Excellent.

My summation (super tiny):

Phaedo is a vehicle by which Plato presents antithesis to materialistic ideas that were developing at the time.

His strategy is to point to aspects of thought that seem to rule out a materialistic view. The significance to "point out" is that per one the arguments, the ideas he presents can't be taught. They can only be revealed through examples and stories meant to uncover them for the reader.

One of the first ideas has to do with the apparently inherent imperfection of things sensed. The point here is related to aesthetics. If we examine a greek statue, it may seem perfect from a distance, but when we get closer, we'll see little imperfections here and there. This is fascinating notion that many people have realized long before encountering Plato. Maybe because Plato is just endemic to Western thought at this point? Or maybe Plato was right: some ideas are just native?

Another fascinating idea he presents will haunt philosophy for thousands of years, all the way to the 20th Century. It was in Aristotle, Kant, in Heidegger and Merleau Ponty, Schopenhauer and so on. It's that a thing has meaning relative to its opposite.

He also talks about forms and such.

In short, it's a philosophical smorgasbord wrapped up in a charming little dialogue (it's not a play).

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so. — Fooloso4

I've been following along, and thanks for your patient explication. This thread has taught me to pay more attention to the detail - particularly the objections from the various interlocutors, and the subtlety of some of the distinctions made in the arguments. Also one thing I do commend is your emphasis on interpreting the texts on their own terms and being aware of hidden interpretive agendas. (Although I think I'm probably one of those you have in mind when you say that you challenge my own assumptions, but I'm also confident that if I concentrate hard enough, I wouldn't have too much trouble defending them. )

I wonder if you're familiar with Katja Vogt. She is a contemporary professor of philosophy at Columbia. She's the author of the SEP article on ancient skepticism.

I bought her book, Belief and Truth, on the basis of the abstact on her website -

In Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, I explore a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs, doxai, are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.” As I argue, this is a serious philosophical proposal. It speaks to intuitions we are likely to share, but it involves a notion of belief that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief. Belief and knowledge differ in such important ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate by thinking through possible ways of seeing things.

although I found it a very hard book to read, in part because it's one of those academic texts where the footnotes seem to make up about two thirds of every other page, and I didn't make a lot of headway with it at the time. I will go back to it.

However, I think there's an underlying tension between scepticism ancient and modern. I think that it's because modern sceptics tend to be scientific sceptics - for many, scepticism implicitly pertains to non-scientific claims, the natural target of which is religion, which is invariably depicted in terms of unjustified belief, whereas those claims that can be tested against empirical evidence can be regarded as justified. That seems the natural faultline in today's culture.

But I think the ancient sceptics were sceptical in a completely different way, that is, they were sceptical of the testimony of the senses. Which means that, in some sense, they are sceptical of the reality of the empirical world. insofar as this is something only ever known by the senses. For instance, Vogt says in the SEP article:

In the Timaeus, Plato argues that an account of the natural world can only be ‘likely’: it is an eikôs logos. Most generally speaking, the idea here is that certain explananda are such that theorizing about them can do no more than mirror their, comparatively speaking deficient, nature. This idea has ancestors in Xenophanes and Parmenides, and it plays a crucial role in the Timaeus (Bryan 2012).

So that might be a form of scepticism, but it's nothing like today's scientific scepticism, I would contend. Likewise, as is well-known, it is thought that Pyrrho of Elis, an important source of ancient scepticism, was influenced by the Buddhist philosophers of Gandhara who taught the 'doctrine of cessation' which was very similar to his 'doctrine of ataraxia' (see Everard Flintoff, Pyrrho and india). But because in today's culture, we identify Buddhism with religion, then it is naturally assumed that it must be a form of belief, and so, must be incompatible with scepticism.

Also, there's another couple of passages in the Phaedo that I would like to revisit, (although I'm finding it difficult to concentrate on it, as I have many other balls in the air right at the moment.) But I will certainly be appending some more questions and comments on the text.

Right, I think Fooloso4 is reaching for straws here, going outside the argument. and I don't see the point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. It is imperative to understand that there is no point using English words like “harmonious” to analyze a dialogue when they make no sense whatsoever in Greek.

If we want to understand Plato, we need to be able to put what we believe to be a “Platonic concept” into Greek. If we were to literally put English “harmonious” into Ancient Greek, we would end up with harmonikos.

Where does Plato use harmonikos? Certainly not in the Phaedo. In the Phaedrus, he writes:

… if he met a man who thought he understood harmony [literally, harmonikos]because he could strike the highest and lowest notes … (Phaedrus. 268d)

A harmonikos is someone who has an understanding of musical scales (or music in general), not a “harmonious person”!

So, depending on the context, and whether it is an object or person, you would need to use “well-fitted” or “arranged”, “well-ordered”, “just”, etc., and in the Platonic framework this would come under the category or universal of order, justice, beauty, and ultimately, good.

For example, you could translate English “harmonious” back into Greek as tetagmenos, arranged in orderly manner from tasso, to arrange or place in order, for which the universal would be taxis, order. Even if you were to use euarmostos, well-joined, from harmozo, join together, it would still have the sense of order.

It follows that “Form of Harmony” is complete and utter nonsense and is just part of Fooloso4's usual repertoire of Straussian diversion and evasion tactics.

In any case, the bottom line is that people need to choose between reading Plato’s dialogues or their own dialogues. They can’t do both.

You are of course right about justice as a type of order. We need to bear in mind that God created the world by establishing order out of disorder (chaos) in order to manifest the Good. So Order as a manifestation of the Good is certainly fundamental in the Platonic framework.

The question of the soul imparting life to the body is a complex one but Socrates definitely rebuts Simmias' Pythagorean theory and this clearly is Plato's intention here.

In the Apology Socrates suggests two possibilities of what happens in death:

to be dead is one of two things: either the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything, or [death] happens to be, as it is said, a change and a relocation or the soul from this place here to another place (40c).

In the Phaedo Socrates is silent about the first possibility. He wishes to leave his friends with a message of hope, but if death is nothingness then despite the attempt to portray the end of his life as a comedy it is a tragedy. The practice of dying and being dead cannot be the practice of nothingness. That practice must take into account both possibilities. If there are rewards and punishments, one must live a just life and be rewarded rather than punished. And if there is nothing after life then one should live life for its own rewards rather than live in expectation of what may never be. Here too it is the practice of justice, for the just soul according to the Republic is the healthy soul, in proper harmony with itself.

If we heed the words of Parmenides that “out of nothing comes nothing”, then if a dead person is nothing and out of nothing comes nothing, there can be no rebirth.

But a problem that must be faced in the Phaedo is fear of death. One has it within their power to live in such a way as to avoid fear of punishment for wrongdoing in death. What about the fear of nothingness? Here the practice may involve meditation along the lines of Epictetus:

Why should I fear death? If I am, then death is not. If Death is, then I am not.

Simmias laughs at Socrates claim that philosophy is the practice of dying and being dead:

'Goodness, Socrates, you've made me laugh, even though I wasn't much inclined to laugh just now. l imagine that most people, on hearing that, would think it very well said of philosophers-and our own countrymen would quite agree-that they are, indeed, verging on death, and that they, at any rate, are well aware that this is what philosophers deserve to undergo.' (64b)

The only good philosopher is a dead philosopher.

Socrates defines death:

'And that it is nothing but the separation of the soul from the body? And that being dead is this: the body's having come to be apart, separated from the soul, alone by Itself, and the soul's being apart, alone by itself, separated from the body? Death can't be anything else but that, can it?' (64c)

Simmias agrees with Socrates’ claim, but we should not be so quick to agree. The question of the soul is the very thing that will be the focus of the discussion. Death may simply be, as Socrates said in the Apology, annihilation. The idea of the soul itself by itself will be questioned.

Socrates then proceeds to make an argument for asceticism:

And certainly Simmias, most human beings are of the opinion that the man for whom none of these things is pleasant and who doesn’t have a share of them doesn’t deserve to live. In fact, the man who thinks nothing of the pleasures that come through the body is pretty much headed for death. (65a)

It is not Socrates who thinks this, it is the opinion of most human beings. So what is the opinion of Socrates who is quite literally headed for death? We are provided with a piece of evidence near the beginning: Xantippe is there with his little boy (60a). A seventy year old man with a young son is hardly a man who eschews the pleasure of sex.

Socrates asks:

So when does the soul get in touch with truth?

Isn’t it in her act of reasoning, if anywhere, that something of the things that are becomes very clear to her? (65b-c)

Socrates now introduces his “Socratic Trinity”, the Just, the Beautiful, and the Good. (65d) But he says nothing of them, and for very good reason:

… if we can know nothing purely in the body's company, then one of two things must be true: either knowledge is nowhere to be gained, or else it is for the dead. (66e)

This is at odds with the Republic and the story of knowledge of the Forms. But of course those philosophers who had knowledge of "the Forms themselves by themselves" only existed in a city made in speech. A city that is the soul writ large. An image of the soul found in an image of the city. A fine example of Plato’s poesis.

Now if the soul is reborn this is not a problem. In fact, it is an essential part of the myth of anamnesis, that is, knowledge through recollection. But if death is the end then knowledge of such things is not possible.

“Then”, said Socrates, “if these things are true, my comrade, there’s great hope that when I arrive at the end of my journey, there - if anywhere - I shall sufficiently attain what our constant business in our bygone life has been for. (67b)

And if these things are not true then rather than great hope there is a danger of a loss of hope. Knowledge of the just, the beautiful, and the good hang on the fate of the soul.

@frank

I would like for you to stick around. This tread was started in part because of things you said about Plato and the soul.

Images from Phaedo have gone deep into my thoughts since I first read it. — frank

That, it seems to me, would be a good reason to read it again. I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different. Certainly I do not the Phaedo now the same way I did when I first read it.

A reading:

Phaedo librivox



It varies moderately from the text being used here, but I found it useful.

But a problem that must be faced in the Phaedo is fear of death. One has it within their power to live in such a way as to avoid fear of punishment for wrongdoing in death. What about the fear of nothingness? Here the practice may involve meditation along the lines of Epictetus:

Why should I fear death? If I am, then death is not. If Death is, then I am not. — Fooloso4

That is a quote I can relate to.

The only good philosopher is a dead philosopher. — Fooloso4

:smile: Am I speaking to a ghost ?

The question of the soul is the very thing that will be the focus of the discussion. Death may simply be, as Socrates said in the Apology, annihilation. The idea of the soul itself by itself will be questioned. — Fooloso4

So, Plato in giving us an understanding of who Socrates was, gives several versions of what he actually thinks ? Talk about getting to the 'truth'... :roll:

This is at odds with the Republic and the story of knowledge of the Forms. But of course those philosophers who had knowledge of "the Forms themselves by themselves" only existed in a city made in speech. A city that is the soul writ large. An image of the soul found in an image of the city. A fine example of Plato’s poesis. — Fooloso4

Ideas of the soul - of afterlife - of life and death - all 'images' or 'imagination' or mere speculation as in a story...?

And if these things are not true then rather than great hope there is a danger of a loss of hope. Knowledge of the just, the beautiful, and the good hang on the fate of the soul. — Fooloso4

Yes, it comes back to the story of hope that Socrates is giving to his audience. Does he actually believe what he is saying, or is it simply a matter of consolation...
If Socrates wants to inspire and for philosophy to continue, then he must offer hope in the very act of practising philosophy.

Plato was like the science of the day around 200 AD. Christianity absorbed it much as the Catholic Church gives pre-approval to what scientists come up with today

Christianity could have been all sorts of things It's Platonic because it has Plato stuck in one of its central columns.

To place Phaedo in the context of religion vs science isn't helpful. Idealism vs realism, yes.

Socrates is well aware of the weakness of his arguments:

Certainly, in many ways it’s still open to suspicions and counterattacks - if, that is, somebody’s going to go through it sufficiently. (84c)

This kind of hint should not be overlooked. Plato is well aware that the arguments will not persuade somebody who is going to go through it sufficiently. We see here that he is writing to two different audiences: those who in one way or another will benefit from hearing his “songs” and those who will not be charmed. Socrates will himself make this distinction.

Instead of another argument Socrates says:

… you must, it seems, think I have a poorer power of prophecy than the swans, who when they realize they must die, then sing more fully and sweetly than they've ever sung before, for joy that they are departing into the presence of the god whose servants they are. (84e-85a)

This is Socrates’ swan song. Interlaced with all his arguments are his songs, his music.

I believe, because, belonging as they do to Apollo, they are prophetic birds with foreknowledge of the blessings of Hades, and therefore sing and rejoice more greatly on that day than ever before. Now I hold that I myself am a fellow-servant of the swans, consecrated to the same god, that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs, and that I'm departing this life with as good a cheer as they do. No; so far as that goes, you should say and ask whatever you wish, for as long as eleven Athenian gentlemen allow.' (85b)

There is something comical about Socrates’ likening himself to the swans. He is, by all descriptions, not at all like a swan in appearance.

It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account. (85c-d)

Later Socrates will talk about his “second sailing”. For the moment I will note only a few things. There is pilot in control of the raft. It goes wherever it is takes. Short of knowledge, what is sought is the best and least refutable “human accounts”. He is fully aware that these accounts may not bring them safely to where they want to go. As an alternative he proposes “some divine account”. This safe account is one that is accepted, but does not stand up to exhaustive examination. They are stories that calm men’s fears and give them courage. Like Socrates’ prophetic swan song.

Simmas:

...'one could surely use the same argument about the attunement of a lyre and its strings, and say that the attunement is something unseen and incorporeal and very lovely and divine in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its strings are corporeal bodies and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. Now, if someone smashed the lyre, or severed and snapped its strings, suppose it were maintained, by the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have perished-because it would be inconceivable that when the strings had been snapped, the lyre and the strings themselves, which are of mortal nature, should still exist, and yet that the attunement, which has affinity and kinship to the divine and the immortal, should have perished … (86a-b)

This is an argument that deserves closer attention, but rather than respond immediately Socrates gives Cebes a chance to voice his objection to Socrates’ argument. Cebes says that he too, like Simmias, must make use of “some sort of likeness” (87b) The making of a likeness or image, the use of the imagination, eikasia, plays an important but often overlooked role in the dialogues. The reoccurring play of images operates throughout the dialogues on many levels.

Cebes draws the likeness: the soul is to the body as a weaver is to his cloak.

'The relation of soul to body would, I think, admit of the same comparison: anyone making the same points about them, that the soul is long-lived, while the body is weaker and shorter-lived, would in my view argue reasonably; true indeed, he might say, every soul wears out many bodies, especially in a life of many years-because, though the body may decay and perish while the man is still alive, still the soul will always weave afresh what's being worn out; nevertheless, when the soul does perish, it will have to be wearing its last garment, and must perish before that one alone; and when the soul has perished, then at last the body will reveal its natural weakness,moulder away quickly, and be gone. (88d-e)

Simmias’ and Cebes’ arguments have shaken the confidence of the others.

Phaedo:

Who knows, we might be worthless judges, or these matters themselves might even be beyond trust. (88c)

Echecrates:

'What argument shall we ever trust now? (88d)

Simmias’ likeness of a raft in dangerous waters was prophetic. Can Socrates restore their trust in arguments? This is an issue of grave concern. Socrates suggests they should be in mourning if the argument cannot be brought back to life. (89b) Socrates makes the problem explicit:

“So that we don’t become haters of argument (misologic), as some become haters of human beings (misanthropic); for it is not possible for anyone to experience a greater evil than hating arguments. Hatred of arguments and hatred of human beings comes about in the same way, For hatred of human beings arises from artlessly trusting somebody to excess, and believing that human being to be in every way true and sound and trustworthy, and then a little later discovering that this person is wicked and untrustworthy - and then having this experience again with another. And whenever someone experiences this many times, and especially in the hands of just those he might regard as his most intimate friends and comrades, he then ends up taking offense all the time and hates all human beings and believes there’s nothing at all sound in anybody. (89d)

… when someone trusts some argument to be true without the art of arguments, and then a little later the argument seems to him to be false, as it sometimes is and sometimes isn’t, and this happens again and again with one argument after another. And, as you know, those especially who’ve spent their days in debate-arguments end up thinking the’ve become the wisest of men and that they alone have detected that there’s nothing sound or stable - not in the realm of either practical matter or arguments - but all the things that are simply toss to and fro, as happens in the Euripus, and don’t stay put anywhere for any length of time. (90b-c)

I think that this is a remarkable demonstration of the power of Plato’s insight into human psychology.

The danger here is that they may come to believe that philosophy has failed them. Socrates is about to die because he practiced philosophy and nothing he has said has convinced them that he will be better off for having practiced it. It is because of Socrates that they came to love philosophy, but it may be that philosophy cannot do what they expect of it. They are in danger of misologic, hating what they once loved.

It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere. — Fooloso4

Well, Socrates says many things in the dialogues. He certainly seems to agree with traditional Platonic concepts such as soul, immortality and rebirth as at 72a - 72d etc.

Incidentally, although the structure of the Platonic texts has been compared to that of a drama or play, the true setting of Plato’s dialogues is more akin to a symposium.

Symposium - Wikipedia

Symposia (“drinking together”) were central to the Greek cultural context in which philosophers like Socrates and Plato operated. They were the part of banquets after a communal meal held in honor of the gods, when drinking of wine tempered with water (hence the Greek term κρασί crasi, literally "mixed" for wine) was accompanied by games, music and discussions among the men. There were big differences between symposia. Philosophical symposia naturally revolved around philosophical discussions (and not around sexual or other such activities as sometimes erroneously assumed).

The dialogues taking place in works like Phaedo are very much like conversations that would have taken place in a philosophical symposium, from which satire or humor would not be lacking.

So, the dialogues may be seen as a combination of dramatic performance and symposium.

In terms of the dialogues' function of stimulating thought, though they may not provide a "dogma" as such, they do provide moral and metaphysical concepts such as justice, immortality, rebirth, etc. that can guide the reader's thought in a moral and metaphysical-mystical direction, should the reader be so inclined.

Cebes is unaware of the problem and says that he is completely satisfied with Socrates’ account of the deathlessness of the soul and has nothing further to say. (107a)

Simmias says he has some lingering distrust:

I myself have no remaining grounds for doubt after what has been said; nevertheless, in view of the bigness and importance of our subject and my low opinion of human weakness, I am bound still to have some lingering distrust within myself about what we have said. (107b)

Socrates responds:

Not only that, Simmias. What you say is good, but also our very first hypotheses - even if to all of you they’re trustworthy - must nevertheless be looked into for greater surety. And if you sort them out sufficiently, you will, as I think, be following up the argument as much as its possible for human beings to follow it. And should this very thing become sure, you’ll search no further. (107b)

Socrates is telling them that they should not be so ready to accept what is said as the truth. There seems to be a play on a double sense of human weakness, the limits of human argument and Simmias’ ongoing concern that death means our destruction, that we are too weak to endure. In any case, there is a limit we human beings cannot go beyond, and we should not search further. That limit occurs at death.

Socrates leaves it there for us to sort it out. Generation and destruction are each one and together two, but it is by the division of what is one, that is, the cycle of generation and destruction, that they become two. Socrates has identified two causes: mental and physical. Mind arranges or orders things according to their kind or Form. Things are not Forms, they come to be and perish. We can now see the difference between Socrates’ unlearned or ignorant hypothesis and the one that has replaced it. The first used only Forms and could not account for things coming to be and perishing. It was a static model that did not allow for change. But change itself needs an account. The two accounts must be unified, made one, by the good, that is, by an account of why it is best that things are as they are. This has not been done.

The discussion of generation and destruction is guided by two considerations that at first may seem odd to have conjoined: physical causes and number. The overarching question of the dialogue is what will happen to Socrates. The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul. It is by this division of one into two that he attempts to demonstrate his unity in death.

According to Cebes’ argument, body and soul are each one and together are two, each separate and distinct. Weaving is an ordering or arrangement. Arrangement or ordering, an activity Socrates attributes to Mind. The act of weaving requires something physically acting on something else that is physical. A disembodied soul cannot be a weaver. Unless the two are one, the man Socrates is cut in two.

Simmias’ account is physical. Body and soul are not separate entities, they are one. A harmony. But harmony is one from many. An attunement is an arrangement. A purely physical account is not adequate either. This is why Socrates initially rejected physical causes but later reintroduced them after the introduction of Mind. Physical things cannot order themselves without Mind.

The problem with Simmias’ account is that if body and soul are one then the destruction of the body is the destruction of the soul. Socrates attempts to separate them in order to save the soul, but can only do so by blurring the distinction between the Form Soul and a soul. If Soul is imperishable it does not follow that Socrates’ soul is. The human soul is átopos, literally, without place, unclassifiable,. It is not a Form and not a physical thing. If there is no distinction between Soul and Socrates’ soul, then it would not be Socrates’ soul that is undying. The fate of Socrates in death is not assured by the fate of Soul. Just as the snow is destroyed at the approach of heat, Socrates’ soul is destroyed at the approach of death, while Snow and Soul remain unchanged Forms.

He turns back to stories that have been told:

We are told that when each person dies, the guardian spirit who was allotted to him in life proceeds to lead him to a certain place, whence those who have been gathered together there must, after being judged, proceed to the underworld with the guide who has been appointed to lead them thither from here.(107e)

The trustworthiness of the story is not questioned. This seems to be because arguments have come to its end, and stories are all that is left. In his last minutes Socrates turns from Hades to the Earth. It is here that he has been all along. (61d)

His tale of the Earth mixes science and myth. The Earth is a sphere in the middle of heaven balanced at rest without support or force. It is very large and we live in only a small portion of it, “like ants or frogs around a swamp”. Many other peoples live in many other similar parts.

Everywhere about the earth there are numerous hollows of many kinds and shapes and sizes into which the water and the mist and the air have gathered. The earth itself is pure and lies in the pure sky where the stars are situated … We, who dwell in the hollows of it, are unaware of this and we think that we live above, on the surface of the earth. It is as if someone who lived deep down in the middle of the ocean thought he was living on its surface. Seeing the sun and the other,heavenly bodies through the water, he would think the sea to be the sky; because he is slow and weak, he has never reached the surface of the sea or risen with his head above the water or come out of the sea to our region here, nor seen how much purer and more beautiful it is than his own region, nor has he ever heard of it from anyone who has seen it.

Our experience is the same: living in a certain hollow of the earth, we believe that we live upon its surface; the air we call the heavens, as if the stars made their way through it; this too is the same: because of our weakness and slowness we are not able to make our way to the upper
limit of the air; if anyone got to this upper limit, if anyone came to it or reached it on wings and his head rose above it, then just as fish on rising from the sea see things in our region, he would see things there and, if his nature could endure to contemplate them, he would know that there is the true heaven, the true light and the true earth, for the earth here, these stones and the whole region, are spoiled and eaten away, just as things in the sea are by the salt water. (109b - 110a)

There are similarities and differences between this story and the allegory of the cave in the Republic. In both stories humans are unaware of their true condition and believe that what they see is the whole of things as they are. The cave images are human artifacts, but what is seen in the hollows is by the nature of our condition.

What the humans say is based on what is seen or experienced. Because of the limits of our experience there are natural limits to our arguments. Myths have no natural limits. In both stories there is an image of an ascent to the truth, a journey from here to There. We have no experience of death and so Socrates’ arguments are not strong enough to transcend that limit. His myths of death, the journey from here to There, are myths about the ascent to truth.

It is only in myth that Socrates can find what is sought in argument: the good. Why it is best that things be as they are. In the myth we find:

The climate is such that they are without disease, and they live much longer than people do here; their eyesight, hearing and intelligence and all such are as superior to ours as air is
superior to water and ether to air in purity; they have groves and temples dedicated to the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they communicate with them by speech and prophecy and by the sight of them; they see the sun and moon and stars as they are, and in other ways their
happiness is in accord with this. (111 b-c)

But the question of the good of the whole is not complete without the inclusion of human actions:

Such is the nature of these things. When the dead arrive at the place to which each has been led by his guardian spirit, they are first judged as to whether they have led a good and pious life. (113d)

Those who are deemed to have lived an extremely pious life are freed and released from the regions of the earth as from a prison; they make their way up to a pure dwelling place and live on the surface of the earth. Those who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live in the future altogether without a body; they make their way to even more beautiful dwelling places which it is hard to describe clearly, nor do we now have the time to do so. (114c)

Immediately following this story Socrates says:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d)

Myths do not reveal the truth. And yet Socrates tells them myths. They are not a substitute for arguments, but argument has its limits. Simmias was not fully convinced by Socrates’ arguments. He was no longer distrustful of the arguments, but still has some lingering distrust within himself. (107b) Throughout the dialogue Socrates has referred to myth as a means of self-persuasion. Here again he says that one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again”(114d)

Crito asks about final instructions. Socrates says they should take care of their own selves.(115b)

Socrates goes into a chamber to bathe. What should we make of this? Why care for his body when the whole time he has been treating it without regard and even with contempt?

Despite all that Socrates has said to convince his friends that what is happening is a good thing, they are distraught:

So we stayed, talking among ourselves, questioning what had been said, and then again
talking of the great misfortune that had befallen us. We all felt as if we had lost a father and would be orphaned for the rest of our lives. (116a-b)

Socrates, on the other hand, did not appear to be troubled at all as he took the cup and drank.


Perhaps the appropriate question is not whether this is a comedy or a tragedy but rather the question of how we choose to persuade ourselves. One might wonder how this can be seen as a comedy. To begin to answer that question we might consider that Socrates himself did not regard his life or its end as a tragedy. This is so not because of what happened but because of how he judges. Argument cannot reveal the good, why it is best that things are as they are. Socrates seems to have persuaded himself and wants to persuade others that what is best is to be persuaded that what is is best.

Being told he could not, as he ironically requested, pour a libation (117b), he says:

“I understand but I suppose I am allowed to, and indeed should, pray to the gods that my emigration from here to There may turn out to be a fortunate one. That’s just what I am praying for - and may it be so!” And with these words he put the cup to his lips and downed it with great readiness and relish. (117c)… these were his last words—"Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius (118a)

Much has been written about what this means. Asclepius is the god of medicine. This suggests that there has been a cure or recovery. Some interpret this to mean that Socrates has been cured of the disease of life. But he says “we” not “I”.

In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)

There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy.

Sure. That is where opinions diverge.

I agree that Plato's arguments are not particularly strong. However, according to scholars, his dialogues are simply dramatized discussions addressing certain philosophical issues that were addressed within the Academy. In which case, the arguments need not be watertight as their main function is to point to the issues discussed as a basis for further inquiry and discussion. Hence the impression of "aporia" one may get when reading the dialogues.

For example, in the Phaedo, Plato wishes to discuss or test his theories of Forms and Recollection and the arguments (and sub-arguments) and conclusions in the dialogue may not be final if the discussion of those topics within the Academy is intended to be ongoing.

It is for this reason that I believe we should not read too much into the dialogues. But nor should we ignore the Platonist tradition whose interpretation of the corpus does not seem to be entirely unfounded.

I think that the question as to what or who causes the body is an interesting one.

As related in the Timaeus, in the beginning God created the World as a living being endowed with a soul and reason. He next created the Cosmic Gods, i.e., the Earth, Sun, Moon, Stars and other heavenly bodies as living creatures (38e), from whom were born Cronos and Rhea, Zeus and Hera, and the other Gods (41a). After this, he commanded the Gods to fashion men and other living creatures and endow them with souls he himself created from the same substance he had used to make the soul of the world and the Gods.

He placed a number of souls on each Star and, after the Gods fashioned the bodies of mortal creatures, they implanted the immortal souls in them. And God ordained that those who have lived their appointed time well shall return to their native Star and gain a life that is blessed and congenial but those who have failed to do so shall be reborn into inferior shapes after the similitude of their own nature until they once again become as pure and good as before (42c).

On this account, the human body is created by the Gods from some material substance (e.g. the four elements, air, fire, earth, water, to which may be added ether). So, the Gods would seem to be the efficient cause of the body.

The soul simply imparts life and motion to the body.

However, Plato’s intention in the Phaedo seems to be to present his own theory of soul as more consistent than that of the Pythagoreans who apparently held contradictory views concerning the soul, one view stating that the soul is imprisoned in the body, another that the soul transmigrates and another stating that the soul is the harmony or attunement of the four elements constituting the body.

Simmias’ own conflicting views may be a reflection of those of the Pythagoreans. If so, Plato (via Socrates) successfully rebuts inconsistent Pythagorean doctrines.

p1 59a Phaedo speaking:

That's why I wasn't visited at all by the pity that would seem natural for someone present at a scene of sorrow, nor again by the pleasure from our being occupied, as usual, with philosophy-because the discussion was, in fact, of that sort - but a simply extraordinary feeling was upon me, a sort of strange mixture of pleasure and pain combined, as I reflected that Socrates was shortly going to die. All of us there were affected in much the same way, now laughing, now in tears, one of us quite exceptionally so, Apollodorus-1 think you know the man and his manner.

So, here pain and pleasure are mixed together - blending the feelings and senses of reflecting on death and loss of Socrates even as they enjoy the philosophical discussion. Noting that some people are more emotionally affected than others - perhaps a criticism of a lack of rationality ? Being emotionally incontinent is not good ?

p3 60a

On entering we found Socrates, just released, and Xanthippe-you know her-holding his little boy and sitting beside him. When she saw us, Xanthippe broke out and said just the kinds of thing that women are given to saying: 'So this is the very last time, Socrates, that your good friends will speak to you and you to them.' At which Socrates looked at Crito and said: 'Crito, someone had better take her home.' So she was taken away by some of Crito's people, calling out and lamenting;

Again, there seems to be a dismissal of what 'kinds of things that women are given to saying'. Implying that it is an unwanted feminine characteristic. And yet, his wife would be the one to carry on and look after their son. I think she is misrepresented here - she has been the provider of finance. She has been there with her care. Living with Socrates and his absences would require a practical wisdom...at the very least.

p3-4 60b

Socrates, meanwhile, sat up on the bed, bent his leg, and rubbed it down with his hand. As he rubbed it, he said: 'What an odd thing it seems, friends, this state that men call "pleasant"; and how curiously it's related to its supposed opposite, "painful": to think that the pair of them refuse to visit a man together, yet if anybody pursues one of them and catches it, he's always pretty well bound to catch the other as well, as if the two of them were attached to a single head...
This is just what seems to be happening in my own case: there was discomfort in my leg because of the fetter, and now the pleasant seems to have come to succeed it.'

I think this section important - his pleasurable release from painful tight chains.
Death might be seen as a welcome release from the physical body with all its discomforts.
The pain of life v the joy of the afterlife ?*
There is a separation. Not here a mingling as felt by Phaedo.

* not convinced that is is how Socrates would see life though, nor about any joy in afterlife.
Although Phaedo seems to think that even in Hell, Socrates would be fine.
58e

I felt assured that even while on his way to Hades he would not go without divine providence, and that when he arrived there he would fare well, if ever any man did

True, and explicated in detail in the Republic, Analogy of the Divided Line, more so than the Phaedo. However the general point of nous as 'the faculty which sees what truly is', is certainly relevant across all the dialogues. — Wayfarer

The Phaedo tells a different story than the Republic.It is certainly useful to compare the dialogues, but what is said in one cannot be substituted for what is said in another. Each must be read on its own as a whole. It is not explicated in the Phaedo because it is not there. As Socrates said, quoted above:

… if we can know nothing purely in the body's company, then one of two things must be true: either knowledge is nowhere to be gained, or else it is for the dead. (66e)

Rather a good analysis of the argument for the soul’s immortality in Phaedo. Nothing new but brings out some points well.

https://dan-shea.medium.com/the-final-argument-for-the-immortality-of-the-soul-in-platos-phaedo-7be1b4d137d6

There is a reference to ‘the ship in which Theseus sailed to Crete’. Is this the same ship which is elsewhere the subject of the famous Ship of Theseus conundrum? — Wayfarer

Yes, it is the ship from the story of Theseus and the Minotaur. I don't think the conundrum is part of the myth, but Plato was aware of the problem. It can be found in a couple of the dialogues. There are several parallels in the Phaedo between the myth of Theseus' journey and Socrates own.

I haven't read Phaedo and it doesn't appeal to me as much as it should probably but one of Plato's arguments, The Affinity Argument for the immortality of the soul seems to have similarities with An Argument From Boredom/Frustration For Physicalism/Dualism.

The thread I provided a link to suggests that our frustrations with what we are (immaterial souls/physical bodies) will automatically lead us to desire/wish to become that we are not. So, if we really are incorporeal souls, we would yearn to be physical bodies and if we're infact physical beings, we would be desperate to be nonphysical souls. Thus, the argument is, since we're all, in a sense, "dying" to be nonphysical souls, it follows, doesn't it?, that we're in fact physical beings.

Some may respond that we could've been souls before birth in physical form and were greatly dissatified to be so and opted for life on a physical plane. The problem is, why don't we have memories of making such a decision?

Persons of such a constitution [those who favor the body] will be dragged back into corporeal life, according to Socrates...they [those who favor the body] will be unable to enjoy the singular existence of the soul in death because of their constant craving for the body. These souls are finally imprisoned in another body — Wikipedia

And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. — Phaedo 69c

Socrates is talking about the Bacchants, those who have been initiated into the rites of Bacchus, that is, Dionysus; the god of the grape, wine, and fertility. Wearing masks is also part of the rituals. The Socrates' and Plato's masks are significant in this context.

Here too the irony should not be lost. Socrates' talk of phronesis and moderation are in sharp contrast to the divine madness the rituals were intended to induce. But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites.

— Phaedo 69c

Socrates is talking about the Bacchants, those who have been initiated into the rites of Bacchus, that is, Dionysus; the god of the grape, wine, and fertility. Wearing masks is also part of the rituals. The Socrates' and Plato's masks are significant in this context.

Here too the irony should not be lost. Socrates' talk of phronesis and moderation are in sharp contrast to the divine madness the rituals were intended to induce. But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites — Fooloso4

Again, interesting information. I didn't know about the Bacchants.

Good to follow the continuing themes as outlined in the OP:

As we shall see, opposites will play an important part in Socrates’ stories. — Fooloso4

:cool:

The interplay.
The pain and the pleasure.
The chains and release.
Life and death.
Body and spirit.
The tragi-comedy of the human experience...

So I take it that Plato's literary tricks in the Phaedo and elsewhere, as dutifully imitated — magritte

I don't know that they were 'dutifully imitated'. Why would you think so ?

the authors of the gospels were intended to make all the tales as a cumulative package more life-like, — magritte

Again, I don't know enough about the authors of the gospels. I do seem to remember that Matthew, Mark, Luke and John had different perspectives of Jesus. Perhaps that is what makes it more 'life-like'.

The contradictions and discrepancies between the first three and John make it impossible to accept both traditions as equally reliable.[17] Modern scholars are cautious of relying on the gospels uncritically, but nevertheless they do provide a good idea of the public career of Jesus, and critical study can attempt to distinguish the original ideas of Jesus from those of the later authors.[18][19] — Wiki: Gospel

more convincing to naive un-philosophical people who listen to such stories? — magritte

Hmmm. The stories as listened to at that time - would have reached different types of people. Whether or not they were convinced or persuaded to follow the preachers - would require a way of thinking and believing that could include both the naive and the more experienced. The wise and the not so wise.

As read today - by all ages and types of people, it might not be so much about trying to convince of any truth. Certain nuggets of good ways to act...ideas of how best to live life...can be extracted from the whole Book.
Some people follow it because they see it as the work of God.
I see it as the work of men...

Your thoughts ?

"Concepts such as 'Beauty' don't exist by themselves, do they ?
They arise from the real world - we create such - why ? "

This is a viewpoint that Plato is dedicated to challenge. Man is not the measure of all things — Cuthbert

Thought I'd return to this.
The phrase 'man is the measure of all things' was familiar but memory failed me yet again. I thought perhaps Shakespeare.
Think again. And search for information:

Protagoras is known primarily for three claims (1) that man is the measure of all things (which is often interpreted as a sort of radical relativism) (2) that he could make the “worse (or weaker) argument appear the better (or stronger)” and (3) that one could not tell if the gods existed or not...

Historically, it was in response to Protagoras and his fellow sophists that Plato began the search for transcendent forms or knowledge which could somehow anchor moral judgment. Along with the other Older Sophists and Socrates, Protagoras was part of a shift in philosophical focus from the earlier Presocratic tradition of natural philosophy to an interest in human philosophy...

Plato (427-347 B.C.E.): Protagoras is a leading character in Plato’s dialogue Protagoras and Protagoras’ doctrines are discussed extensively in Plato’s Theaetetus. Plato’s dialogues, however, are a mixture of historical account and artistic license, much in the manner of the comic plays of the period...

Of Protagoras’ ipsissima verba (actual words, as opposed to paraphrases), the most famous is the homo-mensura (man-measure) statement (DK80b1): “Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that [or “how”] they are, and of things that are not, that [or “how”] they are not.” This precise meaning of this statement, like that of any short extract taken out of context, is far from obvious, although the long discussion of it in Plato’s Theaetetus gives us some sense of how ancient Greek audiences interpreted it. — IEP article: Protagorus

So, Plato gets in on the act again. Telling us about Protagorus. Well, well, well...
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/protagoras.html
and in the Thaetetus:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-theaetetus/

Oh dear...Plato has by the neck grabbed me again.
If only to see...what he sees...how and why...

Protagorus - I had heard about...but no in-depth knowledge...sounds like a cool customer.
Is there a reason he seldom appears on the scene in TPF discussions ?
Too ancient ?

[Apologies for side-track but...]

This is why the immaterial soul is prior to the material body. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is made crystal clear by the text and ought to be beyond dispute.

Unfortunately, Fooloso4 has a long history of making claims for which either (1) he presents no evidence or (2) which are positively contradicted by the evidence. Which is not surprising as he is a self-declared follower of Leo Strauss whose musings about Plato are pseudo-scientific gobbledygook.

When pressed, he offers two kinds of answer, either (1) that the evidence is there but only “careful” readers like himself can see it or (2) that the issue “has already been discussed or addressed” and there is nothing further to say.

I think we have seen where his theories lead to. He fails to understand that to say (a) “the sirens sing or chant to Odysseus in order to charm, spellbind or put a spell on him” as in Xenophon (Mem. 2.6.11), is totally different from saying (b) “the mother sings or chants to her child in order to soothe it” or, as in the Phaedo, “one must sing or chant to oneself in order to soothe or comfort oneself (with knowledge of the immortality of soul and afterlife).”

The same applies to statements like "the argument that the soul is a harmony means that the fate of a particular soul is tied to the fate of a particular body."

Among other things, this totally ignores the fact that the soul is "tied to the fate of a particular body" only so long as the soul inhabits the body, after which it returns to the world of the Forms with which the soul has much more in common than with physical bodies.

The dialogue clearly states, and scholars have long acknowledged, that the soul here is a special case for the simple reason that it is a life-imparting thing that necessarily participates in the Form of Life (cf. 79b) and that therefore any analogy with snow or anything else apart from soul itself is necessarily an imperfect analogy.

But, of course, when people latch on to irrelevant or imagined details to which they accord disproportionate importance, then we enter the realm of never-ending labyrinths from where there is no easy way out ... :smile:

I think the Phaedo is a very interesting and very important dialogue if one wants to correctly understand Plato. As long as one avoids reading it through the eyes of anti-Platonists like Leo Strauss, that is .... :smile:

1. Simmias claims that the soul is a composite thing like the harmony or attunement of a lyre:

we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness [i.e. the properties of the four elements], and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements (86b).

And:

The soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in death (86d).

2. Socrates reminds Simmias of his argument:

You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body. For surely you will not accept your own statement that a composite harmony existed before those things from which it had to be composed, will you?”
“Certainly not, Socrates.” (92a – b)

3. Socrates points out to Simmias that his argument is flawed and that he must choose between “soul as harmony” and “knowledge as recollection”:

“Well,” said he, “there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?”
“The former, decidedly, Socrates,” he replied (92c)

4. The primary meaning of Greek harmonia is “a joining together”. Harmonia here does not mean a harmony in the sense of melodious sound, but the state of the lyre, brought about by a combination of things, that enables it to produce a certain sound:

The word translated as ‘attunement’ (harmonia) is often given as ‘harmony’. But the associations of that word in modern music are misleading, and the forthcoming argument will focus mainly upon the tuned state of the instrument

- D. Gallop, Phaedo, p. 91

5.. Socrates dismisses Simmias’s harmony argument.

6. Simmias’ acknowledges that his argument was based on mere probability and was deceptive and flawed.

7. No “Form of Harmony” is mentioned anywhere in the dialogue.

8. Harmony being a composite thing (syntheto pragma), i.e., a thing made of parts joined together in an orderly fashion, it reflects the properties of order. Therefore the corresponding universal would be Order.

9. Either way, Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul are indisputably accepted in the dialogue.

10. There is no evidence whatsoever that Socrates, or Plato, teaches atheism.

The dialogue under discussion is Phaedo.

Simmias makes no mention of proportions in his argument in this dialogue.

Simmias' argument is that the soul is like the attunement of a lyre.

The formula he uses is:

(A) x has F1 and F2
(B) y has F3 and F4
(C) F1 = F3
(D) F2 = F4
(E) Therefore x = y.

The soul (x) has F1 (“being composite like the body”) and F2 ("being a blend of the things in the body (86d) when these are held taut (92b))”.

The attunement (y ) has F3 (“being a composite thing (syntheton pragma) (92b)”) and F4 (“being a blend of the things in the lyre, body of the lyre, strings, and notes when these are tuned (86a, 92c)).

Therefore x (the soul) is like y (the attunement).

If y (the attunement) does not have features F3 and F4, then Simmias is unable to make his argument.

If y (the attunement) does have features F3 and F4, then y (the attunement) has the same features as x (the soul), viz., F1 (being a compound) and F2 (being a blend of the elements of the lyre when these are tuned), exactly as stated in the dialogue.

If "proportions" were the core of his argument, we can be certain that Simmias would have mentioned them in the discussion. After all, he was an educated person. The fact that he does not mention proportions but both he and Socrates mention "blend" and "composite thing" indicates that attunement here means "ordered arrangement" or "ordered compound".

"Harmony" can mean many things to many people and it may well be the case that Pythagoras or Philolaus would have presented the argument differently. But here we are dealing with the argument as presented by Simmias and it is unacceptable to put words in his mouth that he is not saying.

In any case, if a harmony is a "particular order", then a harmony is an order. And orders participate in the universal or Form of Order.

If Pythagoras has a "Form of Harmony," that is his problem. Plato does not need one, it does not occur in the dialogue, and it is nonsense to claim that it does. And even if it did occur, it would change absolutely nothing about the fact that in the dialogue Socrates proves the immortality of soul and that his conclusion is accepted by Simmias, Cebes, and Socrates himself.

I do not see that this is a "different account". The soul, as an activity which rules over all the parts of the body must be present to all parts. So passions and desires, as emotions, are movements of the soul, and there is no inconsistency. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Not "different account" but different perspective.

In the Phaedo, Socrates' objection is that the soul is non-composite in the sense of "not made of separate elements like the body" as implied by Simmias.

In the Republic, where Socrates is concerned with moral theory, the three "parts" of the soul are really psychological functions of the same one soul, in particular, as determinants of choice and voluntary action.

In addition, they are all governed by justice, dikaiosyne, which is the cardinal virtue of the soul and a manifestation of the Form of Justice that is responsible for order in all things including among Forms. (Which, incidentally, is why in Plato there is no need for a "Form of Harmony".)

Though the three functions of the soul (thought, emotion, desire) are often misconstrued as "parts", they were correctly seen as aspects of the same one soul.

For example, Aristotle in discussing the faculties of the soul, states that the soul is part rational and part irrational, adding that these may be seen "like the convex and concave aspects of the circumference of a circle and distinguishable as two only in definition and thought, and by nature inseparable".

By analogy, the soul's three psychological functions may be seen as the three sides (or corners) of one triangle or whichever way one chooses to illustrate it.

In any case, it is quite obvious that they can be understood only as pertaining to one inseparable whole.

You just posted it. — frank

Do you mean where Socrates said "Homer put it poetically"? (94d) Socrates makes the distinction between poetry and argument several times. Homer does not present and argument. He says:

Odysseus struck his breast and rebuked his heart saying, 'Endure, my heart, you
have endured worse than this.'

Socrates uses this to claim that the soul is not a harmony of the body, but rather the soul rules over the body.

I pointed out that:

But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger. — Fooloso4

And:

In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained. — Fooloso4

Who is the opponent he is addressing? We talked about this earlier (in regards to why it comes in handy to call Plato's approach idealistic). What is the existing contrast to his approach? You should know this. — frank

I don't know what you mean. If you explain it I will respond. If you mean the appropriateness of using the term 'idealistic' I have nothing further to say.

This is a middle work. It's Plato we're hearing here, not Socrates. — frank

It is all Plato we are hearing, from the early dialogues to the end, simply from the fact that he wrote the dialogues. We cannot make a clear distinction between where he might be repeating what Socrates said and where he is not. Some scholars have attempted to do this, but others reject this approach. One thing is clear: With the possible exception of what he wrote while awaiting the poison, Socrates did not write anything and Plato never speaks in the dialogues. In this dialogue attention is drawn to the fact that he was not present. Xenophon also wrote Socratic dialogues. His dialogues differ from Plato's, even when they are writing about the same thing. Compare, for example, Plato's Symposium and Xenophon's.

In what sense was Plato conservative?

I don't think he was. You said:

So maybe Plato is showing off the conservatism of the gentry? — frank

And I responded:

As a student of Socrates a case would have to be made that he is conservative. — Fooloso4

Plato was an aristocrat but not a conservative. He was truly a revolutionary. Socrates was not an aristocrat but was a revolutionary.

Holy crap, man. — frank

Is this what stands as an argument for you? You have not told me why it makes a difference to our understanding of the text if Socrates was alone in calling Homer divine. It is right there in the text. No one who heard it disagreed or found it odd for him to have said this.

This is simply wrong. It is called Platonism because it was influenced by Plato. It is not consistent with his writings. Nowhere in Plato do we find your assertion about the individual mind being illumined by the cosmic or divine Mind and the rest. — Fooloso4

Plato and his disciples didn’t call themselves “Platonists” or their system “Platonism” so the designation is irrelevant. What matters is that this was a living tradition that was transmitted orally from master to disciple for centuries after Plato. Its representatives didn’t think they were just “influenced” by Plato, they believed and had reasons to believe that they followed Plato in all his main teachings.

It is clear from Plato’s writings that he believed in an eternal “Good” which is the source of all ideas, both in the higher world of realities and in the lower world of appearances. The immortal aspect of man, soul or spirit, is obviously connected with the Good, that’s why the philosopher can ascend or reascend to the Good.

Plotinus and others identified the Good with the One, etc. which they had every right to do. That doesn’t mean that they “misinterpreted” Plato or that they made things up just for the sake of it.

That is not the sort of immortality many are hoping for — Valentinus

I follow. I don't think the eschatology is by any means worked out or finalised. This comes up in the Phaedo in the discussion about 'snow' as being 'a kind' on the one hand, and 'an instance' on the other. So it's a question about the relationship between universals and particulars which was of course to continue being explored for millenia thereafter before petering out in the mangrove deltas of modernity.

But, confining the discussion to what is said and implied in the Phaedo, I think it's still fair to say that the intimation of the immortality of the soul seems more than just a wish.

//ps// Incidentally, check out this title. It's on my to-read list.