I finally can accept myself, then I suddenly realize and feel that I can be honest about my situation with others — YiRu Li

I see what you mean.

I suppose that, to me, doesn't smack of 'honesty' but self-awareness.

What I have often seen is families of origin with 'official stories' of nurturing and harmony which are untrue. Also quite often, the experiences of abuse are not from immediate family but come from other sources - scoutmasters, priests, school camp instructors, friends, parents, relatives, etc — Tom Storm

Yeah, re-reading my post I was extremely sloppy lol, so sorry for that - I meant to superficially extend the example to many origins - that kind of misapprehension is actually more often placed on police and justice in general, in my experience. Hence, the context being important as to what we each see from the subject/s.
Where I live, we have swathes of two particular groups (i want to be extremely clear I'm grouping them via their defense positions, not their belief in the position - that would become your issue outlined below):

1. "Free men" who believe the law doesn't apply to them - they feel the system is 'rigged', 'corrupt' or whatever else you can think of - and as a result of this utterly absurd position, offer violence to those attempting to enforce the justice system; and
2. Groups who believe that due to their membership of a social/racial/religious group, they are per se disadvantaged by the justice system - and the result is as above.

So, I'm not trying to say there are 'bad people' (though, i would posit there are as a result of mental illness). But people don't like being impeded. People don't like being told their views are wrong. People also like 'standing up to the man' etc.. and these misguided emotions often land people in prison.

1) Are some people just bad? 2) To what extent are people responsible for the choices they make? Attempts to address these matters can become a cesspit of cultural politics. — Tom Storm

Fully agree, and to the former: No. That saves the cesspit :)

A group chat wouldn't go amiss, im sure @dani @Mikie

While, the body sense lacks this sophistication. Your body feels good here, it is hot there, the stomach feels queasy. — hypericin

From what i gather, the distinction is that these are internal feelings of ostensibly, touch?

My suspicion is is you dig far enough such a reaction may be a consequence of a personality disorder which will itself be the product of significant shortcomings/adverse experiences in a person's upbringing. Being easily slighted is a classic symptom. — Tom Storm

(this may be for a nother thread, but I like this line, so....)

Hmm, a fair suggestion, but I am actually noting that your supporting features are those to what my concept applies. I suppose it would be helpful to know what your context is; but without that in hand I'd say there's going to be a big divide between how I, as a legal mind, would interpret and dig through claims, than would a social worker looking to rehabilitate. It is in their interests to buy into the subjects story. It is not in mine as i am victim-oriented; I want the facts as far as they can be established.

As an example, i regularly, though not frequently, come across offenders who claim in their, what's called a s 27 report here in NZ, that they suffered familial violence or abuse. In these regular, but not frequent cases, it becomes quite obvious that actually what happened was their parents were perhaps restrictive in a way they didn't like - so from a young age, they formed a ridiculous and misplaced view of their family and reacted as if that was a fact. I'm unsure this is controversial. The failure rates of rehabilitative efforts seems to comport with this general theme.

it is that the state-of-affairs, which exist, agree with the proposition that X doesn’t exist because it really isn’t a part of those states-of-affairs. Go back to my ball analogy in the room, saying “there is not ball in the room” is true iff the state-of-affairs, which all exist, in that room are such that there is no ball in them; you seem to think that it would imply, instead, that there is a state-of-affairs that does not exist such that there is no ball. — Bob Ross

I had a hypnogogic version of this occur to me this morning. Finally figured what i was trying to say....Which is essentially this. The claim something doesn't exist can be true, but it's only true in relation to a existing state-of-affairs which excludes the object in question. The thing not existing isn't the state of affairs. Does that comport with your take, or have i misread it?

Maybe - although I'm not sure what emotional reactivity is - if you are referring to difficulties with emotional regulation, that is generally the result of trauma or brain injury. — Tom Storm

The emotion arising from a perception. The reaction to an event in emotional terms.

Interesting. If your interpretation of my words are that some people justify their behavior (or lack of virtue) on the basis of fictional backgrounds - I don't accept this. — Tom Storm

No. I am telling you that i, myself observe this among criminals (particularly career criminals). It is not uncommon for an underlying attitude of aggrievement with no basis in reality to motivate a continuing disrespect for the law and courts. A perceived slight from the 'state' can do this, for instance. And I don't think anything i said inferred fictional. Up front, I noted misfiring or misplaced emotions. The subject may believe their plight is actual, when it is not, and react accordingly. Unfortunately, the legal system will
act accordingly to the 'actual'.

But we were talking about dishonesty rather than emotional regulation and violence. — Tom Storm

My comment was regarding motivations for dishonesty. I don't think i mentioned violence?

What I believe is real for me is real for me and may or may not relate to what you believe is real for you. — I like sushi

This seems a totally useless meaning to ascribe to 'real'. It doesn't delineate anything except that you, rather than another person experience something.

It would have no use, in this case. It is self-evidence that we do not share experiences. It is their comparison resulting in consistency or deviation that matters, and helps us delineate what we can rely on from what we cannot. I suppose, for an idealist this doesn't matter though so I could be barking up the wrong tree.

I have worked with a lot of prisoners and career criminals over the years. In getting to know them, I can't think of one example where the person wasn't a product of disadvantage, abuse or trauma — Tom Storm

I certainly can - some people are just misguided in their emotional reactivity; this is the sense of 'misguided' or 'misfiring' emotions. Thinking you've had a disadvantage and behaving just so doesn't mean that actually happened. But this doesn't defeat your point - it's an anomaly and for the vast majority of people they never even survey their internal maps so it's hard to put much at their feet.

even if its law code is descendend from England (which is and has been a far cry from general European culture), it does not make it alike the English law. — Lionino

One of the largest distinctions in law is the difference between the US system and 'British' which the colonies took on. Canada's law system is closer to England than is the US. Likewise with Australia, New Zealand and many other 'British' countries. The mere existence in the US of Federal and State law sets it aside in a rather extreme way.

It seems to me this was purposeful. While i'm not an historian of Law, i do understand that the War of Independence probably influenced the US legal system and bases as much, if not more, than the pre-loaded British mechanisms of law which were necessarily, at least initially, mimicked.

When we choose to be honest, it may not be because of the outside world. — YiRu Li

I find it quite hard to understand how one could have a 'conclusion' such that it results in behaviour, which is not a direct result of external.. everything...

Can you elaborate on how one might come to that sense of honesty without an external guiding/enforcing mechanism?

Plants are "Sentient", in that they can sense the environment. — Alkis Piskas

I do not believe this to be a very widely view of what sentience consists in. My understanding is there must be feeling in the sense of "what it is like to be.." involved for sentience to be observed. So, @RogueAI has a very apt question for you there..

the bodily sensations (pain, pleasure, heat, thirst, etc) — hypericin

Are these not just modes of touch? The sensations are all physically derived. If not, how do you separate 'touch' from these?

How can the soul be beyond the scope of human comprehension as millions of words have been written about it? — RussellA

If you've experienced an altered state of consciousness, that conclusion (that a 'soul' is beyond comprehension) is perhaps best thought off as an approximation. IN altered states, things become comprehensible which are not in normal waking consciousness. The reality of those things (as with a soul) are up in the air, or perhaps leaned-against. But there are concepts such as the 'soul' or a clear conception (at a very base level) of something 'unimaginable' that don't inspire typical incredulity or awe in those mind states. Being and not being do not always appear contradictory in those states.

We know very little about them and their function. My policy has been, and remains to wait until far more work has been done into the nature of the mind and its, hitherto almost ignored functionality, before making any sweeping statements of the kind made in the 18th and 19th (or even 20th) centuries about them. Without a systematic consideration of that which we know apply, but don't yet understand it seems a bit premature to posit absolutes about the ability to perceive/conceive certain things.

Moral claims absolutely do not escape this.... The larger philosophical question is, what claims do escape this? — hypericin

:up: Yessir.

They comport with all I’ve read about deontological principles from Bentham on? Idk man.

Because it posits a system in which lying is violating a duty. Which supports my contention.

That said; I don’t care. I’ve never seen any deontological writing invite dishonesty for any reason than paradox.

Disagree.

Supports my contentions

But true or false? I don't think so. I just can't see how they are the sort of things that might be true or false. — hypericin

I agree with this - and it seems to me that this exact thinking applies to moral statements. But I consider truth dependent on an object. If your object is “the world at large” I simply don’t understand what you think you’re saying wrt to a moral “fact” of the world.

But again; I may be (and this is active work(including this comment)) changing that conception as we exchange.

Fair, in general. But, not quite my understanding based on multiple academic sources. One below, directly dealing with the issue:

https://www.merton.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/inline-files/Roman-Evans.pdf

From the above:

"From a deontological point of view lying is always wrong (as is deceit for that matter), on the basis that communication is a process needed for prosperity and that truth communicates but a lie does not. Therefore, on this basis lying is always wrong. In the case that there is a clear and moral alternative to a lie then of course anyone would agree that this point of view stands true. But one might ask ‘What if a lie prevented an action worse than a lie from occurring?’ And this essay would answer that from a deontological perspective the lie must still be wrong as a lie is always wrong."

(I understand the Isenberg definition to in fact be Kantian from Arnold Isenberg's essay Deontology and the Ethics of Lying - https://www.jstor.org/stable/2104756 - but i don't have access)

Another, though, i've just pulled this one out for mentioning Kantian ethics specifically:

https://books.openedition.org/obp/4433?lang=en#:~:text=That%20is%2C%20if%20the%20consequences,be%20morally%20acceptable%20to%20lie.

"That is, if the consequences of lying are better than telling the truth then we are morally required to lie. The deontologist — the Kantian or Divine Command Theorist for example — thinks that lying is always wrong. There are no situations at all when it would be morally acceptable to lie."

Someone who values their own self-perceived "respect" so much that would condemn an innocent to a terrible death for its sake, operates under a deeply flawed moral system, I think most would agree. — hypericin

I am not a deontologist. So am free to agree with you. My understanding is that as lying perverts communication, a deontologist cannot, ever, lie, to be consistent. But i agree with you at least intuitively.

Yes. To lie would be to disrespect yourself to a degree that is unacceptable to a deontologist (is my understanding)

Totally missed this thread!

A lot of you already know me and my ankle-biting ways because of that, so apologies.

My name is Amadeus Diamond
I'm Irish; living in New Zealand
33; married; 2 kids (blended family)
Legal professional full time; back in school (conjoint LLB (law) and BA in Philosophy undergrad).

Most intensely interested in the question of personal identity over time both "whether" and "if it matters".
More minor (but still, very much preoccupying) interest in both trying to justify my feeling that morals can be objective, while conceding i have never seen a good argument for it; and understanding why so many philosophers appear totally detached from the real world, while trying to avoid that myself.

Outside of philosophy and law i practice brazillian jiu jitsu competitively and play many instruments.

Looking to make some type of philosophy friends too; hence extraneous information above.

Glad to be here!

I think this depends on your moral standpoint, but i would say deontolog-ism is a good start. I believe that strong deontology requires never, ever being dishonest in any scenario regardless of context.

So if there were an intersubjective agreement that it is permissible to torture babies, then it would be permissible to torture babies? Does the wrongness of torturing babies change with the opinions of the day? This is what you are committing yourself to. — Leontiskos

I don't read Bob as even intimating that this might be the case. All he's positing is that some judgement could be independent of him and still be subjective. That seems obvious. There are opinions on pieces of art i'm not even aware of. That's an independent-of-me judgement that is still subjective. And an addendum of inter-subject agreement about that wouldn't make it objective.

I don't read more than this into what he's saying. Can you lay out where you're squeezing your reading from? (I use squeezing for fun.. Not in any way a comment on your methods). If you don't want to, that's fine; I'm just curious :)

For example, you think that we should not torture babies, and that this moral norm applies universally and unchangeably. — Leontiskos

In my case, I do think this, but i dont think it's a norm (beyond being 'the norm' for most people) or that it applies universally or unchangeably.
Can i be an anti-realist? :P

Thank you! Really appreciate the considered reply! Even a polite rejection is fine by my lights :nerd:

I am doing my best to try not to annoy people so, snippiness is a good indicator (as long it's not gratuitous!). I understand why, too. You'll have seen from several exchanges that I just do not see what moral realists see. I cannot make the connection they make either semantically or conceptually between an act and its rightness or wrongness per se, rather than apropos of a chosen framework. So it is very frustrating, I think, from any perspective to be discussing these things as though we could convince someone of the POV (see below for why your notion of persuasion isn't part of my moral framework, really, other than incidentally - although, i would just note for my own peace of mind here, there is no consensus).

Unfortunately, as I (currently) reject the notion of moral truth in the sense of objectivity, this extrapolation is fairly much unintelligible as a 'way forward' for me but I (think) I grok what's being said regardless, from the realist perspective and it's consistent and helpful.

I have, elsewhere, today, had to alter my formulation of truth, though, and so I could, imagine, with quite little force be convinced of moral 'truth' as long as it's a relative truth.

You are a legal professional. Law is the most practical form of morality, and it is a social reality. As a society we agree that certain actions are impermissible and we lock people up for decades in prisons for carrying out these actions (things like murder, rape, pedophilia, etc.). — Leontiskos

Tricky. Unless you're a legal positivist (Leiter, anyone?) this is not very clear. Things have evolved over time, but drug laws are a very front-and-center example of why your conception probably isn't actually the way things are. I don't really see the law as moral. It's pragmatic and usually, really bad.

I think there are some widely-held views that make their way into law, and that's fine. I don't really think much beyond that. This is why i think activism is great, but faulty. You probably should speak up if you think a law/regulation is wrong. But it's faulty because activism necessarily requires a moral certitude that i don't think is warranted (ever).

I think my same point applies to the question of truth, as judgments always relate to truth. But if you want to say that "true" means "true with a high degree of certitude," then you are of course able to say that one or more of your moral judgments are not "true" in that sense — Leontiskos

What would you think about a visceral uneasiness is calling it 'true'? I don't know whether my behaviour is correct. It's the best i can envisage. I feels awful to claim that as truth. Any comments there?

The posts of yours that I have read always contain something like, "Well, the judgment is abductive so it isn't really a moral judgment." That's not right. It's still a moral judgment, it's just a moral judgment formed or acted upon with less certitude. — Leontiskos

Hmm. I imagine i'm being linguistically imprecise then (or i've been unnecessarily reactionary to challenges), as this is not what i think. I'm happy to call it a judgement. I just think that entails that i believe the truth of the judgement. I do think a tentative judgement precludes me from assigning 'truth' to it, personally but again, I'm not at the stage that i could enunciate this well. I take an internal sense of 'true' to entail a certitude that I don't apply to my moral judgements.

You can't just run around encouraging/arguing/forcing others to act in certain ways and claim you are not a moral realist. — Leontiskos

(please keep in mind I am not defending, particularly, anything here - I am nutting out ideas and approaching tehse things as a pretty green amateur philosopher)

I just cannot see in your exchange where that's established but i run into the huge problem that i don't engage other people's morals for the (imo subjective) reason that i don't feel adequately omniscient to perceive my moral standards as applicable to others. So, i act-out exactly what you're saying in practice (i.e, i take morals to be subjective, and therefore do not attempt to enforce my morals on others), but I don't actually see why i couldn't without a contradiction getting in the middle (treatment of 'enforce' below - whcih i think is relevant).

Can it be the case that, at the apex of my considerations(judgement), a certain behaviour appears moral/immoral, and so I enforce that judgement to the degree that I am acting on it toward other people, and yet am open to their response motivating or informing an adjustment in my judgement?

I think this allows for "running around encouraging/arguing.." but not forcing. But then, do you consider my behaving in line with my (subjective) moral considerations, forcing them on those I interact with, or does 'enforcement' only apply to aattempt to change their behaviour?

Many people who favour artificial intelligence see the absence of emotions as an advantage, for making rational or clinical judgments. Nevertheless, the contrasting argument is how this may lead to an absence of empathy and the ability to feel compassion — Jack Cummins

I have a rather unique, and I imagine, quite pertinent perspective here.

For about seven years i suffered what was termed "Trauma-induced DiD(dissociative identity disorder (multiple personalities)). The over-all effect of this was that my personality became, on average, a sociopathic one. It took rather extreme experiences to alert me to the emotional reality I was inhabiting (i.e the emotions around me, informing those around me, and motivating their actions). I was, during this period, daily likened to Sherlock in the BBC series (in this aspect only).

During this time I found it extremely easy to do things like:

- Hold a conversation;
- Listen to a Podcast; and
- Overhear a conversation in the room

all at the same time, with coherence and attendance to all three activities, verified by the incredulity and accusations of being psychic from others. I can't do this now that I experience emotions the way I used to. I couldn't prior, either. I could, when i was younger, MAYBE grasp two conversations at once and stab at decent replies - but they would be muddled and i'd have to take moments to straighten myself out. The emotions get in the way of the smooth transition from one activity to another as I discern what i am 'to do' and try to justify my 'decision'. While sociopathic, it was already apparent what i was to do/reply/offer based on a sort of logical calculus, in any situation. Obviously, it's almost inevitable my calculus was at times way off, and at most times, a little off. However, my achievements in terms of productivity and expansion of my concepts at that time, i feel I will never come close to again. I prefer feeling - but I miss not wanting to care about things that came through my mind.

Incidentally, it was that period that initially sparked my interest in philosophy proper. I'd listen to someone like Daniel Dennett or Noam Chomsky and just think "What the absolute hell are you talking about?" and then realised what sophistry was LOL.

I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience".
What are your definitions of "Transcendental" and "Transcendental Idealism" in Kant? — Corvus

(well aware you did not ask me.. Just adding a perspective as I'm reading CPR right now for the first time so feel like i need this type of thing to nut out whether i understand.. any.. of it LOL)

My understanding of 'Transcendental' is that it denotes the concepts which transcend phenomena/experience. So these 'a priori' concepts are transcendental, as are the processes by which we make use of them but the concepts are how we experience sensory data. I don't think its strictly a placeholder for 'a priori' but it does encapsulate that there are concepts necessarily experienced in a representation-to-come, yet understood prior to experience of the representation, making the 'giving' of the object possible to our senses. I've not gotten far enough to tease out whether this could (as seems obvious to me) apply to things that don't actually exist (i.e, if: there is no object which could be 'given to' us, could we yet ascribe these transcendental concepts to figures of hte mind not ever present to our senses?). Issue is, it seems to me Kant denies the 'actual' existence of the object aside from the inner sense of it, so... I need to read more lol.

But there’s no object yo be referred to so maybe my formulation of “truth” needs to change — AmadeusD

Yes sir ^^ @Michael

Objects don't need to exist for statements to be true. — Michael

But they are not objectively true. I guess they must be relatively true in light of what does exist - exclusion. Hmm. Thanks for this,

I may be needing to adjust my view here because there is no object. There is no objective reality to non-existence, brute fact maybe? Unsure. But there’s no object yo be referred to so maybe my formulation of “truth” needs to change

onsciousness is not "hard" in a physical sense, but in the holistic philosophical sense of : not subject to simplistic reductionism. :smile: — Gnomon

Given he also identifies a few “easy” problems of consciousness I think you’re safe here :)

f you want to say that not existing isn't a state of affairs, and if it is objectively true that nothing else exists in scenario 1, then you must accept that objective truth does not always depend on there being some corresponding state of affairs. — Michael

While I think probably “yes” I don’t think its a lack of correlation with a state of affairs. It’s a state of affairs which lacks some “thing”.

I see an appreciable difference there. You may not and I’m unsure how to sort that out

You're saying that non-existence exists. That makes no sense. — Michael

Not really no. What I’m saying is that in scenario 1. the entire scenario is caught by your mind. There is no sense of “doesn’t exist” outside that so perhaps I mis-spoke there and used exist incorrectly. The state of affairs is that your mind exists. Nothing else.
The absence of say a cat isn’t a state of affairs. But within the actual state of affairs the fact of “no cat” is evident. Unsure what precise wording I need there I’m sorry. So the state of affairs “there is only your mind” includes there being no cat - so, to me, it can be referred to as “existing” that there is no cat but I concede it isn’t objective because there is no cat to refer to.

Context — 180 Proof

Errr. Okay lol.

Is this so? Any thoughts? — dani

Speaking only to the earlier portion, as i'm actually not too up the relationship between Libertarianism and other identitarian pursuits:|

Huh. My experience of basically the entirety of deconstructionist thought has been that it replaces the individual per se with the individual qua group /membership/s and in varying proportions.

This seems to actually be borne out in the what they 'think is right'. Broadly speaking, it tends to be large-scale either action or reaction in the spirit of some or other group usually with legislative change in mind - I recognize that there's obviously an individual effort involved for each person pertaining to the group to which they belong and are, at any time, acting in light of, but the defining feature of that action or decision's significance in terms of its socio-political nature seems the motivating factor. There's no motivation for an individual to become 'liberated'.

What's the weird slogan being thrown around? No freedom til were all free or something or other.

s Please be more precise: what is (your) philosophical question – perplexity – about "emotions"? — 180 Proof

Why is “your” in parentheses?

I wonder if what we call 'emotion' is in some way equivalent to what was meant by 'the passions' in those sources. — Wayfarer

I doubt this will come as novel but that’s exactly how I read Hume.

usD Are we now playing posts-last-wins? — Banno

I’m just trying to get back to a place of good faith, whether we think the other has missed a specific point in a specific thread being irrelevant :) that’s all.

So it seems. :wink: — Banno

Hehe.
“We ought to get on well”.