Something central to my understanding is something I learned from Klein - "the myth of anamnesis or recollection." A myth Klein points out that Socrates tells from hearsay. The significance of this should not be missed. It is something he has heard, a story, not something he knows from the experience of recollection. He shows how and why the story is problematic. — Fooloso4

The theory of recollection is a very small aspect of Plato's writing. And, where it is displayed in the Meno, it is a matter of interpretation as to whether Plato is supporting this idea, or is simply describing it. The theories of recollection, and participation, are the two principal supports of Pythagorean idealism. Socrates questions Pythagorean idealism endlessly, in the manner of skepticism. Plato exposes the weaknesses of Pythagorean idealism as the theories of participation, and recollection.

To be "Platonist", in the sense of supporting Plato as a very formative philosopher, it is is not necessary to follow Pythagorean idealism, or Neoplatonism. Aristotle rejected Pythagorean idealism, and is often claimed to have effectively refuted that form of idealism, to proceed with another form of idealism which he learned from Plato.

I appreciate the story about the pony. I am more of a donkey.

I support taking breaks.

The allegory of the cave has the philosopher return to it. Whatever good is done there does not stop it from being a cave. — Paine

Good point. What might the reformed cave look like? Would the philosophers do the very thing that Socrates was found guilty of?

However, we are not interested in the people: we are seeking the truth. — ibid. 246c

The foundations of the city and the most fundamental beliefs of the people are destroyed by the truth, for the truth is that what they believe, what they trust, what they take to be the truth itself are only images of images. Twice removed from the truth. This is why Socrates takes the old charges brought by Aristophanes more seriously than the current charges against him. He is guilty as charged.

If the philosopher is to take an interest in the people as well as the truth he cannot simply replace the images on the cave wall with the truth. He must replace the images with images of the truth. The cave remains a cave.

If the prisoner's shackles are removed and they are forcibly dragged out of the cave (515e) and not permitted to immediately crawl back in, the city and life as they know it is destroyed. We should not be too quick to assume that most would regard this as a blessing. The cave offers safety and security. It is their home. Unlike the philosopher the people may not be more interested in the truth.

Good point. What might the reformed cave look like? Would the philosophers do the very thing that Socrates was found guilty of? — Fooloso4

Your first question is very tough to answer. In the context of the Sophist, The Stranger seems to suggest that the 'reformation" will keep changing the terrain of the struggle as time goes by. But I don't see him proposing it will end. He displays confidence that the grounds will change. It is clear who he is rooting for.

On the other hand, the Stranger seems to insist upon the same separation that his Eleatic teachers did. The dangers of using forms requires a kind of hygiene:

“For instance,” said Parmenides, “if one of us is the master or slave of someone, he is not, of course, the slave 133E of master itself, what master is; nor is a master, master of slave itself, what slave is. Rather, as human beings, we are master or slave of a fellow human. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself, while slavery itself, in like manner, is slavery of mastery itself. But the things among us do not have their power towards those, nor do those have their power towards us. Rather, as I say, these are what they are, of themselves, and in relation to themselves, while things with 134A us are, in like manner, relative to themselves. Or do you not understand what I am saying?” — ibid. 133e

The "images of truth", as they relate to the cave allegory, receive a challenge outside of the allegory but not for the sake of cancelling it. In the spirit of refutation, most would have wiped the blood off their blade and re-sheathed it. Plato is saying Parmenides is doing something else.

That does not make your second question any easier but there are at least more clues in the text available to bring out contrasting themes. In my recent drive-by reading of the Sophist, I noticed two elements that previously shot over my head. One of them is the separation of class in society:

Socrates: In that case, Theodorus, are you unwittingly bringing in some god rather than a stranger, as Homer’s phrase would have it, when he says that the gods 216B in general, and the god of strangers in particular, become the companions of people who partake of true righteousness, to behold the excesses and the good order of humanity? So perhaps this companion of yours may indeed be one of those higher powers who is going to watch over and refute our sorry predicament in these arguments, as he is a god of refutation.

Theod: That is not the manner of this stranger, Socrates, no; he is more moderate than those who take controversies seriously. Indeed, the man does not seem to me to be a god at all, though he is certainly divine. For 216C I refer to all philosophers as divine.

Str: They certainly are, Theaetetus. However, it is of no particular concern to the method based on arguments whether purification by washing or medication benefits us much or little. For it endeavours to discern the inter-relation and non-relation of all the skills, with the aim of acquiring intelligence, 227B and to that end it respects them all equally. Indeed, because of their similarity, this method does not believe that one is more ridiculous than another, and it does not regard a person as more important if he exemplifies his skill in hunting, through general-ship, rather than louse-catching, though it will probably regard him as more pretentious. — ibid. 216a

This difference gets re-affirmed at other places in the dialogue. Sometimes as an unexplained reference, sometimes as a joke, sometimes as a direct confrontation:

Str: That they have shown no regard for common folk, and they despise us. For each of them pursues his own line of argument, without considering at all whether we are following what they say or are being left behind. 243B — ibid. 243a

The second element that stood out for me is the way the gentle relates to the violent, both in discourse and the possibility of 'reformation' as a process of change in the world of becoming. Note how Theodorus presents the Stranger as a minor player by saying: "Socrates, no; he is more moderate than those who take controversies seriously." The Socrates who confronts anyone who challenges him is set in contrast to this player who does not accept such terms. But the contrast between the gentle and the violent is a part of so many of the Dialogues that Theodorus must be heard as expressing a particular prejudice.

I am inclined to lean toward Klein's view of change over Strauss'. But I think Strauss is correct putting the beginning of political philosophy at the Meno rather than the Republic. Can virtue be taught? If one can ask that, the quality is manifest in some fashion. We have to start with the insistence upon it being evident.

Socrates gets Meno to accept that condition to some degree without necessarily getting him to understand much else and thus makes Socrates more 'gentle' than often represented. But Socrates also seems hell-bent upon antagonizing Antyus, representing a portion of those who did kill him.

He starts off by comparing two views of mysticism, William James' influential modern view and that of Jean Gerson writing in the 14th century. With this comparison he is able to tease out the problem with James' focus on peak experiences, and as many of the case studies show, many "mystics" focus on a great deal aside from there experiences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'd be interested to hear some of the conclusions regarding this!

So what? Well, the "objects" of the intellect are immaterial, and as we're able to perceive them, we too possess an immaterial aspect - what used to be called the soul. We're not simply mechanisms or organisms. Of course, all Socrates' arguments for the reality of the soul in Phaedo can be and are called into question by his interlocutors but they ring true to me. — Wayfarer

I apologize for the dismissive manner I dealt with this upthread. What I am trying to underline in the discussion is the particular way Plotinus offers a solution to your thesis:

For instance, he will not make self-control consist in that former observance of measure and limit, but will altogether separate himself, as far as possible, from his lower nature and will not live the life of the good man which civic virtue requires. He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods: for it is to them, not to good men, that we are to be made like. Likeness to good men is the likeness of two pictures of the same subject to each other; but likeness to the gods is likeness to the model, a being of a different kind to ourselves. — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

There are other ways of reading Plato.

What "matter" means in the different texts is not an agreed upon point of departure but what seems to require the most argument.

Quite so. I understand that Aristotle's 'hyle' was originally 'lumber' or 'timber', signifying the kind of generic material substance from which any particular might be formed. Interesting etymological point: 'matter' is derived from the same Indo-european root as 'mother', signifying the passive/receptive, 'that which is acted upon'. Form, then, is what 'actualises' the potential of matter to exist, because insofar as matter is formless, it can't be said to exist. (There's actually an ancient provenance to that idea, wherein Zeus is the 'creative principle' and earth the 'mother' - something I learned from Mircea Eliade's writings. This is reflected in the religious imagery of 'God the father'.)

In any case, the outlines of the general idea, and how matter came to be accorded primacy in Western culture, is what is of interest to me.

Given the importance to how matter plays an important role in the present thinking, can you accept that Plotinus was talking about something else?

He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods ... — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

What are we to make of this? What is the life of the gods? Can we leave behind our human life and choose the life of the gods?

I wish that there was an equivalent to Horan's translations of Plato's Dialogues available to present what Plotinus wrote. Then it would be easier to link to a source with a beginning quote and let the reader see for themselves what has been said. The source I pointed to before is weird and makes pretty plainly spoken Greek sound strange. Those words are the same that other authors use to say different things.

This OP is an orphan, abandoned by its author. I made my pitch that Plotinus is the man behind the curtain in this particular wizard of oz. I sense I have worn out my welcome.

I will try to answer your question in another place and time.

I wish that there was an equivalent to Horan's translations of Plato's Dialogues available to present what Plotinus wrote. — Paine

We have our friend @Wayfarer to thank for bringing it to our attention.

I sense I have worn out my welcome. — Paine

Speaking for myself, you are always welcome. Just leave your shoes at the door.

Doesn't this plainly disparage the notion of 'civic virtue' and 'living the life of the good man' in favour of 'leaving that behind' and 'choosing another' - the 'life of the Gods' - — Wayfarer

But the good man may not be able to live the life of the gods, nor might he want to.

What does that life look like? This:

renunciate spirituality — Wayfarer

?

Surely there is more to the life of a god.

And are there 'vast differences' between Plotinus and Plato? I readily grant at every juncture that your knowledge of the texts greatly exceeds my own, but I had thought it well-established that Plotinus saw himself as no more than a faithful exegete of Plato. — Wayfarer

Yes there are vast differences between Plotinus and Plato. Plotinus goes far beyond Plato in his theory of Forms, to propose a hierarchical order, emanation. and even assigning a position to "matter".

But the good man may not be able to live the life of the gods, nor might he want to.

What does that life look like? This:

renunciate spirituality
— Wayfarer
?

Surely there is more to the life of a god. — Fooloso4

We discussed the various examples of what I'm referring to in an earlier thread on esoteric philosophies. I seem to recall I gave the examples of Advaita Vedanta and Zen Buddhism, to which you replied something like 'you have to be prepared to believe in such things'.

There are numerous references to 'the gods' and 'the divine' scattered through the ancient texts. What does that signify to you? Remnants of archaic beliefs now superseded?

I think one of the characteristics of Eastern philosophical religions, like Advaita and Tibetan Buddhism, is that for various historical reasons they seem to have been able to maintain a closer relationship with their ancient roots. Which is why for instance a Swami of the Vedanta Order still appears in monastic robes (in his many youtube videos!) Likewise for many Tibetan Rinpoches.

Plotinus goes far beyond Plato — Metaphysician Undercover

Nevertheless, didn't he himself insist that he was simply explicating what was implicit in Plato?

Apologies to all if my above contributions have been off the mark.

We discussed the various examples of what I'm referring to in an earlier thread on esoteric philosophies. I seem to recall I gave the examples of Advaita Vedanta and Zen Buddhism, to which you replied something like 'you have to be prepared to believe in such things'. — Wayfarer

I do not recall the discussion but think it evident that if

He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

then he must have to be prepared to believe such things. Would he choose such a life if he did not believe it? But this does not get at what I am asking.

... but likeness to the gods is likeness to the model, a being of a different kind to ourselves. — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

What is the model that this is a likeness of? If for us this life is one of renunciate spirituality, is it that for the gods as well? Do the gods too have desires that they must overcome? Can we become a being of a different kind?

... but likeness to the gods is likeness to the model, a being of a different kind to ourselves.
— Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

What is the model that this is a likeness of? If for us this life is one of renunciate spirituality, is it that for the gods as well? Do the gods too have desires that they must overcome? Can we become a being of a different kind? — Fooloso4

They're foundational questions in this context. 'The gods' are, of course, those of the Greek pantheon, but from comparative religion, we learn that have much in common with the other Indo-European cultures, so there are parallels with the Indian pantheon. But in this case, they represent 'the divine' - a word is from the Indo-european root 'deva'. Notice that Parmenides' prose-poem is said to have been 'given' to him by the Goddess. The knowledge of which he speaks is rooted in revealed truth, not dialectical reasoning, although he then deploys reasoning in support of it. (I think in modern terminology, it would be described as 'trans-rational'.) But I notice references to the divine ('the devas') in many of the excepts being discussed in the thread in ancient philosophy. It is part of the assumed background of their world, and I personally think it's mistaken to regard it as a simple figment or archaic superstition, even if that is the consensus of today's disenchanted world.

Renunciate spirituality seeks to sever ties with or go beyond the sensory domain, 'the world' - the world of mundane attachments, pains and pleasures, so as to seek what Alan Watts' described as 'the supreme identity' in his book of that name. It means realising an identity with the One (or Brahman or the Godhead). Plotinus was said by Porphyry to have twice entered a state of supreme ecstasy corresponding to that awareness. It is said that his last words were 'to restore the divine (or: the god) in us (or: in you) back to the divine in the All'.

As to whether this is a realisable aim - the IEP entry on Pierre Hadot says

For all of Hadot’s evident enthusiasm for Plotinus’ philosophy...Plotinus: the Simplicity of Vision concludes with an assessment of the modern world’s inescapable distance from Plotinus’ thought and experience. Hadot distances himself from Plotinus’ negative assessment of bodily existence, and he also displays a caution in his support for mysticism, citing the skeptical claims of Marxism and psychoanalysis about professed mysticism, considering it a lived mystification or obfuscation of truth (PSV 112-113). Hadot would later recall that, after writing the book in a month and returning to ordinary life, he had his own uncanny experience: “. . . seeing the ordinary folks all around me in the bakery, I . . . had the impression of having lived a month in another world, completely foreign to our world, and worse than this—totally unreal and even unlivable.”

But I think this can be acknowledged, without thereby vitiating the mystical element in Plotinus' (and indeed Plato's) spirituality, which is a vital interpretive key in my view. Interpreted through that perspective, the meaning of the passage we're discussing sprang out at me, without any need to reference the political element of The Republic.

Incidentally, and apropos of Leo Strauss, I find a section in his SEP entry on Philosophy and Revelation:

On Strauss’s reading, the Enlightenment’s so-called critique of religion ultimately also brought with it, unbeknownst to its proponents, modern rationalism’s self-destruction. Strauss does not reject modern science, but he does object to the philosophical conclusion that “scientific knowledge is the highest form of knowledge” because this “implies a depreciation of pre-scientific knowledge.” As he put it, “Science is the successful part of modern philosophy or science, and philosophy is the unsuccessful part—the rump” (JPCM, p. 99). Strauss reads the history of modern philosophy as beginning with the elevation of all knowledge to science, or theory, and as concluding with the devaluation of all knowledge to history, or practice.

Something with which I'm in agreement. I wonder if he had any professional contact with Mircea Eliade, who was a peer at the University of Chicago during his tenure, and from whom a lot of what I've learned about comparative religion was drawn.

No reader of Natural Right and History would think that is what just got said. — Paine

Well, I'm not among them. I'm too old to go into either Heidegger or Strauss in any depth, I only mentioned it to @Fooloso4 because it is through his posts that I've become familiar with Strauss at all, and I think the section I linked to about Strauss' view of the relationship of philosophy and revelation is germane.

FWIW, I think 'revelation' is equated with 'revealed religion', thence 'religious dogma' and automatically discounted on those grounds. Whereas I think there's a religious dimension to Greek philosophy, which is neglected on that basis.

Not all discussion of religion involves the same things. And if you want to argue for some element of that, I support your effort.

But I object to this sort of tagging the donkey where simply reading what the person says makes the claim meaningless.

I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you're saying. For the last several posts, I've been addressing the issue of the interpretation of the paragraph from the Enneads that you presented, which I think I have done. The additional point I made to fooloso4 about Leo Strauss was in respect of the broader issue of the relationship between philosophy and revelation and the bearing that might have on interpreting Plotinus. It can be taken as a footnote.

Plotinus is not talking about the relationship between knower and known but the experience of being a soul descended into a body which is not its natural home:

1. Often I have woken up out of the body to my self and have entered into myself, going out from all other things; I have seen a beauty wonderfully great and felt assurance that then most of all I belonged to the better part; I have actually lived the best life and come to identity with the divine; and set firm in it I have come to that supreme actuality, setting myself above all else in the realm of Intellect. Then after that rest in the divine, when I have come down from Intellect to discursive reasoning, I am puzzled how I ever came down, and how my soul has come to be in the body when it is what it has shown itself to be by itself, even when it is in the body.
............

For this reason Plato says that our soul as well, if it comes to be with that perfect soul, is perfected itself and “walks on high and directs the whole universe”2; when it departs to be no longer within bodies and not to belong to any of them, then it also like the Soul of the All will share with ease in the direction of the All, since it is not evil in every way for soul to give body the ability to flourish and to exist, because not every kind of provident care for the inferior deprives the being exercising it of its ability to remain in the highest. For there are two kinds of care of everything, the general, by the inactive command of one setting it in order with royal authority, and the particular, which involves actually doing something oneself and by contact with what is being done infects the doer with the nature of what is being done. Now, since the divine soul is always said to direct the whole heaven in the first way, transcendent in its higher part but sending its last and lowest power into the interior of the world, God could not still be blamed for making the soul of the All exist in something worse, and the soul would not be deprived of its natural due, which it has from eternity and will have for ever, which cannot be against its nature in that it belongs to it continually and without beginning. — Plotinus, Ennead 4.8.1, translated by Armstrong

This is beyond saying that there is more than civic (political) virtue. It stands at cross purposes to the Philosopher returning to the cave to care for his fellow citizens.

It replaces the uncertainty expressed in the Phaedo with a map and a theodicy.

Strauss does make distinctions between Greek thought and 'revealed' religion that I know you would disagree with.

Strauss acknowledges that Heidegger brought the differences between our time and that of Classical Greek thought to our attention. But he opposes Heidegger in essential ways. One thing the guy saying stuff got right is:

Heidegger, in the twentieth-century, depreciates scientific knowledge in the name of historicity. — This guy saying stuff

Strauss strongly opposed that kind of historicity in Natural Right and History through his attack upon Nietzsche as the master of the practice.

I will leave it there. I need to get back to reading Plotinus.

'The gods' are, of course, those of the Greek pantheon — Wayfarer

Are they? I would think that Plotinus would agree with Socrates' criticism of the gods in Euthyphro.

The knowledge of which he speaks is rooted in revealed truth — Wayfarer

In the tradition of the Greek poets, the gods are credited as the author of the poet's works.

But I notice references to the divine ('the devas') in many of the excepts being discussed in the thread in ancient philosophy. — Wayfarer

In the Sophist Theodorus says with regard to the Stranger:

Indeed, the man does not seem to me to be a god at all, though he is certainly divine. For I refer to all philosophers as divine.

(216b-c)

In the Phaedo Socrates calls Homer divine. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)

Plotinus is not talking about the relationship between knower and known — Paine

Indeed he is not, which is why it was not relevant to the question I raised, which was about that relationship.

'The gods' are, of course, those of the Greek pantheon
— Wayfarer

Are they? I would think that Plotinus would agree with Socrates' criticism of the gods in Euthyphro. — Fooloso4

When Plotinus says:

He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

which 'gods' are they? What does 'the life of the gods' refer to?

For I refer to all philosophers as divine.

Why would he consider philosophers, in particular, 'divine'?

In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214) — Fooloso4

So if everything is divine, then the word means nothing. Is that the drift of the argument? That 'the divine' has no referent?

So if everything is divine, then the word means nothing. Is that the drift of the argument? That 'the divine' has no referent? — Wayfarer

Some things are not everything. In that short list three things are referred to as divine.


The behavior of the gods in the Greek pantheon seems to be problematic as a model.

Indeed he is not, which is why it was not relevant to the question I raised, which was about that relationship. — Wayfarer

I get that you connect your view of the 'theological' with a renunciation of the 'material' It is the trick of your pony, as you admitted upthread. You would find Plotinus good company in this regard. I suggest you read him. I am weary of being the only one in this conversation that actually quotes him. I will wait until another thread emerges before doing it again. I have worn out my welcome here and now I am wearing out my goodbye. I will take my last word here in the hope it will clarify future discussion during other OPs:

Your years long effort to see a 'theology' in Plato that others would take away from him is a fight over an undefended territory. Plato writes of his contemporaries and predecessors in a fashion where he argues for and against particular views of the divine in particular contexts and leaves it to the student to find their own way. Quite the contrast with Plotinus coming back from a visit with the One and taking questions on how others can do it.

Therefore, to find a rebuttal of Plotinus' view of political virtues, we need to find a contrast to a vision of a soul re-gaining its virtue as it separates from its body. I am reminded of an observation I made last year

The discussion of cowardice reminds me of the following from Cratylus:

What remains to consider after justice? I think we have not yet discussed courage. [413e] It is plain enough that injustice (ἀδικία) is really a mere hindrance of that which passes through (τοῦ διαϊόντος, but the word ἀδρεία (courage) implies that courage got its name in battle, and if the universe is flowing, a battle in the universe can be nothing else than an opposite current or flow (ῥοή). Now if we remove the delta from the word ἀνδρεία, the word ἀνρεία signifies exactly that activity. Of course it is clear that not the current opposed to every current is courage, but only that opposed to the current which is contrary to justice; — Plato, Cratylus, 413

Socrates is using the vocabulary of Heraclitus and connects "manliness" to the willingness to leap into battle against a 'current' that needs to be opposed. — me

Till next time in another place.

What is at the top of this top down hierarchy? Is the intelligible dependent on an intelligible being? What is the divine which constitutes an irreducible explanatory category? — Fooloso4

As you (and @Paine) will well know, in Plato, the source or upmost level of the hierarchy of being was 'the idea of the Good'. The Idea of the Good, primarily discussed in the Republic, is the highest and most important of the Forms, the ultimate principle that gives meaning and intelligibility to all other Forms and to the material world. The Good is the source of all reality and knowledge, for which the Sun is an analogy in the Allegory of the Cave. Plotinus, building on and reinterpreting Plato, posits "the One" (ta hen) as the ultimate principle, which is even beyond the Idea of the Good. The One is the absolute, transcendent source of all reality, beyond existence and discursive ideation, the ineffable and indescribable foundation from which everything emanates. In Plotinus' system, the One generates the Divine Mind (Nous), which contains the Forms, and from the Nous emanates the World Soul, which in turn gives rise to the material world.

Earlier in the thread you said: 'The gods' are, of course, those of the Greek pantheon, but from comparative religion, we learn that have much in common with the other Indo-European cultures, so there are parallels with the Indian pantheon. But in this case, they represent 'the divine'
— Wayfarer

What does it mean to conceive of the divine in personal terms? — Fooloso4

As you will also know, many elements of Platonism were absorbed into Christian theology by the early Greek-speaking theologians such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Augustine, and (Pseudo)Dionysius. It was also transformed so as to be compatible with Biblical revelation - no easy synthesis, and often with tension between them ('what has Athens to do with Jerusalem?') In any case, this is where elements of Plotinus philosophy of the One became identified with, or subsumed by, the God of Biblical revelation. Not that Plotinus would ever countenance that.

According to Dean Inge, the principle distinction between Plotinus and Christian mysticism is between Plotinus' 'henosis' (absorption into the One) and the Christian 'theosis' in which the soul is said to attain immortality whilst also maintaining an identity. (Even now, there are debates between Christians as to whether and in what sense God is personal - the distinction between 'theistic personalism and 'classical theism'.)

As far as 'the Gods' were concerned, in later neoplatonism they become identified as the Henads, intermediaries between the One and the human realm. Plotinus did not use that terminology, and like Plato tended to speak of 'the gods' as being symbolic of forces and powers. But scattered throughout the Platonic dialogues are references to paying obeisances or respect to the Gods. That doesn't make Plato "a believer" - perish the thought! - but I think it's reasonable to say that references to the Gods are a kind of shorthand for the divine, however conceived.

I don't know the history of nominalism very well, so maybe somebody can illuminate this question with some quotes from the past — Gregory

To understand nominalism, it's best to understand how it originated and what it opposed. Its origin is usually assigned to William of Ockham, famous for 'Ockham's razor'. And what was eliminated through said razor was belief in universals, which were central to the Aristotelian elements of scholastic philosophy, for example in Thomas Aquinas.

So what are universals? In Scholastic philosophy, 'universals' are abstracta that typify the shared properties or essences of particulars. These were said to be real by the scholastics, hence the term 'scholastic realism'. The reality of universals was central to debates about the nature of reality and knowledge. They argued that universals exist in three ways: ante res (before things, as ideas in the Divine Intellect), in rebus (in things, as the common attributes of individual objects e.g. the dogness of dogs, the tree-ness of trees), and post res (after things, as universal concepts such as 'dog' or 'tree'). In Aristotle 'nous' (intellect) is the faculty that grounds rational thought through the ability to grasp universals. This was distinct from sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory. The ability of the intellect to grasp universals is what enables the setting of definitions in a consistent and communicable way and explains how we can speak meaningfully about categories like 'dogness' or 'tree-ness' despite their instantiation in many diverse particulars. Realists believed that the ability to grasp universals is the unique prerogative and characteristic of reason.

See: The Theological Origins of Modernity, by M. A. Gillespie, published January 2008.

"Gillespie turns the conventional reading of the Enlightenment (as reason overcoming religion) on its head by explaining how the humanism of Petrarch, the free-will debate between Luther and Erasmus, the scientific forays of Francis Bacon, the epistemological debate between Descarte and Hobbes, were all motivated by an underlying wrestling with the questions posed by nominalism, which according to Gillespie dismantled the rational Cosmos of medieval scholasticism and introduced (by way of the Franciscans) a fideistic God-of-pure-will, born out of a concern that anything less than such would undercut divine omnipotence."

Also The Cultural Impact of Empiricism, Jacques Maritain - a good summary of the role of universals in rational judgement.

The World of Universals, Bertrand Russell (from Problems of Philosophy).

@Paine - relates to the question raised in the thread on Gerson/Aristotle.