can spontaneously form in the right conditions through atomic forces? — Read Parfit

I would call that magic.

I'll start my critique of C2 by pointing out that “inanimate” can have multiple meanings. — Read Parfit

OK, you leave my argument inconclusive due to ambiguity as to the difference between living and non-living. That's fine for the physicalist, but the dualist accepts no such ambiguity. The ambiguity you describe is just the result of a failure of physicalist metaphysics to be able to distinguish between living and not-living through disrespect for the non-physical. So the ambiguity you refer to is just evidence of physicalist deficiencies.

I suspect you mean the old school ‘there is no life in an element on the periodic table’ kind of definition, but that does not explain how lipids can spontaneously form, in the right conditions, and then organize themselves into membranes. If you peer into the world of protons and electrons, one finds their actions far from inanimate. — Read Parfit

But lipids cannot spontaneously form from inanimate matter, and organize themselves into membranes, that's fiction. So you create ambiguity through reference to fiction, then you use that ambiguity to claim my argument is inconclusive.

You could use that ploy against any argument. You could refer to some fiction, and say that the possibility of this fiction being true renders premise X as unsound, therefore we must dismiss the argument. But all you are really doing is pointing out the weakness in inductive reasoning. You are saying that some "instance of occurrence" could happen along to disprove the inductive premise, so we ought to dismiss the premise as unsound. But this "instance of occurrence" is just fiction so it doesn't really serve the purpose you want it to.

Every so called “inanimate” component inside a ‘living’ cell physically acts and reacts on its own, in accordance with the atomic forces of the molecules they are comprised of and surrounded by, and the cell itself is acting and reacting with atomic forces in its environment. — Read Parfit

This is exactly why we need to refer to the non-physical to account for the unity of "being" displayed by a living being.

Physical time is the concept time used in physics. — ChatteringMonkey

Any concept, in the sense that it is "a concept" is metaphysical. Do you not agree? Unless you subscribe to Platonic realism, in which concepts are eternally existing independent things, every concept is based in, and derived from metaphysical principles. But even Platonic realism is a metaphysical stance so the nature of "a concept", is still metaphysical.

Physics as an empirical science doesn't make metaphysical claims, but only makes models that have predictive value. — ChatteringMonkey

I agree with this, but physics, as an empirical science utilizes metaphysical principles, just like any other science does. The nature of "space", the nature of "time", and the nature of "spacetime" are such metaphysical principles. What space is, what time is, and the relationship between these, what spacetime is, is not itself empirical science. These are metaphysical principles. What space is, and what time is, and the relation between them, has not been empirically observed. So I agree, it is as you say, "science doesn't make metaphysical claims", but physicists use metaphysical claims in their activities, such as the assumptions about the relationship between space and time. These assumptions are utilized in the model building.

How we use clocks and agree upon time, also don't necessarily make metaphysical claims about time. It's just a convention that has pragmatic value if you will. Let's call that conventional time. — ChatteringMonkey

Unless it is completely random, any convention is based in metaphysical claims. Conventions concerning time are clearly not random, therefore they are based in metaphysical claims.

We do not experience time as such, we experience change or motion. — ChatteringMonkey

I think you are confusing "experience" with "observation". We observe change and motion. "Experience" refers to facts, knowledge, which we abstract from the observations. Time is such an abstraction, so it is classed with "experience".

Anything that makes definate claims about time goes beyond that and is metaphysics, because it cannot be veryfied or falsified by physical phenoma. That is metaphysical time. — ChatteringMonkey

Quite right ChatteringMonkey, and this is exactly why physics utilizes metaphysical claims about time. Physics utilizes claims about space and time which go beyond direct observation of space and time. How could one even directly observe space and time? We observe the activities of physical things. We make metaphysical claims about space and time (these are things which have not been directly observed so the claims are metaphysical). When we abstract principles concerning the nature of space and time from these observations of activities of physical things, we make metaphysical claims. These metaphysical principles are utilized by physicists.

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OK, I think I understand what you are arguing now. You are saying that some metaphysicians such as presentists, claim that human beings experience the passing of time. Others. like eternalists claim that what human beings experience and call "the passing of time" , is not really the passing of time, it's something different.

Further, you have already claimed that there is something called "the passing of time", which physicists measure with clocks.

So your argument appears to be that what metaphysicians refer to as "the passing of time" is something completely different from what physicists refer to as "the passing of time". The former refers to the human experience, and the latter refers to the activities of an inanimate clock.

My opinion, is that this distinction you make is unwarranted. I think that what a metaphysician refers to as "the passing of time" is the exact same thing as what the physicist refers to as "the passing of time". The two, the metaphysician, and the physicist, just utilize different measurement techniques, one the human experience, the other a physical clock. This is very clear from the fact that human beings synchronize their experience with the clock, in our day to day life. That the physicist employs a more accurate measurement technique than the metaphysician is irrelevant to the fact that the two are measuring the very same thing.

Therefore, your claim that "physical time" is different from "metaphysical time", is completely ungrounded. The two are just different ways that human beings relate to the very same thing, the passing of time. One is how we measure it within ourselves, as experience, the other how we measure it with clocks. Furthermore, that claim of yours, that these two are fundamentally different, is itself a metaphysical claim. And, since it is evident that there are multiple ways to measure the same thing, different parameters, different properties, etc., the decisions concerning the best way to measure a thing, and the relevance of different ways of measuring the same thing, are metaphysical decisions. These are decisions concerning good and bad, correct and incorrect. So I argue that whether or not the physicist's way of measuring time is the best way for a particular application, is a metaphysical decision. Therefore when Einstein stipulated that this is the way that physicists ought to measure time, this was a metaphysical decision.

I chose to talk about the same general distinction in another way so as to broaden the view you were taking. So try to understand it that way rather than setting things up for further confusion. — apokrisis

OK, but our subject is the question of the existence, or non existence of the discrete and the continuous. Unless we relate this to the talk of container/contents, it is not an analogy (talking about the same thing in a different way), it is changing the subject. That is why I am confused, because I do not see this relationship and it appears like you are changing the subject.

The discrete and the continuous do map to this view. Continuity becomes the global container - the constraints. And discreteness describes the now locally countable, because crisply individuated, degrees of freedom that are being "held" within the container. — apokrisis

But that is completely different from what you said concerning the discrete and the continuous already:

When we speak of them, we are only pointing to the fact that reality must exist between these two reciprocally-defined extremes. Both represent the measurable limits to existence. And so existence itself has to be the bit that stands in-between. — apokrisis

Clearly you are saying here, that "discrete" and "continuous" refer to two "reciprocally define extremes", and that they are "limits to existence". But now, when you apply the container/contents analogy, continuity is represented by "the container" and is called "the constraints", which represents the limits, and "contents" represents the discrete.

So I assume that you have negated the need for "reciprocally-defined extremes". In the first post, these two opposing extremes appeared to form the limits, the constraints. But now the "limits" or "constraints" do not consist of both these two, the constraints are only one of these, "continuity".

The "discrete" now, under this metaphysics which you are proposing is not reciprocally defined by "continuous". It is not defined as the opposite of continuous. The discrete is the contents, whatever it is which is limited by the container, while the container is the continuous.

Since "the discrete" and "the continuous" are no longer represented as reciprocally defined extremes, I have two question concerning the nature of these two.

First, how is it possible for "the continuous" to limit or constrain anything? If the limits, or constraints, do not consist of opposing extremes, but continuity instead, how is it possible for constraint to actually occur? Let's say for instance, that continuity is like the infinite. How can the infinite actually constrain anything" "Infinite" means the exact opposite, unconstrained. Are you saying that the continuous, which is unconstrained, without boundaries, can actually act as a constraint?

The second question is what type of existence does the discrete have now? Let's assume that the nature of the discrete is to be bounded, constrained. So we assume a boundary, and this boundary is as you say continuous, so it must be like a circle, to provide that continuity, and also be a boundary. What lies within that boundary is the question. We cannot refer to the circle itself as the discrete unit, because you have negated "reciprocally-defined". You have posited something within the boundary, something which is constrained within which is distinct from the boundary. What do you think is the nature of this constrained thing? "Locally countable", "crisply individuated", and such terms, refer to what the container does, individuating the contents, by bounding it. But we have to assume that there is something distinct from the boundary, which is bounded or else there is no difference between discrete and continuous.

OK, so I had it all wrong, let me try again then. We were talking about the discrete and the continuous. These two make up the limits, so this is what comprises your proposed "container", the discrete and the continuous. Moving along, you assume "contents" as well as the container, something which is contained by the discrete and the continuous.

Now, the real existence of contents and container are spoken of in terms of "degree". The container (the discrete and the continuous) is real to the "degree" that the contents are real. Can you help me to understand this concept of existence, or reality, by degree? Let's assume that there is something with real existence. Could you say that this thing is 50% contents, and 50% container (discrete and continuous), making it 100% real or existent? Could a thing have 80% real existence, being 40% contents and 40% container?

Are you saying that the content is always equivalent to container? There is always the same amount of contents as there is container? But if the container is both discrete and continuous, as the limits have two extremes, does this mean that the thing is 50% contents, 25% discrete, and 25% continuous. Is it possible that a thing could be 40% contents, 20% discrete, and 20% continuous, making it only 80% existent?

Could you explain to me exactly what you mean by "there would be a contents to the degree there is a container, and vice versa"? As you can see, I'm not quite making sense of this.

To be unaware of this view (or for that matter, the name of the view that you do hold) seems pretty inexcusable for someone who makes metaphysical interpretations (they're not theories) their business. Look up Eternalism. Spacetime is an eternalist model if you take it as metaphysical, which you seem to. — noAxioms

Eternalism does not deny that the human subject experiences the passing of time. It just does not provide an explanation for this experience. It appears like the human subject's experience of the passing of time is unimportant to the eternalist.

Why is it inexcusable for me not to name the view of time that I hold? It is the capacity to understand and to describe time which matters, not the name.

Absent argument, it presupposes itself. You refer to an argument: it presupposes the argument. You describe the argument as comprising logic and empirical evidence. No presuppositions in logic? No presuppositions in empirical evidence? — tim wood

Could you explain this? I don't see your argument.

Please make explicit how your principle is free of presuppositions or try again. (Or find out what presuppositions are, and thereby how they're part of the machinery of thought.) — tim wood

I never claimed the principle is free of presuppositions. As a principle, established before my time, if I accept it as a principle, it is a presupposition and therefore cannot be free of presupposition. What I said is that if one is to properly carry out the activity, metaphysics, whereby such first principles are established, one must free oneself of any such presuppositions. So I gave that as an example of a first principle, not an example of the activity, metaphysics, whereby first principles are established.. It cannot be "my" first principle without being a presupposition

So this is not "my principle", and I do not presuppose it, or any of the ideas which lead to it, when I practise metaphysics. It was an example of a first principle. Do you recognize the difference between a principle, and the activity of thought which leads to the existence of a principle? Metaphysics is the latter, the activity. Since it seeks "first" principles, to presuppose any principles would contradict this. Any principle which was discovered could not be a "first" principle if it relied on any presupposition. the presupposition would render it a "second" principle. The practise of metaphysics is to rid oneself of all such presuppositions, and seek a "first" principle. But metaphysics deals with first "principles". Notice the plural. That is because the first principle for me, if I practise metaphysics, will not be the same as first principle for you if you practise metaphysics. Do you recognize that this difference is the result of excluding presuppositions?

Here's what I find in review of the book on Wikipedia:

Tim Requarth, reviewing The Vital Question for The New York Times, notes that Charles Darwin had speculated that life might have begun in some "warm little pond", but Lane shows this could not have happened. Instead, Lane argues that, in Requarth's words, "life emerged from towering rock formations on the ocean floor, where heated, mineral-laden water spewed from the inner Earth through the rock’s hollow network of cell-size compartments. These rocks contained the ingredients necessary for life’s start, but most important, their natural temperature and energy gradients favored the formation of large molecules." The resulting proton gradient drives "a remarkable, turbinelike protein, ATP synthase" to rotate, capturing energy in usable chemical form. "This bizarre mechanism, as universal as DNA, is as counterintuitive as anything in science", observes Requarth, who finds the book "seductive and often convincing, though speculation far outpaces evidence in many of the book’s passages. But perhaps for a biological theory of everything, that’s to be expected, even welcomed.

Notice the quote "speculation far outpaces evidence in many of the book's passages". As I explained to you, it is a waste of time to read speculation which goes in the wrong direction. The evidence is on the side of the non-physical.

I could start with the first principle established by Aristotle's cosmological argument in his "Metaphysics" Bk.9. This principle, produced from a combination of empirical evidence, and logic, is a demonstration that if anything is eternal, it must be actual. As interpreted by Christian theologians this principle is represented as a priority of "actual" over "potential", such that there is a necessary actuality, God, to account for the reality of contingent existence.

But in the process view, how would the contents be more real than their container? — apokrisis

I'm not saying "more real", I'm saying "both real". The problem is that you talk about the contents and the container as if they are separate things, but then you reduce them in principle to one and the same thing. If the two separate things are in reality incommensurable, then the result is paradox.

So you are trying to impose your own non-process view on an understanding of process philosophy. And yes I agree, it doesn’t work. But that is now your problem. — apokrisis

No, I'm not trying to impose any particular view, I'm just trying to understand your view. When you mention two distinct things "contents" and "container", then talk about them as if they are really one and the same thing, I want to see the principle whereby you unite them as one and the same. Then I can judge this principle. If you have no such principle then you are just talking contradictory nonsense.

This is what I have gleaned so far, tell me if I have anything wrong. You have first stated that the "container", being the limits such as the discrete and the continuous, is not real. These limits are just ideals we have, by which we model things. So when I asked you about "real limits", the "real container", you implied that the contents are somehow also the container. Is this what you are saying, that the contents are self-contained?

If this is what you are claiming, then the contents must have inherent within them, each of the two limits, the discrete and the continuous. And, each of these two limits must be equally real, but fundamentally different in order that there may be real separation between them for the contents to possess real activity. Now we need to account for the real existence of the discrete and the continuous (the container), and the separation between them, within the contents. Do you agree?

You have inverted the perspective such that the container is inherent within the contents. But this does not negate the need to determine the two real, and distinct, limits, the discrete and the continuous, and the real separation between them, which exists within the contents.

Well remember that here I’m using the conventional categories of Being rather than Becoming. So the discrete vs the continuous is talk about that which exists in static eternal fashion. This then creates the tension that bothers you - how can limits be part of what they bound if they are in fact the precise place where that internal bit ends and the external begins. — apokrisis

What bothers me, is that through your process philosophy, you have assigned to the limits (discrete and continuous) the status of not real, non-existent. But then you go ahead and talk about these limits as if they are somehow part of reality. You describe reality as being somehow forced to exist within these limits, yet the limits are said to be non-existent, not real.

If these limits are not real, then there are no such limits to reality, and the entire existing universe is not limited by any such ideal extremes like discrete and continuous, whatsoever. To talk about these limits within reality is just fiction, these ideals are simply within the mind, pure imagination. Though we might use them in application, in modelling, they represent nothing in reality. They cannot if you uphold the status you assign as not real.

However, you talk about these limits as if they are real, as if they are "part of what they bound". Which do you think is true? Are they "part of what they bound", therefore having real existence, such that we have to allow for the two distinct aspects of reality, the discrete and the continuous, co-existing in a mixture as I described, or are they not real, non-existent fictions of the imagination, leaving the world with no real limits in that way?

And that active view, one that sees reality as fundamentally a flux with emergent regulation, would avoid the kind of hard edge paradox that your own non-process metaphysics tends to encounter at every turn. — apokrisis

The paradoxes are encountered in the deficiencies of metaphysical principles such as your own. You readily avoid the paradoxes by simply ignoring them.

Name anything you think or do that does not involve presuppositions. — tim wood

Metaphysics. But let me be clear, as it appears like you misunderstood. It is not that the presuppositions are not there, or that they are not "involved", but that they are recognized as ungrounded, unreliable, and are therefore dismissed. Presuppositions are not accepted for the reasons I gave in the last post. They are prejudices, biases, and therefore unacceptable to metaphysics and the pursuit of truth.

Your use of the word “magic” in relation to membrane assembly reveals a lack of understanding in how atoms and molecules ‘want’ to act according to these forces apokriisis described.

If you take a spoonful of lipids and place them in a cup of water that is in the right temperature range, these lipids will quickly assemble into the same type of membrane that encase our cells. — Read Parfit

Sure, but they are already lipids. I used "magic" to refer to apokrisis' description of the appearance of the membrane, as if it just suddenly appeared without the need for any prior lipids or proteins. if you want to go further and talk about the creation of lipids and proteins, prior to the creation of a membrane I'm still going to ask the same questions, where did the lipids come from, spontaneous generation (magic)?

Your post seems to attempt to throw doubt on SR, like it does indeed threaten your position. Interesting that you feel the need to attack it when you say it is a metaphysical theory. — noAxioms

SR doesn't threaten ,my position at all. I don't know why you keep saying such things. It's just another metaphysical principle which ought to be doubted like any other, and that's why I throw doubt at it, like I do any other metaphysical claim. I'm a metaphysician, and that's my business, to analyze metaphysical theories looking for strengths and weaknesses.

Again an attack, and dragging 'human' into it. You think light speed is different for humans than for other things? — noAxioms

It was you who claimed "empirically proven", so you are the one dragging "human" into it. What I am saying is that "empirical observations" are human observations. To say that SR has been "empirically proven" in a situation where a human being couldn't possibly observe, is simply false. So to say that it has been empirically proven that the speed of light is still constant at .98c, is simply false.

Thing is, if time did not flow at all, we'd experience it exactly the same way. — noAxioms

I don't see how this makes any sense to you. You are saying that if time wasn't passing, we would still experience time in the exact same way that we do. Are you serious?

You seem to think otherwise as you seem to feel the need to cast it into doubt in your above posts, like there is empirical evidence against your view. — noAxioms

The only "view" I am proposing is that SR is metaphysical. It is your claim that it is not metaphysical, and that's what I am casting doubt on, this claim of yours.

Principle of relativity says you can't notice the dilation, but you would if you were experiencing a century of flow in only 10 years of high absolute speed travel. Indeed, nobody has tested this. It assumes that experience is a physical process, and you suggest it is a metaphysical process, that humans are metaphysically different than the rest of matter. Even your presentism doesn't assert this, but you seem to feel the need to add this to it. Yes, SR then would be a threat to your position. — noAxioms

None of this makes any sense to me at all. What you say I claim is not what I've claimed at all.

I'm not talking about the age of the universe from a point of view. I'm talking about the objective age of it, which doesn't exist except in some metaphysical views, my own not included. — noAxioms

What are you talking about, as "objective age" of the universe? How can there be such a thing? "Age" is a function of the principles used to measure. There cannot be an objective age of the universe, that's nonsense, the "age" is dependent on the standard of measurement.

I never said anything about 'the age of the universe", these are your terms. And now when I interpret your terms you say that's not what you're talking about, and you try to assign this "objective age" to me. You're so confused it's starting to confuse me.

Your problem is that you understand only one metaphysical interpretation and process all my comments with only that interpretation in mind, so you can't separate the parts that are different between the various metaphysical views. — noAxioms

I have to say, that you've already assigned about three different metaphysical views to me already, presentism, absolute rest, and "objective age of the universe", none of which I hold, and now you claim I only understand one metaphysical interpretation. I really think that you are metaphysically lost.

If it did, then yes, you are correct to attack relativity because it would indeed disprove your position. — noAxioms

I am not "attacking" relativity. I am describing it as what it is, metaphysics. It is you who is attacking my description, as if this description is somehow a threat to you. Why?

Yeah. But I am arguing that both are practical conceptions. When we speak of them, we are only pointing to the fact that reality must exist between these two reciprocally-defined extremes. Both represent the measurable limits to existence. And so existence itself has to be the bit that stands in-between. — apokrisis

So you are arguing that neither, the continuous nor the discrete are real? They are ideals and reality stands in between.

But then what is reality if it is neither discrete nor continuous, but something in between? What kind of consistency would be neither continuous nor discrete, but something in between? How would you describe this reality which is neither discrete nor continuous? Doesn't it make more sense to you, to assume that reality is a mixture of discrete aspects and continuous aspects, as I suggested, rather than that neither of these are real, but only ideal. Furthermore, how would you account for the existence of these ideals? Are they not in some way real? But you deny that the two can co-exist, (which is what they do as ideals, defining each other), by stating that all existence is in between these two

That is why every actual thing we encounter in the real world is never quite perfect like the model would suggest. The continuous things are still always a little bit discrete. And the discrete things are always a little bit continuous. And indeed most things will be far more obviously a mixture of the two possibilities. They will not be clearly divided in either direction. — apokrisis

Aren't you just describing a mixture here? The real "things" consist of both elements, continuous and discrete. We model as one or the other, so the model doesn't quite capture the reality of the thing. It's illogical to say that the thing is neither continuous nor discrete, but in between, denying the law of excluded middle, but it does make logical sense to say that the thing consists of a mixture of both elements, and the model hasn't properly isolated the two.

This is easy to see if we look at any actual natural feature - the outcome of a dissipative process - like rivers, mountain ranges, coastlines, clouds. They express a fractal balance that puts them somewhere exactly between the discrete and continuous - in a way we can now also measure in terms of fractal dimension, or the notion of scale symmetry. — apokrisis

No, I don't see this at all. The natural feature is not somewhere between continuous and discrete, it is a combination of both. I think that your interpretation of non-linear systems is deceiving you. The mathematics unites distinct variables as if they are one thing. But this is just the model which represents the distinct things as one unified thing, it is not the reality of the thing. That's why such models are extremely flexible and highly unreliable, they do not even attempt to separate the distinct elements, treating the combination of elements as one thing. This unity is completely artificial though, created by the model.

So you are taking the view that the world actually exists as either continuous or discrete in some black and white, LEM-obeying, PNC-supporting, fashion. — apokrisis

No again, you have misinterpreted me. I did not say that the world is either continuous or discrete, I said that it is a combination of the two. And I also said that the difficulty in modeling is to distinguish which elements of reality are of each nature. I think that there is a trend in modern scientific analysis to ignore this differential, but this renders the analysis incomplete.

Consider the concept of "space-time" for example. The concepts of space and time have been united in synthesis to create one concept. Many human beings will insist that this concept cannot be divided in analysis, that space-time is one indivisible thing. But this is to completely ignore the possibility that in reality, one of these may be discrete while the other is continuous.

So modelling can play any game it can invent. And some of those games are surprisingly effective - as if we are actually encountering reality in a totalising fashion at last. — apokrisis

Yes, that's exactly the problem, modelling can play whatever game it wants, in ignorance of reality. But it is not the case that some non-linear models are surprisingly effective. Some are effective in particular situations. But all are surprisingly ineffective in some situations, and that betrays the failings of such an approach to modelling.

I think I object to 'be understood as'. SR was born of empirical evidence of constant local speed measurement, not an adjustment of understanding about it. The theory was a reaction to that evidence that did not fit current models. All of SR follows from constant light speed. — noAxioms

It is exactly this "constant local speed measurement" which makes SR a ,metaphysical assumption rather than empirically proven. It has only been empirically proven In "local speed" which is a very small portion of all possible speeds, yet it is claimed as a constant for all speeds.

Constant light speed is an observation, not an assumption... — noAxioms

The human capacity for observations of this is very limited. A large percentage of the various existing situations are not directly observable by a human being, and that light speed remains constant in these situations, is an assumption which is not empirically proven.

You asserted that metaphysical time is the same as physical time. The latter is that which is measured by clocks, but since clocks in relative motion do not measure the same value, they are not measuring metaphysical time (the actual age of the universe, a concept denied by spacetime metaphysical model). — noAxioms

I don't see how you draw this conclusion. The "actual age of the universe" does not equate to "metaphysical time". Metaphysical time is the passing of time as we experience it, and this is what clocks measure. If clocks in relative motion do not measure time in the same way, then I suggest that people in relative motion do not experience time in the same way. So there is no difference between metaphysical time and physical time. The claimed "actual age of the universe" is calculated from principles and models. If the models are wrong, then so is the "actual age of the universe".

If the universe suddenly aged at half the pace it did before, nothing physical could detect that change. That's why metaphysical time and physical time are not the same. — noAxioms

This is meaningless nonsense. The "aging of the universe", as I described, is calculated from principles and models. It's nonsense to suggest that the universe could age at a pace different than that represented by the models, unless you are proposing that the models are wrong. Then it's not the case that nothing physical could represent that change, it is simply the case that the models don't properly represent that change. This is not due to the change itself being undetectable, it is due to a lacking in the capacities of the human beings, to understand and model the physical universe.

They're all variations on the same theme of constructing a continuum out of the discontinuous. — StreetlightX

That's probably the core issue, the relationship between the continuous and discontinuous.

So the mathematical debate seems to hinge on whether "the real" is discrete or continuous. — apokrisis

But the problem is that they are both real, just like the rational and irrational numbers are both real. Hence the reality of incommensurability. The difficulty is in determining which aspects of reality are continuous and which are discrete, because to treat one as if it were the other is to err.

By presupposition I mean the grounds of any question. — tim wood

Oh, you had said that presupposing is the same as taking for granted. But "grounds" I take to be the evidence for something. When we take something for granted, our reasons for doing this, is other than evidence. So I understand "presupposition" to be completely different from "grounds"..

However, it is not the purpose or function of a presupposition to be right or wrong (or whatever); its business is to be presupposed (An Essay On Metaphysics, pp. 28-29). — tim wood

But "grounds" is how we distinguish between right and wrong. So if it's not the function of a presupposition to be right or wrong, then clearly a presupposition cannot be the grounds for anything. If the function of a presupposition is simply to be presupposed, then how is the presupposition of any use?

As such, it is nonsense to think of questioning presuppositions, the term being properly understood. — tim wood

Actually, what is nonsense is to even presuppose any presuppositions, in the way that you describe. If the presupposition cannot be used to help distinguish right from wrong, then it is completely useless as one could presuppose any random thing whether its right or wrong. And the presupposition, as you describe it, is absolute nonsense.

Hitler and Nazi ideology can stand in as poster-child of metaphysics gone wrong. They didn't think of themselves as criminals (no doubt some did!). How could they? Their Nazi metaphysics excused, even grounded and required, their crimes. The same wind blows everywhere around the globe, though usually less catastrophically. Putin seems the current archetype, but even the fellow who litters with a candy wrapper is operating under defective metaphysics; i.e., "metaphysics" not grounded in understanding what it means to be. — tim wood

Metaphysics can be bad, and metaphysics can be good, there's no doubt about that because it's supported by evidence. But your "fundamental ontology", is grounded by presuppositions, which as you say cannot function to distinguish wrong from right. Therefore the metaphysics which you propose is clearly a bad metaphysics because it provides no principles for distinguishing correct from incorrect. And since it provides no such principles it cannot adequately support any type of epistemology. Epistemology being grounded in the presupposition a real distinction between correct and incorrect. That epistemological presupposition is grounded in good metaphysics, not presuppositions.

I think you need to review what a presupposition is. — tim wood

So far, your description of "presupposition" is pure nonsense, a grounding which cannot function to distinguish right from wrong. What more ought I review?

You're not attending to their function but instead covering up that function in your "metaphysics." "Metaphysics" in quotes because a metaphysics that fails to recognize presuppositions for what they are is not metaphysics. — tim wood

I cannot see that a presupposition, as you describe it, has any function at all within any metaphysics, whether you call it ontology or whatever.. I think that there is no place for any presuppositions in any metaphysics whatsoever. The purpose of metaphysics is to approach the nature of reality with an open mind, and that requires the exclusion of any presuppositions.

Here is a problem. You appear to hold that ontology just is metaphysics. Yet how can it be? — tim wood

I'm sorry to disillusion you, but that's just how the words are used. If the words are used, to refer in this way, then how can it be otherwise, unless you desire to use the words in an obscure way. Yes I know, you take this lead from Heidegger, but we need to see through these deceptive ploys.

Ontology is confronting the the question of what it means to be. Metaphysics: things. Ontology: what it means to be (not what it is to be, which is a metaphysical question). Two different inquiries with differing subject matter, methods, and purpose. It is as if you held that horses were to ridden, to be worked. I point out that to be ridden or worked they first must be cared for; there must first be a consideration of their being. And as it turns out, being concerned for that being, what it means to care for a horse, reveals some things about us as (in this case) caretakers. All of which is missing from your metaphysics. You can indeed ride or work a horse, but if not cared for.... — tim wood

We already went through this. You're just defining terms in an obscure way. That's unacceptable, and pointless to me.

But if a unity is resolved in ontology - what it means to be - then while it may be important to question in terms of metaphysics, it does not belong to metaphysics. — tim wood

Unity isn't resolved in your "fundamental ontology", it is presupposed. And presuppositions are nonsense to any good metaphysician. So your "fundamental ontology" needs to be dismissed as bad metaphysics.

As you don't seem to understand, let me explain why the special theory of relativity is metaphysical. Einstein took the existing theory of relativity, which was a metaphysical theory concerning motions, and adapted it to be applicable to the motion of light. The classical theory of relativity stated that all motions are relative, and this is a metaphysical principle which denies the possibility of absolute rest. In Einstein's day, there was a problem in applying this principle to the motion of light. Classical relativity theory did not appear to hold in relation to the motion of light. According to classical relativity theory, the speed of light relative to various objects moving in relation to each other would have to be variable according to the various different motions of the objects. So, Einstein proposed that the classical theory of relativity be adapted such that the speed of light be understood as constant relative to the various moving objects. This is "the special theory of relativity".

So, the classical theory of relativity, which was a metaphysical theory excluding the possibility of absolute rest, was seen to be incompatible with the motion of light. Instead of rejecting relativity as wrong, which is what the observations of the relations between the motions of light, and physical bodies did, it proved classical relativity to be wrong, Einstein proposed adapting relativity theory to allow that the speed of light remains constant relative to moving bodies. Prior to classical relativity, absolute rest, was the metaphysical principle employed. Classical relativity was proven wrong by the motion of light. Instead of returning to absolute rest as the metaphysical principle, it was replaced with the speed of light, as the assumed constant. Since these are each different fundamental ontological assumptions, absolute rest, and the constancy of the speed of light, which are taken for granted, depending on which one assumes, each is a metaphysical principle.

And presuppositions have nothing to do with skepticism. — tim wood

Presuppositions are exactly what the skeptic questions. Descartes for example questioned the real existence of the material world, something which was taken for granted. The fact that something is taken for granted, is what leaves it open to skepticism.

What's missing is the account. The person is not missing. I think the easiest way here, instead of laboriously chasing you through old philosophies and in some cases yours and their errors - your briar patch, apparently - is to simply say that metaphysics itself is not grounded. The best metaphysics can do is work towards internal consistency. And this is just your point above. And for a remedy you would look for "principles." If you think about it, you'll see that any such principle you find cannot ground the enterprise. It's a little like a criminal undertaking to be the best criminal he can be, thinking he will thereby no longer be a criminal. And this would be a poor analogy and joke, except that history tells us this is exactly what happens time and time again! — tim wood

OK, suppose this is the case, what you describe (though I don't understand your analogy, of how the best criminal would not be a criminal at akk, because that's contradictory and exactly what we're trying to avoid). You seem to be arguing that "fundamental ontology" avoids this problem of not being grounded, and this is how it differs from metaphysics. Yet you describe fundamental ontology as being grounded in its presuppositions, so it's really nothing more than a form of metaphysics. The type of metaphysics you adopt depends on the presuppositions you employ, and these are the "principles" I referred to. The principles however, are open to skepticism and that's why we have a variety of metaphysical positions.

Here we are: we are here. It's useless to debate whether we're here: if we weren't, we wouldn't be asking. What are we going to do with it all? Squeezing this yields two questions: What is "we"? and what is the "it all" we're going to do with? Because the "it all" is the object to be done with (and indeed cannot be an "it all" without a "we"), the first question must be, what is the "we"? That is, the two questions are not equi-primordial. Think do-er and do-ee. Consideration of the do-er comes first. — tim wood

Oh come on, you can't say that it's useless to debate this principle. There are two glaring holes in this, which when analyzed create contradiction. First, what is "here"? We could say that "here" marks a point in space. Second, what is "we"? "We" marks a unity of people. Now we have a huge problem, the contradiction. A unity of people is composed of a number of distinct people which as distinct entities cannot exist at the same place. So it is inherently contradictory to say "we are here". "We" implies a plurality of entities, and a plurality cannot exist at the same place at the same time, which is what "here" implies.

What is evident is that by taking this principle as a presupposition, you are avoiding the issue of unity. You are taking unity for granted, saying that a group of individuals are parts of a whole, we, and this whole exists in one place, here. But the nature of unity is a fundamental metaphysical question, such that we cannot simply take unity for granted, we need to describe what it is. Otherwise we are not accounting for, in our "fundamental ontology", whatever it is which unites parts into a whole.

But here's the danger. If the grounding of metaphysics in dasein is forgotten. then it grounds itself, or is grounded, opportunistically to whatever is available, often culture, and within that, often enough a hi-jacked culture. In a sense, then, metaphysics doesn't need ontology, but without it, it is not grounded except within the illusion of a grounding. You note that this is a problem, and indeed it is. You look for solutions within metaphysics - but that cannot be. The only other place is within the concerns of dasein understood as care(ing), which can be understood only through an analysis prior to metaphysics. — tim wood

You have a glaring problem in grounding metaphysics in dasein. You have assumed a unity which is not real. There are no principles which unite the individual parts into a whole, the whole is simply assumed, presupposed. A real being, as a unity of parts, must have something which unites the parts to make it a unity. We cannot simply assume that there is something there which is doing the act of unifying, without understanding what that something is, because perhaps it's not even there. Perhaps the assumption of unity is just a fantasy, a fiction.

But the questions to you stand: can you, do you, distinguish between metaphysics and (fundamental) ontology, do you recognize in the ontology a ground? — tim wood

No, I do not distinguish between fundamental ontology and metaphysics. Fundamental ontology, as described by you, is just a deficient metaphysics. It is a metaphysics which takes unity for granted, and this produces the contradictory fundamental principle of "we are here". Unity cannot be taken for granted because it is inherently contradictory to say that a number of distinct individuals exist at the same place. Therefore we must dig deeper into the nature of reality (metaphysics) to find principles to avoid this contradiction. We need to establish principles which allow distinct entities, parts, to exist together as a whole.

The logical problem with C is that it is not even wrong. C only argues that it is well known that no inanimate physical thing is capable of doing such organizing. — Read Parfit

Let me rephrase C then, if you want to nit pick. No inanimate physical thing is capable of doing such organizing. C, as is customary in premises of deductive logic is supported by inductive reasoning. I would not go so far as to accept your suggestion of "it is impossible..." because inductive reasoning doesn't ever give us that degree of certainty. For example, we say that the sky is blue, and this is known from inductive reasoning, "the sky is blue", we could use that as a premise in a deductive argument. But this does not mean that it is impossible that I might wake up one morning and find that the sky is some other colour. Inductive reasoning doesn't give us the certainty required for "it is impossible..."

I think that is your intended point, and gives you a more plausible line to keeping D intact? — Read Parfit

A deductive argument cannot produce a conclusion which is more certain than any of its premises. The premises are generally inductive conclusions, which have varying degrees of certainty. Since the deductive argument uses multiple premises, the conclusion will always have a lower degree of certainty than any of its premises. So my intended point is not to say with absolutely certainty that something non-physical is the cause of the physical living body, but that it is probable, and therefore the most plausible avenue for the metaphysician to explore.

In the interest of giving you a concise response, can you give a couple of examples of artificially created things you are referring to? If you are talking about maths, for instance, I think abstract is more concise term than artificial. — Read Parfit

Actually, I was talking about physical things, cars, trains, planes, buildings etc.. You can observe the existence of these things, and know that they are artificial, created by human beings. To account for the existence of these things, we may to turn to the non-physical, mathematics for example. We can see that these non-physical things are essential for such creations. The dualist metaphysician will pursue this line of inquiry, how non-physical things like ideas and concepts can act to cause the existence of physical things. We see that intention and will are at the point of interaction where the non-physical bears upon the physical, to bring into existence the various physical objects. So the dualist already apprehends the world in such a way as to understand that the non-physical has causal priority over the physical. This is the observed relationship between the nonphysical and the physical in such things as art, construction, manufacturing and production, the idea, plan, or concept (non-physical), is prior to the physical thing which is produced. That is the basis for the concept of final cause.

The physicalist metaphysician on the other hand will not pursue the existence of nonphysical things. So the existence of artificial things must be accounted for in terms of physics. Then the capacity of the human brain to create these things needs to be explained. You might turn to biology, and evolution, but we see within all the living things, this same type of creative activity, constructing, manufacturing, producing, all these forms of organizing occurring within the living bodies, similar to what human beings do in the external world. Now we still have to account for the capacity of living things to do this at the most fundamental level, and when we get to the beginning of evolution, the proposed first life form, there is still the issue of determining where this capacity came from. The dualist already has the jump on this problem because the dualist apprehends the non-physical as causally prior to the physical.

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I don't know what you're talking about. All I have said is that special relativity is metaphysical. If this is my "metaphysical view of time", then perhaps my interpretation of the special theory of relativity is in direct conflict with your interpretation. But that's the thing with metaphysical theories, the same metaphysical theory is open to different interpretations.

Your theory makes empirical predictions that have been falsified. — noAxioms

My theory that special relativity is metaphysical entails which empirical predictions that have been falsified?

Seem to have lost interest.

You're right, I wrote hastily. But here's the division: near as I can tell, you start with the thing and try to determine what it is, or why it is, or what it's for. I suppose at one end of a continuum you can call this science and at the other end metaphysics, or not. I find this online: — tim wood

But this is not necessarily the case. You cannot start with the thing, unless you take it for granted that "the thing" is something real. But taking 'the thing" for granted doesn't give you a real ground. That's the point Descartes was making, skepticism disallows you from taking the thing for granted, then all you have is thoughts and the appearance of a thing, and there isn't any point to asking what the thing is or is not until you give some reality to the thing. So we have the Kantian division right here, what are you handing reality to, and asking "what is it?", the appearance, or the thing itself.

What's missing is 1) any account of the person asking, and 2) any attempt to account for the presuppositions implied in the questions asked. Immediate examples: — tim wood

I don't think "the person asking" is missing. It is already implied, and taken for granted in the questioning, that a person is asking. So if any "thing" is to be taken for granted, it is the thinking thing, as Descartes claims. That is why we get that Kantian division. Are we asking about being as it is, or being as it appears to us.

So if we proceed to ask about "what" there is, we must distinguish between what we say a thing is (describe it based on how it appears to us), and what the thing is, in itself. Prior to proceeding to the latter, we must get beyond the Cartesian skepticism, and validate the existence of the thing itself. This is where metaphysics must establish principles. Kant asserted the real existence of the thing itself, but denied the possibility of knowing it. This is to deny the capacity of metaphysics to have any real impact. Accordingly, metaphysics cannot establish any principles of relation between the appearance and the thing. Berkeley was more skeptical and questioned whether the thing itself, as "material thing" was even real.

The questions "what is there?" and "what is it like?" presuppose that the "is" and the "there" are meaningful, as well as the notion that "it" is "like" something. — tim wood

Of course it's meaningful because there is a person asking the question. Unless the person is being completely self-deceptive and asking something which one has absolutely no interest in, then the question is meaningful to the person. What is "presupposed" is simply that the person is living, sensing and experiencing, and is interested in the nature of this experience.

But this is not our subject. Here's the question for us: do you believe or hold that any analysis of the being doing the metaphysics or science, or anything else for that matter, whom the literature calls dasein, is any proper part of philosophy? Heidegger does: he argues that fundamental ontology comes before metaphysics as ground. He is not at all saying that fundamental ontology is metaphysics. — tim wood

I really don't know what you mean by "fundamental ontology". This is the problem I find with Heidegger in general. He uses many terms in a vague and obscure way, which upon interpretation by different people creates ambiguity between the different interpretations. So discussion is fruitless because of this ambiguity, and it ends up appearing like Heidegger never really said anything important.

Your distinction between "physical time" and "metaphysical time", upon which you base your claim that special relativity makes no metaphysical claims, is nonsense. The thing measured, "time" is the very same whether you're a physicist or a metaphysician.

I feel like we got closer - but not quite there. I don't think that someone finding something interesting makes it meaningful in a philosophical sense; the reason interest has come up is because you've linked the two together and I was trying to follow the chain to explain my position. However, you've certainly centred whether this question is meaningful around whether it is interesting which does nothing to counter my position that this question is completely un-grounded. — angslan

Now you seem to be trying to change what you are saying. Before you were talking about whether the question is significant or meaningful, now you are stating that it is "un-grounded".

What do you mean by this claim? Why must a question be grounded? I can see how a statement of claim ought to be grounded, or a proposition ought to be grounded, but how should a question be grounded? Isn't the grounding of the question the person asking's interest? If one is interested in something that person will inquire into it. That's what grounds the question, the person's interest. So we're right back to interest again, and you haven't really said anything new.

Logically, C could be tossed. Whether or not something is “well known” does not make it true or false, and we have already established a physical body needing an “organizer” in A and B. — Read Parfit

OK, so your dismissing inductive reasoning as not capable of assuring truth. That's not an unusual tactic, but we might just as well say that we can never be sure that a premise is true.

Logically, D is pulled from thin air. You made no case why the “organiser” “must be non-physical”. — Read Parfit

There is an organizer and the organizer is not physical. Therefore the organizer is non-physical. Sounds like a valid conclusion to me. You just do not make that conclusion because you reject the truth of C, the inductive conclusion that inanimate physical substance is not capable of such organization. Inductive reasoning does not suffice to produce a valid premise for you.

Your use of the word “must” in D is further called into question given an alternate "organizer" has been described as alkaline hydrothermal vents in a broadly plausible scientific theory that does not require any non-physical entities. — Read Parfit

Fiction and fantasy, what you call "a broadly plausible scientific theory" does not suffice as evidence against C. Anyone can create a fictional scenario under which any inductive conclusion is falsified, and claim it to be a plausible scientific theory. But of course that doesn't really falsify the inductive logic, it just proves that inductive logic cannot exclude the possibility of error.

I think I owe Wayfarer a response on this subject a few pages back. Regardless, I don’t think you are going to get to a “must” in D from “non-physical in right there within our own minds”, but try me :) — Read Parfit

OK then, here's the issue. We observe all sorts of things which have been created artificially through human activity. I think you will agree with that. The dualist apprehends what is obvious, that non-physical things like ideas and concepts, and the associated activities of reason, logic, intention and will, are responsible for the coming into being of these artificial things. The physicalist, for some unknown reason denies the obvious, that these things are non-physical, but then has no real way to account for the coming into being of artificial things. Artificial things are seen as natural, coming into being as a natural effect of living things. This just defers the problem because the coming into being of living things needs to be accounted for.

However, the coming into being of living things cannot be accounted for by the physicalists, so they posit abiogenesis. And abiogenesis is just a fancy word for spontaneous generation, which has long ago been dismissed as an appeal to magic. Now the physicalists in a state of jealous hypocrisy tend to accuse the dualists as conjuring up magic, when really the hypocrisy is that it is the physicalists who turn to magic, spontaneous generation. And the physicalist's jealousy is of the dualist's solid principles, grounded in sound logic and abundant evidence. So they resort to ploys like denying the reliability of inductive reasoning.

Yes, and I thought your use of the word "magical" was an attempt to substitute sarcasm for an actual counter argument. — Read Parfit

My use of "magic" was warranted. Apokrisis described at length, how the existence of life is dependent on an asymmetrical relation between protons and electrons, as if this were the essence of life. Then apokriisis casually added "suddenly all it took was a membrane". So the key feature, which accounts for the emergence of life is not the asymmetrical relation between photons and electrons, but the magical appearance of this special membrane. It's not hard to refute an argument for abiogenesis which relies on the magical appearance of a special membrane.

Just exactly so. I'd continue, but I suspect you do not understand what you wrote. In short it means that metaphysics presupposes being and context - world - and without a preliminary analysis of that as ground, metaphysics has been - will, can only be - incomplete and error ridden. — tim wood

I don't know what you mean by "presupposes" here, and why does such presupposing produce the conclusion you declare. I agree that metaphysis will always be error ridden, that's exactly what I said. The first principles established by metaphysics must be written in such a way that they may be rewritten when the errors are disclosed. That's exactly what the post which you original replied to was about, errors in such principles. As I said last post, the ideal is striven for, but not obtained.

Any argument you have is with Heidegger. And it is easy to argue against Heidegger, if you have neither read nor attempted to understand his thinking. — tim wood

I don't agree that it's easy to argue Heidegger, because his terminology is vague and difficult to understand. That's why I think it's more likely that you don't understand what you wrote, than that I don't understand what I wrote.

For clarity's sake, I take metaphysics to be, generally and mainly, the methods and techniques for finding answers to questions in the form, "What is that?" Example: a metaphysician answers "What is a gun?" — tim wood

I don't think that this is right. Aristotle established metaphysics. He said, that prior to him the metaphysical question was why is there something rather than nothing. He explained why this is the wrong approach, and then went on to introduce the appropriate question for metaphysics as "why is there what there is, rather than something else". So you're right in the sense that the principal metaphysical question involves "what" there is, but it is really a "why" question rather than a "what" question.

It is the analysis of these beings and what it means for them to be that is primordial, the analysis being in terms of a priori elements of being. — tim wood

I disagree with this completely. Analysis of beings is the work of science not metaphysics. Metaphysics takes for granted, a separation, a distinction between what a thing is said to be, and what it actually is. This is the source of human error which I referred to. We, as metaphysicians do not seek to rectify this, it is taken for granted as inevitable due to the failings of the human mind, and science is left to analyze these things.

But you conflate two distinct things here, and that is why I disagree. The "analysis of beings", and "what it means for them to be that" is two distinct things. The former being science, the latter being metaphysics. The analysis of beings determines what they are. But "meaning" involves "why", as it generally relates to human intention. So when we ask "what it means for them to be that" we put "what they are" into the context of intention, asking "why". At this point, we must respect the division which I say the metaphysician takes for granted, between what the thing actually is, and what it is said to be. And we are faced with a huge division. One fork takes us towards what it means to us, what we say the thing is, and this is epistemology. The other fork takes us toward why the actual thing is actually what it is, and this is metaphysics.

That is, fundamental ontology is not to be confused with metaphysics. I am pretty sure you're good on this distinction - but are you?! — tim wood

Ontology is a branch of metaphysics.

The right way (it seems to me) is through a recovery of fundamental ontology, which once recovered is certainly subject to review. — tim wood

If your intent is, as it seems, to separate "fundamental ontology" from the ontology which is understood to be a branch of metaphysics, then you'll have to make a case for this.

Your claim is that ontology is prior to metaphysics, but what do you mean by this? Ontology is a Latin, Christian study, metaphysics was taught by Aristotle before this.

*Can you add a well-crafted sentence or two or three on the exact difference between epistemology and metaphysics? The best I can do is that epistemology is about knowledge and metaphysics is about the asking that produces knowledge. And it seems perhaps ironic, from the standpoint of fundamental ontology, that neither is about understanding. — tim wood

I think that what you consider to be "fundamental ontology", I consider to be ontology. But I believe metaphysics to be more than this, because it includes cosmology as well. And I don't think that one can adequately study fundamental ontology without studying cosmology as well. That is because "being" means nothing without context. One, ontology, looks to the internal, the other, cosmology, to the external. But neither of these has any meaning except in relation to the other. That is why metaphysics must consist of both, and it doesn't make sense to say that fundamental ontology is prior to metaphysics.

To answer your question, metaphysics seeks first principles, while epistemology follows the principles of knowledge established by metaphysics in an attempt to determine what does and does not qualify as knowledge. I agree that epistemology doesn't really touch on understanding, and that is an issue for some epistemologists who think that epistemology ought to establish the principles of knowledge. But understanding is the way that knowledge comes into existence, and metaphysics has an approach to this through "becoming" which is understood from cosmology. That is why metaphysics must establish the principles of epistemology, it reaches beyond the distinction between being and not being (knowing and not knowing).

To cycle back through and redo metaphysics and epistemology* without re-establishing fundamental ontology is simply to repeat errors in new and frightening ways. — tim wood

So metaphysis must do more than asking about first principles, it must establish them. Perhaps this is what you mean by fundamental ontology. The problem which I described, is that as much as we seek to produce the best first principles, they will inevitably become outdated. So they must be produced in a way which will express to the best of our capacity, a clear understanding, yet allow themselves to be superseded, acknowledging that this understanding is not completion. This is how we might define "the ideal", it's always sought but never obtained. We can proceed for now, under principles which are to the best of our capacity, assuming that they are still not the ideal.

No, it is just a way of relating two events. SR only says that the ordering of two non-causally related events is frame dependent. — noAxioms

Right, and that's clearly a metaphysical statement, just like the opposing claim that there is an absolute ordering of events is a metaphysical statement. Whether the ordering of events is frame dependent or not, is an issue concerning the nature of being, existence, and is therefore an ontological question, thus metaphysical

Nope. SR works whether simultaneity is real or not, or if actual simultaneity is objective or relative. SR is an empirical theory, which makes it non-metaphysics in my book. — noAxioms

Your "book" contains a very odd definition of metaphysics. Ontology is metaphysics, and ontology concerns what "is". Simultaneous is a statement about what "is". The special theory of relativity makes statements about the nature of simultaneity, therefore it makes statements about what is, and is clearly a metaphysical theory. Whether it "works", or has in your opinion been empirically proven, (as "empirical theory" is self-contradictory, by the way), is irrelevant.

By “the living body” do you mean the first living bodies? By that I mean bacteria and their predecessors existing ~3 billion years ago? — Read Parfit

Yes, the very first, as the argument is that prior to the physical existence of life there is necessarily a non-physical agent. That's the basis for my claim that abiogenesis is unreasonable. And the educated metaphysician will seek to understand the nature of the non-physical rather than wasting time speculating about abiogenesis. .

Relativity theory IS a non metaphysical theory, so it doesn't render an opinion on say what is real. — noAxioms

Special relativity is a metaphysical theory. It renders an opinion on the reality of simultaneity.

There is no logical “need” to conclude the existence of “non-physical” entities being the cause of physical activity. That is just a theory with without meat on the bone. — Read Parfit

Did you read the argument? It's not a theory, it's a logical argument. You haven't yet addressed it. As it's a very simple argument, you ought to be able to easily refute it if it's not sound logic. Instead you ignore it and keep pushing the unreasonable abiogenesis

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You find broadly plausible scientific theories related to abiogenesis “uninteresting”, and “don’t like that” I refer you to the source of my claims. — Read Parfit

That's right, because abiogenesis is an unreasonable starting point. So reading authors who use science in an attempt to support this nonsense speculation is just a waste of time. As I've explained to you, there's very simple, and sound logic which demonstrates that there is necessarily a non-physical agent which is prior to, as the cause of, the living physical body.

I'll spell it out again so you don't have to go back. The living physical body came into existence as an organized structure. Therefore the "organizer" precedes the physical body. It is well known from the observation of inanimate physical things, that no inanimate physical thing is capable of doing such organizing. Therefore the organizer must be non-physical. The only objection came from apokrisis who said that there is no evidence of anything "non-physical". But both wayfarer and I replied by referring to the fact that the evidence of the non-physical is right there within our own minds. So not only do we have a sound logical argument, but it is also supported by evidence as well. What more could you ask for?

To simply ignore this logic, and proceed to adopt abiogenesis as a principle, and then attempt in some haphazard way to support abiogenesis with science, is nothing other than unreasonable behaviour. Did you read my reply to apokrisis, who postulates the magical appearance of a membrane?

This whole time I've been trying to understand why it is meaningful. Is it interesting to you simply because it is interesting to you? Or is there something more... — angslan

It's hard to say why I find it interesting. I think it's like any field of study, something about it just draws my mind toward it. Suppose you're interested in doing math, or statistics and probabilities, psychology, or biology, or there's something else that interests you, like a hobby. Don't you find it difficult to say why you got interested in doing this particular thing, and not something else? For me, I would have to think back to the situation when I first got introduced to the question at hand, examine the factors involved. But that's a difficult question, very subjective, and I don't think you're interested in that. Furthermore the more relevant question would be why am I still interested in it after all these years. And that would probably be because the question remains unanswered.

Or is there something more... And is there likely some meaning that many people share, or are you just intent arguing that, "Well, angslan asked Devan99 and people in general how this question came about, and the answer is that it is meaningful to Metaphysican Undercover." I mean, that would be something pretty interesting if Devan99 wrote it out because it was meaningful just to you... — angslan

OK, now this is a different question, you are asking if it's the case that the same thing which is interesting to me, is interesting to other people. I think that it's quite obvious that it is, as other people such as Devan99 have asked the same question which also interests me. Perhaps that's part of the reason why it interests me, because it interests others. You know, people kind of follow each other, and we are taught by parents, and trained in school to direct our minds in certain ways which are similar, so we tend to have similar interests.

But also, all human beings are very similar in their biological constitution and I think that this is the more substantial reason why we have similar interests. That we have a similar biology is what allows us to follow others, think in a similar way, and have similar interests. This is all very interesting to me, and notice that I use the word "similar", and not "same". I don't say that all human beings are "the same", or have "the same biology", I say that they are similar. I find this mixture of sameness and difference which we call "similar" to be very interesting. In biology we might think that all human beings are essentially the same, but then we find in reality a vast array of different interests, different thinking patterns, ideas and ideologies, just like people look different. So the biological constitution of the human being is a very interesting mix of sameness and difference. It allows us to be taught, educated, and follow the ideas of others, in this sameness, but at the same time, it allows us to develop our own ideas, and go in all sorts of different directions, following many different interests.

All of that, is very much related to the central issue which I am trying to bring to your attention, of the relationship between existence and time. As we proceed through time, as existing beings, we are very much constrained by the past, restricted by the sameness of the past which is imposed upon us by the physical presence of the past. However, at the same time, (which is always now, at the present), we are free to develop and follow our own peculiar ideas and interests.

So here's an example for you to consider. Let's assume that everything which is constrained or limited by the past is called "existence in time". This is temporal existence. What has happened in the past will necessitate certain things to follow, through causation, and this is called existing in time. We can attribute "sameness" to this feature, things must continue to be the same, by inertia and whatever laws of physics, produced by observations of sameness, are applicable. But the human being has a capacity to develop one's own peculiar ideas and interests, and follow these in all sorts of different directions. That's what we attribute to free will, and this allows for the "difference" which we observe. This part of the human being cannot be explained by "existence in time" as defined above. So we ought to consider that a part of the human being is "outside of time".

I am interested in what this "outside of time" actually means. This interest directs me toward all these different backstories and different ways in which people have tried to describe what "outside of time" actually means.

Because my initial criticism was about how grounded this question was in something non-abstract, but the answer appears to be, well, it is meaningful to Metaphysician Undercover for some vague reason... — angslan

I don't know what you would be asking for in "something non-abstract". Whatever I give you would come from my mind, and whatever is in a mind is abstract.

But I have asked you relevant questions, and, each time, your response isn't to try an engage me in how to answer the question, but to proclaim that you are interested, and that your interest is sufficient explanation of the question's meaningfulness. — angslan

Right, that was my point. Now do you not agree with me? If I am interested, then the question is meaningful, and therefore significant. What makes the question meaningful or significant is the person's interest in it.

Look at all the energy we've expended! I think I remember why I stopped posting here. — angslan

Oh come on, weren't those the good old days? I think we've had some rather extensive energy wasting episodes in the past. Look, I'm much more brief, curt and to the point now.

So let me get this straight. You do not see the significance of the question concerning the relationship between existence and time, and so you are asking me to explain to you the significance.

As I said, if the issue seems insignificant to you this indicates that you are not interested. I do not believe that anything I could post here on this forum could pique your interest because I believe that interest in this subject is a matter of one's disposition. Some people are interested in art, some music some science, others math, some metaphysics, etc..

If, on the other hand, you do have some interest in the question, as you mentioned at one time, then I think you already see some significance, and you misrepresent yourself in your insistence that you see no significance to the question.

I asked what I consider to be a relevant question regarding the significance of this question and I suggest that this is linked to the foundations of the question. Apparently exploring this is being disrespectful and arguing, as though being in philosophical discussion and disagreement is something reserved for other forums. — angslan

Oh, it seems like you have forgotten the disrespect in your approach to the question. You didn't simply ask a relevant question, you made a comparison, making fun of the question. Let me refresh your memory.

I think that this is one of those "the question is wrong" type of questions. There are just so many premises and conceptualisations of power, potential, time, intention and other things to be even able to frame this question.

This reminds me of the question: "What is the difference between a duck?"

How do we get to questions such as these?

...

I guess my point is - the question in the joke is nonsense, and the answer is nonsense.

...

So I guess where I'm going is - why do we think that this is a meaningful question? — angslan

So I answered you, that the question is meaningful because it questions the relationship between existence and time. If you do not see that issue as important, then so be it. But what is not important to you might be important to someone else, and it's not nice to make fun of, or belittle someone else's interests. That's mean, as you might hurt a person's feelings.