Wayfarer, if you don't mind, I'm going to add my two cents worth.

My main interest has been, how is it that scientific materialism has become so influential in secular culture. — Wayfarer

I agree, that's an interesting question.

I think a fair number of people here would naturally be of the view that the change in mentality or outlook that characterises the modern and post-modern world represents progress. — Wayfarer

We ought to evaluate the effects of such progress. The ideas of the modern world are based on the foundation of ancient metaphysics. The scientific progress brings into the realm of knowledge all kinds of new information, and this new information exposes and makes obvious, the deficiencies of ancient metaphysics. The progression of knowledge actually undermines the principles upon which it is supported. In this way, knowledge actually destabilizes itself. This cannot be avoided, because the foundation is the oldest, and cannot completely account for new developments which were not evident when the foundation was established. The result is that the fundamental principles must be re-worked to account for the issues encountered by the progress.

So the entire structure requires dismantling in order to rebuild.. It is not an easy task to study and understand fundamental ontological principles, but this is required. The modern tendency is to ignore ancient principles as outdated, and propose new, unsupported principles, which are really fictions, fantasies which are not supported by a thorough analysis of existence. That's the problem, ontology must reflect the true nature of existence, not just existence in the sense of the way that I like to think of existence. This means that it requires a complete understanding of things like matter, space, and time.

People in Socrates’ day were still h. Sapiens, they eat, breathe, sweat, and die, the same as we do now. Sure we have huge benefits from medical technology and the rest, but self-knowledge can’t be reliant on externals, in my view. — Wayfarer

Ancient Greece went through a very similar experience. At this time, the knowledge of natural philosophy had advanced quite rapidly. But fundamental principles from a more ancient time, such as the geocentric cosmology were being undermined and demonstrated to be inadequate descriptions to account for the reality which was exposed by mathematics.

"Self-knowledge" involves understanding the cyclical nature of the evolution of knowledge, which we can find within each individual each one of ourselves. We learn a system which works, taught from childhood, or developed on our own. It works, so we adhere to it, satisfied, and comfortable in our successes. But failure can never be eliminated absolutely, so the possibility of failure is always real. In our smugness we may be inclined to deny the possibility of failure, and so we sometimes blame our own failures on others, and other things. But this is only to ignore, or deny that our mistakes are our mistakes. There comes a time when we are forced to admit that our mistakes and failure are our own, and we must face the fact of having been wrong. That's reality, it is very important to be able to recognize when you have been wrong, mistaken, and face this instead of glossing over it, hiding it behind exceptions, other principles, as if the mistake isn't really a mistake. At this point, when we acpet the mistake, we can seek the reason for, and the source of the mistake.

But if I were asked to try and articulate what exactly I think has gone missing from modern philosophical discourse, the answer I would give is: the vertical dimension. The ‘vertical dimension’ refers to the axis along which what used to be understood as wisdom and the grasp of higher truths used to lie. It is ‘the domain of value’, the source of real value. I can’t the use word ‘objective’ because it’s not objective, it transcends the objective. How it can transcend the objective, and yet still be real - this is precisely the kind of thing that has been forgotten. As a consequence, nearly everyone will reflexively, instinctively say that truth is what can be established or known objectively. If it can be known objectively, then it can be measured; if it can’t be measured, then it’s subjective, or social, or cultural, or personal; but it can’t be considered real. That’s the issue in a nutshell. — Wayfarer

This "vertical dimension" I believe, actually involves the analysis of mistakes. That's why it is very important to recognize a mistake as a mistake; I have done wrong, I am guilty, etc.. (Confession, and consequently forgiveness, is at the heart of Christianity). By recognizing that I have made a mistake, I am inspired to look for the higher principles, higher than the one's I held when I made the mistake, in order to avoid the mistake in the future.

Modern epistemology gives the "mistake" an odd description. If one is correctly adhering to the principle, mistake is impossible, by definition of "correctly". So mistake involves incorrectly applying the principle, misjudgement by the subject. Principles which are to be followed are designated as objective, and mistake involves what the subject does with the principle. There is no room here for the possibility that the principle itself is wrong, as its usefulness has earned it the assigned designation of "objectivity". If similar mistakes are recurrent, then exceptions are made to the principle, variations, to minimize the possibility of mistake. This turns a very simple (wrong) principle into an extremely complicated principle which works, but is still inherently wrong.

Non linear maths demonstrated that measurement error is not necessarily linear. — apokrisis

That's because, as I explained to you in Streetlight's other thread, the incommensurability lies in the relation of one spatial dimension to another. The modeling of space as dimensions, though very pragmatic, is fundamentally wrong. This incorrectness is demonstrated by that incommensurability.

But you show no signs of being up to date on that science. Read Parfit gave you excellent reading suggestions from a researcher in the front line. So your comment here is supported only by your ignorance of the available evidence. — apokrisis

I read some of the referrals, I found it wildly speculative, as I said, and uninteresting. Read Parfit seems to try to make a point by referral, and I don't like that form of argument. If Read understands the material, why not explain it to me in a way which relates to my point, rather than referring me to various articles, which don't seem to be relevant to the point I am making.

Nick Lane’s latest book indeed makes the case that life anywhere could only take the form of electron respiratory chains and proton gradients. — apokrisis

This is consistent with my claim. At the bottom of such physical activity, the most fundamental, there is still a need to conclude existence of the non-physical to account for the cause of existence of such physical activity.

This is a neat conclusion as it fits the predictions of a biosemiotic approach to abiogenesis. — apokrisis

One problem though, the proper conclusion to draw from this knowledge concerning the degree of complexity at this fundamental level, is that abiogenesis is even less likely, and is therefore even more unreasonable as a speculation. So to use this knowledge as an "approach to abiogenesis" is misguided speculation, unreasonable.

And it even flows from the very particle asymmetry that permits a Cosmos that is more than just a featureless bath of radiation.

A universe with proper matter - lumpy bits of gravitating stuff with charges and sub-lightspeed inertial freedoms - is only possible because electrons wound up having the negative charge, and protons the positive charge.

And then life also depends on this fortunate asymmetry. Because of the physical size difference, electrons could be used to capture the energy to drive life as a process. Protons then could release this energy back in a controlled fashion to spin the molecular machinery.

So it is not all a tale of irrational randomness. — apokrisis

You have replaced my terms, "irrational randomness" with "fortunate asymmetry". Thanks for the laugh, "lumpy bits of gravitating stuff" sounds like the cheerios floating on my milk this morning.

Suddenly all it took was a membrane to hold protons back and then a turnstile to let them pass in a regulated fashion. — apokrisis

Oh, the membrane! A complex filter for atoms. It seems like you almost forgot the most important part, in the reciting of your joke.

As accidents go, in a place like a warm alkaline sea vent, it was an accident waiting to happen. — apokrisis

An accident waiting for the substance, "a membrane", to magically appear. I see said the blind man.

And which bit of this creating and interpreting of genetic information can’t be explained by physicalism? — apokrisis

Exactly as I described, the creation of the living physical body. That is not explained by physicalism, which refers to some unsupported, random and therefore unreasonable speculation of abiogenesis.

You say logically there must be something beyond the physical goings on. And yet there is no evidence of that. — apokrisis

There is no physical evidence of it, because it is non-physical. That's why we need logic to figure it out. And logic is non-physical, so there is your evidence. Go figure, the evidence is right in your own mind. So you ought not try to claim that there is no evidence. You can dismiss the evidence, reject it for whatever reason, but your rejection doesn't negate it, rendering it as not evidence. That's the way evidence is, we have the choice to either accept it as evidence, or not accept it as evidence. But your rejection doesn't mean it's not evidence.

So I'll repeat my answer to what you were asking. The question of the op concerns the relationship between time and existence. I believe that this is something significant. You seem to be turned off by some "backstory". I interpret this as a dislike for the significance which I apprehend as pertaining to the question, inclining you to dismiss the subject as insignificant. If you had proper respect for the interest I have in the question, you would have simply agreed with me, that it is something which I have interest in, but you have no interest in, instead of trying to argue that the subject is meaningless. If you do have interest in it, as you have said, then you would only contradict yourself to argue that it is meaningless.

You mean, like the information of a genome? — apokrisis

No, the genome is the physical body. There is an activity which creates and interprets the information. What directs the activity cannot be the genome, because the activity has created the genome. That activity must be directed by something prior to the genome. It's like what I was saying about semiotic processes. We cannot simply describe these processes as interpretation of symbols or signs, because we need to also account for the creation of such signs. If the living physical body consists of signs, we need to refer to something non-physical as prior to the physical signs to account for their creation.

These very physical and basic molecular activities, which are driven by chemical bonds, are that force I think you miss. — Read Parfit

I am fully aware of all that. What I am saying is that there must be something non-physical prior to these molecular activities to account for their occurrence. Activities of the living body may be accounted for by these molecular activities. But these molecules have already been created by specific activity, directed activity. When we get to the bottom of the physical realm, the most fundamental physical components of living beings, we still need to account for the activities which have brought these most fundamental physical components into existence. These activities can be nothing other than non-physical activities. Abiogenesis is unsupported, random speculation, therefore unreasonable.

Since there is a broadly plausible and very physical explanation for how our bodies came into existence, I disagree that we must conclude anything non physical is necessary. Overwhelming fossil and biological evidence provide a detailed story of how living creatures developed our capacity to conduct directed activity through physical means over millions of years. — Read Parfit

Did you read and understand my argument? I'm not talking about "our bodies" specifically, I'm talking about living bodies in general. So evolution is irrelevant here. Directed activity was present with the very first life form, and this is what must be accounted for. Since that directed activity was the cause of the very first life form (living physical body) on earth, then the directed activity must be prior to the very first living physical body. There is absolutely no evidence of such directed activity in nonliving physical things, therefore it could be nothing other than non-physical living activity.

This is why you and Devan99 potentially having completely different understandings of the question is problematic to me. You speak of poetry and finding relevance for ourselves, and this is exactly my complaint - that this question might be so vacuous that the only meaning is what is projected onto it. This is quite different from being based on a meaningful backstory. — angslan

Why is that "vacuous"? If we are the type of being which can project meaning onto something, create meaning out of nothing, doesn't this say something meaningful about us? We have the capacity to create something out of nothing.

I feel as if your defence of this question being meaningful is to make the whole thing nebulous, personal, poetic and subjective. — angslan

And why is that a problem? Is it your belief that the object is more real than the subject? If so, that is just your belief, and it is in itself subjective. So I think that to have any real approach to this issue, we must begin with the subject, and the subjective beliefs.

We cannot just assume that there is some "objective belief", because that is simply a subjective belief itself, and one which is inherently contradictory. Beliefs are property of the subject, and so are inherently subjective. So your approach, to assume that there is something objective to be said about this, and allude to this assumed objectivity, is simply contradictory. it is quite clear that we must start with the subject, and we have no basis for the assumption of anything objective in this matter. if there is something objective, it must be demonstrated. objectified by logic, justified, not just presumed.

I am surprised you accused me of potentially "possessing an unshakeable prejudice" when it seems that bringing our own perspectives to the question is all that it consists of - my response, as far as I can tell, is just as reasonable as yours, because your metric for reasonableness doesn't even require that two people understand if they are considering the same question at heart. — angslan

Actually, your response is not as reasonable as mine, because you accuse me of trying to make the issue subjective, as if this were the wrong approach, the wrong thing to do. So despite saying here, that your response is just as reasonable as mine, you harbour a hidden prejudice, believing that your response is more reasonable, by assuming some hidden objectivity, when no such objectivity exists. So your response has a degree of deception to it, you claim it is just as reasonable as mine, but you do not believe that. You think that there is some objectivity to this matter which I am missing, and therefore my response is not as reasonable as yours, because this hidden objectivity makes you really believe that yours is more reasonable.

I don't refer to any such objectivity, but I know that my approach is more reasonable than yours, because I recognize the complete subjectivity of the matter, and refer directly to this, without harbouring an unjustified presumption of objectivity.

I have enjoyed this conversation. I think your assumption that a soul is a separate entity is an error that makes further conclusions based on the assumption nonsensical. In my life, I have heard plenty of personal testament about a separate soul, but have seen no evidence. What I have seen is science continually discovering physical activities in our brain and the rest of our body that humans have historically assumed is the work of a separate soul. — Read Parfit

It's not physical evidence which tells us that the soul is non-physical, that doesn't make sense. It's logic which gives us this conclusion. Here's a sample. Consider that the entire living body, any living body, consists of directed activities. I think that there is evidence of this, that every part of the physical body is active, and directed in the sense of acting as a part of a whole. This means that no physical part of the living body could come into existence without consisting of a directed activity. Therefore we must conclude that the thing which directs the activity of the physical living body is prior in time to the physical body itself. This is the non-physical soul. Do you see what I mean? If the living body only exists as directed activity, then the thing which directs the activity must be prior to the physical body.

Looks like some wild speculations there:

The following compounds appear as probable candidates for central involvement in prebiotic chemistry: metal sulphides, formate, carbon monoxide, methyl sulphide, acetate, formyl phosphate, carboxy phosphate, carbamate, carbamoyl phosphate, acetyl thioesters, acetyl phosphate, possibly carbonyl sulphide and eventually pterins.

Do we? How? — Pseudonym

The evidence indicates that the universe was created before human beings existed. If we accept that evidence then a human being could not have created the universe.

This is a strawman, though, because the feeling of connectedness is not dependent on any anthropomorphic, and much less any anthropocentric, worldview; in fact I would say it is quite the reverse now, once we have seen the lurking dualism that is inherent in such thinking, and since it is now impossible to authentically return to any such 'childlike' view. The challenge now is to go beyond simplistic 'subject/object', 'substance/ accident' and 'internal/ external' dualistic thinking and allow for the fullest feeling for the numinous, for art and spirituality as well as science, without returning to the ignorance of reificational thoughts. — Janus

Wow, what an incredibly unphilosophical piece of writing.

If a person believes that "purpose" refers to something which is only expressed by human actions, then it is pointless to discuss purpose in relation to the creation of the universe with that person, because we know that the universe was not created by a human being.

Well, that's just a stupid thing to say, so nessun commento... — Janus

That's your opinion, but "the stupid thing" which I said points to the issue of assigning to the creator of the universe, properties which only human beings are known to have. This creates a logical problem right off the bat. How can the creator of the universe have a property which only humans have?

The op employs "purpose". So we must determine what is meant by "purpose". Is purpose something which only human acts may display, or is purpose something which acts other than human may display?

But there's evidently some underlying backstory regarding these concepts and formulations of them that gives rise to this question. It didn't come out of nowhere. — angslan

Right, and isn't that "backstory" what makes the question meaningful? Aren't you inspired to uncover that backstory and determine its meaning?

Second, what's "the source of existence"? It, too, has a backstory, a rationale for being in this particular question. — angslan

So again, isn't this backstory what meaning is? To uncover the backstory and understand it is to know the meaning. By saying that you recognize that there is a backstory, you are acknowledging that it is meaningful to you, has having "a backstory". If you then deny that it is meaningful, you are only deceiving yourself.

Third, why use the phrase "God" for the source of existence? This is a word, or name, loaded with a host of different meanings (that not everyone agrees on all of the time). Why not use "the source of existence", instead? There is some further backstory here that places this word into the question as meaningful. — angslan

That's simply the way that we use words. There's a word "God", which is used to signify something. Tradition has it that this is the word used in those situations. Of course words always have multiple meanings, some more than others, that indicates that they are meaning-full. There is not only one backstory, there are many backstories. You recognize "a backstory", but when you seek to uncover "the backstory" you will find a multitude of them.

I can't even tell if your description of the question matches Devans99's original understanding. — angslan

That's the thing with meaning and backstories, isn't it? What it means to Devans is not the same as what it means to me, which is not the same as what it means to you, etc.. Have you ever studied poetry? The poet will use ambiguity as a tool. It enables the poetry to appeal to a wide audience. Despite the fact that you and I may interpret the poem differently, we may each find something relevant to our own self within it, and therefore find meaning within it. The ambiguity renders the poem without a specific meaning, but since the poem appeals to very many people, as meaningful in many different ways, it is full of meaning.

So I don't buy this "either you're interested and it is meaningful or you are not interested." The meaningful nature of this question stems from the presuppositions or previous work that it arose from - especially because it concerns such a specifically contested concept such as God. My question is really to what extent the backstory is grounded or to what extent it is circular, and based upon similarly 'floaty' questions. — angslan

No, the meaning stems from the work that the author did to put the piece together. If the piece stirs certain backstories within your mind, or even the idea of "a backstory", making you interested, then the author has been somewhat successful. However, the word "God" is full of meaning, as I described, so the backstories which it stirs within my mind are not the same as the backstories within your mind. That this variation and difference in backstories comprises a "specifically contested concept" indicates that we cannot even question whether "the backstory" is grounded, circular, or whatever, because there is no such thing as "the backstory". So you might offer your opinion on this matter, but your opinion is what is largely meaningless, because it only relates to the one backstory relative to your opinion of "a backstory", not to all the other backstories.

So, you are wrong; this is a perfectly acceptable... — Janus

Unless you are accepting of these "Gods", to claim that they are perfectly acceptable is simple contradiction.

If you think that it is "perfectly acceptable" to assign the emotions of human beings to the creator of the universe, then I think you have a problem.

I am interested enough to have replied for the first time in two years. What your response doesn't tell me is why it is meaningful. — angslan

I answered that, it questions the relationship between time and existence, that's why it's meaningful. If you say that it is not meaningful, and I say that it is meaningful, it just means that we have different interests. Perhaps you don't care about this relationship, or possess an unshakable prejudice concerning this relationship which renders questioning it as meaningless.

I don't have time for much of a response right now, but I am curious: do you believe in a creator God that existed prior to the Universe, and who cares what happens? — Janus

This is not an acceptable question. When you say "who cares what happens", "cares" refers to a human emotion. But it is impossible that a God which was prior to the universe, and creator of the universe could be a human being, and this is what is required to have human emotions. So to combine these two in a single question, assuming a God which is prior to and creator of the universe, yet also having the property of a human emotion "caring", is to ask two very distinct questions, with likely two distinct answers, as one question.

And by the time we've done this we are so far away from wherever we started that the entire question and answer are just abstract, fictional constructs that don't tell us anything except how creative we can be. — angslan

So long as an eternity hasn't passed we should be doing fine. To deny the question as meaningful, as you are doing is what is a fictional construct. Just because you have no interest in this type of question doesn't mean that it is not an important question.

So I guess where I'm going is - why do we think that this is a meaningful question? — angslan

The inquiry is into the relationship between existence and time, "God" signifying the source of existence. A multitude of questions arise, as is evident from the op, one being whether time is necessary for existence, or can there be existence without time..

I agree that a triadic formulation of human substance is more complicated than a dyadic one. Whether or not it's necessary depends on the relevant science and one's theology (or lack thereof). — Galuchat

I think my formulation is triadic. Yours is much more complicated requiring as much as five elements. I have body and soul as the two principals, with the third element being all those features of the relationship between the two, such things as desire, passion, emotion, will, intention, and intellect. If you start with a unity of mind and body, then you still need the third element which is the relationship between these two, desire, passion, emotion, etc.. Further, you have a fourth element, the soul, which you posit as something separate from all of this. So you will then need a fifth element, which will describe the relationship between the mind/body unity, and the soul itself. This complication is unnecessary because it is sufficiently avoided by maintaining the classical soul/body unity instead of your proposed mind/body unity, where the intellect, or mind, becomes a feature of the relationship between the body and soul, instead of one of the two principals.

I think the issue of the unity of the soul and body is complicated, as Wayfarer says. Aquinas wrote a lot about it so he is a good source. At other places he clearly argues a distinction between independent Forms, and the objects which the human intellect comes to know as intelligible objects, because the human intellect is dependent on the body. Because of this, the intelligible objects known to the human intellect are not truly separate Forms.

Here though, the question appears to be whether the intellect itself ought to be related to the soul or to the body. I would say that since the intelligible objects are essentially non-physical, that their essence is non-physical, and they have only physical accidents, then the intellect is more closely related to the non-physical soul. What I mean by this, is that the concept of numbers, or triangle, for example, is essentially the same in its non-physical form, in all sorts of human beings, while the differences within these concepts due to the individuality of the various human bodies, are accidental to the concepts.

So I can agree with Aquinas, that the intellect is more properly referred to as a property of the soul, rather than a property of the body, such that the human being has an intellectual soul rather than an intellectual body. This is because the objects associated with the intellect, the intelligible objects, are essentially non-physical, like the soul, and the physical aspect of them, that they occur in various different individual human beings, is accidental.

I find it unfortunate that Aquinas conflated soul (form) and mind, because it is:
1) Theologically unnecessary. Other theologians have managed to posit human beings consisting of a united body and mind, and separable spirit (i.e., tripartite being).
2) Metaphysically unnecessary and confused. It doesn't derive from the intuitively obvious unity of human mind and body. — Galuchat

These are good points, but the issue becomes much more difficult when we consider the existence of intelligible objects. If we have a unity of body and mind, and a separate spirit or soul, then the intelligible objects are either a product of the mind/body unity, or they are directly associated with the separate soul. Clearly intelligible objects are non-physical, in essence, and ought to be associated with the separate soul. But we have the problem exposed by Aristotle, that the intelligible objects known to the human intellect only have actual existence after being "discovered" by the human intellect.

So your three part categorizing, body, intellect, and soul, only unnecessarily complicates the issue. Instead of having the intellect as part of the relation between the soul and body, as Aquinas does, you have a relation between intellect and body. But we now need a further relation between this unity, and the independent soul, to account for how the intelligible objects are "discovered" by the unity of intellect and body, when they are described as non-physical, and separate from any individual human being. So instead of having two things, soul and body with a relationship between them, intellect being part of this relation, you have mind and body, with a relation between them, and another relation between the unity of these two, and the soul or spirit. So you introduce an extra relation which is an unnecessary complication.

How could the mind have "reasons for individuating things in the way it does" if there were no differences independent of the mind? — Janus

We went through this already. The reason is not necessarily difference. There is no difference between here and there, yet we individuate these as different.

Colour is dependent on the nature of a material (and the ambient light), not on the form it has. But then of course you could say the nature of the material is its form. And then we will just go around and around the boring circle of ambiguous definitions again. — Janus

That's right, the nature of the material is it's form. That's why there is a difference between different molecules, and different molecules are responsible for different colours. It may appear like a case of going around and around in a boring circle, but really we're just getting to the bottom of this, and that appears to be necessary to rid you of your false beliefs.

Form and material are inseparable, so we must perceive both material and form. — Janus

No, you're wrong here. Matter cannot exist without form, but the logic allows that form can exist without matter. So we cannot say that matter and form are inseparable, because it is quite possible, and the logic supports this, that independent form is prior to matter. When matter comes into existence, it must have a form, but this does not preclude the possibility that the form pre-exists the matter.

When we perceive, what we perceive is the form of the thing. The matter stays with the thing, so we do not perceive it. We perceive a form. Consider seeing an object. We receive a form of the object within our minds, but the matter of the object stays with the object. We perceive a form, but we do not perceive the matter at all.

The important point is that we recognize individual differences, and if we didn't we would not be able to tell one thing from another. — Janus

No, the important point, which you are completely missing, is that the "individual differences", are produced within the mind, they are creations of the perceiving mind. The senses are picking up information, data, or whatever you want to call it, they are sensing, and the mind is producing the "individual differences" which you claim are within the thing itself. That there are individual differences is a matter of interpretation.

Those differences or individual things that we are all recognizing all the time are not dependent on your mind or my mind, otherwise there would be no shared world unless our minds were connected in some telepathic way. — Janus

I've explained to you already, numerous times, why this is an unsound argument. All that is required is that the mind has reason for individuating things in the way that it does, there is no need that the things of the world are actually individuated in this way. The mind often works with symbols, and the symbols represent, but the things represented do not have to be similar to the symbols. The mind understands what the word "water" means without the word being anywhere near like what water is. So the mind can individuate things in perception, and use these individuated things to understand reality, without these individuated things which are perceived (representations, images), being anything like the reality which they represent.

If you can't see this, then we will have to agree to disagree because I have said as much as I am going to say on it. — Janus

Well I can't see it because it's an extremely unsound argument. You are arguing that if real things aren't exactly like the mind represents them, then we could not communicate. But it's very obvious that we communicate by representing things with symbols which are nothing like the things which are represented.

So quite clearly we could very well represent the world as differences, and individuals, communicate with each other, and understand each other, and proceed toward a limited understanding of reality, when reality does not even consist of differences and individuals at all. This is evident from the fact that we can represent the world with words, communicate and understand each other, and proceed toward a limited understanding of reality, when the reality which we are describing doesn't even consist of words or anything like words at all. The thing being represented (the world) doesn't have to be anything like the representation (the symbol). So the fact that we represent the world as individual differences and we develop an understanding of the world in this way, does not necessitate that the world consists of individual differences. Otherwise you might as well argue that the world consists of words.

So, Aquinas changed the meaning of "soul" from "form" to "mind" and separated it from "body" for theological reasons. — Galuchat

What Aquinas argues in this passage is that the intellect and the soul of the human being are united as one, such that the human soul is an intellectual soul. The soul was always understood as separable from the body, even following Aristotle's definition, designating it as the form of the body, because forms are in principle separable. The question considered by Aquinas was whether the intellect is separable in the same way that the soul is separable. Aquinas argues that the human soul is an intellectual soul. So the soul maintains its status as the form of the living body, but in the case of intellectual beings, the soul is an intellectual soul

So it is not as you claim, that Aquinas changes the meaning of "soul" to "mind". What he argues is that the soul of an intellectual being is a special type of soul, an intellectual soul. "Soul" maintains its definition as the first actuality (form) of a living body, but he gives the intellectual soul special status in comparison with the vegetative soul, etc..



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Yes sorry, my original question would of been better expressed as: Is god Everlasting (within time) or Timeless (outside of time) — Devans99

To say god is Everlasting, would be similar to saying god is time itself. So long as there is time, there is god, and god is inseparable from time, not being allowed to be outside of time. Isn't this what we normally do with "the universe"? The universe is inseparable from time. the existence of the universe means the existence of time, and the existence of time means the existence of the universe. So if we do this with "God" as well, then in this case God becomes equated with "the universe" and we have pantheism.

Sorry Galuchat, but I really have difficulty with your terminology, and this makes it very hard to answer your questions. You ask me "what is your concept of the relations between Form, Matter, and Mind?", when each of these concepts are extremely broad, requiring pages to describe. Where am I supposed to start? If you do not understand my use of terms, then you probably are not educated in classical philosophy, and it would be extremely difficult for me to teach you that in this sort of forum. You would need to read it yourself.

Hopefully, it is not based on an Aristotelian/Thomist equivocation of "soul". — Galuchat

So here's a question for you which is more straight forward. What do you mean by "Aristotelian/Thomist equivocation of "soul'"? I've never seen such an accusation, that these philosophers equivocate with this word. Aristotle was very explicit with his definition of "soul" as you outlined above, and I think Aquinas adhered to it quite strictly. So what is the basis for the charge of equivocation?

Differences that are perceived, obviously. — Janus

So if individual differences are perceived, doesn't this require a mind to perceive them? Aren't you just confirming what I've been arguing? The mind individuates these differences in the act of perception.

My idea of matter is not unconventional. Matter is what is perceived. — Janus

No, matter is not what is perceived. We perceive the form that the matter has, shape, size, colour, etc.. These are properties, qualities. We assume matter as an ontological principle to support the notion that what we perceive is based in something real. To give our perceptions substance, we assume that there is matter underlying, supporting the things we perceive.. So matter is assumed, it is not perceived. If matter were perceived, you would be able to say what it looks like, tastes like, smells like, sounds like, or feels like. But we cannot say this about matter, because we do not perceive its existence, we just assume its existence.

Are you claiming that there is formless matter or matterless form? — Janus

No, I'm not saying that.

How do you deal with colour differences when they are not differences of form? — Janus

What do you mean? Colour is a property, therefore it is formal. We see colour differences, just like we see differences of shape, and even distances, size. The eyes are very useful, having many capacities, and capable of distinguishing different aspects of the form. Colour is just one aspect of the form of a thing. I think that if anyone tried to deny that differences of colour are differences of form, then that person would have a problem dealing with colour, not vise versa.

Sure, but there is no separation between form and matter, so they are as much material differences as they are formal differences. — Janus

The whole point of distinguishing matter from form is to distinguish between that which is responsible for differences, form, and that which is responsible for sameness, matter. If you are just going to deny this distinction, then your use of "material" is meaningless. So either way, your talk of "material differences" is nonsense.

Either you use "material" in the accepted way, in which case it is contradictory to speak of material differences, or you use it in some other, arbitrary way, in which case you are just making up terms to try and support your position. Clearly it is the latter, so I take "material differences" as random nonsense, a term made up to support your position, pure sophistry..

This might be contradictory to your concept of matter, but I cannot help it if your concept of matter is inadequate. — Janus

If you're not adhering to the accepted concept of matter, then you'd better define your terms, or else your term "material differences" is just random nonsense. Since you've denied a separation between matter and form, it is quite clear that you now have no basis for your category of "material differences", in comparison to other types of differences.. So my examples serve to refute your claim that material differences cannot be the same. I have given you examples of differences which are the same, and your use of "material" doesn't amount to any type categorization of differences.

What do you mean by "perceptual differences"? Aren't these differences which are identified through perception? If these are material differences, then even material difference require a sentient being. So how does this get you anywhere in your argument that differences can exist without a sentient being?

Eternal (lives for ever within time) — Devans99

I don't think that you define "eternal" properly here. It means without beginning or end in time. Because its boundaries are not in time, its existence extends to outside of time. So what you call "timeless", outside of time, is the logical consequent of being eternal. The eternal thing is outside of time.

Material differences are perceptual differences; they are essential to the recognition of objects. — Janus

What we perceive are forms, so perceptual differences are formal differences. "Material differences" makes no sense, as matter is by definition that which stays the same, does not change.

Are now agreeing with me though, that differences are a product of perception?

Every human face, for example, is different than every other human face and is different in different ways in each case. The differences are not merely formal. — Janus

Of course the differences are formal, they are differences in form. The subject matter, "the human face" is the same in each case. What differs from one person to another is the form of the face,

And then you have shape, skin colour, skin texture, nostril size...the list is endless and these are all material differences. — Janus

All these are differences of form, formal differences. As I said, there is no such thing as material difference, this would be contradictory to the concept of matter.

My main point all along has been that no two material differences can ever be the same. — Janus

There's no such thing as "material difference", that would contradict the concept of "matter". All differences are formal.

The differences between any two sets of times may be the same or different in a purely temporal sense. — Janus

So they are the same difference, just like the difference between 3 and 5, and 7 and 9, is the same difference, 2. I take it you are giving up on your argument that no differences are the same, accepting the reality that this is a false premise.

In a material sense no two differences can be the same. — Janus

That's nonsense and you know it. You're just making up an arbitrary qualification, "material sense" for the sake of excluding all the difference that are the same. So any example I give you of differences which are the same,, you will insist that they are not material differences, and therefore somehow don't count as differences. Sorry to have to disillusion you, but all differences are formal differences, and "matter" is the underlying thing which remains the same, unchanged, so there is no such thing as a material difference. You're blowing smoke.

Anyway keep up the sophistry, it's a good way to continue failing to find your way out of the bubble of bullshit. — Janus

Ha, ha, thanks for the laugh. You ought to try philosophizing, thinking about what you are saying, rather than just repeating the same boring (and false) assertion over and over again, while rejecting the overwhelming logic against your position as "sophistry".

This would appear to be our fundamental point of disagreement. — Galuchat

Which part do you disagree with, that what creates genetic code is somewhat unknown, or that the logic leads us to conclude that this cause is non-physical?

Evolution accounts for the creation of gene expression. Phosphodiester and hydrogen bonds are examples of expression between the handful of molecules comprising and animating DNA? — Read Parfit

The article you referred describes the chemical composition of DNA, and the duplication of genetic material, it does not describe what created it, or caused its existence. Nor does evolutionary theory explain this cause.

Digging further into what causes these molecules to express themselves through these bonds seems to be a broader question than the subset of nature that we call life? — Read Parfit

Why do you assume that this, the cause of genetic material, is a question of a broader nature than life? Isn't genetic material confined to living things?

People are uncomfortable with the notion of the universe as just a bunch of gray clouds of electrons (let us give them at least a minimal visualization) floating around and bumping into each other. — Arne

To put it more succinctly, the question would be whether there are any electrons there, or just clouds, without the human act of individuation, which distinguishes individual electrons.

Why do you assume that I buy into your talk about boundaries? — Janus

You are the one claiming individuals, and individuation. I know that there cannot be an individual without a boundary which separates it from everything else. If you think that you know of a way that individuals could exist without such a boundary, then please explain.

Imagine a virtual field of fluctuating intensities (that would seem to be the most minimal determinate model we can imagine); unless the intensities of all the fluctuations are exactly the same, then there are individual differences between the fluctuations. In fact no two fluctuations would ever be exactly the same. — Janus

What are you talking about? Intensities of what? Unless you specify what it is which is more or less intense, you're speaking nonsense. You have no example.

Your example with numbers should have alerted you to the fact that although there is the same difference between many pairs of numbers there are also many (infinitely many) different numerical values between sets of numbers, so the infinitely many individual numbers represent infinitely many individual differences. — Janus

Sure, there are many different differences, but your claim was that it is impossible for two instances of difference to be the same. My example of number showed that your claim is false. And this is even more evident with time. The difference of five minutes is the same whether it is yesterday, the day before, five years ago, or whenever, it is the same difference.

You need to explain how there could be actual difference without there being actual differences, unless there be only one actual difference; which, again, is nonsense. — Janus

No, I don't need to show any such thing. You are the one claiming that there are individual differences, without a human mind individuating them, so the onus is on you to demonstrate this.

That there is difference between then and now demonstrates the existence of difference. What exists at the two times, then and now, is not the same, therefore there is difference. That is my claim. So my claim is backed up by empirical observation, there is difference. You are claiming that this difference consists of individual differences, which exist without being individuated by a mind. So you need to justify this, demonstrate the truth of this claim. How will you proceed?

So, an agent may be a: human being, dog, volcano, tornado, force, wave, phase transition, biochemical signal or reaction, fertilized egg (zygote), television broadcast, mechanical actuator, etc.? — Galuchat

Right, but we have two distinct categories, physical agents and non-physical agents. The physical agent accounts for what we call efficient cause, and the non-physical accounts for what we call final cause.

It is often the case that we can describe the same act by referring to either a physical agent or a non-physical agent. If we say that a certain person did such and such, the person, a physical human being, is a physical agent, acting in the world. But if we turn to the person's intent, then we must account for the non-physical cause of that physical agent's action. Here we must turn to a non-physical agent.

So, in terms of modern science and Aristotle, we could say that human genetic code is the particular form (first actuality) of an individual human being. — Galuchat

No, I wouldn't agree with that characterization. A genetic code is a physical thing which is not necessarily the "first" actualization of the living body. It is necessary to assume an agent which causes the existence of a genetic code, and this is an actuality which is prior to the genetic code itself. So prior to all genetic codes there is an agent which we are required to assume in order to account for the existence of genetic codes.

So, (given your definition of agent) in the case of gene expression, human fertilization would be the agent which produces the genetic code (sign) which is accessed by the zygote (interpreter) which produces a human organism (object) which has a human body and a human mind. — Galuchat

Again, I wouldn't agree with this, because the genetic code is prior to the zygote which is just a continuation of it. What actually creates genetic code is somewhat unknown, and this is what we attribute to the non-physical soul.

The important point we can derive from Aristotle's definition is that the existence of a living body must be accounted for by some form of actuality. The living body is itself an active physical thing which consists of many potencies. The "first actuality" is what gives that living body its actual existence as an active thing. This, "the soul", cannot itself be a physical body, because it is what is required logically, to account for the actual existence of the physical body.

You use soul as a metaphor for chemical reactions behind gene expression? — Read Parfit

No metaphor here, this is a description of reality. Prior to what I think you mean by "gene expression", we need to account for the creation and existence of genes themselves. If we are describing things in terms of semiotics, we cannot just refer to the reading and interpreting of signs, we must account for the creation and existence of signs.

Explain then how there can be difference in general without there being particular differences; the idea makes no sense to me. Also, if there were no actual particular differences then any conceptualized particular difference would be arbitrary. — Janus

We're just going around in circles here. Different means unlike, not the same. If we notice that things are unlike, not the same, we say that thing are different then they were. When we know that things are different, we can conclude logically that there is difference. This is difference in general. We know that there is difference, because we notice that things are different. Suppose you enter a room and notice that things are different than the last time you entered that room, but cannot put your finger on the exact difference. We often notice that there is difference without being able to say what the difference is. To say what the difference is, is to justify the claim that there is difference.

To isolate particular differences requires a type of description, memory, comparison, and judgement. Let's say you enter the room and you notice that a chair is in a different place. You have identified a particular difference.

Now, let's remove conscious judgement from the scenario. We have no chair isolated, we have no room isolated, as these, are things identified by me, the conscious agent. Can we assume a universe with time passing? This is to identify a particular thing, the universe, and it is a conscious mind doing that. The existence of particular things, whether they are individuals, or differences, is an act of assumption made by a conscious agent.

We went through the issue of arbitrariness already. The conscious mind has reasons for individuating the way that it does, so the boundaries which it draws in individuation are not strictly arbitrary they are principled. You want to say that the boundaries which the conscious mind draws must be supported by real boundaries or else the drawing of boundaries is arbitrary. But this is not the case. We can produce our boundaries based on any principles which we want, and that does not make them arbitrary, as they are still principled.

All I am saying is that the drawing of boundaries, which constitutes individuation by the human mind, is not based on following naturally occurring boundaries, it is based on other principles. As soon as you recognize this, then you have to reconsider how you approach the issue of naturally occurring boundaries.

are you suggesting that difference depends on the perceiver while the boundaries that enable to the perceiver to assign a difference does not? — Arne

What I am saying is that Janus assumes the existence of such independent boundaries without justifying this assumption. Janus assumes that there are individuated objects in the world regardless of whether or not they have been individuated by a conscious mind. I argue that it is the mind which individuates, and the assumption of such boundaries, independent of minds, required for independent individuation, is unwarranted.

Take the earth and the sun for example. We say that they are separate, individual things, but where is the boundary between them? Someone might argue that they are both part of one thing, the solar system, and there is no boundary between them. But then what makes the solar system one thing, and not just part of a bigger thing, if we do not apprehend a boundary between it and the universe?

Please define "agent", "agency", and "soul". — Galuchat

An agent is something active, actual. In semiotic processes it is required that there is an agent which produces signs and an agent which interprets signs. That's why it doesn't make sense to say that both the categories, mind and matter, emerge from semiotic process. We might restrict "mind" to consciousness, and say that it emerged through evolution, but if we posit semiotic processes which existed prior to such evolution we need to account for that agent which is similar to mind, but not the same as mind, and is active in such semiotic processes. Classically this agent was known as the soul.

Aristotle's definition of soul: the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.

You say there is difference, but no differences; to me that is a nonsensical statement. if there is difference then there is plurality and if there is plurality then there are differences. — Janus

Do you know the difference between the general and the particular? It is not the same as the difference between the singular and the plural. To say that there is difference is not to say that there are differences, nor is it to say that there is a difference. Your act of converting the general to the particular, in order to support your claim that there are individuals, is what I called begging the question. It's also a category mistake.

And the next headline is Trump imposing major tariffs on Chinese imports. — Wayfarer

For Trump, it's nothing more than a money grab. He says, we're doing it because we have to, but it's more like we're doing it because we can. Of course it's the American consumer who pays. And he'll use that money to build a wall of some sort.

Biosemioticians would say that only life (not conscious agency) is required for semiotic relationships to obtain. — Galuchat

I didn't refer to "conscious agency". The soul is understood to be the agent of all living things. I believe it is a mistake to associate consciousness with agency in such a way as to make agency necessarily conscious agency. Conscious agency is a type of agency, but we see agency in all living things whether they are conscious or not..

The only differences you can reference which are always exactly the same, such as the numerical differences between pairs of numbers, are conceptual differences. — Janus

The point is that all differences are conceptual. "A difference" is a function of the description. We can attribute difference to the independent world, and assume that there are differences, but if we try to isolate a particular difference we do this through description, and therefore through the use of concepts. So an isolated "particular" or "individual" difference is purely conceptual, like the difference of 2.

So, you are now changing the subject, since I was taking about actual differences. — Janus

You have not demonstrated that there are actual differences. That was simply your claim, that there are individual differences, other than conceptual differences. I think that this is nonsense. I think that there is actual difference, in a general sense, but to say that there are actual differences, in the sense of individuated differences, without a mind to individuate those differences, is nonsense. I did not change the subject, I'm just stressing the point that your claim of "actual differences" other than conceptual differences, is just begging the question.

Actual differences are individual, conceptual differences of course may be general, but this is irrelevant. — Janus

Since it is by conception that actual differences are distinguished, then an actual difference is conceptual. What exists in the world, independent from minds is just undifferentiated difference, in a general sense.

The difference between two natural forms, for example, can never be exactly the same as the difference between any other pair of forms. Thus each difference is unique, individual. — Janus

Again, you are begging the question. You are assuming two distinct natural forms, with a difference between them. But the point I am arguing is that they only exist as distinct forms because a mind has determined a separation between them, individuated them. The "difference between any pair of forms" is nothing but a comparison, a judgement, made by a mind. But prior to even being able to compare them we must individuate them as distinct forms. That is why I am arguing that individuation is based in something other than difference. It is based in the apprehension of boundaries. So you're really barking up the wrong tree with this talk of differences, moving further away from our point of interest, individuation, instead of moving toward it by looking at boundaries. Boundaries are what make individuals real.

why wouldn't it do both? Your claim suggests that ultimately we will run out of possibilities. Unless of course there are an infinite number of possibilities. And if there are an infinite number of possibilities, then new possibilities has no effect on the number of possibilities. — Arne

Yes, it would appear like we would run out of possibilities eventually. That would seem inevitable unless something is creating possibilities. I was talking about acts of human knowledge as limiting possibilities, but it is completely possible that something else in the universe could be creating new possibilities. In this case we wouldn't run out of possibilities.

And are not some foreclosed possibilities necessarily less attractive possibilities anyways? If not, then would they be foreclosed. And are not the new possibilities more likely to be a higher level possibilities than those that have been foreclosed? And even if the number of arguably higher level possibilities is fewer than the number of foreclosed lower level possibilities, then do we not have a quality/quantity distinction in which we are still arguably better off with the fewer? — Arne

I wouldn't say that the possibilities which are foreclosed are foreclosed because they are less attractive, they are foreclosed because they are made impossible. So if you speak about choosing something attractive, this choice forecloses certain possibilities by making them impossible. Many of these possibilities would not even have been recognized as possibilities. And if they were, they might have been seen as more attractive. But if one recognizes a possibility, and renders it as impossible by choosing something else, this does not make the chosen one a "higher level; possibility". It just means that it was more desirable to the individual, a better goal. Furthermore, I was not arguing that we are "better off" with fewer possibilities, I was just describing the natural course of what knowledgeable acts do, they limit possibilities by making certain things impossible. Whether or not this process renders us "better off" is another issue.

And what about time in addition to probability? If the newly created or now emerged existing possibilities not only more probably, but if they are going to happen, then are now more likely to happen sooner than later? — Arne

My argument was that possibilities do not emerge in this way. New possibilities are not created by us directing our course of action. Such direction merely increases the probability of certain possibilities by transforming other possibilities into impossibilities. When the probability of a possibility is increased, it may go from being an unapprehended possibility to being apprehended, and this would make it seem like the possibility "emerged", but in reality our knowledge just changed so that we could grasp this possibility.