This comes up in the Phaedo in the discussion about 'snow' as being 'a kind' on the one hand, and 'an instance' on the other. — Wayfarer

I discuss this. It is important because the same thing occurs with Soul/soul. At the approach of Heat Snow retreats but the stuff melts. Analogously, at the approach of Death Soul retreats but the soul of the man is destroyed.

So it's a question about the relationship between universals and particulars — Wayfarer

Right. Socrates' soul is of the Kind Soul, but his soul is not the Kind or Form Soul

I read the dialogues as conversations between themselves. — Valentinus

There are certain continuities that connect them. There are a few passages in the Phaedo that I compare with the Republic. I think the similarities are intentional but the differences are what shed light.

Although I think they are intended to read one against another, I also think they all stand on their own.

The salient passage

“You have spoken up like a man,” he said, “but you do not observe the difference between the present doctrine and what we said before. We said before that in the case of concrete things opposites are generated from opposites; whereas now we say that the abstract concept of an opposite can never become its own opposite, either in us or in the world about us. Then we were talking about things which possess opposite qualities and are called after them, but now about those very opposites the immanence of which gives the things their names. We say that these latter can never be generated from each other.”

At the same time he looked at Cebes and said: “And you—are you troubled by any of our friends' objections?”

“No,” said Cebes, “not this time; though I confess that objections often do trouble me.”

“Well, we are quite agreed,” said Socrates, “upon this, that an opposite can never be its own opposite.”

“Entirely agreed,” said Cebes.

“Now,” said he, “see if you agree with me in what follows: Is there something that you call heat and something you call cold?”

“Yes.”

“Are they the same as snow and fire?”

[103d] “No, not at all.”
“But heat is a different thing from fire and cold differs from snow?”

“Yes.”

“Yet I fancy you believe that snow, if (to employ the form of phrase we used before) it admits heat, will no longer be what it was, namely snow, and also warm, but will either withdraw when heat approaches it or will cease to exist.”

“Certainly.”

“And similarly fire, when cold approaches it, will either withdraw or perish. It will never succeed in admitting cold and being still fire, [103e] as it was before, and also cold.”

“That is true,” said he.

“The fact is,” said he, “in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea." — Phaedo 103b-103e

My gloss on this, is that 'concrete things', or individual particulars, are always a mixture, whereas the forms, or the ideas of things, are not. The form cannot admit opposites because it's not compounded, whereas individual particulars are compounded from essence and accidental properties. But

'On some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea.' So Socrates, whilst not the same as the idea, has or is the form of the soul, which is immortal. This or that instance of snow will melt (perish) but the idea of cold cannot perish.

//ps//And besides, if any names in Western culture live on, surely Socrates is among them. In that sense he’s certainly immortal, even if the person of Socrates is no longer.//

we must follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us (Republic 394d) — Fooloso4

But you are quoting that out of context, aren't you? Socrates was obviously talking about rational, evidence-based argument, not evidence-free speculation.

To say "Socrates says 'one must chant such things to oneself' (Phaedo 114d), therefore he indicates that he is telling myths or lies" is not really rational, evidence-based argument. It is evidence-free speculation just like your other claims about the immortality of soul, etc.

As you can see, your speculation is blatantly contradicted by Socrates' own statement to the effect that "this is the reason why a man should be confident about his own soul".

To say "Socrates says 'one must chant such things to oneself' (Phaedo 114d), therefore he indicates that he is telling myths or lies" is not really rational, evidence-based argument. — Apollodorus

That line of argument is wholly of your own creation. This is not the first time you have done this. You falsely accuse me of saying something then argue against it. It is dishonest and intended only to win arguments. It is antithetical to your claim that you are here to learn.

More than once you have done this and each time I challenge you to point out where I said what you claimed I said you go silent and move on to something else.

Isn't it just as plausible to say that the soul, which is immortal, is withdrawn from the body at death, meaning that, the body is what perishes? — Wayfarer

It isn’t “just as plausible” but far more plausible (and logical) if we read the text carefully. I think that point was already settled at page 13:

In their Introduction, Sedley & Long say:

“… in this concluding moment Socrates and his companions are in no doubt as to what it amounts to: soul must leave the body and go to Hades.” — Apollodorus

The main proof now ensues at 105c - d. Another member of the same class is soul: it always imports life to what it occupies, and is itself incapable of being dead. This is already enough to show that it is “deathless” or “immortal” (105e), in the strong sense that its death is as impossible as an even trio or a hot snowball …

The point of the argument’s continuation at 105e - 107a … is to establish a strictly supplementary point, one that at last puts to work the ‘retreat or perish’ principle … the snowball can (a) retreat from the heat or (b) stay and melt, but cannot (c) stay and become a hot snowball.

Soul, however, is a special exception. If upon the approach of death it were (b) to perish, it would also (c) take on the opposite property to the one it bears, that is, become a dead soul. Therefore in the special case of soul, perishing is ruled out, and on the approach of death there is only one thing left for it to do: it retreats …

- D. Sedley & A. Long, Meno and Phaedo

Bearing in mind that Socrates and his companions were Greeks living in 4th-century BC Athens, it follows that ‘retreat from death’ means leave the body and go to Hades as explained at 106e - 107a.

I find the most compelling and important argument in The Phaedo is the argument against the soul as a harmony. As a harmony, continues to be the populist view today as emergence; life is something which emerges from properly aligned material parts. But Socrates' argument actually demonstrates that the soul must be prior to the body, being the cause of alignment of the parts, rather than the harmony which is the result of such alignment. This is important because it provides us with the basis for understanding the nature of free will, and other fundamental ontological principles.

Socrates answers that question in the affirmative — Apollodorus

Once again you refuse to follow the argument. Claiming it is a special case is special pleading.

"Incantations" and "charms" are not in the Greek text — Apollodorus

Are you claiming that Liddell and Scott is wrong? Were they influenced by Strauss?

Hence you made them up for the purpose of Straussian esotericism and sophistry. — Apollodorus

Quoting two different translations is not making stuff up

From the IEP:

and repeat such a tale to ourselves as though it were an “incantation” (114d).

https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/

And Gallop:

-so one should repeat such things to oneself like a spell;

and Grube:

and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation

...not to tell them lies and also them them that he is telling them lies. — Apollodorus

It is your assumption that incantations and charms are lies.

I really don't think you understand universals. — Wayfarer

What is at issue is the fate of Socrates' soul. It is a question of the distinction between the particular and the universal. The immortality of universal Soul does not tell us what happens to Socrates' soul. The myths in the Phaedo are about particular souls not universal Soul.

This is what you are implying. — Apollodorus

The failure of the argument is the result of the limits of argument. No argument can determine the fate of the soul. This does not mean that myths are lies.

You are using weasel words to imply that Socrates has failed to demonstrate the immortality of the soul and is resorting to “charms and incantations” to persuade his companions — Apollodorus

These are not my words. I gave several translations with those words. In addition, you seem to be unaware that mention of charms and incantation occurs several times throughout the dialogue.

You need to show more respect for people and not constantly try to take us for a ride with unwarranted Straussianist sophistry. — Apollodorus

The translations I cited were not translated by Strauss. Strauss is not the author of Liddell and Scott lexicon. Did you just ignore all of it? Perhaps you missed it:

According to Liddell and Scott:

2 sing as an incantation, ἃ αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ X.Mem.2.6.11; χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ Pl.Phd.114d, cf. 77e; ἐ. ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Id.R.608a; ἐ. τινί sing to one so as to charm or soothe him, Id.Phdr.267d, Lg.812c, al.:—Pass., Porph.Chr.35: abs., use charms or incantations, Pl.Tht.157c; ἐπαείδων by means of charms, A.Ag.1021 (lyr.), cf. Pl.Lg.773d, Tht.149d.

From the IEP:

and repeat such a tale to ourselves as though it were an “incantation” (114d).
https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/

And Gallop:

-so one should repeat such things to oneself like a spell;

and Grube:

and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation — Fooloso4

The key concept is μέθεξις methexis, participation or sharing in the Forms:

Things exist by virtue of their participating in their distinctive being or Form (Phaedo 101c).

The soul being that which imparts life to the body (105c), it necessarily participates in the Form of Life.

The soul necessarily participating in the Form of Life, it is necessarily deathless.

Being necessarily deathless, the soul cannot die, it must retreat or be destroyed.

Being necessarily deathless and therefore indestructible, the soul cannot be destroyed, it can only retreat.

Ergo, the soul retreats away from the body and to the other world (Hades).

This is the inescapable conclusion.

It is worth noting that the dialogue is named after a person, Lysis, rather than the topic, friendship. In short, what is at issue here as in other dialogues is the question of self and other selves.

This ties in nicely with the question of the self in the Phaedo, specifically with the problem of the self as a whole and the analysis of the self as divided or doubled, that is, the place or topos of self in relationship to the separation of body and soul.

But what if participation is by departure? — Gary M Washburn

Well, if things exist by virtue of their participating in their distinctive being or Form (Phaedo 101c), then the soul becomes more real after death than in life by virtue of departing the world of sensibles and returning to the world of intelligibles where it is closer to its own being which is the Form of Life and thus more real than ever before.

This is why philosophical life according to Socrates is a preparation for death and the philosopher must aim to detach his soul from the body as far as possible in anticipation of his departure to the realm of higher realities which is the only place where true knowledge and wisdom may be attained (66e - 67a).

There is no such thing as "more or less in tune". Either the waves are in sync or they are not. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't want to get too far off topic but there is 'just temperament or intonation', 'equal temperament or intonation'. With fretted instruments such as the guitar all tunings are a compromise so that most chords with sound good wherever they are played on the neck. Some electronic guitar tuners allow for 'sweetened tunings'. There is an old joke when tuning: "close enough for rock and roll".

See this article on ancient tuning methods: https://ancientlyre.com/blogs/blogs1-f324d18b-4152-49e5-aa3c-6539ac974916/posts/ancient-tuning-methods

The problem is that while the intervals of perfect 4th and perfect 5th sound in tune other intervals such as the major 3rd do not. The Wiki article on Pythagorean tuning:

"The Pythagorean system would appear to be ideal because of the purity of the fifths, but some consider other intervals, particularly the major third, to be so badly out of tune that major chords [may be considered] a dissonance."

Either the waves are in sync or they are not. Either it's in tune or not, — Metaphysician Undercover

"One must therefore suppose that a harmony does not direct its components, but is directed by them". — Metaphysician Undercover

The first is true independent of any instrument. The second is true of a particular instrument. The first is about the ratio of frequencies. The second about whether those relations are achieved on a particular instrument.

of all the parts of a man, can you mention any other part that rules him than his soul — Metaphysician Undercover

In the Republic the problem is not between the parts of the body and the soul but which part of the soul. The answer is reason. In addition, appetites are treated as a part of the soul and not the body. The conflict is within the soul, not between soul and body. Also the soul in the Republic has parts but in the Phaedo it is denied that it has parts.

Claiming this to suggest self-hood as the theme of the dialogue hangs on a pretty slender thread. — Gary M Washburn

It is not that "self-hood" is the theme. In the specific sense what is at issue is what will happen to Socrates, and more broadly what happens to us when we die, what will happen to me myself and you yourself. It is addressed in terms of the soul rather than the self, of a part rather than the whole. Comparing the analysis of the soul in the Republic and Phaedo points to the problem.

It is a dangerous matter, too, to assume Socrates is ever serious about drawing conclusions, other than to discourage them. — Gary M Washburn

I think that Socrates was a zetetic skeptic. I also think that he was aware that this could be a dangerous attitude for most people.

Your point is well taken that Socrates demands direct engagement with ideas from his interlocutors and eschews arguments based upon authority.
It is also true the conversations between say, Socrates and Cebes in the Phaedo and Socrates and Theodorus in the Theaetatus, are shaped by the degrees of mutual understanding possible between one and the other.

On the other hand, so much of the work of Socrates was to question what "personal" expressions of experience might mean seen against the background of our world.

There is the drubbing of Protagoras in Theaetatus claiming "man is the measure of all things."

In the Philebus, Socrates influences the views of Protarchus concerning the centrality of pleasure in human experience by prefacing his argument thusly:

"Well then, Protarchus, don't let us shut our eyes to the variety that attaches to your good as to mine. Let us have the varieties fairly before us and make a bold venture in the hope that they may, on inspection, reveal whether we ought to give the title of the good to pleasure or to intelligence or to some third thing. For I imagine we are not striving merely to secure a victory for my suggestions or for yours; rather we ought both of us fight in support of the truth and the whole truth."
-translated by R. Hackworth, section: 14 b

In the Cratylus, Socrates moves Hermogenes to accept that the meaning of names is neither completely arbitrary or necessary. In the latter part of the dialogue, Socrates argues with Cratylus about the importance of the original "namers', saying:

"Socrates: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and analyzes their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?
Cratylus: How so?
Socrates: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified?
Cratylus: True
Socrates: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find themselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?
-translated by Benjamin Jowett, section 436a

There are many other ways to portray the demand for a universal truth over other kinds but I will stop here to see what you say in response.

The epistemological issue is that this principle of unity is not something that exists on the objective plane; it is not an object of perception; it can't be discerned objectively. It is conceptually nearer to 'harmony', as has been discussed in relation to the analogy of the lyre, in the sense that it is a consequence of the dynamic balance of a number of otherwise discrete factors to generate a (transcendent) whole, allegorically like the sounding of a chord (hence the allegory.) — Wayfarer

Sure. However, the allegory does not refer to the sound. Harmonia here does not have the sense of sound but of state or condition (of being joined together), that renders the instrument capable of producing sound, i.e. a harmony of the component parts of the lyre.

Simmias' mistake is to hold that the soul is a harmony of the constituent parts of the body. It is this that leads him to make the analogy.

That this is how harmonia is intended is clear from Socrates’ statement at 92a - b:

And Socrates said: “You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body. For surely you will not accept your own statement that a composite harmony existed before those things from which it had to be composed, will you?”
“Certainly not, Socrates.”

The soul pre-existing the body, it cannot be compared to the harmony of the lyre that only comes into being after its components have been assembled.

The soul being non-composite, it cannot be compared to a harmony that is composite.

The soul being devoid of degrees, it cannot be compared to a harmony that has degrees, etc., etc.

Simmias’ theory fails from the start. That’s why Socrates mocks the idea at 86d.

Then Socrates, looking keenly at us, as he often used to do, smiled and said: “Simmias raises a fair objection. Now if any of you is readier than I, why does he not reply to him? For he seems to score a good point.

On the one hand, by dividing Socrates into two, body and soul, Socrates himself cannot be found. On the other hand, the arguments for an immortal soul all fail, but further, the idea of an independent soul is incoherent. — Fooloso4

From an encyclopedia article on the Phaedo:

Known to ancient commentators by the title On the Soul, the dialogue presents no less than four arguments for the soul’s immortality.

So, it's your view that none of the arguments succeed?

For you which you think that the text offers no real explanation? — Wayfarer

It does. Once again

“ For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death.” (91b) — Fooloso4

This is the same thing he said in the Apology:

“...to be dead is one of two things: either the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything, or [death] happens to be, as it is said, a change and a relocation or the soul from this place here to another place .”(40c).

The problem that must be faced in the Phaedo is fear of death. One has it within their power to live in such a way as to avoid fear of punishment for wrongdoing in death. What about the fear of nothingness? Here the practice may involve meditation along the lines of Epictetus:

“Why should I fear death? If I am, then death is not. If Death is, then I am not.”

It is entirely consistent with the text to think that Socrates' self-persuasion may be, in whole or in part, along these lines.

There is certainly nothing of what we would accept as empirical proof, but that says as much about our beliefs and standards as it does about Socrates'. But he thinks it is 'fitting' - suitable, reasonable - even if it can't be proven to a 'sensible' man. — Wayfarer

First, empirical evidence is not a modern invention. Second, my response said nothing about empirical proof. What I said is that the arguments fail. I also said that this is a matter of the limits of argument. The limits of argument is the central theme of the text, literally occuring at the center.

The problem that must be faced in the Phaedo is fear of death. — Fooloso4

I think that it's the fact of death that is at issue. Immediately prior the first passage quoted is:

For when they argue about anything, they do not care what the truth is in the matters they are discussing, but are eager only to make their own views seem true to their hearers. And I fancy I differ from them just now only to this extent: I shall not be eager to make what I say seem true to my hearers, except as a secondary matter, but shall be very eager to make myself believe it. For see, my friend, how selfish my attitude is. If what I say is true, I am the gainer by believing it; and if there be nothing for me after death, at any rate I shall not be burdensome to my friends by my lamentations in these last moments. And this ignorance of mine will not last, for that would be an evil, but will soon end.

Bolds added. It's a sentiment very like Pascal's Wager, I'd wager. Nothingness is nothing to fear, but it's only one of the possibilities, no more certain than the alternative.

I bolded the passages in order to dispel the notion that Socrates believes that the soul is immortal. — Fooloso4

Well, I don't think you have succeeded in doing that. The conventional view was that Phaedo presents four arguments for the soul's immortality, and I see no reason to doubt that Socrates believes them to be true. The passage about misologic is simply a warning not to be too easily convinced by false arguments, so as to become cynical. So I think in this regard, we will have to agree to disagree, but as said before, I have benefitted a lot from this thread, as it has made me pay much more attention the text.

there are differences — Valentinus

Some, but the point remains.

I don't think this is quite what he is saying. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is what he says:

“… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.” (92a)

“... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease.” (95d)

“Answer me then, he said, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living?

Cebes: A soul.” (105c)

That is the problematic perspective further analyzed to a great extent in the Timaeus. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether or not the perspective is problematic is not at issue in the Phaedo.

To say that there is a body first, and then life is put into it is not consistent with our observations of living things. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet, that is what is said. You are trying to do two different things at the same time. On the one hand, you argue about what the text says, and on the other reject what the text says without distinguishing between the two.

To deny that there is a Form Harmony is arbitrary. The term is used in different ways with regard to different things. Here, given Simmias' analogy, musical harmony must not be ignored. Harmony itself is not the harmony of a particular lyre. The ratio of frequencies exists independently of any instrument. The octave is 1:2, the 4th is 4:3, the 5th is 3:2. It is not just the sounds that are harmonious. In the Republic he says that these numbers are harmonious. (531c) These are things known to the intellect, not to the senses. There are of a Kind distinct from their opposite, Dissonance.

It is probable that as the eyes are fixed on astronomy, so the ears are fixed on harmonic movement, and these two kinds of knowledge are in a way akin, as the Pythagoreans say and we, Glaucon, agree ...

we'll inquire of the Pythagoreans what they mean about them ... (Republic 530d-e)

It isn't these men I mean but those whom we just now said we are going to question about harmony.
They do the same thing astronomers do. They seek the numbers in these heard accords and don't rise to problems, to the consideration of which numbers are concordant and which are not, and why in each case. (Republic 531c)

The numbers in the heard accords are the ratios of the octave, fourth, and fifth. Knowledge of harmonic movement is not auditory, in is intelligible, it is knowledge of the ratios. What all harmony, whether it is music or parts of the soul or body or city, has in common is proper proportions of the parts or elements. It is not just a mixture or an ordered arrangement, it is a properly proportioned arrangement, one with the correct ratio of parts.

Simmias says:

... the tuning is something invisible and bodiless and something altogether divine in the tuned lyre ... (Phaedo 86a)

The tuning is not the thing that is tuned. The tuning is the octave, 4th, and 5th, the ratios according to which the strings of a lyre are tuned. Analogously, the tuning of the parts of the body too is in accord with the proper ratios. Again, the tuning should not be confused with the body that is tuned.

I already explained how this interpretation is faulty. "The tuning" is the act which tunes. — Metaphysician Undercover

The tuning is not the act of tuning, it is the ratio of frequencies according to which something is tuned.

... the tuning is something invisible and bodiless and something altogether divine in the tuned lyre ... (Phaedo 86a)

The soul accordingly is the attunement, the harmony, the condition of the body, not the act of tuning or something that does the tuning.

The cause of the lyre being in tune is not the activity of tightened and slackens the strings. If I give you a lyre you cannot tune it unless you know the tuning, unless you know the ratio of frequencies. It is in accord with those ratios that the lyre is in tune. The cause of the lyre being in tune is Harmony.

You continually ignore Socrates' reference to the activity of the soul — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether the body requires something else acting on it is never discussed. Simmias says:

... our body is strung and held together by warm and cold and dry and wet and the like, our soul is, as it were, a blend and tuning of these very things, whenever, that is, they're blended with one another in a beautiful and measured way. (86c)

The soul is embodied. It exists when the body is in a harmonious condition. This is never pursued because he has accepted that the soul is prior to the body based on the story of recollection.

Harmonia here does not mean a harmony in the sense of melodious sound

That is correct. That is the point of the quote from the Republic in my last post:

It isn't these men I mean but those whom we just now said we are going to question [the Pythagoreans] about harmony.
They do the same thing astronomers do. They seek the numbers in these heard accords and don't rise to problems, to the consideration of which numbers are concordant and which are not, and why in each case. (Republic 531c)

These numbers are the ratios identified by the Pythagoreans. As I said above:

Knowledge of harmonic movement is not auditory, in is intelligible, it is knowledge of the ratios. What all harmony, whether it is music or parts of the soul or body or city, has in common is proper proportions of the parts or elements. It is not just a mixture or an ordered arrangement, it is a properly proportioned arrangement, one with the correct ratio of parts. — Fooloso4

The Republic is a different dialogue with different arguments.

There is no mention of proportions in Simmias' argument in the Phaedo.

Pythagoras does not say that harmony is not mixture or ordered arrangement.

A mixture or ordered arrangement is a mixture or ordered arrangement irrespective of "proportions".

If the text says "mixture", "blend", "composite thing", then it is totally wrong to claim that it does not say that.

Ditto, if the text defines "attunement" as "composite thing composed of the features of the lyre as the soul is composed of the features of the body when these are held taut" (92a - b), then it is unacceptable to say that this is not the case.

On Simmias' account the attunement is not separate from the lyre, in the same way the soul is not separate from the body but is made of bodily elements, air, fire, earth, water, and their properties (86b).

If the attunement is like the soul which Simmias says is composed of bodily elements, then the attunement is composed of the elements of the lyre, i.e. body of the lyre, strings, etc.

Were this not the case, the comparison would be invalid from the start and would not stand for even a second.

Plus, Simmias eventually dismisses his own argument and chooses recollection and immortality of the soul as the correct argument (92d - e).

Do you not grasp the "ing" suffix on "tuning"? — Metaphysician Undercover

When he says:

...the tuning is something invisible and bodiless and something altogether divine in the tuned lyre ... (Phaedo 86a)

he is not talking about some invisible act. The tuning of what is tuned is not the act of tuning, but rather the result. When a musician asks "what is the tuning" she is asking what the pitches are. [Edit: Examples: open E tuning, E flat or half-step down tuning, drop D tuning]

noun [ U ]
the way an instrument or a string on an instrument is tuned:
The tuning on this piano is awful.

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/tuning

However, there is still a need for an "efficient cause", as the source of activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

From the Stanford article quoted above:

Philolaus presented a medical theory in which there was a clear analogy between the birth of a human being and the birth of the cosmos. The embryo is conceived of as composed of the hot and then as drawing in cooling breath immediately upon birth, just as the cosmos begins with the heat of the central fire, which then draws in breath along with void and time from the unlimited.

In the case of the cosmos as a whole, as we have just seen in Fr. 6, Philolaus argues that three starting points must be assumed, limiters, unlimiteds, and harmony, as a third element to hold these two unlike elements together.

There is in this theory no outside agent or principle acting:

Philolaus begins his book:

Nature (physis) in the world-order (cosmos) was fitted together out of things which are unlimited and out of things which are limiting, both the world-order as a whole and everything in it. (Fr. 1)

the requirement of something else acting on it is discussed, throughout 94 — Metaphysician Undercover

I was referring to Philolaus' argument. There is not discussion of Philolaus' argument. No discussion of a self- contained, self-sufficient system of limiters and unlimiteds, tied together by harmony.

I'm afraid it looks like Fooloso4 is totally unaware of the fact that the discussion is not about Pythagoras or Philolaus but about Simmias. In the Phaedo. Not in some other book, world or universe.

Admittedly, the confusion sometimes arises from the fact that Ancient Greek harmonia is not the same as English "harmony".

In English, the primary meaning of "harmony" is "combination of simultaneously sounded musical notes, especially as creating a pleasing effect".

In Greek, the primary meaning of harmonia is "a joining or fitting together". It does not even need to be a particularly good or "harmonious" one.

In musical terms, harmonia can mean the stringing of an instrument, a scale, mode or harmony, or music in general.

There is no doubt that various theories comparing the soul with a "harmony" were in circulation and that Simmias uses one version of these in his own argument.

However, it is clear from the context that in Simmias' argument, harmonia refers to the combination of the various parts of the lyre, viz., body, strings, pegs, notes, etc. that together make up the state of the instrument that enables it to produce the desired sound.

It is precisely for this reason that harmonia in better translations like the one by Sedley and Long (that I am using), is rendered as "attunement", not "harmony".

As Sedley and Long point out, "no reliable source explicitly attributes to him [Philolaus] the thesis that soul is an attunement" (p. 78).

In fact, there is no evidence that would link Simmias' argument with any theory of soul other than the one he himself describes in the dialogue, period. And what that theory is, I think has been more than sufficiently demonstrated.

As already stated, had "ratio", "proportion", or anything of that kind been central to Simmias' argument, he would have made this very clear. Instead, both he and Socrates keep talking about component parts of the body (elements and their properties) and of the lyre (lyre, strings, notes), and of both soul and attunement as being a "blend" or "compound" of those parts.

IMHO instead of making up his own dialogue, Fooloso4 should concede that he is mistaken and that he has lost the argument. Unfortunately, when people have taken the path of Straussian esotericism and sophistry, they are in constant danger of becoming lost in a fantasy world where every word, sentence or paragraph has a "secret meaning" that they alone can know and interpret for the rest of us ....

where Socrates corrects Simmias,.with a more true description of "tuning" — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not a correction. It is a series of weak arguments.

“Therefore it follows from this argument of ours that all souls of all living beings will similarly be good if in fact it’s similarly the nature of souls to be this very thing - souls.” (94a)

The argument is as follows: soul is an attunement, vice is lack of attunement, and so the soul cannot be bad and still be a soul because it would no longer be an attunement. What is missing from the argument is that being in or out of tune is a matter of degree. Vice is not the absence of tuning but bad tuning.

You previously denied that something can be more or less in tune, but, as any musician or car mechanic can tell you, that is simply not true.

At 94b Socrates locates the passions in the body. This is questionable. In fact, so questionable that in the Republic he locates the passions in the soul.

The problem with 94c is that there is such a thing as singing out of tune, internal conflict, acting contrary to your own interests, and so on.

Socrates closes this discussion by citing the authority of Homer, the “Divine Poet” (94e-95a). He uses Homer’s authority in support of his argument against attunement on the grounds of the separation of body and soul, and the rule of the soul over the body. But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger, not the soul controlling the body. But according to Socrates' claim that the soul is without parts and so he cannot account for the soul controlling itself.

In the Republic passions and desires are in the soul. It is a matter of one part of the soul ruling over the other parts of the soul. Why does Socrates give two very different accounts of the soul? Does the soul have parts or not? Are desires and anger in the soul or in the body? Why would he reject attunement in the Phaedo and make it central to the soul in the Republic?

You are refusing to accept Socrates' correction — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not a correction, it is a different concept of the soul. It is a soul that is completely separate from the body. This raises a host of problems. In addition to those above there is the problem of the identity of Socrates himself. He is neither his soul or his body. And if he is some combination then Socrates does not survive death.

Yes, that's the whole point, in that theory, the one offered by Simmias, there is no outside agency. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no need for outside agency. This view is much closer to our scientific understanding of physiology and homeostasis.

There is no need for outside agency. This view is much closer to our scientific understanding of physiology and homeostasis. — Fooloso4

You might place the agency within, as immanent, but the main point is the lack of agency in Simmias' argument. And, when agency is accounted for the agent must be prior to the body, because the body only exists as an organization of parts. Therefore a separate soul, prior to the body is a necessary conclusion.

It is not a correction, it is a different concept of the soul. It is a soul that is completely separate from the body. — Fooloso4

It is a correction, a move toward a more realistic conception of the soul. It's more realistic because agency is a very real part of life (look at Aristotle's potencies of the soul, self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, intellection), and therefore must be accounted for. And when it is accounted for, the agent which causes the parts to be ordered is necessarily prior to the ordered parts, which is the body. Therefore it is necessary to conclude the existence of a soul which was prior to, and independent from the body.

The argument is as follows: soul is an attunement, vice is lack of attunement, and so the soul cannot be bad and still be a soul because it would no longer be an attunement. What is missing from the argument is that being in or out of tune is a matter of degree. Vice is not the absence of tuning but bad tuning. — Fooloso4

We went through this already, bad tuning cannot be called tuning. If I go to an instrument and start adjusting it to put it out of tune, I am not tuning the instrument. One can change the tuning, by altering adjustments, but if you move toward being out of tune, this cannot be called "tuning".

You continually refuse to recognize that tuning is an act, so you refer to "the tuning", as a static state, But if you would recognize the true nature of tuning, as an act which cause the instrument to be in tune, you would see that if you change the instrument in the wrong direction it cannot be called "tuning".

This is why at 92, the soul as a harmony (static thing), is contrasted with learning (an activity) as recollection The two are incompatible because one is described as a static thing while the other is an activity. What Socrates demonstrates is that "the soul" is better described as an activity "tuning", which causes the harmony, rather than the static thing which you all "the tuning". But since "the body" is understood as a thing, this produces the necessary separation between soul and body.

You previously denied that something can be more or less in tune, but, as any musician or car mechanic can tell you, that is simply not true. — Fooloso4

The point is that the activity, which will affect "the tuning", which we call "tuning" when we respect the "ing" suffix, will alter the instrument in one way or the other, and if it is the other, it cannot be called "tuning". You continually deny the reality that "tuning" properly refers to an activity, insisting that it means "in tune".

The problem with 94c is that there is such a thing as singing out of tune, internal conflict, acting contrary to your own interests, and so on. — Fooloso4

Right, this is acting in a way which is contrary to the direction of the soul, and the reason why the soul needs to inflict harsh punishment to break bad habits, as described. It is not a problem to Socrates' argument, but the first step to you acknowledging the difference between a static state, and an activity. You think there is a problem, but it only appears as a problem because you haven't moved toward recognizing "the soul" as an activity, and breaking away from that static state you call "the tuning". That's why the soul is a "form" for Aristotle, and forms are actualities.

In the Republic passions and desires are in the soul. It is a matter of one part of the soul ruling over the other parts of the soul. Why does Socrates give two very different accounts of the soul? Does the soul have parts or not? Are desires and anger in the soul or in the body? Why would he reject attunement in the Phaedo and make it central to the soul in the Republic? — Fooloso4

I do not see that this is a "different account". The soul, as an activity which rules over all the parts of the body must be present to all parts. So passions and desires, as emotions, are movements of the soul, and there is no inconsistency.

. In addition to those above there is the problem of the identity of Socrates himself. — Fooloso4

I don't see any problems above, except your failure to recognize the distinction between an activity and a state. I agree that "identity" is an issue when we assign personality to an activity, but that's why Aristotle formulated the law of identity, in an explicit way, to resolve this problem. Aristotle's law of identity allows that a thing which is changing may maintain its identity as the same thing, despite changing.

Dreams are a bit of a mystery. — Amity

Socrates obeys what the dream commands so as to acquit himself of any impiety. (60e) Only now, at the end of his life, he doubts that he has not obeyed by philosophizing. And it is only by chance that his death was postponed. Since the same dream visited him often in his past life, it is curious that he remembers the dream but only now questions he was doing what it asked.

So, whose voice would be it be ? That of his daemonion ? Some kind of a spirit ? — Amity

Plato's Socrates says that his daemonion only warned him about what not to do. Xenophon's Socrates tells a different story.

But why would it need to do that - if it is a source of inspiration, then Socrates already has it in spades. — Amity

I think it is Plato's way of telling us that what follows should be regarded as stories rather than reasoned arguments.

Does S. then see himself as a poet, even as he makes arguments ? — Amity

I think his intention is, like that of the sophists, to persuade. This leads to the question of the relationship of the sophist and the poet to the philosopher. Rather than attempting to resolve that problem I will leave it open, because I think that tension is always at play in the dialogues.

Why, if he was being encouraged to 'make music and practise it' - or rhythmic lyrics - would he dismiss his own talent and rely on second-hand material? — Amity

I will be addressing that.

a comedy or tragedy
— Fooloso4
Both ? — Amity

Yes. The idea of opposites not being mutually exclusive will come up several times.