It is an argument against Platonic realism by Paul Benacerraf. — Uber

Modern Platonic realism is a form of idealism which does not, in itself, provided a good representation of dualism. Aristotle sufficiently refuted Pythagorean idealism, and the form of Platonic idealism which is basically the same as modern Platonic realism. This did not prevent the Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians from developing a form of dualism which was immune to such refutation. So we need more than just a refutation of Platonic realism to deal with dualism in general, because Platonic realism does not provide us with the principles which are fundamental to a more advanced and comprehensive dualism

It boils down to a simple question, which can be asked in different ways: how can universals communicate their properties to the human mind if not through physical causation? And if they do so through the latter, how are they not physical? — Uber

The answer to this question is what we call "final cause". Final cause is non-physical causation. That this type of causation is non-physical is the reason why the will can be said to be free. "Final cause", as a concept, allows that the non-physical interacts with the physical, in a causal way.

There is no successful refutation of this problem by dualists. — Uber

Sorry to disappoint you, but Plato put forward the principles to solve this problem thousands of years ago with the points put forward in his Timaeus. This work provides the guidelines for understanding how that which is believed to be outside of time, eternal, the forms, which we now call "non-physical", may interact with material, or "physical" existence. It involves a unique understanding of the nature of time.

You seem to be obsessed with the ontological nature of constraints. But I have already acknowledged that I don't really know where they come from or "what they are like." To echo Newton, I feign no hypothesis. Maybe God set them there. Maybe they are eternal and fundamental conditions of reality. Perhaps the most basic ones did not come from anywhere; they are just the default states of reality. I am perfectly content not knowing their "ultimate nature," to the extent that a concept like this makes any sense. To me what matters most, although it's not the only thing that matters, is that these constraints are validated through rigorous empirical observations. — Uber

The point is that the position you put forward actually falls to the very "epistemological problem" which you cited. According to your definition of "physical", constraints are necessarily non-physical, as what constrains the physical. So how can the non-physical constraints act to constrain the physical, if not through physical causation? Do you accept the free will, and final causation as the solution to this problem?

Obviously I do not actually believe that mathematical equations have any causal powers. It's not like the uncertainty principle in the form of an equation is doing any kind of constraining. — Uber

Don't you find this to be contradictory? The things which you are calling "constraints", you are now saying don't actually do "any kind of constraining". What are the real "constraints" if not the things which you call "constraints"? What kind of non-physical thing does the real constraining, the will?

All great points. I identified some of these problems myself when I asked where do constraints come from and mentioned how in many cases we don't know. In some cases, certain constraints can be explained in terms of other constraints. For example, a limited version of the conservation of energy can be derived from Newton's third law. More general versions in classical physics can be derived through Noether's theorem, which relates continuous symmetries to conservation laws. But I admit that the idea needs more work and would be happy if you offered some suggestions to improve it. — Uber

Do you recognize the difference between a thing and the description of that thing? Laws such as the conservation of energy, and Newton's third law are descriptions, produced from inductive principles. If these laws refer to constraints, they are descriptions of constraints, not the constraints themselves.

In a general sense, I guess what I'm trying to do is put motion front and center, and then explain that things in the world can't just exist in any state of motion they like. The very concept is a bit tough for me to put into words. When I talk about actual constraints in physics, I can easily express them as equations or something to that effect. But I would want to avoid saying something like physical things are subject to equations that constrain energy, for the reasons you highlighted. — Uber

But you are doing exactly that, what you say you are trying to avoid. You are talking about these laws, which are descriptions produced by human minds, and saying that they are constraints on the physical. This is no different from saying that physical things are subject to human equations, as if the human equations are somehow controlling "constraining" the physical things. We see this quite commonly in discussions of quantum mechanics when people reify fields and wave functions, as if these mathematical objects were interacting with the physical world rather than just representing, or describing it.

You seem to see the importance of keeping a clear separation between the world and the representation of it, so why does it appear like you are intentionally blurring this boundary, actually dissolving it into vagueness, when you speak about constraints?

I could make things very metaphysically lean by saying something like this: physical things are just finite states of motion (ie. basically finite energy). And then when asked to explain what this means in the context of physics, I could delve into equations of constraint and things like that. Thoughts? — Uber

I really don't think this would work. Do you not see that "motion" is itself a description? If there is motion, there is necessarily something which is moving. "Motion" is a descriptive term, refrring to the properties of a moving thing. Do you agree? "Motion" is a description of a thing which is moving, it is attributed to the thing, as a property of it.

In the old days, physicists talked about bodies, moving bodies, and "physical" was defined as "of the body". Motion is "of the body", so motion is physical, but it is not a physical "thing", it is a property of a physical thing. Attributes, properties, such as colour, size, motion, etc., when understood as things themselves, are non-physical things, they are things of the mind, concepts. The "physical thing" is the assumed body which is moving. Notice I say "assumed", because the existence of physical things, bodies, is a metaphysical assumption. We make this assumption to make sense of "change". If there is change, then something is changing, and we assume a physical body as the thing which is changing.

By the way, I am still waiting for the dualists to address the epistemological problem. The silence is deafening. — Uber

I tend to employ dualist principles, so you might call me dualist. But I haven't seen your expression of this "epistemological problem". The silence is us dualists waiting with bated breath for something to address.

One can provide a sensible definition of physical things without worrying about the wavefunction and the measurement problem. Here is one candidate: a physical thing is any system subject to energetic constraints. These constraints could be conservation interactions for macroscopic systems, uncertainty principles for quantum systems (which covers any and all scenarios, regardless of whether the wavefunction actually exists or whether it's a mathematical construct), or any other constraint on how much energy a system can have or share with other systems. What is energy? They teach the kids that it's the ability to do mechanical work, but that ignores all other kinds of energy (heat, radiation, etc). The simplest and yet most universal definition of energy is this: different states of motion. This is the fundamental feature of all that exists. Over 90% of the mass-energy of a proton is fluctuating quantum fields; the rest is in the gluons, also furiously moving around. Thus a physical thing is anything that has constrained states of motion. Particles? Check? Fields? Check. Consciousness? Absolutely check. Try starving yourself and see how much rational thinking you can pull off.

Questions you might have:

1) Where do the constraints come from?

In the quantum case we don't always know, but it doesn't affect the reliability of my definition. All we need to be sure of is that these constraints are empirically valid, and the uncertainty principle most certainly is! Thank you 1000 experiments in quantum physics.

2) What is doing the moving?

If energy is motion, then we should want to know what's doing the moving. But having this knowledge also doesn't affect the definition. Let's say it's a car. Is the motion of the car somehow constrained? Absolutely yes. Let's say it's the sequence of thoughts inside your brain as you're reading this. Is the motion of the neurons in your brain constrained? Absolutely yes. The emergent consious states in your brain? Absolutely yes. If you seriously believe your ability to think has no constraints whatsoever, then see above. Or try to compute 3473.262427 x 2728292.9263 instantly without a calculator. Or try to think of fifty different and fully formed sentences in two seconds (fully formed and different, not vague notions or the same thing repeated!).

Thus I've done what few people in this forum seemed to have any interest in doing: provide a general definition of physical stuff that at the same time demarcates naturalism from supernaturalism. Clearly God should not be energetically constrained! And the soul can apparently survive for eternity after death. So, very much a reasonable dividing line between the two realms. — Uber

Your definition of "physical" is missing something, Uber. It is missing a clear definition or explanation of "constraint". It relies on "constraint" as a crucial term, but what "constraint" means is left vague. If the physical is that which is constrained, then a "constraint" in the context of your definition, must be non-physical. Does that make sense to you, that a constraint could be non-physical? The instances of constraints which I come across in my life, other than the exertion of will power, which is more properly called "restraint", all seem to be physical constraints. So how does it makes sense to class "constraint" as non-physical?

All we need to be sure of is that these constraints are empirically valid, and the uncertainty principle most certainly is! Thank you 1000 experiments in quantum physics. — Uber

See, look here, you talk about the uncertainty "principle" as if it were a constraint. But a principle does not act to constrain. Isn't a "constraint" supposed to constrain something?

If I say that a poodle is a dog, and you give me an example of a dog which is not a poodle, as evidence that my claim is false, all this means is that you have misunderstood what I said.

We're going round in circles and I don't think my replies are helping at all. Let's see if I can clear up a couple of points where I think we might be talking across one another and maybe some idea of what we really disagree on might emerge. — Pseudonym

To clarify my position, I believe that there is no such paradox. The apparent paradox is the result of Wittgenstein describing "rule" in an unacceptable way. A rule is something which exists within human minds, not in the public domain. What exists in the public domain is physical material, in various shapes and forms, which we all sense, therefore it is public. This includes written, or spoken, physical representations of rules. Wittgenstein fails to properly distinguish between these two, the rule and the physical representation of the rule, when describing what a rule is, so he uses "rule" to refer to both. Since the two are not the same, yet he uses the same word to refer to both, as if they were, an apparent paradox arises. The appearance of a paradox is the result of Wittgenstein using the same word to refer to two distinct things, the rule, and the representation of the rule. That's equivocation.

"Suppose that a general rule is given. One can, nonetheless, apply the rule only if he understands its application. Suppose, for instance, that someone should translate a sentence from one language into another. He is given the set of sentences to be translated and a dictionary, which is the set of rules of translation:
One could say then: But it is not enough to give him both things; you have also to tell him how to use them as well. But in this way a new plan would be created, which would need an explanation as much as the first one." (MS 109, p. 82). — Pseudonym

See, his misuse of "rule" is very evident here. "Understanding" the application of a rule is something which occurs within human minds. But then he says that the dictionary "is the set of rules", and this is false. Neither is the dictionary a set of rules, nor is it even a representation of a set of rules. It is a representation of how words are commonly used.

If we proceed and consider a game, and refer to the spoken words, or written words, which represent "the rules of the game", it is evident that these are just physical representations of rules, because it is necessary to interpret these words, to understand "the rules". Common parlance allows us to say that these are "the rules", the written words, but we must differentiate between this common usage, and when we say that someone "understands the rules", because what is understood as "the rules" is the limitations as to how to play the game, not just the words on the paper. What is added by the interpreting mind, is the "ought", and this is not part of the words, it is part of the interpreting mind.

This is the is/ought divide. The words on the paper say something. The player interprets this as how one "ought" to behave. But there is nothing within the words themselves which dictate that the player "ought" to behave in any particular way, the player interprets the words as saying what one ought to do. Since the "ought" is the essential aspect of the rule, making the rule what it is, a guideline for future behaviour, and the "ought" is only assigned to the words by the minds of the writer and interpreter, then what is on the paper does not exist as "rules", in a more strict sense of "rule", when we talk about a person "understanding the rules".

2. The Rule-following paradox is only tangentially linked to the private language argument. The additional difficulty of following a rule private applies to a specific set of rules that are about the correct interpretation of signs. The private language argument is about the correct interpretation of signs, not about the correct application of a prediction. You seem to be likening having a private rule to something like " I wish to stop smoking to make me healthier, I must not have any cigarettes" Such that if a new cigarette-like thing enters the market and you must judge whether smoking it breaks your rule, you can do so by perhaps smoking it, noticing your health is worsening again and thinking "Oh, this must be one of the things I must not have because it is having the effect my rule is trying to avoid"

But this is not the kind of rule Wittgenstein is talking about in the private language argument (though it is a rule that would suffer from the rule-following paradox). So disputing the private language argument and disputing that the rule-following paradox is really a paradox are two different things and you seem to be conflating the two. — Pseudonym

The private language argument only follows from this equivocation of "rule". The equivocation of "rule", described above, which Wittgenstein employs, allows him to proceed into the private language argument. If we deny the equivocation, and keep a clear separation between a rule, and a representation of a rule, there is no premise to even start the private language argument. That premise, at 202, concerning the nature of rules, which allows for the private language argument, is rejected. Nor is there the appearance of a paradox. And the appearance of the paradox is what inclines Wittgenstein to propose that premise.

But how do you realise it was 'wrong'. Different, yes, but 'wrong'? — Pseudonym

When you fail to achieve the desired effect for example, you know there was a mistake. If there was a mistake, then something was done wrongly.

Great, let's have a look at one of those examples for a public rule then, that might get us somewhere. If you provide an example of a public rule where the 'correct' interpretation or use of it can be derived by some means other than
consensus, we could resolve the problem. — Pseudonym

I am not claiming that "the correct" interpretation can be derived at all. As I said, the right interpretation is an ideal. I don't believe that the ideal is ever achieved. As you argued concerning Wittgenstein's PI. varying interpretations may all be "correct". There is no such thing as "the correct" interpretation, in the sense of the best, the ideal interpretation.

The rest of your argument is based entirely on an error of mine. I meant to say the correct interpretation of the rule is 'judged' publicly, not is 'held' publicly. — Pseudonym

This does not avoid the problem I described. Individual human beings make judgements. To say that something is "judged publicly", is to say that there is a vote or some such thing. Just because the majority constitutes consensus, does not mean that the interpretation chosen by the majority is the correct interpretation. And, that interpretation which is accepted by consensus still needs to be itself interpreted by each individual member of that voting public, causing the infinite regress problem.

I can only blame trying to write too fast, I'm sorry to have made you painstakingly explain the infinite regress argument for no reason. — Pseudonym

So, you thought at the time that you were following a rule. But you now realize that you were trying to write to fast, and you really weren't following your rule. See what I mean?

For, if one were to follow a rule, then the criteria for following it is dictated by something beyond the rule itself. — Posty McPostface

Yes, that's exactly my point. That's what allows that an individual can think that oneself is following a rule, a private rule, then later realize that the rule was actually not being followed. Whether or not the rule has been followed, as judged after the action, requires a completely different form of judgement from the judgement of whether or not the rule is being followed, as judged prior to the action. The former is a judgement in relation to the past, how the rule was applied, the latter is a judgement in relation to a future act, applying the rule toward possible acts. One is posterior to the act, the other prior to the act. and these are distinct forms of judgement. One judges actual activity in relation to the rule, the other judges possible activities in relation to the rules. Each has criteria beyond the rule itself, but very different types of criteria.

Because you cannot simultaneously hold a rule and faithfully try to interpret it yet make a mistake. We do not have two minds, one with the 'real' rule in it and another trying to understand the what the first one meant by it. — Pseudonym

Quite obviously this is wrong, because it happens all the time that we make such mistakes. It's a matter of misinterpretation. It's not a case of having "two minds", it's a matter of changing one's mind. You make a judgement, apply the rule, then later you realize the judgement was wrong. Have you never changed your mind before?

You just keep making nonsense assertions without thinking about what you are saying.

By consensus. — Pseudonym

OK, that is your claim, consensus makes "right". I disagree. I see evidence that in many cases when there is consensus, mistake is still made. Therefore it is impossible that consensus makes "right".

The 'correct' interpretation of the rule is held publicly, by consensus. — Pseudonym

And this is just more nonsense. Interpretation is what individual minds do. How could "the public" hold an interpretation? If people discuss interpretations of a rule, they use language, and that language must be interpreted by each of them. So each person has one's own interpretation of the "public" interpretation. They could discuss their interpretations of the interpretation, and find consensus, but again, each would have an interpretation of the interpretation of the interpretation. Infinite regress is implied.

This is why Wittgenstein seeks to remove the necessity of interpretation at 201, to avoid this problem. Wittgenstein's claim is not that the correct interpretation of the rule is held publicly. That doesn't make sense. The claim is that the rule itself is what is held publicly. In this scenario, there is supposedly no need for interpretation, either the person follows the rule or not. The problem is that a judgement is implied here, as to whether or not the rule is followed, and there is no "public mind" to make that judgement. We really cannot refer to "consensus" because then we fall into the problem of interpretation.

But you haven't explained how. — Pseudonym

I told you, evidence comes up at a later time which makes you see that you made a mistake. If anyone else can judge you at a later time, by reviewing the evidence, as having been wrong, why can't you judge yourself as having been wrong, by reviewing the evidence? What's the difference? It's nonsense to think that one cannot judge oneself as having been wrong. We are taught to recognize our mistakes as mistakes, and accept responsibility for them.

How could you later decide you were wrong about your interpretation, what measure of 'right' interpretation do you have by which to make such a judgement? — Pseudonym

How can anyone judge someone as having made a wrong interpretation? What measure of "right interpretation" does anyone have? It is the same issue whether the rule is public or private.

You are the one who has been arguing that there is no necessarily "right" interpretation of Wittgenstein. On what principle do you insist that the idea of private rules ought to be rejected because there could be no "right" interpretation? The 'right" interpretation is nothing other than an ideal.

Similar use of deception has been used by police forces to capture criminals in the US for some time now. They say that the person has won a lottery and needs to claim it, and things like that.

Then I think I would agree. But I go even further to say that when we identify a thing as a particular, it is not strictly the "the seeing of particular differences" which is the reason for this, because there could be some other reason. This might be that we see the thing as the same thing, as time passes.

He's talking about a case where one has very consciously tried to apply the rule but nonetheless made an error — Pseudonym

This would be an error of misinterpretation then. Either the situation is not interpreted properly, or the rule is not interpreted properly. So the rule is not applied correctly.

It is the impossibility of this kind of mistake which leads to the paradox. It is obviously possible to have what we think is a rule in mind and then not follow it (either deliberately, or absent-mindedly), what is not possible is to think that you are following your private rule when in fact you are not. This, Wittgenstein concludes, must mean that there is no 'fact' of the rule other than your thinking of the following of it at any one time. — Pseudonym

So it is very possible and common to think that you are following your private rule, when you are not, because you have misinterpreted the situation, misjudged, and therefore wrongly applied your rule. There is no paradox, the supposed paradox is artificial, made up by Wittgenstein to support his intent to avoid the matter of interpretation. All such mistakes, those which are not due to memory, absent mindedness, habit, can be understood as matters of interpretation. I would divide the source of error into two distinct sorts, errors of not having the rule properly in mind when acting, and errors of interpretation. All possible errors fall into these two categories and there is no paradox to be resolved.

But what would constitute a mistake. If your rule was, I must not smoke cigarettes, and a new cigarette-like device entered the market, how would you know whether smoking it was breaking your rule or not? You need to interpret the new cigarette-like item, but how could you possibly make a mistake in that interpretation? — Pseudonym

I don't see the problem. You must interpret the thing, and interpret your rule. You judge the relationship between them and decide in one way. Then, you later decide that you were wrong, mistaken in your interpretation. That's the nature of recognizing your mistakes. At a later time, something comes to your mind which makes you realize that your judgement was wrong, so you admit that you were wrong, mistaken. Each and every mistake only becomes evident after the fact, and your example is no different. There is no reason to insist that it is impossible to make a mistake in following your own private rule. That's nonsense. Why would a private rule be any different from a public rule in this respect? Is it that in a public case we might have a judge or jury decide whether a mistake was made, rather than the person who acted decide whether a mistake was made? There is no reason why the person who acted cannot decide that a mistake was made, if evidence to that effect is revealed.

So, we must think that our seeing of particular differences is sufficient reason for our generalizing of identities? — Janus

No, not "generalizing of identities" the contrary of this. We must refer to the law of identity itself. The law of identity recognizes the identity of a thing within the thing itself, such that the thing is what it is and nothing else. This actually disallows any generalizing of identities, because the identity is specific to the particular. However, when we as human beings assign identity to a thing, we cannot avoid some degree of generalizing. This makes the human assigned identity other than the identity of the thing itself. When the humans assign identity, they seek to differentiate the thing from other things, such that they can hand it an identity. The differences assigned (those "seen" by us) are assumed to be derived from the identity of the particular thing itself, not from a generalizing of identities..

When you first learned how to play chess, you had to do that for a while, but no one who's played for a while ever thinks about the rules while they play, do they? — Srap Tasmaner

That's how mistake is possible.

We cannot simultaneously hold a view on what a rule is and faithfully, with good intent, make a mistake in applying it. — Pseudonym

One problem of mistake is as Srap indicates. The rule is relegated to memory, and we act most times by habit without consulting the rule. Actions of habit must be distinguished from actions of following a rule.

How can you think you are following a rule (which is known only to you) and yet not be (make a mistake)? Where, and in what form, is the rule kept in your mind which is something other than the responses to circumstances you're faced with? — Pseudonym

As I described, it is impossible to follow a rule, and simultaneously make a mistake. That's contradiction. If one holds a principle and adheres to it, one is not making a mistake. if one makes a mistake, one is not holding a principle and adhering to it. However, we find ourselves in vastly varying situations, in which we need to interpret the situation, as well as interpret the rule in a way which is applicable to the situation. Mistake is often attributable to misinterpretation. As you can see at 201, Wittgenstein attempts to remove the importance of interpretation. Since interpretation is a major source of mistake, this procedure is unacceptable.

Consider Srap's chess example above, but imagine a private version. A game which you invented the rules for and only you know them. In this game some piece (which only you know), moves in some way (which only you know), but playing it in your mind you make a mistake you move it in a way that is 'wrong'. How do you know you've made a mistake? — Pseudonym

In that instance, it's easy to know you made a mistake. You go back and revisit the move while holding the rule in your mind, and see that you made the move absent mindedly.

How do you know that the piece wasn't actually supposed to move that way and you've misremembered the way you originally intended for it? How do you know that whatever sensory or internal input is telling you that the piece is in the 'wrong' place is the same or different to the one you had when you invented what the 'right' place for it should be? — Pseudonym

These would be cases of misinterpretation. And, as you describe, in these cases you do not know whether or not a mistake was made. That's life. We cannot liberate ourselves from the restrictions imposed by the facts of life, by changing the definition of rule-following, as Wittgenstein tries to do..

Since you cannot define a rule in your mind other than by the actions that should be taken in response to certain circumstances, you are beholden to the inconsistency of your understanding of 'action' and your meaningful interpretation of 'circumstances' neither of which you can have any faith in. And this is just one simple moving rule in a made up game. How much more unreliable will it be when we come to rules about the meanings of words or ethics? — Pseudonym

Uncertainty is an essential aspect of living as a human being. So be it.

It does not work that way. It is though interactions with others that we come to realize that we are separate individuals with similar likes, dislikes, fears and so on. If you had no such interaction you would not, could not become a person. — Cavacava

You know I disagree. You've described two distinct things here, and conflated them as one. Realizing that we are separate is one thing, and realizing that we have likes, dislikes, etc., which are similar to others is another thing. The former, recognizing that we are separate, does not require a recognition of other persons, as I explained, the latter does. The two are clearly not the same sort of thing, and ought not be classed together, as you do.

Your desires are not your desires, they are the desires of others. — Cavacava

Consider this. Do you agree that in order to believe that others have desires, likes and dislikes, which are similar to your own, you must first recognize such things within yourself? You cannot recognize a desire within another, as similar to your own, without having first recognized your own desire in order to make the comparison.

The question I have for you, is how can your own desires come from others, if you cannot even recognize a desire in another without first recognizing that desire within yourself?

I don't see any argument there. Since we can and do communicate without definitions, your talk of definitions is irrelevant. Definitions are not a required part of language. That sort of private language argument fails for that reason.

The exposition of the rule following argument is simply that since you can think you're following a rule when you're not, thinking you're following a rule cannot be the same as actually following a rule. Yet privately (in the sense Wittgenstein uses the term), thinking you're following a rule is all you have, so it's impossible to claim you're following a rule privately. — Pseudonym

Right this is the point I dispute as unacceptable. I think that following a rule is nothing other than thinking that you are following a rule. It is to hold a principle in one's mind and adhere to it. That's what "following a rule" is. And, I do not see how it is possible that while one is holding the principle in mind, and adhering to it, (thinking you're following a rule), that person is actually not, as Wittgenstein suggests here. Yes, mistakes are possible but this occurs when we do not hold the principle, or do not adhere to it. At this time, it is impossible to be thinking that you are following the rule, because thinking that you are following a rule is to hold the principle and adhere to it.

As I said before, Wittgenstein switches what it actually means to follow a rule, hold the principle in mind, adhere to it, and act accordingly, with what it means to be judged as following a rule, to act as if one is obeying a particular rule. He has no description of what it means to follow a rule, only a description of what it means to be judged as acting as if one is following a rule. So he dismisses a true description of rule-following, to replace it with a description of acting as if one is following a rules. He does not describe the object, (rule-following) but a representation of the object (act like one is following a rule).

Rigjt, so the particular difference is sufficient reason for the general condition of being different? — Janus

Yeah, that makes sense to me.

Now consider this. Anytime that we describe what is, it is always based in abstraction, and the abstraction is produced by the person making the description. So no matter how hard we try to describe a particular situation, the description is always going to come out in general terms. So "what is" is always a generalization, and this cannot be avoided, it is a human judgement, which relies on generalization. The PSR holds, because there will always be a reason why whomever made the generalization, made it. A generalization as the act of a living creature, is not a random act. Whatever is expressed as "what is", is always the product of abstraction, generalization, and there is always a reason for the way that "what is" is expressed. What "is", is always how we as human beings see the world, and there is always a reason why we see it in that way, because living creatures like human beings, produce things for a reason. .

How does a person talking to you in such a way, produce a need to recognize the pre-existence of that person? I would think that the desire to recognize another comes from within, not from the other, a personal reason.

Firstly, these passages are Wittgenstein laying out the paradox and its implications, not providing the solution to it. Only Saul Kripke has really considered the phrase at 202 to be the conclusion of the argument. Most scholars (Hacker, Wright, McGinn, McDowell, for example) do not consider the argument concluded until passage 243 where he begins his attack on Private Language, with “The words of this language are to refer to what can be known only to the speaker; to his immediate, private, sensations. So another cannot understand the language.” — Pseudonym

That, at 202 is the premise, the definition of "obeying a rule" which allows for the private language argument. As you can see, it's very clearly stated:

"And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately':"

I really don't care what "most scholars believe", I know how to read. I am doubtful about some scholar's ability to do that. As I said, if you think that you can formulate a private language argument without that premise, then demonstrate it. Otherwise you're just blowing smoke.

Which is why your conclusions about how we must respond to the rule-following paradox are not necessitated by it. — Pseudonym

What are you talking about? Either you continue to deny that Wittgenstein stated this principle or you accept that he did, and accept what the proposition means, as well as the logical implications. You cannot accept the proposition, and the private language argument which follows from it, yet reject what the proposition means.

I reject the proposition because I do not accept the meaning of it as representing what I consider to be rule-following. You seem to agree with me, but instead of rejecting Wittgenstein's principles, you insist that Wittgenstein didn't mean what is explicitly stated. Then what do you think Wittgenstein means with the conclusion, that there cannot be a private language?

Which is why your conclusions about how we must respond to the rule-following paradox are not necessitated by it. As I said, There are numerous interpretations, there's no 'right' or 'wrong', there's no 'unacceptable' it just depends what conclusion you want to come to and then re-arrange the meanings of the terms to suit. The whole philosophical argument resulting from the rule-following paradox is about how we conceive of 'a rule', not about how we 'must' respond to others in respect of whether they are following one or not, that is part of the paradox, not one of the the solutions to it. If the private rule-following behaviour is or is not really 'rule-following', then does that mean anything? It's certainly some form of behaviour. It's undeniably a different form of behaviour to following public rules, so what difference does it make if we call it 'rule-following' or not? — Pseudonym

Right, it is Wittgenstein's definition of "rule". To think that I am following a rule is not to follow a rule. As I said, this definition excludes all the times that I hold a principle in my mind, privately, and follow that principle, as a rule. This is very explicitly "not to obey a rule". Either we can accept this definition, or we can reject it as unacceptable. But for you to try and say that Wittgenstein didn't mean this, what is stated so explicitly, is complete nonsense.

I'm not sure if I'm explaining it any more clearly, but I will try to use the example you gave of a person quitting smoking. You'd said that such a person must be following a rule - the rule "I will not have a cigarette", but that it is perverse to say he's not following a rule simply because we cannot say if he is following it correctly by his action of not having a cigarette. So this is the paradox. But Wittgenstein says that we cannot simply say he is following a rule (one in his own mind) because even he does not know all the interpretations of that rule until they arise, he has not, for example specified whether, should some company invent a new type of smoking device, that constitutes 'a cigarette' or not. He has not defined 'cigarette' against all possible future issues, nor could he ever define 'cigarette' without using other words which he would then have to define...and so on. So either we must remain quiet on whether the man is following a rule (or breaking it), or we must conclude that he might be but it's impossible to know. Or, to use Crispin Wright's words instead; — Pseudonym

Nonsense, it is explicitly stated, he is not following a rule. This is the way that the paradox is avoided, and private language is denied. We do not have to say whether the person is following the rule correctly or not, because the person is simply, and very explicitly, not following a rule. And, the consequences of this, are the absurdities I referred to earlier, concerning the relationship between rules, and right and wrong.

It's not difficult. It's only difficult if you desire to hide this premise, because it's unacceptable to you, yet you also want to maintain the conclusion of the argument. That's deception though.

My contention is that in the real world the only actual way for a person to realize that it is an individual person is because it is able to distinguish itself from other persons and this can only be possible due to the pre-existence of other persons. If other people did not exist then I too would not exist. — Cavacava

I don't see this as logical. The person distinguishes itself from all that is other than itself. Why does the person need to consider the pre-existence of other persons to do this?

Do you notice that the particular, the specific difference, is distinct from the general, being different?

I have not, however, yet read any interpretation of Wittgenstein that suggests that he is making the claim that we must conclude the thinker is not following a rule at all. — Pseudonym

My claim is not that we must conclude that any given thinker is not following a rule. It is that if a rule cannot be identified from the person's actions, then we must conclude that the person, despite believing oneself to be following a rule, is not following a rule. I really can't understand why you argue against this, as it is the key premise to the so-called private language argument. Are you arguing that those Wittgensteinians who produce a private language argument from his principles have misinterpreted him? Here's a simplistic version of the private language argument. If you think that you can create a rendition without the third premise, the one that you claim Wittgenstein didn't state, then show me.
P1. Language requires following rules
P2. A private language would consist of following private (unidentified) rules.
P3. Following private (unidentified) rules do not qualify as "following rules".
C. Therefore a private language is not possible.

If there is an interpretation where Wittgenstein insists we must presume the thinker is not following a rule at all, however, it would not surprise me in the least. Why don't you actually quote the passage you think is making that claim (or the secondary interpretation) and we can look at it. — Pseudonym

All right, here you go

201. This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined
by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to
accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out
to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it.
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact
that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after
another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we
thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that
there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which
is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it"
in actual cases.
Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the
rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation"
to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.
202. And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one
is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey
a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be
the same thing as obeying it. — Philosophical Investigations

Notice 202. It explicitly states "And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule." This is what makes it impossible to obey a rule privately. Holding a principle within my mind, and adhering to it is to "think I am obeying a rule". But this is explicitly "not to obey a rule". That is what Wittgenstein excludes from "obeying a rule". As a result, "obeying a rule" is restricted to a practise which is observed to be in accordance with a rule. If the observer cannot identify the rule, because it is only the actor who holds the rule within one's mind, this is "to think one is obeying a rule", which is "not to obey a rule".

I'm not really following you. If you didn't know the reasons for two things being different, then how could you know there are such reasons? Would this not be an unjustified assumption? — Janus

It's simple logic. In order that they are different, there must be a difference. The difference is the reason why they are different. That they are not the same (different) requires, logically, that there is a difference.

Or are you proposing a more deflationary approach which might, for example, count the very having of different qualities as sufficient reason for things being different from one another? — Janus

It's not even necessarily a matter of having distinct qualities, it's simply a matter of difference. Remember, we are starting from the other side, assuming that two things are different things. This doesn't necessitate specifically that they have distinct qualities, as the reason for being different, it just necessitates a difference between them.

Whether or not the reasons are known is irrelevant to the principle of sufficient reason which just states that there is a reason. Whether or not the reason is known is irrelevant. So if there are two entities then they are different from each other, and by the PSR there must be a reason for this. It would make no sense to say that two things are two different things, but there is no reason for this. The very fact that there are (particular) differences is reason for them being (in general) different. So the reason for them being two distinct things is the difference between them.

In this example it makes no difference whether the actual difference (which is the reason for them being different) is known, because the example stipulates that they are different. Therefore by the stipulation of the example, and the PSR, there must be a difference between them (the reason for them being different things), regardless of whether the difference is known, and this difference is the reason why we can say that they are different. If there were no difference between them, they would not be two different things

The differentiation need not be a differentiation from other individuals. It might only be a differentiation between oneself and what is other. So if I differentiate myself from that which is other than me, I need not recognize the "other" as individuals. It is simply other.

So what conclusion do you think someone with false memory syndrome would come to about what rule motivates their actions? What about phantom limb syndrome, Capgras delusions, synathesia, or simple dementia. How are you so sure your brain serves you up an accurate report of what is it to follow a rule, not just for you, but apparently for all humanity? — Pseudonym

I don't see how this is relevant.

I mean, I don't even completely go along with Wittgenstein (or Kripkenstein) on this issue, im just trying to point out how unlikely it is that such intelligent people are categorically 'wrong' about an issue in respect of which they are in possession of all the relevant facts. — Pseudonym

Oh, so you don't "completely go along with" it. Then why not give it up as unacceptable? Why gloss over the unacceptability? Who cares if other intelligible thinkers accept it. If you can't go along with it, then take the aspects which appeal to you and leave the rest as unacceptable.

How many people have you spoken to about what it feels like is going on when they use the term "rule-following"? I mean, out of the 7 billion people currently speaking to each other about their experiences, how many of them have you interviewed to arrive at this "vast number" who are using the term and meaning by it exactly what you describe. — Pseudonym

What I describe is instances of "rule-following" which are inconsistent with Wittgenstein's definition. These are situations such as when someone resolves to do something, like a New Year's resolution. It appears to me like there is a vast number of people who talk about New Year's resolutions, don't you agree? Or are you going to obstinately insist that following a New Year's resolution is not an instance of rule-following.

No, as I said, it's not about concluding that they're not following a rule, it's that we must conclude that we cannot know what that rule is. — Pseudonym

This is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. It is very clear that if we cannot know the rule which one is following, we cannot say that the person is following a rule. If the rule cannot be identified then the person must be said to be not following a rule. This is the crux of the private language argument. An unidentifiable rule is not a rule at all. If it were a rule then there could be private rules and private language. So if we conclude that we cannot know what the rule being followed is, then it follows that there is no rule being followed. An unidentifiable rule is not a rule. A private rule would be a rule which cannot be identified and therefore it is not a rule at all. So there is no such thing as a private rule.

We need not conclude that the thinker is not following a rile. — Pseudonym

Reconsider your misunderstanding of Wittgenstein which I described above. A private rule is not a rule. If the thinker is following an unidentifiable rule, the thinker is not following a rule. This is fundamental. Have you read the Philosophical Investigations, and how Wittgenstein describes what it means to follow a rule? Or, are you going by some secondary source, a watered down version with an author trying to cover up the unacceptability of Wittgenstein's proposal? Why would someone try to make an unacceptable principle appear acceptable?

Your description also didn't sound very logical for that matter. — Cavacava

I was talking about the logical relation between one and many, which I explained. You still haven't gone back to address how it is possible that we, implying many, is prior to I, implying one.

Lacan's explanation makes no sense to me. The child takes itself to be its mother seems like nonsense.

Lacan also conceptualized the mirror stage in relation to Hegel's concept of recognition and desire. The infant has a sensuous relation with its mother. Its needs are fulfilled by her and she is in tactile relation with it. In addition to needs, and quite distinct from them, the child has desires (libido) and, as Hegel says, the prime desire is to be recognized by the other's desire. The desire of the mother and the desire of the child thus enter into a complex, confused relation.

This actually contradicts "the child takes itself to be its mother. It talks about a relation between child and mother, and a relation between the desires of the mother and desires of the child. And, it clearly refers to a recognition of the other. If the child takes itself to be its mother, then obviously there is no recognition of the other. What you have presented is nothing more than contradictory nonsense.

The issue I suppose, is whether prior to recognizing the mother as other, does the child recognize the mother as itself. Why would you think that this is the case? If the child recognizes the mother at all, wouldn't the child recognize the mother as something other than itself? Why would you think that when the child first recognizes the mother, it recognizes the mother as itself? That doesn't make sense.

The infant child does not identify itself apart from its parents until it becomes self aware of itself as an independent agent, this is what Freud is all on about. — Cavacava

I don't know Freud very well but I know that a lot of his principles are debatable, if not completely discredited.

The child has no structured psyche until it has experience, and these experiences are shaped by its caregivers....the child's desires are the desires of the mother, and in a similar manner our desires are the desires of others. — Cavacava

This is surely wrong. A baby has the desire to eat, and though the mother may shape this desire through timing and substance in an effort to create habit, the desire is not the mother's desire. Nor is the desire derived from the mother. The desire is that of the baby, as an independent agent. Even within the womb, the need for nutrition is a need of the foetus, not a need of the mother.

The 'I' is derivative of the 'We'. — Cavacava

You didn't reply to my description of the logical relationship between "one" and "plurality". So I take this as a hollow assertion which is contrary to logic and ought to be rejected.

what god-like insight has allowed you to simply 'know' what it is to follow a rule in it? — Pseudonym

I follow rules all the time, don't you? I hold a principle within my mind and adhere to it. There is no "god-like insight" involved in me knowing this, just a little bit of self-reflection. It's really quite straight forward, you ought to try it sometime. However, you for some reason seem to think that following a rule is some sort of complex, and difficult thing to understand, requiring a god-like insight. Why make it so difficult when it's not?

Yes, of course I would have to. If the rest of the speaking world were referring to some object as a 'plant' which I personally considered not to be one, or vice versa, I would have to follow suit in order to communicate. The is no thing that 'plant' means outside of its use. You're arguing that your personal uses of the the term 'rule' need to be included in the global definition of what it is to follow a rule. That's the whole of what Wittgenstein had to say about Private Language. — Pseudonym

Right, so my argument is that Wittgenstein didn't account for a vast amount of usage of "rule-following" when he defined it. So he acted in a hypocritical way, arguing that usage must be accounted for in producing a definition, but then not doing that when he produced a definition for rule-following.

This is simply wrong, in that this is not what Wittgenstein said. His claim was that we would have no way of knowing whether a person was following a rule correctly causing their actions or following a different rule but making a mistake. — Pseudonym

This is a misunderstanding of what I said. I was not talking about a situation of when a person appears to be following a rule, but is really not following that rule, I was talking about a situation when a person appears not to be following a rule, but really is. These are the situations which serve as evidence that Wittgenstein's description of rule-following is unacceptable. These are the situations in which rules come into existence. A person thinks up a rule and starts following it. In these situations there is also "no way of knowing" that the person is following a rule, but it must be concluded according to the definition, that the person is not following a rule. This is an unjustified conclusion.

This unjustified conclusion has extensive epistemic consequences. It leaves us with no principles whereby we might judge rules themselves, as right or wrong. A person is judged to be acting rightly or wrongly, according to whether one is acting by the rule, but a rule is not the type of thing which can be judged as right or wrong. This, what you call "no way of knowing" the actual rule which is being followed by the individual, makes it impossible to judge the rule itself. All we can do is judge the individual's actions in relation to known rules. If the person does act according to known rules the person cannot be acting rightly.

Of course there is a simple solution to this problem which Wittgenstein creates, and that is to recognize that judgement, as well as rules, occur within peoples' minds. This allows that an individual, with one's own mind may judge a rule as right or wrong, as well as judging another person's actions as right or wrong. But Wittgenstein's principles leave us without the capacity to judge a rule as right or wrong.

That's the point of this thread, without that capacity, the capacity to judge a rule, rules must be completely arbitrary. However, we actually often judge rules. The op adds "aim", purpose, such that rules are judged and shaped toward specific goals. Now we have to account for the existence of such goals, and this brings us right back into the minds of individuals. So we are no further ahead. Instead of having principles for judging a rule as right or wrong, which is what Wittgenstein avoided the need for, we now need principles for judging a goal as good or bad. Wittgenstein provides us with nothing but a deferral of the problem, veiling the deferral as a proposed solution.

It's not about following a rule it's about the inability to know which rule a person is following. — Pseudonym

I agree, but this "inability to know" is exactly where Wittgenstein makes his mistake, what I called the unjustified conclusion. By Wittgenstein's principles, if there is an inability to know whether or not the person is following a rule, we must proceed as if the person is not following a rule. That is simply how Wittgenstein defines "rule-following", and we must adhere to the definition in our procedure. But this is to proceed on an unjustified premise, and that's why the definition is unacceptable.

But this is not the right place to get into a deep discussion about Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox. It is relevant to this thread, as the authors of the paper in the OP point out, in that one cannot say anything concrete about solutions arising from framework choices because one cannot say anything concrete about what rules the respective thinkers are actually following to derive their conclusions. — Pseudonym

I don't think you are adhering to Wittgenstein's principles here. By his principles, if we cannot say anything concrete about the rule which a thinker is following, we must conclude that the thinker is not following a rule. This is the critical point which renders Wittgenstein's principles ineffectual for dealing with instances of creative thought. Such choices are left by Wittgenstein as arbitrary, unruly. The op turns to "aim", purpose, to deal with these choices. This puts us back into the minds of the thinkers, which is what Wittgenstein was trying to avoid.

But that doesn't mean that what makes a person a person is the caregiver. A human being cannot survive without food either, but this doesn't mean that food is what makes a person a person. A human being cannot survive without oxygen, either. There are many things which we need, to make us what we are, but not one of them can be cited as the cause of a person being a person.

I believe in parents, caregivers, the people who teach you that the fire truck is red. The people teach you to speak and to help make you who you are....and you are not possible without them. — Cavacava

So you've gone from a vicious circle to an infinite regress. Each person requires parents, ad infinitum. Do you believe that there was an infinite number of people before you?

Of course, in a merely logical sense, it is possible to say that its denial "would state that there is at least one thing that does not have a sufficient reason", but so what? — Janus

This would actually defy the law of identity. If a thing is identifiable as one thing, then there is a reason why it is that thing and not another thing. That's what makes it identifiable as a thing. So you cannot premise that there is one thing which does not have a sufficient reason without saying that this thing is not a thing, and that's contradiction. That it is a thing implies that there is a reason why it is a thing. The PSR cannot be avoided so easily.

You only need one uncaused event to refute PSR. — tom

The same criticism applies to this statement. if it is "one event", as stated, then it is necessarily that event rather than some other event. This implies a reason why it is that event rather than some other event, fulfilling the conditions of the PSR. So rather than refute the PSR such an incident just confirms it.

You ought not confuse "reason" with "cause" unless you are prepared to allow for different types of causes, some non-physical like final causes.

So no one raised you? You didn't learn how to be a person on your own, sure consciousness but you learnt how to be conscious by studying what others were doing, realizing that you are also an person. — Cavacava

Isn't this a vicious circle? Don't you need to be conscious to be able to study what others are doing? So you seem to imply that one must already be conscious in order to become conscious.

A dog, a mouse, and so on are all conscious but none of them are persons. What I am saying is that to be a person is to be self consciously aware of one's self among others and that this is learnt from others in the sense of a differentation. The 'I' is only possible because of the 'We', the "I" is derivative of the We. — Cavacava

I don't see how this is possible. You seem to be arguing that a plurality (we) is prior to the individual (I). Don't you believe in a first? How are two, three, and four possible without there first being one? I think that you have this backwards.

A plurality is made up of a group of individuals, so the individual is a necessary component of the plurality. However, the existence of an individual does not require the existence of a plurality, so a plurality is not necessary for the existence of an individual. Therefore it is impossible that the plurality is prior to the individual, yet possible that the individual is prior to the plurality. Furthermore, arguments can be made which indicate that it is probable that the individual is prior to plurality, as one is prior to two.

But he obviously did. I don't think there can be any doubt that Wittgenstein was a very clever man. He obviously found it adequate, as do a number of equally clever Wittgenstein scholars who still hold to his solution to a greater or lesser extent. (one could include John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, Saul Kripke, potentially Crispin Wright). — Pseudonym

Sure, Wittgenstein found his description of "rule-following" adequate for his purposes, and perhaps these other philosophers found it adequate for their purposes as well. However, as I explained, it doesn't apply to a vast quantity of instances of rule following, therefore we would be foolish to accept it. Would you accept a description of "plant" which was inapplicable to a large number of things which we call by that word? I would reject the definition as unacceptable, wouldn't you?

In any situation where an observer was incapable of identifying the rule which an individual was following, as a specific rule, the individual could not be following a rule. That means that a large number of cases where a person is actually following a rule, we have to say that the person is not following a rule. Furthermore, if a person makes a rule, and follows this rule with one's actions, but the actions are inconsistent with, or contrary to a rule identified by an observer, the observer would have to say that the person is not following a rule, because the person is breaking a rule. However, that person is clearly following a rule, it's just that the observer has wrongly identified the applicable rule, saying that the person is breaking a rule, rather than that the person is actually following a different, unidentified rule.

So unless you are privy to some unique insight these other scholars lack, one of two things must be the case - either one group is wrong but it will be impossible to tell which (all the relevant data having already been presented), or you are simply using words differently to describe the same thing. — Pseudonym

It's very easy to see who is right and who is wrong. My description applies to all cases of "following a rule" whereas Wittgenstein's only applies to some specific cases. According to Wittgenstein's description, a person is only following a rule if the person acts in the right way. This excludes the possibility that a person who is acting in the wrong way is actually following a rule. So all the instances when a person is acting in the wrong way, yet is still following a rule, are excluded as instances of rule following. It is obvious therefore, that Wittgenstein's rule, concerning rule following, is wrong, because it disallows the possibility that when someone is wrong, they are still following a rule. It only allows us to say that a person is following a rule if the person is judged to act in the right way, despite the evidence that people who act in the wrong way are still following rules.

On no account does the mere presentation of a counter-argument demonstrate anything at all about the 'adequacy' of Wittgenstein's solution other than an expression of your own personal satisfaction with it. — Pseudonym

Right, I was very dissatisfied with Wittgenstein's proposed solution. And if you follow what I say, then unless you have a rebuttal for me, you ought to be dissatisfied with it as well, regardless of whether any other philosophers are satisfied with it.

Its possible to arrive at dozens of counter-arguments to your position, not that doing so makes your position wrong either. We could say that the first instance is not a true expression of 'rule-following' (having just invented the term, we're free to define it as we see fit), we could justify such a distinction by saying that the first instance represented an investigation, whereas only subsequent ones can be said to follow a truly 'private' rule. We could claim that one could not be said to follow a private rule until they had personal experience which removes it from the public sphere. And on and on. At no point in time is anyone 'proving' to anything. Nothing is what is happening "in reality" because we do not have unfiltered access to 'reality'. — Pseudonym

Sure, you can define "rule-following" however you please, and offer this to me. It doesn't serve as a rebuttal though, because my argument is against the use of such a definition. What is the point in defining "rule-following" such that it excludes a vast number of instances which we refer to as following a rule? If it's just for the purpose of solving some paradox, then the paradox is not really solved, because all these paradoxical instances of rule-following are still going on, despite the fact that your definition of "rule-following" denies that we can call these instances of rule-following.

This seems to miss the point of Wittgenstein's challenge regarding rule following (at least under Kripke's interpretation of it) - it merely pushes the sceptical challenge back to asking what tells you which principle it is that you hold in your own mind. — jkg20

I really don't see your point. Care to explain?

This is the whole point of Wittgenstein's investigation. A point not lost on the authors of the paper themselves who note the importance of Wittgenstein's solutions to the rule-following paradox. — Pseudonym

Wittgenstein did not provide an adequate description of what it means to follow a rule. He stated that if one could be observed to be acting in a particularly described way, then that person could be said to be following a rule. But this requires that the person do the same type of thing, more than once, producing an inductive conclusion by the observer, in order that the person is following a rule. Therefore "following a rule" is a property of the inductive conclusion of the observer, rather than a property of the person following the rule.

In reality, to follow a rule is to hold a principle within one's own mind, and adhere to it. This allows that one is following a rule in the very first instance of acting according to the rule. Furthermore, it allows for the very important, and relevant type of following a rule, which is to restrain oneself from a certain activity, like we do with a resolution to quit a bad habit. This is clear evidence that Wittgenstein's description of rule following is way off the mark. If one is successful in quitting a bad habit, there is no second time, and according to Wittgenstein this person could not be following a rule..

So Wittgenstein doesn't really solve any "rule-following paradox". All he does is define "rule-following" in a way which could make the problem appear to go away. But his definition doesn't match what rule-following really is, so what he has done is produced a fantasy solution which is really quite useless because what it resolves, if anything, is an issue with what Wittgenstein refers to with "rule-following". and this is nothing real.

Yet another way to put this is that the object of philosophy - I want to say its only object - is sense. Philosophy is an exploration of sense, and not truth. Any philosophical distinction - say between the sensible and the intelligible, the material and the ideal, immanence and transcendence - is an exploration of the sense of these terms, of the way in which they are articulated and the way in which they allow us to speak about the world (in certain ways and not others). One last consequence of this is that to then speak of philosophies as being 'wrong' - in any way other than as a figure of speech - is to misunderstand totally the vocation of philosophy. Philosophies are only more or less useful, more or less interesting, more or less significant. As Bryant says, those who hold philosophy to the criterion are truth are nothing less then cretins. — StreetlightX

There is a sense of the word "true" which is consistent with this description of philosophy. This meaning is along the lines of genuine, right, honest. And derivative of this usage is another sense which is to adhere to a course of action, stay true to one's principles. This is not coherency, it's honesty. Accordingly, a philosopher who writes in contradiction is not staying true to one's principles, and is therefore speaking untruths, being dishonest. Much more common, and often very subtle is the philosopher who utilizes ambiguity to produce a conclusion through equivocation. Again this is a case of not adhering to one's principles, therefore being untrue. Many at tpf write these untruths habitually without even noticing that it is only by switching the meaning of the words that their professed conclusions are produced.

One corollary of this, which Bryant doesn't dwell so much upon, is that philosophy then is largely an exercise is exploring the consequences of what follows once we've fixed our frame; it's an exploration of implications. — StreetlightX

Yes, this is the point, the fixing of the frame. Staying true means that the frame stays fixed. If we stay true to ourselves, we face the consequences which are implied by the frame. If the consequences are unacceptable, then we must reject the frame. This is analogous to rejecting premises which produce unacceptable conclusions. The problem occurs when we like the frame too much, and do not wish to dismiss it when the consequences prove bad. Then we twist and manipulate the consequences, painting them a rosy colour. In this case we are not staying true, because we are not accepting the true consequences of the frame in order that the frame may be maintained. Rather, to reject the frame because one cannot accept the consequences of that frame, is to stay true to one's principles. These are the principles which render the consequences unacceptable.

Bryant puts its scathingly but appropriately: "A critique of a philosophy shouldn’t be based on whether it’s internally consistent or whether it is veridical, but on whether or not it conceals or veils things that are unacceptable to veil. And here I’m inclined to say that the problems that motivate a philosophy never come from within philosophy. If, for example, you find yourself obsessed with the problem of how to refute the skeptic when developing your philosophy of mind, I’m inclined to think you’re a cretin that lacks a single important thought in your head". — StreetlightX

Again, Bryant seems to be right on the point here. Why do we veil the unacceptable? And by who's principles is it ever acceptable to veil the unacceptable, as if the veiling of the unacceptable would make it appear acceptable.

This drives toward a deeper problem What makes something unacceptable? What is the criteria for unacceptability? And why are we so prone to cover up the unacceptable, disguising it, to let it pass as acceptable, when deep inside we know that it is really unacceptable? Is it so difficult to let go of that frame which produces the unacceptable consequences? Yes it is, because letting go of that frame without having something to replace it with will leave you empty. Hence the claim by Bergson: "The truly great problems are set forth only when they are solved." Of course this is not really accurate though, because necessity is the mother of invention. So we must reject the unacceptable first, and feel that emptiness, before we are inclined toward a real solution. This is difficult as it puts us in a state of deprivation.

In my opinion, a very good thread, StreetlightX. We need to frame 'truth" in a completely different way, one which is acceptable. Otherwise philosophers will continue endlessly with inane discussions about what the word means, without hope of agreement. That lack of agreement, is an unacceptable consequence of how philosopher speak about truth.

A line is a 1D edge to a 2D plane. A point is a 0D bound to a 1D line. So you are simply choosing to pretend to be confused by the fact that we use terms that speak to the specifics of some act of constraint. — apokrisis

Good, you recognize your mistake then, when you said that a point is an edge to a line. That's a start.

Yes, a line is an edge to a plane. And a point is only an "edge" to a line. — apokrisis

What? Why contradict yourself? That's the end of that start.

But if you can't see that in the context of my account that the similarity of the nature of the constraint, the form of the symmetry breaking, is exactly the same, then I've no idea how to talk about interesting ideas with you. — apokrisis

I think that's why your account is unintelligible to me. Things which are different, you claim are the same. You'll insist that it's a difference which doesn't make a difference, but that's nothing more than contradiction. And your whole account of symmetry breaking is based in contradiction.

And those two distinct dimensions would be distinct because ....? — apokrisis

The dimensions are distinct because they are designated as such. That designation is based in the assumption that there is an angle which distinguishes them one from another. The assumption of an angle is completely fictitious. So any distinction which separates one dimension from another by employing a specified angle is a fictitious distinction and is therefore completely arbitrary.

I don't know what they taught you at high school Granddad but you are just imagining any number of rays in a spherical co-ordinate space - a description that is dual or dichotomous to the usual Cartesian one. — apokrisis

Right, and the point being that there is an infinite number of possible ways to construct "dimensions" which lie between the orthogonal way that you imagine it, and the way that I just imagined it. My argument is that each of them will end up with the very same problem of incompatibility (irrational numbers) between one dimension and another, because each utilizes the same falsity, the angle. Until we get rid of this antiquated way of modeling spatial existence, with dimensions and angles, we have no hope of producing a proper understanding.

If you did go to big school any time in the last century or two, you would have learnt that higher dimensional geometry doesn't work like that. You could indeed have an infinity of spatial dimensions, but they would all have to be orthogonal to each other as that is the critical thing making them a distinct dimension of the one connected space. — apokrisis

That spatial dimensions must be orthogonal is just a convention. You break the conventions, saying that a point is an edge, so why can't I break the conventions? Furthermore, your breaks in convention result in contradiction, because you're careless, mine do not result in contradiction, because I'm careful to analyze what I am doing.

So a point can be the edge to a line? Make up your mind. — apokrisis

I never said a point is the edge of a line. Your putting words in my mouth. An edge marks the boundary of a region, a point marks the boundary of a line segment. A region is two or three dimensional, a line is one dimensional. Why are you intent on producing ambiguity?

So if we cut away all the line to one side, it is bounded by a point on that edge. And if we then cut away all the rest of the line to the other side, what then? Is the point bounded by a point or is there just the point? — apokrisis

Take away the line and there is just the point. Remember, this is conceptual, we're not talking about a line drawn on a paper or any such thing, we are discussing concepts.

Isn't the fundamental difference that the point is the natural unit of which lines are composed? — apokrisis

No, that's absolutely false, a line is not composed of points. Who taught you geometry? A point is zero dimensional, and a line is one dimensional. An infinite number of zero dimensional points could not produce a one dimensional line. This is the incompatibility between the dimensions which I referred to.

But doesn't the point have a location? — apokrisis

No again, a point doesn't have a location. It is conceptual and concepts do not have spatial location. A point represents a location, it does not have a location. When I say that there is a point which is half way between where I am and where you are, I use "point" to represent this place. It does not mean that there is literally a point existing at this location. When someone says assume a point halfway between A and B on line AB, it does not mean that there is a point existing at this location, making up part of the assumed line. "Point" is used to represent this location.

It is not arbitrary. What got inserted was the very notion of a dichotomy or asymmetry. Dimensions are distinct due to their orthogonality. — apokrisis

Again, that's not true. Geez, what are they teaching in school these days, that kids like you get so mixed up?

Two lines may cross at any random angle, and represent two distinct dimensions. "Orthogonality" is the product of choosing "the right angle" as the distinction between two dimensions. The choice of the right angle (because it had already been proven to be very practical for producing parallel lines), means that any line at a different angle from the arbitrarily chosen two perpendicular lines, is necessarily a two dimensional line. Why not choose that two dimensional line as the representation of one dimension instead? Why are those other, arbitrarily chosen perpendicular lines the privileged signifiers of the two dimensions?

Theoretically, we could assume an infinite number of rays around a point, and assign to each ray a dimension, such that there would be an infinite number of dimensions. That classical "dimensions" are produced by right angles, and are therefore orthogonal is completely arbitrary.

Ask yourself why pi = 180 degrees. Hint: a circular rotation that flips you back to a flat line having transversed its orthogonal "other". — apokrisis

Utter nonsense apokrisis. Pi is the relation of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, as a measurement, length. That a straight line which marks the diameter is designated as 180 degrees, is irrelevant to the value of pi.

What then of the points that make the circle. Are they not the smallest possible straight edges? — apokrisis

Neither can a point have an edge, nor can a circle be made up of straight lines. So this idea is contradictory in two ways.

A point is the limit to a line - the zero-D terminus that has greater local symmetry than the 1D line which is having its own symmetry broken by being cut ever shorter, and eventually, infinitely short. A point is simply a line that can't be cut any shorter. — apokrisis

A point marks the limit to a line segment. It is contradictory to say that a point is a line segment which can't be cut any shorter, because a point and a line segment are fundamentally different. The two are incompatible. A point has zero dimensions, while a line signifies a dimension. A point has absolutely no spatial extension. It's relation to space is limited in a most complete way such that it cannot have any shape or spatial form. A line, despite the fact that it continues infinitely, has a very specific, and limited spatial extension, limited to what we call a dimension.

Then for a line to be either straight or curved is itself a question embedded in the 2D of a plane at a minimum. So curvature, or its lack, is determined by the symmetry breaking of a more global (2D) context. A line becomes "straight" as now the locally symmetric terminus of all possible linear wigglings. — apokrisis

I agree that a plane is two dimensional. But a line, by definition cannot be two dimensional. Therefore, "curved line" is itself a contradiction. To express two dimensions with lines requires two distinct lines. The relationship between the lines is expressed as an angle. You cannot have a curved line. That's why pi is irrational, it tries to establish a curved line, but a curved line itself is contradictory, irrational.

My argument is that it is not the curved line itself which produces the irrationality, it is the relationship between two dimensions which is what is truly incommensurate, just like the relationship between zero dimensions and one dimension, described above, is incommensurate. That is why the square root of two is irrational as well. What this indicates is that our spatial concepts, in terms of dimensions, are incorrect. The concept of dimensions of space produce an unintelligibility and therefore must be incorrect.

Straightness is defined in terms of the least action principle. A straight line is the shortest distance to connect two points. You may be familiar with that story from physics. — apokrisis

I think that the application of the theory of general relativity has proven this to be false, the shortest distance to connect two points is not actually a straight line. This is further evidence, that our dimensional modeling of space employing lines and angles, vectors, is incorrect.

They are minimal length lines. But are they straight or are they curved? Or would you say the issue is logically vague - the PNC does not apply? No wiggling means no case to answer on that score. — apokrisis

I answer this question by saying that the entire conceptual structure which models space in terms of distinct dimensions is inadequate and therefore incorrect. This conceptual structure leaves us with an unintelligible, irrational relationship between dimensions. The relationship is modeled with angles, but the concept of "angle" doesn't allow for the true nature of curvature. The "angle" is something totally arbitrary, inserted into spatial conceptions as an attempt to alleviate the described problem of an incompatibility between linear dimensions. When something fails you insert a stopgap to deal with the problem. That is the "angle", but the stopgap is supposed to be temporary. The only real thing that the "angle" represents is the limitations of linear geometry. Pythagoras was perplexed, that there was irrationality inherent within "the right angle", as right and useful as it had proven to be. In reality, as useful as it may have proven to be, no angle is the right angle because "the angle" represents nothing, it is a falsity.

Thanks Srap. This is really the difference between continuity and discrete points. You could construct a circle with points equidistant from a centre point, but this circle would be lacking in continuity, the points being discrete. If you connect the points, you cannot connect them with a straight line or else you do not have a circle, you have straight lines at an angle to each other. It is this queer aspect of the circle, that the continuity from one point to the next is not a straight line, which makes pi an irrational ratio. The continuity between one sot on the circle and the next, must always be two dimensional and cannot be represented as a one dimensioned straight line. The diameter of a circle is a straight line (one dimensional), while the circumference is curved (two dimensional), so the two cannot be measured with the same units of measurement.

You cannot measure a two dimensional object with the same units of measurement as you measure a one dimensional object because you need to allow for the defined difference between the dimensions. This is expressed as the angle. The relation between a first dimension and a second dimension is described by Euclid with the parallel postulate. The concept of "angle" is required to relate two distinct dimensions So if you measure a one dimensional object (straight line) with a specific unit of measurement, you cannot measure a two dimensional object (arc, or circle) with the same unit of measurement because the angle, which allows for two dimensions rather than one, needs to be accounted for and cannot be measured with that unit of measurement. Angles are measured by another unit.

That's funny, given a circle is the most fundamentally symmetric type of unit. It stands as the limit to an infinite regress in terms of the number of sides to a regular polygon. — apokrisis

A circle, because it has no beginning nor end, is the very same thing as an infinite regress. The circle cannot limit the number of sides to a polygon because a curved line is fundamentally different from a straight line. A polygon is made of straight lines with angels, and a circle consists of a curved line. Do you see the difference between the two, and how they are fundamentally incompatible? The curved line is not a limit to the straight line, the two are categorically different.

Consider that a circle could have whatever number of degrees we want. The choice was for 360 because it was derived from a proximity to the number of days in a year, but we could assume any number, even an infinite number of degrees to a circle. Suppose that we assume an infinite number of points around a circular line, because a line segment is infinitely divisible. Between each of these infinite number of points assume a connecting straight line. Now we have a polygon with an infinite number of sides. This is not a circle, because it is derived from an infinite number of points equidistant from a central point, rather than a circular line. So a circle does not limit the number of sides that a polygon can have. It is a completely different concept.