People have understood it for thousands of years. I guess you're cut off from the vast majority of people in your own culture and broader language group. — frank

See my earlier comments about Plato's Phaedo. While ostensibly he is laying out an argument to support an immortal soul, he is at the same time showing that there is no coherent concept of an immortal soul.

Added: I also cited two seminal sources from my own culture: Aristotle and the Hebrew Bible. Neither posits an immortal soul that exists apart from a particular body.

See my earlier comments about Plato's Phaedo. While ostensibly he is laying out an argument to support an immortal soul, he is at the same time showing that there is no coherent concept of an immortal soul. — Fooloso4

I don't think so.

Added: I also cited two seminal sources from my own culture: Aristotle and the Hebrew Bible. Neither posits an immortal soul that exists apart from a particular body. — Fooloso4

Christianity.

When your hot do you dispute that? — Zenny

Good example! My wife says she is hot or cold and wants to turn the temperature up and down. The thermostat, however, is set at a specific temperature. 70 degrees F is the temperature whether she feels hot or cold.

Maybe you are too young or too sheltered to have ever found that your intuitive certainty about something turned out to be wrong, but it happens all the time.

Is it your intuitive certainty that led you to conclude that I am a worshiper of dialectics? If you had actually read the essay on Plato's Phaedo that you said you did you would know that this is false.

Not sure if that adds anything; it's a pretty standard take. Basically, Christianity does a number on what Nietzsche's takes to be "life" and this is not due to later perversions of a corrupt institutional church - it's right there in the words and deeds of Jesus. — Erik

It is not clear what Jesus meant by "Kingdom of God is at hand". Some take it to mean a geopolitical change, but others interpreted it as a change in the person. Paul, on the other hand, is quite clear. The world was at any moment going to undergo a fundamental change with only the saved remaining as "spirit bodies" (I think he gets this from Plato's Phaedo). It, of course, did not happen.

Paul taught that we are born in sin and must be saved. The physical body is a slave to sin. Hence the saved will be "spirit bodies". The Earth will be transformed to Heaven on Earth.

It is not clear what Jesus meant by "Kingdom of God is at hand". Some take it to mean a geopolitical change, but others interpreted it as a change in the person. Paul, on the other hand, is quite clear. The world was at any moment going to undergo a fundamental change with only the saved remaining as "spirit bodies" (I think he gets this from Plato's Phaedo). It, of course, did not happen.

Paul taught that we are born in sin and must be saved. The physical body is a slave to sin. Hence the saved will be "spirit bodies". The Earth will be transformed to Heaven on Earth. — Fooloso4

The kingdom of God is psychological state according to Nietzsche... a state beyond suffering, completely peaceful... by denying the world. In the symbology he often uses, it's at end of the apollonian spectrum, the dream... hence dionysus VS the crucified. The Antichrist is where he gets into this I think.

No results in a search for “Plato's Phaedo”

https://thephilosophyforum.com/search?Search=+Plato%27s+Phaedo

Works fine.

Gremlins.

Link to them, with a reason. — Banno

You neglected to share the reasons you like Plato's Phaedo so much.

IN the recent thread on Plato's Phaedo, I was struck by the discussion of whether suicide was ethical. The discussion revolved around the idea that it wasn’t, in light of the fact that humans are chattel of the gods (I think was the expression.) The implication being that as life had been bestowed on us by the gods, it was not fitting to take our own lives, because in some sense we're the property of the gods, that we don’t own ourselves, that we’re not our own property, so to speak. Can’t help but think this is relevant.

IN the recent thread on Plato's Phaedo, I was struck by the discussion of whether suicide was ethical. The discussion revolved around the idea that it wasn’t, in light of the fact that humans are chattel of the gods (I think was the expression.) The implication being that as life had been bestowed on us by the gods, it was not fitting to take our own lives, because in some sense we're the property of the gods, that we don’t own ourselves, that we’re not our own property, so to speak. Can’t help but think this is relevant. — Wayfarer

Seems relevant although I don't know how you'll take it.

There is only one really serious philosophical question, and that is suicide. — Albert Camus

Any ideas what the absurdist Camus meant? What's the difference really between someone who takes faer own life and someone who doesn't? We're all, as you once jocularly put it, in the same boat! I have a rejoinder to that - some are in first class and the rest of us are in third class and that might be the difference between life in the lap of luxury, intoxicated as it were with the pleasures life has to offer and thus addicted, we want to live...one more day, just one more day while those at the bottom, who barely manage to scrape a living are much relieved by thanatos knocking on their crumbling doors if they have on that is.

No matter where I looked, the platonic forms were not found. — Corvus

Well, Socrates says:

The man who as far as possible uses his thought in its own right to access each reality, neither adducing the evidence of his sight in his thinking nor bringing any other sense at all along with the reasoning, but using his thought alone by itself and unalloyed, and so attempting to hunt down each real thing alone by itself and unalloyed, separated as far as possible from eyes and ears and virtually from his entire body, for the reason that the body disturbs his soul and, whenever it associates with it, doesn't let it acquire truth and wisdom, is the man who will attain to the knowledge of reality (Phaedo 66a)

You hunt something down by following its tracks until you see it. The tracks of the Forms are the universals, the things whose properties can be perceived in particulars ....

In Plato's Phaedo, the act is wrong because it puts asunder what the divine has brought together. The proposed exceptions to the prohibition are presented as respectful arguments brought forward as a human desire for a different outcome in a particular situation. That is what a human being can do.

But that means humans are also involved with what continues to live. The argument with the divine is leverage of some kind; Not understood before it is applied. Not understood very well after that either.

The way I understand Greek philosophy and, in particular, Platonism, philosophy, by definition, is the quest for wisdom or knowledge (sophia), where "love" of wisdom is not a passive state but an active desire to attain wisdom or knowledge that manifests itself in all areas of life.

This is why, like Socrates, the genuine philosopher in the Greek tradition begins from a stage of ignorance, or more precisely, of awareness of one's own (and others') ignorance, and progresses onward and upward toward knowledge all the way to the very apex and beyond - if there is such thing.

This means that philosophy is a process in which the intelligent principle (nous) in man progressively sheds all ignorance or non-intelligence until knowledge or intelligence itself alone remains. And at that point, the seeking intelligence becomes united to knowledge.

At the same time, it is also a process of self-discovery or self-realization in the sense that (1) when all that is left is intelligence, one is nothing but that, and (2) the ultimate goal is attained through introspective inquiry as described in Plato's Phaedo, where intelligence or nous gradually dissociates itself from the physical body, sense-perceptions, and thoughts, and abides "alone, itself by itself". This is the culmination of the celebrated maxim "know thyself" (gnóthi seautón).

This is why religion is not necessary in this process, the only required belief being belief in truth and in one's own ability to discover it.

This doesn't mean that we must discard religion altogether in the same way as it doesn't mean we must give up science or basic comforts and needs like food, clothes, shelter, relationships, work, and everything that amounts to "normal" life. On the contrary, self-realization is best achieved in the midst of a full life.

The withdrawal from the "unreal" is purely inward and is in no way incompatible with "external" reality as one's experience of it is completely transformed and no longer represents a "hindrance" to be avoided.

There is here a series of questions that begins almost as soon as they meet.
[...]
Neither is asking the question to the other, for how would they know? — Fooloso4

I hadn't thought of that. It seemed like a dialogue. So, is this internal self-talk - or a writer's technique to help the reader better know the characters?

The saint does not want to give anything to man but rather wants something taken away. I think this refers to salvation from sin, the three metamorphoses of the spirit (page 16), and the burden of the camel. — Fooloso4

OK, you have the advantage of having read this before. I think this is a book which you can read over and over and still find something new or revealing.

This is the first time I've noticed this aspect of the saint — Tate

The beauty of discussions like this; new ways of looking and discovering.
Thanks for starting the thread :up:

The saint ask Z what he brings "us" — Fooloso4

The royal 'we'? Those 'above' in the spiritual realm. Or the saint and his natural companions.

Z says he has nothing to give the saint but leaves quickly before he takes something away (page 5). This might be a clue to the second part of the book's title:
A Book for All and None". — Fooloso4

What's the link between the 'clue' and the title?

To them our footsteps sound too lonely in the lanes

'Lonely in the lanes'. I like that.
Mankind as a general collective can be suspicious or scared to be separate.
We (the unroyal) mingle in the marketplace.
Not wanting to be alone along a narrow way; on a parallel single line as in a swimming pool.

And if at night lying in their beds they hear a man walking outside, long before the sun rises, they probably ask themselves: where is the thief going?

We cling to each other in our beds in darkness. No light shining. We can imagine dark deeds outside.
We build separate family homes for shelter and protection. We guard our property. The material.

If Z were to tell the saint the news that God is dead would be to steal something from him. Why would Z give the gift of the overman to mankind but not to the saint? — Fooloso4

Yes, it would deny the saint his comfort blanket; his faith is his protection. Against what?
Men? The World? He wants his Garden of Eden.

Why would Z give the gift of the overman to mankind but not to the saint? — Fooloso4

I'm still not exactly sure what 'the gift of the overman' is?

I make songs and sing them, and when I make songs I laugh, weep and growl: thus I praise God.
With singing, weeping, laughing and growling I praise the god who is my god.

This made me think of our 'Plato's Phaedo' discussion.
The repetition and singing as incantation; myths and magic.

Why the difference between the lines, even if it seems they are saying the same thing?

There is for the saint no burden to be carried or to be alleviated from. The god who is his god is not one Z wants to take away. To take it away would be to leave him empty. — Fooloso4

Before someone's belief/faith is questioned, attacked or removed, there would need to be something to take its place. Our minds can't say empty forever...

OK but you didn't address my question:

This made me think of our 'Plato's Phaedo' discussion.

The repetition and singing as incantation; myths and magic.

Why the difference between the lines, even if it seems they are saying the same thing? — Amity

I make songs and sing them, and when I make songs I laugh, weep and growl: thus I praise God.
With singing, weeping, laughing and growling I praise the god who is my god.

What I noticed here was the change from God to god.
The difference in context and circumstance; between time ('When') and person (''With)

1. 'God', the general God: The Big External Spirit in the Sky (Heaven). The Ideal.
The religious inspiration for the saint's creativity.
'When...' - He makes them with feeling, then sings in Faith. Hallelujah! Praise the Lord!
Singing as Incantation, like in a church. Invoking magic charms.

2. 'god', here. is his god. A more personal god.
The saint is human with a wide range of emotions, from joy to sadness, anger even?
'With....' - In the midst of 'suffering', he talks/prays directly to his particular god, special to him alone.
This personal relationship comforts him.
His Belief is his protection against the lower parts of him, his demons. Help me in my hour of need.
Without God, he would be vulnerable. That is why he praises God. He might also think that unless God receives gratitude, He will become angry and desert him.

That is one way of looking at it.

There is for the saint no burden to be carried or to be alleviated from. — Fooloso4

The burden of being human still remains, even if he might delude himself with magic charms.
The saint has Pride in being above others he looks down on.
Physical and Spiritual combined.

Hi and thanks again.

I mean, whenever you start a thread you have to choose different categories to fit your new discussion. You propose a new category for "reading groups" — javi2541997

No, that isn't it.
There is already a category in the dropdown menu for 'Reading Groups'. Not easily seen, it lies tucked away under another subcategory 'Learning Centre'...way, way down...

What I've just discovered is that some discussions I thought would be in that category have been placed in 'General Philosophy'. For example, Plato's Phaedo and the recent 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra'.

My proposal was more modest. Simply to have a stickie attached.

For me it is so interesting, indeed. Probably we can put up there discussions like "Thus spoke Zarathustra" or "Emmanuel Kant readings" etc... instead of trying to put them in specific categories such as "Metaphysics" "Epistemology" "Philosophy of religion" etc... — javi2541997

So, yes. You would think that specific readings would already be placed and found in the reading group category. But it seems that this is a lost place not used, for whatever reason.

Perhaps 'book discussions' should be given a tighter and higher spot in the hit parade :chin:

But hey, I've given this Feedback section enough of my time.
Appreciate your welcome follow-up :sparkle:

This field of study (pun intended) is very problematic. Physicists understand the transmission of energy in electromagnetic fields as waves. They also know that a wave is the movement of a substance. This produced the idea that there was an aether, as a medium, within which the electromagnetic waves are active.

The current attitude in the scientific community is to deny the reality of the medium, and produce models, or representations of the wave action which do not include the medium, space-time being a separate somewhat static background. This renders the true nature of the wave action which is involved here impossible to understand. You can see that a true understanding would require that either we stop representing electromagnetic energy as a wave action, or else we include within the representations, the substance (aether) which is active. Of course the former is unrealistic, and that leaves us with the task of trying to determine the true nature of medium which is the substance within which, those waves exist. Denying the reality of this substance, and continuing with the current enterprise of faulty models is not the answer.

I'm interested in any sources for these kinds of ideas — Wayfarer

There is a large volume of speculative information on the web, which begins from the assumption that all physical existence is vibrations of the underlying medium (the medium here being roughly equivalent to what scientists call space-time). That the entire Cosmos is a collection of vibrations is a very ancient idea, extending back through the Pythagoreans and beyond. You'll find it very evident in Plato, The Phaedo for example, where the idea that the soul is a harmony which creates the unity of the material body is discussed. If you start searching through "vibration" theories on the web, it's a very daunting task to separate the tidbits of valuable information from the masses of propaganda, as is the case with much religious material.

Perhaps you might prepare yourself by listening to one of the greatest pop songs ever written: "Good Vibrations"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apBWI6xrbLY

Of course, but then again, what is good? How can you guarantee that the good that your moral education teaches people actually creates a good bias? What if your moral education isn't forming the good that you thought it would and people are now having a bias that is instead morally questionable? — Christoffer

Yes, this is exactly the issue, how are we to determine good biases from bad. You were talking as if all biases are bad, but now you appear to accept that some might be good. So, on what bases are we going to distinguish good biases from bad biases?

Isn't it then better to have a neutral system of anti-bias so that good is always evaluated by not having a pre-existing belief bias? — Christoffer

No, like I explained, biases are a natural and essential part of being human. Therefore it is impossible to be bias-free, and any attempt at "not having a pre-existing belief bias" would be a completely unrealistic attempt due to that impossibility. Such an attempt would just turn into a matter of gravitating toward keeping the biases which one is comfortable with, and eliminating the others, because it is impossible to not have any bias. Then we end up still having biases and no principles for distinguishing which biases we ought to have and ought not have.

Our biases is us favoring certain knowledge over other. We favor those things out of our emotions, our craving for comfort. The comfortable "truth" is the one we defend and form our world-view on. This means we evaluate new knowledge not by their own merits, but by how they relate to the knowledge we favor, that we are comfortable with.

Therefore, detachment from bias makes us better at evaluating the knowledge we have and the knowledge we are confronted with. — Christoffer

Your proposed "detachment from bias" is unrealistic, impossible for a human being to achieve, analogous to a mind separated from its body. It is not the human condition, nor is it a possible condition for a human being, so forget about it, and move along to something more realistic.

Bias is an error in perfect understanding. — Christoffer

Do you accept as true, the proposition that "perfect understanding" is impossible for human beings to obtain. If so, then you ought to recognize that your goal of being bias-free is not a reasonable goal for a human being. This conclusion necessitates a completely different approach to biases. Instead of attempting to reject all biases as fundamentally unwanted, we need to accept that it is impossible to reject all biases, therefore we need some principles by which we can decide which to reject. Do you see that these "principles" cannot themselves be biases, but more of a versatile, or universal method for assessing biases.

You cannot conclude there to be good biases without first concluding an answer to what a good bias really is. And to form such an answer requires you to explore a moral realm without bias, since you would otherwise just apply your own bias of what you believe is good before concluding and applying it as a collective bias that others should follow. — Christoffer

This is not true. My demonstration that there are good biases came from your assumption that there are bad biases. So from your premise, that we ought to rid ourselves of biases, because they are bad, I demonstrated that if there are bad biases there is necessarily also good biases. So the conclusion is derived from your premise of bad biases, and there is no need for me to show what a good bias is..

Furthermore, all that is required to further this process, is a definition of what constitutes "good". Once we have that, we can judge biases as to whether or not they are consistent with, or have that quality. "Good" would be defined in such a way as to be a principle, to serve as a method for judging biases, without itself being a bias.

Again, how can you distinguish good biases from bad if you don't form arguments in a mental space where biases do not exist? How can you deconstruct something if it is essential to the human existence? That would imply that all of philosophy is circular reasoning, one bias following the next ad infinitum. — Christoffer

All that is required is to have a process for judging biases which is separate from the biases, a process being an activity, whereas a bias is a static belief. The process therefore cannot itself be a bias. This is why science is based in a method, "method" signifying a process.

And yes, it is part of the human condition to have biases, it's part of our human psyche, which is why acting against it, understand it and understanding its behavior has been the single greatest method for human advancement. We cannot question the status quo without acting against our biases, without detachment from them. — Christoffer

It appears like you have the idea here, when you talk about a "method". But it is not a matter of acting "against" biases, as you state. Nor is it a detachment from bias, as this is impossible. It is simply a way of acting which recognizes the reality of biases and the need to cope with them. To deny them, or pretend a detachment is self-deception.

Where I draw the line, however, is when specifics are boiled down to something similar to factual claims. If someone speaks of "soul" and actually means some ethereal part of the divine that's trapped in our flesh, and uses this as a factual premise in their arguments, that is an unsupported claim. It's this type of claim that I refer to as biased. It is a bias towards the preconceived belief of the soul as something actual, something part of physical reality or supernatural reality that in itself hasn't been supported either. It's arguments that functions on these biases that philosophy consequently dismantled, if not in the time they were formed (due to historically inadequate methods of actually knowing how the world worked), then in historical times after when more factual understandings emerged. — Christoffer

Let me take what you say here about the "soul" ad make an analogy. The concept of "soul" is a very difficult and complex subject in philosophy. It requires great study to understand the soul, Plato's "Phaedo" is a good start. But then there is Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and many others. So when a learned philosopher makes a claim about "the soul as something actual", I would assume that this philosopher has some understanding about that matter. That philosopher probably even understands that Aristotle defines the soul as actual, and explains the logical reasoning why the soul must be defined as "actual". Therefore we cannot say that such a claim is "unsupported".

But you could call that a bias if you like. Then however, when a learned physicist refers to a photon as something actual, we should assume that the definitions produced from observations of the photoelectric effect which incline the physicists to speak of a photon as an actual thing, constitute a bias in the very same way.

How do we have knowledge? If we believe we magically have knowledge then don't we have a serious problem? — Athena

The metaphor of the tree of knowledge is not intended to be an explanation, magical or otherwise. But the story does point to desire and vulnerability as leading to knowledge. Even before eating Eve saw that the fruit of the tree was desirable for gaining wisdom (3:6). They saw that they were naked and sewed together fig leaves to cover themselves. (3:7) This was the beginning of technical knowledge. But this attempt was not adequate. God made garments of skin for them (3:21). The problem of nakedness is that they were aware that they were vulnerable, exposed. They hid because they were naked and afraid. (3:10)

Desire also leads to sexual knowledge. It is interesting that woman's desire will be for her husband (3:16) but nothing is said about a husband's desire for his wife. For man knowledge is tied to the need to produce food from the ground. Agriculture.

Socrates thought we knew everything but when we are born we are in a state of forgetfulness. — Athena

The myth of anamnesis. I discuss it a bit in my thread on Plato's Phaedo.

The metaphor of the tree of knowledge is not intended to be an explanation, magical or otherwise. But the story does point to desire and vulnerability as leading to knowledge. Even before eating Eve saw that the fruit of the tree was desirable for gaining wisdom (3:6). They saw that they were naked and sewed together fig leaves to cover themselves. (3:7) This was the beginning of technical knowledge. But this attempt was not adequate. God made garments of skin for them (3:21). The problem of nakedness is that they were aware that they were vulnerable, exposed. They hid because they were naked and afraid. (3:10) — Fooloso4

Of course, fig leaves don't make good clothes it would be a very stupid human who doesn't know that. And I strongly doubt that a metaphorical god made their clothes out of animal skins. How did the god kill the animal and treat the skins? Do you know how hard it is to cut and sew leather? Surely humans in cold regions learned to do that for themselves without the help of a god and that is possible only because we have desire and curiosity and we are made to resolve problems. Our survival depends on that. Isn't there something wrong with telling us what is good about us is bad and should be punished?

People in warm climates such as Hawaii and Africa have no problem exposing their bodies. If we cover any part of the body it is about protection, and not shame unless we learn to be ashamed. And you left out the snake who lured Eve into eating the fruit. Maybe this god and the snake had bodies or maybe they were just metaphors. For sure a person has to have a set of beliefs before anything in the Bible makes sense. Before the Bible can make sense we have to get past the problem of determining what is a metaphor and what is not. I think Greek philosophy can help us with that. Do you think less sophisticated people knew the difference between a metaphor and something that is real? Remember the witch hunts and fear of being possessed?

I see others who posted here said they never did accept the Christian mythology as truth. I was a believer and a part of that belief was fear of being possessed. I had a choice. Decide it was all a myth or begin killing people as I felt like a power was pushing me to do. It was a serious fight for my sanity and I am glad I chose to believe the Christian belief is false.

The myth of anamnesis. I discuss it a bit in my thread on Plato's Phaedo. — Fooloso4

I would rather go with the empiricist, but I am not closed to the possibility of life after death or reincarnation. I think I am very open-minded. However, when it comes to having good moral judgment, I am 100% in favor of educating people for good moral judgment and good citizenship.

The acts of martyrdom may not have been taken on without a belief in a literal afterlife. It is questionable whether many current thinkers would be prepared to die like Socrates. — Jack Cummins

When in Plato's Phaedo Socrates says:

... all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead.

(64a)

this should be seen in light of what he said in the Apology:

...to be dead is one of two things: either the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything, or [death] happens to be, as it is said, a change and a relocation or the soul from this place here to another place .

(40c).

Not knowing what will be, the focus of the philosophical life must be on the here and now. On living a good life, an examined life. If one lives a good life then there should be no fear of punishment if there happens to be a next life. But if dying is the end then we should not squander what is given to us by living in expectation of rewards that may never be.

...the heavenly, or inner treasures and quest for 'truth'. — Jack Cummins

The quest for truth cannot occur at some other time in some other place. One interpretation of the claim that the kingdom of heaven is at hand is that it is to be found within, here and now. To look elsewhere, away from oneself, is to turn away from where one's responsibilities lie and one's inner treasures are to be found.

The guiding question of Aristotle's Metaphysics is the question of 'being qua being", that is, what it is for something to be the thing that it is. What is it, for example, that distinguishes man from other beings. And, what it is distinguishes Socrates from other men. The puzzle is laid out in Plato's Phaedo. Each attempted solution proves to be problematic. — Fooloso4

That is essentially my point. One cannot point to a set of necessary and sufficient properties as the essence of a thing, so what's left other than the assumption that there is some unanalyzable, immaterial aspect of a thing. The notion that a bread wafer is essentially flesh is based on some such assumption. Why accept it, other than to rationalize Catholic dogma?

does suggest that Descartes believed that being a thing that thinks was an identity. — J

In the sixth meditation he says:

Nature also teaches me, through these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I (a thinking thing) am not merely in my body as a sailor is in a ship. Rather, I am closely joined to it – intermingled with it, so to speak – so that it and I form a unit.If this were not so, I wouldn’t feel pain when the body was hurt ...

As to the first question, it's unwarranted if the "is" of "he is a thing that thinks" is construed as an essence or identity. — J

The essence of something is its nature. He says:

... nature or essence...

... nothing else belongs to my nature or essence ...

About the concept of nature he says:

... I have been using ‘nature’ ... to speak of what can be found in the things themselves

and:

... my own nature is simply the totality of things bestowed on me by God.

On the one hand:

I know that I exist and that nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing

but on the other:

... the nature of man as a combination of mind and body ...

If nature is what is essential and in the things themselves, and among the things bestowed on him by God is his body, then it would seem that the nature of the self is to be both mind and body.

And yet he says:

I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.

He distinguishes between his nature or essence and the nature of man, just as he distinguishes between a badly made clock which:

... conforms to the laws of its nature in telling the wrong time.

and a clock that work badly:

... a clock that works badly is ‘departing from its nature’

In the first case he is talking about the nature of a particular clock, a badly made one, while in the second he means the nature of clocks, that is, what it is to be a clock.His nature as a particular man is not the same as the nature of man. We might say of someone, for example that it is his nature to be timid or gregarious. It is Descartes' own nature to be a thinking thing. In this he aligns himself with an idea of the philosopher that goes back at least to Plato's Phaedo.

But there is another aspect to this. What he seems to be hinting at is made more clear when we take note of the fact that what he calls the mind is what the theologians call the soul. In the sixth meditation he says:

my whole self insofar as I am a combination of body and mind ...

My sole concern here is with what God has given to me as a combination of mind and body.

All of this makes it clear that, despite God’s immense goodness, the nature of man as a combination of mind and body is such that it is bound to mislead him from time to time.

If the nature or essence of man is a combination of mind or soul and body, then the theological teaching that the soul is what is essential and Descartes claim that he is a thinking thing, to the extent it disregards the body, is like a badly made clock and its maker a poor craftsman.

But the idea that the self or I is a soul persists. If, however, the soul is the mind then it is given the kind of agency that may be missing from the concept of soul. Thinking for Descartes is not fundamentally contemplative or meditative but constructive. Thus he sought foundations on which to build. Although a lot of attention is paid to his epistemology it was the groundwork for a science that would change the course of nature. We might say, of his nature to find the Archimedean point from which to move the earth.

a platonic number or form (e.g., the perfect circle, devoid of which there is no pi, devoid of which there is no QM) will all "stand out" to us. Whereas consciousness (via which we apprehend objects of awareness such as the....universal of a perfect circle) does not. Were existence to be synonymous to actuality, as per what you've said of Peirce's interpretation, this discrepancy would not be accounted for. — javra

Here, I want to come back to the reality of intelligibles. Scientific principles, mathematical relations, and the natural numbers are not dependent on any individual mind, yet they can only be grasped by a mind. That is the sense in which I hold they are real (in the noumenal or intelligible sense) but not existent (in the phenomenal, spatiotemporal sense. This is nearer to the pre-Kantian sense of 'noumenal', which Kant adapted, and changed, for his own purposes.)

This isn’t meant as a full metaphysical system, but as an heuristic:

* existent = that which appears in space, time, and causal relations; what can be encountered as a phenomenon

* real = that which has objective validity or logical necessity, but is not a physical particular

This is very close to Peirce’s schema: laws, generalities, and mathematical structures are real even though they do not exist as phenomena of Secondness. On those grounds, I don’t think “reality” can be collapsed into “existence” without erasing the ontological standing of intelligibles altogether.

Furthermore language depends on such abstractions. Whenever we use the terms ‘same as’, ‘equal to’, ‘different from’, ‘less than’, and so on, we’re making use of our capacity for rational abstraction, without the requirement of being aware of doing so. This capacity is anticipated by a discussion in Plato’s Phaedo called ‘The Argument from Equality’. In it, Socrates argues that in order to judge the equal length of two like objects — two sticks, say, or two rocks — we must already have ‘the idea of equals’ present in our minds, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to go about comparing them; we must already have ‘the idea of equals’. And this idea must be innate, he says. It can’t be acquired by mere experience, but must have been present at birth.

I don’t know if it’s necessary for us to accept the implied belief in the ‘incarnation of the soul’ to make sense of the claim: the fact that it’s innate is what is at issue. It is the innate capacity which provides us the ability to make such judgements, which we as rational creatures do effortlessly. It is just this kind of innate capabiiity which empiricism tends to deprecate (subject of Steve Pinker's book The Blank Slate).

On a larger scale, the same kind of capacities of abstraction are brought to bear on formulating the mathematical bases of theoretical physics. Science sees the Universe through such mathematical hypotheses, which provide the indispensable framework for making judgements (in accordance with the oft-quoted Galilean expression that ‘the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics’).

Thus intellectual abstractions, the grasp of abstract relations and qualities, are quite literally the ligatures of reason — they are what binds rational conceptions together to form coherent ideas.

You did ask me once what I meant by that expression.

Gerson is a scholar whose focus has long been on Plotinus and your description of 'Platonism' is very close to his view. Gerson used the expression "disembodied self." There is source for that expression in Plotinus. I am not aware of a source for that language about self in Plato. Perhaps Gerson throws some light upon that topic somewhere. — Paine

Gerson doesn't focus just on Plotinus, though he does refer extensively to him. This is (1) because Plotinus was the first to attempt to systematize Plato and (2) because Plotinus, like other Platonists, sometimes uses Aristotle to interpret Plato - and for very good reasons given that Aristotle was Plato's pupil for twenty years!

As shown in my previous post, Aristotle's framework is largely Platonic, which refutes the modern scholarly perception of Aristotle as an "anti-Platonist". I am quoting Gerson because he does a good job in exposing the flaws in the consensus perception and because I believe that any objective inquiry into the authentic teachings of Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient authors ought to begin by first eliminating the propaganda and disinformation.

Plato may not have a technical term for "disembodied self" but he does use phrases like "soul itself by itself", Aristotle speaks of "separable nous", etc. And since that soul (psyche) or (nous) – the terms are often used interchangeably - is said to be man's "true self", both by Plato and Aristotle, I think it is legitimate to refer to it as "disembodied self".

Gerson attempts to answer questions such as whether the surviving element is personal or impersonal, etc. in Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato.

To begin with, what is certain is that both Plato and Aristotle posit an immaterial, eternal entity that (1) forms part of embodied man’s person, (2) is man’s true self, and (3) survives the death of the physical body.

Among questions that still need to be settled is (1) how impersonal this surviving self is and (2) what is its exact relation to other such selves.

In other words, (1) does the surviving self retain any traces of “personality” such as memory and emotion, and (2) does it continue to exist as a separate unit or does it merge with other such selves or with a higher principle or entity?

In order to throw some light on this, we need to start from the stated assumption that this immaterial and immortal self, the nous, is a form of intelligence that has certain capacities or powers, such as consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action.

At the very least, as a live entity, the nous has the capacities to know and to act. Certainly, for Plato true knowledge is possible only in a disembodied state. This makes the disembodied nous a knower by definition.

As Gerson says:

Though idiosyncratic subjective content does appear in his [Plato’s] treatment of embodied subjectivity, it does not belong in the disembodied ideal. But then we must naturally ask in what sense there is truly identity between the embodied person and that person’s disembodied ideal state. Once again, Plato’s answer is to be found in his account of knowledge as constitutive of that ideal state … For Plato the ideal person is a knower, the subject of the highest form of cognition. That this form of cognition is apparently attributable only to disembodied persons is of the utmost importance. For from this it follows that the achievement of any embodied person is bound to fall short of the ideal (Knowing Persons, pp. 10-11).

This seems to be Aristotle’s position too. Not only because Aristotle’s framework is largely Platonic, but also if we consider the prevalent view at the time.

The general view in Ancient Greek religion was that part of a person’s embodied soul did indeed survive death, but that there was a big difference between different souls’ postmortem existence. Whilst ordinary souls lived a shadowy life in the darker recesses of the underworld (Hades), those who had distinguished themselves through extraordinary actions or knowledge, such as heroes and wise men led a happy and bright existence in the sunlit Isles of the Blessed (or Elysian Fields).

Knowledge and action, the very powers of the embodied self that determine its fate, are the same powers that define it once death has separated it from the physical body. Plato defines death as the separation of soul (nous) from body (Phaedo 67d ff). And at the level of separation from body, i.e., disembodied, intelligible existence, knowledge is a form of action and action is a form of knowledge.

Knowledge is the key to happiness both in this life and the next. Hence the emphasis both Plato and Aristotle place on knowledge and, in particular, self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of one’s true identity as self-conscious (self-aware or self-reflexive) intelligence endowed with the powers of knowledge, action, and the rest.

As Gerson says, for Plato “self-knowledge consists in the recognition of one’s true identity as a subject of thought” and “even while embodied, our lives are all about being knowers”.

Obviously, those who have attained a state of self-knowledge, self-recognition, or self-realization, will experience a state not only of knowledge, but also of supreme happiness as unhappiness is merely the awareness of not being oneself. This is why Plato describes death for the self-realized philosopher not only as separation from body but also as a state of “release” (lysis). Indeed, he defines the practice of philosophy itself as “release and parting of soul from body”:

Socrates: And doesn’t purification turn out to be the very thing we were recently talking about in our discussion [at 64d-66a], namely parting the soul from the body as much as possible and habituating it to assembling and gathering itself from every part of the body, alone by itself, and to living alone by itself as far as it can, both now and afterwards, released from the body as if from fetters?
Simmias: Certainly.
Socrates: So is it this that is named “death”: release and parting of soul from body?
Simmias: Yes, entirely so.
Socrates: Right, and it is those who really love wisdom who are always particularly eager – or rather, who alone are always eager – to release it, and philosophers’ practice is just that, release and parting of soul from body.
Simmias: It seems so.
Socrates: In that case, Simmias, those who truly love wisdom are in reality practicing dying, and being dead is least fearful to them of all people (Phaedo 67c-e).

As Gerson observes, Plato here uses the ambiguity between metaphorical and literal dying to make a point that is central to his teaching:

How would someone come to be persuaded that literal dying is the separation of the soul and the body in the way that the argument [Socrates’ Cyclical Argument] assumes? Perhaps by the discovery of the identity of the soul and person that is metaphorically dying to the body. Even if it is not Plato’s main intention that the logos presented to the reader serves that discovery by leading him to reflect on his own identity, it does function in that way. For the belief that the death of my body is not the death of me is substantially the same as the belief that my body, though it be mine, is not me either (pp. 64-65).

Being oneself and being free from unhappiness are inextricably connected as is suggested, for example, by the happiness experienced in the state of deep sleep when the subject is completely free from worries and thoughts related to things other than itself.

Another way of testing this is to identify ourselves in thought with that in us that is “immortal, eternal, unaffected, perfect (i.e., not lacking anything), divine, and free”. The mere thought of it tends to result in a state of enhanced peace and happiness. Clearly, if this is the case when our consciousness is still overwhelmingly dominated by the physical surroundings, body, emotions, and thoughts, it will be even more the case when our consciousness is dominated by an actual awareness of ourselves as the immortal, unaffected, perfect, divine, and free intelligence or nous that is our true self.

But what happens in the case of those who fail to attain self-knowledge or correct self-identification?

Gerson says:

One way Plato answers this question is with a doctrine of punitive reincarnation. It is, in a universe ruled by a good Demiurge, too grotesque to suppose that the wicked are ultimately no worse off than the just. But another way suggests itself too. If there is no knowing without self-reflexivity – if one cannot know without knowing that one knows – then the status of one who did not self-reflexively know would be like a non-conscious repository of knowledge. He would be a non-person, roughly analogous to the way that someone in a chronic vegetative state might be characterized as a non-person, though he be alive, none the less (p. 279)

In sum, as in embodied life, everything in disembodied life, including happiness, revolves on the degree of self-identification with one’s true or ideal self. While this leads to higher states of experience, self-identification with things other than one’s true self lead to the opposite result and may involve repeated embodied life.

Aristotle criticizes the Pythagorean claim that a soul can transmigrate into random bodies, but it is far from clear that he rejects reincarnation itself, stating only that “as a craft must employ the right tools, so the soul must employ the right body” (De Anima 407b23). As reincarnation was a fairly widespread belief in philosophical circles at the time (which is why it appears in Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato), it seems likely that he accepted (or at least was not opposed to) some forms of the theory.

A question that might be considered is whether 'survival' and 'transcendence' entail the same kind of state. 'Survival' seems to imply persistence of some elements, whereas 'transcendence' might imply an aspect of the self that is not subject to the vicissitudes of being born and dying. That latter interpretation is something found widely in various forms of the perennial philosophies. — Wayfarer

Correct. And if an element has the capacity to survive, the same element might also have the capacity to transcend. The only difference being that ‘survival’ comes naturally, while ‘transcendence’ is something that needs to be learned or recognized. Plato refers to this when he emphasizes the need to detach oneself not only from the physical body, but also from sense-perceptions, desires, and feelings, and avoid attributing reality to them:

Now the soul of the true philosopher is not opposed to its release and that is why it refrains from pleasures, desires, pains and fears as much as it can: it reckons that when someone experiences intense pleasure, pain, fear or desire, they do not only inflict on him minor injuries, for example, falling ill or wasting money because of his desires, but that they inflict on him the greatest and most extreme of all evils, without it even appearing in his reckoning, namely that the soul, when it experiences intense pleasure or pain at something, is forced to believe at that moment that whatever particularly gives rise to that feeling is most self-evidently real, when it is not so (Phaedo 83b-c).

Though Plato here uses the word ‘soul’ (psyche), it is clear that when the self has detached itself from body, sense-perception, desires, and feelings, what is left is the rational ‘intellect’ or nous.

In any case, should a certain degree of detachment or ‘transcendence’ be not achieved, on the model of a just universe, this might render repeated embodied existence necessary. And if the transcendence process leads the self further and further away from what is not self, it is entirely conceivable that the final stage consists in some form of unity or union with a Higher Intelligence in which the individual self is itself transcended to give way to Ultimate Reality.

What do you want and expect from philosophy? If we take Socrates’ claim seriously that he does not know anything noble and good (Apology 21d) we are confronted by a number of questions and problems.

Plato gives us two incompatible images of the philosopher. The first is the lover of wisdom who desires to be wise but is not. The second is the philosopher in the Republic who does possess this wisdom, who has knowledge of the just, the beautiful, and the good.

If philosophy is the desire for something we may never possess then of what value is “human wisdom”, of knowing that we do not know?

Socrates never abandons his pursuit of the good. It is not for him an intellectual puzzle to be solved. It is a way of life. The pursuit of the good is good not because the good is something we might discover. The pursuit of the good is ultimately not about knowing the good but about being good.

We are easily charmed, dazzled, and confounded by the epistemological possibilities and problems raised by Plato. By comparison, self-knowledge and the examined life may seem small, pale, and trite. But the mundane everyday world we live in is what is of most immediate and persisting importance to the Socratic philosopher.

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - phronesis. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold …

(Phaedo 69 b-c)

Phronesis, often translated as practical wisdom or prudence, is not the same as sophia. It is about sound judgment rather than knowledge.

In the Phaedo Socrates tells his friends a recurring dream in which he is told to make and practice music. (61a) He thought that the dream is telling him to do what he is already doing since

...philosophy is the greatest music.

(61a)

Now, in prison and about to die, he reconsiders:

I reflected that a poet should, if he were really going to be a poet, make stories rather than arguments …

But, he says:

… being no teller of tales myself, I therefore used some I had ready to hand …”

(61b)

Of course, despite what he says here, we know that Plato’s Socrates, although he did not write, is a highly skilled story-teller. He distinguishes between the music of philosophy and music in the popular sense.(61a) For the purposes of making popular music he thinks that second-hand stories will do. The question arises as to how much of what Socrates says in the dialogues is the reworking of second-hand stories?

In the Phaedo reasoned argument has reached its limit. It fails to prove claims regarding the soul and an afterlife. This raises the danger of misologic, hatred of reasoned argument. In response to this danger Socrates turns from argument to stories or music.

Socrates turns from the problem of the limits of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments.

“Well,” he said, “first and foremost we should guard carefully against this, and never allow into our souls the notion that no arguments are sound. Instead, it is much better to accept that we are not yet in a sound condition ourselves, and that we should take courage and be eager to attain a sound condition, you and the others, for the sake of the rest of your lives, and I for the sake of death itself.

(90e-91a)

He continues:

I won’t put my heart into making what I say seem to be true to those present, except as a side effect, but into making it seem to be the case to me myself as much as possible.

(91a).

“Making it seem to be the case” is something that the sophists do. Investigating what seems to be true and making it seem to be true are two different things. That he means the latter is confirmed by what follows:

For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death.

(91b)

Here, for the first time in the Phaedo, Socrates suggests that there might be nothing at all for those who die, that they have met their end. The timing is important, coming immediately after the questioning of the ability of arguments to establish the truth.

There are things that he thinks it is better to believe to be true even if they are not. The philosopher may object that she is interested in what is true, not in what seems to be true, and certainly not in making it seem to be true. But the truth is, there are things that we do not know to be true. Rather than this leading to nihilistic skepticism, in the absence of knowledge Socrates asks us to consider what it is that is best for us to believe as true. This not for the sake of the truth but for the sake of the soul.

He does not, however, want his friends to abandon the truth. He tells them:

You, however, if you take my advice, should pay little regard to Socrates, and much more regard to the truth, and if I actually seem to you to be saying anything true then you should agree, but if not, you should resist with every possible argument, being careful lest in my eagerness I deceive both myself and yourselves at the same time, and depart like a bee leaving my sting behind.

(91b-91c)

Perhaps this is why Plato never speaks in his own name in his dialogues. As he might say, following Socrates’ example: you should pay little regard to Plato and much more regard to the truth.

Making philosophical music requires both reason and imagination. Both arguments and stories, including the stories we tell ourselves. Stories come to us chronologically before reasoned arguments and logically after reasoned argument comes to its end. I will end this with another question: Has the philosopher outgrown the need for stories?

ARGUMENTS AGAINST SOCRATES’ ATHEISM

Socrates was tried and sentenced to death by taking poison for “morally corrupting the youth” and for “impiety toward the Gods”.

With regard to religion, the exact charges reportedly were:

He does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings (Pl. Apol. 24b-c)

His adversaries had charged him with not believing in the gods worshipped by the state and with the introduction of new deities in their stead (Xen. Apol. 10)

And Socrates’ own statement:

For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods (kainoi Theoi) and do not believe in the old ones (Pl. Euthyph. 3b)

Socrates’ main accusers were Anytus and Meletus who represented groups of people that held a grudge against Socrates. Anytus was a wealthy and powerful Athenian politician from a family of wealthy tanners, who had been angered by Socrates’ remarks about famous men being unable to teach virtue to their sons (Meno 94e), and by Socrates’ advice not to let his son follow a career in the family trade (Xen. Apol. 29).

Anytus is also said to have initiated the corruption of the judiciary by bribing the jury in a court case brought against him for a military fiasco in which he lost the city of Pylos (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 27).

According to Hermogenes who was present at Socrates' trial:

The Athenian courts have often been carried away by an eloquent speech and have condemned innocent men to death, and often on the other hand the guilty have been acquitted either because their plea aroused compassion or because their speech was witty (Xen. Apol. 5)

It can be seen from this that the fact that Socrates was indicted, tried, and found guilty, does not necessarily mean that he was guilty as charged.

If Socrates had simply been a known atheist, then (a) he would not have been allowed to preach his views for many years (he was in fact taken to court late in his life and by people who clearly had a grudge against him), and (b) it would have been in the prosecution’s interest to make his alleged atheism part of their case.

In Xenophon’s Apology, Socrates himself states after the trial that “the witnesses were instructed that they must bear false witness against me, perjuring themselves to do so” (24).

Socrates knew many people and likely had reliable information to make such a claim.

In addition, there seems to be no independent tradition according to which Socrates was an atheist.

This suggests that the charge of atheism may not be as credible as it seems.

Is there any positive evidence to indicate that he was not an atheist?

1. The accusation of “making new Gods” may itself be such an indication. Making Gods does not necessarily mean inventing non-existent entities. Artisans in Ancient Greece made images or statues of Gods in whom they actually believed. Following ceremonial dedication, a statue was treated as if living and was inhabited by the deity during epiphany. Similarly, when the Israelites made a gold image of a calf which they worshiped, as described in Exodus, they did not invent the deity, they simply made a religious representation of it (possibly under Canaanite or Egyptian influence). Socrates himself did not make concrete images but he made literary images in his speeches about demons, Cosmic Gods, and Forms, i.e., entities he apparently believed in.

In a speech about Socrates in Plato’s Symposium, Alcibiades compares him with a Silenius statue full of words that are like divine images that mesmerize the audience like the song of a Siren, Alcibiades himself feeling left “in a condition of a common slave”:

Whether anyone else has caught him in a serious moment and opened him, and seen the images inside, I know not; but I saw them one day, and thought them so divine and golden, so perfectly fair and wondrous, that I simply had to do as Socrates bade me (Sym. 216e-217a)

It is not difficult to see how speeches about Socrates’ Siren-like words being like “divine images” that captivated the minds of younger men, could inspire rumors of his “corrupting the youth by making new Gods”.

2. During trial, Meletus claims that Socrates does not believe in the Sun and Moon or any other deities.

However, Socrates first points out that (a) the claim that the Sun and Moon are stone and earth is Anaxagoras’, not his own and (b) that his alleged disbelief in any deities contradicts the original claim that he believes in new Gods:

I am glad that I have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court; nevertheless you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies, as you say and swear in the affidavit; but if I believe in divine beings, I must believe in spirits or demigods; - is not that true? Yes, that is true, for I may assume that your silence gives assent to that. Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either gods or the sons of gods? Is that true?

[Jury] Yes, that is true.

But this is just the ingenious riddle of which I was speaking: the demigods or spirits are gods, and you say first that I don't believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods.

Indeed, in the Phaedo, Socrates recounts to his friends how he had long distanced himself from Anaxagoras’ materialist teachings that he found unsatisfactory and disappointing (Phaedo 98b-c).

He now says:

At any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies, as you say and swear in the affidavit; but if I believe in divine beings, I must believe in spirits or demigods; - is not that true?
[Jury] Yes, that is true (Apology)

3. Socrates’ statement that he believes in spiritual entities is consistent with numerous other statements in the Phaedo, Gorgias, Republic, etc. For example, he says that the soul is immortal and that those who believe this and care for their soul should take his account of afterlife or something like it as true (Phaedo 114d). He says that he is convinced of divine judgement after death and urges all men to join him in this belief in order to save themselves in the other world (Gorgias 526e). He repeats this in the Republic (621c), etc.

4. According to his own statement at trial, Socrates took part in public sacrifices to the Gods:

One thing that I marvel at in Meletus, gentlemen, is what may be the basis of his assertion that I do not believe in the gods worshiped by the state; for all who have happened to be near at the time, as well as Meletus himself,—if he so desired, — have seen me sacrificing at the communal festivals and on the public altars … For it has not been shown that I have sacrificed to new deities in the stead of Zeus and Hera and the gods of their company, or that I have invoked ill oaths or mentioned other gods. (Xen. Apol. 11, 25)

In Memorabilia, Xenophon states that Socrates always offered sacrifices at home and at public temple altars (1.1.2), suggesting that it is hard to believe that someone who devoutly performs religious rites does not believe in the Gods in whose honor he performs the rites.

5. This, and other instances throughout Plato’s dialogues seem to be inconsistent with atheism. For example:

Socrates tells Critias to carry on his discourse by invoking the aid of Apollo and the Muses (108c).

Socrates prays to the Cosmos (as a God) to grant them the knowledge to provide a truthful account (106b).

Socrates invokes the aid of the Muses in making his first speech on love (Phaedr. 237a)

Socrates refers to the Sun as “one of the Gods in heaven” (Rep. 508a).

Socrates is said to have prayed to the Sun at sunrise after a long contemplation (Symp. 220d).

6. In Apology, Socrates concludes his address to the jury with the following statements:

But you also, judges, must regard death hopefully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him (41c-d).

I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God (42a).

On balance, Socrates seems to hold religious beliefs that are similar to those of Athens’ intellectual classes. Yes, he does advocate examination of one’s beliefs in general, which is only natural as he believes in intelligence and knowledge, but he does not seem to advocate that people discard all their religious beliefs.

In particular, Socrates does seem to connect wisdom with some spiritual or divine agency. Even his own quest for wisdom is said to have been prompted by a statement attributed to the God Apollo.

More generally, what we must not overlook is that religious beliefs were quite common among ancient philosophers, and it seems unwarranted to assume that they, and Socrates, were secret atheists.

Further reading:

Mark L. McPherran, The Religion of Socrates
Darrel Jackson, “The Prayers of Socrates”
James A. Notopoulos, “Socrates and the Sun”

One of the key strengths of Gerson’s work is his detailed comparative analysis of the core doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. — Dermot Griffin

I think that this is the key weaknesses of his work. In Plato's Seventh Letter he says:

"There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be." (341c)

In other words, according to Plato in the Seventh Letter there are no core doctrines or any doctrines at all in his writings that can rightly be attributed to him. I have included more from the letter below.

According to the Phaedo, if there is a "theory of forms" it is, as part of Socrates' second sailing, a hypothesis. (Phaedo 96a-100a) It is a turn away from the attempt to see the things themselves as they are themselves, which like looking directly at the sun can cause blindness, to take refuge in speech. The hypothesis of Forms is called "safe and ignorant" (Phaedo 105c) The inadequacy of Forms is the starting point of the Timaeus.

With regard to Plato and Aristotle their shared common ground is that they are both Socratic skeptics, inquirers who know that they do not know. Their writings are dialectical or dialogical. The dialogue between Plato and Aristotle is part of their practice of thinking and writing as both internal and external dialogue. It models the reader's or listener's active role as skeptical inquirers.

More from the Seventh Letter:

If it seemed to me that these [philosophical] matters could adequately be put down in writing for the many or be said, what could be nobler for us to have done in our lifetime than this, to write what is a great benefit for human beings and to lead nature forth into the light for all? But I do not think such an undertaking concerning these matters would be a good for human beings, unless for some few, those who are themselves able to discover them through a small indication; of the rest, it would unsuitably fill some of them with a mistaken contempt, and others with lofty and empty hope as if they had learned awesome matters.

(341d-e)

For this reason every man who is serious about things that are truly serious avoids writing so that he may not expose them to the envy and perplexity of men. Therefore, in one word, one must recognize that whenever a man sees the written compositions of someone, whether in the laws of the legislator or in whatever other writings, [he can know] that these were not the most serious matters for him; if indeed he himself is a serious man.

(344c)

Any man, whether greater or lesser who has written about the highest and first principles concerning nature, according to my argument, he has neither heard nor learned anything sound about the things he has written. For otherwise he would have shown reverence for them as I do, and he would not have dared to expose them to harsh and unsuitable treatment.

(344d-e)

Wait...What? You're actually debating it? It's ironic, right? — Skalidris

Not ironic. Merely skittish. It was good enough for Plato.

But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?
....
And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is comparatively smaller?
.....
And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe that what I am saying is true.
......
I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking, not only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen, either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at the approach of the less has already ceased to exist; but will not, if allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that; even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person. And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small, in like manner the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite, but either passes away or perishes in the change. — Plato, Phaedo 102b etc

False modesty. I know what I know and act on it. — Jackson

Well, it is not false modesty in so far as he attributes ignorance to all of us.

Have you ever changed your mind about anything you regard as just or unjust?

There are many who make the same claim about knowing and acting who claim to know and act on things contrary to you.

Socrates acted in accordance with what seemed to him to be just, but was willing to change his mind given an argument he found persuasive or evidence that he was wrong.

I don't find that inspiring. — Jackson

Plato took the problem of inspiration very seriously. Countless people have been drawn to philosophy through Plato's myth of transcendence. Only it would be far less convincing if it were presented as a myth instead of something closer to an initiation into mystical knowledge. That it is a myth is something that many reject. They see it either as a wrong theory or the truth itself.

My criticism of Plato is that he reduces the universe to knowledge claims. That the universe itself is a form of knoweldge. — Jackson

I do not think he reduces the world to knowledge claims, but rather, he gives us reason to be skeptical of such claims. The problem is what he calls in the Phaedo, misologic, a hatred of reasoned argument, a form of nihilism. It is to guard against this that he tells stories of transcendent knowledge.But for those who look more closely, he also points to the inadequacy of the Forms.

I have discussed this

Here

and

Here

and elsewhere, including my commentaries on Phaedo

and Euthyphro which is also germane to the problem justice and acting on assumed knowledge.