But Socrates demonstrates, by the argument we've been discussing, that this idea, "that the soul is a harmony" is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Simmias himself acknowledges that his theory, though "held by many", has not been demonstrated and he discards it in favor of recollection and immortality:

“Well,” said he, “there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?”

“The former, decidedly, Socrates,” he replied. “For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely seemed probable and attractive, which is the reason why many men hold it. I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our guard against them they deceive us greatly, in geometry and in all other things. But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound course of argument. For we agreed that our soul before it entered into the body existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists (92c – d).

Plus, as already stated, the soul being a special case, no comparison is perfect. And, when making comparisons, we must consider not only similarities but differences:

When making comparisons it is useful to see not only similarities but differences. Socratic philosophy proceeds by rational inquiry, by the critical examination of opinion, that is, dialectic. — Fooloso4

And it should be obvious to everyone that there are more differences than similarities between the soul and the harmony of a musical instrument.

The dialectic is the intimation of the worth of time. — Gary M Washburn

The worth of time is highly important in more than one sense. In Ancient Greek tradition, the souls of the departed go to the other world which is ruled by Cronus, the God of Time. Whilst ordinary souls are reborn after some time, the perfected ones are divine and enjoy eternal life in paradise.

Time is qualifier, space is extension, or quantifier. Moment, the worth or meaning of time, is complete, too complete to endure, or to be extension. The quantifier extends, endures, evaporates that completeness. Time is completeness, space, extension, enduring, the convoluted concept of eternity, is always incomplete. The very form of incompleteness.

The intimation is a concept I use advisedly. I am very concerned it will be taken as some tawdry sentiment or spiritualism, I've even been accused of romanticism. The dialectic intimates growing depth of rigor in shared terms that cannot be made explicit because it entails changes in our grasping of terms through a process by which we try in all due rigor to sustain our convictions. But if a broadening lexicon of terms is the entailed result of conserving them, then we can hardly claim this mere sentiment or deny the growing lexicon we share is any less rigorously achieved than the discipline of conserving our premises.

But if a broadening lexicon of terms is the entailed result of conserving them, then we can hardly claim this mere sentiment or deny the growing lexicon we share is any less rigorously achieved than the discipline of conserving our premises. — Gary M Washburn

That is an interesting point of comparison. I will think about it.

By the way, if you mean to respond to a particular post, there is a swoopy reply button that appears next to the time of post text.

His argument is that Harmony is a universal. What is at issue is the difference between the universal and particular. Harmony itself is prior to any particular thing that is in harmony. — Fooloso4

The argument is not about universals. It is a question of whether the activity required to produce, or create, an organized system of parts (the harmony), is necessarily prior to that organized system of parts. Read 93-95.

It definitely is not about universals at all. And another question (at 93b) is the fact that a harmony can be greater or lesser, whereas a soul cannot be any more or less soul than other souls. Which conclusively demolishes the harmony theory. But maybe Fooloso4 is reading a different translation.

Simmias' argument begins here:

“...'one could surely use the same argument about the attunement of a lyre and its strings, and say that the attunement is something unseen and incorporeal and very lovely and divine in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its strings are corporeal bodies and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. Now, if someone smashed the lyre, or severed and snapped its strings, suppose it were maintained, by the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have perished-because it would be inconceivable that when the strings had been snapped, the lyre and the strings themselves, which are of mortal nature, should still exist, and yet that the attunement, which has affinity and kinship to the divine and the immortal, should have perished …” (86a-b)

All of Socrates' arguments are about Forms or Kinds, which Wayfarer calls universals:

So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.” (99d-100a)

Let's look at the arguments at 93-95.

Socrates asks:

Wouldn't it be more so and more fully a tuning, if could be tuned more fully, and less so and less fully a tuning if it were tuned less so and less fully? (93b)

Socrates does not make the proper distinction between a tuning and what is tuned. It is not more or less a tuning, it is more or less in tune.

Then is this the same with soul? Is one soul, even in the slightest degree, more fully and more so than another, or less fully and less so this very thing - a soul? (93b)

Note the shift from ‘soul’ to ‘one soul’ and 'a soul'. If death is the “perishing of soul” then a soul, the one that perishes, is to the greatest degree "less fully a soul". In addition Socrates earlier raised the problem of the adulterated condition of a soul. (81c) Such a soul is not "less fully a soul". In both cases it is a matter of the condition of the soul, not whether it is a soul.

Next he asks:

'Then what will any of those who maintain that soul is attunement say these things are, existing in our souls- virtue and vice? Are they, in turn, a further attunement and non-attunement? And is one soul, the good one, tuned, and does it have within itself, being an attunement, a further attunement, whereas the untuned one is just itself, and lacking a further attunement within it?'” (93c)

The proper analogy to good and bad souls would be good and bad tunings. Good and bad, virtue and vice, are not things in the soul, they are conditions of the soul, just as sharp and flat are conditions of an attunement. A good soul would be a well tuned soul and a bad soul a poorly tuned one.

“'And moreover, since this is her condition, one soul couldn’t partake of vice or of virtue any more fully than another, if in fact vice is to be lack of tuning and virtue tuning?” (93e)

Socrates has intentionally jumbled terms and Simmias is unable to disentangle them. Attunement itself cannot be non-attunement just as Equal itself cannot be unequal, but just as equal things are more or less equal, attuned things are more or less in tune.

“Therefore it follows from this argument of ours that all souls of all living beings will similarly be good if in fact it’s similarly the nature of souls to be this very thing - souls.” (94a)

The argument is as follows: soul is an attunement, vice is lack of attunement, and so the soul cannot be bad and still be a soul because it would no longer be an attunement. What is missing from the argument is that being in or out of tune is a matter of degree. Vice is not the absence of tuning but bad tuning.

Socrates closes this discussion by citing the authority of Homer, the “Divine Poet” (95a). Socrates appeals to Homer’s divine authority or less gloriously, to the authority of the poet rather than the strength of argument. He uses Homer’s authority in support of his argument against attunement on the grounds of the separation of body and soul, and the rule of the soul over the body. But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger. In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained.

Can't there be a harmony in dissonance? A symmetrical contrariety to the prevailing paradigm that erodes that paradigm, while erecting a replacement? We may suppose we are challenging each other, but in a more subterranean sense revising our terms? If so, that revision cannot be identified between the poles of that contrariety. It is as much the product of one as of the other, though opposed to each. Simplistic logic, either/or, is blind to that change. And if reasoning erodes its own premise, then the final continuity of ideas is the act of participating in that change. And of recognizing ourselves and each other in that activity. If the moment of that recognition encompasses that continuity, then which is more timeless? The purified and isolating idea? Or the community in contrariety generated it?

In Lesser Hippias Hippias contrasts Achilles and Odysseus as opposites, and each as the paradigm of the character they embody. Socrates keeps thwarting this strict contrast, even showing how one idea embodies its opposite. Achilles, far from being what courage is, the very form of the idea, is himself a coward. In order to become the idea of courage he has to die. The definition of the idea by the extreme that is so perfect it is not within the real range of its examples. Odysseus would be, not the extreme, but the typical. His great ambition is to be one of the guys. But to achieve this his men have to die. Between the typical, so embedded in the category it says nothing about it, and the extreme, so outside the category that nothing within the category says anything about it, the idea strains to be anything at all. Between cup and lip, many's the slip. But perhaps the slippage is everything, before after all.

The Forms are obviously discussed in the dialogue, but Socrates and Simmias agree on the Forms.

What they disagree on is the nature of soul and whether Simmias' theory of harmony that compares the soul with a harmony is correct.

Socrates and Simmias agree that the theory is an unexamined one that has not been demonstrated and that the theory of recollection which implies that the soul is immortal, is the correct one.

Simmias says:

The argument about recollection and learning, on the other hand, has been provided by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance. Because it was said [at 76e - 77a] I think that it is certain that our soul existed even before it entered a body as that there exists in its own right the being that bears the label "what it is". And I have accepted that hypothesis, or so I convince myself, on both sufficient and correct grounds (92d e).

The discussion finally ends at 94e -95a:

Do you suppose that, when he [Homer] wrote those words, he thought of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body, and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony?”
“By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think.”

“Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems, agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves.”
“That is true,” said he.

They are not taking Homer as their authority but Homer AND themselves, i.e. the strength of their own argument.

And 94e does not say "the body's desire or anger" but the body's "conditions" or "affections" τα πᾰθήμᾰτᾰ τοῦ σώμᾰτος ta pathimata tou somatos. In other words, the soul is not led or ruled by the conditions undergone by the body.

For this reason, it is agreed (1) that the soul cannot be compared to a harmony, (2) that the theory of recollection is correct, and (3) that the soul is immortal.

The immortality of the soul is reaffirmed at 105e:

In that case, soul is immortal.
Yes, immortal.
Very well, he said. Should we say that this has been proved? What do you think?
Yes, and most sufficiently, Socrates.

And at 114d:

... since the soul turns out to be immortal, I think that for someone who believes this to be so, it is both fitting and worth the risk - for fair is the risk - to insist that either what I have said or something like it is true concerning our souls and their dwelling places [in the other world] ... Anyhow, these are the reasons why a man should be confident about his own soul ...

The discussion ends with the conclusion that the soul is immortal, is incapable of death and destruction, and "retreats" to the other world (Hades) at the death of the body.

The correct translation of 93b is:

Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Asection%3D93b

The obvious point is that a soul cannot be more or less of a soul than another soul. Therefore a soul is not comparable to a harmony.

This is precisely why the harmony theory is rejected.

There is no need for the arguments in the dialogue to "hold up to rigorous logical examination".

If the arguments are accepted as valid in the dialogue, it is incorrect to claim that they are not.

Readers should not deliberately select imprecise or incorrect translations for the purpose of reading things into them.

Readers should subject their own claims to the same rigorous logical examination to which they subject the dialogue.

If the reading of a dialogue involves or leads to radical skepticism, nihilism, sophistry, evidence-free assumptions, text manipulation and misconstruction, and irrational speculation, then there must be something wrong with the reader.

Socrates makes an ironical comment about Cebes:

“'There goes Cebes, always hunting down arguments, and not at all willing to accept at once
what anyone may say.'” (63a)

It is ironic because this in the opposite of what Cebes does. He simply accepts whatever argument Socrates makes. The following exchange is telling:

“Socrates, the rest seems to me to be beautifully put, but what you say about the soul induces a lot of distrust in human beings. They fear that the soul, once she is free of the body, is no longer anywhere, and is destroyed and perishes on that very day when a human being dies; and that as soon as she’s free of the body and departs, then, scattered like breath or smoke, she goes fluttering off and is no longer anywhere. Of course, if she could be somewhere, herself by herself, collected together and freed from those evils you went through just now, there'd be a great hope - a beautiful hope - that what you say, Socrates, is true. But this point that the soul is when the human being dies and holds onto both some power and thoughtfulness - probably stands in need of more than a little persuasive talk and assurance.”(70a)

Cebes hopefulness amounts to saying that if what Socrates says, that the soul is somewhere herself by herself, is true then is true. Cebes states it in such a way that the latter follows as a conclusion from the former, but both state the same thing.

Socrates responds:

“What you say is true, Cebes, but now what should we do? Or do you want us to tell a more thorough story about these things to see whether what we’re saying is likely or not?””(70a-b)

Socrates proposes telling a more thorough story in order to see if the stories he has told are likely or not. He shifts from Cebes ‘true’ to ‘likely’. He proposes to “investigate it in some such way as this”:

“ … do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an
ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead; yet if this is so, if living people are born again from those who have died, surely our souls would have to exist in that world? Because they could hardly be born again, if they didn't exist; so it would be sufficient evidence for the truth of these claims, if it really became plain that living people are born from the dead and from nowhere else; but if that isn't so, some other argument would be needed.'”(70c-d)

But, of course, some other argument is needed. First, the argument assumes the very thing that is in question. It is question begging. Second, the living come from the living. Now perhaps a soul separate from the senses, a priori, might think that the living come from the dead, but our experience informs us that we are born of living parents. Third, the argument plays on an ambiguity. Hades is the place of the dead, but the whole force of Socrates' arguments is to show that the soul does not die. And so, life does not come from death if the soul does not die.

The argument from opposites concludes with the claim that this movement must be circular:

“And similarly, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake in life were to die, but when they'd died, the dead remained in that form, and didn't come back to life, wouldn't it be quite inevitable that everything would ultimately be dead, and nothing would live? Because if the living things came to be from the other things, but the living things were to die, what could possibly prevent everything from being completely spent in being dead?'” (72 b-d)

Perhaps Cebes is persuaded by this, but it assumes what is still to be proven, the continuation of the soul in death, and ignores the obvious fact of generation of life from the living.

The passage in question says this:

Well then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonized?”
“I do not understand,” said Simmias.
“Would it not,” said Socrates, “be more completely a harmony and a greater harmony if it were harmonized more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonized and to a less extent?”
“Certainly.”
“Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?”
“Not in the least,” said he. (93a – b)

1. A harmony is by nature a harmony according to the degree to which it is harmonized.

2. If it is harmonized more fully and to a greater extent, it is more completely a harmony and a greater harmony, and if it is harmonized less fully and to a lesser extent, it is less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony.

3. But a soul cannot even in the slightest degree be either more or less completely, or to a greater or lesser extent, a soul than another.

4. It follows that a soul cannot be said to be like a harmony.

The other distinction is that whereas in the case of the harmony, the lyre precedes the harmony, in the case of the soul, the soul precedes the body.

In fact, the body cannot exist without the soul as the soul is said to be that which imparts life to the body:

“Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?”
“Certainly,” he said. (105d)

The harmony theory is refuted whereas the recollection theory implying the pre-existence and immortality of the soul, stands, i.e., it is accepted as valid in the dialogue.

It follows that the soul is immortal.

Every part of that argument is wrong

Organization and matter are simultaneous and reflect each other. A thing is determined (a one) and undetermined (flux) at once

The soul is the harmony among parts. There were Homo Denisovan, Homo Erectus, Homo Neanderthal, and many others

It is not insignificant that all the arguments for the immortality of the soul fail.The reason is simple. No one knows what happens when we die.

But that is not the end of it. Not knowing and positing an immortal soul are two very different things. Of course, myths of the soul were well known and Socrates borrows from them to tell his own. The myths take over where the arguments fail.

“I reflected that a poet should, if he were really going to be a poet, make stories rather than arguments ... ”(61b)

In the Republic he says that:

“there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (607b)

He says the poets are inspired and therefore do not speak from knowledge. Myths can be persuasive in a way that arguments, especially weak arguments, cannot.

There are two reasons why I think Socrates wants to persuade people that the soul is immortal. First, to charm away childish fears of death. Second, through images of death he can improve souls. If one believes that there are rewards and punishment one might lead his life accordingly. In addition, he secures the belief in notions of truth, knowledge, and wisdom. Even if they cannot be found in life they will be found in Hades, and, with the myth of recollection, these are things we already know and so can be found in life.

The philosopher sees the myths for what they are. Her life is guided not by myths and promises but by phronesis.

And the other thing is that Socrates himself mentions the word "belief" quite a few times, and not always in a negative sense. So, clearly, not all beliefs are "shameful".

Well, that's right. Belief or doxa can certainly have different meanings. To begin with, there is ordinary belief or opinion and right belief or opinion. The latter is what we hold to be true or is true on the basis of what we know from others, for example. What we know through reason is episteme and what we know through personal experience is gnosis. Higher forms of knowledge include noesis and sophia, intuitive knowledge and wisdom.

Contemplative insight is an interesting concept. Some accounts of Socrates in the dialogue seem to lend themselves to the interpretation that Socrates was something of a contemplative. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing what exactly it was that he was contemplating. Perhaps the Forms or some other metaphysical realities? In any case it does not sound as if he was simply pondering something, though he must have done quite a bit of thinking to come up with all those ideas of his.

But what if participation is by departure? Harmony is inarticulate. it is a ping-pong game that goes on forever without anyone ever scoring. It is endless empty space with no matter. But matter, life, and reason, is a dynamic of complementary dissonance. Matter is most dynamically emergent out of 'interference'. Cell differentiation is more the engine of life than replication, and if every cell differentiates, if even in the least degree, every time it divides, then this is more likely the regulating or determining factor of life than DNA. Reason is the disciplined analysis of terms, but whereof these terms? And does that source influence the meaning of the laws of that analysis? To paraphrase Laws: is it a god or some man that is the author of your terms? If a god, is that god on your side, but not mine? If a man, which one? But no god, only a living person can divest him- or herself of that expropriation. That is, by seeking to be a complement in dissent to it. I always suspect an irrational fear of being departed in discussions like this. A fear that corrupts. As if another voice lurks somewhere, not permitted to be heard by all. Fear of death is fear of being real, for it is death through which we are most completely real. Speculation about an afterlife would cheat us of that realness. Socrates proves this by demonstrating so articulately that he is unafraid. And that is far more eloquently put than any occasional assertion of faith in some beyond. You see, if change occurs to our terms through the most disciplined effort to conserve them, then the least change is universal. If the very rigidity of the causal nexus shatters its original condition, then that change, however small, is more completely what realness is than all the continuity of changeless extension. The least term of time is all the differing it is. And if rigor in conserving terms generates that moment, then it can hardly be less rigorous than that conservation that otherwise seems law. No god can save us, of course (from our dread of being real), because no god can be most real by the act of its departure, and so cannot be complementary to the community in contrariety that is the engine of everything real.

Yeah yeah yeah, sure. Socrates does indeed speak of something like "soul", but, for goodness sake, don't confuse this with the Christian era notion. Whatever he calls it, it should probably be rendered in the usual term "shade", something that even at the time was conceived, even by its most fervent believers, as barely a toehold of being real at all, like the smell left by a fart. The more pertinent matter is how ideas arise in discourse, and how that source gets its energy from a rational process of convincing ourselves ideas are eternal and unchanging. Many contributors to these remarks seem to think set theory applies. But when a Greek said a thing is predicated of a trait something more was implied. Ideas were personal. Embodied by human character identified in their gods. But this was just a rough-and-ready way of spanning the abyss between the moment of unlimited differing of all terms and the epochal structure of limiting reason that entails that moment as its only real ends. Where everything changes of a moment there is no epochal duration within which to name (identity which one) or number (enumerate the duration between beginning and end). That is, subject is predicate does not mean it is of the set and can be isolated from what is not of that set. It means means each needs the other to clarify or articulate itself. But the character of that participation is neither one thing nor the other. It is, rather, the personal discipline and drama by which each is recognizably not the other. The act of being that drama is the articulation of the person of that discipline. The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline. Reason is personal, not an impersonal mechanics.

The human body is composed of a plethora of autonomic systems, but each of these is more finely attuned to the individual differences and condition of each cell. Every heart beat is slightly adjusted to the current needs of the body in ways that makes the term rhythm or pulse a dangerous misunderstanding. The subtle adjustments that regulate and supersede all theses autonomic systems are the clues and the area in which we need to look for agency and consciousness. But this is a phenomenon very much immanent to the cruder workings of the physical body. Without it,,,, well, meat.

But the character of that participation is neither one thing nor the other. It is, rather, the personal discipline and drama by which each is recognizably not the other. The act of being that drama is the articulation of the person of that discipline. The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline. Reason is personal, not an impersonal mechanics. — Gary M Washburn

I see the interaction of terms playing a part in the way we talk about things but it seems to me that the remark: "The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline" is a psychological observation that translates all arguments into another register.

That does not help me.

Socrates does not make the proper distinction between a tuning and what is tuned. It is not more or less a tuning, it is more or less in tune. — Fooloso4

It appears to me, like you're totally missing Socrates' argument. There is no such thing as "more or less in tune". Either the waves are in sync or they are not. Either it's in tune or not, this is not a matter of degrees. The point Socrates makes,93d- 94a, is that a group of notes is either in harmony or not, and there is not a matter of degrees here. But a soul has degrees of wickedness and goodness. So that is one reason why the soul is not a harmony. Either the parts are in harmony or not, and there is no matter of degrees in this situation. But, there is a matter of degrees of goodness with the way that the soul rules the body. That is why the soul is not a harmony.

The main point though, is made at 93a, "One must therefore suppose that a harmony does not direct its components, but is directed by them". This point is built upon at 94b: "Further, of all the parts of a man, can you mention any other part that rules him than his soul, especially if it is a wise soul?" He then explains how the soul rules by opposing what the body wants, and if the soul were a harmony of parts such an opposition would not be possible.

Well, does it now appear to do quite the opposite, ruling over all the elements of which one says it is composed, opposing nearly all of them throughout life, directing all their ways, inflicting harsh and painful punishment on them, at times in physical culture and medicine, at other times more gently by threats and exhortations, holding converse with desires and passion and fears as if it were one thing talking to a different one... — 94c-d

The proper analogy to good and bad souls would be good and bad tunings. — Fooloso4

The point is that there is no such thing as good or bad tunings. Being in tune is an objective fact of the wave synchronization, and if it is out of tune, it is simply not in tune, not a matter of a bad tuning, but not in tune at all. But the soul is not like this, it has degrees of goodness and badness.

The problem for moderns, is that 'prior to' must always be interpreted temporally - in terms of temporal sequence. However, I think for the Ancients, 'prior to' means logically, not temporally prior. 'The soul' is eternal, not in the sense of eternal duration, but of being of an order outside of time, of timeless being, of which the individual is an instance. I think that comes through more clearly in neo-Platonism but the idea is there from the outset. — Wayfarer

Yes, I believe this understanding of the two distinct senses of "eternal" is very important in metaphysics. What we have now, in our modern conception of "eternal", is a notion of infinite time, time extended eternally. This is because with materialism and physicalism, the idea of anything outside of time, (which is the classical theological conception of "eternal"), is incomprehensible.

I believe Aristotle's cosmological argument actually demonstrates that the idea of infinite time is what is incomprehensible, and this forces the need for something outside of time ("eternal" in the theological sense). So it's a matter of how one apprehends the boundaries. Is all of reality bounded by time (physicalism), or is time itself bounded?

The dialogue opens:

You yourself

And in response:

I myself

The dialogue is about what happens to oneself, or, more narrowly, Socrates himself. The question “what counts as oneself?” is never asked. Rather than Socrates being treated as ‘one’ he is immediately divided into two, body and soul. Socrates is neither a body or a soul, but it would be wrong to regard him as some third thing. By division one becomes two, and by addition two becomes three. Either 1 (body) + 1 (soul) = 1 (self) or 1 +1 = 3 (some third thing which is a combination). There is something wrong with this arithmetic (arithmos). There can be no proper count or account without identification of the unit of the count.

The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul. It is by this division of one into two that he attempts to demonstrate his unity in death, but in doing so Socrates can no longer be found.

That Socrates should be identified with the soul alone rather than the whole of him is shown to be problematic.

The supposedly immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul. But Socrates does not stop there. The soul of the philosopher may enter the class of the gods (82c)

Either the soul of ants and donkeys are immortal and so it is not Socrates’ soul but a soul that is now Socrates’ and previously and latter not Socrates’ that endures; or Socrates is at various times an ant or donkey or some other animal. Or a god. Only in that case it is no longer immortality that distinguishes mortals from the immortals.

The consequence of the attempt to save Socrates by dividing him into soul and body is the destruction of the unity that is Socrates. No coherent account can be given because of the failure to properly identify the unit of the count, that is, Socrates himself.

I'd like to make it helpful, but I'm afraid of what commitments you might have to convention that might interfere with the effort. What is a proposition, really? Feed it into set theory and there is no room for modification. But what if a predicate is is a modifier, rather than a fixed designation? In fact, it's a modified modifier. Achilles may be courageous, but his courage is problematical. He wants to the paradigm of courage, but he's a pretty sorry-ass 'courage'. But this only means we need to recognize how he is not 'courage' to understand the idea, at least from how he embodies it. Such personalities became less of a religion than a language of ideas for the Greeks. Personal character was the engine of ideas, and Socrates found in this participation the engine of reality itself. But if each proposition is a modifier, not a rigid designation, if 'A' is recognizable in its way of being 'B', and being 'B' is recognizable in the way 'a' is being it, then 'B' is 'C' in a way that may not be similar at all. And even if the variation is slight, if we try to make a machine out of it that machine will ultimately grind to a halt. We can try to redesign and manipulate the machine so it runs smoothly, but at the expense of losing the meaning of the whole system. It is not how we speak or think or understand each other.

It is not how we speak or think or understand each other.↪Fooloso4 — Gary M Washburn

I am not sure if this is intended as a criticism of what I said or if what I said is being pointed to in support of your claim about how we speak or think or understand each other. There is an irony here.

How we speak includes those who say that we are a soul, and those who say we are physical bodies, and those who say the self is a social construct, and so on.

All of which is fraught with often hidden baggage. I'm afraid I do worry I might be up against something of the sort. But convention has it that holding firm to convictions, or ultimately achieving convictions resistant to critique is a virtue and goal. The notion that the characterology of changing convictions is the engine of meaning and language feels like it's a hard sell in such a milieu. I suppose it may seem an irony that I may seem convinced of this.

All of which is fraught with often hidden baggage. — Gary M Washburn

All of what? 1) I pointed to an ambiguity that as far as I can tell you did not address. 2) I said this ambiguity was ironic. 3) I mentioned a few ways in which we talk and think about the soul and the self. But your statement was in the singular:

It is not how we speak or think or understand each other. — Gary M Washburn

Do you include your response as being fraught with hidden baggage? Is that comment applicable to language as a whole or to specific unidentified statements in this thread?

But convention has it that holding firm to convictions, or ultimately achieving convictions resistant to critique is a virtue and goal. — Gary M Washburn

That may be, but what is true by convention is not the same as what may be true for all participants in this thread.

I suppose it may seem an irony that I may seem convinced of this. — Gary M Washburn

The irony that I saw was that you talked of understanding each other, but I have not understood much of what you have said and you have done little to clarify. In addition, although you are fond of speaking in generalities, if any of your comments were directed specifically at me, I suspect you have not understood me either.

Beginning your reply with "I'd like to make it helpful, but I'm afraid of what commitments you might have to convention that might interfere with the effort." is a pompous observation that does not advance your point of view.

Personal character was the engine of ideas, and Socrates found in this participation the engine of reality itself. — Gary M Washburn

Perhaps you could assemble the texts that encourage this point of view. I suppose the view is a part of you saying: "The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline. Reason is personal, not an impersonal mechanics."

The "predicate" in the Dialogues is constantly being challenged as something given on the basis of matters far from the personal. In Cratylus, Parmenides, and the Philebus, overconfidence in what a thing "is" becomes the fulcrum for arguing for something else. And the interlocutors are treating Socrates as the unconventional one. It kind of sounds like the opposite of what you are arguing.