a scientific orientation often leads us to assume that objectivity is the sole criterion for what is real. This approach seeks to arrive at a view from which the subject is bracketed out or excluded, focusing exclusively on the primary and measurable attributes of objects and forces. In this framework, the subjective is relegated to derivative status. However, in so doing, scientific objectivity also excludes the qualitative dimension of existence — the reality of Being. — Wayfarer

I would prefer to say that scientific concepts are
themselves qualitative ( mass, motion, energy,’etc), and what characterizes them as leaving out what you call the subjective dimension is that these are peculiar kinds of qualities. They are flattened abstractions modeled as external to the subject. Bringing ourselves back into the picture returns scientific qualities back to the rich contexts of intersubjective relevance from which they were generated.

Stoic philosophy, which is enjoying a cultural resurgence, is built on the foundation of apatheia — not mere indifference or callousness, but a state of calm equanimity that comes from freedom from irrational or extreme emotions (mood swings, in today’s language). The Stoics believed that apatheia was the essential quality of the sage, unperturbed by events and indifferent to the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. ‘Detachment,’ said one ancient worthy, ‘is not that you should own nothing, but that nothing should own you.’ — Wayfarer

A detached attitude is not the absence of affect; there is no such thing as affectless awareness. All forms of rationality get their sense and meaning from an underlying affective stance. By elevating detachment, one is simply substituting one mood for others and then proclaiming it the supreme ‘rational’ value. Rather than aiming for detachment, one should do the opposite and immerse oneself as intricately as possible in the contextually shifting meanings that affective attunement to the world discloses. We need to get in touch with the bodily felt affective sense of situations in order to cope with a constantly changing world, and to creatively move forward. Detachment can be a useful preliminary means of preparing to experience the affective feel, tonality and meaning of a situation as a whole rather than getting stuck within one fixed conceptual detail of it.

. We want to understand how something called a flow can have order and patterns while lacking formal features. We also want to understand how this flow is not an entity, nor is it composed of entities. Would an analogy with water help? -- it's the first thing that comes to mind when I think of "flow." The problem here would be that water is composed of entities, and the ways in which water is ordered and patterned give rise to features such as depth, velocity, waves, eddies, etc. (Arguably, these are not formal features, but then we need an account of what a formal feature would be.) We could say that the "entities" of which water is composed -- I'm thinking of molecules -- are themselves composed of smaller entities, right down to the subatomic level, at which it's unclear whether we can speak of entities at all. Might this level be closer to Husserlian "flow"? But do we really perceive that flow? If we could imagine -- and I'm not sure we can -- an epoché that bracketed everything, would we get the quantum world?

. The question discussed is whether quantity is simply a primitive property of the physical world, or whether it can be explained in non-mathematical terms. The relevance here would be that quantity might be an example -- like texture and consonance -- of something that appears ontologically primitive, part of the "flow" we encounter in the lifeworld. But maybe not, as the paper discusses. — J

In order to understand the basis of quantity, we have to see its relation to quantity. We can only count instances of something that remains qualitatively the same over the course of the counting. For instance, if we define change in terms of spatial displacement of a body, we are defining change in terms of motion. Motion is a formal notion of change, because it relies on the form of a quality, which remains self-identical as we measure its temporal movement in space. Contrast this to Husserl’s temporal flow, which contains within itself no self-identical qualities, and thus cannot be measured like motion can, and which is why it doesn’t make sense to talk about the flow moving faster or slower. Each new phase of the flow varies qualitatively with respect to the previous phase, but this doesn’t prevent there being dimensions of similarity and resonances within the differentiations of the flow.

Put differently, if every change in degree is at the same time a difference in kind, then both quality and quantity are in a sense illusions or abstractions we place over the flow.
Nathan Widder reveals a similar way of thinking in what Deleuze borrows from Nietzsche:

“…the thesis from Deleuze's late 1960s writings holds identity to be a simulation or optical illusion…identity and fixed markers, which may be considered natural and pregiven or contingently constructed but indispensable, are surface effects of difference. Identities and fixed markers, I want to say, are like patterns on the surface of water, which appear fixed when seen from a great distance, such as from the window of an airplane in flight: their stability and substantiality, in short, are a matter of perspective.”

“Nietzsche declares that ‘everything for which the word “knowledge” makes any sense refers to the domain of reckoning, weighing, measuring, to the domain of quantity' (Nietzsche 1968: §565); but he also maintains that ‘we need “unities” in order to be able to reckon: that does not mean we must suppose that such unities exist' (§635). Mechanism begins with unities that can be quantified or counted, but the idea of unity applies to abstract things and objects, not to forces. On a more concrete level, where there are no unities or things pre-existing their relations but only incongruent relations of force, quantity cannot be a number but only a relation: as Deleuze argues, there is no ‘quantity in itself', but rather ‘difference in quantity', a relation of more and less, but one that cannot be placed on a fixed numerical scale. Forces are determined quantitatively – ‘Nietzsche always believed that forces were quantitative and had to be defined quantitatively' (NP 43) – and this determination takes the form of relative strength and weakness.But this difference does not entail fixed numerical values being assigned to each force, as this can only be done in abstraction, when, for example, two forces are isolated in a closed system, as mechanism does when it examines the world. A quantitative difference between forces is therefore on the order of an intensive difference à la Leibniz, an intensive quantity in which forces vice-dict rather than contradict one another.”

whereas I'm inclined to grant the subject a kind of ontological primacy. — Wayfarer

Husserl certainly grants subjectivity ontological primacy, but the content of the ego changes with its acts.

“We can discern with evidence the sense in which the pure Ego changes in the changing of its acts. It is changeable in its practices, in its activities and passivities, in its being attracted and being repulsed, etc

What is unchanging about it is its structural role as center from which the retentional and protentional horizons extend backward to the past and forward to the future, respectively.

“As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear. All richness lies in the cogito and in the mode of the function which can be adequately grasped therein.”(Ideas II). Husserl describes this pure ego pole as non-perceivable, non-graspable and anonymous. This suggests that the pure ego may function as nothing but an empty zero point or center of activity rather than a consciously sensed feeling of any kind.

An utterly formless, structureless flow of change.
— Joshs

That would be what is traditionally called chaos, would it not?

Traditionally, chaos is defined by its opposition to order. But
the constituting temporal flow is not without all order. Heidegger says:

“Chaos and the Greek meaning of it are not the same. Chaos mostly refers to the disorder which is a consequence of a loss of order; thus chaos, as the interpenetration and mishmash of all claims, measures, goals, and expedients, is completely dependent on the precedent “order” which still operates on it as its nonessence. In contrast, the Greek meaning of it, chaos in the original sense, is nothing nonessential and “negative”—instead, it is the gaping open of the abyss of the essential possibilities of grounding. An experience of this kind of “chaos” is reserved for the one who is decided and creative—this “chaos” cannot be brought into order, but “only” into an unfolding toward an extreme and ever freer opposition. The essentiality—the nearness to being—of a humanity can at times be gauged by what it takes, and can take, to be “chaos.”” (Ponderings 1938-39)

1) Why are the suggested terms exempt from the criticisms you make about any other supposedly external term? Why is OK to acknowledge the non-arbitrary existence of a “consonance” but not a tree or some other self-identical spatial object? — J

The nature of the flow that Husserl described is not without order, even though it lacks formal features. How can this be? Husserl is not the only philosopher who has depicted the primordial basis of reality in these terms. We find such thinking also in Nietzsche , Deleuze, Foucault, Heidegger , Derrida and others. What is common to them is the idea that no entity in the world pre-exists its interactions with other entities. The patterns that arise obey no analogies or categorical placements. Things are not identities , they only continue to exist the same differently.

2) Why, and in what way, would an “affordance”, e.g., be constraining? Why couldn’t it be ignored? Does this have to do with the role that “our own activities” play in this process? — J

We cannot ignore events which thwart our purposes, even though what stands in the way of our goals emerges by way of those very goals.

3) Are these terms actually meaningful? Is it possible, e.g., to have “texture” without its being of anything? This seems like a predicate without a subject. Surely textures and consonances need to inhere somewhere, otherwise what organ of perception are we using to identify them? — J

The subject is itself produced as a continually shifting effect of organism-environment interactions. The person-world dynamic isnt a subject-predicate propositional structure, with a subject representing a world to itself. Instead, both the subject and the object ‘inhere’ as the result of their interaction.

Sure, but then I don't understand what the issue is. We have a whole range and breath of intellectual fields, sciences, arts, humanities that generate knowledge or culture in different ways. So I don't really understand what the central issue is here — Apustimelogist

The issue for me is that incorporation of the insights I mentioned can inform and transform the content of the hard sciences, just as it has already begun to have its effect on biology, neuroscience and cognitive psychology.

. So now I can ask: Is the utterly formless, structureless flow nevertheless constraining, in some degree, of what we can constitute as an object or event? How is this flow not "whole cloth," as it were? — J

It is not as though this flow were devoid of textures, of consonances and dissonances. When we slap abstractions like self-identical spatial object and effluent causation over the flow, we are not producing such distinctions out of thin air, but forming idealizations out of the constants and affordances which emerge from our own activities.

Science attempts to explain how and why what we all observe is the way it is. It is unquestionable that we, and the other animals live in and experience the same world. Nonetheless how we experience the same things differs from individual to individual. — Janus

The world is not a static frame with objects in it, it is a process of reflexive self-change , and our sciences, arts and other forms of creative niche construction particulate in this process. Since this world continues to be what it is by changing with respect to itself, there is no ‘same’ world for any part of it to relate to. There are only partially shared patterns of action and interaction among its elements, including us humans. the aim of science is not to represent , but to change our interaction with it in ways that are intelligible and predicable.

If we do not invent objects out of whole cloth, what are the constraints put upon the way we constitute them? Will the lifeworld allow anything? Or, said another way: If we did invent objects out of whole cloth, how would we be able to tell the difference between doing that and merely constituting them through intentional acts? What would mark one or the other description of what we do as being the correct one? — J

We can’t invent out of whole cloth.Wr invent what we want to invent, but what we want is already conditioned and informed by ways of understanding the world that we share with others. The fiction writer expresses aspects of the norms of their culture even when they think they are being utterly original. What is true and false, what ought to be and what ought not to be get their intelligibility from such larger partially shared patterns of meaningful practices. The world that we co-construct talks back to our inventions, offering constraints and affordances that are specifically responsive to those constructions.

Sure, but there is no way to communicate about qualitative experiences in a way that is any different to what science, or any other intellectual field, does when it constructs knowledge and talks about things. You can't really go any deeper — Apustimelogist

Different sciences talk about things in different ways. Some rely on reductive causal abstractions, some begin from the contextually particular circumstances of persons in interaction. It’s not a question going into the ‘depths’ of an inner subjectivity but of staying close to the interactive surface of intersubjective practice and. it abstracting away from it with with claims to pure ‘objective’ description.

Science has little to say about your subjective experience as it is impossible to capture. Its not just science, but anyone. Even the closest person in your life doesn't know what your actual subjective experience is.
— Philosophim

Completely agree, and partly why I have never really understood what Wayferer is trying to push with his perspective and what precisely he is saying is lacking or what that has to do with science. — Apustimelogist

Everything science says is a statement of subjective experience. Your subjective experience sits smack dab in the very heart of scientific concepts, by way of the intersubjective interaction which transforms subjective experience into the flattened , mathematicized abstractions that pretend to supersede it, while in fact only concealing its richness within its generic vocabulary.

Is there more to the nature of things than this?
— Joshs

Whatever that might be may not be made subject to propositional knowledge, which already is a matter of implicit consensus, but it may be a subject of insight which is conveyed symbolically or by gesture or in art. Besides, this is where I feel that Husserl’s ‘wesen’ (essence) is significant. Granted they’re not self-existent platonic forms, but they’re still an underlying reality in some important sense, that are not grasped by objectivism. (I will come back to that.) — Wayfarer

You want to know what is out there as the underlying reality for Husserl, apart from iintentionally constituted objects? An utterly formless, structureless flow of change. Husserl shows us the difference between how the world looks to us after we have constituted it through objectivizing intentional syntheses (what he calls constitutive time) and how the world is ‘in itself’ prior to such constituting acts (what he calls constituting time).

Each individual object (each unity, whether immanent or transcendent, constituted in the stream) endures, and necessarily endures -that is, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process. Conversely: what exists in time continuously exists in time and is the unity belonging to the process that carries with it inseparably the unity of what endures in the process as it unfolds. The unity of the tone that endures throughout the process lies in the tonal process; and conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point. Individual or concrete being is necessarily changing or unchanging; the process is a process of change or of rest, the enduring object itself a changing object or one at rest. Moreover, every change has its rate or acceleration of change (to use an image) with respect to the same duration. As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be carried over into change.

Now if we consider the constituting phenomena in comparison with the phenomena just discussed, we find a flow, and each phase of this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle, no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession, and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous "change", and this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither "faster" nor "slower." If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration.”

“Can one speak in the strict sense of change in a situation in which, after all, constancy, duration filled out without change, is inconceivable? No possible constancy can be attributed to the continuous flow of appearance-phases. There is no duration in the original flow. For duration is the form of something enduring, of an enduring being, of something identical in the temporal sequence that functions as its duration. In the case of processes such as a thunderstorm, the motion of a shooting star, and so on, we have to do with unitary complexes of changes in enduring objects. Objective time is a form of "persisting" objects, of their changes and of other processes involved in them. "Process" is therefore a concept presupposing persistence. But persistence is unity that becomes constituted in the flow, and it pertains to the essence of the flow that no persistence can exist in it. Phases of experience and continuous series of phases exist in the flow. But such a phase is nothing that persists, any more than a continuous series of such phases is. To be sure, in a way it is also an objectivity. I can direct my regard towards a phase that stands out in the flow or towards an extended section of the flow, and I can identify it in repeated re-presentation, return to the same section again and again, and say: this section of the flow. And so too for the entire flow, which in the proper way I can identify as this one flow. But this identity is not the unity of something that persists and it can never be such a unity. It belongs to the essence of persistence that what persists can persist as either changing or unchanging. Every change idealiter can pass over into a condition of constancy, every motion into rest and every test into motion, and every qualitative change into a condition of qualitative constancy. The duration is then filled with "the same" phases.

As a matter of principle, however, no concrete part of the flow can make its appearance as non-flow. The flow is not a contingent flow, as an objective flow is. The change of its phases can never cease and turn into a continuance of phases always remaining the same. But does not the flow also possess, in a certain manner, something abiding, even if no concrete part of the flow can be converted into a non-flow? What abides, above all, is the formal structure of the flow, the form of the flow. That is to say, the flowing is not only flowing throughout, but each phase has one and the same form. This constant form is always filled anew by "content," but the content is certainly not something introduced into the form from without. On the contrary, it is determined through the form of regularity only in such a way that this regularity does not alone determine the concretum. The form consists in this, that a now becomes constituted by means of an impression and that a trail of retentions and a horizon of protentions are attached to the impression. But this abiding form supports the consciousness of constant change, which is a primal fact: the consciousness of the change of impression into retention while a fresh impression continuously makes its appearance; or, with respect to the \"what\" of the impression, the consciousness of the change of this what as it is modified from being something still intended as "now" into something that has the character of "just having been." (The Phenomenology of the Constitution of Internal Time, Appendix 6)

Also wanted to add - yes, of course you're right about that. It was carelessly expressed on my part. But he does insist on the primacy of scientific paradigms, which are in some important sense, conceptual constructions. — Wayfarer

If I understand the aim of your OP correctly, you’re trying to get to the bottom of the relation between subject and world. Inn order to do so, we must grapple with the nature of subjectivity, and thisn requires an understanding of notions like conceptual construction and consciousness. I follow Thompson in tracing the origins of consciousness and cognition to the goal-directed normativity of the simplest living systems. Put simply, we don’t have to remain at the level of human conceptuality. By understanding what an object is for a bacterium, how their active interactions with their world constitutes what its reality is by reference to how it matters to them, we have already come a long way toward solving the mystery of what is real and how we come to know it.

To clarify this distinction, consider the act of looking out a window. Naturalism concerns itself with what you can see outside: the objects, events, and phenomena unfolding in the world. It aims to describe these with precision and detachment, focusing solely on their objective characteristics. Phenomenology, by contrast, is like studying the act of looking itself: the awareness of the scene, the structures of perception, and the way the world is disclosed to you as a subject. While naturalism investigates the external landscape, phenomenology turns the lens inward, asking how that landscape appears to and is interpreted by the observer. So it is characterised by a certain kind of detached self-awareness. This shift in focus introduces a self-awareness that naturalism, in its strict adherence to objective fact, often neglects. — Wayfarer

Something seems to be missing here. This description focuses solely on an ‘inner’ mental aspect of perception, as though there were the objects out there and the representing of them in here. This reminds me of Dreyfus’s cognitive science misreading of Husserl. The subjective pole of consciousness does not just process and interpret. Through intentional acts , it constitutes the objects as what they are and how they are. This does not mean that it invents them out of whole cloth, but neither does it mean that there is any aspect of the object that simply independent of the subject. The object gets itself sense from an inseparable synthetic co-construction effected between the noetic-egoic and the noematic-objective sides of an intentional act.

The ego pole projects an anticipatory sense forward , a form of belief, and the object assimilates itself into this anticipated meaning while simultaneously completing the intentional act by obliging the ego to accommodate its anticipated sense to what is novel in the object. Thus, spatial objects are ‘real’ for Husserl as idealizations constituted via synthetic acts of consciousness on the basis of the adumbration of similarities of sense. We don’t ever actually see spatial objects as persisting identities, and have no basis for assuming the ‘reality’ of such unities besides our sciences, whose notions of objects as self-identities in externally causal interaction are themselves abstractions and idealizations derived from phenomenological acts.

Thus, scientific naturalism, what Husserl calls the natural attitude, doesn’t differ from a phenomenological analysis by being oriented toward the ‘outside world’ while phenomenology is interested in inner experience, as though the external landscape would still be what it is without the participation of intentional acts. Phenomenology shows us that the ‘outside’ is already an idealization constituted within transcendental consciousness. In other words, the very distinction between outside and inside is an artifact of the naive thinking of the natural attitude.

“Certainly the world that is in being for me, the world about which I have always had ideas and spoken about meaningfully, has meaning and is accepted as valid by me because of my own apperceptive performances because of these experiences that run their course and are combined precisely in those performances—as well as other functions of consciousness, such as thinking. But is it not a piece of foolishness to suppose that world has being because of some performance of mine? Clearly, I must make my formulation more precise. In my Ego there is formed, from out of the proper sources of transcendental passivity and activity, my “representation of the world, ” my “picture of the world, ” whereas outside of me, naturally enough, there is the world itself. But is this really a good way of putting it? Does this talk about outer and inner, if it makes any sense at all, receive its meaning from anywhere else than from my formation and my preservation of meaning? Should I forget that the totality of everything that I can ever think of as in being resides within the universal realm of consciousness, within my realm, that of the Ego, and indeed within what is for me real or possible?” (Phenomenology and Anthropology)

“Indeed, perhaps it will turn out later that all externality, even that of the entire inductive nature, physical and even psychophysical, is only an externality constituted in the unity of communicative personal experience, is thus only something secondary, and that it requires a reduction to a truly essential internality.” (Husserl 1977)

Consider an allegory. Three men are viewing a parcel of land. One is a real-estate developer, one an agriculturalist, and one a geological surveyor. They all have different uses for that land, and would all develop it in different ways, with very different consequences. If what that land is, is entirely determined by the use it is eventually put to, does that mean the land itself has no reality independently of those uses?

Of course, this is only an allegory, but it raises the question: do these different perspectives fully exhaust the nature of what the land is? Or is there something more to it? — Wayfarer

It’s not just that the different uses of the land bring with them their own real dimensions of meaning. The concept of parcel of land is itself already a discursively produced normative meaning. But just because our materially real meanings already move within some set of discursive practices or other doesn’t mean that the practices themselves are static. They are, in Joseph Rouse’s words, temporally extended. This means that practices only exist by being repeated, and the repetition itself, in partially shared circumstances, is always anticipatory, oriented toward new directions of understanding. As Rouse explains:

Norms are not already determinate standards to
which performances are accountable but are instead temporally extended patterns that encompass how we have already been living this part of our lives as well as the possibilities open for its continuation. Just what this pattern of practice is-what we are up to, and who we are in our involvement in it-is always partly ahead of us, as that toward which the various performances of a practice are mutually, but not always fully compatibly, directed. The temporal open-endedness of our biological niche construction and that of social practices are two ways of describing the same phenomena."

Is there more to the nature of things than this? Let me put it this way, if there is, it can never be anything that we articulate, since any way we formulate this idea already presupposes some prior practical stance toward and engagement with what is claimed to be independent of us.

The current subject of many animated philosophical debates is whether we humans are able to see ‘things as they truly are’. At issue are the perennial philosophical questions: What is real? and How can we come to know it? These are questions fundamental to philosophy and science alike. — Wayfarer

Certainly we are able to see things as they truly are. There is no way the world is ‘in itself’ The world shows itself to us in our practical engagements with it. This world that we are already deeply and directly in touch with is the only world that will ever matter to us.

philosophers of science, such as Thomas Kuhn¹ and Michael Polanyi², have demonstrated that tacit knowledge and personal perspectives shape even the most rigorous of scientific practices. — Wayfarer

Kuhn’s paradigmatic model does not rely on personal perspective in the sense of a subjective representation of reality. Rather. it is based on practices of DOING THINGS with the world.

Obedience to proper authority is part of "right behavior." If children refuse to listen to their parents or teachers, employees refuse to listen to their bosses, citizens refuse to listen to the police or tax collectors, nurses assisting a surgeon refuse to obey the surgeon, cops refuse to obey elected officials, etc. there will be obvious problems.

This is fairly obvious is contemporary American society, where we see police forces (paramilitary organizations) openly heckling what are essentially their commanders-in-chief (i.e., mayors, sheriff's, commissioners) and responding to orders with: "nope, don't feel like doing that," or "maybe if you pay us a large donative we will consider following that order." For instance, when elected officials try to respond to citizens concerns and anger over law enforcement, impunity, etc., a not uncommon response has been for forces to simply to stop doing their jobs in protest.

Simply ignoring the rule of law is another example. Yet such behavior by those in positions of relative authority only makes sense in a frame where the "common good" is merely a means of maximizing the fulfillment of the individuals' desires, and where there is no such thing as "right desire," but merely acts that maximize utility—the fulfillment of existing desire—or fail to. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Law and other structures of authority hold society together only to the extent that they refer back to societal consensus, and the glue holding societal consensus together is shared understandings that only preserve their validity through repeated testing effected by each individual. Doing rightly must be based on right understanding, and obedience only has ethical import to the extent that it leads to such understanding, or presupposes such understanding, such as in obeying rules of the road. We need not know the basis of every rule, but we have faith in the wisdom of those who did create the rules.

I figured people might find this interesting. There has been a boom in interest in classical education across the US over the past few years, with growth rapidly outpacing other K-12 enrollment in the US. The advance is occuring on several fronts, being a major trend in homeschool settings, private schools, and (to a lesser extent) public charters. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I believe that both empirical knowledge and ethical understanding undergo a historical evolution. Therefore, I think a classical education is important as a way to understand where we’ve been, in order to reveal how we have surpassed old superstitious and doctrinaire ways of thinking. We cannot orient ourselves toward the future without putting under critique the traditional presuppositions. Any classical education which simply venerates the past in the name of sovereign moral verities is doing its students a moral injustice.

from what I understand and experienced the norm is to basically have …very little ethics outside of basic obedience — Count Timothy von Icarus

Now there's an oxymoron if I ever heard one.

I'm not saying that my interpretation of his philosophy is correct, I'm just saying that it seems more Postmodern than Pragmatist. — Arcane Sandwich

I think that’s why he added ‘NEO-pragmatist.

What did you think of the book?

How about the "Mirror of Nature"? Sound better? — Arcane Sandwich

It sounds wonderful when used as the foil it represented in Rorty’s book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

We can attend to the world in different ways, paying more attention to certain aspects, configurations, things that seem relevant to us for various reasons and are maximally informative in regard to affording the behavior required to live or do what we want to do. I think all our perception trivially is picking out structures in the world even if it requires some processing to do so (e.g. our ability to sense and engage with 3-dimensional depth in visual space can only be inferred indirectly from 2D visual cues and also information from our bodies). — Apustimelogist

I dont like the metaphor of lens as a depiction of the relation between mind and world. It implies a detached, subjectivist view of how we make sense of the world, as though the information contained in reality is already sitting out there and all we have to do is notice and process it internally. We don’t pick out factual aspects of the world based on relevance for our purposes, we actively do things with the inanimate and social world, and the patterns of our doings forms normative structures of intelligibility and purpose which determine HOW the world appears meaningfully to us, how it ought to be relative to the predictive norms of correctness of fit that are generated from our discursive interactions with it, as well as the pathways by which its intelligibility changes for us over time.

Davidson's point is that the idea of conceptual schemes becomes vacuous once mutual intelligibility is allowed - it is not so troublesome to incorporate a concept you have never heard of before into your own conceptual repertoire. I think Kuhn's notion of paradigms was never about some notion of global unintelligibility but about general underdetermination of the kinds of hypothetical metaphysics that can account for empirical evidence, and local misunderstandings that cause scientists to sometimes talk past each other. — Apustimelogist

The idea of mental scheme vs factual content is vacuous. But if we recognize the performative, enactive nature of sense-making, then we can see why it is the case that when it comes to vitally important aspects of our dealings with each other , on matters such as science, politics and ethics, it is indeed enormously troublesome to incorporate a concept you have never heard of before IF that concept gets its sense from a discursive system of practices that is only peripherally shared by you. No need to blame this on a split between scheme and world, since the world is already directly present in our practices.

Then there's the question of who has interpreted Derrida correctly, at least for the most part. Maybe it's you, Joshs. Why not? — Arcane Sandwich

Correctness doesn't go very far. I like Deleuze’s view of truth:

“… what someone says is never wrong, the problem isn't that some things are wrong, but that they're stupid or irrelevant. That they've already been said a thousand times. The notions of relevance, necessity, the point of something, are a thousand times more significant than the
notion of truth. Not as substitutes for truth, but as the measure of the truth of what I'm saying.” (Negotiations)

Philosophy does not consist in knowing and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure. Now, this cannot be known before being constructed. We will not say of many books of philosophy that they are false, for that is to say nothing, but rather that they lack importance or interest…Only teachers can write “false" in the margins, perhaps; but readers doubt the importance and interest, that is to say, the novelty of what they are given to read.(WIP)

Nietzsche remains the idol of post-pubescent males. Someone to consider and grow beyond. — Banno

Perhaps it’s not Nietzsche one needs to grow out of but a shallow, post-pubescent reading of his ideas and his character. I’ve recently discovered something in Nietzsche’s work that appears to ‘grow beyond’ the current thinking on the relation between affect (emotion, mood , feeling, becoming, value) and truth (perception , cognition, reason, identity, empiricism). The most sophisticated contemporary accounts , like those of Damasio, Prinz, Haidt and Ratcliffe) treat these as a reciprocally causal interaction. Nietzsche, however, sees identity and truth as derivative of difference, affect and desire. Deleuze, Foucault, Heidegger and Derrida are among those who continued to follow Nietzsche’s thinking on this well past their post-pubescent stage.

Heidegger shows how the common notion of time dates back to Aristotle's derivation of time from motion.

“The thoughts of motion, continuity, extension—and in the case of change of place, place—are interwoven with the experience of time.”(basic problems of phenomenology) “ So far as time is kineseos ti, something connected with motion, this means that in thinking time, motion or rest is always thought along with it. In Aristotelian language, time follows, is in succession to, motion.” “Because the now is transition it always measures a from-to, it measures a how-long, a duration.”

Time is making present according to Aristotle, (the present at hand) and in so doing is a counting of time as now, now, now.

“And thus time shows itself for the vulgar understanding as a succession of constantly "objectively present" nows that pass away and arrive at the same time. Time is understood as a sequence, as the "flux" of nows, as the "course of time.”

“The succession of nows is interpreted as something somehow objectively present; for it itself moves "in time." We say that in every now it is now, in every now it already disappears. The now is now in every now, thus constantly present as the same, even if in every now another may be disappearing as it arrives. Yet it does show at the same time the constant presence of itself as this changing thing.”

But mutationem means that it can change, that it can mutate. It has the potential (as in, capax) to do so. It is capable (capax) of it. What is that, if not the Aristotelian concept of potency as matter-in-motion? And this very capacity necessarily entails the reality of time itself. For how could something have the capacity to change, without ever changing? — Arcane Sandwich

What does motion imply if not spatial displacement of a self-identical object over time?

↪Joshs Why do you think that Heidegger's phrase "remanens capax mutationis" is important? Can you explain that? Because it has to do with both the concept of Being as well as the concept of time. I would more or less translate it like this, focusing on its meaning:

"It (Being) remains capable of changing" — Arcane Sandwich

I understand it to mean "something that persists identically in time". Heidegger is defining what he calls the ‘present-at-hand’ (Vorhandenheit), which he contrast with the ready-to-hand’, our comportment toward things in terms of how we use them and what we use them for rather than in terms of their properties and appearance.

Time itself doesn't have past present future. It is us who divide time into those categories depending on what point, and what part of time we want to focus on. — Corvus

It is also us who invented the clock, and it is the clock that doesn’t have past, present and future. It sounds like you’re getting your notion of time from that human invention and then applying it back onto the concept of time, in the process concealing the basis of time in past-present-future. Physics made that same mistake for years, claiming that the phases of time were mere human constructs, and that past, present and future were not intrinsic to physical processes, which could be understood backwards as well as forwards without any effect on the fundamental nature of those processes.

…some scientists and philosophers have proposed that there is no ever-changing now. Instead, all change is illusory. In this way, they use theoretical tools from Einstein's relativity theory to echo pre-Socratic philosophers like Parmenides and Zeno. Going by the name of eternalism, the core notion is that just as the diagrams that display the whole of space-time seem to reflect a timeless reality of being, it is our narrow three-dimensional view of reality that brings forth notions of past and future. In the full glory of four dimensions, there is no time flow. This view is often called the block universe theory: all of space-time is an unchanging four-dimensional block.

Accordingly, all cosmic history and the entirety of the future constitute a single block in four-dimensional space-time, and our experience of time's flow is illusory. In the words of mathematical physicist and philosopher Hermann Weyl, “The objective world simply is, it does not happen.

In Bergson's words: “By adding a dimension [time] to the space in which we happen to exist, we can undoubtedly picture a process or a becoming, noted in the old space, as a thing in this new space. But as we have substituted the completely made for what we perceive being made, we have . . . eliminated the becoming inherent in time.”46 The block universe theory confuses a mathematical picture with what is being pictured; it confuses the map with the territory.

Time's flow is palpable, even if relativity theory shows us that the rate of our flow of time is not universal but rather local to us as observers. Thus, if our goal is to offer a map of reality, we have two options: offer a map that invokes an abstraction to discard the flow of time, or one where the flow of time is an inherent part of our experience and of an unbifurcated nature. What would be the purpose of a map that discards the flow of time? Where does it lead us? Does it help us understand time any better or lead to intractable conundrums? One of the lessons from our discussion of Bergson and Einstein is that there cannot be a temporal bird's-eye view of the universe, one that flies outside and above the disparate paths through space-time and the different rhythms of duration. The block universe theory renounces this insight, pushes physics back into a blind-spot worldview, and remains stuck with the intractable conundrum of being unable to account for the temporality of time —time's passage, its flow, and its irreversible directionality. For these reasons, the block universe theory is essentially regressive. It reinstates the Blind Spot instead of helping us get beyond it.(The Blind Spot)

I don't know Thompsons’s work, but there is something odd in what ↪Joshs quoted, since it wrongly claims Davidson was a realist, then sets out an approach that rejects realism and antirealism in much the way Davidson actually does, but then re-introduces conceptual schemes — Banno

Thompson is simply reiterating Davidson's claim that “with a correct epistemology we can be realists in all departments.”

Two interpreters, as unlike in culture, language and point of view as you please, can disagree over whether an utterance is true, but only if they differ on how things are in the world they share, or what the utterance means. I think we can draw two conclusions from these simple reflections. First, truth is correspondence with the way things are. (There is no straightforward and non-misleading way to state this; to get things right, a detour is necessary through the concept of satisfaction in terms of which truth is characterized.' So if a coherence theory of truth is acceptable, it must be consistent with a correspondence theory. Second, a theory of knowledge that allows that we can know the truth must be a non-relativized, non-internal form of realism.

So if a coherence theory of knowledge is acceptable, it must be consistent with such a form of realism. My form of realism seems to be neither Hilary Putnam's internal realism nor his metaphysical realism. It is not internal realism because internal realism makes truth relative to a scheme, and this is an idea I do not think is intelligible.' A major reason, in fact, for accepting a coherence theory is the unintelligibility of the dualism of a conceptual scheme and a 'world' waiting to be coped with. But my realism is certainly not Putnam's metaphysical realism, for it is characterized by being 'radically non-epistemic', which implies that all our best researched and established thoughts and theories may be false. I think the independence of belief and truth requires only that each of our beliefs may be false. But of course a coherence theory cannot allow that all of them can be wrong.
(Davidson, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge)

As to Thompson re-introducing conceptual schemes, he can’t be doing that since that would imply a representationalist view of the world, which Thompson is rejecting. His approach, like Davidson’s , assumes that language is directly in touch with the world. The key difference between his pragmatism and Davidson’s unconventional realism is expressed in Thompson’s assertion that “the world is both found and made: it is made in the finding and found in the making.”

Davidson rejects the view, held by both metaphysical realists and anti-realists that persons represent the world (scheme vs content) to themselves. Hilary Putnam argues that we all share a single scheme, but, as As Evan Thompson explains

Davidson's conclusion is not that we all share a scheme, but that, since we have been unable to give adequate content to the scheme idea, the idea has no application. As he concludes in another essay, “there can never be a situation in which we can intelligibly compare or contrast divergent schemes, and in that case we do better not to say that there is one scheme, as if we understood what it would be like for there to be more.”

I find Thompsons’s pragmatist pluralism an appealing alternative to Davidson’s non-representationalist direct realism, so I’ll quote his argument here:

We can accept the idea that there is no such thing as a scheme or representational medium interposed between us and the world while making merely the inference that we should not explicate incommensurability by appealing to the dualism of scheme and content. The problem of incommensurability is primarily empirical: it arises in the work of historians, anthropologists, and literary theorists when they attempt to make sense of what seem to be widely divergent systems of belief. We can give up the difference between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world, and yet hold with Whorf that the Hopi way in the world and ours cannot be “calibrated.” Davidson is right to insist that we must assume an overall agreement to make sense of differences in belief. We must concur about all sorts of things, such as that cows eat grass, that snow is white, that people must eat to survive. But Davidson is, in Hacking's words, a “superholist.”~~ (Remember that a Davidsonian theory is meant to interpret all utterances, actual and potential, of a speaker.)

Thus he seems to think that these mundane agreements are enough to preclude incommensurability. I am suspicious of superholism. Feyerabend might have been mistaken in thinking that “there is still human experience, as an actually existing process independent of all schemes”, but he was right, I think, to insist that theories and practices proliferate, and that the connections among them are often loose and chaotic. These loose connections indicate that our everyday, superficial agreements with another may not help all that much in resolving our differences. That possibility is all that is needed, I think, to warrant occasional talk of incommensurability, where incommensurability simply means that one language may have a range of expressions that cannot be translated into another language without remainder. In such a situation, one may have no choice but to learn the foreign range of expressions and incorporate it directly into one's language. (Isn't this all that Kuhn ever really claimed?) What we learn from Davidson is that we need not, and indeed should not, support such an appeal to incom- mensurability with the metaphysical idea of scheme and content. We should instead make the case directly in anthropology, literary theory, and the history of science.

Davidson does seem to think that he has vindicated realism, but I suggest that he has shown us a way of continuing to do philosophy after representation (pace Rorty) and beyond the realist/anti-realist debate. Recall that the philosophical device of the field linguist abstracts not only from cultural conditions in general, but also from the detail of local, pragmatic situations (e.g., problems of understanding within and among the paradigms, disciplinary matrices, and research programmes of a given science). But these conditions and situations are precisely those in which substantial epistemological and hermeneutical issues arise. Davidson's realism cannot address, then, the realistlanti-realist disputes that arise within these situations. Davidson grounds the claim “that knowledge is of an objective world independent of our thought or language” by trying to show that most of our beliefs must be true.

But these true beliefs are the commonsense, everyday beliefs that most people share; they are not, for example, beliefs about particle physics, selection in biology, authorial intention in literature, or representation in painting, Recent anti-realism, however, has not arisen as a challenge to commonsense; it has arisen in cognitive domains of perplexing complexity, such as particle physics and literary theory. Only if one accepts a superholist view of belief and meaning will one suppose that Davidson's defense of commonsense realism is also a gobal vindication of realism. I suggest, therefore, that by adopting the stance of the radical interpreter to achieve a global perspective on belief and meaning, Davidson has shown us how local issues about realism and anti-realism must ultimately be.

I would give up both realism and anti-realism, then, in favour of what could be called a pluralist pragmatism. What the pluralist insists on is that there is no foundational version, one which anchors all the rest or to which all others can be reduced. The pragmatist insists that the world is both found and made: it is made in the finding and found in the making. To erase the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way in the world gives us a fresh appreciation of the world. That world, however, is not given, waiting to be represented. We find the world, but only in the many incommensurable cognitive domains we devise in our attempt to know our way around. The task of the philosopher is not to extract a common conceptual scheme from these myriad domains and to determine its faithfulness to some uncorrupted reality; it is, rather, to learn to navigate among the domains, and so to clarify their concerns in relation to each other.

https://evanthompson.me/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/j-1467-9973-1991-tb00717-x.pdf

I'd sort of agree, although Marxist materialism is a different kettle of fish. — Wayfarer

As is new materialism.
https://www.academia.edu/40986241/WHAT_IS_NEW_MATERIALISM

To me this fits into the American pragmatism of Dewey and so on. Only in transcendental terms
— JuanZu

To me it sounds like that, and it also sounds like Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Augustine.

Heidegger was an intellectual thief. — Arcane Sandwich

Are you saying that his work is more derivative
than these other thinkers?

Is there a Dasien/being-in-the-world binary in Heidegger's philosophy? If there is, then it's just a historicized version of the good old subject-object binary from The Good Old Days. — Arcane Sandwich

For Heidegger , subject implies self-consciousness, S=S. Dasein is neither subject nor world, but the in-between. The self does not pre-exist its world, but is reflected back from what it is involved with.

Heidegger’s notion of temporality deconstructs both subjectivity and objectivity, replacing the subject-object binary with Dasein’s being in the world.
— Joshs

But would he agree that time is inseparable from lived experience? — Wayfarer

Absolutely

Thanks to Heidegger's analysis of Kant's work we have to say that the time we say is subjective is in fact constitutive of subjectivity itself, which determines it as objective or trascendental. This form of time I would say is more fundamental than the one provided by physics (because of the problems that arise when we think of time as a series of discontinuous points that follow one another). — JuanZu

This may be true of Kant’s work on time, but Heidegger’s notion of temporality deconstructs both subjectivity and objectivity, replacing the subject-object binary with Dasein’s being in the world.

The intuition that a phenomenon flows is in conflict with the intuition that the phenomenon is comprised of a sequence of states, as per Zeno's Paradox. So if talk about experience deflates to talk about phenomena, and if the nature of phenomena is relative to how it is attended and phenomena doesn't always flow, then must the existence of phenomena necessitate the a priori existence of a psychological time series? — sime

It isn’t necessary to use a notion of flow to address the necessity of the inclusion of past in the experience of the punctual now. Regardless of whether we attend to a discrete ‘state’ vs a flowing continuum, in either case the ‘now’ we experience includes within it the just past.

↪Joshs I see you're lookong for an education... accepted I was trying to save it for the June 6th thing... but alas those who don't read need to be read to apparently.

Oh, on, second thought, I realize what error your having... because you understand that Nietzsche doesn't believe things exist solely in black and white dualism, that you think opposite ends of the spectrum don't exists. Hehe cute, though it's pretty poor logic to assume spectrums don't have opposite ends. And you have to also understand Nietzsche's use of the term "opposite" when he uses it means "the other end of the spectrum." Not a black and white 180... — DifferentiatingEgg

I want to distinguish two uses of the word ‘opposite’. The first use includes both binary ‘black vs white’ oppositions and differences of degree within a spectrum. What both of these have in common is that they derive the opposition between two things from their mutual belonging to a shared superordinate category, like color. The second use of ‘opposite’ is the one that Nietzsche develops alongside his notion of the Eternal Return. This concept of opposition refers to qualitative differences among things which belong to no shared binary category or spectrum. He embraces this use and rejects the first use of opposition.

Time doesn't exist. Only space and objects exist — Corvus

The experience of any thing is the consciousness of time. When we think or perceive an object , we are synthesizing the ‘now’ of its existence for us as a three-part structure of retention (immediate past), present and protention (anticipation). Without awareness of time there is no awareness of the continuity of the flow of experience. It would be impossible to understand music, for instance, or the spacing of space.

↪ChatteringMonkey He does indeed believe in opposites — DifferentiatingEgg

The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the belief in oppositions of values. It has not occurred to even the most cautious of them to start doubting right here at the threshold, where it is actually needed the most – even though they had vowed to themselves “de omnibus dubitandum.”? But we can doubt, first, whether opposites even exist and, second, whether the popular valuations and value oppositions that have earned the metaphysicians' seal of approval might not only be foreground appraisals. (Beyond Good and Evil)

If anything signifies our humanisation, a true and actual progress, then the fact that we no longer need any excessive oppositions, any oppositions at all . . .

In sum: morality is precisely as 'immoral' as every other thing on earth; morality itself is a form of immorality. The great liberation this insight brings, the opposition is removed from things, the homogeneity of all that happens is rescued - - ( The Last Notebooks)

Freddy seems to me 'an absurdist skeptic of European modernity' (both heir to Epicurus, Spinoza & Voltaire and predecessor of Zapffe, Camus & Rosset). "Some are born posthumously" ... yet, apparently, his protean works have been coopted – mis/appropriated :mask: – by both existentialists and postmodernists (as well as nazi / fascist propagandists). Just my two shekels. — 180 Proof

I recommend Klossowski’s ‘Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle’ for insights into his thinking that may be new to you. You might also enjoy Daniel Smith’s comments on Klossowski’s book.

https://philarchive.org/archive/SMIKRO