Qualia is brute sensation (e.g. seeing green, hearing noise, etc.). Although imagination, and memories probably rely on qualia, etc. they are not the same as qualia. My point was there are other internal states besides just qualia that one can have. And I don't understand why you would be deflating the issue. The very question regarding the Hard Question is to understand how/why internal states are equivalent to brain processes. Anything else is not the world we live in, but P-Zombie world. That is not ours though, so it is a big deal. — schopenhauer1

You confuse me here. Perhaps my confusion confirms my ignorance about the topic? My understanding of the hard problem is that there is "something that it is like" to entertain mental states. This state of affairs, this quality if you like, is what we refer to more generally as the experience of qualia. The feeling of warmth, the colour blue, the memory of a red car, the sight of my child, and so on. When we entertain mental states they are something we can introspect upon - they have some kind of presence. If they did not, we should in a literal sense be in the dark. Our brains can and do compute a vast amount of information for which we have no felt analog. That is also what we assume computers do - undertake complex computations for which there is no felt analog, no inner experience. No qualia. Qualia are all there is, as far as the hard problem goes.

Stanford says:

"The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience. If you are told to focus your attention upon the phenomenal character of your experience, you will find that in doing so you are aware of certain qualities. These qualities — ones that are accessible to you when you introspect and that together make up the phenomenal character of the experience are sometimes called ‘qualia’. C.S. Peirce seems to have had something like this in mind when he introduced the term ‘quale’ into philosophy in 1866."

My proposition is that, on this kind of definition, were mental states not experienced (were they not attended by qualia) they should not require an explanation. There'd be no hard problem and as a consequence no claims for panpsychism.

Everything has a function, in the sense meant by functionalism, which is different from the sense you seem to mean. A function in the sense that it responds to inputs with some output: if you do something to it, it does something in response. The function of a sock or a rock is very trivial, but it still has one. Imagine for clarity that you were programming a simulation and you had to code what such a virtual object does in response to other events in the virtual world: you have to code in that the rock moves in response to being pushed, for example. That’s a kind of functionality. — Pfhorrest

I shall have to leave that as I am not familiar with the concepts. Function for me denotes an active sense of the term - that is, the term "function" in this context describes the state of affairs in which an object or system undertakes an operation where an operation is a causal physical process. A rock being moved by my foot is not a function of the rock, though it might be a function of my foot. A sock sitting on a bed is an object, not a function. It has a function, but derivatively. It can be a member OF a function, but is not A function. So I guess there is a lot more to this question of what constitutes a function.

So you want to say something like that the source of the concept "the rock is hard" is not a predication but an identity? — Banno

I said what I wanted to say in my article: One and the same reality must be the source of both the subject and predicate concepts for the judgement to be true. If one reality elicits <This rock> and a different reality elicits <hard>, the judgement (not concept) <This rock is hard> is unjustified.

You keep saying, despite the text of my article, that I am claiming the subject and predicate are identical. They are not. Perhaps you believe that concepts can only be different if the object eliciting them is different. That is a misconception. One and the same object can elicit many concepts: e.g. <spherical>, <red>, <rubber>, <soft>, <elastic>, etc., etc.

Nor is it at all clear what the source of a concept might be. — Banno

Again, reading my article resolves this: "If we are aware of feeling a stone, we can abstract the concept <hard>. Then, being aware that the identical object elicits both <the stone> and <hard>, we link these concepts to judge <the stone is hard>, giving propositional knowledge." (p. 110) Clearly, the stone we are feeling is the source of the relevant concepts.

Concepts are sometimes erroneously conceived of as mental furniture, as things inside the mind to be pushed around, repositioned in different arrangements. Concepts are sometimes better understood as abilities than as abstract objects. There then need be no discreet concept of "hard" situated somewhere in the mind, or in the brain, but instead a propensity to certain outputs from a neural net, which includes the construction of certain sentences such as "this rock is hard" - along connectionist lines. — Banno

I have taken none of these positions. I said, "the concept <apple> is not a thing, but an activity, viz. the actualization of an apple representation’s intelligibility." (p. 109). Surely, you will agree that we have neural representations and are aware of some of their contents.

Indeed, I'll offer connectionist models of representation as far superior to a regression to Aristotelian models. — Banno

You seem to think that connectionism is an alternative to my analysis. It is not. I have no fundamental problem with connectionism. In fact, I invoked it to make one of my points (p. 99). What connectionism tells us, if true, is how representations are generated, instantiated and activated. It does not even attempt to explain how we become aware of the contents they encode -- how their intelligibility becomes actually known.

You have a blind spot in respect of the issue at hand. 'Facing up to the hard problem of consciousness' is not trivial or redundant, but a statement about the inherent limitations of objective, third-person science with respect to the nature of first-person experience. — Wayfarer

First of all,made up pseudo philosophical ''why" problems are not "hard problems". The Evaluations of the quality of an experience is not a problem from our objective investigation of the mechanisms responsible for our ability to be conscious aware of our experiences.
i.e. we know that memories are stored in specific areas of the brain and we can become consciously aware of them (experience them) through the ability an extended brain mechanism to bring them "online"( connect them with others areas where Symbolic language, pattern recognition etc are store) and produce a meaningful experience of "remembering something" conscious state.
The ACTUAL content of that memory(conscious state) is IRRELEVANT to our investigation and understanding on how the brain does it.
Subjective is only the quality of the experienced state by an individual. The study of the mechanism responsible for retrieving "material" from a specific mental property (memory, old thought,biological stimuli (pain, thirst hunger),pattern etc) and sharing it with the rest of the stored properties in order to produce an experience is OBJECTIVE. This is why we found thousands of publications on mechanisms responsible for specific functions in a mental state.

The great thing is that we already have the technology to decode the content of an active conscious state allowing us to compare and identify common mechanisms in brains.

Jerome Feldman isn't a Neuro or Cognitive scientist and even if he was his ideas would never render "why" questions on the quality of our subjective conscious awareness of our experiences a problem for our Objective study of brain mechanisms - enablers of the conscious awareness of our experiences.

So, contrary to all of the journal articles that you continue to cite, the subjective unity of perception, which is a major aspect of the 'hard problem', remains unexplained, and indeed inexplicable, according to this paper, which essentially provides scientific validation for the argument made in Chalmer's original article. — Wayfarer

No it doesn't. Chalmer's asks Why questions. ITs like asking "why the intense wobbling of molecules is perceived as heat by our brains"....the answer will always be "BECAUSE"....... and Marc Solms through his new Theory on Consciousness will add "because it has evolutionary advantages to feel uncomfortable when your biology is exposed to a situation that has the potential to undermine your well being and your "being".
Chalmers's focuses on the wrong aspect of the problem. Anil Seth explains in detail why there is no value in trying asking "why" questions on the quality of the phenomenon. Its far more useful to find the mechanisms responsible and the "forces" that shaped their functions.
This is the only way to find how conscious states emerge, how they are affected and how we can improve them.
We have being doing it for decades, this is why we have Medications on psychopathology, this is why we have Brain Surgery protocols for different pathologies and this is why we can make Diagnosis (predictions) based on the physical condition of the organ (brain imagine).

The debate is over.....and philosophers didn't get the memo
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8121175/

Thanks for the link. I guess I was trying to explain consciousness in physical terms. How does one explain brain damage and the subsequent loss of mental capacity in non-physical terms?

What is argument for a non-physical consciousness? — TheMadFool

I find it strange that some people cannot see what I can. But perhaps that indicates the point I am trying to make. We may all have the same brain structures but there is a difference in our level of awareness and subjective assessment of the world and ourselves. And that can affect our objectivity and sense of identity over time.

I think it common sense that humans are more than just skin, bone, and connections. Why do philosophers give themselves such a hard time...

Here is link which explains the effects of brain damage in terms other than physical matter:

https://www.headway.org.uk/about-brain-injury/individuals/effects-of-brain-injury/

'...For some people, the emotional, behavioural, physical and cognitive changes after brain injury can have an impact on existing and future relationships. There are a number of ways in which this can happen and a number of different outcomes. Some relationships may strengthen, whereas others may become strained over time or even completely break down...'

In my view, as a physicalist and a nominalist who doesn't buy genidentity (identity through time) — Terrapin Station

So you identify as a physicalist and a nominalist. I am not sure what that entails. What does this mean to you, when and how did you decide ? Did it change your way of life ?

I would be surprised if you didn't already know about Chalmer's Hard Problem of Consciousness and the various arguments involved:

https://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

'Explaining why consciousness occurs at all can be contrasted with so-called “easy problems” of consciousness:  the problems of explaining the function, dynamics, and structure of consciousness.  These features can be explained using the usual methods of science. 

But that leaves the question of why there is something it is like for the subject when these functions, dynamics, and structures are present.  This is the hard problem...'

ur brains can and do compute a vast amount of information for which we have no felt analog. That is also what we assume computers do - undertake complex computations for which there is no felt analog, no inner experience. No qualia. Qualia are all there is, as far as the hard problem goes. — Graeme M

This is the difference between cognition and behavior. It is doubtful most computers are cognizant, but certainly they perform behaviors which might be called "processing". These presumably come with no internal states, however. The exact problem here is how processing is internal states.

Qualia are all there is, as far as the hard problem goes. — Graeme M

Again, imagination, introspection of any sort on any feelings, awareness of something, remembrance, future projections, etc. These are all introspective inner qualities that are more than just qualia. Imagine a friend right now. That is more than just qualia. You are actually reconstructing a whole set of things beyond simply colors, sound, feel, etc. Qualia are simply sensations. Unless you think all introspection is just sensations, then this is wrong. As I stated before, sensations may be a necessary part of the all introspection, but not sufficient to account for all of it.

My proposition is that, on this kind of definition, were mental states not experienced (were they not attended by qualia) they should not require an explanation. There'd be no hard problem and as a consequence no claims for panpsychism. — Graeme M

Even if you reduced the idea of inner experience to the term "qualia", then qualia would simply encompass all the phenomena I mentioned, and yes, this still would have to be accounted for. It is not like this minimizes the problem, it just encompasses everything under one term.

To be conscious is to have existing states of conciousness which are caused by other things. It's just a causality, like rain making paper soggy.

In this case, we have some states which are not concious experience interacting to create a new existing state, a conscious state. No hard problem. — TheWillowOfDarkness

A. If by ''conscious'' you mean meta-consciousness (the ability to self-reflect; abstract), and if by ''not conscious experience'' you mean qualia - you end up with the panpsychist so-called combination problem - how come small blocks of consciousness come together and form a higher consciousness.

B. If by ''not conscious experience'' you mean 0% consciousness (no qualia, no thought, no nothing you could associate with consciousness), then why did you use the word ''experience"? In this case, you've got the hard problem: how do you end-up with consciousness from combining things with 0% consciousness?

It seems to me from what you're saying that it's impossible to avoid either the hard problem or the combination problem.

1. More of a personal one - when I was 18 and didn't care about absolutely anything except for having fun, I thought about God for around 5 minutes and I actually came to a conclusion pretty similar to Spinoza's. It was ''something we could not comprehend''. ''He is everything - both finite in infinite; self-created; it's both different and the same with the Universe; etc.''. Of course, for me it wasn't something I had contemplated before, I guess I just wanted a God who includes everything and in which everyone could find his own truth. And that's the thing: I think Spinoza left too much space for interpretations.

2. Let's start from the following premise: I think the hard problem is real. I believe it's impossible to get consciousness from something with 0% consciousness. I also believe the composition fallacy is real. Starting from this premise, I just want to know if there's an interpretation of Spinoza in which you can get consciousness from something with 0% consciousness, intention, or will even if the hard&combination problems are true. If that's possible, then how? And when I'm saying how, I don't want an answer explaining me how the hard problem is false, I want something that passes the hard problem undetected.

I've been following this thread (and thanks to the learned exponents who have taken the time to spell out the detail.) I too find Spinoza quite difficult to understand, but I think your specific problem is you're looking at the issue through a 20th century mindset without being aware of the way that attitude conditions the kinds of questions you're asking and therefore the kinds of answers you're looking for.

We're separated from Spinoza by centuries of rapid intellectual change, and this conditions the way that we think about the nature of mind, the nature of matter, and so on. The way we think about it today is very different to how such questions were understood then - one of the main challenges with reading philosophy, generally.

There's a useful article on the understanding of 'substance' in 17th C philosophy https://iep.utm.edu/substanc which among other things gives a primer on the concept of 'substance and modes' in Descartes, Liebniz and Spinoza.

There's a paragraph in that article which I have always found crucial:

Degrees of Reality

In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more real or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is. Given that there are only substances and modes, and that modes depend on substances for their existence, it follows that substances are the most real constituents of reality.

Bearing in mind here that 'substance' is a translation of the Aristotelian 'ouisia' - 'substance' is definitely not 'a kind of matter with uniform qualities' but 'the bearer of attributes'. It would be nearer in meaning to either 'subject' (as in, 'subject of experience') or 'being'. So here we see at least an echo of the medieval 'chain of being', with the divine intellect (God) at the top of the hierarchy, with the rational intellect being below that but in some sense also reflecting it. This was not so much an articulated premise as an underlying assumption.

Besides that, the Damasio book which @180 Proof mentioned previously might be a useful bridge between Spinoza and modern thinking on neuroscience.

I myself am interested in Chalmers' 'hard problem of consciousness' argument, and furthermore believe that Chalmers is on the right side of that argument against his materialist opponents (e.g. Dennett). But I think the whole 'hard problem of consciousness' debate is more relevant in respect of the implications of Descartes' dualism. I think you're looking at the issue through a 'post-Cartesian' perspective, which is why you're finding it so hard to understand (not that it isn't hard to understand!)

I think there is not just one "hard problem" but four.
1. the one Chalmers concentrates on..how does physical activity generate sensations or qualia. Maybe this one is not that hard. It is clear that certain physical vibrations or energy deterministically generates sounds and colors. I would assume something like this also happens in the brain.
2. This may be the most "hard problem". How are the different sense modalities bound together into a single conscious entity. I think that Chalmers and most philosophers make a critical error here by assuming that problem number one comes first and number two second so that qualia are first created and then bound together into a unity. I think number two comes first and has no dependence on number one. Conscious entities exist and are fundamental aspects of the universe. We can say that all animals (even single celled protozoa) are conscious and come with the inherent ability to sense qualia in there environment.
3. This and the next problem are ignored entirely by Chalmers. Conscious entities are efficacious. If they were not so we would not be having this discussion. Given the existence of quantum physics and probability waves I dont think this is such an impossible idea anymore.
4. What is called indexicality. Why I am I me and not you. Even if we concede that points of view or perspectives exist in the world, why am I this one particular point of view. Nagel pointed out that even in a world where everything is understood objectively this one very important fact would be missing.
see: https://philpapers.org/rec/SLETLO-2

But we don't need a justification to ignore the hard problem. We can just concentrate on the easier problems regardless. It's not like the hard problems presents any barrier to physical research. — Echarmion

You don't need a justification to ignore any philosophical problem. You can just do it. Same with math, history, unsolved crimes, etc. But some people will continue to be interested in those puzzles and want to solve them. Even some scientists. Why does it matter at all? Because the hard problem potentially alters what we think about the world and ourselves. But again, you can ignore that if you want.

Thank you for the considered response. It does strike me that all this is being done by - as you put it - swapping words. I'm not sure those words are having the same power on me as they are having on you.

In relation to the mind body problem it seems to be a problem for idealists but not naturalists. A problem in as much as 'physicalism' seems to be its target. The ontology held seems to generate the type of argument and its resolution. Which may partly be your point.

I observe the cup on the table and there before me in the appearance is the reality. — Constance

But you are only able to say this from the perspective you have chosen. For many philosophers there remains a Kantian distinction between appearance and reality as it is in itself. Can we just make this go away simply by using different words or concepts? How is this different to saying that we can solve the problem of the origin of life just by saying God created it? It's only solved if God is 1) real and 2) God created life.

If I say from now on I am a monist, that very act does not do away with the hard question even if it satisfies me, right?

But maybe I've missed something in your response?

You are missing his point. Rotating a cube in your mind is a phenomenon. Physiological/biological processes are a phenomenon. They are correlated. Yet that correlation, while no one is doubting its correlation through observation, has it such that a completely new kind of phenomena takes place that is different from all the other physical phenomena — schopenhauer1

-Yes that is his point and I am not saying he is not making that point. I am only saying that his objections are hugely misinformed! All Emergent properties BY DEFINITION do NOT share the same characteristics with mechanisms responsible for their "existence".
Physiological/biological processes are emergent phenomena. life,Metabolism, mitosis,self organization, Photosynthesis etc are emergent properties irrelevant how amazing or impossible they appear to us!

Again, Science doesn't arrive to conclusions through simple correlations. The systematic and methodological nature of Science allow us to identify Strong Correlations between a low level mechanism and its high level features even in complex biological systems. This is what makes those Strong Correlations capable to produce Meaningful Descriptions, Accurate Predictions and Technical applications.!

That is, it is the fundamental phenomena of qualitative-ness/ experiential-ness. — schopenhauer1

You are using way to many abstract concepts for your statement to make any meaning. I will try to break it down in known processes. "Yes the ability of the brain to receive internal or external stimuli through the workings of a complex sensory system and to reflect upon them through the unique biological setup of an organism and a large list of mental properties(memory, reasoning, imagination, symbolic language, pattern recognition etc) renders its role fundamental for our ability to experience the qualities of the worlds subjectively.

That such a unique thing exists that is so different than all the physical phenomena is the question. — schopenhauer1

All emergent phenomena are different from any other phenomenon. i.e. Cellular Self Organization is a unique feature! We just cherry pick the phenomenon experience to produce our narrative for our "special nature" or to justify our death denying ideologies.

Why should neural networks be correlated with qualatitiveness? — schopenhauer1

-Again, "why" questions are not good questions when it comes to understand Natural phenomena.
Neural Networks enable mental properties(like conscious experiences) to emerge. The subjective nature of our conscious experiences depends on:
1.our biological setup. i.e. A super taster(one with a huge number of taste buds on his tongue) finds the experience of spicy foods really bad compared to people with a smaller number of taste buds.
2.our previous experiences. i.e throwing up a meal for irrelevant reasons will make us hate that taste.
3. Physiological Anomalies. Eyes lacking specific color rods are unable to accurate convey the actual information of energy carried by a photons.
Childhood experiences are stronger, stress affects our ability to store info, feelings enhance our abilities to store memories, hormones and receptors work different on different individuals so people tend to experience things differently based on how their limbic system works and whether they had positive or negative childhood experiences.
We can NOT provide answers to those questions without proper scientific knowledge on the relevant mechanisms.

A purely physical description would simply be some sort of behaviorism. — schopenhauer1

-That is a false conclusion.First all we haven't verified any other realm so a physical description is the only thing we can evaluate. Such a description could NEVER be an ism (since it is a description)....It can only be Science.

. It would be like AI that has no qualitative experience but has inputs and outputs. But that's not the case, we have experience. — schopenhauer1

That's a wrong example. AI works on algorithms. We on an other hand work on emotions reasoned in to feelings which in turn inform our Actions.
Mark Solms, the founder of Neuropsychoanalysis in his latest Theory explains how emotions fuel our states and how advanced mental properties like Symbolic language and previous knowledge and experience introduce meaningful content in our conscious experiences.

You can play ignorant hobbit, and say we don't need to explain that, but then you are just pouting that it is such a hard question and then delegitimizing it because of its difficulty. — schopenhauer1

You are not listening , I am not saying "we don't need to explain that". I am only pointing out that "amazing properties" are what matter is capable off. The bigger the complexity of the structure and function is the more advanced these emerging properties get.
Asking ''why'' matter is capable of this thing is a nonsensical question. IF you have a way or a method to go beyond the physical realm (if of course there is a "beyond") and study whatever (if) lies beyond then be my quest.
From the moment you are unable to verify or study anything beyond the Physical realm, you are doomed to speculate without epistemology....and Philosophy without epistemology is Pseudo Philosophy.

Well, poo poo, it is a quite difficult question, and thus will remain a thorn in the side of your sour grapes that it cannot be explained. — schopenhauer1

Again these questions are not hard, they are fallacious (poisoning the well).
Its a huge argument from ignorance fallacy too...since they "create" a fake unknown and they use it as an excuse to introduce magic as a potential answer.

My answer is "we don't know" we can only observe empirical regularity in our Strong Correlations. Specific structures of Matter appear as Necessary and Sufficient for these phenomena .
You on the other hand claim...because we can not prove 100% the ultimate ontology of the phenomenon(ignorance fallacy) and because the phenomenon seems to us completely different (personal incredulity fallacy) we are justified to assume additional dimensions ,realms and agents (argument from magic).
The truth is that biology is not the smallest scale of our world. Its bigger than the quantum scale and the molecular scale. Phenomena like the mind can only emerge in this larger scale (biology).

So there is no reason to assume hidden scales or dimension and reject our current Scientific Paradigm just because we ask the wrong questions.

But to make the problem go away by simple fiat that philosophical inquiry just sucks is not going to do anything other than show your feeling about it. — schopenhauer1

Please, don't project your personal motivation!.I am not the one who really needs to have an answer even if it means to invent a completely new substrate (its not wise to attempt to answer a mystery with a bigger mystery). My approach is cold, scientific and in total agreement with the basic rules and principles of science.
The moment to assume an additional dimension/substance/agent as necessary and sufficient is ONLY after we manage to demonstrate its existence and role...not a second sooner.

I don't know the answer to the hard question obviously. But what I do know is that there is a hidden dualism in materialist assumptions. — schopenhauer1

For that...you will need to talk to materialists. I am not a materialist but a Methodological Naturalist. I reject all metaphysical worldviews and I try to keep out from our epistemology and working hypotheses all metaphysical artifacts that can't be falsified.
And yes I know you don't know the answer of the "hard question" because it doesn't have an answer. Its a "why" question. Teleology is useless when we are trying to understand natural phenomena.

Emergence/integration/binding it doesn't matter your phrasing, it is all stand ins for "magical experience takes place". You are always thus jumping from category physical to category mental activity. — schopenhauer1

-This doesn't make sense. Pls read about Scientific Emergence and Complexity science. It will help you understand the differences between Pragmatic Necessity ( to accept a empirical regular phenomenon without making ontological questions) and Idealistic preferences (making up claims for an assumed underlying ontological mechanism).
In Methodological Naturalism we don't accept made up Substances to explain a phenomenon. We know for decades now its a waste of time. Phlogiston , Miasma, Orgone energy etc etc derailed our efforts to understand the world by assuming these agents responsible for the phenomena in question.
We identify our limits in our observations and within the realm accessible to us we try to construct the best descriptions we can.
Materialists might say "there is nothing beyond Matter" , idealists might say "there is mind beyond matter"....Methodological Naturalists say who cares with your unfalsifiable stories...lets do science and provide justification to our knowledge claims.

You are always thus jumping from category physical to category mental activity. — schopenhauer1

Mental Activity is contingent to physical structure and function. Without the latter you can not have the first.
What may lie beyond our observations is something that both Materialists and Idealists need to justify free from fallacies before bringing their ideologies in Philosophy.

The assumption is simply just put there because we know indeed we experience. Nothing is explained otherwise as to the nature of this "experience" other than it is correlated with these physiological correlations. — schopenhauer1

-You need to study Neuroscience before making those false claims. Again don't talk about "correlations" . Science systematicity doesn't deal with simple correlations.

No, again, that is not ontologically how they are one and the same, just that these physical processes correlate to these experiential ones. Those are indeed the easy problems Chalmers mentions. — schopenhauer1

We Shouldn't care for any assumed, untestable metaphysical ontology.We only care about the observable ontology that enables a phenomenon to manifest in our realm.
You don't know and have no way to prove the existence of an underlying ontology so it is irrational to keep pushing this ideology on the excuse "conscious experience appear to be magical"!

Experience the very thing which observes the other phenomena. How is it this is the biological/physical substrate, and if it "arises" from the physical substrates, "what" is this "arising"? — schopenhauer1

-Be aware of your bad language mode since it derails and pollutes your train of thought. Experience is NOT an agent. Its a label we put on a biological process where sensory systems feed stimuli to the brain and the brain process them in to meaning through the consumption of metabolic molecules and by achieving connections to different brain areas specialized on different properties of mind..
Again you are asking "Why" questions and that is a fallacious practice.
Those questions do not address the same thing with what science tries to explain.
They go beyond our verified realm and ask questions on unobservable and unverifiable ontologies.
This is Pseudo philosophy.

Again, you erroneously imply that I deny the role of Brain in Mind functions. — Gnomon

Sorry, that was not intended to target you in general, more the general idea some have in this thread.

What we call "mind" is the immaterial function of a physical brain. — Gnomon

I have no problem with the metaphysics description and the use of words that do not lean on the physical. My concern is that it should not be forgotten that it is all physical at its core.

That's the problem with Materialism, it looks for empirical evidence of something that is immaterial. The only evidence of Mental Functions is philosophical inference. — Gnomon

I agree. I've noted several times that it is currently impossible to objectively evaluate someone else's subjective experience. But do note that this problem does not go away even if we remove science. Any attempt, be that metaphysical, idealist, etc., falls prey to the same criticism. Such language is fine to describe our emotions and feelings, but it will never be objective.

You may not think Darwin was asserting something unbelievable, but most of his contemporaries did, because they were convinced of a different belief system. — Gnomon

My point is not whether a person agrees with beliefs or not. My point is whether they are open to looking at the facts, even those that challenge their beliefs, and determine whether their beliefs hold true in the face of the evidence. Trust me, I challenge belief systems all the time, including my own. I'm sure some members despise me for it. :) Often times I don't communicate in the 'meta' of philosophy, and that really bothers some people. I have read and formally studied many different philosophies, and I have found that to think freely, you need to not be unduly constrained by communities or habits.

A person being constrained by their beliefs is not the same as a person proposing new, undeniable facts that invalidate that belief. If you can show me undeniable facts that demonstrate something which exists apart form matter and energy, I'm very open to it.

And this is not a problem. This is the limit of what we can measure today, and we take what is most reasonable from that analysis.
— Philosophim
I agree. Yet Reasoning is not empirical, but philosophical. A Paradigm Shift is a change of perspective on the evidence. :cool: — Gnomon

I agree that it is both. Empirical evidence without logic or reason leads to nothing new. We must have a strong sense of skepticism in any claim, and require logic and evidence. New perspectives should always be brought forward, but they must be tested against the hard rock of existence.

PS___ I appreciate your respectful skepticism. It forces me to tighten-up my own reasoning. And to find new ways to describe an emerging new paradigm of Philosophy and Science. — Gnomon

I really appreciate your viewpoints as well Gnomon! I'm glad you're not taking my points the wrong way. I greatly enjoy chatting with thinkers like yourself, and I think you're setting up your language and approach to science and consciousness that is palatable to someone like myself.

I have never quite understood arguments that end up with the conclusion that Consciousness is an Illusion. In my way of thinking an Illusion is something that doesn't really exist. The Red Experience certainly Exists. So how do Physicalists understand the meaning of the word Illusion? — SteveKlinko
I'm not sure I've done enough reading of the Physicalist boffins to answer for them. But years back asked a big-time Zen teacher why Buddhists said we all live in the 'Maya' world of illusion - when there was so obviously correspondences beween the world and my experiences of it. He said, yes a material world does exist but it's SO different from how we perceive it that we more accurately should say we're living in an illusion. — Kym

I completely agree with that interpretation of Illusion in that we never really experience the External World directly but only through our internal Conscious representation of the External World. Our Internal Conscious experiences are Surrogates for the External phenomenon. The Zen interpretation seems at least to admit that the Illusion experience is at least Something. But the way I understand how the Physicalists use Illusion is to try to minimize the Conscious phenomenon and make it go away. They say Consciousness is an Illusion and doesn't really exist so there's nothing that we even need to study here. No Explanatory Gap and no Hard Problem.

But the way I see it, the experience of the color Red (Redness) is a real phenomenon that needs to be Explained. Redness is a Conscious phenomenon not a Physical phenomenon. I like to say that Physical Red Light has Wavelength and other Properties that exist in the normal Physical Space that Science can explain. I also say that Conscious Red Light (the thing we actually experience) has Redness and other Properties that exist in some as yet unexplained Conscious Space that Science does not know how to deal with yet. We should think about Conscious Space, at this point, as just a tool that gives Conscious phenomena a place to exist for the sake of discussion. Think about the Redness of Red. It must be explained. It does not exist in Physical Space but only in Conscious Space. If Science can show that Conscious Space is part of Physical Space then the Hard Problem will be solved. But up to this point Science has not shown that. The Hard Problem remains.

I think calling Conscious experience an Illusion is very misleading and counter productive for understanding Consciousness. Consciousness is not an Illusion but is rather a whole different realm of Phenomena that are unexplained by Science at this point.

Yes, things aren't always as they seem. We agree on that. However the distinction doesn't imply dualism (i.e., of ontologies or worlds). Adopting dualism is a philosophical choice. — Andrew M

Right, dualism is just one possible answer to the hard problem. So let's say that you're right and there is no hard problem. So how would you decide whether a robot was conscious? What would sonar experience be like? Can Earth as a combined swarm of human activity hear its busy cities? Would a perfect recreation of your brain in software experience pain? What do X-Rays look like? What would the world look like in 5 primary colors? What does carbon monoxide smell or taste like? How many different kinds of experiences can there be?

If there is no hard problem, we should be able to reach scientific or philosophical consensus on those types of questions.

The hard problem also has to do with the fact that we are trying to understand the very thing we are using to understand anything in the first place. Consciousness is the very platform for our awareness, perception, and understanding, so this creates a twisted knot of epistemology. Indeed, the map gets mixed into the terrain too easily and people start thinking they know the hard problem when they keep looking at the map again! — schopenhauer1

It isn't so surprising that the hard problem is unsolvable when the capacity to give an account attempting to solve it apparently undermines any account.

Yes, but this is a rejection of the hard problem, while explaining why we mistakenly think there is one. — Marchesk

But does it really explain, in the sense of giving additional information? What is it that Illusionism says beyond "the hard problem is an illusion?"

Yes, the brain is presenting an "interface" to itself. Some people have suggested this is for an greater ability to reflect instead of just automatic responses. — Marchesk

And what are the implications, other than that the hard problem doesn't exist?

Difference between epistemology and ontology. Hard problem raises the possibility that the ontology of the world is dualistic, but it also raises an epistemological question of whether we can know what the nature of consciousness is. — Marchesk

You have it backwards. The hard problem is the product of the dualists own making by positing two different substances with no means for them to interact. How does meat generate meatless illusions? There is no hard problem for a monist.

"The Hard Problem" is only "hard" for philosophers because philosophizing, as Witty et al point out, does not explain matters of facts, but only describes (or, as per Deleuze, re/creates) concepts – interpretations of facts (& practices). The so-called "problem" of the 'explanatory gap' is a scientific – testable hypothesis-modeling – problem, various solutions to which have been proposed and the latest are still being further developed by e.g. Giulio Tononi (ITT), Thomas Metzinger (PSM), Antonio Damasio (SMH & CST), Sebastian Seung (CT), Stanislas Dehaene (GWT), R.S. Bakker (BBT & HNT) ... Those are among the 'models' I currently find most promising. I just can't take serious mysterians like Chalmers (or other panpsychists) who propose that the 'explanatory gap' is a "hard problem" for philosophy, which it is not, because philosophy itself is not (equipped to effectively engage) in the 'theoretical explanation' business.

If you feel that Spinoza should have known of the "hard problem" then either you think he was wrong or you believe he thought God was conscious — Gregory

Let me present it from a different angle. For the sake of the argument, let's assume the hard problem and/or the combination problem are both true. In this case, in your interpretation of S, can spinozism still resist?

For example, in TheWillowOfDarkness's view, if the hard problem is true, then spinozism is wrong.

I don't think your depiction of it is mistaken, but it's not the whole story. Recall a salient passage from the original paper:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. — David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

What I think Chalmers is actually trying to convey by 'something it is like...' is, simply, being. Being, and what it means to be, is surely one of the major preoccupations of philosophy (and much else besides) although it's not always explicit - for Heidegger questioning the meaning of being is philosophy. (And I do wonder whether eliminative materialism is in some ways a manifestation of what Heidegger called 'the forgetfulness of being'.)

Another point I'd make is that there is the study of consciousness as an object of analysis - which is cognitive science - which I'm interested in, and trying to get a better understanding of. And cognitive science and philosophy definitely converge in a lot of ways. But the philosophical question about the nature of the mind (a term I prefer to 'consciousness') is broader, and deeper, than the specific questions which are the subject of cognitive science. That is reflected in Chalmer's distinction between the easy and hard problems of consciousness. And you find within cogsci, there are those with different philosophical aims, views, objectives. They will agree on some things - methodologies, empirical facts - but differ in others, such as intepretation, what conclusion to draw from the facts.

But at the bottom of it, the fact is that the subject of experience - you and I - are not reducible to objects - which is what neuroreductionism, as a philosophical attitude, tends to do.

I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” he said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable? — Daniel Dennett

I think there's a completely unambiguous answer to that: we are not robots, or machines, or even simply organisms, but beings, and a science that doesn't understand that is a risk to humanity. You never know what you, or the person next to you, is capable of being, or becoming.

If non-physicals are showing up you should observe they always can be mapped to a physical brain in location and time. — Mark Nyquist

Not so. That is where the 'multiple realisability' argument comes into play. This concept, which emerged in the philosophy of mind, argues that a particular mental state, like pain, can be realized by many different kinds of physical states across varied organisms. In other words, different physical configurations can all give rise to the same mental experience.

The significance of this theory lies in its challenge to reductionist views, particularly those in the realm of mind-brain identity theory. This theory posited that each mental state is identical to a specific physical state of the brain. However, the multiple realizability argument suggests that this one-to-one correspondence is overly simplistic. Since different organisms with different physical makeups can all experience something like pain, it implies that a mental state cannot be directly and exclusively equated with a specific physical state.

But it can also be extended to the idea that propositional content can be correlated against brain states. The argument of brain-mind identity theorists, who posit that every thought or mental state is identical to a brain state, faces major difficulties when dealing with semantic content. The core challenge is this: while neuroscience can identify and map various brain activities and states, it struggles to find a direct and consistent correspondence with the semantic content of thoughts or propositions. This issue arises partly because thoughts and propositions are abstract, involving meaning, context, and interpretation, while brain states are physical, observable phenomena.

There are several reasons why mapping semantic content to brain states is challenging:

Variability Across Individuals: Different individuals may have different neural activations for the same thought or proposition. This variability makes it hard to pinpoint a universal brain state corresponding to a specific thought.

Context and Interpretation: The meaning of a proposition can change based on context, individual understanding, and interpretation. This subjective aspect of semantic content is difficult to capture in the objective framework of brain states. (This is the subject of the discipline of semiotics.)

Complexity of Language and Thought: Language and thought are highly complex and dynamic. The same proposition might involve different cognitive processes depending on factors like language proficiency, attention, or prior knowledge.

The Problem of Qualia: There's also the issue of subjective experience or qualia. How a person experiences understanding a proposition might not be directly translatable to a measurable brain state.

And to top it all off, it is recognised that the subjective unity of consciousness - the fact that we're aware of ourselves as unified subjects of experience - is not something that neuroscience has been able to account for. This is called the neural binding problem.

Which brings us back to the problem of consciousness.

True, but this is true for almost every interpretation of quantum mechanics. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As far as we know, none of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics can be verified even in principle. They are all equivalent. There is no difference except, perhaps, a metaphysical one.

Right, but this is true of virtually all of quantum foundations. Mach famously held that atoms were unfalsifiable and unscientific. Quarks were held to be unfalsifiable pseudoscience until just a few years before they were "verified." Lots of elements of string theories are unfalsifiable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Unverified is not the same thing as unverifiable. If I'm wrong and one interpretation of QM can be verified, then your argument will mean something. Modeling the behavior of matter at the smallest scales as atoms and quarks allows generation of predictions of behavior that can be tested. QM interpretations do not.

My counterargument would be that if you bracket off these issues as non-scientific it puts a stigma on them (and indeed a prohibition on research in quantum foundations was dogmatically enforced from on high until the late-90s). Philosophers in general lack the skills and resources to pursue these ideas; they have to be done by physicists. In many cases, we see theories that are initially attacked as unscientific coming to mature and eventually develop means of testing the theory against others. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I noted, if I'm wrong and the various QM interpretations can be tested, then we can have this discussion. I'm not the only one who thinks that is unlikely. I acknowledge I am far from qualified to render an opinion on this. I'm not a physicist. I'm basing my understanding on reading what other more qualified people have written.

Per Poppers evolutionary view of science, we need such suppositions because they are the "mutations," that allow science to keep "evolving." Of course, most mutations result in the death of the organism (or the scientific career), but occasionally they are hugely successful. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem with that analogy is that evolutionary ideas in science have to make testable predictions in order to be useful. None of the QM interpretations do that.

In any event, we currently have a number of theories about what causes quantum phenomena that are empirically indiscernible given our current technology and knowledge. By what rights should we select any of them as canonical? The idea behind enforcing the Copenhagen Interpretation as orthodoxy was that this secured science against metaphysics, but this is not what it did. Instead, it enshrined a specific type of metaphysics and epistemology as dogmatism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

They are not "a number of theories" they are a number of interpretations of one theory. The reason the Copenhagen Interpretation is in any way canonical is that it's really not an interpretation at all. It just describes how quantum level phenomena behave. Shut up and calculate is not metaphysics. It's anti-metaphysics.

How so? Certainly it's a problem that is taken seriously. The rapid coalescence of support for the Many Worlds Interpretation over that past decade is often based around the conception that the interpretation is "more likely," because it answers the Fine Tuning Problem. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There have been plenty of discussions of the fine-tuning problem here on the forum before that never got anywhere, just like all the hard problem and QM interpretation discussions. I'll just stand by my statement that it misrepresents the meaning of probability. It explains nothing. It will be fruitless to go any further here.

But the question remains, "why do the origins of consciousness yield so slowly to the same methods that have allowed us to understand so many other phenomena with a great level of depth." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a straw dog or straw man or straw something argument. The social and psychological mechanisms of consciousness have been studied for decades, centuries, millennia, with some success. The neurological mechanisms of consciousness have not been because the technology has not been available. Over the past few decades, those technologies have been evolving rapidly. Again, this is an argument that has been gone through many times on the forum without resolution.

In summary - I've identified three elements of you thesis about which I am skeptical - the fine-tuning problem, the hard problem, and the interpretations of QM. Clearly I have not resolved those issues and I'm sure I won't. I don't think I'll live long enough. My purpose here is just to let people who haven't run through this mill as many times as we have know that your argument is built on an unsteady foundation.

I think we're miscommunicating a bit here. To be fair, your argument was a google search. What I mean by 'drops out of the explanation' is that all that is said is we have reality on one side, and appearance on the other, and two claims about both. When asked how reality becomes appearance, the answer is 'the brain did it, just like it does with other objects to keep the color constant under different light conditions' where the main example was a blue sky.

My question is -- what does the brain do to reality to make the appearance? But the answer is "it makes the appearance appear like the appearance appears, different from reality" -- which just masks the mechanism I'm asking after. — Moliere

And my question is: why do you ask, and why isn't that answer good enough for you? You could go and ask a neuroscientist who could probably give you a more detailed answer, although my guess is that you still wouldn't be satisfied. But why should I care? We only know what we know, and what we know enables us to answer the question in the way that I have done, which is good enough for the sake of this problem of perception, but perhaps not for some other problem that you seem to have introduced into the discussion. But this is a discussion about the former, and it need not digress into a discussion about the so-called hard problem to which you seem to be alluding.

I'm grouping these just as a side note, because it will take us pretty far astray.

A basic view of science:

Science is little more than a collection of arguments about certain topics. There are established procedures in place for certain sorts of questions, there are established beliefs due to said process, but in the end it's a collection of arguments about certain topics on what is true with respect to those topics.

At least, as I see it. We don't science it -- we make an argument. An argument, in this context, can of course include experimental evidence. But said evidence must, itself, be interpreted to make sense.

So really I'm just asking after the arguments in play. What does the scientist say to make his case convincing to yourself? What convinced you? — Moliere

I didn't elaborate because I didn't think it necessary. You already know about this, don't you? And even if you don't, others in this discussion have gone into detail on this. There is an established means of categorising colour based on range of wavelength. That's what I was referring to, and you can look it up yourself if need be. This is what I'm appealing to when I make the claim that the strawberries are not red, and I do so because I think that it makes for a better explanation than the alternative which claims that they are red. I don't really want to go into further detail than that, since I've already done so in previous comments, and I stand by those comments. I'd rather you just address what I've already said on the matter, rather than reiterate from the starting point of this discussion.

I mean that when Newton placed prisms to diffract light from the sun into a spectrum that the red part of the spectrum which came out of the prism was called 'red' not because it was had a larger wavelength and such was proven, but rather because the light was red. — Moliere

Okay, but that's not in itself a good reason to stick by that, is it? Times have changed, discoveries and developments have been made. And sticking by that doesn't resolve the problem of perception or explain optical illusions as well as you otherwise could. If you disagree, then you should explain how, and explain why you think that your explanation is better. I don't see how the better explanation can involve a picture which changes colour, because that just isn't how optical illusions work. Optical illusions are about naturally misleading perceptions, not magically changing realities.

No, that makes sense to me. — Moliere

Good. Well, that's analogous to my point, so if you concede to the one, you in effect concede to the other.

Though if all the parts are made of wood, and some parts are painted green while others are painted yellow, then it wouldn't make sense to say that the chair is green. :D — Moliere

Yes, I agree, but that is not analogous. Although if that was just a joke, then that doesn't matter.

In fact, what if the chair had a sticky reprint of the pixel-image we're discussing? Just to make it closer. Then, what color would the chair be? — Moliere

The colour of the pixels.

I'm thinking this is probably where we diverge the most, then. We seem to be in agreement on both the fallacy of composition and whether or not it has merit depends on the circumstances. If, in fact, the image is gray and appears red then certainly I am wrong.

So really it seems we're more in disagreement on determining which color is the real color, and which color is the apparent color. — Moliere

We're in disagreement about which colour is the apparent colour?! That's news to me. Obviously the apparent colour is whatever colour it appears to be, irrespective of the real colour. If it appears red in circumstance X, then red is the apparent colour in circumstance X, and if it appears grey in circumstance Y, then grey is the apparent colour in circumstance Y. Whence the disagreement?

As for disagreement about the real colour, it makes more sense to call real that which is mind-independent, hence that position being known as realism.

Cool. This is much closer to what I'm asking after.

I think this condition: " if we're talking about colour in terms of wavelength or some related scientific description,"

is likely the culprit of disagreement. Electromagnetic waves are real, as far as anything in science goes. But neither photons, nor atoms, have any color whatsoever. This is not an attribute of the individual parts of what we are saying causes the perception of color. Certain (regular, obviously, as you note about gray not being a regular wave) wavelengths of light correspond with our color-perceptions. But the color is not the electromagnetic radiation.


Color is -- to use your terminology -- subjective. I'd prefer to call it a first-person attribute not attributable to our physics of light, which is a third-person description of the phenomena of light rather than objective/subjective, myself. — Moliere

Photons and atoms don't need to have colour. If that's what we're talking about, then they're not red.

And the whole point with the picture of the strawberries is that the wavelengths of light do not in this case correspond to our colour-perception! Our colour-perception is red, but the wavelengths do not correspond!

It's not about waves, photons, atoms, radiation, or whatever, "having" colour, as such. It's about wavelengths of light according with an established colour categorisation, and it's about how useful this colour categorisation is. It is useful when trying to explain what happens with certain optical illusions, for example.

Colour is not subjective, unless by colour, you just mean colour-perception. But it was you yourself who introduced that latter term, so clearly the distinction is useful, yes?

I don't think we need to get caught up in the hard problem either. I wasn't really trying to go there, but it does seem related to the topic at hand. But it seems like we've managed to pair down our disagreement to one of "how to determine such and such", so there's no need to get into it. — Moliere

Okay.

Honestly, while brains are certainly a part of the picture of human consciousness -- I wouldn't dispute this -- we just don't know how we become conscious. Either there is no such thing in the first place, in which case there is nothing to explain, or if there is such a thing then we don't know how or why it's there. — Moliere

Maybe you're right. It does seem a bit of a mystery. I'm not agreeing or disagreeing with that. I think that that's a different problem that we needn't get into.

I think this is covered at this point. Let me know if you disagree. — Moliere

Yes, I disagree if you do. That is, I stand by my claim that optical illusions like the picture of the strawberries emphasise the fallibility of what we normally do, viz. jump to the conclusion that the strawberries are red because they appear red, and so if you disagree with that, then I disagree with your disagreement.

Rather, I meant to account for the apparent dualism monistically, e.g. self versus other — jorndoe

Ok, the Dualism that you're referring to is the absence of oneness with our surroundings.

I guess Advaita is the perfect and pure Monism, because it says that there's really only one Existent.

I'm not an Advaitist (though I'm a Vedantist), because I insist on avoiding assumptions, and I consider the avoidance of assumptions to be more important than ultra-perfect Monism.

, as simply being due to (self)identity, while still taking Levine's explanatory gap serious.

Forgive the delay in this reply. I had to look up Levine's explanatory gap. According to Wikipedia, it's the gap that must be be bridged to solve the Hard-Problem-Of-Consciousness.

No, don't take that explanatory-gap, or that "Hard Problem Of Consciousness seriously.

It's a made-up makework "problem" invented by Western academic philosophers who evidently need a problem, so that they'll have something to publish about. You know, "Publish or Perish"..

I've answered it many times in these forums.

How could mere physical material, in a physical purposefully-responsive device like us, result in Consciousness?

Let me say it again:

Animals, such as humans, are purposefully-responsive devices, resulting from natural-selection, and designed by natural-selection so as to best achieve survival and reproduction (which includes care for and protection of offspring).

As such, they must respond to their surroundings in a manner that best achieves those purposes.

Our feelings, likes, disllkes, wants, fears, and efforts are exactly what would be expected for such a purposefully-responsive device. So where's the problem???

I repeat:

Where's the problem???

You continued:

All the self stuff...

The self-stuff consists of the animal (that's us).

together already is what our cognition is — our self-awareness, 1st person experiences

1st-person experience is exactly what one would expect for a purposefully-responsive device such as an animal.

, thinking, etc (when occurring) — and is ontologically bound by (self)identity

Of course the animal has self-identity.

, which sets out mentioned partitioning. We're still integral parts of the world like whatever else, interacting, changing, albeit also individuated.

Of course we're part of our life-experience possibility-world, though we're central and primary to it, because we're what it's for and about.

We're a distinct and special part of it. The essential part of it.

So, cutting more or less everything up into fluffy mental stuff and other material stuff is misleading from the get-go; monism of some sort is just fine, and perhaps a better categorization is that mind is something body can do

Ok, but even that needn't be said, because it's an unnecessary separation of us into Mind and body, as if they were two separate metaphysical substances.

, and body is moved by mind

No, that's Dualism.

Instead of separate body and Mind, there's just the animal.

The fact that the word "Animal" is derived from a Latin word for "Spirit" is a reminder that the animal embodies "spirit" and body as one integral unit. No need to even mention Spirit or Mind. There's just the animal, the purposefully-responsive device.

, alike, which (in synthesis) is what we are as individuals.

But there's no need to synthesize the supposed parts of what's already one thing, never separated in the first place.

Michael Ossipoff

At some point, there was a spark that produced an "inside" and an "outside", a perception that perceived a subject and a verb. It's hard to think about this, but what do you think could have been that first primordial and irreducible unit of consciousness? — Watchmaker

Subjective and objective things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Consider that in the very simplest life-forms, characteristics emerge which are not discernable in any inorganic process. In all life-forms, there is the ability to seek homeostasis, to maintain a state of equilibrium whilst exchanging both nutrients and information with the environment, and to heal, grow, reproduce and evolve. Living things, as I've learned from Apokrisis, embody a semiotic dimension at the most fundamental level - which is what differentiates them from anything in the inorganic domain (including crystals or other repeating inorganic structures; see this reference, which suggest, among other things, that the origin or source of whatever this is, is formally unknowable in the same sense that there are propositions of logic that are undecideable.)

So, isn't it feasible to consider that the 'interaction problem' manifests in at least a rudimentary form right at the origin of life itself? And further, that this is another aspect of the problem of comprehending the nature of subjective experience from an external perspective (referred to as 'the hard problem of consciousness'?)

I maintain the problem of understanding the nature of mind is that we're never outside of it - it's never something that appears to us as an object, whereas that is precisely what all of the objects of the natural sciences do. To bring something within the domain of natural science is to objectify it. The problem with Descartes' model of res cogitans is that it lead to the conception of the mind as a potential object of analysis, as some existent thing (after all, 'res' means 'thing'). But no such 'thing' can ever be demonstrated to objectively exist - hence the ridicule heaped on dualism and the 'interaction problem', derided as the ghost in the machine by analytical philosophy, all of which grows out of a grotesquely mistaken caricature of the nature of life and mind in the first place.

To understand this approach requires a different perspective - not a different conceptual framework but a different stance or attitude towards it, which we see emerging in enactivism and 'embodied cognition'.

Well the end of Philosophy came with that "why" question. There is nowhere to go from there. If we embrace the right "how/what" question there is plenty of philosophy to be done on available scientific data.
Philosophy's goal is to produce wise claims on available facts and expand our understanding of the world. Fallacious questions don't really serve that purpose. — Nickolasgaspar

You are missing his point. Rotating a cube in your mind is a phenomenon. Physiological/biological processes are a phenomenon. They are correlated. Yet that correlation, while no one is doubting its correlation through observation, has it such that a completely new kind of phenomena takes place that is different from all the other physical phenomena. That is, it is the fundamental phenomena of qualitative-ness/ experiential-ness. That such a unique thing exists that is so different than all the physical phenomena is the question. Why should neural networks be correlated with qualatitiveness? A purely physical description would simply be some sort of behaviorism. It would be like AI that has no qualitative experience but has inputs and outputs. But that's not the case, we have experience. You can play ignorant hobbit, and say we don't need to explain that, but then you are just pouting that it is such a hard question and then delegitimizing it because of its difficulty. Well, poo poo, it is a quite difficult question, and thus will remain a thorn in the side of your sour grapes that it cannot be explained. But to make the problem go away by simple fiat that philosophical inquiry just sucks is not going to do anything other than show your feeling about it.


You

Even if that was true...How can you ever make claim that? BUt it isn't . For 35 years we have managed to get closer and closer to a descriptive framework about the Necessary and Sufficient role of a biological mechanism in our ability to experience ourself and surroundings.
Denying it is just scientifically wrong. The data are overwhelming.
As Laplace replied to Napoleon's question "where God fits in your model" we can say with certainty " We have no need for that hypothesis, the model works without it".(not only Describes accurate, it Predicts and it offer us Technical Applications)
Necessity and Sufficiency are met...and Chalmer's "why" questions aren't enough to justify any unnecessary entity/process/substance/force (unparsimonious). — Nickolasgaspar

I don't know the answer to the hard question obviously. But what I do know is that there is a hidden dualism in materialist assumptions. Emergence/integration/binding it doesn't matter your phrasing, it is all stand ins for "magical experience takes place". You are always thus jumping from category physical to category mental activity. The assumption is simply just put there because we know indeed we experience. Nothing is explained otherwise as to the nature of this "experience" other than it is correlated with these physiological correlations.

-For that question you will need to visit Neurosciencenews.org , put the search key phrase "How the brain does" and you will learn the "hows" and "whats" for many mental functions. — Nickolasgaspar

No, again, that is not ontologically how they are one and the same, just that these physical processes correlate to these experiential ones. Those are indeed the easy problems Chalmers mentions.

-Please do, but I think the problem here is that you ignore the latest science what fallacies are. — Nickolasgaspar

Experience the very thing which observes the other phenomena. How is it this is the biological/physical substrate, and if it "arises" from the physical substrates, "what" is this "arising"?

Intelligibility has existence independent of the perception and comprehension of agent intellect? — ucarr

It has actual existence as what it is, say an apple, but is potential with respect to our perception (sensibility) and comprehension (intelligibility).

Asking this another way, when a tree falls in the forest sans observer, is this event nonetheless an intelligible phenomenon? — ucarr

Yes, the event is intrinsically comprehensible, but the extrinsic conditions required to actualize that potential are missing.

Asking it obversely, does intelligibility propagate only in direct connection to the comprehension of the agent intellect (of the sentient being)? — ucarr

What propagates is a physical action that can inform sense organs (the Scholastics called this the sensible species). This is because the object is acting on its environment, say by scattering light, emitting sound or pushing back when touched. Without this sort of action, there would be no sensation. After that, it is up to the subject to attend to the sensation or not. Attending is the act of the agent intellect, and deciding to attend is an act of will.

Does intelligibility persist in the absence of sentience? — ucarr

The simple answer would have been: "As long as the intelligible object does. Not as a stand-alone entity." We now aware that objects are surrounded by a radiance of action (or sensible species) that may persist long after the core object has ceased to be. For example, a star may be long gone before we perceive and comprehend it.

Aristotle held that action is an accident inhering in the substance, even though its effect is spatially outside the substance. (The house being built is outside the builder building it.) In this view, which I think we should adopt, substances are not confined by the spatio-temporal boundaries we perceive, but also include their radiance of action. There is no text saying this, but it follows from what the texts say, and helps clarify issues of delayed perception. It makes sense of us saying "I see that star," when the core object may be long gone.

Consider: Intelligibility ≡ Order
The above statement is true? — ucarr

Well, order is intelligible.

I see two problems which make me hesitate to agree. The first is conceptual. Assuming that order and intelligibility are coextensive, they still differ in definition. "Order" names an intrinsic property, while "intelligibility" points to a possible relation -- the possibility of being an object in the subject-object relation of knowledge.

The second problem is that order is one of those things which we may know when we see it, but does not have an agreed upon definition. The definition in the Cambridge Dictionary online is: "the way in which people or things are arranged, either in relation to one another or according to a particular characteristic." This does not seem to capture the philosophical idea of order, for the arrangement may be quite disorderly. If you want to add that the arrangement has to be according to some intelligible principle, then we come close to what you are saying -- but I think metaphysical naturalists might object to such a definition as it implicates a source of intelligibility. Another problem with this definition is that we might want to say that unity is a form of order, and maybe even the highest form of order, and unity is not an arrangement of parts.

So, I cannot agree, not because I disagree with the insight, but because I do not see the connection clearly enough to commit to it.

Obversely, does non-teleological evolution preclude all linkage between intelligibility and order? — ucarr

I think "non-teleological evolution" is an oxymoron. Natural selection is selection by the laws of nature, which act to determinate ends.

Can there be unintelligible order? — ucarr

To judge that a system has order, it has to be capable of eliciting the concept <order>, which means that order is, by definition, intelligible. How can something unintelligible elicit any concept?

If not, must we conclude there can be no non-teleological evolution? — ucarr

That has long been my position for many theoretical and empirical reasons. See my "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 22 (1-2):32-66 (2010) (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution).

If so, must we conclude mind takes the sensory input of the proto-order of the objective world and converts it into the following block chain: intelligibility_perception_memory-processing-comprehension_self — ucarr

I would start with sensibility, but I agree that we come to know our self, not a priori, but by reflecting on what we do -- both physically and intentionally.

Using the above statements, can I deduce agent intellect is ontologically present and active within the mind of humans? — ucarr

Yes. The historical question was whether it was a human or a divine power. I think that idenitifying it with awareness allows us to settle the question in favor of a human power. If it were a divine power, we would be aware of everything.

Moreover, can I conclude agent intellect lies somewhere between hard dualism at one end and hard reduction at the other end? — ucarr

The agent intellect is an essential part of a theory that stands between them.

If part of the theory is "it cannot be bridged", that does put an onus on an opponent to show the gap doesn't exist or alternatively that it's already been bridged. — fdrake

I think that's only true though if there's some within-frame theoretical support for the notion that "it cannot be bridged", which I think is lacking. I don't think it's reasonable to start one's Ramsey sentence with "suppose the gap between neurological goings on and first-person consciousness is unbridgeable..." it seems the oddest thing to suppose as a foundational, but more than that it imports assumptions which then need examining - like what does 'unbridgeable' actually mean in this context?

I think it's unfair to expect a concise definition of content from a nascent field of inquiry. Like "hey Mr Newton, can you define what a force is for me? It doesn't seem to be a substance... is it immaterial? How can it be part of a physical law without a physical body?" — fdrake

I agree, but that's not what I'm doing here (at least I don't think it is). I'm not asking the proponents of a 'hard problem' to define terms, or the components of their model. I'm asking for the criteria of sufficiency being used in the expression "neuroscience does not explain why/how we have consciousness". I'm just asking what is insufficient about the explanations given (say by the Churchills - to go extreme eliminativist).

It's quite acceptable to me to say "my model of consciousness involves this bridge/force/realm which I can't quite define" no problem at all with that, but what I do not understand is when asked "why have you invoked this bridge/force/realm in your model" the answer comes back blank.

Essentially, as with all philosophy, if we can't say anything about why one frame is preferable to the other then it's redundant (as a social exercise) we have to have criteria - even if it's aesthetics, parsimony, clarity, coherence... something has to be the matter we can discuss when comparing models/frameworks, otherwise what are we discussing?

And... point of order about charity. This thread is entitled "Neuroscience is of no relevance to the problem of consciousness" it is a direct attack on eliminativist or reductionist explanations of consciousness (elsewhere described as 'evil' with virtually no comeback). Can you honestly say that the problem with a lack of charity is toward non-reductionism? I've been as open as possible to the arguments put forward, accepting any framework (despite my personal preference for functionalist ones), short of just laying down at the feet of the non-reductionist problem, I'm not sure how I could possibly be more charitable whilst still disagreeing.

I don't think anyone could say the same of the treatment of reductionist approaches here, which are routinely dismissed as simply 'not understanding' the arguments, if not openly treated as coming from soulless nihilists.

I also don't think this is particularly charitable, you can treat arguments like Mary's Room, zombies etc as attempts to show why consciousness is "special" in this way. Furthermore, expecting a functionalist answer to those is in some regard begging the question. — fdrake

Unless I've misunderstood your use of the term 'functionalist' then I'm not expecting a functionalist account. '"Why/How?" is taken directly from the question posed by the hard problem (and its proponents), I've not added anything to that question. I'm simply saying that one can continue to ask 'why?' to any given explanation. "... but why?"... We choose when to stop. that's all I'm saying here. Nothing functionalist, nothing beyond the simple grammar of the word 'why?' It expects some reason. Questions beginning "why..." are universally answered in the form "because...", and I'm not the one posing the question in that format, they are.

Another way of seeing the debate is not about sufficient conditions for consciousness, but about sufficient conditions for positing consciousness, experience and so on as primitives for a theory. Like you might not expect necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as "matter" or an "institution". Just whether positing something helps alleviate problems with hitherto existing accounts.

And that's addressed by attacking arguments which purport to show that hitherto existing accounts from functionalist/physicalist philosophers don't or cannot account for some phenomena consciousness exhibits (narrow vs wide content from Chalmers eg). — fdrake

I agree. In a sense, that's what I'm trying to ask here for a clearer (to me) explanation of, simply what it is that the reductionist model doesn't account for.

So far, the answers given seem question-begging. I'm asking why the need to invoke 'first-person consciousness' as an entity/property, and the answer given begins "assume there's first person consciousness..." Let's assume there isn't. Assume it's a story, nothing more. Now... why do we need to bring it back? That's the question.

It's not the question because eliminativism is (or should be) the default. It's the question because they are attacking us, not the other way round. The OP is an attack (in the non-personal 'combat of ideas' sense) on eliminativist neuroscience. And already the whole debate has been skewed into painting Chalmers et al as the victims of an uncharitable, superficial attack on their position which they are being asked, quite unfairly, to defend.

I'd invite you to look again at the title of the OP. Who is asking whom to defend their position?

If the second is true, and physical processes such as energy are also fundamental, it seems that the combination problem is trivial: we have observed that physical processes can form complex objects without human intervention, such as trees: if we assume that another quality is fundamental (ignoring consciousness), and this quality is used to make a complex system like a tree, which seems to have fundamental components working together to form a complex system, why can’t the same be true of consciousness

The way I understand combinatorial objections to panpsychism, the issue isn't that fundemental forces cannot combine to form complex systems. Rather, it is that the boundaries that delineate "things" are arbitrary from the standpoint of physics. Information, causality, mass, and energy flow across all such "boundaries" as if they didn't exist. This means you can draw arbitrary lines around different physical ensembles and claim an almost infinite number of distinct consciousness.

So the issue isn't that fundemental forces cannot combine to create human level intellect, but that it seems all sorts of systems can do this.

Another problem is that the Earth's core, clouds, the sun, etc. all also in involve a ton of information transfer. So too, a room with 10 people having a conversation can be thought of as a physical system, and this system has even more complexity than a single human body.

Why then does it not appear that the sun has a mind like a human? Why don't rooms of people produce self-aware group minds? If you cut my arm off, my conciousness stays mostly the same, but presumably my arm's level of conciousness deteriorates to some sort of basic, fundemental level. Why is this?

To explain this, we need to explain what it is about human beings and animal life that works differently to make conciousness become "more full" in them. But then this problem turns out to look a lot like the "Hard Problem of Conciousness" that we had before we invoked panpsychism, so we end up in the same spot.

That, or we have to suppose that the sun might have an awareness similar to ours, but be unable to act due to its composition, which seems strange. A problem for this avenue is what happens with brain injuries, where people lose whole chunks of their conciousness. If brain injuries, Alzheimer's, certain drugs, etc. that disrupt the brain cause such profound shifts in experience, then it seems like we still need to explain many of the same things that the Hard Problem asks us to, even with panpsychism.