And presuppositions have nothing to do with skepticism. — tim wood
What's missing is the account. The person is not missing. I think the easiest way here, instead of laboriously chasing you through old philosophies and in some cases yours and their errors - your briar patch, apparently - is to simply say that metaphysics itself is not grounded. The best metaphysics can do is work towards internal consistency. And this is just your point above. And for a remedy you would look for "principles." If you think about it, you'll see that any such principle you find cannot ground the enterprise. It's a little like a criminal undertaking to be the best criminal he can be, thinking he will thereby no longer be a criminal. And this would be a poor analogy and joke, except that history tells us this is exactly what happens time and time again! — tim wood
Here we are: we are here. It's useless to debate whether we're here: if we weren't, we wouldn't be asking. What are we going to do with it all? Squeezing this yields two questions: What is "we"? and what is the "it all" we're going to do with? Because the "it all" is the object to be done with (and indeed cannot be an "it all" without a "we"), the first question must be, what is the "we"? That is, the two questions are not equi-primordial. Think do-er and do-ee. Consideration of the do-er comes first. — tim wood
But here's the danger. If the grounding of metaphysics in dasein is forgotten. then it grounds itself, or is grounded, opportunistically to whatever is available, often culture, and within that, often enough a hi-jacked culture. In a sense, then, metaphysics doesn't need ontology, but without it, it is not grounded except within the illusion of a grounding. You note that this is a problem, and indeed it is. You look for solutions within metaphysics - but that cannot be. The only other place is within the concerns of dasein understood as care(ing), which can be understood only through an analysis prior to metaphysics. — tim wood
But the questions to you stand: can you, do you, distinguish between metaphysics and (fundamental) ontology, do you recognize in the ontology a ground? — tim wood
There are plenty of scientists postulating that timespace was a thing before big bang, but plenty of others postulating that timespace itself was nonexistent. The reason is simple. Because no one knows and Big Bang theory does not rely on unobservables such as the "universe" outside the unborn universe. Since I am no theoretical cosmologist, I cannot defend either position. — FLUX23
By presupposition I mean the grounds of any question. What are questioned are the answers to questions. A presupposition is not made explicit until a question is asked, and then it stands as an answer and not a presupposition. The trick is that to question an answer is to ask if it meets or does not meet some criterion, usually if it is right or wrong, somehow. Sometimes if it's useful or not, and so forth. However, it is not the purpose or function of a presupposition to be right or wrong (or whatever); its business is to be presupposed (An Essay On Metaphysics, pp. 28-29). As such, it is nonsense to think of questioning presuppositions, the term being properly understood.Presuppositions are exactly what the skeptic questions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Hitler and Nazi ideology can stand in as poster-child of metaphysics gone wrong. They didn't think of themselves as criminals (no doubt some did!). How could they? Their Nazi metaphysics excused, even grounded and required, their crimes. The same wind blows everywhere around the globe, though usually less catastrophically. Putin seems the current archetype, but even the fellow who litters with a candy wrapper is operating under defective metaphysics; i.e., "metaphysics" not grounded in understanding what it means to be.OK, suppose this is the case, what you describe (though I don't understand your analogy, of how the best criminal would not be a criminal at all, because that's contradictory and exactly what we're trying to avoid). — Metaphysician Undercover
I think you need to review what a presupposition is. Any - every - meaningful question involves presuppositions. Nor are they principles. You're not attending to their function but instead covering up that function in your "metaphysics." "Metaphysics" in quotes because a metaphysics that fails to recognize presuppositions for what they are is not metaphysics.You seem to be arguing that "fundamental ontology" avoids this problem of not being grounded, and this is how it differs from metaphysics. Yet you describe fundamental ontology as being grounded in its presuppositions, so it's really nothing more than a form of metaphysics. The type of metaphysics you adopt depends on the presuppositions you employ, and these are the "principles" I referred to. The principles however, are open to skepticism and that's why we have a variety of metaphysical positions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Here is a problem. You appear to hold that ontology just is metaphysics. Yet how can it be?First is to repeat until learned that fundamental ontology is not metaphysics. — tim wood
Ontology is confronting the the question of what it means to be. Metaphysics: things. Ontology: what it means to be (not what it is to be, which is a metaphysical question). Two different inquiries with differing subject matter, methods, and purpose. It is as if you held that horses were to ridden, to be worked. I point out that to be ridden or worked they first must be cared for; there must first be a consideration of their being. And as it turns out, being concerned for that being, what it means to care for a horse, reveals some things about us as (in this case) caretakers. All of which is missing from your metaphysics. You can indeed ride or work a horse, but if not cared for...."Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that explores the nature of being, existence, and reality. Metaphysics seeks to answer, in a "suitably abstract and fully general manner." — tim wood
Nope. Ontological analysis arrives at a unity.You are taking unity for granted — Metaphysician Undercover
Nope. Is English your native language? You understand as a matter of simple understanding of the English wrord "here" that a group of people can be here in one place, yes?and this whole exists in one place, here. — Metaphysician Undercover
It may well be a fundamental metaphysical question as to what it is. But if a unity is resolved in ontology - what it means to be - then while it may be important to question in terms of metaphysics, it does not belong to metaphysics.But the nature of unity is a fundamental metaphysical question, such that we cannot simply take unity for granted, we need to describe what it is. — Metaphysician Undercover
By presupposition I mean the grounds of any question. — tim wood
However, it is not the purpose or function of a presupposition to be right or wrong (or whatever); its business is to be presupposed (An Essay On Metaphysics, pp. 28-29). — tim wood
As such, it is nonsense to think of questioning presuppositions, the term being properly understood. — tim wood
Hitler and Nazi ideology can stand in as poster-child of metaphysics gone wrong. They didn't think of themselves as criminals (no doubt some did!). How could they? Their Nazi metaphysics excused, even grounded and required, their crimes. The same wind blows everywhere around the globe, though usually less catastrophically. Putin seems the current archetype, but even the fellow who litters with a candy wrapper is operating under defective metaphysics; i.e., "metaphysics" not grounded in understanding what it means to be. — tim wood
I think you need to review what a presupposition is. — tim wood
You're not attending to their function but instead covering up that function in your "metaphysics." "Metaphysics" in quotes because a metaphysics that fails to recognize presuppositions for what they are is not metaphysics. — tim wood
Here is a problem. You appear to hold that ontology just is metaphysics. Yet how can it be? — tim wood
Ontology is confronting the the question of what it means to be. Metaphysics: things. Ontology: what it means to be (not what it is to be, which is a metaphysical question). Two different inquiries with differing subject matter, methods, and purpose. It is as if you held that horses were to ridden, to be worked. I point out that to be ridden or worked they first must be cared for; there must first be a consideration of their being. And as it turns out, being concerned for that being, what it means to care for a horse, reveals some things about us as (in this case) caretakers. All of which is missing from your metaphysics. You can indeed ride or work a horse, but if not cared for.... — tim wood
But if a unity is resolved in ontology - what it means to be - then while it may be important to question in terms of metaphysics, it does not belong to metaphysics. — tim wood
And presuppositions are nonsense to any good metaphysician. — Metaphysician Undercover
Name anything you think or do that does not involve presuppositions. — tim wood
To answer your question, metaphysics seeks first principles — Metaphysician Undercover
So metaphysics must do more than asking about first principles, it must establish them. — Metaphysician Undercover
Or is Aristotle nonsense?presuppositions are nonsense to any good metaphysician. — Metaphysician Undercover
Absent argument, it presupposes itself. You refer to an argument: it presupposes the argument. You describe the argument as comprising logic and empirical evidence. No presuppositions in logic? No presuppositions in empirical evidence? — tim wood
I never claimed the principle is free of presuppositions. As a principle, established before my time, if I accept it as a principle, it is a presupposition and therefore cannot be free of presupposition. What I said is that if one is to properly carry out the activity, metaphysics, whereby such first principles are established, one must free oneself of any such presuppositions. So I gave that as an example of a first principle, not an example of the activity, metaphysics, whereby first principles are established.. It cannot be "my" first principle without being a presuppositionPlease make explicit how your principle is free of presuppositions or try again. (Or find out what presuppositions are, and thereby how they're part of the machinery of thought.) — tim wood
Was the universe created by purpose or by chance? — Devans99
Presuppositions are not accepted for the reasons I gave in the last post. They are prejudices, biases, and therefore unacceptable to metaphysics and the pursuit of truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
To answer your question, metaphysics seeks first principles
— Metaphysician Undercover
So metaphysics must do more than asking about first principles, it must establish them.
— Metaphysician Undercover
Can you list a few, or even one? — tim wood
For clarity: I do not question the existence of presuppositions. When they constitute answers to questions - that is, when they are propositions - then they're fair game for interrogation. As presuppositions, they're not, and it is a mistake to think they are. — tim wood
Where it gets interesting is when the presupposition is a) buried so far down that it is never made explicit, and b) is foundational to the thinking that presupposes it. — tim wood
One such is that every effect has a cause. In many areas of science, this is still a fundamental presupposition of that science (i.e., not proved but presupposed - there is not proof of the presupposition).. But not all sciences, physics being an example of a science where the study of cause and effect has yielded to "field" theories and the like. — tim wood
So, same question - or, please try again. Please exhibit a piece of "metaphysics" or a "first principle" that is free of presuppositions. — tim wood
Nevertheless, the attitude of the metaphysician is to reject all presupposition which become evident as presuppositions, whether explicit or implicit. — Metaphysician Undercover
Here's the problem, or I think it's the problem. It seems to me you a) want to uncover and learn what presuppositions are actually being presupposed (which is one definition of Metaphysics), and b) then want to "prove" them. — tim wood
And when you manage to get to an "absolute" presupposition, which by definition never becomes a proposition in the thinking in which it operates but is instead like an axiom, then it's useless to try to "prove" it, because usually it's not provable, or, because its function (axiom-like) is to be presupposed. — tim wood
God for example, is an absolute presupposition of Christian faith. People who fail to understand this are forever worrying at the question of God's existence and any "proof" of that existence. That failure is held to be the flaw in Christianity. But Christians announce their creed as, "We believe...". Now what, as a "metaphysician," do you do with that presupposition? — tim wood
The understanding that I have of Metaphysics is that it is the historical science of determining the presuppositions held by different groups at different times, and nothing further. — tim wood
In this way we seek a first principle, one which is not grounded in any presuppositions. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's an absolute presupposition of my political thinking, such as it is, that American style democracy, while at all times a work-in-progress, is the best form of government possible.But I think that it is necessary to prove the first principle. — Metaphysician Undercover
Really! Example?The problem is that the way I understand it, it is not a presupposition at all. It is created then and there by the thinking mind which apprehends it, so it is not something presupposed. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's an absolute presupposition of my political thinking, such as it is, that American style democracy, while at all times a work-in-progress, is the best form of government possible.
Simple enough and any number of people could have said it. Give it a "metaphysical' try. Remember, no presuppositions allowed! — tim wood
Really! Example? — tim wood
1) Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question. — tim wood
Go read the book. — tim wood
"The reader's familiarity with the truth expressed in this proposition is proportional to his familiarity with the experience of thinking scientifically. In proportion as a man is thinking scientifically when he makes a statement, he knows that his statement is the answer to a question and he knows what the question is. In proportion as he is thinking unscientifically he does not know these things. In our least scientific moments we hardly know that the thoughts we fish up out of our minds are answers to questions at all, let alone what those questions are. It is only by analyzing the thought which I expressed by saying, "this is a clothes-line" that I realize it to have been an answer to the question, "what is that thing for?" and come to see that I must have been asking myself that question although at the time I did not know I was asking it. — tim wood
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