I believe this particular ontological transformation of abstract truths requires a conscious host. — Read Parfit

That is the issue which apokrisis doesn't seem to understand. Apokrisis wants to reduce everything to semiotics, not apprehending the logical conclusion that this requires something (an agent) who is practising semiosis

What I object to is the lingering dualism of treating consciousness as a substance, an immaterial soul-stuff or transcendent spirit.

....

And that is what I see semiotics doing. It dissolves both mind and matter as species of substantial being. They both become emergent states of semiotic organisation. — apokrisis

See, apokrisis places the cart before the horse, claiming that mind, and matter (which is necessary for the existence of the signs which are interpreted by minds), emerge from semiotic organisation, when actually it is very clear that mind and matter are the required elements of semiotic organisation.

So at least one or the other, mind or matter, must be prior to semiotic organization. In the Neo-Platonist tradition, consequent to Aristotle's cosmological argument, we conclude that mind, being the active agent in this process, is prior, creating the signs, and matter itself which constitutes the existence of physical information, as all matter can be interpreted as containing information.

Every difference is individual insofar as it is not exactly the same as any other difference. — Janus

Different means not the same, unlike, and "a difference" is an instance of this. As such, "difference" is a general term, it doesn't refer to an individual thing, nor does it refer to a particular. So there is no means by which we can say that a difference is individual. Nor can we say that any difference is not exactly the same as any other difference, unless they are judged as being different.. That is because "difference" is conceptual, it is a judgement of different. So each difference is essentially the same, in so far as each is an instance of judgement of unlike. The difference between 3 and 5 is the same as the difference between 7 and 9. Each is 2.

And there are many other instances in which two distinct instances of difference can be said to be the same difference. That is simply the way that we judge differences, by comparing them to other instances of difference to see if they are the same difference or a different difference. The same difference cannot be excluded. Temporal differences are another good example. An increment of time is the same difference, but it could occur at any time, thus being a different instance of the same difference. So we have no logical means to conclude that two instances of difference are necessarily not the same. In fact that goes against the definition of what a difference is, and what we actually look for in differences, whether or not they are the same difference.

If no two individuals are the same, by the law of identity, then it is impossible that a difference is an individual, because two instances of difference can be the same difference.

Why can the head and torso not be considered as individual components or processes of the body? — Janus

Each, the head, the torso, and the unity, can be considered as individuals. That's my point, individuation is how we judge things. One way of judging might say that the head and torso are not individuals, another might say that they are.

The point is that all differentiation presupposes, consists in, real individual differences. — Janus

I don't know what you would mean by "real individual differences" here. I can see how you would claim that a difference is real, but on what principle would you claim that a difference is individual? When we judge differences we refer to general principles, and these are not particulars or individuals, they are universals. So when we say that the difference between X and Y is as such, this is not an "individual" difference, it is a general type of difference. This is simply how we describe things, in general terms of description.

All boundaries and interdependencies are "porous", not absolute. But that does not entail that boundaries and interdependencies are merely arbitrary. Using your example, the question is 'What is it that allows and enables you to non-arbitrarily distinguish between your head as a whole and your torso as another whole? — Janus

Remember, I keep having to remind you that I am not arguing that individuation is arbitrary. Of course we have reasons for the way that we individuate. So the fact that we individuate, and I think this is indeed a fact, does not mean that individuation is arbitrary.

And, as you yourself say, boundaries are "not absolute", and this allows us to place the boundaries where we see fit. And it is the placing of boundaries which is what individuation is. Since we can place the boundaries where we see fit, we have to ask whether there are any real boundaries other than the ones we place. If there are no boundaries other than the ones we place, then there is no individuation other than what we do.

Well, clearly differentiation is something completely different from individuation. As I explained to Streetlight, individuation requires boundaries in order that there are separate individuals. A difference between my head and my torso doesn't make these separate individuals. So individuation cannot be reduced to differentiation because individuation requires the assumption of boundaries between the differences to justify the assumption of "individuals" as distinct objects.

This is the issue with the sorites paradox, and its relation to mereological nihilism. Are you familiar with this issue? It doesn't suffice, as a metaphysical principle, to simply assume that objects, as individuals, have existence, this assumption must be justified by demonstrating the real existence of boundaries.

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OK, let's assume that there is an act of differentiation which is responsible for real differences as a cause of differences, as you suggest, such that we can say "if there is difference there is already differentiation". Do you agree that this is a different use of "differentiate", with a different meaning, than the way that I used it to describe the act by which human beings differentiate?

Now our subject is "individuation", not "differentiation", and my claim is that human beings individuate through the act of differentiation. So all you have done is produced an argument from equivocation. You have given a different meaning to "differentiation" in an attempt to mislead me.

The logical association between individuation and differentiation requires that we define the words in my way, as human acts, such that the human act of individuation requires the human act of differentiation. You are referring to a different type of differentiation, so your conclusion "they are therefore also individuated" does not follow. It is a conclusion produced by equivocation. You have not established that differences constitute individuals without a human act of individuation. Nor have you established any relationship between differences and individuals. The only relationship between differences and individuals, which we have to go on is the one which I refer to as the human act of individuation.

Furthermore, individuation requires differentiation, but differentiation does not necessitate individuation. Differences do not necessarily constitute different individuals. There can be differences which are not differences of individuals So it is impossible to conclude that if there is differentiation therefore there is individuation, as you do. Therefore your argument is non sequitur in two distinct ways. Clearly it is you who is trying to put forward some sophistry.

There's a sense in which God here would see less than a human would, and not more. — StreetlightX

But God would see every single thing large or small, meaning all parts, and how each part is a part of something larger, which itself would be a specific thing, and how the larger things relate to each other as even larger things. So God would actually see a whole lot more than any human, or even all humans together.

Specialization does not extrapolate reliably to the large picture. You need to be more of a generalists who is able to zoom out and take it a wider range of clarity, at the same time. From the big picture, the specialty details, can take on new meaning. — wellwisher

Specialization does extrapolate to the large picture if you do it properly. Each specific thing is a part of something bigger, which is itself a specific thing. Conceptualization makes the specific thing into a member of a genus, a general type. The genus is not allowed to be a specific thing because it is thought to be a more vague idea, so this presents a problem to the extrapolation process.

So, you think the world is utterly homogeneous, undifferentiated until the human mind comes along and carves it up? No constraint on the way the mind carves things up from nature at all? — Janus

Do you not understand that there are differences, and then there is the recognition of differences? These two are completely different. The latter is referred to as differentiation, and it is a human act. The former is just a general reference to an assumption of something called difference. To differentiate, just like to individuate, is what human beings do. How can you believe that something has differentiated between the differences prior to something like a human being actually differentiating? The existence of difference does not constitute differentiation, but differentiation is to determine a constitutive difference.

I said that two individuals cannot inhabit precisely the same region of space simultaneously, and you reply with the lame objection that, for example two individuals could be in the place at the same time "depending on how one individuates". What, you mean like two people could be in the same room? As I said this is mere sophistry; but at least its kinda funny... — Janus

I guess you forgot to read my other examples? More evidence that you do not read very well. It appears like anytime you can't understand what another has written you declare it as sophistry and pass over it. So instead of understanding that human beings individuate by observing real differences in the world, you insist that if it's human beings which individuate, then they must do it in a random way. But that's complete nonsense, as your entire discourse here has been.

I know that the speed of light is not constant, but it is a constant, equivocation makes a meaningless argument.

Physics does not currently use C-level as the ground state. It assumes, without saying, that inertial and matter is the ground state. — wellwisher

There is inconsistency between using inertia as the "ground state", and light as the "ground state" because of the difference in the conception of time which lies behind these two. They are fundamentally incompatible because special relativity releases light from the force of inertia which is a function of the passing of time.

Individuation is a process. — StreetlightX

Yes, individuation is a process which gives existence to an individual. But that process is not the ever changing world, through which things come into being and perish, it is the process whereby human minds determine the boundaries of things. Individuation requires boundaries and the human mind assigns these.

They cannot be at precisely the same place even at different times. In any case it should have been obvious that I was referring to being at the same place at the same time.

Nothing else there to respond to, so.... — Janus

Clearly, as my examples show, different individuals are at the same place at the same time, depending on how one individuates. So you're still making baseless claims without substance. You've provided no argument at all, just a failed attempt to back up your claim with examples

presumably an act carried out by a subject); — Janus

You should interpret as written, without adding your own presumptions.

This seems like blatant sophistry, you are morphing the terms of the discussion. — Janus

You don't seem to know how to read very well. I use explanatory terms to help you to understand

So the difference involved in spatial location is clearly a necessary element of individuation. — Janus

Why would you say it's necessary? Individuation may be based on all sorts of things. Just because difference in location is commonly used as a principle for individuation doesn't mean that it always is, making it a necessary element. Different individuals can be at the same place, at different times.

Further, there are all sorts of instances where individuals overlap in spatial location. My example of a blade of grass, and the lawn, is an example of spatial overlapping of individuals. The earth is an individual, and the solar system is an individual, and they are both right here.

But is the speed of light a ceiling, or is the speed of light really the floor; ground state? — wellwisher

Since the speed of light is the constant, it is definitely the "ground state".

...what we might call the 'singular universal'... — StreetlightX

That my friend, is the ideal.

And so you burble on and on.... — apokrisis

As Uber said, just like a broken record. At least I am consistent, unlike your incoherent babbling.

They all possess said suffix. They are counterexamples to your baseless claim. — Janus

You said "Individuation is not an act, at least...". I said "the suffix "ation" indicates an act". That you can give examples of many "ation" words which are not acts carried out by a subject is irrelevant to whether individuation is or is not an act carried out by a subject.

Do you agree that "individuation" refers to an act? If so, we might proceed to discuss what sort of act it is.

Any distinction we make could be nothing but arbitrary unless it is due to real differences. It is difference, singularity, which constitutes individuation. — Janus

As I said, "real differences" does not constitute individuation. A difference between here and there does not mean that here and there are separate individuals. Difference is not individuation. Is individuation an act? Difference is not an act.

What makes you think that a human act of individuation would necessarily be arbitrary? So long as there are reasons for the distinctions which are made, the distinctions are not arbitrary. The reasons for some individuations might even be what you call "real differences". Clearly there are reasons why we individuate the way that we do, so there is no need to invoke arbitrariness.

You haven't provided any argument as to how individuation could be any sort of act other than some sort of act of judgement. It seems quite obvious that you have no such argument. Obviously it is your claim which is baseless.

Oddly, you seem happy with what this "uneducated metaphysical speculation" - ie: physics - has to says about perpetual motion machines, but not what it then has to say about dissipative structures. — apokrisis

You were talking about disorder being prior to order, in an absolutely way, as Peirce's Firstness. This is contrary to the 2nd law of thermodynamics. I know that you place this type of "disorder" as outside of time, but this 2nd law defines order in relation to time, so your use of disorder, or undirected, is meaningless nonsense.

Try to keep up with the educated view. — apokrisis

I have nothing against the general concept of "dissipative structures", it is you're application of the concept which is unprincipled, and therefore uneducated. You go beyond the boundaries intended by the concept, pretending that this is acceptable. And your pretense, that it is the "educated view", when it is clearly unprincipled and undisciplined is pure deception.

But pay attention. He was talking about the boundless. He was characterising a naked potentiality that is logically all that would remain after all constraint was removed. So now creation becomes constraints-based, not construction-based. It starts with formal and final cause, not material and efficient cause. — apokrisis

This is precisely where your speculation is illogical. A constraint is an actuality. You remove all constraint to have no actuality in the first place. If you have no actuality, you have nothing to cause the existence of any constraints, and the emergence of constraints from pure potential is logically impossible.

It is a fundamentally different way of thinking about creation. We don't start with some uncreated stuff - the material required to construct. We start with the structural limitation of the unformed and the undirected. We begin with the process of reining in possibility itself so as to start to have a material world that expresses the intelligibility of form and finality in its existence. — apokrisis

"Fundamentally different" is useless when it is also illogical. When you start with an illogical premise, your conclusions lead you deeper and deeper into the illogical. Next, you will need to defy the laws of non-contradiction, and excluded middle, in a completely unprincipled way, in order to support the conclusions which follow from your illogical first principle.

Sure, construction quickly follows. Indeed, some form of constructive material activity is going to have to be there pretty much from the start. History has to begin by freedoms being physically disposed of in a fashion that makes the past materially concrete. — apokrisis

This is what contradicts the 2nd law of thermodynamics. You have unconstrained potential, absolute freedom, pure lack of information, then all of a sudden the "construction" of information occurs spontaneously. You have simply adopted the disproven concept of spontaneous generation, to account for the emergence of the universe, from your illogical Firstness.

Right, that's exactly the uneducated metaphysical speculation I was referring to. It's clearly unprincipled speculations which are completely meaningless, just like speculations about perpetual motion machines. You can discuss it all you want, as if it's a real possibility if you ignore fundamental principles. Perpetual motion requires ignoring fundamental empirical principles, and self-organization requires ignoring fundamental logical principles.

Universal computers are real. I am typing on one. — tom

I thought you said that a universal computer could emulate any possible physical system, and that it's impossible that one universal computer could do something that another could not. Are you claiming that you're using a computer that can emulate any physical system?

There is no such thing as a universal computer that can do something that other universal computers cannot.

There is no such thing as a physical system that can undergo any dynamics that cannot be exactly simulated on a universal computer. — tom

So a "universal computer" is a fictional thing, defined as a computational device which can simulate the dynamics of any possible physical system? Since it's fictional, how do we even know that such a devise is possible? And if we do not know whether such a device is even possible, of what use is the assumption of such a thing?

Who carries out the acts of precipitation, adaptation, conflagration, (non-human) propagation, prolongation...and so on? — Janus

These examples are irrelevant. We are talking about the act of individuation, what this consists of, not what some other types of acts consist of. That's just changing the subject.

Objects are individuated by constitutional difference as I said before. If there were no individual differences between things we would not be able to differentiate them in the first place, would we? — Janus

The assumed existence of differences does not constitute individuation. The differences must be judged, distinctions must be made, in order that there is individuation. It is the act of judging the differences which creates an individual. This is very evident from the fact that the very same differences can be judged in different ways, therefore the same things individuated in different possible ways. I can look at my lawn as an individual lawn, or I can look at it as individual blades of grass.

This is fundamental to arithmetic. 1 signifies an individual, 2 signifies an individual, 3 signifies an individual. 1, and 1, and 1, are three distinct individuals, but they are said to be equivalent to this individual, 3. The same individual, 3, can be represented in countless different ways, which are all equivalent yet different. These are some of the many possibilities, "5-2", "2+1", "9/3", etc..

Time is change with a general direction. That general direction is what emerges due to symmetry breaking. So time does not pre-exist change as such when there is only change, or fluctuation, lacking in a general direction. — apokrisis

So prior to "symmetry breaking", there is change without direction. This must be disorderly change, change which is not in any way directed. Where does the intent come from, which is necessary to direct change, making it orderly, directed, what you would call "temporal"?

Do you see what I mean? In order that directed change emerges from undirected change, we must assume that something starts to direct it. This directing agent could not be part of the undirected because then it would pre-exist the emergence, and would not actually be emergent. It would be a separate type of existence, like what is implied by dualism.

If you deny the need for a directing agent, then you are only saying that order could emerge out of disorder. This is what I say is a statement made by a person uneducated in the field of study, analogous to a person uneducated in the laws of physics claiming that one could make a machine which powers itself, (perpetual motion). Both of these claims are the result of not having a well-rounded understanding of the relationship between physical existence and time.

I think the suffix "ation" indicates an act. If this act is not carried out by a subject who individuates something from that thing's environment, then what does carry out this act? An object cannot individuate itself.

I'm saying time emerges. — apokrisis

Do you agree that emergence is a type of change? And doesn't change require time? If so, then it is impossible that time could emerge (come to be as the result of a change0.

Now you can ignore what the physics suggests on this score. But I prefer to let the available evidence inform the metaphysics. Especially when on logical grounds, Peirce had already set out the machinery of this kind of radically emergent ontology. — apokrisis

If "the physics" is contradictory then of course I will ignore it as unintelligible nonsense. But I really don't think that "the physics" suggests that time emerges, I think that this is just undisciplined metaphysics.

Here's an analogy. I have met different people who have ideas, even plans for types of perpetual motion machines, electric cars which can recharge their batteries from their own forward motion, and things like this; machines that produce enough power to do work and also recharge their own source of energy. These people are uneducated in basic high school physics, not understanding the basic laws of conservation. We try to convince these people that their ideas won't work, without ridiculing them, but they just can't seem to understand that their ideas contravene fundamental laws of the field in which they are speculating, physics.

Likewise, there are people who are highly educated in science, who have not been educated in the broader field of philosophy. They have not been disciplined on issues of human consciousness, the nature and history of ideas, concepts, the human will, judgement, ethics and morality. Some of these people will venture into metaphysical speculations without the proper training. They may put forward ideas which contravene fundamental principles, like the cosmological argument. We must explain to these people, trying not to ridicule them, that their speculations are a meaningless waste of time because they contravene this fundamental principle, the cosmological argument, just like we have to do this for those who dream about machines which contravene the law of conservation of energy. It is simply a matter of undisciplined, uneducated speculation, when you put forward ideas, schemes which contravene fundamental principles of the field in which you are speculating. How do we convince these people of this without ridiculing them?

But didn't you slip up in presuming that time always exists? My approach says it emerges. So when there is only the originating potential in "existence" (which of course, can't be existence as we normally mean it), then there is no actual time. At best, time is one of the possible emergent outcomes of a process of cosmological evolution, along with space and energy. — apokrisis

If there is no time, then emergence, which is a type of change, is impossible. So it doesn't make any sense to say that there was potential before there was time, this unintelligible, incomprehensible. This is why Aristotle's metaphysical principles are highly acceptable, he makes "potential" intelligible by restricting it, or constraining it, with time. It is a temporal term, having no meaning outside of time. Putting "potential" outside of time renders the term unintelligible, without any real meaning.

So that's exactly what the cosmological argument does, it demonstrates that it is logically impossible for pure potential to be prior to time. Think about your proposal. There is potential, with no time passing. Something has to start time in order for time to start passing. It is impossible that potential itself can cause time to start passing, because it is just the potential for time, and any potential needs something to actualize it for it to become actual. There is an act required.

So there is a suppressed premise here - that time exists before the existence in which I say it emerges. — apokrisis

It is not a "suppressed premise", it is the conclusion, and it's not begging the question. The argument is based on what the terms "change", or in this case, "emerge" mean. The nature of "emerge", or in Aristotelian physics, "change", is such that it requires time. Time cannot come into existence from change, it cannot emerge, because time must already exist in order for any change or emergence to happen.

You are taking the view that motion could be completely eradicated and so absolute rest would be the natural baseline state of existence. But inertial motion could be used as proof of my constraints-based approach. The fact that spin and straight-line motion are energy conserving symmetries - symmetries that can't be broken - shows that your atomistic assumptions about absolute rest can't be right. Physics has concrete proof against your metaphysics. — apokrisis

Do you not see that you are contradicting your own premise here? Your premise, "potential without time", is exactly what you deny here, "absolute rest". So you propose "absolute rest", disguised as "potential without time", to counter the cosmological argument, then you turn around to say that physics has concrete proof against this. If you truly believe that physics has concrete proof against "absolute rest", then drop your contradictory proposal of "potential without time".

The cosmological argument says nothing more than what you say physics has concrete proof against, that absolute rest is impossible. Pure potential, without anything actual is exactly that, absolute rest. Since absolute rest is denied, the Neo-Platonists take the premise that there are active Forms (in Christian theology God and angels) which are prior to any potential, "potential" being a word used to refer to a non existent motion. Non-existent motion is rest.


Isn't it necessary to reach conclusions in order to gain a comprehensive grasp? How can you say that you have grasped anything if you haven't reached any conclusions?

MU, if it is accepted that there must be a uncaused cause for all things, what does that tell us about the nature of that uncaused cause, other than that it is not caused by anything within the Cosmos? Or, on the other hand, why can the Cosmos itself not be the uncaused cause of all things? — Janus

It is not necessarily represented as "uncaused cause". I think that's a misrepresentation of Aristotle's cosmological argument, because "cause" is an ambiguous term, as Aristotle demonstrates with the "four uses of 'cause'". The argument is against those like apokrisis, who place potential as prior to actual, in an absolute way. This category of premise, placing potential as first, comes in two types, idealists like apokrisis who put the potential of ideals (symmetry) as first, and materialist who put the potential of matter as first.

OK, explain how you understand these two terms then.

Identification <> Individuation. — StreetlightX

To identify something is to recognize it as distinct from everything else, which is to assign to it a specific character, and this is to individuate it. "Identification", and "individuation", are two different ways of describing the very same act.

The Church-Turing-Deutsch Principle tells us (proves based on known physics) that all computationally universal devices are equivalent. — tom

Equivalent in what way, they are all computational universal devices?

So, I think, for me at least, the most intellectually honest thing to do is suspend judgement on the whole matter. — Janus

We can suspend judgement on all principles, as doubtful, and this is the way of skepticism. But it is possible to reach the bottom, a principle which is uncontrovertible, and on the uncontrovertible principle we can construct a reasonable ideology. For me, this is Aristotle's cosmological argument. It's a logical principle describing what cannot be otherwise, if we accept the validity of empirical evidence.

There's no actual individuation that goes on at all: the whole idea is that possible worlds are a given set out of which the actual world is simply one; as you said, "the actual world is part of the set of possible worlds" — StreetlightX

How would one differentiate the actual from the possible, if the actual is supposed to be one of the possible? Would this be an arbitrary designation?

"We can do the thing" (given the current conditions). But then some idiots decided that it'd be a good idea to reify individual possibilities as quasi-substantial entities in-themselves. — StreetlightX

But what's the difference between identifying (individuating) a real (actual) thing and identifying a possible thing? On what principles is the proposition that a real (actual) thing is identifiable, and a possible thing is not identifiable based?

don't think this is right. The expanding sphere opens up new possibilities that are not predictable. This shows up every time someone tries to speculate on the world of the future. It's always wrong because the whole system pivots on some little feature no one thought of before or noticed when it happened. — T Clark

But a possibility does not need to be predicted, or even to be apprehended in order to exist as a possibility. After it is apprehended it exists as an apprehended possibility. So the "expanding sphere", if this refers to the sphere of what is apprehended, does not open up new possibilities, it just the apprehension of possibilities which were previously not apprehended. And if "expanding sphere" refers to the creation of new physical realities, this does not create new possibilities, they were already there as possibilities which required the expanding sphere in order to be actualized.

In the scientific context in which the concept was elaborated, the adjacent possible is created or brought into being where it simply did not 'exist' before hand even qua possible; In Kauffman's own words: — StreetlightX

This is a mistaken idea. The possibility always "existed", it is just one step closer to becoming a reality. Most possibilities require numerous efficient causes to be brought into reality. Each efficient cause which is fulfilled brings the possibility closer to reality. But it is wrong to say that fulfilment of one or another of the efficient causes brings the possibility into existence.

Once you fry an egg the raw egg can't be gotten from it. — fdrake

That's the point I made, creating something produces impossibilities, not possibilities. It eliminates the possibilities which the creation of that thing excludes.

What you call the "adjacent possible" is just another way of expressing "the means to the end". What you are saying is that specific ends cannot be brought into existence without the required means to reach that end. Bringing into existence a portion of the required means does not necessitate the end though. It increases the probability of that end. Invention of the microchip did not necessitate the existence of the smartphone, it increased its probability.

But where your description does not seem to be accurate, is that the possibility of the smartphone was still there prior to the invention of the microchip, at a lower probability, requiring the invention of the microchip. So "adjacent possibilities" are not brought into existence by the preliminary invention, they always existed before. The preliminary invention makes the "adjacent possibilities" apprehendable to the human mind.

For one, the idea of the adjacent possible makes it possible (hah) to think of the emergence of possibilities; usually, possibility is thought of as a purely abstract modal category in which certain possibilities are simply either 'realized' or not. — StreetlightX

I think that you have this backward. Bringing something into existence, creating or inventing something actually limits possibilities because any possibility which is excluded by that invention is now denied. What you describe is that bringing into existence something new, allows human beings to apprehend more possibilities. Those possibilities were there before, but not apprehended, as potential ends which require too many means to be apprehended as ends. Knowledge progresses by limiting possibilities, producing impossibilities. This is the nature of certainty, that which is impossible.

I have more productive things to do than waste time in a dualist cesspool. — Uber

The preacher has left the building. "Conception" and "imagination" have the same meaning to you. Where lies reason in this confused mess, which is your mind?

Finally, it's worth noting for the record that this thread has still not reached an understanding of what is physical and what is not. All of the debates on this thread, including my posts, have relied on some hazy and contingent assumptions about what we mean by that term, but the debates reveal very clearly that we really have no clue. — Uber

Then why preach as if you have it all figured out, and those who don't agree with you are speaking infantile nonsense?

But doesn't this come back to our usual sticking point? I say the problem with the Aristotelian telling is that is seems to put actuality before potentiality - in time. — apokrisis

That actuality is put before potentiality is the logical conclusion produced by Aristotle's cosmological argument. The argument is very simple, and once understood it is very forceful. Simply put, it states that if at any time, there was only potential, there would always be only potential, because if any actuality comes into existence it requires an actuality as its cause. However, we observe that there is actual existence, therefore it is impossible that potentiality is prior to actuality in an absolute sense.

The argument was intended by Aristotle, to demonstrate that anything eternal is necessarily actual, and it appears to produce an infinite regress of actuality. That's why Aristotle introduced the eternal circular motion. as the representation of this eternal actuality. In modern times, many monists will posit an infinite regression of the co-existence of actuality and potentiality. Neo-Platonists, and Christian theologians reject infinite regress as repugnant to the intellect, infinite regress is produced by misunderstanding. So they maintain a dualist separation between the actuality which is prior to time, and the temporal actuality which exists in time.

These two different perspectives produce two distinct meanings of "eternal", and consequently two distinct interpretations of "time". From the monist perspective, eternal means extending forever in time, infinite temporal extension, and this is what is dismissed in theology as repugnant, unintelligible. In the theological representation, eternal means outside of time. The meaning of "time" is the same here, it is a concept derived from physical motion. But when eternal is understood in the theological way, as outside of time (as derived from physical motion), then we need to reconceive "time" to allow that the things which have been designated as outside of time can interact with temporal things.

This is why I cannot accept that principle you derive from your interpretation of Peirce. To place potential as first is to violate the very simple logic of Aristotle's cosmological argument, and so it is illogical. The monist approach unites potential and actual as one, making them co-dependent. This may appear to be acceptable, but it renders time as unintelligible. The separation between past and future, the boundary, is lost because there is no real difference between potential and actual, as this is just two different ways of looking at the same thing. There is no real beginning and end as there is a beginning of the past and an end of the future when we allow for a real division, so intelligibility is lost to infinity.

The present is where the actualised past is exerting its historical weight of established being on the possibilities that may ensue to mark out its future. — apokrisis

This is the way of thinking about time that I think we need to avoid. It views the impetus of motion as "historical weight", inertia, The way that something has been, in the past, will force it to continue to be that way in the future. But this notion is just derived from our perspective, our memories of how things were, our observations of consistency, and our inductive reasoning. In reality I think, what determines how things will materialize at the present, is the Forms which are prior to the present. We observe these patterns of materialization as consistent, and inertial, but the real "cause" of how things exist at the present is the Forms which are prior to the present, causing things to come to be at the present, the way that they are. And in an inverse way, due to our observations and induction, we attribute "cause" to historical weight, the past, as if what has already past has causal power. But what has already past has no real power to affect the future.

So every moment has some limited set of choices. But the choices are free ones - either properly random, at the level of physical nature, or ones that reflect the kind of options that life and mind can construct for themselves in having their own memories, habits and intentions. — apokrisis

Consider that every moment has in principle, an unlimited number of choices. But the choices by which the universe may materialize at each moment are limited in a way similar to the choices that a human being makes are limited. The human being's choices are limited by the ideas in its mind, and the possibilities for the universe are limited by the Forms which are existing in the universe. Now we approach the need for the second type of actuality which is the basis for dualism. We must assume something which chooses the possibilities to actualize. In Aristotle's biology, this is the soul. The living body consists as potencies which are not necessarily actualized. They are classed as potencies because they are not always active, but when activated they proceed in the same way, like a habit. The habitual activity is not occurring all the time, it lies in potency until it is activated. The point being that we must assume an actuality (the soul), as that which activates the various potencies. From this perspective, the living body exists as a conglomeration of potencies, it is produced and maintained by this further actuality, the soul.

But I am talking about the choices actually happening, and thus establishing a further concrete fact about historical existence. — apokrisis

Remember, a set of choices is meaningless without something which chooses. Possibilities will come and go, but unless there is something which chooses, some form of actuality (like the soul), which can actualize one possibility rather than another, the whole structure of possibilities is meaningless.

So throw out these, but keep his understanding of time right? — Uber

Right, have you read his expose on time? Do you understand the difference between time as a measurement and time as something which measured? Are you familiar with Wittgenstein's discussion of the metre stick?

When you say physics provides no means to look at time as something which is measured, you are basically implying that an absolute reference frame of time exists that ticks at the same rate for everything in the Universe. — Uber

No, that's not what it means. It means that the passing of time is a real thing, which can be measured. This does not imply that it is absolute, it just implies that it is a "thing" like other things, like the metre stick, which can be measured. None of the things which we measure are absolute, measurement is to establish a relation between the thing and something else. So there is no reason to believe that time, as a measurable thing is absolute.

The problem appears to be that since time is a non-physical thing, you are hesitant to acknowledge that it is a thing at all. What about space then? Is space a thing to you? If not, then how about space-time? Is it a fiction, or is space-time a thing for you?

Modern physics does allow us to measure time, but it warns us that our measurements do not represent an absolute state of time, merely a relative one. — Uber

I disagree, the concept of time used by modern physics necessitates that there is nothing which is actually being measured. This is necessitated by the constant which is the speed of light. Assuming this as a constant necessitates that no time is passing at the speed of light and therefore the passing of time cannot be a real thing, because it is negated by light speed. And light speed is assumed to be very real, it is not a boundary like infinity. Since this negation of the passing of time is the constant, it acts as the premise upon which any measurement of time is based. Therefore any measurement of time is based in the denial of the passing of time as a real thing, and the measurements employed are arbitrary, based in assumptions other than the assumption of a real passing of time.

It also warns us that time by itself does not make any sense separately from space, hence why we describe events and causes as unfolding in spacetime. — Uber

This is a falsity, the claim that time makes no sense without space. And this is why we must employ logic and reason rather than our senses, to figure this out. It is only this particular conception of time, which you call "spacetime" that assumes time does not make sense without space. But this assumption is completely unfounded because it is not difficult to conceive of time passing with active (immaterial), non-spatial Forms, in the Neo-Platonic sense, with space along with spatial existence, emerging from this. The inverse though, spatial existence with time emerging, is impossible to conceive of because emergence requires time. So it is impossible for time to emerge, but possible for space to emerge.

On this basis, I challenged the notion that Forms can somehow be active in time without being active in space as well. In other words, what does it mean for them to be active, if not in spacetime? — Uber

There are many ways to conceive of space, different dimensionalities, etc.. We can infer from this, that space is not necessarily the way that we conceive it to be. In fact, since there are different possibilities of how to conceive of space, we can infer from this, that space is probably not any of the ways that we do conceive it to be. Therefore, your conception of space, which ties time to space, implying that time makes no sense without space, is probably incorrect, and it is your argument, which relies on this unsound premise, which is unsound, not mine.

Furthermore, reason about what it means to exist cannot develop except through empirical experience. — Uber

How do you know this? If there was a being with access only to its internal self, no senses to sense its environment, would this being be incapable of reasoning about what it means to exist? Why could it not learn things about what is happening outside itself just from understanding what is happening within itself? What comes to be, in the inner space, does not necessarily come through the outer space, and that's one of the quirky things about space which makes the conception of space, and space/time relations so difficult. Where did that fundamental particle come from which just popped onto the scene?

Our "rational operations" in the brain, to quote Wayfarer, depend on the outside world, and then they develop concepts that go along with that dependence, such as existence, theories about the nature of that existence, etc. — Uber

Having said that, I accept that rational human beings rely on their senses for much of the material with which they reason, but not all of it. And this is the issue here, that potion of the reasoning material which is derived from sources other than the senses. It's this material that we need pure reason to account for. You deny that there is such material, material derived from the non-physical, as is common today, but this denial is unreasonable.

Finally, there is absolutely no such thing as metaphysical reason separate from the physical structure of the brain. Let's not equivocate: it is the brain that reaches conclusions about the world. Thank you modern neuroscience. — Uber

Let's not change the subject on this matter. What is at issue is the supremacy of empirical experience, not whether it is the brain which does the thinking. "Empirical" implies specifically data derived from sensation. If we now discuss activities of the brain we need to differentiate data derived from sensation and data derived elsewhere. Once we allow that valid data is sourced internally, through means other than sensation, then the supremacy of empirical experience must be called into doubt. To re-establish this supremacy, as you would like to do, we need to fully analyze and understand the internally sourced data. You can start with that which is hereditary, but you will rapidly find that our understanding is incomplete, and there is evidence to implicate non-physical sources. Unless we can obtain complete understanding of the non-physical, or exclude it decisively, the supremacy of empirical experience over reason must be left as highly doubtful.

Seeking a higher truth may be seeking an ideal, but not all ideals that are sought are higher truths; in fact most are not. People strive towards all kinds of ideals: ideal weight, ideal physique, become the best athlete, musician, artist, writer, businessman, academic and so on; the list is endless. — Janus

Right, and the point I made was that trying to persuade others to work with you toward an "ideal", whether it's a "higher truth", or any other ideal you might have in mind, this is not the same thing as trying to impose your own notion of truth onto another.

I would add that expecting others to share your beliefs and ideals is a form of imposition, even if it is not overtly acted upon, it will show up covertly in forms of passive/ aggressive behaviour. — Janus

This is plainly untrue. Imposition implies enforcement. To discuss ideals, allowing one to judge and decide, by means of one's own free will, is by no means "imposition".

And to take the next step, to reach a theory of quantum gravity that might account for time, the wheel looks likely to turn again towards a constraints-based view where the past is the actualised and the future is the potential. Having spatialised time for so long, we may have a QG theory based on reality's thermal history. — apokrisis

Despite the fact that I constantly harp on you concerning the things we do not agree on (Uber thinks I'm a broken record), I do recognize that we actually do agree on a lot of things. There's just no point in discussing those things.

Is the non-physical simply the unexpressed-as-yet future then? MU will want to be more scholastic and place the forms clearly in the past - prior to that which actually exists. And they might be prior in the sense of being latencies. — apokrisis

Yes, I'd agree that the non-physical Forms could be "the unexpressed-as-yet future". But there's a sense of "prior" here which is difficult to grasp. If the unexpressed future is non-physical, and the past is physical, then the present is the act of expression, whereby the non-physical produces the physical (future gives way to become the past). So if at each moment, as time passes, the non-physical produces the physical, then if this is not instantaneous (which by the nature of "becoming" seems impossible), then we have to account for this expression, as a process. Hence the things which come out of the future first, those which are nearest to the purest of the non-physical, are "prior" in that sense. This order is understood in Neo-Platonism as procession, or emanation.

So, what makes you think it would be a good idea to impose your idea of truth on others? — Janus

But this was not the question though. The issue was this:

This is the case with any "higher truth" whatsoever. Higher truths are real only insofar as people are committed to them, and they may be judged only by their fruits. I'm not saying people should not be committed to such ideals, if that is what they feel is right for them, but the fatal error consists in prescribing such things for others, even for all people. — Janus

Notice that you refer to the "higher truth" as an ideal. An ideal is something sought, as a perfection, so the "higher truth" is something sought, it is a goal. That's what an ideal is. Someone who believes in a "higher truth", as an ideal, believes that there is a higher truth, and that we ought to seek it. That is the commitment. It is not a belief that one knows a higher truth than others, and they are committed to this belief. To convince another to seek the same goal, a "higher truth", is not the same as imposing one's idea of truth on another.

I think you have not properly distinguished between an "idea" and an "ideal". An idea is a belief about what is, and ideal is a belief about what ought to be.

apologize for my harsh language, Undercover. The words I used were inappropriate and should have been avoided. — Uber

The apology is accepted, and gratefully received, but I'm afraid that the real problem, which is the attitude behind those words used, remains. You've presented an exposition about how you understand the terms of physical and non-physical, and when I confronted you with problems concerning your metaphysical principles, you countered in two ways. First, you switched a key word for some other, more vague description, as if altering a few words would make the problem with your principles disappear. Second, when I suggested alternative metaphysical principles, ones which avoided the problems I pointed to in your principles, instead of trying to understand what I was saying, you dismissed it as "nonsense". So it became clear to me that you were not interested in discussing metaphysical principles, all you were interested in is preaching.

But I do not apologize for the general observation they expressed. Though not impossible, it's extremely difficult to have a rational discussion with someone who borrows theories of time from Plato and who believes that empirical reality is the subservient handmaiden to logical truth. At that point the problem is no longer dualism versus naturalism. It's the fundamental assumptions we make about the nature of the world. — Uber

Have you read Aristotle's Physics, his discussions on time? He displays a much more comprehensive understanding of time then you will find in most modern philosophy of time. Surely, you must understand that the nature of time has not been, and is not, understood by any human being. This means that if we are interested in the nature of time, we ought to consider all theories of time, to see what each of them has to offer. So, your statement, that you cannot have a rational discussion with someone who borrows theories of time from Plato, is nothing other than a statement of bias. It is an expression of your own irrationality.

Do you recognize that there is a difference between the past and future? If not, then it would be difficult for me to have a rational discussion with you, because such a recognition is implied in all that we say, think, and do. It would be a most hypocritical way of speaking to say that you do not recognize a difference between past and future. If you are truthful to yourself, and say that you do recognize a difference between past and future, how would you account for this difference? Would you say that the future is full of possibilities, and the past is full of actualities, or would you dismiss this as unacceptable Aristotelian terminology?

In Aristotle's description of time, he recognizes two ways that we apprehend time. First, and principally, time is a means of measurement, we use time as a ruler, to measure. Secondly, in another way, time is something which is measured. You offhandedly dismiss any way of looking at time which is not the way of modern physics, but modern physics provides no way to look at time as something which is measured. So if you think that the passing of time is something real, something which is measured by clocks, then you need a way of looking at time which is not the way of modern physics. And if you think that the way of modern physics is the only acceptable way of looking at time, then you exclude the possibility that the passing of time is something real, which we measure with clocks.

Take the argument about the unicorns. Why do we all agree that it's ridiculous, even though it's a logically valid syllogism? Because we all know that the properties of addition have nothing to do with the existence of unicorns. — Uber

This argument was completely irrelevant to the point I was making. That's why I say you dismiss my points out of bias without even trying to understand what I was saying. Clearly the logic which tells us that 2+2=4 is not the same logic which tells us that numbers exist as immaterial objects.

And why do we know that? Because we have a deeply embedded sense of causality that has developed through empirical experience. — Uber

But you're wrong here Uber, and you refuse to consider the possibility that you're wrong, to allow yourself to review your principles to see whether you might actually be wrong. It is not merely "empirical experience" which tells us whether something exists, because it is reasoning and logic which tells us what it means "to exist". Sure, you could define "exist" in any way that you desire, and whatever things fulfill that definition through empirical evidence, those things exist, but that is to be unreasonable. We need a reasonable definition of "exist". So it is not empirical experience which tells us which things exist and which do not, because reason must tell us what it means to exist. And if reason tells us that it's possible for things to exist which we have no empirical experience of, then we ought to accept that. Quit your childish protestations and behave reasonably.

Do you accept what I told you in my last post, that the capacities of the human senses are limited? If so, then it is clearly unreasonable for you to insist that the criteria for determining what exists and what does not exist is empirical experience. If you refuse to recognize the limitations of the senses, thus disallowing yourself from getting beyond the limitations of the senses, how are you ever going to proceed toward a higher level of understanding?

This was the basis of my criticism for your explanation of the epistemological problem. It was a completely unsound argument. Using a word like "active" does not amount to a causal relation between Forms and real things in the world, and throwing out all of modern physics is not the best way to engage in discussion about the nature of reality. — Uber

Let me see if I have this straight then. My argument is a completely unsound argument because it employs an understanding of time which is inconsistent with the understanding of time employed by modern physics. Now, I've described why the understanding of time employed by modern physics is inadequate, because it does not allow that the passing of time is something which is measurable. Therefore employing a different understanding of time does not necessitate that the argument is unsound. So I've addressed your counter argument, and you no longer have any reason to say that my argument is unsound.

Now we can have immaterial Forms without the epistemic problem in the way that the Neo-Platonists envisioned. Do you see, that the reason why modern materialists/physicalists deny immaterial existence, and dualism, plunging themselves into all sorts of contradictions and inconsistencies in their speak (because the language is developed on dualist principles), is simply due to a misunderstanding of time which they harbour?

Though not the only reason, I think my foundational assumptions of the world are largely accurate because of empirical evidence, the very thing you deny has any major importance. You think you can bring Forms into existence because of logical necessity, the very I think deny has any causal relevance in the actual world. There's no way to square that circle. — Uber

I do not deny that empirical evidence has major importance. What I deny is that we can make an adequate decision about what exists and what does not exist, based on empirical evidence. This is due to the reasons I described. To make such a decision we need to first determine what it means to exist. This determination must be made by reason. And, it is unreasonable to base a definition of "exist" in empirical evidence because we know that the senses have limited capacities.

I'm not saying people should not be committed to such ideals, if that is what they feel is right for them, but the fatal error consists in prescribing such things for others, even for all people. — Janus

How is this an error, to encourage people to work toward the same goal, the "higher truth", or whatever ideal it is that one may encourage others to work toward?

The subtle imposition of meaning by the collective on the individual is what holds, at least for modernity, the seeds of nihilism, insofar as it forecloses on the possibility of any creative individual establishment of meaning. — Janus

But don't you see that this "imposition of meaning by the collective on the individual", already requires the other. There is no "collective" without that other, which is what you call the "fatal error". That fatal error of encouraging others to adopt the same goal "higher truth" or whatever common goal is adopted, is what produces the collective. Without it, there is no collective, just individuals seeking to fulfill their own wants and needs.

It is common in modern philosophy to describe how the collective, society as a whole, shapes the individual, but the collective is often taken for granted. This collective cannot be taken for granted, it is a unity which is caused to exist, and it is subject to similar principles of generation and corruption as any contingent being is.

Thanks, I'll give it a look.

So let me get something straight: would you be ok with this definition if constraints were non-physical? — Uber

According to the definition they are non-physical. That is implied necessarily by you definition of physical as that which is subject to constraints. You've created a separation between the physical, and that which constrains the physical. This must be non-physical. I'm not OK with it because it suffers the epistemological problem. As I said in my first reply, I find in my experience that constraints are physical, so I think you're way of the mark even using "constraints" as a defining term.

The definition does not imply any division at all, and in any case I rephrased it a while back to state anything that only has finite amounts of energy, in response to your initial objection. So you keep attacking a strawman. — Uber

Good, as I said, we ought to leave "constraints" right out of this definition. How would you define "energy" here? Do you allow for potential energy? Suppose as a simple example, because I'm no physicist, that an object transfers energy to another object, through force, and this is explained by the means of a field, such that the potential energy is the property of the field. Would you say that the field is something physical because it has a finite amount of energy, even though that energy is just potential energy, and a "field" is just a mathematical construct?

The basic problem is that your fundamental assumptions about the world are totally bonkers. — Uber

I'll keep that in mind.

What epic lunacy. — Uber

I'll keep that in mind as well as the following:

Beautiful nonsense, some of the most beautiful nonsense I've yet seen on this forum. — Uber

It appears like you have no constructive criticism, no interest in philosophy, and no means for discussing, let alone refuting, the points I made. At least you admit that my replies are beautiful. Yours are ugly.

To understand metaphysics requires meta-noia, a literal change in the way cognition operates; it requires insight into one's own mental operations. It requires the intelligence becoming aware of the way it 'constructs' the world. Naturalism doesn't deal with that, because it operates at the level where that construction is itself treated as reality with a taken-for-granted nature. Questioning that is the business of metaphysics. — Wayfarer

I agree. This is why we proceed with logic as the fundamental principle of "construction" rather than the sense impressions of empiricism. Uber calls this "epic lunacy" to place logic as more reliable than the senses.

There was no substance in your counter-arguments. Honestly and seriously. — Wayfarer

That's an understatement. Look at Uber's replies to me. Bye now, I know when my time is being wasted.

No obviously they do not contain the same problem, for the reasons that apokrisis explained and for the reasons that I mentioned: namely that we know about constraints on larger states of motion emerging from more fundamental states of motion. There could be some kind of metaphysical resolution there. The epistemological problem only exists when you divide reality into multiple realms and then pick and choose which causal rules apply in one realm but not the other. — Uber

By your own definition of "physical" you have divided reality into multiple realms. You say that the physical is "any system subject to energetic constraints". By this definition you divide reality into the physical (that which is subject to constraints), and the constraints themselves.

Apokrisis does not provide a solution to this problem, as we've discussed this before. There is no logical way that the non-physical, the constraints, can emerge from the physical, that which is constrained. Emergence of constraints implies a time of no constraints prior to the existence of constraints. But it is illogical to think that that which is fundamentally unconstrained (prior to constraints) could produce its own constraints. If constraints have always existed, then the "fundamental states of motion" already had constraints, and "emergence" is denied as inapplicable to this situation. But this makes constraints prior to motion, as constraining all motions, and therefore eternal. Now we have the epistemological problem. How does something prior to time and motion (constraints) have causal efficacy in the physical world?

Having said all that, it is abundantly clear to me that the definition I gave for physical stuff is at least empirically reliable, even though it has outstanding metaphysical questions...as any definition for anything would! — Uber

Your reliance on "empirical reality" is what is misleading. Empirical reality is based in sensation, and sensation is fallible. That's why we turn to logic, to lead us out of the mistaken assumptions of empirical reality. Our sense observation lead us astray because of the limited capacities of the senses, while reason and logic allow us to identify the mistakes which the senses lead us into, and rectify them. Ultimately the "logical reality" must be given priority over the "empirical reality", in order that the intellect can overcome the problems given to it by the senses. You, like apokrisis, appear to believe that we must depreciate our logical principles, because our senses give us an "empirical reality" of vagueness which logic cannot grasp. Logical principles must be adapted to empirical evidence even if the senses give us illogical confusion. Instead of realizing that this is a deficiency of our senses, you would insist that it is a deficiency of logic, suggesting as apokrisis does, that logical principles be degraded to allow that the confusion which the senses hand us is a real aspect of the universe rather than a deficiency of the human being's ability to apprehend. As you give priority to the "empirical reality" rather than the intelligible reality.

Nothing written about the epistemological problem actually addressed the problem itself. — Uber

Have you read how I have addressed the epistemological problem. The same problem was really addressed thousands of years ago by Plato. Ancient dualist metaphysics has progressed far beyond that problem.

First because it assumes that "Forms" exist when there is no evidence for them. — Uber

The evidence is logical. The active Forms are implicated by logical necessity. Their existence is demonstrated by logical necessity. Your reliance on "the empirical" misleads you into thinking that all evidence is sensual.

But more fundamentally, because you assume that any conception of time can exist separately from space, which is a categorical no in modern physics. — Uber

Quite obviously a conception of time which is different from that of modern physics is going to be a "categorical no in modern physics". That is tautological. But this does nothing to demonstrate that the conception of time employed by modern physics is better. And please, don't turn to your "empirical evidence". When dealing with the non-physical, as space and time clearly are, it is imperative that we rely on the intellect, and logic, for our understanding, not the senses.

Nothing I have read so far warrants throwing Platonism out with Dualism. — Galuchat

What I suggest is throwing out Platonism, in its common, degraded representation, which is the presentation of its critics, in favour of an intelligibly formulated dualism.

To clarify, on your view:
1) Forms (both General and Particular) are not physical, mental, or spiritual?
2) It is only information which may be intelligible (pure) or substance (empirical)?
3) How does your "true dualism" address the mind-body problem? — Galuchat

I must be honest with you Galuchat, and tell you that I always have problems understanding your terminology. I will however address 3) above. The mind-body dualism of the human being is one instance of dualism. It is the example of dualism which is most evident to us because we have access to the non-physical within us. But we must extend dualism to cover all existence in the universe, as Aristotle does with his matter/form dualism. This is extremely difficult for us to do, because everything external to us is only evident to us through our senses. So we cannot immediately apprehend the non-physical aspect of all that is external to us because we only apprehend our surroundings with our senses. Only our intellects can demonstrate to us, through the means of logical argument, that the non-physical is real.

We apprehend the non-physical aspect of reality within ourselves, with our minds. We understand that it is real. But we cannot sense it in the rest of the universe, because it is not something which can be sensed, though it is just as real throughout the entirety of the universe as it is within each of us. It is the intellect, logical principles, and reasoning, which demonstrate to us the reality of the non-physical, not the senses.

You sound like a broken record. — Uber

That's the idea, I keep harping away at inadequacies, contradictions and hypocrisy, until the professors of said inadequacies admit to the inadequacy. Do you admit that the principles you espouse fall victim to very same epistemic problem that you cite against dualism, as I described? If you do, then you should look into a true dualism, like the one I profess, which avoids this epistemic problem.

Actually - and I know we've discussed this quite a few times - what I'm starting to understand through research, is that the 'hylomorphic' (matter~form) dualism of Aristotle is what was incorporated into Thomas Aquinas. Now, Lloyd Gerson, whom as you probably know of, says that in his view, despite their differences, Aristotle remained broadly speaking Platonist and that regardless of their differences, Aristotle is still broadly Platonist. — Wayfarer

I agree that Aristotle was, broadly speaking, Platonist. But through the terms of his dualism, matter and form, which are associated with "potential" and "actual" respectively, he manages to refute Pythagorean idealism, and what he refers to in my translation as "some Platonists". This can be found in book nine of the Metaphysics.

Plato himself turned against this form of idealism, commonly called Platonic realism today. I've seen it argued that he actually refutes this idealism (Pythagorean idealism, or Platonic realism) in the Parmenides. And, in the Timaeus, which is of his latest works, he offers a completely different form of idealism, which relies on a divine mind, similar to Berkeley.

The key problem which arises in Plato's extensive expose is the nature of the separation between the ideas which you and I have, and the proposed separate "Idea", which is represented by Parmenides as eternal unchanging truth. In his earlier works, such as the Symposium, you can find Plato describing and explaining the concept of "participation". We come to apprehend the reality of independent Ideas in this way. As individuals we form an idea of "beauty" (the example in The Symposium) from observing things which are said to be beautiful. But to validate this subjective notion of beauty we must assume that the things actually partake in an independent "Idea of Beauty" in order that there is any truth to saying that they are beautiful.

Notice the extremely subjective nature of the example, "beauty". This is intentional to expose the difficulties of the independent Idea. Since all ideas, concepts are essentially the same, the example holds right through to the most certain and "objective" of the mathematical ideas. So Plato uses an extremely subjective idea, to demonstrate that even the most objective ideas, such as the ones utilized in mathematics, receive their objectivity in the same way that an extremely subjective idea could receive objectivity. This is by means of the assumption of the independent "Idea". Mathematics receives its objectivity through the assumption of independent mathematical objects, "Ideas".

Having exposed this principle in his early works, Plato moves along to analyze the problems which develop from this assumption, the assumption of independent Ideas. The first logical consequent, which is already accepted by Parmenides and the Pythagoreans is that these ideas, independent from the changing human mind, must be eternal. If we remove the forces of change to the Idea, the human mind, the Idea cannot change.

This eternal uinchangingness becomes a very serious difficulty for Plato. It is basically the "epistemological problem" which Uber points to. These eternal Ideas are necessarily passive, being actively "participated in", or "partaken of" by the activities of material things. You can see that Plato gets a glimpse of this issue in The Republic with his introduction of "the good". "The good" can be understood as the inclination to act. What causes a person to act is a perceived "good". So "the good" becomes representative of the cause of activity, the cause of actuality. Now Plato has the principle whereby he can move "Ideas" from the category of eternally passive, to the category of active in causation. Under "the good", ideas are associated with the will to act, as having causal relevance. The problem of giving causal power to independent Ideas is resolved by allowing for an independent will. In theology this becomes the will of God. God created the material world because he saw that it was good.

You can see in the Parmenides that Plato is still trying to cling to the notion of participation, in which material things actively participate in the passive, independent Ideas, but it is not working out. Socrates gives a very heartfelt defence of the Parmenidean Ideas, arguing that the Idea is like the day. No matter how many different places partake of the day, it changes nothing of the day itself. But we can see through this, knowing that in reality the day is actively passing. So while the day appears to be passive, and partaken of, it is actually active, actively imparting itself to the places that partake.. And while it appears like the physical things are actively taking part in the passive day, and this constitutes the passing of the day, what is really occurring is that the passing of the day is the activity which imparts itself, as the cause of all the apparent activities of the passive things.

So this is the principle that is present in the Timaeus which is key to understanding dualism and getting beyond the objections of Aristotle, and the "epistemological problem". The independent Forms are active, as necessitated by the above discussion, and Aristotle's cosmological argument. It is the human misconception of "time" which renders the Forms as passive, non causal, outside of time, eternal. When our conception of time excludes the possibility that something non-physical (Forms), may be active (being impossible because the conception of time leaves them outside time, therefore inactive), then these Forms are necessarily eternal, therefore passive and non causal. This misconception of "time", as a premise, produces the conclusion that immaterial Forms are necessarily outside of time, therefore inactive and non-causal. This is Uber's epistemic problem. But the epistemic problem does not refute dualism as Uber claims, what it does is serve as evidence of the human misconception of time.

At issue is wholly and solely the reality of abstracts, as far as I'm concerned, and that is where Platonists of whatever stripe have a case to make. — Wayfarer

The point then, in a nutshell (if the above is too rambling) is this. When we conceive of Forms, mathematical objects, laws of physics, and this type of constraint, as outside of time, eternal, our principles are subject to this "epistemic problem". "Outside of time", eternal, renders the Forms as inactive, passive, and necessarily non-causal. So we are forced to either reject the independent Forms as the materialists and physicalists choose to do, or reconceive the relationship between the Forms and time, such that the Forms may be active, as the theologians have done. If we choose the latter, then it becomes immediately evident that we cannot have a conception of time which is derived from the motions of material objects. This will place the activities of the immaterial Forms as outside of time, incomprehensible, unintelligible, contradictory, as time is required for activity.