Is this true though? I feel like I have a pretty easy time imagining abstract objects without having to attribute extension to them. I don't know if I buy theories that involve propositions as abstract, eternal objects, but I've never really had a problem of conceptualizing them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea of an abstract object didn't exist back then. He was talking about things like cups and trees.

I see what you're saying. I agree.

Hence you will have reasons to conclude that there is no need to suppose that something material passes from objects to our eyes to make us see colors and light, or even that there is something in the objects, which resembles the ideas or sensations that we have of them. In just the same way, when a blind man feels bodies, nothing has to issue from the bodies and pass along his stick to his hand: and the resistance or movement of the bodies, which is the sole cause of the sensations he has of them, is nothing like the idea he forms of them."

In this case, objects stimulate an innate mechanism which leads us to form an idea of the world. Notice that the objects just stimulated the blind man with the stick, but his ideas were inside the whole time. Similar observations apply when Descartes mentions the following:

"But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgement which is in my mind."

Leibniz, on the other hand, replying to Locke, points out:

"The reason why there is no name for the murder of an old man is that such a name would be of little use... ideas do not depend upon names [words with definitions, in this context] ... If a... writer did invent a name for that crime and devoted a chapter to 'Gerontophony', showing what we owe to the old and how monstrous it is to treat them ungently, he would not thereby be giving us a new idea."

We already know the meanings of words, prior to definitions. — Manuel

Oh! I see what you're saying. This is the difference I'm seeing between Descartes and Kant: Descartes is sort of saying that our ideas of the world supervene on our experiences. It's the argument from anatomy. Descartes knew that there are "strings" that flow through the body back to the brain. He thought the world "plucks" these strings and the brain subsequently does something with those pluckings.

Kant points out in the Transcendental Aesthetic that we can't imagine an object that doesn't have spacial or temporal extension. He's borrowing the form of Hume's Bundle Theory argument. If you can't conceive of objects without spacial extension, this shows that you don't learn about space through experience. Knowledge of space and time are a priori. That actually is Copernican! To me, anyway.

Kant points out that aspects of the phenomenon are known to us prior to experience with the world. He lays out clear and persuasive arguments for this. What you do next with that information is up to you.
— frank

As does Descartes, Leibniz and Cudworth — Manuel

I've never thought of Descartes as proving that some of our knowledge of the world is a priori. Nor Leibniz. Could you expand on that?

He also thinks he can’t just ignore it, because he regards it as an unavoidable product of the understanding. — Jamal

The idea that science can be purely empirical is still around. It's this vision of science that Kant and others killed, for philosophers anyway.

I once watched a discussion between Dennett and Krause in which Krause announces that he's an empiricist. Dennett tries to explain that he's not really, and Krause gets this quizzical look on his face. Krause is a scientist who thinks he's discovering the noumena. In other words, once you understand the concept of the noumena, then you can ignore it. Not before.

Kant points out that aspects of the phenomenon are known to us prior to experience with the world. He lays out clear and persuasive arguments for this. What you do next with that information is up to you.

Well I kept having this feeling that there's something wrong with creating a logical argument for physicalism, though I couldn't put my finger on it. But I think you're pointing to it: it's foundation problem. Let me try to put it in words:

A physicalist believes interaction with the world is primal. Logic is a realm of pure abstraction and universality. The physicalist says that realm is abstracted from our constant communication with the world. We ask the world questions, like what do I need to do to ease my hunger? Then I listen for the answer. What is my purpose? I listen for the answer, hoping I'm clear eyed enough to see the truth amidst the wishful thoughts and fears I give life to everyday.

Physicalism has to do with the truth. Give me the answer that has nothing to do with my fantasies. And to find that, I appreciate a little logic, but that's not the final source of truth because logic can also be manipulated to rationalize my fond stories. Look to where the rubber meets the road. That's the beginning of it all. Let the metaphors flow from there.

I think you hit the nail on the head the first time. :grin:
@Banno would be proud.

Maybe physicalism is first and foremost a form of life in Wittgenstein's sense. And he's another who seems to speak truth without rigor. We're in the land of metaphor.

Don't worry! They'll cook it and feed it to the masses. — Wayfarer

The Chinese masses are turning middle-class. There's a threat in that that Chinese communism never had to deal with. They have a learning curve ahead of them. But for now their economy is tanking. The immediate significance of that to me is that the Aussie dollar is dropping relative to all other currencies.

I like that, although it's not a slam dunk for physicalism. It's an excellent expression of the physicalist vibe.

I guess I particularly appreciate it because I've gone back to reading Nietzsche. He has to be taken the same way. None of it amounts to a rigorous argument, but it's more like the truth you find in poetry or maybe even music.

Fooled By Randomness, Nassim Nicholas Taleb. This is philosophy of the market, which touches on philosophy of math. The same author wrote The Black Swan. There's a black swan event brewing in China as we speak.

Agreed. I never meant to the contrary. My original post was supporting methodological naturalism, not physicalism. — Bob Ross

Oh, I see. I thought you were saying they're the same.

Yes, it does. But out of respect for your present thread on physicalism I am trying to not veer too far off topic with a discussion of Phaedo and the problem of interpreting Plato in this thread. — Fooloso4

Thank you.

Phaedo is one of my favorite philosophical works. I also disagree with your interpretation, and indeed your whole take on Plato. But there's always room for diverse views. It creates dynamism in discussions.

If your point is that people with views which do not impede some areas of their naturalistic investigations can still contribute to our knowledge even if those views cannot, then I totally agree. — Bob Ross

My point was that physicalism isn't entailed by empiricism and naturalism.

I would say the most compelling reason to be a physicalist is methodological and not ontological. We simply have only one valid methodological approach: naturalism.

Every advancement we have made into the truth has been empirical, even if it be done from an armchair, and never by educated guesses that are not grounded in empirical evidence. Likewise, it seems, historically speaking, that we assume something we don't understand is supernatural and then learn later it is perfectly natural--which I think counts in favor of methodological naturalism. — Bob Ross

But Berkeley paired empiricism and idealism. Augustine advised methodological naturalism in that he advised people to look first for natural causes before claiming miracles. Augustine was a hardcore idealist like most intellectuals of his day.

Best explanation I've ever heard. Thank you, my friend. :up:

You wanna bring up Aristotelian vs Galilean physics, do it in the OP! — fdrake

I honestly thought it was obvious from the question itself. Oh well.

potential vs actual infinity and whether the limit construction in analysis actually represents the concept of infinity. — fdrake

Instantaneous velocity does touch directly on those issues, so Aristotle. :roll:

Plus you copied my use of "adjacent" you prick.

The answer varies with starting assumptions. Only one set of assumptions leads to the answer 4.

Specifically, you have to pay attention to what's been declared stationary, or what your POV is.

I think Israel would react the same no matter who was in Gaza. I don't think their actions are governed by racism, such that if the Gazans were Dutch, everything would be fine.

Pretty cool!

Anyway, the OP under discussion here was moved because it was lazy and far too brief. OPs need to have more than “x says y, true or false”. — Jamal

I think the appeal of the simple question is that it inspires one to think outside the box for a second. Instead of trying to figure Kant out, do some philosophy yourself. There isn't one right answer to the question. That's what was cool about it.

But I get it. It looked lazy to you.

Perhaps climate change should go to the Lounge as well. Keeping it the main page makes it more philosophy than science? — jgill

And Israel? And Ukraine? And whatever the hell other than philosophy?

I disagree. I think it would be obvious to anyone with a little familiarity with philosophy of math that this question opens up in multiple directions, from contemplation of infinitesimals to set theory.

But wait, NOS said something about Trump. Let me go slam some brain cells together to answer him!

ha. It was supposed to be about instantaneous velocity, finitism, all that stuff

Eh. Who cares.

Yes. But let's talk about Donald Trump instead of philosophy. :up:

Are causes in the world or in the way we describe the world? — Banno

whereof one cannot speak...

If it is a way of thinking, is causation then not a thing in the world but a way of understanding things in the world? — Banno

What does the way we are bound to think have to do with the way the world is?

Schopenhauer wanted to answer that by way of Kant. Wittgenstein says we can't have an answer to that question.

we can't not think in terms of causation by our very nature. — Moliere

Schopenhauer agreed. He called it the law of explanation.

What does this actually tell about the West itself? — ssu

Nothing. Gaza was a giant refugee camp, one of the most densely populated areas on the planet, spewing demoralizing attacks on its neighbor.

The west cautioned Israel not to go overboard attacking Gaza because of all the helpless, innocent people who would suffer or be killed. Israel didn't listen. What was the west supposed to do about it?

:up:

ALL IS ENERGY. — boagie

Not first thing in the morning

Plotinus by Eyjolfur K. Emilsson — Manuel

I read this one! How did you become interested in Plotinus?

:up:

I don't mean given in the sense of something given once and for all without the need for explanation. — JuanZu

Sorry, that's what I meant. "Explanandum" was changed to "explanation" by my autotext. Fixed.

I would simply say that there are phenomena that are given — JuanZu

I think that's similar to saying gravity is an explanandum in its own right. We're just saying it's a given.

I don't think this got the attention it deserves:

The statement that "only physical statements are true" is not a statement in physical terms. It is neither falsifiable nor demonstrable.
— Banno — Banno

This is sort of what Wittgenstein is saying in the Tractatus, right? It doesn't get the attention it deserves because it spoils all the fun. :razz:

Maybe. I just don't see how physicalism differentiates itself from the wider umbrella of naturalism in that case though. I can't think of any reason why objective idealists, dualists, or physicalists couldn't overlap completely on methodology. "Methodological physicalism," seems like a misnomer to me. It seems like it would just be naturalism + a certain set of theory laden ideas. The difference isn't in the methodology, but in contents of the theory ladenness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The physicalist sees a "dead" universe, so to speak. Scientists don't consider the possibility that the universe is alive or developing according to psychological rules. If an idealist looks at the world that way, then yes, that idealist is basically a naturalist.

As a philosophy of mind, I think physicalism has some killer arguments that suggest it gets at least some crucial details right. Physicalist philosophy of mind also doesn't have the same need for reductionism to be coherent, minds don't need to reduce to brains, embodied cognition still works, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Embodied cognition just aims to explain some features of functionality. But I admit that the term kind of irritates me. It's not like we overlooked the relationship between mind and body as we went about discovering how the body works.