But don't simulation or modelling at the end of the day need observation to be meaningful? Simulation and modelling unobserved by humans don't exist, therefore meaningless? — Corvus

Absolutely. Models don't exclude the modeler and the modeled, they unite them.

But don't simulation or modelling at the end of the day need observation to be meaningful? Simulation and modelling unobserved by humans don't exist, therefore meaningless? — Corvus

Also simulation or modeling can only be of that which is observed else it would be simulation or modeling of nothing.

Absolutely. Models don't exclude the modeler and the modeled, they unite them. — Pantagruel

Also simulation or modeling can only be of that which is observed else it would be simulation or modeling of nothing. — Janus

Simulation or modelling are ideal for verification, testing, demonstration and presentation of the theories. However, they still need hypotheses, data collection, and experiments before establishing scientific theories. Whatever the case, they all need observation by humans who record and monitor the process, and simulation and modelling wouldn't replace observation in science.

Whatever the case, they all need observation by humans who record and monitor the process, and simulation and modelling wouldn't replace observation in science. — Corvus

Yes. Bearing in mind that

...the work of observing facts is really done by the senses with assistance from the intellect. What the positivists called ‘observing’ facts is really historical thinking, which is a complex process involving numerous presuppositions
~Essay in Metaphysics

‘observing’ facts is really historical thinking, — Pantagruel

What do you mean by historical thinking?

a complex process involving numerous presuppositions — Pantagruel

Could you elaborate further? What numerous presuppositions for what, and why?

But don't simulation or modelling at the end of the day need observation to be meaningful? Simulation and modelling unobserved by humans don't exist, therefore meaningless? — Corvus

Observation takes place through an apparatus of perception, which includes not just telescopes and microscopes, but conceptual apparatuses of interpretation.

\ This basically says that observation is theory laden, so all thought is the product of its history of conceptualization (including observations). Fundamentally (observation is theory laden) it's a pretty basic concept. Collingwood expands upon it considerably.

:up:

Observation takes place through an apparatus of perception, which includes not just telescopes and microscopes, but conceptual apparatuses of interpretation. — Joshs

Of course there is a sense in which our perceptions are always already interpretations. But we are blind to how the body/brain does that. It is pre-cognitive and so cannot be taken into account.

This basically says that observation is theory laden, so all thought is the product of its history of conceptualization (including observations). — Pantagruel

Observation is historical thinking sounded vague. From the common sense, observation is perceptual act looking for data and collecting data from the phenomenon in the world. Not quite sure what you mean by observation is theory laden either. All thought is the product of its history of conceptualization? It needs explanation as well.

Fundamentally (observation is theory laden) it's a pretty basic concept. Collingwood expands upon it considerably. — Pantagruel

Perhaps you could elaborate further on the points from the original text?

Observation takes place through an apparatus of perception, which includes not just telescopes and microscopes, but conceptual apparatuses of interpretation. — Joshs

This sounds like an abstract waffle. You need to explain it further how and why observation is conceptual apparatuses of interpretation. Why do you need concept and interpretation when you are looking for and collecting data?

Not quite sure what you mean by observation is theory laden either. — Corvus

As I said, it is a well-known concept; there is actually a wiki on it. I would start with that.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory-ladenness

As I said, it is a well-known concept; there is actually a wiki on it. I would start with that.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory-ladenness — Pantagruel

Thanks for the link. Yes, it is an informative content for the point. I agree with the article's point saying

"Theory-ladenness poses a problem for the confirmation of scientific theories since the observational evidence may already implicitly presuppose the thesis it is supposed to justify. This effect can present a challenge for reaching scientific consensus if the disagreeing parties make different observations due to their different theoretical backgrounds."

:up:
This is fundamental to a philosopher like Collingwood, for example, and his notion of "absolute presuppositions," which are the epistemological cornerstone of his metaphysics.

There are also a ton of hits on TPF if you search "theory-laden".

Thank you for your confirmation and information on the point. It is an interesting point in Philosophy of Science and Metaphysics. I feel I learnt something new thanks to this thread. Thanks.

You need to explain it further how and why observation is conceptual apparatuses of interpretation. Why do you need concept and interpretation when you are looking for and collecting data? — Corvus

What motivates and guides the search for and organization of data? How do we determine what is actually data and what is irrelevant?

What motivates and guides the search for and organization of data? How do we determine what is actually data and what is irrelevant? — Joshs

Are they not presupposed in all scientific observations? Reiterating those sounds like just stating the obvious. No scientific observations would be done without all that predetermined and pre-equipped unless they are done by bunch of bird watchers, trainspotters, or sports spectators.

Are they not presupposed in all scientific observations? Reiterating those sounds like just stating the obvious. No scientific observations would be done without all that predetermined and pre-equipped unless they are bunch of bird watchers, trainspotters, or sports spectators. — Corvus

Presuppositions are conceptual in nature. And the kinds of presuppositions necessary to do what I outlined are specific to the particular task. Science isnt monolithic in its methods or presuppositions. Different empirical endeavors develop their own methodological practices, their own criteria for what constitutes data and how to collect and organize it.

Presuppositions are conceptual in nature. — Joshs

Again, it sounds vague. What is your definition of concept? Why are presuppositions are conceptual?
Are all presuppositions conceptual in nature?

It is pre-cognitive and so cannot be taken into account. — Janus

“It” here being observation, and observation is pre-cognitive? If so, I agree, from which follows that “apparatus of perception, which includes (…) conceptual apparatuses of interpretation”, is false.

But I'd suggest there must be account, however mere….that is to say, trivially given…. it may be.

Of course there is a sense in which our perceptions are always already interpretations. — Janus

I would agree with this as well, iff interpretation here is meant as judgement. Experience is the common character of already interpreted perceptions, but not all perceptions result in determined experience, so always interpreted cannot be imposed on experience. Judgement fits both always and already, and….added bonus…judgement is the very epitome of conceptual apparatuses’ functionality.

“It” here being observation, and observation is pre-cognitive? — Mww

"It" denotes how the body/ brain is apparently affected by the environment to produce perceptual experiences. We can tell the scientific story about how that happens, but that account is post hoc. If you would call that pre-cognitive affection "observation' then we would be talking about the same thing.

I would agree with this as well, iff interpretation here is meant as judgement. Experience is the common character of already interpreted perceptions, but not all perceptions result in determined experience, so always interpreted cannot be imposed on experience. Judgement fits both always and already, and….added bonus…judgement is the very epitome of conceptual apparatuses’ functionality. — Mww

I guess it depends on how you intend the word "experience" to be taken. We can say the organism experiences the pre-cognitve affect of the environment and we can refer to the already interpreted perceptions as experiences. It seems to be the "seeing as" which I refer to as "interpretation" that you denote by "judgement"?

Language can be problematic. Meaning is not as transparently obvious as we would like it to be.