I appreciate your taking the time to lay all this out for me. Could I ask you to take this to a simpler level, and describe to me what you think happens when I imagine a purple cow? I'm still concerned about the hard problem, understood as the emergence of subjectivity (or the illusion of subjectivity, if you prefer) from chemical/neuronal activity,

The hard problem is more about trying to explain how color "arises" from non-colored things, like neurons and wavelengths. — Harry Hindu

You're drawing a bead on the center of the HPoC. As I understand you, the central issue is the question: How is the subjective experience connected to the physics presumed to be the ground for it?

My first thought (for an answer to your specific question about the experience of the color red in relation to a specific wavelength within the EM visible light spectrum) says "like the experience of
motion, the experience of color is due to a relativistic effect."

Einstein tells us that we only experience motion relative to other material objects either stationary, or moving at a velocity different from ours. If we're in a spaceship traveling very fast between planetary systems, inside the ship we don't known we're moving at all. Only when we look out through a window and see our motion relative to other material objects do we perceive motion.

Likewise, when we experience seeing red, it's because that specific wavelength stands in contrast to other wavelengths of visible light. Therefore, within the neuronal circuits of the brain wherein we interpret the specific wavelength for red, there's nothing therein that's red because the relativistic effect that supports our experience of red exists within the context of the visual field of our eyes, not within the neuronal circuits of the visual cortex of our brain.

The locality of the context of the relativistic effect of experiencing the color red, being separate from the neuronal circuits interior to the visual cortex, like the interior of the spaceship being separate from the external planets it whizzes past, raises the question of the connection between the physics of the brain and the cognition of the mind.

My point is that... ..you judge a resemblance by comparing the cat that you imagine to the cat that you see. — Luke

A resemblance-relation requires at least two objects which can resemble each other. Granted that all objects resemble each other in the abstract sense of being objects, but how can anything invisible resemble something visible?

My point is that they can't, unless you somehow make both visible. For example, you draw a picture of the cat that you imagine. The visible features of the cat-picture are comparable with the visible features of the cat.

However, there's a feeling in what it's like to see the cat, which is comparable with a feeling of what it's like to see the cat-picture. There's also a feeling in what it's like to imagine a cat. You can compare your feelings (via memories), and judge resemblances between them.

I was questioning why you are talking about physical states at all with regard to judging a resemblance between an imagined cat and a seen cat. — Luke

You're right, I don't need to talk about physical states with regard to judging resemblances between different experiences. However, the thread is about the hard problem of consciousness, recall, in which dualism is implied between mental and physical states. Hence talk of physical states.

I don't believe consciousness is an illusion, and I don't believe it is immaterial, I believe we cannot know either of these things. — Skalidris

You're telling me the category type for consciousness is unknowable.

The hard problem of consciousness arises when one believes consciousness can successfully study (and explain) itself as an object in the world. — Skalidris

You're telling me the category type being unknowable is intimately tied to consciousness being necessary to the examination of consciousness.

You can see that “and” is already in the definition and even if we try to phrase it differently to avoid the “and”, you’ll still need to talk about the several inputs being received, and what’s “several”? It is at least one unit AND another. Do you see the circularity? — Skalidris

You're telling me "and" is fundamental, and thus cannot be analyzed down to smaller parts.

So even if we can associate physical processes with consciousness, we cannot break down the intuitive meaning into smaller parts, and breaking something into smaller parts is how we explain things. — Skalidris

You're telling me the intuitive meaning of consciousness inside the mind is fundamental.

To go back to the "and" example, any definition or description of the material processes behind "and" includes the concept "and". — Skalidris

You're telling me examination of "consciousness," like examination of "and," always leads to a circular definition, and thus the identity of these terms cannot be illuminated by analysis.

If, as you imply, consciousness is thwarted by the self-referential state into useless circularity, then that's a claim that supports: consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional. — ucarr

No, it simply implies that we do not know. — Skalidris

In this case, I think your claim: consciousness examining consciousness always leads to circularity implies beyond doubt that self-examination, in the case of consciousness, cannot lead to a bi-conditional interweave of subject/object. This, in turn, implies subjectivity is pure; it stands outside of the subject_object duet. Mysteriously, this has something to do with the claim: we can't examine how subjectivity arises from brain functions.

...we could explain the "And" logic gate but yet never be able to explain the "And" concept. — Skalidris

So far, I'm not understanding why you think the concept of the conjunction operator cannot be explained: ¬ {x ∧ Y} both x and y are negated; {¬{x} ∨ {y}} x is negated, y is not. By contrasting "and" with "or," the two operators clarify and explain each other. In other words, the "and" operator is an attractor that puts multiple members into one set, whereas the"or" operator is a separator that puts multiple members into separate sets, as demonstrated by the two expressions above. Now there, I've defined the "and" operator without any circularity.

Well, you quote two of my sentences, but omit the two different senses in which I use them, which makes them contradict each other. But that's not how I use them.





In the sense that an imagination is invisible and a cat is visible, they can't be compared, and that's why we can't find any resemblance between them. They can, however, resemble each other in the sense of what it's like to imagine vs see the cat.

Notice that there is no need to assume dualism between the cat and what it's like to see the cat: the experience is the cat. Nor is there a need to eliminate ordinary language use of the verb 'see' (or other perceptual verbs). See or experience or feel etc are used in many different senses.

However, when the same word is used in many different senses, it also gets used ambiguously between different senses. Many forms of dualism are fallacies of ambiguity. A literal interpretation of the term 'mental image' is a fallacy of ambiguity. Whenever our talk of what we have in mind gets muddled, or leads to intellectual disasters, it's probably because we use perceptual verbs ambiguously between different senses.

So perhaps the hard problem of consciousness is a fallacy of ambiguity?

In the sense that an imagination is invisible and a cat is visible, they can't be compared, — jkop

An imagination is invisible to the 3rd person perspective; it is not invisible to the 1st person perspective.
I can't see what you imagine; I can see what I imagine.

Notice that there is no need to assume dualism between the cat and what it's like to see the cat: the experience is the cat. — jkop

Do you claim a cat seen via the virtual viewing of imagination is no less physico_material than a cat seen via the optics of the eyes?

Many forms of dualism are fallacies of ambiguity. — jkop

Language open to more than one interpretation falsely suggests two objective and parallel modes of being?

A literal interpretation of the term 'mental image' is a fallacy of ambiguity. — jkop

I see the redundancy; I don't see the ambiguity.

So perhaps the hard problem of consciousness is a fallacy of ambiguity? — jkop

You're saying the HPoC stems from an ambiguity of language without a referent ambiguity in nature?

Working on it - getting to grips with my own thoughts about consciousness and relating them to those of Chalmers is certainly a hard problem for this consciousness.

can you give me an example of how any perception/feeling/thought could be reduced to a particular physical system?

In fact I think mental illness in general is a good example of how the quasi-perceptual cognitive process, including the hard problems of consciousness, can manifest itself. People suffering from these disorders can experience drastic changes in their subjective qualitative experience of themselves including the way they feel and experience visual and auditory sensations. These mental states can be transient or long lasting and are most definitely reducible to physical systems in the human body.

Really, I see the hard problems as a direct critique at Materialism. Materialism proposes that everything is material or abstractions of material. There is no room for "inner aspects" because that itself is not material. — schopenhauer1

It's not opposed to materialism. It's a call for an expansion of what counts as material.

Correct , the diversity of properties emerging from different arrangements of matter is the amazing thing. Asking "why" this is possible its like a kid asking his mum ....why the sky is blue as if there is a purpose behind it. — Nickolasgaspar

'Hard problems' ,of the kind that Chalmers referred to, are not about 'why' in the teleological sense. They are about how. How is it that consciousness can emerge from non-conscious systems? How could a material world arise from consciousness? I think both of these are insoluble, and we need more than one fundamental property.

'Hard problems' ,of the kind that Chalmers referred to, are not about 'why' in the teleological sense. They are about how. How is it that consciousness can emerge from non-conscious systems? How could a material world arise from consciousness? I think both of these are insoluble, and we need more than one fundamental property. — bert1

-Not really lets analyze them. His three main questions are:
"1.Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience?
2. why does a given physical process generate the specific experience it does
2. why an experience of red rather than green, for example?
In all 3 questions the answer "because it does" is adequate.
Now Mark Solms in his latest theory provided evolutionary answers on "why" emotions can be better addressed by advanced mental conscious states...but that was not what Chalmer's was really asking.


-"How is it that consciousness can emerge from non-conscious systems?"
If Chalmer's did his homework he would know the role of ARAS and Central Lateral Thalamus in the emergence of our conscious states.(ARAS state of awareness and alert/ stimuli arrive as signals/ the Central lateral thalamus share them to other areas specialized in Symbolic language, Memory/expeirence/ pattern recognition/ reasoning etc and the feedback enables our conscious content to emerge).

-"How could a material world arise from consciousness? "
-thats a fallacy (begging the question )not a serious scientific question. Consciousness is a testable, quantifiable mental ability...not a creation agent. At least claim needs to be demonstrated before starting search for the "how".

-" I think both of these are insoluble, and we need more than one fundamental property."
-Both are a great example on how pseudo philosophy can derail our philosophical inquiry.

The point is not to solve the problem but to dissolve it. Saying phenomenal consciousness, not just access consciousness, arises from computation still leaves the question of how and why, a seemingly unanswerable question as you point out in the OP.

Philosophy progresses by breaking down those intractable problems into either tractable problems for science to go solve, or non-problems that don’t need solving. The question of consciousness breaks down into two different questions, one of each kind. The tractable one, the easy problem of access consciousness, is just a question of functionality for psychologists, neuroscientists, and programmers to figure out.

The “hard” (non-)problem of phenomenal consciousness is whatever’s left after that: if we built perfect functional simulation of a human, would it have a first-person experience like we do? If no, why not, what’s different about it, besides the functionality that we’ve already stipulated is the same? If yes, then what is it besides the functionality, which we’ve already bracketed, that gives it that first person experience? My answer is “nothing”: there is no mystery to be explained, there is nothing besides the functionality of access consciousness that differs between a human and something that else that we wouldn’t normally call conscious, so whatever it is besides that functionality that might be required for humans to have a first-person experience, that is something trivial that’s just part of being, something everything has, and only the functionality, the access consciousness, is different.

I’m not saying that there are two kinds of substance, or two kinds of property, or anything like that: just that we can look at the same things, all things, which are all metaphysically alike and differ only in functionality, from two perspectives: third person / objective, and first person / subjective. That difference in perspective is all there is to phenomenal consciousness, and the functionality of access consciousness is all the rest of the explanation for consciousness, which is no longer a philosophical problem but a scientific one.

Subjective experience of consciousness, or qualia, seems to be completely out of reach to be explained by any kind of motion, mechanics, or dynamics. It's something else, and we don't know of anything else. So, the problem is hard because we don't even know the type of answer that could fit here. There is simply no place to start. Or is there? — Zelebg

If you're not familiar with Thomas Metzinger's work, check out Being No One (or his abbreviated, non/less-technical summary The Ego Tunnel). Also this lecture. Complementary to IIT (below).

If, however, you're familiar with Metzinger and you find his work insufficient to (begin to scientifically) explain "subjective experience of consciousness", make (a) case for rejecting Metzinger's 'phenomenal self model', etc.

Consciousness is hard to be treated scientifically, not because it is hard to explain but because it is hard, if not impossible to detect. — A Seagull

This wiki article summarizes neuroscientists Tononi's & Koch's information integration theory (IIT), with citations of papers published in (mostly) peer-reviewed journals, which predicts(?) that "consciousness" (i.e. degrees of self-awareness) can be detected. Complementary to Metzinger's work (above). Thoughts?

Thus the nature of subjective experience, aka qualia, can either be physical or abstract phenomena. — Zelebg

In what sense can Qualia be physical? Is "redness" a force or a material object? That question is the crux of the mind-body debate. Physicalists try to define Qualia as-if they are real things apart from conscious minds. But that presumption is what makes the problem "hard".

Just as Minds are correlated with Brains, and Qualia with Objects, correlation does not prove causation. As Hume noted, even though not physically connected, proximity in space-time merely implies a connection for an intuitive cause-imputing mind. As you noted in the quote below, Qualia are relations between things, not things in themselves. As an abstract concept, the correlation "1 : 2" is meaningful even in the absence of physical objects. That's why Algebra works.

Qualia : The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem.

Correlation : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlation_does_not_imply_causation

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder : "Beauty is no quality in things themselves : it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them ; and each mind perceives a different beauty."
___David Hume

It is important to note that being abstract or virtual does not mean immaterial per se, it only means it is not directly physical, but instead it exists in the relations between chunks of matter, like angle exist wherever two lines meet. — Zelebg

If abstract concepts in mind are material, what kind of matter are they made of : atoms of consciousness? In my thesis they are made of Information (i.e. mental relationships). I suppose you could call bits & bytes "atoms of information". :wink:

What does "not directly physical" mean? Is that a reference to Virtual Reality? If its existence is uncertain, in what sense is it real? In The Matrix, did Neo begin in the Real world, or in the Virtual simulated world? The bald kid answered that question, "there is no spoon". That's why Neo was able to dodge bullets : they were not real. [the movie is a metaphor of the Mind/Body problem ]

Virtual Particle : In physics, a virtual particle is a transient quantum fluctuation that exhibits some of the characteristics of an ordinary particle, while having its existence limited by the uncertainty principle. [actually VP exhibit no characteristics (properties, qualities) until observed (measured).]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_particle

Virtual = simulation = imitation = illusion = deception

Everything we know in science dealing with the natural phenomena, every law, discovery, explanation... everything is about some kind of motion, ultimately explained by the dynamics of the underlying elements. At the bottom of it all is just plain mechanics, what moves where and whether it will stick or bounce, essentially.

Subjective experience of consciousness, or qualia, seems to be completely out of reach to be explained by any kind of motion, mechanics, or dynamics. It's something else, and we don't know of anything else. So, the problem is hard because we don't even know the type of answer that could fit here. There is simply no place to start. Or is there? — Zelebg

Strange isn't it that consciousness forms part of the system (logic, pattern recognition, etc.) that explains the world and yet it cannot explain itself?

I see a fundamental problem here which can be better seen within a simplicity-complexity framework.

I believe that, if nature as it is is true, understanding/comprehension has a top-down structure. In a crude sense the complex can grasp the simple but not the other way round. This isn't an outlandish claim for the evidence is plain to our eyes - humans can study and comprehend other animals but the converse is false. The reason being a difference in complexity.

Therefore, "understandably", it would be quite difficult for consciousness to comprehend itself.

There wouldn't be a distinction between minds and consciousness. That is just continuing to use the false-dichotomy from the material-mind paradigm. — Pantagruel

Actually it's not. I am not assuming that minds and consciousness are different things. I am simply pointing out that epistemologically we can track minds and what they do, but we cannot track consciousness. Perhaps these are indeed facets of the same thing. But we can measure one and not the other. Just as we can track behavior - which is how we track minds - or we can track glucose uptake, but we can't track consciousness because we do not know what is conscious and what is not. And perhaps that means we do not also know what has mind or not. Current research into plant intelligence - a phrase that is no longer fringe - is finding many of the behaviors of animal minds. But then we can't communicate and the chemisty is different. So we can neither rule out consciousness nor can we confirm it. Perhaps plants and some computers now can do many things that minds can do without being aware, without experiencing. Perhaps the functions always correlate with being aware. We don't know. I am not asserting dual substances. I am saying we don't know where consciousness begins and ends. Perhaps yes mind, where there is mind, is always the same as the consciousness that is there, but perhaps there is a rudimentary consciousness in all matter. I am blackboxing the monism vs. dualism debate and also being cautious.

And given the history of science's rather late getting it that animals had both minds and consciousness I am wary of leaping in an assuming we know what experiencing must be coupled to. Perhaps it need no be coupled to what we call minds. Which does not mean that our consciousness is a separate substrance from our minds (or brains).

Everything that emerges establishes functional systems at its own level. Consciousness qua consciousness is perfectly explicable and can be studied to the extent that its activities exhibit systematicity. Which the activities of consciousness certainly do. — Pantagruel

You are talking about activities. We do not know that all consciousnes is active.

You also use the term 'emergent', but we do not know at what point consciousness emerges or why it does there.

We used to think it emerged only in humans, and not that long ago, in fact in my lifetime.

In fact, there are people designing neural nets now that don't solve a problem directly (the problem is coded at the level of the hidden neurons) but solve it by having the neurons link in a way that mimics neurons in the brain. So the physically-faithful neural net can solve the same problems as the concept-driven neural net, but the physical model is much larger and less efficient. — Pantagruel

But none of this lets us know if they have designed a non-conscious problem solver or something that is conscious. We don't know.

Perhaps it's only present in carbon based complicated systems...for some reason.

We don't have this yet.

I agree, and I think that this is analogous to the situation with incompatibilist free will. Incompatibilists insist that free will means being undetermined. Okay, electrons are undetermined, according to contemporary physics. So electrons have free will? Sounds like kind of a useless definition of free will then. But hey look over there, those compatibilists have a much more useful definition of free will according to which humans sometimes have it but electrons don't... it just has nothing to do with (in)determinism.

Likewise, phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. — Pfhorrest

This interesting, and I think I understand your point. In the analogy, phenomenal consciousness is like incompatibilism - a coherent and meaningful idea, but not useful or particularly interesting. And compatibilism is like access consciousness - it's actually interesting and useful to be able to talk about the particular capabilities, powers and limitations of the mind in question.

I half agree with you. I'd be interested in your views on overdetermination. I eat because physical events in my brain cause, in law-like ways, my muscles to pick up food, put it in my mouth and chew it and swallow it. And presumably these causal pathways are in principle traceable. But I also eat because I feel hungry. And I wouldn't eat if I didn't have that feeling - the physical story is not the whole story of why I eat. So we have two causes (don't we?), and the question is, what is the relationship between them? There is a problem, because when we speak about machines which we presume are not conscious, an account of the physical processes is taken as sufficient to explain the behaviour of the machine. But in humans it's not enough, and we then have to try and explain why the situation is different in humans. My panpsychist answer is to say that it is not ultimately different. The problem is resolved if we can reduce one explanation to the other. Attempts to reduce will or consciousness to physical explanations have so far failed, but I think the reverse reduction can perhaps be made. Physical explanations refer to laws, causes, forces, all of which are presumed to be insentient. But these are just made up ways to refer to what things just do. To illustrate this, consider a crude analogy. Imagine an alien race of giants who discover humans. However they see only our behaviour and have no idea we are conscious. They design a light switch (admittedly a rather crap design, but bear with me). They put a giant 100m rocker switch like a see-saw on the ground. 20 humans are placed on one end and the whole lever is enclosed in a cage so that the humans can't escape. Now they wait a bit. To operate the switch they put some bags of food at the other end. The hungry humans move to the other end to get to the food, and the switch tips over and is operated. Now we know that the switch depends on phenomenal states to work, because we know what it is like to be a human experiencing hunger. But the giant aliens, who are not like us at all, presume that we do not possess consciousness, because we are very different from them. So Prek the alien giant observes this behaviour very carefully and invents Prek's law, namely that human particles follow a four-hour cycle of attraction to carbohydrate particles which are then absorbed by the humans particles. This is just taken as a fundamental law which 'just is', and it works. It successfully predicts the behaviour of the switch. (Yes, I know it is a really crap switch). We know Prek's law is a made-up law, because it is just a stand-in for the real cause, which is the phenomenal state of hunger. And the panpsychist thought is to simply extrapolate this to everything, so when we look at the behaviour of a system, we are looking at conscious things following their will. And mechanism can emerge from this, and predictable results can be exploited which are not intended or understood by the constituent entities. Any time we appeal to a force in a physical explanation, I suggest we are referring to the phenomenal states of the entities involved. And if we remember that entities are really persistent doings themselves, even the very existence of anything depends on will. This is of course problematic and raises a lot of questions. But it seems to me that reducing physical explanation to will is a much more hopeful project than reducing will to physical explanation. So I am an emergentist after all, but not about consciousness, but about mechanism. If we think 'reduction' is a dirty word then we are the stuck with the problem of the relationship of the mental to the physical. Do you find this at all plausible?

Everything we know in science dealing with the natural phenomena, every law, discovery, explanation... everything is about some kind of motion, ultimately explained by the dynamics of the underlying elements. At the bottom of it all is just plain mechanics, what moves where and whether it will stick or bounce, essentially.

Subjective experience of consciousness, or qualia, seems to be completely out of reach to be explained by any kind of motion, mechanics, or dynamics. It's something else, and we don't know of anything else. So, the problem is hard because we don't even know the type of answer that could fit here. There is simply no place to start. Or is there?

Subjective experience of consciousness, or qualia, seems to be completely out of reach to be explained by any kind of motion, mechanics, or dynamics. — Zelebg

The problem of Consciousness is "hard" only for those who think in materialistic terms of "motion, mechanics, or dynamics". If instead, we think of Causation, Relationships, and Systems, we can trace the evolution of Qualia back to its origins in the Big Bang -- not in the sense of a physical explosion, but of metaphysical Creation. Consciousness is indeed "amenable to scientific study". But not to materialistic study.

Ironically, the physical account of the Big Bang sounds like an act of magic : "Poof, a universe from nothing!" But it's what the magician does before the "Voila!" that makes all the difference. "Vive la difference!" What I'm talking about is immaterial Information/Enformation/Causation. :wink:

Thank you. My interpretation is that Emergence/Panpsychism (which is a wonderful paradigm/metaphor for consciousness) would explain the cognition phenomena itself, but it wouldn't explain the actual true nature of conscious existence itself. In other words it's not explaining truly novel phenomena. Or maybe I'm not understanding.

In that way, I don't feel you got the gist of my questions. I don't know if you could logicize your thoughts/theory in this way, but can you explain the hard/soft problem viz Emergence/Panpsychism in a syllogistic bullet-point style?

For example,
1. The metaphysical properties of consciousness work:...…
2. The true nature of consciousness is made from:.....
3. The human sentience is made from:.....
4. Mental properties can be reduced to physical properties by way of:....
5. There are truly no emergent properties of complex systems because:....

What I'm trying to parse is the distinction between a micro v macro view of consciousness. For example, in a micro view, it's conceivable emergence explains EM fields of conscious cognition alone, but to make the leap to a macro view of evolution would require more work.

The irony of one who charges another with exactly what they are guilty of doing. I'm not interested in continually explaining with someone who doesn't even accept and/or understand when an adequate explanation has been given. I'll add this and see how it goes...

Continually? You never explained anything even once. I explained in the opening post why the problem is hard, what exactly is not clear to you?

If consciousness is not adequately accounted for in terms of "objective" and "subjective", then any and all notions of human thought and belief based upon that dichotomy cannot take consciousness into proper account. Consciousness consists - in very large part - of human thought and belief.

You keep making vague and empty assertions. How does that have to do with anything I said?

I explained in the opening post why the problem is hard... — Zelebg

You claim something existed called "subjective experience of consciousness, or qualia".

I'm saying that "subjective experience of consciousness" points to nothing that exists in it's entirety prior to naming and descriptive practices, and yet consciousness does. So...

Topic of this thread is far more specific than 'consciousness '. It's _subjectivity_ of the experience. That is what makes the problem hard.

The “hard” (non-)problem of phenomenal consciousness is whatever’s left after that: if we built perfect functional simulation of a human, would it have a first-person experience like we do? If no, why not, what’s different about it, besides the functionality that we’ve already stipulated is the same? If yes, then what is it besides the functionality, which we’ve already bracketed, that gives it that first person experience? My answer is “nothing” — Pfhorrest

So you would be inclined to agree with Daniel Dennett, then? David Bentley Hart's observation about his work is that 'it is all very obvious: Under certain chemical and environmental conditions, life will emerge in time and develop organisms with large brains, and these organisms will of necessity be social organisms. And social organisms require mental activity to survive and flourish. For Dennett, all evolutionary developments occur because they incorporate useful adaptations.'

That seems to mesh well with your account.

There, that explains everything. — Zelebg

It's the kind of thing a demon would have you believe, were there such beings.

According to the Wiki definition below, mathematics is not a physical thing, but simply "knowledge", "number", "structure", "geometry". All of these are forms of generic Information. So wherever you find mathematical "structures" you have Information. — Gnomon

I’ve been interested in mathematical Platonism since I started posting on forums. I believe that that number is 'real but incorporeal', hence showing that materialism is false. But the philosophical implications are very tricky.

You have to recall that in Platonism, mathematical knowledge (dianoia) was only one aspect of an entire and very subtle epistemological scheme, which also included noesis, knowledge of the forms, and the knowledge of the good, the beautiful and the true.

It also has to be remembered that the expression ‘mathematical objects’ is kind of analogy, because numbers and so on are not actually objects at all, they’re intelligible ideas. They’re an aspect of reason. So I don't accept the idea that information constitutes the world or physical objects. As I was saying before, I don't think it's true to say that minerals and inanimate objects encode or contain any information as such; that we can obtain information about their constitution and so on, but they're not inherently information-bearing apart from that. So

Information : Knowledge and the ability to know. Technically, it's the ratio of order to disorder, of positive to negative, of knowledge to ignorance. It's measured in degrees of uncertainty. . . . — Gnomon

I'm highly dubious about this. You can't make up definitions of fundamental words, like 'information'.

"a quantum particle is nothing but Information". — Gnomon

I’ve read a lot about the philosophical implications of quantum physics and have argued that it also undermines materialism (‘materialism’ being the view that matter is fundamentally real). I am inclined towards Heisenberg’s philosophical attitude, generally discussed under the heading of the ‘Copenhagen interpretation’. And this view was very reticent about statements about what the subjects of observation actually are, whilst also fully acknowledging the role of the observer in determining the experimental outcome. Later in life, he wrote Physics and Philosophy, which is generally supportive of Platonism. (See Plato vs Democritus.)

If physics describe the natural world, that would suggest that there is a metaphysical language ( mathematical abstracts) encoded into all of nature. — 3017amen

Galileo beat you to it, saying 'the book of nature is written in mathematics'. Galileo too was basically Platonist is some ways, mainly by virtue of the neo-platonist revival that was a product of the Italian renaissance. But there is also the matter of 'Galileo's mistake'.

People like Max Tegmark argue (and I agree) that there isn't a hard ontological difference between abstract mathematical objects and the concrete physical world: — Pfhorrest

I think that is mistaken. That just allows you to think you know something which is far from evident. The nature of the reality of number, is completely different than the nature of the reality of material objects, because the former can only be grasped by reason. It's the exact problem with a lot of modern philosophy, which fails to differentiate the sensory and the intelligible.

Tegmark's recent books are regarded by many critics as completely unmoored from reality, and besides, he still maintains a physicalist view of brain/mind.

As I said before, progress in philosophy is most often made by dissolving problems, thinking about things in ways that do not give rise to those apparent, intractable problems. Such problems are like paradoxes: the fact that you've run into one shows that you made some error somewhere along the way to there.

The software thing is just an analogy or illustration of the underlying philosophy I'm talking about. I come to that philosophy, to massively simplify things (I literally wrote an 80,000 word book about the whole system), from trying to think about the world and the mind in as unencumbered a way as possible.

What are we trying to talk about when we talk about the world? Most basically, we're talking about the stuff that we can see and hear and otherwise sense. Everything about anything in the world comes down to some impact on my senses, so I'm lead to something like a "bundle theory": objects are bundles of attributes, which are all empirical properties. Phenomenal consciousness on the other hand seems to be talking about the other side of that exact same thing: my "phenomenal consciousness" is the bundle of sense-experiences that I have, something like a bundle theory of self. Combine that with old philosophical adages like "to do is to be" or "to be is to do", thinking in more detail about what it means to have a sensory experience of something, and you start thinking of sense-experiences of things as interactions between yourself and them: the sight of an object just is the photons it sends my way, and its visual appearance more generally is what kind of photons it sends my way under what conditions of what photons are sent its way, what it does in response to what it done to it; specifically what it does to me, and how I interact with those photons, what my eyes are sensitive to, etc. (I'm skipping on elaborating on this for all senses because this is already getting too long). That lends to thinking about objects as being defined in terms of function, of mapping of input to output: a thing is a bundle of empirical properties, and an empirical property is a propensity to do something in response to something else. That dissolves all the philosophical problems about the ontology of physical stuff: materialism, idealism, it's all irrelevant, there doesn't have to be any substrate at all, all that matters is the network of sense-data interactions.

On a separate topic, about access consciousness, we've already got functionalism pretty well-established there: access consciousness is a kind of function, a mapping of inputs to outputs, including internal states as a kind of output, all regardless of the underlying substrate. (The exact specifics of that function are up for empirical investigation). So now that we're already thinking of all objects as functional "bundles" or nodes in a web of interactions of sense-experiences, and of phenomenal consciousness as just being on the receiving end of such sense-experiences, and of the important aspects of human consciousness being the details of our complex functional access consciousness, then it seems like phenomenal consciousness in that sense is naturally attributable to everything, and what differentiates human consciousness is the specific, complex functionality of our brains, access consciousness. All of this is completely independent of whatever any "underlying substrate" might be; we don't need to concern ourselves at all with what that is or whether there is such a thing, it makes no difference in explaining the world in as it appears to us. That dissolves all the philosophical problems about mind-body interaction and what phenomenal consciousness is, because minds and bodies are made of the same stuff and "phenomenal consciousness" (that doesn't even really deserve to be called consciousness) is a trivial aspect of that stuff, what really matters is what kind of functions are going on in human minds.

So we're basically just talking about everything in terms of exchanges of sense-data now, basically already thinking of the universe in terms of the information that describes it. When it comes to descriptions of things, there is the old adage that "the map is not the territory", but a perfect 1:1 map of something just is a perfect copy of that territory (e.g. if you build a map of a city down to the atom, what you've done is replicate the city). So whatever complete theory of everything it is that perfectly describes the physical world in every last detail, that would just be a perfect copy of the physical world. Such a theoretical model would also be an abstract object. Perfect copies of abstract objects are identical to each other, even expressed in different terms: for example the series of sets and set operations that behave identically to the natural numbers and arithmetic are considered by professional mathematicians to be the same objects and functions as the natural numbers and arithmetic, just expressed differently. So the physical world, as a bunch of (sense-)data, being indistinguishable from whatever mathematical model perfectly describes it, just is identical to that mathematical model: if you ran that model on an actual computer somehow, and it gave rise to sub-structures just like us humans in that virtual universe, those structures would find themselves having sense-experiences of an apparent physical universe just like we do. So at least one abstract, mathematical object is definitely real: the concrete, physical world. If that's the case, then like with modal realism, which addresses why the actual world exists instead of some other possible world by assuming all possible worlds exist and "the actual" world is just the one we're in, likewise we can dissolve a lot of philosophical questions about why the concrete world follows the mathematical laws that it does by assuming that all mathematical structures exists, and "the concrete" world is just the mathematical structure of which we're a part. That also then dissolves the problem of whether and how abstract objects exist, neither having to deny their reality nor having to posit some kind of weird other realm for them to exist in: they're just like the world we're familiar with, ontologically, except we're not a part of them. (Again, just like modal realism dissolves the question of the ontology of possible worlds by assuming there's nothing special about them at all, they're just like the actual world, except we're not in them).

TL;DR: the reason to think of things in this way is that it makes a bunch of apparently-intractable problems about ontology and consciousness go away like the illusory problems they are (by responding to questions about "how do you explain this special weird thing?" with "that's not weird or special, that's normal and unremarkable, everything's like that and couldn't not be"), and lets us focus instead on the contingent particulars about exactly what functions human minds and other physical objects in our actual concrete universe execute.

. And this doesn’t run afoul of physicalism on my account because the concrete physical world just is one of those forms/ideas/mathematical structures — Pfhorrest

Is 'just' that, eh? The problem with this is that sticks and stones are demonstrably different to fours and fives. Simply saying that the physical IS forms or ideas or mathematical structures, doesn't say anything meaningful.

The point where this radically diverges is that in Platonism, 'the physical' is distinguishable from the intelligible. The material domain is inherently changeable and separated from the changeless. The hoi polloi are bamboozled by appearances into believing that it has inherent worth, which generally manifests as avarice, attachment to pleasure and status, and all of the other illusory goods which worldly people pursue. Whereas 'the philosopher' ascends by dint of hard intellectual and noetic discipline to understand the source and origin of things not simply their manifestations in the world of form.

So the point which your account is lacking, is any sense of the requirement for the ascent to a higher understanding. That is preserved in science in some sense, but the consequences, in modern science, are instrumental or utilitarian, not qualitative and ethical. In other words, if we only retained the principles of Greek philosophy that were relevant to science and engineering, but jettisoned the spiritual principles that were felt to be even higher in the grand scheme - then you would have the kind of scientific philosophy that we see the effects of today.

All mammals, including humans, are Pragmatic Materialists by nature, because it is adaptive to assume that what you see is what's really out there. But humans are also capable of looking beneath the superfical surfaces to the underlying "foundational principles". Yet, what we have found there is the weird world of Quantum Physics, where the foundation of reality can be described, not in terms of macro-level space-time properties, but only in terms of arcane quantum mathematics, and of Unicorn metaphors for individual Particles that behave like holistic Waves. Counter-intuitively, "Wavicles" seem to be both particles and waves — Gnomon

But, the only reason to regard the sub-atomic domain as foundational, is a hangover from philosophical materialism and the quest to resolve everything to 'fundamental particles'. '

Although Quantum theory has turned Classical Materialistic Physics inside-out, it is now grudgingly accepted by most scientists — Gnomon

Whoa. Quantum theory as a means of prediction and control is intrinsic to all modern physics and a huge proportion of modern technology. But the interpretation of what it means is intensely contested and controversial. There is no way to claim that there is one accepted, authoritative and mainstream consensus on the meaning of physics.

I've read quite a few popular accounts of this, notably Manjit Kumar's Quantum (excellent), David Lindley's Uncertainty (3 stars) and most recently Adam Becker's What is Real? Hey, note the title! This is the question at issue!

Sean Carroll, a physicist and pop-philosopher (and a poor one, in my opinion) has just published a book assuring us that the multiverse is the ultimate reality. Yet he's also embroiled in a massive stoush with other scientists who think the whole idea is unscientific. I don't expect any of this to be resolved in my lifetime - or ever!

We have to always remember that the basic meaning of philosophy is 'love~wisdom'. We have to find some source of those qualities in our own being and the being of those around us.

Granted, but still raises the question.....why would we care about what we are not? — Mww

Hey Mww, that's an important question. We are hard-wired to care-by default-when doing philosophy. We know that the many philosophical inquiries involving declarative statements (or Kantian propositions and judgements) about our existence involve experience. And in phenomenology, if I experience something that you don't, how then do I know it exists (or vise versa)?

Said another way, how does one know if that experience exists if one doesn't experience it himself? One obvious answer is the objective/subjective truth dichotomy. But all that tells us is that there are different ways of knowing something. It doesn't explain the experience. I think it is another problem of consciousness.

For example, a musician doesn't know what it's like to be a Doctor. And even if he becomes a Doctor, he still cannot experience everything any other Doctor experiences. And the opposite is true in this sense: if a musician claims they had an ineffable experience, who would believe them?

Or, even say, if the layperson hears voices in a pre-dream state (pre-lucid state) that tells him/her to do something extra-ordinary, what should they do; who should they consult to verify its truth value? Anyway, the lists (phenomena) are endless...

I'm thinking you kinda' already know that stuff :)

But nevertheless, we can still differentiate two distinct categories of existence — Zelebg

So, what's the problem?. As far as I can tell, no one here is denying that humans have two ways of thinking about existence : sensory reality and mental ideality. Which category would you place Consciousness in : mental or physical --- or metaphysical?

unable to understand the difference between physical existence of actual electron in the outside world,virtual existence of simulated electron in a computer, and mental existence of imagined electron in the brain. — Zelebg

You equate "physical" and "actual", and I agree. But if a simulated electron is not physical & actual, what is it? Why do we call it "simulated"? If a "virtual" particle is not real, what is it? If an imaginary electron in a mind is not real, what is it? I call it "Ideal" : the idea of an electron. These are all conventional dictionary terms to describe those "distinct categories of existence".

Besides coinages for unconventional concepts (see Glossary), I do use some ordinary dictionary terms in personal ways to make a point about my personal worldview. For example, I use capitalized "Ideality" in the philosophical sense of "existence only in idea and not in reality", as the opposite of "Reality", as an allusion to the "Forms" of Platonic Idealism. Is that an example of "malfunctioning logic"? I also adopted a common philosophical term related to Aristotle's book on ideas that were not discussed under the heading of "physics" for my personal worldview. Would you place Consciousness in the category of Physics or Metaphysics?

Metaphysics --- Latin: Metaphysica, lit: "the beyond the physical". Is that hard for you to understand?

Perhaps if you will answer your own question [ "My question then, again, is whether mental existence of imagined electron is like physical existence of real electron or like virtual existence of simulated electron" ] in your own highlighted terms, we can compare terminologies to discover the cause of our failure to communicate. I'm hoping it's not due to immature robotics or a "malfunctioning logic and semantic unit". :joke:


Meta-physics :
The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value.
1. Often dismissed by materialists as idle speculation on topics not amenable to empirical proof.
2. Aristotle divided his treatise on science into two parts. The world as-known-via-the-senses was labeled “physics” - what we call "Science" today. And the world as-known-by-the-mind, by reason, was labeled “metaphysics” - what we now call "Philosophy" .
3. Plato called the unseen world that hides behind the physical façade: “Ideal” as opposed to Real. For him, Ideal “forms” (concepts) were prior-to the Real “substance” (matter).
4. Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

t seems to me you are writing about minds, not consciousness. Yes, we can look at what minds do, especially if they can talk and write. — Coben

There wouldn't be a distinction between minds and consciousness. That is just continuing to use the false-dichotomy from the material-mind paradigm. The systems paradigm doesn't reduce to either, but allows for each simultaneously to be true. Everything that emerges establishes functional systems at its own level. Consciousness qua consciousness is perfectly explicable and can be studied to the extent that its activities exhibit systematicity. Which the activities of consciousness certainly do.

If you do choose to arbitrarily sever some of those activities at a lower level (say brainstem) and say that those are "physical" that's fine too. I just finished "Chaos and Complexity in Psychology" and there is one essay on experiments studying the patterns of neural firings during specific types of thought. And indeed, there are patterns that model in non-linear terms. In fact, there are people designing neural nets now that don't solve a problem directly (the problem is coded at the level of the hidden neurons) but solve it by having the neurons link in a way that mimics neurons in the brain. So the physically-faithful neural net can solve the same problems as the concept-driven neural net, but the physical model is much larger and less efficient.