I would be surprised if you didn't already know about Chalmer's Hard Problem of Consciousness and the various arguments involved: — Amity

Yes of course. The first step in tackling "the hard problem" is setting out our criteria for explanations in a way that (a) the things we consider explained fit our criteria, (b) the things we consider not explained are not explained because they don't fit our criteria, and (c) our criteria are fashioned in a manner where anyone (reasonably educated/competent), or even perhaps a well-programmed computer, could check whether a putative explanation counts as a legitimate explanation under our criteria, so that we can't just willy-nilly declare things to be explained or not.

I think it's worth asking why are people who think that there's an "explanatory gap" likely to accept explanations that are "mapping between rich conscious descriptions and brain processes"? — Terrapin Station

Because many of them like Chalmers want a science of consciousness where it's taken seriously, and they think there is a strong correlation between brain activity and consciousness, so it would be informative to map that out. Also, I think philosophers like Chalmers would change their mind on the hard problem if science showed them a way the gap might be explained.

Presumably, proponents of the hard problem became convinced there was a gap because of arguments in favor of a gap, so they could become unconvinced. That's how it should work. We should change our views when good arguments/evidence become available.

For those who prefer to conflate mystery (a form of ignorance) and incommensurability, consciousness is a hard problem.

I view the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" as a conceptual mystification, and consciousness (mass noun) as a set of sensitivity-awareness (body-mind) conditions which vary.

For example, human beings may be:
1) Conscious: uninhibited (physiologically unconstrained) and actively aware,
2) Semi-Conscious: inhibited (physiologically constrained) and passively aware, or
3) Non-Conscious: inhibited (physiologically constrained) and unaware.

The hard problem also has to do with the fact that we are trying to understand the very thing we are using to understand anything in the first place. Consciousness is the very platform for our awareness, perception, and understanding, so this creates a twisted knot of epistemology. Indeed, the map gets mixed into the terrain too easily and people start thinking they know the hard problem when they keep looking at the map again! — schopenhauer1

:cheer:

There is, but better mapping/measurements could lead us to clues and reduce the explanatory gap. — Marchesk

As it is, over the last few decades we have a wealth of mapping a la, for example, fMRI correlations with mental events and general mental status (it can help predict mental future mental health issues, for example). Has that helped anyone who buys into the "hard problem" and who thinks there's an explanatory gap come any closer to believing that that's not the case? I don't think so.

The "hard problem" arises due to a combination of (a) a bias against seeing mentality as something physical and (b) bad analysis of what explanations are and what they can and can't do in the first place, and (c) sundry other ontological misconceptions.

If it wasn't, there wouldn't be a hard problem, — Marchesk

Goddammit man, I just explained why there's a "hard problem."

Goddammit man, I just explained why there's a "hard problem." — Terrapin Station

You tried, but I think there's a hard problem without the quotes, and that's why I'm explaining it to you.

One leads to a hard problem and one doesn't. — Marchesk

That strikes me as a bit circular. The hard problem is the reason we are even considering the approach.

An analogy used is that the illusion is like a computer desktop, which is a useful abstraction for users, while the underlying computer system is quite different from the visual interface. — Marchesk

But since, in that scenario, we are the computer desktop, it seems entirely irrelevant (much like the simulation hypothesis, incidentally).

That strikes me as a we bit circular. The hard problem is the reason we are even considering the approach. — Echarmion

Yes, but this is a rejection of the hard problem, while explaining why we mistakenly think there is one.

But since, in that scenario, we are the computer desktop, it seems entirely irrelevant (much like the simulation hypothesis, incidentally). — Echarmion

Yes, the brain is presenting an "interface" to itself. Some people have suggested this is for an greater ability to reflect instead of just automatic responses.

Elaborate. I'm not following this ... — 180 Proof

Chalmers argued that the "problem" could not be solved by reducing the fact of experience to a result of functions:

"When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of explanation fails. What makes the
hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance
of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the
cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination,
categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered
question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple
explanation of the functions leaves this question open."

This is a good observation and the paper goes on to suggest other approaches including the Bateson information parallel between "knowers" and what is known. But if such approaches are possible, the starting point of physical and computational functions that were deemed inadequate for the task at the beginning seem arbitrary in their subtraction from what is possible. I can take away something from the beginning and give it back to myself later on.