Which is all the more reason to suspect that he did not arrive at his certainty about those religious ideas by those same rational arguments with which he's trying to persuade thinking people.
— baker

Are you practicing your Buddhist sophistry, sorry, debating, skills on us? — Apollodorus

Eh?

Logic was just emerging and every system of rational thought is based on the elements available in the current culture of the time. Plato simply made use of what he had at his disposal. What would you have liked him to do, invent everything from scratch?

I'm saying that it is not at all likely that he arrived at his certainty about those religious ideas by those same rational arguments with which he's trying to persuade thinking people.

Instead, he was more like religious people usually are: born and raised into a religion, and then only later on developing justifications for their religious choice and knowledge.

The Forms are a type of universals. First, in Greek religion, the Gods were personifications of natural phenomena, states of mind, human occupations, moral values, etc., that served as a form of universals that enabled Greeks to organize and make sense of the world they lived in.

Second, the Greek word for Form, eidos, means “form”, “kind”, “species”. So, it makes sense to speak of a particular x as being a form or kind of a universal X.

Third, Plato follows the reductivist tendency already found in Greek philosophy, and in natural science in general, that sought to reduce the number of fundamental principles of explanation to the absolute minimum, hence the “first principle” or arche of the earliest Greek philosophers.

So, the Forms are consistent with Plato’s explanatory framework which is hierarchical.

Fourth, it is an undeniable fact that all experience, for example, visual perception, can be reduced to fundamental elements such as number, size, shape, color, distance, etc. that constitute a form of natural universals.

Fifth, it is a common feature of the Greek language as spoken at Plato’s time to form abstract nouns by adding the definite article to the neuter adjective. Thus the adjective “good”, agathos, which is agathon in the neuter, becomes the abstract noun “the good”, to agathon. This enables the Greek philosopher to speak of “the Good”, “the Beautiful”, or “the True”. Plato was making philosophy and logic for Greeks, not for non-Greek speaking people.

Sixth, eidos comes from the verb eido, “I see” and literally means “the seen”, “that which is seen”. This reflects the fact that for Greeks in general and for Plato in particular, to know was to see, thus knowledge or wisdom being a form of mental looking or seeing. Which is why in Plato, invisible realities are seen with the “eye of the soul”.

So, when Socrates talks to Meno or Simmias about Forms, it makes perfect sense to them.

Thank you for the summary! However,

No one says that we should. But if we are trying to reconstruct what Socrates meant by examined life, etc., we need to look into known states of consciousness that are in agreement with Socrates' statements in the Phaedo and elsewhere.

It seems unquestionable that certain concentration and meditation techniques lead to an experience of peace and calm followed by joy, clarity, and what has been described as something akin to “love”, as well as experiences of "light."

But just like ordinary religious people nowadays, Plato et al. didn't arrive at their certainties by doing concentration and meditation techniques, did they?

I find it more likely that they were born and raised into their religion, and then later on propped it up with fancy explanations and justifications. As is common for religious people.

Socrates relates that he had dreams in which he was ordered to write poems to his master Apollo (Phaedo 60d-e). People have precognitive dreams. How does science explain this?

And Beethoven said God inspired his music. I wouldn't make too much of such declarations; I see them primarily as culturally specific way of professing humility, gratitude, justification for making art.

It is a well-known fact that in ancient philosophy, astronomy was used as an analogy for psychological and metaphysical phenomena. — Apollodorus

Right, and Plato rejects that. Follow his argument as outlined above.

Given that Plato believed in an immortal soul — Apollodorus

But it is not a given. As you know, I posted a long thread on the Phaedo that shows that the arguments for the immortality of the soul all fail. The mythological stories may persuade some, but that Plato is persuaded by the stories he makes up is far from given.

the spiritual part of the soul — Apollodorus

Where does Plato say that there is a spiritual part of the soul? Certainly not in the Republic or the Phaedo.

Plato can be properly understood only by studying Platonism ... — Apollodorus

That is a statement of your belief. In my opinion to understand Plato one must begin with a careful, open minded reading of the dialogues, not by imposing religious and metaphysical assumptions on them. In doing so one must ignore the dialogic arguments that threaten those assumptions.

There is a long and varied history of interpretation of the dialogues. In the ancient world, prior to and contrary to Neoplatonism, we find:

In their writings the most famous philosophers of the Greeks and their prophets made use of parables and images in which they concealed their secrets, like Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato.
– Avicenna (Ibn Sina), “On the Parts of Science,” 85

Which is all the more reason to suspect that he did not arrive at his certainty about those religious ideas by those same rational arguments with which he's trying to persuade thinking people. — baker

Are you practicing your Buddhist sophistry, sorry, debating, skills on us? :grin:

Logic was just emerging and every system of rational thought is based on the elements available in the current culture of the time. Plato simply made use of what he had at his disposal. What would you have liked him to do, invent everything from scratch?

The Forms are a type of universals. First, in Greek religion, the Gods were personifications of natural phenomena, states of mind, human occupations, moral values, etc., that served as a form of universals that enabled Greeks to organize and make sense of the world they lived in.

Second, the Greek word for Form, eidos, means “form”, “kind”, “species”. So, it makes sense to speak of a particular x as being a form or kind of a universal X.

Third, Plato follows the reductivist tendency already found in Greek philosophy, and in natural science in general, that sought to reduce the number of fundamental principles of explanation to the absolute minimum, hence the “first principle” or arche of the earliest Greek philosophers.

So, the Forms are consistent with Plato’s explanatory framework which is hierarchical.

Fourth, it is an undeniable fact that all experience, for example, visual perception, can be reduced to fundamental elements such as number, size, shape, color, distance, etc. that constitute a form of natural universals.

Fifth, it is a common feature of the Greek language as spoken at Plato’s time to form abstract nouns by adding the definite article to the neuter adjective. Thus the adjective “good”, agathos, which is agathon in the neuter, becomes the abstract noun “the good”, to agathon. This enables the Greek philosopher to speak of “the Good”, “the Beautiful”, or “the True”. Plato was making philosophy and logic for Greeks, not for non-Greek speaking people.

Sixth, eidos comes from the verb eido, “I see” and literally means “the seen”, “that which is seen”. This reflects the fact that for Greeks in general and for Plato in particular, to know was to see, thus knowledge or wisdom being a form of mental looking or seeing. Which is why in Plato, invisible realities are seen with the “eye of the soul”.

So, when Socrates talks to Meno or Simmias about Forms, it makes perfect sense to them.

But why should we accept them? — baker

No one says that we should. But if we are trying to reconstruct what Socrates meant by examined life, etc., we need to look into known states of consciousness that are in agreement with Socrates' statements in the Phaedo and elsewhere.

It seems unquestionable that certain concentration and meditation techniques lead to an experience of peace and calm followed by joy, clarity, and what has been described as something akin to “love”, as well as experiences of "light." I don’t think that people need to have their experiences certified, approved and stamped by scientists, but science seems to agree to some extent:

In a 2012 study, researchers compared brain images from 50 adults who meditate and 50 adults who don’t meditate. Results suggested that people who practiced meditation for many years have more folds in the outer layer of the brain. This process (called gyrification) may increase the brain’s ability to process information.

Meditation: In Depth | NCCIH (nih.gov)

Research has shown that the perception-meditation continuum of increasing arousal of the sympathetic nervous system is not the same as the perception-hallucination continuum.

A Cartography of the Ecstatic and Meditative States - JSTOR

Personally, I haven't seen any evidence of "omniscience" or anything of that kind, but there is some evidence that it isn’t all just hallucination. This is sufficient basis for further investigation.

Socrates relates that he had dreams in which he was ordered to write poems to his master Apollo (Phaedo 60d-e). People have precognitive dreams. How does science explain this?

Two things are important here:

First is that skepticism had its heyday after Plato, with the Academy itself having a "skeptical period." So, while threads of skepticism run through the dialogues, particularly the Meno, Phaedo (interlude on misology), the Theatetus, and parts of the Timaeus and the Republic, it's not a position Plato is necessarily paying close attention to because he is more focused on the relativism of the Sophists. Relativism leads to its own sort of skepticism, but it's distinct from skepticism and Plato puts far more focus on dealing with the claims of the former. Phyrro isn't around yet, so he doesn't have this sort of broader skepticism in mind.

Second is that, when discussing Socrates, its always important to note that he is being fictionalized into highly stylized and artistic project, and his view is not always meant to be "correct." I tend to agree that the early dialogues are very focused on the project of introducing Socrates as an alternative to the Homeric heroes and those of the contemporary dramatists, but that this Socrates might also be closer to the historical one. But they key point I'd make here is that it'd be a real risk to read the later Socrates of the middle and late dialogues through the lens of Socrates initial statements about the limits of his own knowledge. Plato does think he knows some important things, and he wants to teach them to us, primarily through Socrates. He is skeptical about physical knowledge, since the physical world is always contingent and changing (e.g. the Phaedo) but that skepticism doesn't extend everywhere (there are interesting similarities to Shankara here).

There is a profession of falibalism in the Timaeus, but it's important to distinguish fallibalism from total skepticism. I would take Socrates' initial statements about his own lack of knowledge in the Apology and the other early dialogues in context. He seems to be talking about the ability to to know important things, e.g. how society should be run, what is good, etc. While Plato does get into more fundemental sorts of doubts, doubts about the accuracy of perception, etc. in the Theatetus and other places, the rest of the content in the Apology would seem to warn against Socrates' being taken as a wide-ranging position about all knowledge.

If you want a really good ancient treatment of the skepticism that grew out of Plato and its relation to faith, St. Augustine's Contra Academicos is quite good and includes a version of Descartes famous "cognito ergo sum."

Impossible. Can't be done. The term covers such a diverse range of cultural phenomena, that it has no single meaning. There are those who say that the word itself is an impediment. But one thing it's not, is a compendium of peer-reviewed scientific journal articles proposing a testable hypothesis. — Wayfarer

Ok, then let's take a step back here. It may be that I experience you misinterpreting what I'm saying due to us not agreeing on clearer definitions.

What I use the term "religion" for in this context is primarily in claims about reality, i.e in religious beliefs that have no supported claims either in facts or any logical framework. I'm not talking about the use of religious teachings that have been used for thousands of years for moral explorations, phenomenological explorations and existential meditations on the human condition etc. These parts are more linked to what I referred to as the important aspects of religion that society needs to be careful not to eradicate when dismantling institutional religions. There are extremely important parts in religious texts throughout history that are just as important as any continental philosophy exploring the human condition using more poetic representations of such explorations.

Where I draw the line, however, is when specifics are boiled down to something similar to factual claims. If someone speaks of "soul" and actually means some ethereal part of the divine that's trapped in our flesh, and uses this as a factual premise in their arguments, that is an unsupported claim. It's this type of claim that I refer to as biased. It is a bias towards the preconceived belief of the soul as something actual, something part of physical reality or supernatural reality that in itself hasn't been supported either. It's arguments that functions on these biases that philosophy consequently dismantled, if not in the time they were formed (due to historically inadequate methods of actually knowing how the world worked), then in historical times after when more factual understandings emerged.

Are you familar with Plato's dialogues? Socrates, as you're well aware, was sentenced to death for atheism, but the Phaedo, the dialogue taking place in the hours leading up to his execution, is one of the main sources for the defense of the immortality of the soul. Is that a religious dialogue, or is it not, by your lights? — Wayfarer

It is not a religious dialogue because the method of inquiry tried to use factual premises. However, it is a partly religious dialogue in light of what we know today.

What I mean by this is that the problems with asking this about Phaedo is that it excludes what each historical time concluded being facts about the world. In the Ancient Greek things like Empedocles and Apeiron were considered the same as we view electrons or the Higgs field. So just as we conduct philosophy today and rely on science as a source of factual premises when formulating arguments, so too did they in the same manner. This means that the context in which they draw empirical understanding through their dialogue, were based on facts that we know today aren't facts. Their understanding of the soul is therefor different to how we view the soul today, where, if we try to use factual knowledge, we might form arguments around neuroscience, mind upload technologies etc.

This is very important when we analyze historical philosophical texts. We need to understand the difference between a philosophical discussion that relied on factual premies based on what each historical time had as a factual foundation, and those that relied on religious beliefs. They are two different things. The former can survive and change throughout history based on recontextualisation when new discoveries in science adds to the factual foundation that society is built upon. We can take Phaedo and recontextualize the dialogue into a modern framework, discarding or changing aspects of it based on up to date scientific understandings but keep the dialogue's foundation. An argument that has bias towards a religious belief is however locked into that framework. It never gets past the belief, regardless of newly discovered factual foundations.

Phaedo is also not concluding anything, it is a dialogue that at its best forms concepts of duality that we still use today. The concepts that were formed by it has little to do with any support for the soul or the immortality of the soul, but instead were concepts that created a new framework to explore new ideas in. This is something that differs from what I mean by religiously biased arguments which focus on making religious conclusions rather than explore in the form of expanding perspectives.

Are you familiar with the early Buddhists texts and the account of the awakening of the Buddha? What 'wild assumptions' do you think are conveyed in those texts? For that matter, what issue are they addressing? — Wayfarer

In light of what I wrote on Phaedo, you can deconstruct that in a similar manner. What are religious conclusions and what are conceptual explorations in pursuit of further perspectives?

The key is still that bias locks your perspective into a rigid and non-moving framework. It's this that philosophy constantly dismantles.

I'll go with the approach articulated by scholar and historian of philosophy, Pierre Hadot. — Wayfarer

This:

This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. .... — IEP

Is basically what I'm talking about. This is fighting bias. This is philosophy. And I think the misunderstanding you make about what I have written is due to misinterpreting (or maybe because I've been unclear), the difference between a formed conclusion and conceptual exploration. Much of what Hadot is talking about refers to a meditation for the purpose of dismantling biases, towards habits, passions and... religion. This is the difference between religious arguments, religious beliefs, religious thinking and... philosophy.

What i think is unfortunate is that we use terminology that is closely linked and somewhat owned by religious beliefs and religious institutions. Spiritualism, meditation etc. This confuse people into mixing everything together, rather than look at the practical implications of expansion of the mind, meditation and ritualistic behaviors to focus thought and reasoning. Neither of these have anything to do with religion in their function, because neither of them require religious belief.

Why did Einstein take daily walks? His habits were ritualistic behaviors that focused his mind. One of the most scientific thinkers in history utilized a framework of rituals, expanded his mind through Gedankenexperiment. Neither of this is religious or belief systems, but mental tools.

My gallery analogy is a form of Gedankenexperiment-type method. Aimed at detaching yourself from your ideas and biases. Aimed at combating the passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits and upbringing.

The philosophical issue with modern science, in particular, is that it leaves no place for man as subject. Science relies on the fundamental techniques of objectification and quantification, and can only ever deal with man as object. It is embedded in a worldview that isn't aware that it's a worldview, but thinks of itself as being 'the way things are'. And there's no self-awareness in that. — Wayfarer

And I have not lumped together science and philosophy, I have held them separated. What I am trying to show is that philosophy functions as a form of guided meditation that requires you to act against bias when forming conclusions. In that sense it is more similar to science than religious belief as religious belief is essentially biased to the religion that is believed. You cannot form rational conclusions in religious arguments since they are bound to a specific pre-existing belief. Philosophy, even in ancient practices, aimed at mentally remove biases, even religious ones, in order to explore everything. This is why real philosophy survives time, while religious claims does not. And this is why there can be real philosophy in religious texts, at the same time as other parts of the same texts can be religious hogwash.

The challenge for the philosopher or any explorer of thought, is therefor to distinguish hogwash from the profound. Metaphor from the actual. Pure belief from the rational, bias from an open mind.

Positivism, again. — Wayfarer

So no, it's not positivism, as you can read above, it is acknowledging historical context, and through that, understand what is and what isn't philosophy. That exploration isn't the same as conclusions and that claims requires an understanding of their historical context as well as what the aim of the claim is.

One problem is that you have labeled me a positivist, so you are now biased towards that label. You read what I write in that context and you will mentally discard what is problematic for the conclusion that I am a positivist. But I guarantee you that I'm not, I'm just more based in the historical context we live in at the moment, in which there are so many scientific explanations for so many things that it becomes irrational to do philosophical arguments without that context being a part of it. That does not mean positivism, it means that I, just like with Phaedo, structure my philosophy based on the history I live in and what factual foundation there is at this time. I explore in this context and form my anti-bias out of it. If someone claims something as a deductive conclusion based on arguments formed in historical times that had factually incorrect understanding of the world and universe, then it doesn't matter if that conclusion has an internal logic that were accepted at the time, it is still incorrect and biased towards that understanding, especially if it's formed through religious belief. If it's however not concluding anything, but opening the door to exploration of a topic, then it's still philosophy, even if it has problematic factual ideas.

The bottom line is that context matter and bias is connected to conclusions. Philosophy fights bias, in order to meditate our thoughts towards better understanding and conclusions that form stepping stones for further exploration. Bias is a quicksand that people get stuck in and drown if they're not careful, and its philosophy's primary function to act against it and has been long before philosophers knew of the concept of bias.

Greek philosophy: Indian, Indo-European, or Egyptian?

Ancient Greek philosophy emerged in the 6th century BC and has played a major role in the development of Western philosophy. But where did its central concepts originate? Some have identified Indo-European, Indian or Egyptian elements.

Although some cultural interchange with India does seem to have taken place, and influence flowed in both directions, an Egyptian connection cannot be ruled out. Indeed, it seems likely.

Death and immortality played a central role in Greek thought from the time of Homer and immortality was subsequently re-imagined under the influence of philosophical cosmology and theology which in turn show Mesopotamian and Egyptian influence as does Greek astronomy and astrology.

There were two basic conceptions of death and afterlife in the Ancient World. One was the Sumerian/Mesopotamian one which viewed the afterlife as an underworld of darkness, and the other was the Egyptian one which viewed it as a possibility of attaining everlasting life in paradise.

The Ancient Sumerian and Egyptian Attitudes toward Death and the Afterlife

The ancient Egyptians viewed death as a temporary transition into what could become everlasting life in paradise. The Egyptian outlook on death was not focused on fear as much as it was preparing and transitioning into a new prosperous afterlife.

The Egyptian Gods judged the merits of human character and deeds when deciding who was permitted to be immortal. As a result, much of human-life was centered on the hopeful attitude that if one is moral, one will live forever in a blissful afterlife. (This is somewhat comparable to Christian conceptions of religion that may also, at least partly or indirectly, have Egyptian roots.)

So, basically, for the Egyptians – at least the wise or the initiated into wisdom traditions – life was a preparation for death.

Greek philosophy seems to follow the Egyptian outlook, with philosophical life being regarded as a preparation for death. Virtuous conduct on earth was regarded as the path to higher realms of existence after death, while an unvirtuous life led to a place of suffering. This was particularly central to the tradition established by Pythagoras and Plato. See, for example, Phaedo 67e.

There are literary accounts of Pythagoras going to Egypt in search of secret knowledge which he apparently obtained from Egyptian temple priests.

“[Pythagoras] was also initiated into all the mysteries of Byblos and Tyre, and in the sacred function performed in many parts of Syria […] After gaining all he could from the Phoenician mysteries, he found that they had originated from the sacred rites of Egypt […] This led him to hope that in Egypt itself he might find monuments of erudition still more genuine, beautiful and divine. Therefore following the advice of his teacher Thales, he left, as soon as possible, through the agency of some Egyptian sailors […] and at length happily landed on the Egyptian coast […] Here in Egypt he frequented all the temples with the greatest diligence, and most studious research […] After twelve years, about the fifty-sixth year of his age, he returned to Samos …”

Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras

The solar symbolism found in Greek philosophers like Plato also seems to have Egyptian parallels.

In the Republic (Politeia) Plato gives the analogy of the sun which provides the visibility of the objects, but also generates them and is the source of their growth and nurture.

Above the phenomenal world or world of appearances is the intelligible or noumenal world which is illumined by the Good (ton Agathon).

The Good is also the source of all ideas that constitute the intelligible world, copies of which make up the phenomenal world.

In other words, the whole of existence, including soul, originates in the Good and is bathed in its light just as the physical world is bathed in the light of the sun.

"... And this is he whom I call the child of the Good, whom the Good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the Good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind.

And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence

You would say, would you not, that the Sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?

In like manner the Good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the Good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power ..."

Both Socrates and Plato are traditionally associated with the Greek Sun God Apollo. For example, in Phaedo 85b, Socrates refers to himself as "the dedicated servant of Apollo from whom he obtained the gift of prophecy".

The Platonic outlook seems to be a philosophical or spiritual interpretation of Egyptian religious belief. Egyptian tradition itself entailed various levels of interpretation such as ritual, metaphysical and philosophical or spiritual. The Platonic tradition would correspond to the latter and would seem to support the traditional account of Pythagoras - and possibly other Greeks - acquiring secret knowledge from the Egyptians.

That there are living things that act purposively, that there are living things with desires, does not mean that the universe must act with purpose and have desires, any more than that there are living things that walk and talk and see means that the universe must walk and talk and see. — Fooloso4

Certainly, the universe considered as the object of science need not be regarded as purposeful or even as 'acting'. Putting aside these motivations is part of the basic methodology of science.

But the philosophical issues are deeper than that. Cast your mind back to the Phaedo, where Socrates says of Anaxagoras' naturalism:

One day after his initial setbacks Socrates happened to hear of Anaxagoras’ view that Mind directs and causes all things. He took this to mean that everything was arranged for the best. Therefore, if one wanted to know the explanation of something, one only had to know what was best for that thing. Suppose, for instance, that Socrates wanted to know why the heavenly bodies move the way they do. Anaxagoras would show him how this was the best possible way for each of them to be. And once he had taught Socrates what the best was for each thing individually, he then would explain the overall good that they all share in common. Yet upon studying Anaxagoras further, Socrates found these expectations disappointed. It turned out that Anaxagoras did not talk about Mind as cause at all, but rather about air and ether and other mechanistic explanations. For Socrates, however, this sort of explanation was simply unacceptable:

To call those things causes is too absurd. If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be right, but surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have chosen the best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and carelessly. Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause. (99a-b) — IEP Plato, Phaedo

Here, Socrates is criticizing that the mechanistic principles provided by Anaxagoras as being insufficient - mere 'bones and sinews', whereas the explanation that he wants has to account for 'Mind' (presumably 'nous') as the ultimate cause. So here, the principle of agency is introduced.

I think it anticipates later developments, particularly Aristotle's 'four causes', in which the cause of something is also part of the explanation as to why it exists, and also the various dialogues of Plato's which explicate his cosmology and the role of the Demiurge.

Because science is principally concerned with what Aristotelian philosophy would call material and efficient causes, it has lost the broader conception of reason that is suggested by that. It's all 'bones and sinews'! Post 'death of God' the Universe is believed to be devoid of reason, save that superimposed over it by the mind of h. sapiens. That's why there's a major thread in 20th Century philosophy and literature that life is a kind of cosmic accident, the 'million monkeys' theory (e.g Jacques Monod, Richard Dawkins, early Bertrand Russell. It's always struck me as somewhat absurd that 20th century science, which insists on finding causes, regards the absence of cause, in the case of the beginning of life, as being somehow an explanation.)

Now, I'm not appealing to ID arguments. But what I will say is that the consequence of this view is that the mind, as the result of the doings of the 'blind watchmaker', is presumed to be the product of this billion-year process which is essentially insentient and non-rational. And I think there's someting profoundly fallacious about that picture.

Putting it in as naturalistic terms as possible, what if the tendency towards the evolution of more intelligent species is a latent capacity within the Universe itself. Thomas Nagel wonders in Mind and Cosmos if 'each of our lives is a part of the lengthy process of the universe gradually waking up and becoming aware of itself’. Which doesn't deny, or even conflict with, the scientific analysis of the process, so much as extend it, to re-encompass the dimension of 'intentionality' which has somehow become lost.

So he did something similar as, for example, Christian theologians did and do: Adopt a religious foundation and build on it. I see nothing special about this. — baker

Plato bridged the gap between the religion of the masses and the philosophy of the intellectual elite. This is what his theology does. It offers the less spiritually advanced a path to higher intellectual and spiritual experience.

But can atheists do it in a way that will have the same positive, life-affirming results as when religious people contemplate the Forms?
My personal experience is, they can't. Without that religious foundation that had to be internalized before one's critical thinking abilities developed, contemplation of "metaphysical realities" doesn't amount to anything. — baker

Not religious but moral and intellectual foundation. Religion is about belief (pistis) which is OK in the lower stages, but by definition, Platonism goes beyond religion or belief to the stages of reason (dianoia) and inner vision (noesis).

Religion is about obeying and worshiping the Gods. Philosophy, i.e., philosophia, is about desire or love of wisdom, it is the all-consuming desire to transcend your present condition and experience of yourself and of life.

Plato is about intelligence and transcendence. The Platonic Way is the Upward Way (he ano odos), the Way of Righteousness and Wisdom, i.e., the way of moral conduct and spiritual insight, the ascent that takes you from where you are (wherever that is) to the highest.

Religion serves the purpose of preserving order and ethical conduct in society. It also inspires us to think of something higher but beyond this it is left behind and philosophy, i.e., intellectual and spiritual training takes over. Plato is totally committed to intelligence. What distinguishes humans from inanimate objects is intelligence. Intelligence is what defines us. To deny intelligence is to deny who we are and makes no sense. Philosophy is knowing oneself and knowing truth, and the two are ultimately identical.

But what is meant by "contemplation of metaphysical realities"?

I meditate on your precepts
and consider your ways.
Psalm 119:15 (NIV) — baker

There are of course different forms of contemplation (theoria), some involve contemplation of scriptural passages, others involve contemplation of the cosmic Gods, Forms, or the One.

Does it not simply mean 'to obey religious decrees' and all the "contemplation" and "reflection" are really just about bearing in mind the extent and the details of the religious decrees?
I don't think it includes contemplating the possibility that the "metaphysical realities" might not be real at all. — baker

For Plato, what the contemplative (theoros) contemplates (theorei) are the Forms, the realities underlying the individual appearances, and one who contemplates these atemporal and aspatial realities is enriched with a perspective on ordinary things superior to that of ordinary people (A W Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context).

The Symposium speaks of contemplating the Beautiful (211d) and the Republic of contemplation of the Form of the Good (517c-d).

But, ultimately, the metaphysical realities are you. Of course you contemplate the possibility that the lower aspects of yourself such as body and mind might not be real, but you cannot doubt that your higher self, which is identical with the realities you are contemplating, is eminently real. The closer you get to the realities you are contemplating, the more you experience yourself as your true self. It is like the centers of two circles that get ever closer to one another until they occupy exactly the same space and position and become one. Focusing, centering, and grounding yourself in a higher and more stable reality.

But the method, the method of this absorption is not known to us! And this method is crucial for understanding what exactly it was that he was doing when "standing motionless". I can "stand motionaless" but I will have ascended to the realm of the pure as much as a mole hill. Because I don't have the method. — baker

The method is known if you read the dialogues carefully. The Phaedo and the Republic tell you exactly what it is. The Good or the One is the ultimate telos of philosophical life. The One is to the intelligible world what the Sun is to the sensible world. Hierarchy of Light, Sun, Intelligence, Reality, One.

The process involves unification, concentration, interiorization, elevation, and expansion of consciousness.

This is what the Forms are about. If you follow them they take you to the One.

There are different stages of experience and realization, accomplishment, or perfection and, therefore, different methods and stages of practice.

As stated before, there are several methods or paths of achieving the goal: (1) religious and devotional practices (theourgia), (2) the mystery traditions (mysteria), and (3) philosophy proper based on intellectual training and contemplation (theoria). Religion is only necessary where required by the practitioner's level of intellectual and spiritual development.

Philosophical practice begins with the cultivation of virtues (self-control, courage, wisdom, righteousness). Self-control and courage lead to indifference to material things and physical and emotional needs, and overcoming fear of death.

The verb meletao, “to take thought”, “meditate”, also “practice” is used by Socrates with reference to “practicing dying” (Phaedo 67e). Of course “dying” here does not mean literally dying but being “dead” to the material world, body, sense perceptions and everything else aside from the soul and pure reason:

In fact, then, Simmias,” said he, “the true philosophers practice dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by itself alone (67e)

Depending on your stage of intellectual and spiritual development, if the stages of spiritual progress are purification (katharsis), illumination (ellampsis), oneness (henosis) then contemplation or meditation on light is a logical first step. Light dispels the inner darkness, empties and purifies your mind and sanctifies it in preparation for the inner vision of the light of consciousness.

Plotinus says:

[one must] wait quietly till it appears, preparing oneself to contemplate it, as the eye awaits the rising of the sun; and the sun rising over the horizon (from “Ocean,” the poets
say) gives itself to the eyes to see.

- Awaiting the Sun: A Plotinian Form of Contemplative Prayer

Many times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself; becoming external to all other things and self-encentered; beholding a marvellous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with the loftiest order; enacting the noblest life, acquiring identity with the divine; stationing within It by having attained that activity; poised above whatsoever within the Intellectual is less than the Supreme: yet, there comes the moment of descent from intellection to reasoning, and after that sojourn in the divine, I ask myself how it happens that I can now be descending, and how did the soul ever enter into my body, the soul which, even within the body, is the high thing it has shown itself to be (Enneads 4.8.1)

Among methods, Plotinus also enumerates learning about the Good by analogies, abstractions, understanding, upward steps toward it, purification and cultivation of virtues by means of which one becomes at once seen and seer, and the Supreme is no longer seen as an external:

Here, we put aside all the learning; disciplined to this pitch, established in beauty, the quester holds knowledge still of the ground he rests on, but, suddenly, swept beyond it all by the very crest of the wave of Intellect surging beneath, he is lifted and sees, never knowing how; the vision floods the eyes with light, but it is not a light showing some other object, the light is itself the vision … With This he himself becomes identical, with that radiance whose Act is to engender Intellectual-Principle …(Ennead 6.7.36)

But you need to go through the purification stage to insure that you are psychologically and morally stable and strong, otherwise any metaphysical experience can throw you off balance and do more harm than good.

If the philosopher is intellectually and spiritually not ready, then they must revert to the preparatory practices, otherwise they are wasting their time.

After all, the absolute is not reality with appearances removed, but reality + all appearances. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right: the absolute does not exclude the relative but the relative does exclude the absolute. I have been wanting to read more Schindler.

Wouldn't discussions of God fall into this category? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this point is even better made one step removed. Theological disagreements are implicit in many mundane disagreements. For example, the disagreement over Original Sin (theological or philosophical anthropology) underlies very many moral and political disagreements.

The crucial distinction is that signs are always "how we know," whereas more pernicious forms of pluralism often seems to rely on the claim that "signs are what we know." But if everything is signs, "appearance," then there can be no real reality/appearance distinction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agreed. I think this is important and I think the oversight of semiotics leads to a lot of problems.

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Yup, but the conclusions which are drawn from this vary quite a bit. We are drawn to ask: "where do theories come from?" That they have cultural, linguistic, and historical determinants is obvious, but there is a weird tendency to move from this insight to the idea that this makes them in some way arbitrary, and thus disconnected from truth. "X is socially and historically determined, thus X cannot tell us about the way the world really is." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right: the inferences are not sound. I think Hume feeds into these unsound inferences:

I'd say that Hume's constant conjunction and the probability theories that tread similar ground are intellectually problematic insofar as they pre-pave a meta-rut for cognitive bias. For instance, we are now prone to mistake anthropological habits for natural probabilities. — Leontiskos

The reduction of sense data to constant conjunction brings with it a destruction of a posteriori inference, and with it a posteriori knowledge. This is the logical conclusion, and even those who do not embrace it are still sipping on it unconsciously. Once the idea of demonstrative (a posteriori) inference is abandoned, people can say whatever they like and it will appear just as "rational" as anything else. Thus the claims that things like languages or history exclude truth, despite being inferentially unsound, continue unabated. The real error here is what you have noted: the idea that an absolute cannot account for any form of relativity. It is the idea, for example, that truth cannot be mediated by language or history or what have you.

---

And I think that other way is captured, in part, in your usual suggestion that everything we do and say involves a metaphysics, generally unacknowledged and unexamined, and thus properly called our "metaphysical assumptions." — Srap Tasmaner

Compare the way that Sider connects quantification to truth:

To avoid triviality, a first step is to restrict our attention to meanings with a “shape” that matches the grammar of quantifiers. We may achieve this indirectly, as follows. Understand a “candidate meaning” henceforth as an assignment of meanings to each sentence of the quantificational language in question, where the assigned meanings are assumed to determine, at the least, truth conditions. “Candidate meanings” here are located in the first instance at the level of the sentence; subsentential expressions (like quantifiers) can be thought of as having meaning insofar as they contribute to the meanings of sentences that contain them. Thus quantifiers are assured to have meanings whose “shapes” suffice to generate truth conditions for sentences containing quantifiers. — Sider, Ontological Realism, 8-9

And he's right. Infants acquire the idea of object permanence even before the idea of object identity. They're not born with it, so far as we can tell, but it develops predictably, and so that pattern of development is more or less "built in." And it comes before language, and evidently would have to come before anything like rational thought, so it's not like you could reason your way there anyway. — Srap Tasmaner

It seems to me that what very often happens with Humeans is that an assumption is made and everything follows from the assumption, but the assumption is contested and question-begging. For example, the neat and tidy understanding of reason as conscious discursive inference is not at all accepted by pre-moderns. If we accept that notion of reason then the infant is not using reason to know that an object has permanence, but why accept such a notion of reason? According to Aristotle repeated experience with, and memories of, an object(s) provides a condition whereby one is able to understand things about that object, such as its permanence. Knowledge is already had long before one gets to the point where they can write formal inferences on the chalkboard.

We could assume with Hume that each time we experience the sun and the sunrise we have a purely separate experience, unconnected to previous experience and memory. If this is right then we could never know anything about the sun, whether this knowledge has to do with its rising and setting or its heat. But why make such a silly assumption? The fact that we do know things about the sun is enough to dispel such a strange assumption. Yet if we do make the assumption then reason becomes weakened such that irrational things will appear rational, just as anything follows from a contradiction. If we make those sorts of weak assumptions universally, then our whole philosophy will be brittle and unsteady, along with everything built upon it. At this point the only reason to retain the odd assumptions seems to be that we have built much upon them, and to abandon the assumptions would be to abandon the edifice set upon it. ...Like a poor foundation that cannot be remedied without demolishing the house that sits atop it. But I wonder if this is really the case.

Our metaphysical assumptions, if there are such things, are probably no more accessible to us than they are to non-linguistic beings. — Srap Tasmaner

These sorts of assumptions, along with the sort of brain-physicalism moves, presuppose a strange skepticism which then makes rationality an epiphenomenon or artifact. Yet the performative self-contradiction again comes to bear, for the brain research you have read is purportedly rational. The scientists who do that research are using reason to access knowledge of the brain and thus behavior, and if rational inferences are nothing more than post-hoc rationalizations of something that occurs for an entirely separate reason, then there can be no reason to favor the scientist's rational inferences to the metaphysician's.

I want to say that the reason this is mistakenly taken to be rigorous is because of the democratic turn that has occurred. In Plato's day the common opinion was largely understood by the philosophers to be suspect. In our day if enough people (and scientists) promote Scientism or related theories, then even the philosophers accept these theories to be true. The Humean and probabilistic premises support such an approach. Reason has become more of a force to be measured, like the wind, rather than an art to be practiced.

That's pretty weird, but the main thing is that it suggests there's an entirely separate route to belief available: you saw the car accident happen, I only heard you talk about seeing it, and we both hold beliefs that it happened. — Srap Tasmaner

Er, this is just testimony or natural faith. It is the thing that the Enlightenment was determined to eradicate, and apparently it worked ("Sapere aude!").

I suppose I'm suggesting that thinking a concept like "object permanence" is actually instantiated in the infant brain might be a sort of category mistake. The whole system will behave in a way that we recognize or categorize as embodying such a conception, but that doesn't mean it's "in there" somewhere. — Srap Tasmaner

Or maybe object permanence is simpler than you think. Maybe the infant can recognize an object, and he also believes that when the object disappears from sight it will reappear again. Maybe that's all we mean by object permanence.

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I was very impressed by the idea (in Mercier and Sperber) that participants in a discussion systematically simplify and exaggerate their positions, in both the definiteness of their view and their confidence in it, and that this is strategic: you're responsible for bringing a view to the table, others bring others, and you argue to some kind of consensus that would enable group action. (Reasons are in part excuses you offer others to make going along with you palatable.) We're crap at judging our own views but pretty good at criticizing others. — Srap Tasmaner

And it's pretty obvious that something like this is right at the root of language use. We talk digital even if we mostly live analog. — Srap Tasmaner

With @Count Timothy von Icarus, I think there are non-sequiturs occurring in these sorts of things. All of this is true, as well as the other things, like neuroscientific research, but does any of it really imply the metaphysical claims at the root of Hume? I don't think so. I'm not really sure why we would think such a thing. "We systematically simplify and exaggerate positions in discussion," ...therefore? What we have here, I aver, are data points that many different philosophical positions can and have taken into account. I don't see how they favor Humean or probabilistic views. :chin:

...So yeah. Hume? I don't see the appeal. I was recently looking at Hume's treatise on the passions, and it reminded me that if one is accustomed to Aristotle or Aquinas' deeply syllogistic method, Hume reads like a popular magazine article. I just don't see a lot of strict reasoning occurring there.

Edit: Worth quoting, I think:

Phaedo: Likely indeed, he said, but arguments are not like men in this particular.

Socrates: I was merely following your lead just now. The similarity lies rather in this: it is as when one who lacks skill in arguments puts his trust in an argument as being true, then shortly afterwards believes it to be false—as sometimes it is and sometimes it is not—and so with another argument and then another. You know how those in particular who spend their time c studying contradiction in the end believe themselves to have become very wise and that they alone have understood that there is no soundness or reliability in any object or in any argument, but that all that exists simply fluctuates up and down as if it were in the Euripus10 and does not remain in the same place for any time at all.

What you say, I said, is certainly true.

It would be pitiable, Phaedo, he said, when there is a true and reliable argument and one that can be understood, if a man who has dealt with such arguments as appear at one time true, at another time untrue, should not blame himself or his own lack of skill but, because of his distress, in the end gladly shift the blame away from himself to the arguments, and spend the rest of his life hating and reviling reasonable discussion and so be deprived of truth and knowledge of reality.

Yes, by Zeus, I said, that would be pitiable indeed.

This then is the first thing we should guard against, he said. We should not allow into our minds the conviction that argumentation has nothing sound about it; much rather we should believe that it is we who are not yet sound and that we must take courage and be eager to attain soundness, you and the others for the sake of your whole life still to come, and I for the sake of death itself. — Plato, Phaedo, 90b..., tr. Grube

Or as Eva Brann puts it ...

My thread on the Phaedo is based on her translation, which I deliberately choose over others

Brann was a student of Klein. Here are a few things she said about Strauss;

I did not attend Mr. Strauss’s seminars regularly, but I saw him often at the Klein house for lunch and dinner. I can give you an overall impression. He was absolutely the most exquisitely courteous man imaginable, especially to me as “the daughter of the house.” He was very, very polite. I heard much conversation. I don’t know if I absorbed much of it, but I know that Jasha [Klein] was very happy to have him in Annapolis.

This stands in stark contrast to the allegations of Burnyeat and others.

She continues:

... one point of difference, and maybe the most important, was that Mr. Strauss thought that political philosophy was fundamental. I think that Jasha thought that ontology, or metaphysics, was fundamental, and that the revolution in science was more telling for modernity than the political revolution.

They accepted their differences. It did not stand in the way of their friendship. In addition to what they had in common regarding how to read Plato they shared a good character. They were the same type of men.

I sometimes wonder what Plato would have thought about analytic philosophy with its extreme focus of formalism and decidability. In some ways, Plato seems like the progenitor of the preference for the a priori, and in others his ecstatic view of reason seems completely at odds with it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that to the extent they can be reconciled it can be found in his treatment of misologic in the Phaedo. Analysis is important but can only take us so far. From my thread on it:

The danger here is that they may come to believe that philosophy has failed them. Socrates is about to die because he practiced philosophy and nothing he has said has convinced them that he will be better off for having practiced it. It is because of Socrates that they came to love philosophy, but it may be that philosophy cannot do what they expect of it. They are in danger of misologic, hating what they once loved.

...

The danger of misologic leads to the question of who will keep Socratic philosophy alive? Put differently, philosophy needs genuine philosophers and not just scholars.

Socrates turns from the problem of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments.

In other words, the development of good character. The pursuit of the good is good because through its pursuit we can become good. The pursuit of transcendence can be transformative.

And this is why Plato keeps prodding us to never settle down with what is in the text itself—the ideal orientation is towards the Good and True, not towards any specific teaching. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I agree.

Thanks for the Edit:

We also see one way in which Plato is addressing two different types of readers. On the one hand he says that there are independent Forms, but on the other he indicates that things are not quite so simple. We are left to ask about the origin of the Forms. We are also compelled to consider in what way things would be able to "participate" in the Form. Socrates raises the question in the "Second Sailing" section of the Phaedo:...
...Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.” (100e) — Fooloso4

Yes. Thanks for that reminder from your previous thread:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10914/platos-phaedo/p1

***

He raises the question of the relationship between things and Forms, but does not insist on the precise nature of that relationship. Why? It he had a coherent argument why wouldn't he present it here or elsewhere? He calls the hypothesis of Forms (100a) simple, naive, and perhaps foolish, and later "safe and ignorant". (105 b)

Now some will try to defend the idea of transcendent Forms with accusations of bias against those who question it, but in that case it would seem that Plato is biased against Plato.] — Fooloso4

So it would seem...

That suggests that it is self evident. — Valentinus

Categories are used specify. When I originally mentioned Plato's idealism, I was pointing out that when reading Phaedo, It might enhance understanding to contrast his view to that if Democritus, whose influence was also present.

Plato would have realized that his own idealism and the materialism of Democritus explain one another. In a sense, they create one another. This understanding is implied by one particular argument in Phaedo, which I'm sure you could pick out.

So as opposed to closing down exploration of Plato, noting his idealism is just the beginning.

Well, as already stated, the difficulty arises from an incorrect or incomplete grasp of Greek or Platonic terminology.

The world is generally admitted to exist. If we philosophize about the world, that doesn’t mean that the world is just philosophy or philosophizing, right?

Similarly, perception is generally admitted to exist. If we hypothesize about what it is or how it comes about, it doesn’t mean that perception itself is mere hypothesis.

Now we know that the world exists because we perceive it through our faculties of sensory perception, such as sight.

By sight we mean seeing physical objects. But if we analyze the objects of sight, what we actually see is color, shape, size, distance (between different objects and between objects and ourselves as the perceiving agent), etc.

Color, shape, size, etc., are universals held in common by all objects of sight. They are things we see, not hypotheses. The Forms are similar to these universals though also different in that they are prior to the particulars.

The Ancient Greek word for “see” is eidon which is the same as Latin video, “I see”. Greek το εἶδος to eidos literally means “the seen”, “that which is seen”, or “visible form”, hence English “Form”.

So, Greek “idea” is not the same as English “idea”, it is something that is actually there and that we can see.

If we arrange what we see in ascending order we have:

1. Physical object.
2. Mental object perceived internally.
3. Properties that make up the mental object.
4. Eternal, unchanging “Forms” to which the properties belong.

English “idea” is what we perceive mentally and think about in discursive thought (dianoia).
Platonic “Idea” (“Form”) is what we see in a kind of non-discursive, intuitive perception (noesis) or contemplation.

Similarly, English “theory” is just a mental construct. Greek θεωρία, theoria, is much more than that. It is “contemplation” as in observing something that is seen.

It is somewhat similar to the difference between thinking and lucid dreaming. In lucid dreaming we don’t just think about an object, we actually see it and are perfectly conscious of the fact that we see it as well as of ourselves as the seeing subject.

Edit. So, Socrates often uses hypotheses to prove the validity of a concept, not to deny it. He does this, for example, with the immortality of the soul and concludes that “it turns out that the soul is immortal” (Phaedo 114d). Socrates does not deny the Forms, he merely attempts to find ways of mentally describing or defining them.

For Plato, the Forms are indescribable, eternal realities, that are above discursive thought and can only be referred to in negative terms. For example, this is what the Symposium says about the Form of Beauty:

“It neither comes to be nor perishes, neither waxes nor wanes … nor again will the beautiful appear to him [the philosopher] like a face or hands or any other portion of the body … or piece of knowledge … but itself by itself with itself existing for ever in singularity of form” (211a ff.)

“In that state of life above all others, a man finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential beauty […] there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with truth” (211d – 212a).

This is not the description of a “hypothesis”, it is the description of a metaphysical reality. We can hypothesize about the Forms but we are always a few steps away from them. We can only experience them in direct metaphysical experience.

It is clear how hypotheses are used in Plato, including in the Phaedo, where Simmias says:

“The argument about recollection and learning, on the other hand, has been provided by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance […] and I have accepted that hypothesis on both sufficient and correct grounds” (92d - e).

The hypothesis then, is a provisional thesis adopted to explore its consequences and arrive at a conclusion. Because of the metaphysical nature of the Forms, Socrates does not always come to a definitive definition or conclusion about the Forms even though he comes sufficiently close to point us in the right direction.

Philosophical language was only being developed at the time and no “scientific” definition or description was possible or, indeed, needed as the Forms were meant to ultimately be experienced through a form of perception that can be developed through mental training.

Plotinus gives a more detailed account of the Forms, but ultimately, all we can say in general philosophical terms is that the Forms stand at the threshold between indeterminate and determinate consciousness, where self-aware consciousness begins to perceive things other than itself. The Forms are the underlying patterns that consciousness uses to organize itself in order to produce determinate perception.

Whilst ordinary perception is a cognition arising from mental operations following contact with a sense-object, perception of the Forms arises from activities within consciousness (nous) itself and independently of sense-objects. Because the Forms stand at the very root of experience, at a stage where the (mental) objects and discursive thought or language related to the objects have not yet emerged, they are impossible to describe. They, nevertheless, are very real. In fact, according to Plato and other Platonists, the Forms are more real than physical reality itself. Like energy particles to physical matter, the Forms are the ultimate constituent elements of subjective experience (i.e., experience directly produced by consciousness) at both cosmic and individual level.

Where does Plato say that there is a spiritual part of the soul? Certainly not in the Republic or the Phaedo. — Fooloso4

Plato clearly says, through Socrates and others, that the soul is immortal - the bit that you left out from the Phaedo in your translation. As immortal means non-physical, the soul has a part that is non-physical, i.e., metaphysical or, in modern terminology, "spiritual".

No one studies Marxism by applying chemistry or astronomy to it. Likewise, no serious scholar attempts to study Platonism from a materialist or anti-theist perspective, i.e., by denying the fundamental principles upon which Platonism is based.

There are some excellent studies of Platonism that have been published since the 1950's and 60's like From Plato to Platonism (2013) by Lloyd P Gerson who is a respected professor of philosophy and author of many academic works on the subject. As I said, it is imperative to keep up with the times, and not stay stuck in the outdated ideas of post-war neo-liberalism and intellectual nihilism.

But you may do as you please. I don't care.

Plato's dialogues set a very high bar for what constitutes knowledge. The Theaetetus ends in aporia, with no accepted account of what constitutes knowledge.

A little further on in Theages, you find the often-quoted statement:

There is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything; and if one of my friends consults me and the voice occurs, the same thing happens: it prohibits, and does not allow him to act.

According to McEvilly, The Shape of Ancient Thought Socrates and Plato both practice asceticism; there are various accounts of Socrates standing still in apparent trance for hours on end, oblivious to the jeers of those around him, listening to his daimon. The Phaedo, as has been discussed elsewhere, urges indifference towards sensual pleasures and overcoming attachment to the body. McEvilly compares many of these sections with corresponding passages in Patanjali's Yoga Sutras and the Upaniṣads, arguing that there was a kind of pan-cultura form of asceticism which is found in both Greek and Indian sources. He says that the accepted view is that in his later dialogues Plato moderates the asceticism of the Phaedo, but he gives examples of how it is a thread running through the later dialogues. In them, what is being sought is not knowledge of the arts and sciences, but liberation from the round of birth and death - nearer in meaning to the 'vidya' of the Upaniṣads.

(I can't do justice to McEvilly's book, it is about 700 densely-footnoted pages, all based on primary texts, but worth knowing about.)

do you assert that distancing yourself from something is the same thing as denying it? — Leghorn

As to whether the sun was a rock, he neither affirms nor denies it. As to whether Anaxagoras' Mind is a cause, he found it problematic. Anaxagoras' explanation did not show how Mind order each thing in a way that is best. (Phaedo 97b-d)

I believe this fact indicates he may have believed something similar to what Anaxagoras taught. — Leghorn

The passage from the Phaedo is a prelude to Socrates "second sailing", which he calls his safe answer, the hypothesis of Forms. He shifts from Mind to his own mind.(99d-100a) He arranges things according to kind. That it is best that they be this way, either as a way of understanding things or as things are, is something he does not show. As to the relationship between a Form and a thing of that Form he says he cannot insist on the nature of that relationship. (100e). Later he recognizes the need to reintroduce physical causes. He calls the safe answer, his hypothesis of the Forms ignorant. (105b-c)

This statement leaves me very perplexed, since we only know Socrates’ defense of himself from Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of it. — Leghorn

Right. That is why I said, in their accounts of the trial. We do not know what he actually said, but we do know that both Plato and Xenophon defended him in their works after their Apologies.

I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation. — Leghorn

I think both would agree that whatever Socrates might have believed about the gods is secondary to the truth about the gods. To even raise the question is an impiety. To who or what do we turn to learn the truth about the gods? Do we believe the poets and their stories of the gods acting unjustly? Do we turn to reasoned argument? In that case the authority of reason stands above the gods, for it is reason that determines their truth.

There is, however, no such dialogue.

That does indeed appear synonymous to Mokṣa. As I don't read Greek, do you know any instances in Plato's dialouges? — Wayfarer

Sure:

The true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release (lysis) and separation of the soul from the body—is their study (Phaedo 67c).

The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy, taking possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and tries to set it free (lyein), pointing out that the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since everything of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is invisible and apprehended by the mind. Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it must not resist this deliverance (lysis), and therefore it stands aloof from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so far as it can … (Phaedo 83a-b).

Essentially, the release or liberation of consciousness from the body-mind complex, i.e., from conditioned experience or existence, is common to both Platonism and Indic traditions such as Hinduism and Buddhism.

In any case, the underlying idea seems the same to me. And so is meditation or introspective inquiry as the means of attaining that state. The only matter of debate seems to be the exact state or experience denoted by the term “release” (lysis or mokṣa).

And if Greek lysis and Sanskrit mokṣa are synonymous, what other parallels are there? Is it not the case that parallels can be found by looking for parallels instead of focusing exclusively on differences?

My feeling is that an understanding of Platonism may help us better understand some aspects of Indian philosophy and vice-versa, an understanding of Indian philosophy may help us understand aspects of Platonism - more so than looking at either tradition through modern eyes.

Hadot, Suzuki, and others are alright as far as modern analyses go, but I think the key to understanding Plato is to read Plato.

Thus far we've got:

1. The world of phenomena as unreal or impermanent "appearance".

2. Existence centered on appearances as "painful", "unhappy", or "unsatisfactory" and leading to more "pain/unhappiness/lack of satisfaction".

3. Knowledge leading to release from the world of appearance and mental states associated with it, as the solution. (It is interesting to note in this connection that Greek lysis means "release" as well as "solution".)

4. Meditation or introspective inquiry as the practical means of attaining insight into reality and, ultimately, the final goal.

5. The importance of dissociating one's consciousness from the physical world, body, emotions, and thoughts.

6. Development of virtues and adherence to ethical patterns of thought and behavior.

I think this is quite a handful already .... :smile:

the 'argument from equals' in the Phaedo — Wayfarer

I've been mulling over your post and I don't have a simple response to it. I might spend some time actually looking at the Phaedo and then start a thread on it. In the meantime, I have some remarks.

1. I think it may not be possible to resolve our differences, because I am not sure they can be expressed cleanly, that there's some proposition or set of propositions you hold true and I false, for instance. Maybe, but I have my doubts.

2. There is a broad sense in which you seem to believe there is a world of concrete particularity, accessible to the senses, and a world of abstract generality, accessible to reason. It looks like there's little room for disagreement; I can't taste or see or touch the relation of equality, only things that are or are not equal.

3. That's not so far from Hume's observation about causality, but he didn't conclude that we can learn through rational insight what we cannot learn by looking; he concluded that the belief in causality is in some sense a fiction, a useful simplification.

4. If Plato's argument is right -- not clear to me yet -- if the concept of equality is unlearnable, then we might also conclude that we have no such concept, rather than concluding it must be innate.

5. "But of course we have the concept of equality!" --- We are adept at doing the things that having a concept of equality was supposed to explain, certainly. But if we cannot have such a concept, then the explanation must change.

6. It seems to us we see the entire environment before us, like a high-definition movie on a screen, our visual field. This is false. There is no such rendering of our environment present anywhere in our brains, and could not be. The truth is that we move our eyes frequently, much more than we are aware of, and we see a section of about a degree or two of our visual field clearly each time; the complete visual field is patched together without our awareness, giving the impression of a seamless whole.

That's an example of how an explanation can change to make something impossible possible.

7. The assumption that we must have the abstract concept of equality to judge whether two sticks are the same length suggests a computational model of the mind, with abstract rules being applied to concrete cases as they come up. I have my doubts.

8. Presumably the argument against materialism will continue before birth: if it's not a concept that could have been learned, it will also turn out to be a concept evolution could not have provided us with.

9. As you see it, Plato provides a dispositive argument that equality cannot be learned, but we have the concept, therefore ... If that argument is watertight, there's no need to consider empirical evidence, which could only mislead us.

10. On the contrary, I'm inclined to look at the research. Mathematical concepts have always been a central focus of developmental psychologists from Piaget on down to today. Parents and teachers spend time teaching children how to count, how to recognize shapes, similarity and difference, and so on, or at least providing them the appropriate setting for learning those concepts.

11. At what age do children actually acquire the concept of equality? What does the proto-concept look like, and how do they use it? Are there differences between cultures?

12. Mostly I think making claims about what can be learned and what cannot without looking at the development of children is worse than a waste of time.


As I said, I may post something about Plato, just because it might be interesting, though, not because it would lead to anything.

...My difficulty with Fooloso4's Plato is fairly simple. I think Plato is a great philosopher and an unparalleled pedagogue, and Fooloso ends up making him an invisible philosopher and a shoddy pedagogue. — Leontiskos

I too think Plato is a great philosopher. As to invisibility why does he not speak in his own name? Why does the Phaedo make a point of Plato's absence? With regard to pedagogue: Socrates denies that education is putting knowledge into the soul. (Republic 518b-c) One who knows must come to see for themselves, not have his head filled with theories and claims. Plato's pedagogical power lies in his teaching us to think, not to have truths revealed to us.

Fooloso has an a priori (political?) motivation to wrestle Plato away from the Christian tradition — Leontiskos

If the "Christian tradition" lays claim to ownership of Plato then I think that is wrong, but I doubt that there is a single Christian interpretation. My argument is against claims of transcendent knowledge, which is not limited to Christianity. Given your Christian affiliation, however, it would seem that it is your own beliefs and assumptions as they relate to Plato that is at issue for you.

... prevents one from building any substantial doctrine upon Plato's writing — Leontiskos

Well, if you want to build such a doctrine have at it.

The irony is that in order to dethrone a Christianized Plato, Fooloso has conjured up a dogmatism of his own, namely the dogma of Plato as a skeptical-know-nothing. — Leontiskos

Dethrone? It has honestly never occurred to me that a Christianized Plato sits on the throne. I do, however, reject theological interpretations.

... anyone who draws anything of substance from Plato has de facto misunderstood him; and if everyone has misunderstood Plato then surely Plato is a shoddy teacher or else a non-teacher. — Leontiskos

I draw a great deal of substance from Plato. The difference is that I do not find it in the same places that you do. I have not claimed that "everyone' has misunderstood him. I do, however, think that you have misunderstood him, but I don't blame Plato for that. It is likely that in some ways I also misunderstand him. The problem is, instead of discussing specific things you think I've gotten wrong, you make sweeping accusations.

I find this all rather silly, especially given the strange swirling motivations which are very far from an innocent attempt to understand Plato in himself. — Leontiskos

What is silly is your accusations about my motivations.

Obviously such an approach creates the ambience of a secret knowledge of gnostic Platonism, unknown to the uninitiated — Leontiskos

So which is it, know nothing or secret knowledge?

And to be clear, the focus on Christianity comes from Fooloso, not from me. — Leontiskos

Where has my discussion of Plato focused on Christianity?

I would prefer to let Plato speak, but in order for that to happen we must acknowledge that he has a voice and we must also clear our ears of biases that would pre-scribe his voice. — Leontiskos

Where does Plato speak in his own voice? Certainly not in the dialogues. Not even once. Why is that?

Fooloso4 - I think we discussed the meaning of Socrates last words in your thread?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10914/platos-phaedo/p1 — Amity

From page 12 of that thread:

Much has been written about what this means. Asclepius is the god of medicine. This suggests that there has been a cure or recovery. Some interpret this to mean that Socrates has been cured of the disease of life. But he says “we” not “I”.

In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)

There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy.

If you are interested in Plato you might want to look at my thread on the Phaedo. — Fooloso4

Thank you. I'm not much into Plato to be honest, but your summary in the OP was well done, a very decent work of extracting the gist, and I know that is difficult to do. You made this one dialogue alive for me. I went back and read it, found the conclusion quite witty although the dialogue procédé is tiresome at times.

Also I owe you one because I misunderstood you at first in this thread.

So yes, I'll check your Phaedo thread.

@Tom Storm

Unfortunately, Socratic skepticism has been misrepresented in this discussion. If it is to be understood, it must be distinguished from other forms of skepticism. Two points:

Socratic skeptics make no claim about what can be known, it is rather, an awareness of what is not known.

Second, it is not a claim that extends to any and all kinds of knowledge. It does not lead to a paralysis of action or an inability to make decisions. We act and make choices, but when it comes to such things as what is good or just or noble, we do so on the basis of opinion not knowledge. The Socratic skeptic, however, does not simply settle for whatever opinion she happens to hold or has been told to hold. If there is transcendent knowledge, she is aware that she in not privy to it.

She knows she knows nothing of the soul separate from the body, but she does not simply leave it there. She questions what happens to our understanding of a human being when we divide him in two and regard only part of him, the soul, as who or what he is. She questions whether it makes sense to think that knowledge can only come from the soul apart from the body, apart from the ability to see and hear and feel. Apart from desire, for desire for Plato includes the desire to know. The location of desire, in the soul or in the body, differs in different dialogues, as, for example, the Republic, Phaedo, and Phaedrus. In some of the dialogues the soul is said to be immortal, but in the Timaeus, the soul of human beings is mortal. In addition, although in the Phaedo the soul is said to be immortal, the question of what happens to Socrates when he dies is not raised. If the soul becomes that of an ass or an ant then it is no longer Socrates' soul. Socrates, it would seem, is dead. Plato leaves it up to us to sort all this out as best we can. It is a serious mistake to take what is said in one place or another as the truth when what is said is contrary to what is said elsewhere.

As part of the examined life, she examines her opinions and the opinions of others. But such examination can only be done on the basis of opinion. The Socratic skeptic remains open to revising her opinions when it seems best to do so in light of reason and what seems to be good and true.

Socrates says he has had this dream before and had always understood it to mean doing what he is always doing:
since philosophy is the greatest music.” (61a)

Now he thinks the dream meant:
make music in the popular sense of the word.

So he:
took whatever stories were to hand, the fables of Aesop which I know, and turned the first ones I came upon into verse.

Taking whatever stories that were at hand suggests that the content of music in the popular sense did not much matter. — Fooloso4

Interesting that at the start and end of Crito, Plato invokes a sense of mystery; soul and mysticism.
Socrates takes his dream world as clear evidence. This adds to his dramatic character, someone with special, perhaps divine, knowledge. More than a logical, rational thinker.
Also, he suggests that Crito's watching and not wakening him is a serendipitous stimulus for his noble, beautiful prophetic woman. Ah, Fortuna! as a Roman might say. Fate.

Soc: Well, Crito, may it be for the best. If this pleases the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will be here today.
Crito: 44A What is your evidence for that?
Soc: I’ll tell you. Presumably I am to die the day after the ship arrives.
Crito: That is what the authorities say, in any case.

Soc: Well, I do not think it will be here today, but tomorrow. My evidence is a dream I had a little earlier, during the night, perhaps when you decided not to wake me.
Crito: What was the dream?

Soc: I thought that a noble and beautiful 44B woman wearing a white robe approached me, called out and said: Socrates, on the third day thou shalt reach fertile Phthia.[3]

Crito: What a strange dream, Socrates.
Soc: Well now, Crito, it seems clear enough to me anyway — Horan's Crito

***
It seems Socrates is visited by a creative spirit or muse when he turns fables into verse. Also, there is a hymn to Apollo. Other people, including a poet. are talking about and wondering as to its meaning.

Then Cebes took this up and said, “By Zeus, it is just as well you jogged my memory, Socrates. A number of people have been asking me about your compositions, 60D the setting of Aesop’s fables to verse and the hymn to Apollo. — Horan's translation - Phaedo

Might this be the brain's reaction to forthcoming death? Sing now, or forever hold your peace. He is superstitious and needs to heed the call of his dreams. Socrates/Plato gives us musicality in poetry, music and philosophy.

Remember I mused earlier about the quickening, breathless pace of the final argument as a kind of stream of consciousness? Now I'm thinking of a jazzy vocal improv! The bookends of Crito as a reprise.
The repetitions are a rhythmic beat; a popular song that Crito might understand.

I guess it depends on what you mean by "zeteic skeptic." Plato seems to allow a priority to dialogue—as opposed to speeches—even as he suggests there are strong limits on what words can reach (Republic, Letter VII). A big theme in the Protagoras is that the Sophists keep wanting to leap into long speeches, while Socrates keeps trying to pull them into a "back and forth" conversation (i.e., a certain form of argumentation). This is still argument, but it isn't a type of argument that is passively received. This difference—the involvement of the other party—is key, since the "whole person" must be "turned" towards the Good to know it. We might also consider the explicit warning against losing faith in all arguments just because one has discovered that a favored argument turns out to be bad, presented during the interlude on misology in the Phaedo.

Plato seems to embrace a certain sorts of theorizing, e.g. the discussion of normative measure in the Statesman and Protagoras, just as he seems confident is a certain sorts of knowledge possessed by people, namely techne (which ties in with normative measure).

But there are limits on what can be said with words, because words always deal with the relative, and this is where I see the zeteic skeptic label being particularly apt. In particular, there is the critique of teaching as somehow being a simple "putting of ideas into a person," in the Republic. When Socrates tells Glaucon that he has no knowledge of the Good, this seems to both aim at and have the effect of drawing Glaucon on in search of this alluring knowledge. After this, Plato presents his three "images," the Good as the sun, the Divided Line, and the Cave. These images go beyond rhetoric, into the realm of analogy and metaphor, but they are still painted using language.

Notably, in each description something has to come from outside the image to explain the Good. For example, the Good cannot be on the divided line because this would make it just one point among many, and thus neither absolute nor transcedent. Rather, the Good lies off the line because the Absolute must contain both reality and appearances. Likewise, the philosopher must descend back into the cave to gather up the whole, rather than being satisfied with a part.

In the cave image it is Socrates himself, a reference to the historical Socrates, who "breaks in" to the image from without, transcending its limits. I have seen a few writers suggest that this moment is Plato's answer to Glaucon's pivotal question: "why would we ever prefer to be the man who is just, but who is thought unjust and punished by others, rather than the man who is unjust but who is thought just and rewarded by others?" Plato cannot answer this question with mere words, which are relational and thus always point to relative goods; he answers with a deed, the moral life and death of Socrates.

At the heart of this question is the distinction between things that are good only relative to something else, things that are good in themselves, and things that are both relatively good and good in themselves (a distinction that collapses into a binary in Aristotle, but here we can see a mirror of the appearances/reality/Absolute distinction).

Yet I think Plato thinks words, and more importantly philosophy as a whole, can do a lot for us. In the Republic, each of Socrates' main interlocutors takes on the characteristics of one of Socrates' political analogies for types of men (e.g., the timocratic man, the tyrannical man, etc.). By the end of the dialogue, each has an insight whereby they move up one level, ascending the steps towards philosophical man. Plato then, sees philosophy as a transformational process. Where his skepticism is most obvious is vis-á-vis the rhetoric and demonstrations of the Sophists. If the "whole person," is not changed, we can always reject an argument. Likewise, as we see in the Gorgias, Protagoras, Theatetus, etc., words can be twisted any way their speaker wants, resulting in dismal products, like the first speech of the Phaedrus. The image of the value of what Plato is doing then seems quite a bit different than Wittgenstein's "getting the fly out of the fly bottle."

How does this match up to Wittgenstein? It seems to me like Wittgenstein thinks that philosophy can do a lot less for us. Both philosophers see limits on what can be done with language, but it seems to me that Wittgenstein (particularly the early Wittgenstein) sees far more constraint here. Particularly, Wittgenstein's view on religious speech doesn't seem to allow for the truly transcedent role of the Good vis-á-vis human freedom and actualization that is staked out in Plato, or the Good's role vis-á-vis the Absolute.

I think Wittgenstein's image of language games as being relatively discrete (e.g. the theory of religious speech) seems to potentially be what Plato is warning against is his concerns over misology (depending on how Wittgenstein is read). Reason ultimately relates to the whole for Plato. Sophistry becomes toxic because it takes reason as being fractured—here it applies, here it is bent to my will, here it is just formalities. But for some of the intellectual descendents of Wittgenstein this is precisely what they take Wittgenstein to be positively arguing for in parts of PI (e.g. the part about the king who thinks the world began when he was born), i.e., different games cannot speak to one another because reason does not transcend them.

Of course, Wittgenstein is read many different ways, and sometimes Plato is deflated into an out and out skeptic on everything, so they can variously be quite far apart or quite close together. I would tend to think them quite far apart on several readings though. If Wittgenstein's king is taken to represent that truth is dependent on presuppositions that cannot be reached by reason, or if his ideas on language are taken more generally to say that games are what we know rather than being an (imperfect) tool vis-á-vis knowledge, I'd say the two are skeptical about quite different things.

As to midwifery, I see similarities in approach in some ways. But the idea of "giving birth in beauty," so potent in Plato, doesn't seem to be in Wittgenstein the same way (this would be a good or bad thing depending on who you ask).

Just to return to this, you have not answered why Plato, in his letter, when he clearly has an opportunity to present himself as a skeptic, instead chooses to say something very different, and even implies that he has shared knowledge of the forms with others (although not through dissertations.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

He leaves it to the reader to decide whether he is a skeptic by way of their engagement is skeptical practice. That is to say, by way of doubt and inquiry. The question of what he knows is left open. Where does he imply that he and others have knowledge of the forms?

The Seventh Letter might not have been written by Plato, but it was decidedly not written by a skeptic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, you may have decided it was not written by a skeptic, but there are others who do not share that opinion.

Your reference to the Phaedo also doesn't say what you say it does in context. He doesn't call the forms "foolish" at 100. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. He does not call the forms foolish. What he says is:

“Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything ... I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.”

Socrates does not attempt to describe the precise relationship of beautiful things to Beauty itself. One would think it important to do so if it is to be accepted as philosophically sound.

Like he says in the letter, you can't put this stuff into words. This is why he uses many different images to try to get the ideas across. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is more to it than that. See what he says about his "second sailing" in the Phaedo:

After this, he said, when I had wearied of looking into beings, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material ...

So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.

(99d-100a)

In the Republic:

“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …”

(517b-c)

A god knows if this account "happens to be true" but he does not claim to know this. He is not using images to convey something he knows. He is using images and the imagination as a way of thinking about how things he does not know and cannot see. This is very different from the image of philosopher whose soul is turned to see the Forms.

acting like the very paradigm of the Sophists he criticizes so heavily. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As he says in the Sophist, sometimes the philosopher appears as a sophist. (216d) What distinguishes the one kind from the other? Without getting too far into it, I think it is a matter of intent. The sophist aims to benefit himself, the philosopher to benefit others. it is for the benefit of others that they believe in the just, beautiful, and good. To this end the philosopher makes images of them.

He would be someone who pretends to know what he doesn't know — Count Timothy von Icarus

But Socrates does not pretend to know what he does not know. In the passage from the Republic he does not say that the way things look to him are the way they are. He says that a god, not him, knows if it happens to be true.

according to the dialogue (Phaedo) knowledge of the good can only be attained in death if at all. — Fooloso4

I recently watched an interesting documentary on Mt Athos, the Orthodox monastery complex. Towards the end, the head monk re-affirms that final union with God can only be realised at death, and that their life-long residency at the monastery is all by way of 'practicing for death' - exactly as Plato says in Phaedo. Then again, Orthodox Christianity incorporated much of Plato early in their development, hence the designation 'Christian Platonism', which especially characterises Orthodox spirituality.

PLATONIC EPISTEMOLOGY: THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTION

A central theme in Platonic writings is knowledge. Plato drew a clear line between knowledge acquired through reason (episteme) and opinion (doxa). However, opinion was not just any opinion but right opinion. For example, if somebody knew the way to Larisa (the city where Meno was born) without himself having travelled there, his knowledge would not be mere uninformed opinion but right opinion (Meno 97b). A third form of knowledge is knowledge acquired through direct experience (gnosis). As we shall see, there is a higher form of knowledge, namely, wisdom or sophia.

In everyday life, knowledge is primarily obtained through sensory perception. The study of the process or phenomenon of perception enables us to understand how knowledge comes about.

The physical world consists of five primary elements or principles, earth, water, fire, air and ether (or space). Despite their names, these primary elements are not the physical substances earth, water, etc., but patterns of energy in which minute particles move, vibrate, or radiate in particular ways (Timaeus 31b ff.). Combinations of elements make up all physical substances and objects.

The physical objects and their characteristics are perceived by the soul by means of its sense faculties, smelling, tasting, feeling by touch, hearing and seeing.

For example, through the physical organ “eye” and associated faculty of “sight”, etc., the sensual aspect (epithymetikon) registers discrete sensory perceptions such as colour and combines them into a mental image (eidolon). This image is taken up and analysed by the intellectual aspect (logistikon), given a name and assessed in terms of its relevance to the self. The emotional part (thymos) then reacts emotionally to the image and a decision is reached as to the course of action (if any) to be taken. All these mental functions or operations exist within, and are illumined by, the light of spirit or nous.

What becomes clear is that in ordinary perception we have no direct apprehension of the objects “out there”, but only of the mental image that the sensual aspect of our mind forms out of a multitude of points, minute particles, or atoms of perception such as colour, etc. What we perceive is not the actual object but a mental copy of it.

One question that arises is, how does our intellect know what the object of experience is? For example, on seeing an object such as a flower, on what basis does the intellect say or think, “this is a flower”? On the face of it, the answer might be “through experience”. We experienced an object called “flower” before and on perceiving it now, we recollect having experienced the same or a similar object in the past. The name and past experience stored in our memory are revived on contact with the current image and mentally associated with the object we perceive or experience now and this enables us to identify and name it.

However, Plato asserts that the physical world and its constituent substances and objects are in constant flux, which makes sensory input inaccurate and unreliable. True knowledge can only be acquired by referring to higher realities apprehended through a higher faculty of intuitive perception. Therefore, at this point, Plato introduces the concept of “ideas” or “forms”. The object we perceive is an imperfect copy of a perfect and unchanging “idea” (eidos), or “pattern” (paradeigma). The same applies to concepts or ideas and everything else that makes up the world of multiplicity: “fire”, “earth”, “man”, “beautiful”, “just”, etc. When we perceive a physical object, we recall our innate memory or knowledge of its ideal form and the name associated with it.

Critics have questioned the soundness of the Theory of Forms and Plato himself was aware that his theory was not perfect. Yet he kept it all the same and for a good reason. Philosophy does use logic, but it is not a slave to strict or pure logic. Like a true philosopher, Plato aimed to look at the mental processes and concepts behind perception and at the activities of consciousness behind mental processes and concepts in order to arrive at the ultimate source of all knowledge – consciousness (nous) itself.

Greek culture itself had a tendency to personify abstract concepts or universals. Time was personified by Cronus, Justice by Dike, Love and Beauty by Aphrodite, Sleep by Hypnos, Death by Thanatos, etc. So, the concept of eternal, ideal Forms or Patterns was in a sense implicit in Greek thought. What Plato actually proposes to do is to illustrate the fact that in the same way as the physical world is organized according to certain set patterns, so the intelligible world, the world of spirit, too, is ordered according to pre-established patterns.

As sunrays radiate from the Sun in waves of light, the physical World emanates from the World-Soul and is simultaneously made visible to man by its light, in a constant process. This constant emanation, projection or overflow of the World is not and cannot be random, otherwise a completely different world might be created every moment. Creation follows certain pre-existing patterns: the objects which make up the World belong to certain species or classes, possess certain qualities such as colour, quantity or size, stand in a particular relation to other objects, etc. These patterns are present in the ideal world of the Cosmic Mind (Nous).

Of course, man cannot expect to grasp the precise details of creation which are known only to the Creator. These teachings merely serve to point out the fact that the Natural World in which man lives is a world of appearances (the Greek word phýsis, “nature”, also means appearance from phýo, “to appear”) and that the reality behind it can be found only in the Divine World-Mind which has created it.

The problem that Platonism seeks to solve is how the absolute unity of spirit becomes the multiplicity of thought and matter.

The concept of abstract ideas (eidea) such as “fire”, “earth”, “man”, “beautiful”, “just”, existing on a higher plane from which they are copied into the physical world serves in the first place to point to the fact that particulars can be reduced to universals.

Although specific objects are distinct from each other, they may share common properties or features such as colour. For example, the feature “blueness” is the universal shared by the chicory flower, blue paint and the sky. Thus, blueness enables us to grasp the concept of unity in multiplicity.

The Greek word “idea”, eidos, is related to the verb “to see”, eidon which is cognate with Latin video, "to see". In the physical world of matter, to see means to perceive an object that is distinct and separate from ourselves. In the intelligible world of spirit, to see means to think, ideate, or bring into being a concept or thing. For Plato, knowledge was ultimately a form of being, or mental seeing in which intelligence becomes the object of experience while retaining awareness of itself at all times.

In order to understand the concept of “ideas” (eidea), “patterns” (paradeigmata) or “forms” it may be helpful to think of universals such as “colour”, “number”, “size”, “distance”, etc. However, it is important to understand that universals are posterior to particulars. We first perceive a number of particulars from which we abstract one (or more) universals. In contrast, Plato's ideas or forms are prior to particulars. They are the "essences" and "patterns" from which particulars are formed.

The ideas themselves ultimately consist of creative intelligence. Contemplation on the ideas leads to a direct experience of how intelligence “projects” or “emanates” objects of experience and the soul realises its essential identity with the Cosmic or Divine Mind (Nous), in the same way the centres of two circles get closer and closer to each other until they become one.

From the individual soul’s point of view, contemplation of the One is the highest form of knowledge. In contrast to this, from the perspective of the One, the highest form of knowledge is self-contemplation. Therefore, the highest form of knowledge, wisdom (sophia), is self-knowledge, that is, the knowledge that consciousness has of itself as self-aware, creative intelligence.

This is very clearly stated by Plato in Phaedo (65a – 67b; 79c, d) and emphasised by Plotinus. In fact, this may be seen as the core of Plotinus’ and other Platonists' teachings.

Self-knowledge in the highest sense goes beyond normal forms of knowledge such as opinion, reason and experience. Therefore, it cannot be expressed in words or grasped mentally. It can only be experienced in an ecstatic state that our limited intellectual faculties cannot grasp or explain. For example, the most attempts to describe this state have produced are approximate depictions of "infinite light, love and joy" and of a sense of "becoming alive" for the first time and in a way that completely eclipses all experiences of ordinary life in the same way the light of a candle is eclipsed by strong sunlight. It is an experience that totally transforms you and makes you part of a much larger and more powerful reality of whose existence you were totally unaware (in any case not consciously or fully) until that point.

As such depictions are meaningless to those unfamiliar with the experience, this illustrates the difficulty or impossibility of conveying the experience to others. Moreover, the impact this experience can have on the untrained mind makes it imperative to undergo prior intellectual training. The prescribed progression from purification to illumination to oneness, is to be strictly followed and "short cuts" to be avoided.

In any case, Plotinus is said to have taught from his own experience of union with the One (enosis). In the Life of Plotinus, his disciple Porphyry relates that his master attained an exalted state four times in his life.

However, despite its mystical side, Platonism remains a practical philosophy. The purpose of attaining Oneness is not to become completely absorbed or submerged in Ultimate Reality, but, in Plotinus’ own words, “to give back the divine in us to the divine in all”.

Plotinus - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Internet Classics Archive | The Six Enneads by Plotinus (mit.edu)

From what I can see, you are claiming that Plato was an atheist and his writings teach atheism.

You are also saying that Plato uses secret language to conceal his atheism.

In support of your theory, you cite Clement of Alexandria and Ibn Sina who, apparently, believed that Plato and/or the Greeks in general, concealed secrets in their writings.

You are claiming that this proves that Plato was a covert atheist.

The first problem with this is that, when carried to its logical conclusion, your theory becomes an extraordinary conspiracy theory according to which Plato and his followers from Aristotle to the Church Fathers and the Christian and Islamic philosophers and mystics were all secret believers in atheism.

What I am saying in response to this is that anyone with even the most basic understanding of philosophy and logic, would ask two simple questions:

1. What do those authors mean by “secrets”?
2. Why should “secrets” mean “atheism”?

“Secrets” could mean a number of things, e.g., knowledge unknown to the general public, allegorical passages referring to metaphysical realities, etc.

There is no evidence to suggest that Clement or Ibn Sina were atheists, and even if they were atheists, this doesn’t prove that Plato was an atheist. It may perfectly well be that they chose to read Plato in an atheist sense. But there is zero evidence of that.

So, this takes us back to the dialogues. These are some of your arguments:

1. Socrates says “one must, so to speak, chant such things to oneself” (Phaedo 114d).
2. Plato bans the Gods from the ideal city discussed in the Republic.

1. In fact, “chanting to oneself” means that Socrates wants his friends to overcome their grief and fear of death with the help of his account of life after death. No more and no less than that.

2. As already stated, banning the poets’ and artists’ irreverent representations of the Gods does not equal banning the Gods.

As to the Good, I think the matter is very clear. The Good is a meta-principle that explains the function of other, subordinate principles as part of a harmonious whole, i.e., how they all fit together to form a functioning, ordered system.

Allan Silverman – Some Ways of Being in Plato

1. I have already explained how Plato's “Forms” play the role of “patterns” (paradeigmata) whereby consciousness organizes itself to generate determinate cognition.

2. The Good explains how the Forms and all other things fit together to form a unified, harmonious reality.

3. The dialogue says very clearly that the Good is “superior to and beyond being” (509b), i.e., a form of Transcendent Reality that contains all things:

“The Sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation.” “Of course not.” “In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power.”

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D6%3Asection%3D509b

Ergo, monistic idealism, not atheism.

I am responding to your comment in the Griffin thread in this one because it concerns the current discussion of how "matter" is to be understood in the works of Aristotle and Plotinus.

In the Gerson review of Johansen, Aristotle's treatment of the "receptacle of creation", introduced at Timaeus 49A, is said to be:

In the sixth chapter, Johansen turns to an analysis of the receptacle of creation, arguing that its function is to be understood in the light of Plato’s conception of what coming into being actually is. The receptacle constitutes space (or place) because Plato needs to postulate a condition for something’s coming into or going out of existence. These are construed as “a certain kind of movement in and out of space (122).” Consideration of such movement abstracts from the mathematical conceptualization of nature. Thus coming into existence and going out of existence are really cases of the locomotion of the solid triangles out of which bodies are constructed. This is in contrast to the pre- kosmos where the coming into and going out of existence of the phenomenal bodies does not involve the movement of triangles. Both in the pre- kosmos and in the kosmos itself, movement is intrinsic to the phenomenal bodies or elements and is only derivatively attributable to the receptacle. Johansen goes on to argue that, in addition to the receptacle’s representing space or place, Aristotle was basically correct to identify it with matter. So, “place and matter coincide in that both are to be understood as the product of abstracting the formal characteristics of a body (133).” Space or place becomes mere extension. The receptacle thus becomes the continuant in change, which in the context of Timaeus is essentially locomotion. By contrast, Aristotle wants to distinguish fundamentally locomotion from other types of change — especially generation and destruction — and so he makes a sharper distinction between space or place and matter than does Plato. — Gerson, review of Plato's Natural Philosophy

I don't know if this account corresponds to Johansen's text but it leaves out a critical context in the dialogue. The "receptacle" is introduced at the start of a new beginning:

Clearly we should now begin again, once we have called upon 48E the god, our saviour, at the very outset of our deliberations to see us safely out of an unusual and unaccustomed exposition, to the doctrine of things probable. In any case, our fresh start concerning the universe should be more elaborate than before, for we distinguished two entities then, but now we must present a third factor. Two were sufficient for our previous descriptions, one designated as a sort of a model discernible by Nous and ever the same, while the second was a copy of the model 49A involved in becoming and visible. We did not distinguish a third entity at the time as we thought it enough to have these two, but now the argument seems to compel us to try to manifest a difficult and obscure form in words. What should we understand its capacity and nature to be? This in particular: it is the receptacle of all coming into being, like its nurse. Now although the truth has been spoken, a clearer statement about it is still required but it is difficult to do so, particularly 49B because it is necessary for the sake of this to raise a preliminary problem about fire and its accompaniments. It is difficult in the case of each of these to state what sort should actually be called water rather than fire, and what sort should be referred to as anything in particular rather than as everything individually, in such a manner as to employ language which is trustworthy and certain. How then, may we speak about them in a likely manner and in what way, and what can we say about them when faced with this problem? — Plato, Timaeus, translated by Horan

I take Gerson's point that a "likely account" does not refer to its "probabilistic" sense. The difficulty described by Timaeus is that the language of correspondence does not serve us as readily as it did in the other two models. The other difficulty is that third entity is prior to the other entities as fundamental ground of natural being. The new beginning is in that sense a second sailing as taken in the Phaedo (to which Fooloso4 often refers to.

A scholar who takes that perspective seriously is John Sallis. He takes exception to how χώρα is referred to as "space" in the sense of extension in (as expressed in Gerson's review) and even greater exception to Aristotle equating χώρα with "place" (τόπος):

For, according to Aristotle, this is what Plato declared the receptacle to be: “a substratum [ύποκείμενον] prior to the so-called elements, just as gold is the substratum of works made of gold.” Though in this context Aristotle refers to one other image of the χώρα, that of nurse (τιθήνη), he forgoes drawing on the content of that image and, instead, moves immediately to identify the receptacle with “primary matter” (329a). Yet the passage that is, at once, both most decisive and most puzzling occurs in Book 4 of the Physics: “This is why Plato says in the Timaeus that matter and the χώρα are the same; for the receptive and the χώρα are one and the same. Although the manner in which he speaks about the receptive in the Timaeus differs from that in the so-called unwritten teachings, nevertheless he declares that place [τόπος] and the χώρα are the same” (209b).

One cannot but be struck by the lack of correspondence between this passage and the text of the Timaeus. The passage declares three identifications: that of the receptive (μεταληπτικόν) with the χώρα, that of matter (ύλη) with the χώρα, and that of place (τόπος) with the χώρα. Only the first of these identifications has any basis in the text of the Timaeus, and then only if one disregards any difference that might distinguish μεταληπτικόν from the Platonic words δεχόμενον and ύποδοχή.

For the identification of ύλη with the χώρα, there is no basis in the Timaeus. Plato never uses the word ύλη in Aristotle’s sense, a sense that, one suspects, comes to be constituted and delimited only in and through the work of Aristotle. When Plato does, on a few occasions, use the word, it has the common, everyday sense of building material such as wood, earth, or stone. Following Aristotle’s own strategy in On Generation and Corruption, one could refer to the image of the constantly remodeled gold as providing support for the identification. But reference to this image could be decisive only if one privileged it over most of the others, disregarding, for instance, the image of the nurse, which represents the relation between the χώρα and the sensible in a way quite irreducible to that between matter and the things formed from it. What is perhaps even more decisive is that all these are images of the χώρα, images declared in an είκώς λόγος (likely account}, which is to be distinguished from the bastardly discourse in which one would venture to say the χώρα. — John Sallis, Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus

Since the topic of Aristotle has come up, I will quote selectively from a post of mine in another thread.

First, there is the passage from Timaeus that is being considered:

Clearly we should now begin again, once we have called upon the god, our saviour, at the very outset of our deliberations to see us safely out of an unusual and unaccustomed exposition, to the doctrine of things probable. In any case, our fresh start concerning the universe should be more elaborate than before, for we distinguished two entities then, but now we must present a third factor. Two were sufficient for our previous descriptions, one designated as a sort of a model discernible by Nous and ever the same, while the second was a copy of the model involved in becoming and visible. We did not distinguish a third entity at the time as we thought it enough to have these two, but now the argument seems to compel us to try to manifest a difficult and obscure form in words. What should we understand its capacity and nature to be? This in particular: it is the receptacle of all coming into being, like its nurse. Now although the truth has been spoken, a clearer statement about it is still required but it is difficult to do so, particularly because it is necessary for the sake of this to raise a preliminary problem about fire and its accompaniments. It is difficult in the case of each of these to state what sort should actually be called water rather than fire, and what sort should be referred to as anything in particular rather than as everything individually, in such a manner as to employ language which is trustworthy and certain. How then, may we speak about them in a likely manner and in what way, and what can we say about them when faced with this problem? — Plato, Timaeus, 48e, translated by Horan

The difficulty described by Timaeus is that the language of correspondence does not serve us as readily as it did in the other two models. The other difficulty is that third entity is prior to the other entities as a fundamental ground of natural being. The new beginning is in that sense a second sailing as taken in the Phaedo (to which Fooloso4 often refers to).

A scholar who takes that perspective seriously is John Sallis. He takes issue with Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's passage:

For, according to Aristotle, this is what Plato declared the receptacle to be: “a substratum [ύποκείμενον] prior to the so-called elements, just as gold is the substratum of works made of gold.” Though in this context Aristotle refers to one other image of the χώρα, that of nurse (τιθήνη), he forgoes drawing on the content of that image and, instead, moves immediately to identify the receptacle with “primary matter” (329a). Yet the passage that is, at once, both most decisive and most puzzling occurs in Book 4 of the Physics: “This is why Plato says in the Timaeus that matter and the χώρα are the same; for the receptive and the χώρα are one and the same. Although the manner in which he speaks about the receptive in the Timaeus differs from that in the so-called unwritten teachings, nevertheless he declares that place [τόπος] and the χώρα are the same” (209b).

One cannot but be struck by the lack of correspondence between this passage and the text of the Timaeus. The passage declares three identifications: that of the receptive (μεταληπτικόν) with the χώρα, that of matter (ύλη) with the χώρα, and that of place (τόπος) with the χώρα. Only the first of these identifications has any basis in the text of the Timaeus, and then only if one disregards any difference that might distinguish μεταληπτικόν from the Platonic words δεχόμενον and ύποδοχή.

For the identification of ύλη with the χώρα, there is no basis in the Timaeus. Plato never uses the word ύλη in Aristotle’s sense, a sense that, one suspects, comes to be constituted and delimited only in and through the work of Aristotle. When Plato does, on a few occasions, use the word, it has the common, everyday sense of building material such as wood, earth, or stone. Following Aristotle’s own strategy in On Generation and Corruption, one could refer to the image of the constantly remodeled gold as providing support for the identification. But reference to this image could be decisive only if one privileged it over most of the others, disregarding, for instance, the image of the nurse, which represents the relation between the χώρα and the sensible in a way quite irreducible to that between matter and the things formed from it. What is perhaps even more decisive is that all these are images of the χώρα, images declared in an είκώς λόγος (likely account}, which is to be distinguished from the bastardly discourse in which one would venture to say the χώρα. — John Sallis, Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus

What makes the passage from Physics even more convoluted is that Aristotle is not actually agreeing with the view he ascribes to Plato regarding whether 'place' belongs to a being as its form and matter do:

We have seen that attributions are made directly, in virtue of their immediate applicability, or mediately, because, though not immediately applicable themselves, they include, involve, or imply something that is immediately applicable. And so, too, a ‘place’ may be assigned to an object either primarily because it is its special and exclusive place, or mediately because it is ‘common’ to it and other things, or is the universal place that includes the proper places of all things.

I mean, for instance, that you, at this moment, are in the universe because you are in the air, which air is in the universe; and in the air because on the earth; and in like manner on the earth because on the special place which ‘contains and circumscribes you, and no other body.

But if what we mean by the ‘place’ of a body is its immediate envelope, then ‘place’ is a limiting determinant, which suggests that it is the specifying or moulding ‘form’ by which the concrete quantum, together with its component matter, is ‘determined.’ For it is just the office of a limit so to determine or mould something. From this point of view, then, we should identify ‘place’ with ‘form.

But if we think of a thing’s place as its ‘dimensionality’ or ‘room-occupancy’ (to be distinguished from the thing itself, as a concrete quantum) we must then regard it as ‘matter’ rather than as ‘form,’ for matter is the factor that is bounded and determined by the form, as a surface, or other limit, moulds and determines; for it is just that which is in itself undetermined, but capable of being determined, that we mean by matter. Thus, if a concrete sphere, e.g., be stripped of its limit, as well as of its other determining characteristics, nothing but its matter is left.

This is why Plato, in the Timaeus, identifies, a ‘matter’ and ‘room,’ because ‘room’ and ‘the receptive-of-determination’ are one and the same thing. His account of the ‘receptive’ differs in the Timaeus and in what are known as his Unwritten Teachings, but he is consistent in asserting the identity of ‘place’ (τόπον) and ‘room.’(χώραν) Thus, whereas everyone asserts the reality of ‘place,’ only Plato has so much as attempted to tell us what it is.

It is no wonder that, when thus regarded,—either as matter or as form, I mean,—‘place’ should seem hard to grasp, especially as matter and form themselves stand at the very apex of speculative thought, and cannot well, either of them, be cognized as existing apart from the other.

But in truth it is easy enough to see that its place cannot possibly be either the matter or the form of a thing; for neither of these is separable from the thing itself, as its place undoubtedly is. For we have already explained that ‘where’ the air was ‘there’, again the water is, when the water and air succeed each other, and so too with any other substance; and therefore its ‘place’ can be neither a factor nor an intrinsic possession of the thing, but is something separable from it. — Aristotle, Physics, 209a, translated by Wicksteed and Cornford