Hey, that's all good, but my question was about the kinds of thinking in Aristotle and whether Aristotle's philosophy allows for incomplete knowledge or if it's already always complete. I don't feel that there was an answer to these questions in your post. This is because...

a. The fact that Aristotle might also believed in gradations of knowledge does not mean that he believed in the exact same theory that Plato's analogy points to. Also, that particular question was about the kinds of thinking, not knowledge. There might be gradations of knowledge but Gerson distinguished between knowledge (as a kind of thinking) and other kinds of thinking. Which are these other kinds of thinking (which aren't necessarily kinds of knowledge)?

b. Again, the question was about Aristotle, not Plato, the Ancients in general or Aquinas. All these might share some doctrines but their theories are not necessarily the same top to bottom; unless this is what you're arguing for of course (but if this is so, let's first focus on what Aristotle says). Furthermore, the question wasn't really related to perception or to a possible apodictic nature of rational truths. It was about the possibility of incompleteness of our knowledge, whatever knowledge is. For example, is a geometer's knowledge of his science already complete from the get go or is this completeness achieved with time? The accuracy of the knowledge he has gained at anyone point is not the issue here, I'm just asking if he knows from the start all that there is to know. Also, taking a non-science example, do we, as regular people, know all there is to know from the start according to your understanding of Aristotle?

A few points on hylomorphism. It's an odd compound word but what it means is 'matter (hyle) form (morphe) dualism'. The 'hyle' of Aristotle was the word for timber, signifying the raw material that things are shaped from. The 'form' a thing takes is like 'the impression of a seal on wax'. So until matter 'takes form' or 'receives form' then it is 'inchoate' or formless. (The emergence of order from chaos is of course one of the underlying problems of all philosophy and science.)

In this context the 'esse' means literally the 'is-ness' of a particular - what it is that gives a particular identity. (to ti ên einai, literally “the what it was to be” for a thing - SEP.) Socrates is an instance of the 'substance' (or 'type of subject') 'man', whose features (accidents) include a flat nose and blue eyes. (Note the Aristotelian 'substance' was the Latin translation of the Greek ouisia, which is nearer in meaning to our 'being' than to our 'substance'.)

But overall, I think the basic intuition of hylomorphism is still quite sound.

“EVERYTHING in the cosmic universe is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual.

Now, the process of knowledge is immediately concerned with the separation of form from matter, since a thing is known precisely because its form is received in the knower.

But, whatever is received is 'in the recipient' according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses.

If, then, the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner.

This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. 'To understand' is to free form completely from matter.

Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.

Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known.

But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

From Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.; Macmillan Co., 1941.

So, the idea here is that the rational mind recognises the form (essence, what-is-ness) of a particular, which is a purely intelligible act. The senses 'receive' the impression i.e. the physical signals of sight, sound, smell, etc, through physical means.

These are combined to form the knowledge of particular beings that the rational mind has.

Most likely, moderns will be inclined to reject the 'immaterial' nature of 'the intellect'. This actually is central to the whole scheme, however. According to Lloyd Gerson's reading, Aristotle's basic contention is that reason is inherently universalising, i.e. it operates by recognising the type or universal of particulars. This is what enables reason to compare like with like or contrast like with unlike. Reason is inherently universalising - which is a point that became lost with the advent of nominalism in the late middle ages. WIthout some concept of universals, then reason becomes progressively internal or subjectivised. (This is the subject of a lot of literature).

When it is said that A = A, this is an abstraction. It is nevertheless applicable to real particulars but only because particulars are instances of forms or types. So birds are birds, not bats, because they are of the form 'bird'. Of course this doesn't address the question of what all birds are, or what it is to be a bird. It simply states that, given that we can identify a thing by type, then such principles as 'the principle of identity' can be applied to that type. In that sense, reason is always operating according to universals or generalisations, although again that is nowadays contested because of the influence of nominalism on modern thinking. ¹

But, again, in matter-form dualism, there is at least a coherent way to account for the relation of form and matter and the sense in which 'intelligible' forms and 'mindless' matter can be understood as parts of a unified whole.

----------------------------------------------------

1. Compare Jacques Maritain:'For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).'

Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

I hadn't noticed that paragraph, but now you mention it, it is right on the mark.

To my mind, the high point of that essay is:

Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired.

Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.

In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality.

You will notice that an 'ordering grasp of reality' is almost entirely absent from the modern scientific picture, which has splintered into a trillion conjectural worlds, which only the mathematical literati can even comment on.

The human mind abstracts concepts from percepts by "sucking-out" only their logical structure (essence or meaning), and leaving behind the physical husk that our senses detect. So, which is real, and which is ideal? — Gnomon

A neo-scholastic analysis:

if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

From here

IN this picture, the intellect ('nous') is what grasps the form of things - which is their essence, meaning, or type. The physical senses receive the physical signals but the mind, nous, apprehends the form, and thereby knows what it is seeing, in a way which non-rational creatures cannot.

Nowadays, due to the influence of empiricism, we generally take the sensory domain as possessing an inherent reality, indeed as being the yardstick against which all judgement is validated. However, reason itself, which is the basis of judgement, is grounded in the recognition of the universal forms of things, which in no way can be accounted for by experience alone.

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson

So what is 'real' is the form or idea of the individual particular, and the ability to discern that form is the basis of rational thought.

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form - which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism v Naturalism

If it were only bosons and fermions that really existed, we wouldn't be able to talk at all, much less make sense of anything. — Manuel

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

Here's an index of the Dialogues in which the forms are discussed.

The key dialogue is Plato's Parmenides.

On a very general note, this lecture, Lloyd Gerson on Platonism vs Naturalism, is well worth listening to. The standout passage for me is around 38:00 with discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of universals, but take the time to listen to the whole thing when you have an hour or so.

I'm looking for books on the logical form and process of thought and its relationship to the logical form of the mind considered in itself, but cannot seem to find any. — TheGreatArcanum

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

Bolds added.

thinking is a universalising activity...This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

Nice! I have not added this truth to my collection yet. Thank you. Is this part from De Anima, as well, or is only the bold writing from De Anima?

We have the skill to judge these the same (same enough) — j0e

Shaping arrows is a skill. Reasoning is an ability which can be used to greater or lesser extent but without that ability, there is no way to develop it.

The conflation of the works of Plato and Platonism is a fundamental mistake. — Fooloso4

Lloyd Gerson refers to 'ur-platonism' in distinction to 'the philosophy of Plato'. Actually that's the substance of his book, From Plato to Platonism, which is another on my to-read list. As is Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignity of the Good.

The images of knowledge in the Republic are his exoteric teaching cleverly disguised as an esoteric teaching. — Fooloso4

I think that is at least open to debate. You already said:

I too once believed that the ascent from the cave and the power of dialectic was a description of the mystical experience of truth. I no longer see things that way. — Fooloso4

There are others that do see it that way. You may claim they're mistaken but there's no unanimity of opinion on the matter.

Plato, like Socrates before him was a zetetic skeptic, that is, one who seeks and inquires, driven and guided by his knowledge of his ignorance — Fooloso4

I bought a book called Belief and Truth by Katja Vogt. It explores these themes. Vogt is also the author of the SEP article on Ancient Scepticism.

But anyway, I will freely admit that my own knowledge of Plato is sketchy, I think it would be wise if I kept counsel unless or until I least read some of the things I'm always talking about reading (The Jowett translation of the Complete Works is available for more or less free so I'm going to go back to those, and the other sources mentioned previously.)

Concisely put, what we see in the Euthyphro is not that Socrates wants Euthyphro to give up the concept of piety. On the contrary, he wants Euthyphro to develop a broader and more precise definition that stands to reason and that, as we shall see, conveys a very profound Platonic teaching.

Socrates wants Euthyphro to expand his definition of piety from “that which is loved by the Gods” to “that which is loved by all the Gods (i.e., the divine)” and from there to what the actual nature of piety is.

Socrates starts in the role of student and keeps asking Euthyphro to teach him about piety.

Euthyphro eventually says that piety is a kind of justice

What kind of justice?

Of the kind that is pleasing to the Gods.

Socrates at this point assumes the role of teacher and suggests that piety is a form of justice that assists the Gods in achieving an act. What might this act be?

Euthyphro insists that piety is knowing how to speak and act in a way that is pleasing to the Gods.

Socrates suggests that piety must be the science of putting requests and giving returns to them (or giving and asking).

Euthyphro exclaims that Socrates understands him well.

Socrates agrees and explains that the reason he understands Euthyphro so well is that he pays close attention to everything Euthyphro says so that “nothing shall fall to the ground” (14d)

“Fall to the ground” means nothing else than “be rendered invalid”. In other words, Euthyphro’s words are accepted as valid. The concept of piety as something that is of service to the Gods stands. It only needs clarification.

The only thing that remains in need of clarification is (a) “what is the divine?” (ti esti to theion) and (b) “what is the act or work in the accomplishment of which piety can assist?”

The answer is that (a) the divine is the nous (a key conception in Plato) and that (b) its function or “work” (to ergon) is to apprehend the Platonic ideas.

Therefore, the service that piety renders to the Gods lies in aiding them to perform their “work” or function of apprehending the ideas.

The definition of “the pious” (to hosion) depends in the first place on the definition of “the Gods” and in the second on the definition of the “divine work” (to ergon) that piety is supposed to assist.

This is the true intent of the dialogue, to uphold the principle of piety whilst endowing it with a deeper, Platonic meaning.

W Gerson Rabinowitz, Platonic Piety: An Essay towards the Solution of an Enigma, Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1958), pp. 108 -120.

I think this would be an acceptable and rather neat solution (though variations of it are possible). What do you think?

Since, as we have already seen that Plato at the time of writing the Euthyphro in all probability believed in the separate existence of Forms, the appearance that the question is left open is explained (far better, in my view) by the exigencies of the dramatic dialogue structure … “

52. See Kramer 1973; Prior 2004; Fronterotta 2007

(L. P. Gerson, From Plato to Platonism, 2013, pp. 52, 58-9)

I believe that this answers Banno's objection re aporia and I don't see any arguments presented by @Fooloso4 that would successfully challenge this. — Apollodorus

Maybe I can take that. The end of Euthyphro is best understood as ironical, a tone frequently associated to Socrates.

SOC. Let us begin again from the beginning, and ask what the holy is, for I shall not willingly give up until I learn (1). Please do not scorn me: Bend every effort of your mind and now tell me the truth (2). You know it if any man does, and, like Proteus, you must not be let go before you speak. For if you did not know the holy and unholy with certainty, you could not possibly undertake to prosecute your aged father for murder in behalf of a hired man. You would fear to risk the gods, lest your action be wrongful, and you would be ashamed before men (3). But as it is, I am confident that you think you know with certainty what is holy and what is not. (4) So say it, friend Euthyphro. Do not conceal what it is you believe (5).

EUTH. Some other time, Socrates. Right now I must hurry somewhere and I am already late.(6)

SOC. What are you doing, my friend! You leave me and cast me down from my high hope that I should learn from you what things are holy and what are not, and escape the indictment of Meletus by showing him that, due to Euthyphro, am now wise in religious matters, that I no longer ignorantly indulge in loose speech and innovation (7), and most especially, that I shall live better the rest of my life.(8)


1. Thus Socrates is not clear yet about what piety is.
2. Implying that so far Euthyphro was not telling the truth.
3. Accusing Euthyphro of doing something that most men would think unjust, and covering up his shameful act with false piety.
4. Note the wording: "you think you know", which is different from knowing.
5. Ditto: "you believe".
6. Euthyphro cannot provide a concise, clear answer, and eludes the question.
7. A glimpse into Meletus' accusation that Socrates indulges in innovation and lose speech about Athenian religion.

In other words, Socrates is accused of being impious. His defense is that "pious" means everything and nothing, that it cannot be defined, that it helps justify the most unjust behaviors such as Euthyphro's, and therefore that justice should not concern itself with piety.

This is what Prof Lloyd Gerson says on the subject:

“… we may assume that, owing to Aristotle’s testimony, Plato when he wrote Euthyphro, believed in the existence of separate Forms, even though they do not appear as such in that work — Apollodorus

It's kind of obvious, really.

Let's not forget that this is a dialogue by Plato, right? Plato's main concern was not to criticize religion but to convey a metaphysical message. Socrates himself suggests that piety is of service to the Gods in aiding them to perform a certain "work". So, I think Gerson and other scholars are right.

This is what Prof Lloyd Gerson says on the subject: — Apollodorus

All well and good, but I don't want to jump the gun. I would like to see how the ideas develop in the course of the dialogues, rather than interpreting them in line with subsequent developments. (Although I will admit I haven't been devoting enough time to closely reading the actual dialogue and commentaries. )

So after reading the dialogue, do you think Euthyphro wise? — Banno

Not necessarily. Depends on what you mean by "wise" and when.

As Gerson, Rabinowitz and many others have pointed out, the dialogue appeals to the reader to follow the lead of Socratic statements like "piety is being of service to the divine (including the divine spark within the soul)" and turn their attention to the forms, patterns or models mentioned in this and other dialogues.

Of course, this is just one possible reading. What is yours?

So after reading the dialogue, do you think Euthyphro wise?
— Banno

Not necessarily. Depends on what you mean by "wise" and when. — Apollodorus

I'm asking what you think - not Gerson, Rabinowitz and many others. Do you think him wise?

For my part, he is a buffoon, a clown, a puppet made to dance to Socrates' tune, and running off when things don't go as planned.

So

Euthyphro despite his high opinion of himself is not advanced in wisdom and so should not do what he intends to do. — Fooloso4

...looks quite right to my eye; yet you questioned it.

So, do you think Euthyphro wise?

I'm asking what you think - not Gerson, Rabinowitz and many others. Do you think him wise? — Banno

I thought I had answered that already:

As for the anti-materialists, they may have no interest in Euthyphro or his father. They may read Plato to gain spiritual knowledge. Therefore, they may take another lead offered by Socrates, viz., that "piety is doing service to the divine" that dwells within the soul, and accordingly turn their attention to the forms that take them to the divine above. — Apollodorus

You implied that there may be an account in which Euthyphro is wise, and ought do as he intends. What is that account? — Banno

Anything is possible. You seem unwilling to share what you mean by "wise".

Anyway, if we were to take Socrates' alleged description of "wise" as "knowing that one does not know anything", then Socrates was possibly "wise" in that sense.

But we can't say much about Euthyphro because he never said anything that would enable one to make an accurate judgement. As a general impression, I would say he was neither wise nor unwise, just a regular guy.

Having said that, I don't read Plato to worry about this or that character. I read him to see if he, Plato, has got any metaphysical thoughts to share. And I also read Gerson and other scholars to verify if I understood him right.

Clearly, he was not such, when he denied the gods. — baker

He didn't deny them. That was the charge against him, which he denied. See Apology:

"Let the event be as God wills: in obedience to the law I make my defence ... I believe in spiritual agencies, as you say and swear in the affidavit; but if I believe in divine beings, I must believe in spirits or demigods; - is not that true? Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either Gods or the sons of Gods?"

"Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the Sun or Moon, which is the common creed of all men? You are a liar, Meletus"

"If, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfil the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the Gods, if I disobeyed the oracle [i.e. Apollo]"

Can you provide some reference for this? Because it seems to be an awfully modern, self-helpy idea. — baker

You are kidding, right?

Socrates says:
“Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise”, etc. (Thaetetus 176a – b).

See also Timaeus, Plotinus, etc. Read Rabinowitz, Gerson, etc.

N Sedley, Becoming godlike

You take Socrates' irony and false praise at first degree. That's quite foolish in my opinion. — Olivier5

You are making that up and that's quite foolish in my opinion.

I have said many times that Euthyphro is of no interest to me at all, I only want to know what metaphysical message Plato has for the reader:

Having said that, I don't read Plato to worry about this or that character. I read him to see if he, Plato, has got any metaphysical thoughts to share — Apollodorus

Plato's main concern was not to criticize religion but to convey a metaphysical message — Apollodorus

As for the anti-materialists, they may have no interest in Euthyphro or his father. They may read Plato to gain spiritual knowledge. — Apollodorus

If I wanted to read about social and cultural critique, there are many other authors to choose from.

But, apparently, you can't read other people's posts. That's why you are unaware that many scholars like Prof Gerson quoted above are of the view that the Euthyphro has a metaphysical message.

So, it reaches an impasse. It seems you now agree with @Banno and I that at least one dialogue ends in aporia. — Fooloso4

You are reverting back to materialism, aren't you? Socrates clearly makes no attempt to dissuade Euthyphro. It may at the most be said that he wants him to think about it and make a considered decision. That's about it.

However, as already indicated, the aporia regarding Euthyphro's court case or whatever isn't really the issue. The reader is left pondering and, as he thinks it over, if he hasn't already realized it, it dawns on him that Plato is really talking about "idea", "eidos", "paradeigma", "service to the divine", etc. which can only mean that the real message is metaphysical.

As shown by Gerson and others, Plato had already developed the concept of Forms. Therefore, when Plato and his immediate disciples read the dialogue, they would immediately see the words "idea", "eidos", etc., that would put them on the right track and put Euthyphro and his dilemma on the back burner. In fact, that was exactly my experience when I first read the Euthyphro.

I can understand that someone unfamiliar with Platonic concepts may read it differently. But I think it is obvious that Plato really wrote the dialogue for his disciples, for those who knew him and his thoughts, not for the uninitiated.

Do you define yourself as anti-materialist? — Olivier5

I don't define myself as anything for the purposes of this discussion. You guys are taking things too seriously just like you are taking Euthyphro's character too seriously and forget he is just a character that Plato uses to convey a message or set of messages.

Anyway, IMHO the facts of the matter are as follows:

1. The central question of the dialogue is “If x is pious, is it the case that [x is pious] obtains in virtue of [The gods love x], or is it the case that [The gods love x] obtains in virtue of [x is pious]?”

Evan’s Interpretation of the Explicit Euthyphro Argument may be of interest to those who profess an interest.

2. Another question is, in view of Plato’s well-known metaphysical ideas, does the Euthyphro have a metaphysical message?

The affirmative answer is given, among many others, by Gerson Rabinowitz, Platonic Piety: An Essay towards the Solution of an Enigma, Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1958), pp. 108 -120.

Socrates calls the Forms hypothesis in the Phaedo.
— Fooloso4

He doesn't call them that in the Euthyphro though. — Apollodorus

No he doesn't. He doesn't talk about Forms at all. He talks about one Form and calls it a pattern. He says nothing about instrumental causality, a concept of central importance to Gerson. I suspect you do not understand what you copied and pasted and used as an argument from authority.

The fact is that the Platonic Forms were simply a way of expressing abstract nouns in the same way Goddess Dike represented Justice before Plato. — Apollodorus

You're getting closer. Plato replaces the mythology of the gods with the mythology of Forms.

How is it "ignorance of the problem of interpretation"?

Interpretation has never been such a problem until the 1900's. There is a very long and well-attested Platonist tradition from Plato and Aristotle to Plotinus and Proclus all the way into modern times, which for some strange reason you choose to ignore.

See From Plato to Platonism by Gerson and other scholars if you don't believe me.

That's why I'm asking you a simple question. Why don't you try to look into how Plato's and Socrates' contemporaries would have read the dialogues if you really want to know?

But it seems that you are not interested.

Yep. If somebody asks for evidence that the Timaeus teaches atheism, that is definitely "narcissism".

And what would you call other people's refusal to back up their claims with some evidence?

As already pointed out, Gerson and other respected scholars have conclusively shown that Plato does not teach atheism.

Where does Plato say that there is a spiritual part of the soul? Certainly not in the Republic or the Phaedo. — Fooloso4

Plato clearly says, through Socrates and others, that the soul is immortal - the bit that you left out from the Phaedo in your translation. As immortal means non-physical, the soul has a part that is non-physical, i.e., metaphysical or, in modern terminology, "spiritual".

No one studies Marxism by applying chemistry or astronomy to it. Likewise, no serious scholar attempts to study Platonism from a materialist or anti-theist perspective, i.e., by denying the fundamental principles upon which Platonism is based.

There are some excellent studies of Platonism that have been published since the 1950's and 60's like From Plato to Platonism (2013) by Lloyd P Gerson who is a respected professor of philosophy and author of many academic works on the subject. As I said, it is imperative to keep up with the times, and not stay stuck in the outdated ideas of post-war neo-liberalism and intellectual nihilism.

But you may do as you please. I don't care.

There is a long and varied history of interpretation of the dialogues. In the ancient world, prior to and contrary to Neoplatonism, we find:

"In their writings the most famous philosophers of the Greeks and their prophets made use of parables and images in which they concealed their secrets, like Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato".
– Avicenna (Ibn Sina), “On the Parts of Science,” 85 — Fooloso4

I'm afraid that proves absolutely nothing. "Secrets" can mean anything. It certainly doesn't have to mean atheism and is in no way, form or shape "contrary to Platonism". If anything, as history shows, it means exactly what scholars like Gerson are saying.

Another Islamic mystic, Mansur al-Hallaj wrote “I saw my Lord with the eye of my heart”, i.e., exactly what Platonists and Christians had taught for centuries before him.

We have already seen that Plato taught that a philosopher had to become as godlike as possible. That meant seeing God within himself and experiencing a state of oneness with him. That was what
al-Hallaj did. He proclaimed (the Platonic doctrine) "I am the Truth/God".

In 922 CE al-Hallaj was executed by the Islamic authorities.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avicenna

So of course Ibn Sina would say that Plato’s teachings were secret. He didn’t want to meet the same fate as al-Hallaj. It's just common sense when you live under strict Islamic rule.

So, your own "evidence" demolishes your case rather nicely and conclusively IMHO.

And about Plato and the practice in ancient times:

"In their writings the most famous philosophers of the Greeks and their prophets
made use of parables and images in which they concealed their secrets, like
Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato".
– Avicenna, “On the Parts of Science,” 85
— Fooloso4

However, as already demonstrated on the other thread, that line of argument is too flawed to even qualify as an argument. It proves absolutely nothing. "Secrets" can mean anything. It certainly doesn't have to mean atheism and is in no way, form or shape "contrary to Platonism". If anything, as history shows, it means exactly what scholars like Gerson are saying.

Another Islamic mystic, Mansur al-Hallaj wrote “I saw my Lord with the eye of my heart”, i.e., exactly what Platonists and Christians had taught for centuries before him.

We have already seen that Plato taught that a philosopher had to become as godlike as possible. That meant seeing God within himself and experiencing a state of oneness with him. That was what
al-Hallaj did. He proclaimed (the Platonic doctrine) "I am the Truth/God".

In 922 CE al-Hallaj was executed by the Islamic authorities.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avicenna

So of course Ibn Sina would say that Plato’s teachings were secret. He didn’t want to meet the same fate as al-Hallaj. It's just common sense when you live under strict Islamic rule.

Your "argument" falls like an ill-conceived and ill-constructed house of cards.

Plato’s philosophy is a form of monistic idealism that holds that consciousness (nous) is the only absolute reality, and entails a hierarchy of realities ascending from the physical to the mental and from the mental to the supramental or spiritual, culminating in the ineffable One Ultimate Reality.

Because reality is an emanation of Ultimate Reality which is Consciousness, and is therefore, real, Plato’s philosophy may be described as realistic idealism: though the world is a product of consciousness, it is not the product of the individual mind but of the Universal Consciousness, Cosmic Intellect or Mind of God. Plato’s Forms are the product of the Cosmic Intellect.

This is 100% consistent with the Platonic texts and equally inconsistent with "atheism".

Even Wikipedia which is run by liberals and atheists classifies Plato and Platonism under Idealism.

Idealism – Wikipedia

The notion that Plato taught atheism is not only contradicted by the evidence and logic but it is a fringe theory introduced in the early 1900’s. I suspect you are drawing your inspiration from Shorey who also preached that Jesus was a Pagan and other similar ideas that were popular at the time under the influence of Marxist and Fabian Socialist deconstructionism.

Unfortunately, Shorey has long been thoroughly refuted by Gerson and other respected scholars.

Why the need to have the last word on thread that I start? — Fooloso4

No need whatsoever. As I suggested from the start, you had no chance of proving your case.

You gave me a list of authors, which is fine. But I also suggested you read Sedley, Gerson, and others, and you refused. All I'm saying is that it would have been in your own interest to familiarize yourself with a topic that has been conclusively settled.

Plato may have taught many things. Atheism wasn't one of them.