That is not the sort of immortality many are hoping for — Valentinus

I follow. I don't think the eschatology is by any means worked out or finalised. This comes up in the Phaedo in the discussion about 'snow' as being 'a kind' on the one hand, and 'an instance' on the other. So it's a question about the relationship between universals and particulars which was of course to continue being explored for millenia thereafter before petering out in the mangrove deltas of modernity.

But, confining the discussion to what is said and implied in the Phaedo, I think it's still fair to say that the intimation of the immortality of the soul seems more than just a wish.

//ps// Incidentally, check out this title. It's on my to-read list.

The immortality of universal Soul does not tell us what happens to Socrates' soul. The myths in the Phaedo are about particular souls not universal Soul. — Fooloso4

Perhaps the division is not hard and fast.

“The fact is,” said [Socrates], “in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea." — Phaedo 103e

But according to my Liddell and Scott, psyche is breath. Seeing spirit in it seems 'vaporous'. — Gary M Washburn

Well, I think my LSJ shows very clearly that the primary meaning of ψυχή psyche is “life” and, by extension, “soul” exactly as Socrates says.

In addition:

Hom. usage gives little support to the derivation from ψύχω 'blow, breathe'; “τὸν δὲ λίπε ψ.” Il.5.696 means 'his spirit left his body', and so λειποψυχέω means 'swoon', not 'become breathless'

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=yuxh%5Cn&la=greek&can=yuxh%5Cn0&prior=th\n&d=Perseus:text:1999.01.0169:text=Phaedo:section=64c&i=1#Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=yuxh/-contents

But here are some examples from the Phaedo:

1. “Then,” said he, “when does the soul attain to truth?” 65b
2. “if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone” 66d – e
3. “But perhaps no little argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead the soul still exists and has any power and intelligence.” 70b
4. “And such a soul is weighed down by this and is dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the other world” 81c
5. “philosophy, taking possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and tries to set it free … and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means” 83b

So, in your opinion, "breath" attains to truth; we behold with the eye of "breath"; "breath" has power and intelligence; "breath" fears the invisible and the other world; philosophy takes hold of the "breath", etc, etc.?

In the Greek original ψυχή psyche “soul” occurs about 80 times:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/searchresults?q=yu%2Fxw&target=greek&doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0169&expand=lemma&sort=docorder

IMHO even if it were used in the sense of “soul” just in the five examples above, this would still indicate that it was used by Socrates in the sense of “soul”.

The first is true independent of any instrument. The second is true of a particular instrument. The first is about the ratio of frequencies. The second about whether those relations are achieved on a particular instrument. — Fooloso4

The second is always true regardless of the instrument. That's what I've been explaining to you, the temporal aspect of Socrates' argument. The harmony is the effect of, therefore caused by, the appropriate tuning. It does not direct the tuning. That's what Socrates is saying, a harmony does not direct the parts which it is composed of, to create itself. This is the key point, what directs the tuning is the mind with some mathematical principles, and harmony is the result, or effect of that direction. The soul is more like the thing which does the directing, therefore the cause of the tuning, rather than the result of the tuning, the result being the harmony itself, which is produced.

In the Republic the problem is not between the parts of the body and the soul but which part of the soul. The answer is reason. In addition, appetites are treated as a part of the soul and not the body. The conflict is within the soul, not between soul and body. Also the soul in the Republic has parts but in the Phaedo it is denied that it has parts. — Fooloso4

We are discussing the Phaedo here. Do you agree that Socrates' argument is that the soul is more like the thing which directs the parts, as the cause of harmony, rather than like the harmony which is the result, or effect of being so directed. If you agree that this is Socrates' argument, do you also agree with this principle in general?

The conventional view was that Phaedo presents four arguments for the soul's immortality, and I see no reason to doubt that Socrates believes them to be true. — Wayfarer

Socrates himself is never persuaded by conventional views. If you have followed the arguments yourself and found them convincing and do not think my arguments showing them to be problematic to be convincing then we are at an impasse.

The passage about misologic is simply a warning not to be too easily convinced by false arguments, so as to become cynical. — Wayfarer

The problem is deeper than that. Of course one should not be convinced by false argument, but how do we know which arguments are false?

Phaedo:
“ Who knows, we might be worthless judges, or these matters themselves might even be beyond trust.” (88c)

Echecrates:
“'What argument shall we ever trust now?” (88d)

… when someone trusts some argument to be true without the art of arguments, and then a little later the argument seems to him to be false, as it sometimes is and sometimes isn’t, and this happens again and again with one argument after another. And, as you know, those especially who’ve spent their days in debate-arguments end up thinking the’ve become the wisest of men and that they alone have detected that there’s nothing sound or stable - not in the realm of either practical matter or arguments - but all the things that are simply toss to and fro, as happens in the Euripus, and don’t stay put anywhere for any length of time.” (90b-c)

From the first part of the last quote one might conclude that having the art of argument is the solution, but the second part indicates that it can be part of the problem.

I have benefitted a lot from this thread, as it has made me pay much more attention the text. — Wayfarer

Glad to hear that. In my opinion, no interpretation is final or definitive.

I think you are being taken for a ride. There is no "Form of Harmony".

The terms “harmonious body” or “harmonious” anything do not occur in the dialogue. There is harmonia, “attunement”, but that is Simmias’ Pythagorean theory that has nothing to do with Socrates’ or Plato’s Theory of Forms.

There is no “Form of Harmony” in Plato for the simple reason that what we call “harmonious” in Modern English, is “rightly-ordered” or “just” (depending on the context) in Plato. So, the corresponding Form would be Justice, not “Harmony” which does not exist.

In Plato, the proper functioning of a whole, be it a city or a human, is not harmony but justice or righteousness (dikaiosyne). Dikaiosyne is the state of the whole in which each part fulfills its function:

Plato finds justice in the city to consist in each part “having and doing its own,” and since the smaller is just like the larger, justice in the individual consists in each part of the psyche doing its own work.

Justice as a Virtue - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Plato's dialogues are not about harmony but about justice or righteousness, i.e. proper or right order as a reflection of the cosmic order which in turn is a manifestation of the Good.

The soul, according to his argument, brings life to the body. — Fooloso4

I don't think this is quite what he is saying. In fact, this is the problematic perspective which Plato believed needs to be clarified. Think about what you're saying, that there is a body, and the soul brings life into it. This is not right. The body does not come into existence without life in it, as if life is then brought into the body. That is the problematic perspective further analyzed to a great extent in the Timaeus. To say that there is a body first, and then life is put into it is not consistent with our observations of living things. The living body comes into existence with life already in it. So it's not a matter of the soul putting life into an already existing body. This is why Plato posited a passive receptacle, "matter". The form is put into matter, which is the passive potential for a body, and then there is a body. But matter is not by itself a body, as Aristotle expounds, it is simply potency which does not exist as a body, because it requires a form to have actual existence.

So we are lead toward the conclusion that life creates the very body which it exists within. And this is why Aristotle defined soul as the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it, to emphasize that the soul is the very first actuality of such a body. The body doesn't first exist, and then receive a soul, the soul is the first actuality of that body. For him, the soul couldn't exist without a body, so he assigned "soul" to the very first actuality of such a body, as a sort of form, which provides for the actual existence of that body. For Plato and the Neo-Platonists, it is necessary that the soul is prior to the body to account for the reason why the body is the type of body which it is. Therefore the soul doesn't only provide the general "actuality" of the living body, but also the more specific type.

[His response to Simmias' argument is that you can't have it both ways. You can't have both the soul existing before the body and the soul being a harmony of the parts of the body.] — Fooloso4

He demonstrates that the soul cannot be a harmony, but allows that the body might still be a harmony created by the soul.

Right. In this case the Form would be Harmony. Just as a beautiful body is beautiful by the Beautiful, the harmonious body is harmonious by the Harmonious. — Fooloso4

I think you are being taken for a ride. There is no "Form of Harmony". — Apollodorus

Right, I think Fooloso4 is reaching for straws here, going outside the argument. and I don't see the point.

There is no “Form of Harmony” in Plato for the simple reason that what we call “harmonious” in Modern English, is “rightly-ordered” or “just” (depending on the context) in Plato. So, the corresponding Form would be Justice, not “Harmony” which does not exist.

In Plato, the proper functioning of a whole, be it a city or a human, is not harmony but justice or righteousness (dikaiosyne). Dikaiosyne is the state of the whole in which each part fulfills its function: — Apollodorus

I think that's right. In The Republic, justice is described as a type of order, in which each person minds one's own business and does one's own part, fulfills one's own function without hindering others from fulfilling their functions.

The question of whether there is an Idea of Justice is similar to the question of whether there is an Idea of Good. These questions cast doubt on the theory of participation. It can be argued that Plato rejects the theory of participation in the Timaeus, when he introduces "matter" as the medium between the Form and the material object.

Plato and his disciples didn’t call themselves “Platonists” or their system “Platonism” so the designation is irrelevant. — Apollodorus

And yet that was the designation you used.

What matters is that this was a living tradition that was transmitted orally from master to disciple for centuries after Plato. — Apollodorus

That may be what matters to you. What matters to me is the dialogues themselves. I have no interest a Platonist cult.

Its representatives didn’t think they were just “influenced” by Plato, they believed and had reasons to believe that they followed Plato in all his main teachings. — Apollodorus

Well, if what you claimed is an example of following his main teachings then they thought wrong.

It is clear from Plato’s writings ... — Apollodorus

In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. (341c)

In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. (341c)
— Fooloso4

That's precisely why I pointed out that in the Greek philosophical tradition, teachings were transmitted orally. — Apollodorus

Oh. really. You said:

It is clear from Plato’s writings ... — Apollodorus

It cannot clear from his writings if he did not write what he actually thought about such things.

Has an oral tradition ever been authenticated?

Even if there is no "treatise" by Plato, certain core teachings must be acknowledged ... — Apollodorus

The core teaching of Plato is not in the form of a doctrine. He teaches those who are thoughtful and perspicacious enough how to philosophize. To the careful reader he does not provide answers, although there are plenty of things he says that can be latched onto as answers. This dynamic plays out in the dialogue, as we shall see.

... if you do want to have a discussion of Plato ... — Apollodorus

I am not going to allow you to dictate how I will proceed in this thread. I will follow Plato's lead, attending to what is said and done in the the dialogue in the order it occurs. It is only once we have seen the whole that we can see how everything fits together, with each part serving its purpose.

From the OP:

The question arises as to whether this is a comedy or tragedy. — Fooloso4

Thanks to @Fooloso4 for drawing this to my attention. It meant that I paid more attention and found comedic elements I wouldn't otherwise have done. It surprised me at the time because I had the wrong impression that Plato did not think highly of humour. So, another paradox.
See SEP article on 'Philosophy of Humour':

Plato, the most influential critic of laughter, treated laughter as an emotion that overrides rational self-control. In the Republic (388e), he says that the Guardians of the state should avoid laughter, “for ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter, his condition provokes a violent reaction.” Especially disturbing to Plato were the passages in the Iliad and the Odyssey where Mount Olympus was said to ring with the laughter of the gods. He protested that “if anyone represents men of worth as overpowered by laughter we must not accept it, much less if gods.”

Another of Plato’s objections to laughter is that it is malicious. In Philebus (48–50), he analyzes the enjoyment of comedy as a form of scorn. — John Morreall

Humour compares, I think, to the issue of desire, as a bodily disturbance to be disdained.
However, as mentioned previously, this is not absolute. It includes the idea of temperance. The Goldilocks effect. Keeping the right balance. So, what matters is the quantity and quality of the emotion; the type and motivation, virtuous or vicious.

I have probably missed some of the wry, subtle humour sprinkled throughout. Some are obvious: 'chuckles'. We have to work at noticing. No emoticons here :smile: :sad: :chin: :brow:
In general, it is a way of looking at the human condition; the bitter-sweet connections, the experiences of pain/pleasure.

Listening to the second of the audio files recommended earlier by @Banno
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/536659
I woke up in time to hear the last few minutes:

pp15-16 ( 70b-d)

...on just this point, perhaps, one needs no little reassuring and convincing, that when the man has died, his soul exists, and that it possesses some power and wisdom.' (14)
'That's true, Cebes,' said Socrates; 'but then what are we to do?
Would you like us to speculate (15) on these very questions, and see whether this is likely to be the case or not?'
'For my part anyway,' said Cebes, 'I'd gladly hear whatever opinion you have about them.'
'Well,' said Socrates, 'I really don't think anyone listening now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I'm talking idly, and arguing about things that don't concern me. If you agree, then, we should look into the matter.
'Let's consider it, perhaps, in this way: do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, (16) that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead;

Bracketed numbers within the text refer to the Notes.
I haven't looked there yet. Curious as to why 'speculate' and 'recalled' have been highlighted. I could speculate...that mere or idle 'opinion' had been frowned upon...that 'recall' occurs when thinking in the present about things past, we don't need a re-born soul.

Socrates mentions his scornful and critical 'comic poet' - ? Aristophanes *
Again, we can see why this kind of humour was not appreciated and objected to.
Nevertheless, it is used to good effect in the dialogue(s), helping us to form the picture.

For example: the audience is fearful about death and loss. What happens after death.
Socrates brings in some wry comments that raises chuckles - a release from pent up nervous energy and anxiety. Both Plato and Socrates are more than aware of the human condition - the interplay between body and mind. The need for a sense of humour...

Not to mention patience with those who hurl false accusations :brow:

-----

* Edit to add from the Notes, p104:

Socrates' denial that he is 'talking idly' (70cl-2) may be an allusion to Aristophanes' caricature of him in the Clouds. For the gibe cf. Republic 489a, Gorgias 485d-e. As if in answer to charges of 'irrelevance', the close connection between the present inquiry and Socrates' own situation is stressed again and again (7 6b 10-12, 78a1-2, 80d7-8, 84c6-85b9, 89b, 91a-c, 98c-99a).

From an interview with Stanley Rosen, an influential scholar who has written extensively on Plato:

ROSEN: Well, firstly, the approach to the Platonic dialogues has changed over the course of history. For example, in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously. And they read very complicated views into what would look to, say, the members of the contemporary analytical tradition like extremely trivial and secondary stylistic characteristics. Secondly, there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer. And we now know, of course, that Heidegger in his lectures on the Sophist took the details of the dialogue very seriously. So, that has to be said in order for us to understand that the apparent heterodoxy or eccentricity of Leo Strauss’ approach to the Platonic dialogues is such a heterodoxy only with respect to the kind of positivist and analytical approach to Plato ... Final point, within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue as though they discovered this. More directly, the Strauss approach is characterized by a fine attention to the dramatic structure, the personae, all the details in the dialogues because they were plays, and also by very close analyses. https://college.holycross.edu/diotima/n1v2/rosen.htm

Rosen demonstrates the approach in Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image.

A few more points from the interview that are worth considering:

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third.

First of all, there is no unanimity in the tradition of reading Plato. I told you that what passed for orthodoxy is no longer orthodox. The same analysts who made fun of Leo Strauss and me and his other students, today are copying us, but with no acknowledgment. They are copying the Straussian methods, but not as well. Leo Strauss is a much more careful reader and a more imaginative reader, and I certainly am as well. You get these inferior, inferior versions of the same methods they criticized ten years ago. This thesis of a long, orthodox tradition, that’s nonsense. It doesn’t exist. Even if it did, it would show nothing.

Yes, Hochschild makes a good point.

However, authors like Strauss are a different matter. Strauss is not a trained classicist. He studied al-Farabi and Maimonides who lived in Muslim-occupied Spain - when philosophers had to be very careful about what they said - and developed the theory that all ancient philosophers had “secret teachings”. As a political philosopher and atheist, he believes that Plato’s dialogues have a hidden political message and he makes no effort to see anything metaphysical in the dialogues. In fact, he positively resists the idea just as he ridicules Plato’s theory of Forms.

Strauss does make a valid observation, though:

There is an infinite literature on the Platonic myth. They all suffer, as far as I know, and I don’t know all of them, from the fact that the scholar himself decides what is a myth, a most unscholarly procedure. One has to find out from Plato what a myth is. In other words, I would regard only that as a myth of which Plato or his characters say it is a myth.

The Forms, of course, do not seem to be a myth in the dialogues. On the contrary, they represent a logical attempt to reduce the number of fundamental principles to the absolute minimum. Whether they actually exist as such, is an open question. Plato, in any case, does not think that they are a figment of imagination.

Plato is best interpreted in the Platonic tradition of Plotinus and others. — Apollodorus

Platonism is an impediment to understanding Plato. You end up attributing things to Plato that are nowhere to be found in the dialogues.

If you choose a different standpoint then it might help to let us know what it is. — Apollodorus

It is not a matter of a standpoint but of letting the dialogues stand on their own. In the Phaedrus Socrates says about a written composition:

Every part must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work. (264c)

The dialogue should be read as a whole, with each part having a function within that whole.

If you want to read Plotinus you would do well to read Plato, but not the other way around.

Not necessarily. What kind of things might that be? Wouldn't an anti-Platonic approach also lead to misattributions or and perhaps even more so? — Apollodorus

You are confusing terminology. Platonism and Platonic are not the same. "Anti-Platonic" would presumably mean against Plato. The result may well be misattributions or misinterpretations.

Philosophical systems do evolve over time. — Apollodorus

The dialogues are not a philosophical system and do not evolve. How the dialogues are read and interpreted change over time. The reliability of any of those interpretations can only be evaluated in light of the dialogues themselves.

Platonism is generally consistent with Plato's writings, that's why it's called Platonism — Apollodorus

This is simply wrong. It is called Platonism because it was influenced by Plato. It is not consistent with his writings. Nowhere in Plato do we find your assertion about the individual mind being illumined by the cosmic or divine Mind and the rest.

In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. (341c) — Fooloso4

That's precisely why I pointed out that in the Greek philosophical tradition, teachings were transmitted orally.

Even if there is no "treatise" by Plato, certain core teachings must be acknowledged and they have been acknowledged, both by Platonic philosophers like Plotinus and by modern scholars. If you don't acknowledge that, then you might as well throw the book out of the window and forget the discussion.

On the other hand and as I said before, if you do want to have a discussion of Plato then it would be helpful to state what you think Plato's core teaching are or are not, and then adduce evidence for or against as the case may be. This would be a sensible procedure IMO.

Plato's own Greek terms? And how do we decide on their precise meaning when it has already been determined that the dialogues can, and maybe should, be interpreted in many different ways? — Apollodorus

Plato's own Greek terms were often varied and indeterminate. Plato deliberately did not employ precise or just consistent meanings throughout his works or even within the same dialogue.

Why? Perhaps his philosophy was a work in progress with many problems and hypothesized solutions still open in his mind. He suggested many alternatives for discussion or debate but certainly not for fixed single-minded interpretation. Although Plato's philosophy can be partially reconstituted for a single dialogue as implied by the setting, events, and characters portrayed.

The fact is what he called Homer divine. If I am wrong that others did not regard him this way what difference does that make? — Fooloso4

One of the things one could do is analyze the argument that Homer affirms that the soul can be separated from the body.

Who is Plato arguing with here? Would this opponent (who believes the soul is essentially motion, or what we might call energy) be persuaded by an appeal to divinity? Is that was Plato has Socrates doing?

Who was the great Athenian law giver? A god? No, it was Solon, a man.

So maybe Plato is showing off the conservatism of the gentry? Think about the images in the works of Homer. It's the Greek epic. It describes how people should relate to one another and it clearly gives precedence to an aristocrat like Plato. Maybe it's: I speak for tradition. I speak from the depths of the Greek soul.

Or maybe it's something else.

Thank you @Fooloso4 for https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/538287
You are right the book you mentioned does sound interesting but expensive !!
Here is another : 'Laughter, Humor, and Comedy in Ancient Philosophy'

The introduction by the editors, Pierre Destrée and Franco V. Trivigno, explains the organization of the book in three sections, on the psychology of laughter, the norms that govern humor, and the way philosophers make use of humor in their works. In fact, there is no sharp division among the chapters, and, as is to be expected, a good deal of overlap.

As the editors note (8), the primary type of humor turns out to be abrasive or polemical, and Plato's treatment of humor in relation to phthonos ("envy," "malice") is a theme that runs throughout.

It is also the focus of the opening chapter, by Trivigno, who observes that "Plato's explicit theorizing about laughter and comedy is . . . focused on particular sorts of laughter that are presented as morally harmful" (13). Laughter poses a double danger: it threatens to become uncontrollable and overwhelms one's judgement, appealing as it does to the lower part of the soul. Furthermore, the pleasure it provides is mixed, as Plato argues in the Philebus, since the envious feel pain at the success of others even as they delight in the anticipation of their failure.

In the Laws, however, Plato contemplates dividing "comedy into two kinds, according to whether it is playful [paizein] or not" (935D), the latter being free of animosity.

When Socrates makes fun of his interlocutors, Trivigno suggests, his humor is not hostile but aims at their moral improvement. Whether this counts as playful is perhaps questionable. — Book review by David Konstan

[my bolds]

Again, we see the opposites pain and delight > mixed pleasure.

To zoom out a little.
For those interested in interpretations. 'Methodologies for Reading Plato' :

Such an open-ended type of interpretation has its representatives among two radically different groups: among philosophical interpreters, for whom it makes Plato a philosopher much like them—more interested in, or expecting more from, arguments than in or from conclusions;

and among literary interpreters, who insist on the literary and dramatic form of Plato’s works and argue that we can no more read off his intentions from what he puts in the mouths of his characters than we can infer what an Aeschylus thought from what he has his Clytemnestra or Cassandra say.

But one problem faced by both of these approaches, as by the skeptics of the New Academy, is that of explaining why, if they are right, certain ideas keep recurring in the corpus...

...Platonic metaphysics, that backbone of historical Platonism, also looks comfortably at home in an ethical context, insofar as it places a reconfigured goodness, beauty, and justice within the very structure of things—however it may be that Plato thought that trick could be pulled. Indeed, without that context (and without its inventive elaboration and re-elaboration by successions of Platonists and idealists), it can look as unmotivated as it appeared to an unsympathetic Aristotle.
— Christopher Rowe

Just a few snippets from this article which has 12 short sections !
OK enough already... back to the text...

You are right, The Theaetetus, as well as many of the other dialogues, ends in aporia. What is less well known or agreed upon is that there are also aporia in Aristotle. Some recent work addresses this.

In my opinion, and I am not alone, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were all zetetic skeptics - driven by the knowledge that they did not know to inquire.

Another thing worth pointing out in the Theaetetus is that there is no mention of recollection. It would be here, in a dialogue devoted to knowledge, that one would expect to find it if it was something he accepted.

I trust the thread was worth your while ... — Banno

It was an enjoyable challenge trying to make sense of the dialogue and putting all the pieces together. No doubt, there are pieces I left out. Perhaps only those who have a fondness for Plato would find my commentary of interest, but in my opinions the details matter. I know that there are some here who admire Plato who did not appreciate what I had to say because it runs counter to their own assumptions. But running counter to assumptions is fundamental to Socrates and Plato.

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so.

The approach of Aristotle of formulating different arguments and comparing them is more like what we are used to. — Valentinus

I keep missing the second part of your posts.
I think this is why I struggle with Plato. My preference is usually for the practical not the abstract.

According to a conventional view, Plato’s philosophy is abstract and utopian, whereas Aristotle’s is empirical, practical, and commonsensical — Britannica: How Plato and Aristotle differ

I have compiled the separate commentary posts in order that it may be read together:

1. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10914/platos-phaedo/p1


2. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534860


3. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535343


4. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535924


5. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/536573


6. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/537114


7. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/537698


8. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/538481


9. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/539501


10. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540733

I fully agree. It's just that when people take for their model the likes of Strauss who wrote:

Why Plato thought of this apparently fantastic doctrine [of the Forms] is a very difficult question. ... According to an interpretation which I read in certain writers, Plato teaches that there is an idea of everything which is designated by a term which is not a proper name. There is no idea of Socrates. But whenever you find a noun or an adjective, there is surely an idea conforming to that. My favorite example is the third undersecretary of the Garment Workers Union. Even if there exists only one of those, there could exist an indefinite number, and therefore there is is an idea of it. Somehow this sounds like an absolutely absurd doctrine. What is the use of such a duplication?

- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, p. 199

then the whole project of attempting to understand Plato goes out of the window.

The question of the soul is the very thing that will be the focus of the discussion, but argument is made that at death the soul is alone by itself. It is simply accepted from the start as a given. — Fooloso4

Every argument starts with axioms, and as we now accept, not all axioms can be proven. In Socrates' culture, belief in the soul was generally accepted, so was axiomatic, one might say. In secular culture the opposite is the case, but it's still a question of belief, as today's science is created on the assumption that no such powers or entities exist, and then proceeds to frame its approach on the basis of that assumption, such that inside that framework it is impossible to disprove, save by stepping outside it. (c.f. Kuhn's 'paradigms'.)

A reborn soul is one that has previously died. It exists in Hades as a dead soul. — Fooloso4

'Dead soul' is an oxymoron. If the soul is immortal then it cannot be dead, although it can dwell in different planes of existence (sometimes for aeons).

Socrates shifts from things perceived to “the equal itself”.

"Then we must previously have known the equal, before that time when we first, on seeing the equals, thought that all of them were striving to be like the equal but fell short of it. "(75a)

It is through the combination of sense and thought that we perceive that things are equal. — Fooloso4

Stepping outside the framework of strict textual intepretation, consider that the concept of 'equal' represents a fundamental breakthrough in the development of abstract consciousness and reason. Being able to see that one thing equals another, or that two numbers equal a third number, and so on, are easy for us to take for granted, but the discovery of this intellectual skill is fundamental to arithmetic, geometery, language and rational thought generally.

Again from outside the explanatory framework of Platonism, couldn't this idea of 'recollection' be an attempt to fathom such innate abilities as the ability to acquire language, to learn, to make mathematical discoveries, and the many other abilities that reason provides? Consider, at the dawn of civilization, how intoxicating the discovery of the power of reason must have been - how it promised release from creaturely existence and never-ending toil, the discoveries of the mathematical sages, such as Archimedes. This power must have seemed miraculous (whereas us jaded moderns nowadays rationalise it in terms of the pragmatic criteria of 'adaptation').

Perhaps the ancients had an intuitive wonder at the nature of reason which appeared to them as recollection of what must have been previously known. They certainly saw it as an innate power, contra today's empiricist dogma of the mind being a 'blank slate'.

The other problem with the cycle of opposites argument is that obviously the living come from the living. — Fooloso4

Implicit in Platonic dualism is the belief that the soul is 'joined' to the body. So I don't think Plato would seek to deny the role of the reproductive act! But what makes the being alive is the same as what withdraws from the body at death. Other traditional philosophies have an account of this - it is why Christians oppose abortion. Of course that doesn't make it right, but it is characteristic of belief in the soul.

Obviously, not everything that is unseen is unchanging. More to the point, Socrates talks about such things as the corruption of the soul "polluted and impure" (81b) and the soul of a human being becoming the soul of an ass or some other animal or insect. (82a-b) So, the claim that the soul is unchanging is questionable at the least. — Fooloso4

One of the things that got me interested in Platonism was the sudden realisation - an epiphany, I like to think - about the nature of number. (This was the subject of the first question I posted on philosophy forums.) Very briefly, everything in the sensable domain is composed of parts and comes into and goes out of existence, so is temporally delimited. Number, on the other hand, is not composed of parts (or any parts other than numbers) and neither goes into or out of existence (hence, 'imperishable'.) That, in my opinion, is why Platonic epistemology believes that 'dianoia' is of a higher order than 'opinion concerning visible things' - because it provides apodictic certainty that is not obtainable from knowledge gained by the mediation of sense. (See Augustine on Intelligible Objects.)

The 'impurity' of the soul is owed to its attachment to sense-impressions and sensual pleasures. It causes a sense of false identification with the sensory realm, with the domain of perishable things and transient pleasures. You will find exact analogies for this attitude in Hindu and Buddhist philosophy, in fact, it is universal in pre-modern philosophy, although of course is profoundly at odds with much modern philosophy.

The snow does not retreat, it melts. — Fooloso4

However this is followed by the qualification:

"The fact is,” said he, “in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea." — 103e

I take this to mean that although snow melts, wherever snow exists, it instantiates 'the idea of cold', because it has the form of the idea of cold.

The failure of the arguments does not mean that the soul is not immortal, it simply means that Socrates has not shown that it is. He says it is worth the risk of believing that it is, but if the philosopher seeks truth she does not settle for a belief. What the soul is and what its fate may be remains unknown. — Fooloso4

I accept that many people will find the idea of the soul archaic and anachronistic and that these arguments will fail to persuade them otherwise. Indeed there's a lot of people who think Plato has been superseded, that it's all ancient history. But I don't accept that the texts show that Plato himself doesn't believe them. I think the difficulty is that while Plato is recognised as one of the foundational figures of Western culture, this aspect of his thought is impossible to reconcile with this secular age. That's what I think is the underlying motivation in many modern intepretations.

There's also another factor which I have to state, which invariably gets a lot of pushback. It is the idea of the 'ascent to truth'. This example is from a Catholic philosopher, but I could find similar passages from other traditions:

Our minds do not—contrary to many views currently popular—create truth. Rather, they must be conformed to the truth of things given in creation. And such conformity is possible only as the moral virtues become deeply embedded in our character, a slow and halting process. We have lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity. That is, in order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort. The full transformation of character that we need will, in fact, finally require the virtues of faith, hope, and love. And this transformation will not necessarily—perhaps not often—be experienced by us as easy or painless. Hence the transformation of self that we must undergo perhaps resembles passing through something akin to dying.

A philosopher, practising for death.

I believe that this type of conception is promoted by atheists who approach this issue with a bias which encourages them to unreasonably reject the requirement of agency. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good point. Simmias’ theory of the soul as harmony is just a materialist proposition with a “Pythagorean” twist. It seemingly resembles the view attributed to some Pythagoreans, but there is no evidence to link it with an actual theory that makes exactly the same claims.

As observed by Sedley and Long, “no reliable source explicitly attributes to Philolaus the thesis that soul is an attunement”.

According to H. B. Gottschalk, the theory is actually Plato’s own creation. We need to recall that Plato’s main object here is to test his theories of Forms and Recollection and Simmias’ thesis presents a convenient opportunity to refute the views held by the materialists of the time.

H. B. Gottschalk, Soul as Harmonia – JSTOR

Socrates refers to it ironically at 77d-e and Cebes himself laughs at it just as Socrates smiles when Simmias presents his argument:

However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather.
And Cebes laughed and said, “Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us”

As shown by Lloyd Gerson, the whole Platonic project is based on an anti-materialist position. Plato believes in non-material intelligence and assumes an intelligent agency as ultimate cause.

So I think the issue of agency is an interesting one especially as at 86c Simmias generalizes his theory to include all the harmoniai found “in all the products of craftsmen.”

This reminds the careful reader of Plato’s Craftsman or Maker of the Cosmos ....

Correct. At 92c Socrates makes fun of Simmias by pointing out that his previous statement to the effect that soul pre-exists the body does not work in harmony with his statement that harmony in the lyre comes after the lyre has been put together from its component parts. Socrates then stresses that if any argument should work in harmony it is an argument about harmony.

This can be seen again at 97c – 99d where Socrates mocks Anaxagoras for failing to use his intelligence. Anaxagoras held that intelligence both orders things and is cause of everything, a view that Socrates was delighted to learn. But to Socrates’ great disappointment Anaxagoras failed to use his intelligence in that he assigned the ordering of things not to some intelligent cause but to the four elements.

I think it is pretty obvious that this is, in fact, Plato’s position. He does not mock the belief in the immortality of the soul, afterlife, God, etc. but materialist views that lead to atheism.

The same views leading to atheism, according to which the four elements are primary and soul posterior to them, are criticized in Laws:

It appears that the person who makes these statements holds fire, water, earth and air to be the first of all things, and that it is precisely to these things that he gives the name of “nature,” while soul he asserts to be a later product therefrom. (891c)

As shown by A. E. Taylor:

Atheism is treated by Plato as identical with the doctrine that the world and its contents, souls included, are the product of unintelligent motions of corporeal elements. Against this theory, he undertakes to demonstrate that all corporeal movements are, in the last resort, causally dependent on “motions” of soul, wishes, plans, purposes, and that the world is therefore the work of a soul or souls, and further that these souls are good, and that there is one ἀρίστη ψιχή [ariste psyche], “perfectly good soul,” at their head.

- A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man And His Work

This is not to say that people are not allowed to be atheists if they so choose, only that Plato in his dialogues does not teach atheism. On the contrary, he is committed to showing that intelligence is the ultimate cause of everything and that belief in this intelligence is the right belief for philosophers. Otherwise they would not be philosophers in a Platonic sense but materialist scientists.

It appears that the world is to be 'seen' by thought alone. This line drawn between sense experience and rational thought - I don't find compelling. — Amity

I've long been fascinated by culture. In this case there's 2400 years of cultural change that stands between us and Plato.

I always wonder to what extent I can put down the lens of my own worldview and see through the eyes of someone like Plato.

If you analyze what I just said, you'll see traces of what Plato has Socrates say here.
Instead of saying that sinful flesh stands in my way, I say my worldview distorts the truth.

Compare this to Kant: that there is no knowable truth beyond what I couch in the language of time and space.

Does pure thought reveal to us that there is an unexplored landscape right in front of us? What do you say?

So, Plato in giving us an understanding of who Socrates was, gives several versions of what he actually thinks ? Talk about getting to the 'truth'... — Amity

In the Second Letter Plato says that the Socrates of the dialogues is made "young and beautiful", which can also be translated as "new and noble".

Ideas of the soul - of afterlife - of life and death - all 'images' or 'imagination' or mere speculation as in a story...? — Amity

Reading and thinking along we become involved in speculation, but Plato provides the images and stories.

Does he actually believe what he is saying, or is it simply a matter of consolation... — Amity

Before deciding whether we think he believes what he is saying, we have to figure out what it is he is saying. There may be more to it than at first appears.

If Socrates wants to inspire and for philosophy to continue, then he must offer hope in the very act of practising philosophy. — Amity

Yes! He will have much more to say about this.

Platonism is an impediment to understanding Plato. You end up attributing things to Plato that are nowhere to be found in the dialogues. — Fooloso4

Not necessarily. What kind of things might that be? Wouldn't an anti-Platonic approach also lead to misattributions or misinterpretations and perhaps even more so?

Philosophical systems do evolve over time. However, Platonism is generally consistent with Plato's writings, that's why it's called Platonism, and it does help in understanding uncertain or ambiguous points. Obviously, concepts that are unambiguous and crystal clear need no reference to external sources. But where this is not the case, it can do no harm to see what other Platonic writers have to say.

As I said in my previous post, it may even be helpful to refer to the wider cultural context, including non-Greek (e.g. Egyptian) influence, to better understand the worldview of Ancient Greek philosophers.

I think part of the attraction to Plato is the lack of interpretative consensus. — Fooloso4

Of course.

There is an obvious methodological error in

if you do want to have a discussion of Plato then it would be helpful to state what you think Plato's core teaching are or are not, and then adduce evidence for or against as the case may be. — Apollodorus

I am not surprised to see this in Apollodorus, having observed a habit of first forming a conclusion and then looking for the arguments that might support it.