I further narrow it down to the thesis that everything that exists has a common ontological structure: a particular with intrinsic properties and extrinsic (relational) properties to other existents. This implies everything is the same kind of thing, which I label, "physical". — Relativist

I've said before, quantum physics demolishes such a Newtonian conception of reality. At the fundamental level, the properties of sub-atomic primitives are indeterminate until measured. But of course, that can be swept aside, because 'physicalism doesn't depend on physics'. It's more a kind of 'language game'.

With what model?

You’re treating the wavefunction as if it were the state of an object with determinate properties, and then explaining measurement as a change in those properties. Basically declaring that the experiment itself is an object. But the fundamental object in question remains undetermined. The formal role of the wavefunction doesn’t, by itself, supply a foundational ontology.

That's a good point. I think the issue - and this is one thinkers like Sam Harris, ever the peddler of parsimony - tend to miss: if you're going to take this bent, you best be open to truly, honestly considering the theories that come across your desk. Most will be easy to dismiss, but to become jaded is to enter into an essentially dishonest critique of your challengers. I think.

I, on the other hand, have had to do the opposite and reign in my penchant for the weird.

You can’t stipulate your way out of the uncertainty principle.

This post. You’re treating “the experiment” or “the state of affairs” as the object that perdures, so objecthood on this context is not in question. But, as you already acknowledged, the 'true ontology' is unknown. What this means is that there is not some 'actual state of affairs' or 'object with determinate properties' at the fundamental level. And this is something broadly acknowledged about quantum theory. It is why Roger Penrose is always saying that it must be false or incomplete - because, he says, it should - again, stipulative - provide a true description of what is really there, prior to any act of measurement.

I'm not going to continue to argue this point, which is simply this: that 'the thesis that everything that exists has a common ontological structure: a particular with intrinsic properties' cannot be sustained on the basis of physics.

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After this post, I'll be offline a couple of days.

but since it's inconsistent with physicalism, I lean strongly away from it. — Relativist

Why is physicalism inconsistent with a libertarian free will account?

(at least the specific form of it that I defend) — Relativist

Right, so I would need a reason that physicalism, on every interpretation, entails determinism; or alternatively, a reason why your specific form of physicalism is the correct one (were I to agree with you that determinism is entailed by physicalism).

Do you think P-zombies are a real possibility or merely something we imagine we can imagine?

No doubt you are aware of the phenomenon of blindsight where people are able to navigate environments even though they are not conscious of being able to see anything at all.

Imagine extending that syndrome to experience as a whole where someone would say they were not aware of experiencing anything, even though being able to navigate environments, guess correctly what has been said to them, guess what they had just tasted or smelt or what kind of object they had felt or touched and indeed respond to the question as to whether they experienced anything. all; without any conscious awareness of having experienced anything at all.

The P-zombie case, as specified would seem to be the very opposite to that, in that the zombie would say that they had seen, heard, felt, tasted, etc., while not having actually had any experience of anything at all.

While the experience-blindness case seems weird in that experience is occurring without being conscious of it, the zombie case seems altogether impossible in that they would be reporting experiences which, by stipulation, they didn't have.

Not sure which bullet you are referring to...

If a walking robot with a mechanical eye is approaching a cliff, and turns to avoid it, was it because there was information? Photons hit the robot's sensor, a signal traveled to the hard drive, which is programmed to turn the body away from drop greater than X.

If information can exist in the presence or absence of consciousness, then consciousness isn't part of its grounding. What is it grounded in?

I think you are talking about meaning, not information. Meaning is interpreted information. Also, there is no necessary involvement of consciousness. Machines can interpret information and derive meaning from it. — hypericin

I imagine DNA is the first appearance of information. It seems to me that the codons in DNA mean proteins. A specific string of codons S1 will always be interpreted as a specific protein P1. S1 will never be interpreted as P2.

And, in the right environment, S1 will be interpreted as P1.

Consciousness is not involved in this interpretation, which, as you say, is not necessary. A machine is not interpreting the information. And even if a machine that interprets information is not conscious, it was built by human consciousness to operate in such a way as to interpret information.

It seems the laws of physics interpret the information encoded in DNA. In fact, the laws of physics encoded the information into DNA in the first place.

Although information seems somehow parasitic on matter, in that it needs a material medium in one form or another to exist — hypericin

Although I know what you mean, I wouldn't use the word "parasitic", because information doesn't harm the material medium.

I agree that science depends on the working assumption of a reality that is what it is, independent of us. That’s the stance of objectivity, and it’s indispensable for observation, experiment, and prediction. But that stance is methodological, not metaphysical. It’s a way of working, not a complete account of what reality is. — Wayfarer

I don't think it is the case that science depends on the "assumption of a reality that is what it is, independent of us". I believe that idea is a misunderstanding of the true "objective" nature of science. Experimentation involves human action, and what we are looking for with this activity, is a reaction from our environment. So the experiment, being derived from hypothesis, is directed by the hypothesis.

This implies that any assumptions about a reality which is independent of us, are hypotheses dependent. In many cases, of scientific experimentation, the implied assumption is actually the opposite of that. This is clearly evident with the use of relativity theory in the creation of hypotheses. Relativity theory is based in the assumption that if there is a reality about what is, independent of us, this reality is irrelevant to our modeling of observed activities. In other words, the premise of relativity theory is that we can produce an adequate understanding of activities without assuming "a reality that is what it is, independent of us".

So, our attitude toward "a reality that is what it is, independent of us", need not be one of affirmation or negation, when we engage in scientific experimentation. And, I would say that this attitude, be it relativistic or non-relativistic, greatly influences the type of experiments which we design. Notice in the paragraphs above, the experiment is directed by the hypothesis, and the hypothesis is directed by the underlying assumptions or attitude.

Phenomenologists like Husserl showed that even the most rigorous scientific observation is grounded in the lifeworld — the background of shared experience that makes such observation possible in the first place. This doesn’t mean reality depends on your or my whims; it means that what we call “objective reality” is already structured through the conditions of human knowing. Without recognising this, science risks mistaking its methodological abstraction for the whole of reality.

So yes, objectivity is crucial. But it is not the final word — it’s one mode of disclosure, and it rests on a deeper, irreducible involvement of the subject in the constitution of the world - a world in which we ourselves are no longer an accident. — Wayfarer

According to what I wrote above, "reality" to a large degree does depend on the whims of individuals. That is the whims of the scientists devising the experiments. Of course these whims are shaped by the social environment, and the ideology which informs the scientific community. Notice the modern trend, which is greatly influenced by the relativistic perspective, is toward metaphysics like model-dependent realism, and many-worlds. These are ontologies which deny "a reality that is what it is, independent of us", or perhaps could be described in the contradictory way of, 'the reality that is what it is independent of us is that there is no reality which is what it is independent of us'.

Regrettably in this case I have to agree with your opponent. That is the error of psychologism. Geometric shapes and numbers are not mind-dependent in that sense at all, even though they can only be perceived by the mind. As Bertrand Russell remarked of universals 'universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.' — Wayfarer

I would say that they are not even just imagined. That is, they have a historical appearance, through writing and through language. You find a triangle in a book or on a computer. In fact, I would say that they are more perfect in both cases than in the imagination. But the most important thing is that if someone says that the contents of geometry can be reduced to psychology, that person must carry out that reduction and show it (for example, just as we can reduce Newtonian physics to relativistic physics). That case has not occurred. And I think I have explained why any attempt is doomed to failure.