There are different schools of thought. There are also many scholars who avoid the use of anachronistic terminology. The idea is, to the extent it is possible, to understand an author on his own terms using his own terminology. — Fooloso4

Do you want to continue this here or start a different thread?

As a general interpretive principle I think it best to minimize the use of anachronistic terminology. — Fooloso4

Yep.

It really is that simple.

However, good translations of foreign texts will usually include an Introduction, Notes on the text and address problems of interpretation. They discuss other interpretations and meanings and give reasons for their own choice. — Amity

No one disputes that. But @Fooloso4 said he reads the dialogues differently every time he reads them and he intends to disregard meanings suggested by Platonists like Plotinus and modern scholars alike.

No one disputes that. — Apollodorus

N.B. I was addressing your post:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/536374

But that doesn't eliminate the problem of terminology and meaning. — Apollodorus

But Fooloso4 said he reads the dialogues differently every time he reads them and he intends to disregard meanings suggested by Platonists like Plotinus and modern scholars alike. — Apollodorus

Still you focus on @Fooloso4.
I will leave him to address your 'concerns', misunderstandings or misrepresentations - yet again... :roll:

More distraction from actually reading the text.
Why ? Continual thread disruption needs to be addressed - possibly by the mods ?

I will leave him to address your concerns - yet again — Amity

I won't. When he deliberately alters what I have said, as he has done and elsewhere, I no longer respond. Disagreement is one thing, dishonesty another. Disagreement I address, dishonesty I call out and the conversation ends.

I won't. When he deliberately alters what I have said, as he has done and elsewhere, I no longer respond. — Fooloso4

Good call.
I have had enough and contacted @fdrake via PM.
Also flagged posts.

If you want to join in, do your best to make it textual. That's gonna hold for everyone. — fdrake

Thank you for quick response :sparkle:

I realise this is a multipost, but considering that "going off topic" isn't generally against the rules, I cleared the mod queue for the thread. I will leave up the exchanges that you used to summon me.

considering that "going off topic" isn't generally against the rules, I cleared the mod queue for the thread. I will leave up the exchanges that you used to summon me. — fdrake

I agree that going off-topic to a certain extent can be a valuable and further exploration.
However, this appears to be more a continual pattern of dishonest and disruptive behaviour, even if it seems to be, at first glance, genuine questions or concerns.
Thanks.

'You're right, Simmias,' said Cebes. 'It seems that half, as it were, of what is needed has been shown-that our soul existed before we were born; it must also be shown that it will exist after we've died, no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is going to be complete. (77b)

Cebes does not remember what went before, the cyclical claim about life and death he had agreed to. Socrates reminds them that it has been demonstrated, but is willing to go through it again. Their fears, he says, are childish. (77e) We might then wonder whether Socrates will attempt to persuade them the way one might persuade a child. And sure enough, that is exactly what Cebes asks him to do:

'Try to reassure us, Socrates, as if we were afraid; or rather, not as if we were afraid ourselves-but maybe there's a child inside us, who has fears of that sort. Try to
persuade him, then, to stop being afraid of death, as if it were a bogey-man.' (77e)

Cebes is too manly to admit that he is afraid of death.

What you should do,’ said Socrates, ‘is to sing him incantations each day until you sing away his fears.’
Then where, Socrates,’ he said, ‘are we to get hold of a good singer of such incantations, since you,’ he said, ‘are abandoning us?’ (77e-78a)

There are a few things here to note. First, Socrates tells him to sing his own incantations to sing away his fears. Second, Cebes sounds like a child when he accuses Socrates of abandoning them. Third, it appears that he really does not want proofs and demonstrations but incantations to charm away his fears. I think this is why they are so ready to accept what really are weak arguments. It may be why some readers are so ready to accept them as well.

'Greece is a large country, Cebes, which has good men in it, I suppose; and there are many foreign races too. You must ransack all of them in search of such a singer, sparing neither money nor toil, because there isn’t anything more necessary on which to spend your money. And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.' (78a)

Socrates says they could search both Greece and foreign cultures to find a singer of incantations to spend their money on. In the earlier passage on purification he also abruptly talks in terms of monetary exchange, but suggests that thoughtfulness is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold. The incantational songs are the Greek and foreign mysteries and mythologies.

But Socrates says that they are not needed, that there is no one and no song more capable of preparing them for death than themselves by their own thoughtfulness, courage, moderation, justice, and true virtue.

At Cebes urging they return to the point they left off. Socrates uses an argument that Descartes will borrow:

'Then is it true that what has been put together and is naturally composite is liable to undergo this, to break up at the point at which it was put together; whereas if there be anything incomposite, it alone is liable, if anything is, to escape this?' (78c)

Cebes agrees.

Then aren’t those very things that are always self-same and keep to the same condition most likely to be non-composites; and aren’t those that vary from one moment to another and are never in the self-same condition likely to be composites? (78c)

Cebes forgets about “the child inside us”. Their fear of death and turmoil at Socrates’ impending death are at odds with something that is always self-same and keeps to the same condition.

Socrates now returns to the discussion of Being, the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, what is invariant and constant, and contrasts them with the many beautiful things and equal objects, that is, things that change. (78d-e)

'Now these things you could actually touch and see and sense with the other senses, couldn't you, whereas those that are constant you could lay hold of only by reasoning of the intellect; aren't such things, rather, invisible and not seen?'
'What you say is perfectly true.'
'Then would you like us to posit two forms of things that are - the Visible and the Unseen?'
'Let's posit them.'
'And the unseen is always constant, whereas the seen is never constant?' (79a)

Cebes agrees, no doubt he has heard Socrates talk about the Forms. But the distinction between the visible and intelligible realm in the Republic is not the same as the distinction between the visible and unseen. Obviously, not everything that is unseen is unchangeable.

In accord with this distinction Socrates divides body and soul, here and There, the senses and thoughtfulness, master and slave, divine and mortal.

'Whereas whenever it studies alone by itself, the soul departs yonder towards that which is pure and always existent and immortal and unvarying, and in virtue of its kinship with it, enters always into its company, whenever it has come to be alone by itself, and whenever it may do so; then it has ceased from its wandering and, when it is about those objects, it is always constant and unvarying, because of its contact with things of a similar kind; and this condition of it is called "phronesis", is it not?' (79d)

I left the Greek term phronesis untranslated here. The online translation uses ‘wisdom’, Brann uses ‘thoughtfulness’. It is commonly translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudence’. Brann’s choice is intended to distinguish phronesis from sophia, that is, wisdom and to emphasize thatphronesis, “ … in spite of its strong connotation with the heights of intellectual vision in this dialogue, refer in its most basic meaning to a thoroughly healthy state of mind - to good sense and sound judgment”.


What Socrates here calls ‘ phronesis’ is instead the state of the soul separated from the body. The condition Socrates elsewhere calls death. The attempted division does not hold. Practical wisdom is about living, the union of body and soul. The soul alone has no use for phronesis or thoughtfulness. We should recall that Socrates previously said that knowledge of things themselves, the Forms, is only possible, if possible at all, in death. Despite the high flown language, Socrates’ feet remain firmly on the ground, tethered byphronesis.

Don't you think the divine is naturally adapted for ruling and domination, whereas the mortal is adapted for being ruled and for service?'
'I do.'(80a)

It is instructive to compare this with the divisions of the soul in the Republic. A tripartite soul undermines the argument for a unitary soul. The problem of self-rule in the Republic is not a matter of competition between the body and soul, but takes place within the soul itself and introduces an element that is absent here: thumos or spiritedness, the love of honor and recognition, loyalty, anger, defensiveness, and so on. With the split between body and soul desire, eros, is atopos, without a place. Socrates has tied it to the body, but philosophy, the love of wisdom is described in the Symposium as eros and is not a bodily desire. Is eros then an in between, between body and soul?


The assertion of separation and the unchangeable nature of soul now becomes more doubtful:

'Whereas, I imagine, if it is separated from the body when it has been polluted and made impure, because it has always been with the body, has served and loved it, and been so bewitched by it, by its passions and pleasures, that it thinks nothing else real save what is corporeal-what can be touched and seen, drunk and eaten, or used for sexual enjoyment-yet it has been accustomed to hate and shun and tremble before what is obscure to the eyes and invisible, but
intelligible and grasped by philosophy; do you think a soul in that condition will be released herself all by herself and unadulterated ?' (81b)

Cebes agrees. Previously he agreed that the soul is unchangeable but he has changed his unseen mind.

What happens next seems to undo what has been done. The immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul. But Socrates does not stop there. The soul of the philosopher may enter the class of the gods (82c)

Thanks, if I find some more time I will check it out...

Odd, that the poor old Donkey rates lower than bees and wasps in Socrates' esteem. (82b)

'Then is it true that what has been put together and is naturally composite is liable to undergo this, to break up at the point at which it was put together; whereas if there be anything incomposite, it alone is liable, if anything is, to escape this?

The reputed last words of the Buddha were 'all compound things are subject to decay. Ardently seek your own salvation'.

The immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. ( — Fooloso4

viz. the Indo-European myth of Saṃsāra.

The focus you bring to what Cebes agrees to despite the inconsistencies between the particular arguments is interesting. Cebes also changes the subject when pressed beyond his willingness to just agree. His mention of "knowledge as recollection" in response to Socrates at 72a is a dodge:

If there were not perpetual reciprocity in coming to be, between one set of things and another,
revolving in a circle, as it were-if, instead, coming-to-be were a linear
process from one thing into its opposite only, without any bending
back in the other direction or reversal, do you realize that all things
would ultimately have the same form: the same fate would overtake
them, and they would cease from coming to be?'

It is fair enough to say that Cebes' reference to what Socrates argued for before is germane to the discussion but it is not a response to Socrates' statement in the moment.

The Argument from Opposites

I'd like to see what others make of the 'argument from opposites' (70c-72e).

It seems to operate on the presumption that 'the opposites' - those given include larger and smaller, weaker and stronger, faster and slower, the beatitful and the ugly, and of course the living and the dead - are intrinsic to the whole process of generation and decay. Also there's a correlative relationship, in that one gives rise to the other - what was smaller becomes larger, what is weaker becomes stronger, and so on.

There are some problems that I think are easy to see with this argument - firstly that whilst weaker and stronger are comparative - things can be weaker or stronger - being alive or dead is not a comparative, as something can't be more or less dead. So there's something of an equivocation going on. Furthermore, there's a counter-argument that the living are simply the natural descendants of other living creatures, that they've since died is immaterial to the nature of their origination. And that it's not hard to envisage that the process could come to end with complete extinction.

I'm also interested in the provenance of this type of argument. I can think of one example from the pre-socratics, and another, even more alike, from completely different culture setting roughly contemporaneous to Socrates. (Any guesses?) But I'm surprised that Cebes seems to so willingly accept the premisses of the argument without voicing any of the above kinds of objections.

I'm also intrigued by the argument that if things didn't arise from their opposites, then everything would end up dead, or asleep (like Endymion, the legendary sleeping ruler.) I've read elsewhere of a later argument, I think from Islamic philosophy, that says that if the universe was of infinite duration, then everything that could happen, being of finite duration, would already have happened.

Furthermore, there's a counter-argument that the living are simply the natural descendants of other living creatures — Wayfarer

Right. I pointed this out. The opposite of soul is body, which would mean that the soul comes from body.

I possess prophetic power from my master.

His 'daemon'?

I've read elsewhere of a later argument, I think from Islamic philosophy, that says that if the universe was of infinite duration, then everything that could happen, being of finite duration, would already have happened. — Wayfarer

As a side note, Nietzsche argued for a version of this in his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. So, arguing for the infinity rejected by others. Also a part of rejecting what he saw as "Socratic"

So - who is the reference to?

I possess prophetic power from my master."

His 'daemon'? — Wayfarer

Socrates means Apollo, his master and god of prophecy.

that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs" Which indicates that it is not Apollo. — Fooloso4

How does it indicate that? To me it is clear that he means Apollo.

My translation (Sedley & Long, 2011) of 85b has:

"Now I believe that I myself am the swans' fellow-slave and sacred to the same god, and have prophecy from my master no less than they do"

There is nothing unclear in the text.

The text includes an unnamed authority after the reference to Apollo.

The Sedley & Long version doesn't. You're using the wrong translation.

Socrates is the dedicated servant of Apollo who is his master and god of prophecy. Hence the gift of prophecy is naturally and logically from his divine master Apollo.

The reference to 'my master' caught my attention because of the suggestion that he was referring to his spiritual master. (In Asiatic traditions, one's guru is not necessarily a person.) Happy to reserve judgement on that pending further reading (however Apollodorus' account seems perfectly reasonable.)

Yes, but especially with reference to prophecy, I think in this case the text refers to Apollo as indicated by the Sedley & Long translation.

'In literature and myth, the swan symbolizes light, purity, transformation, intuition, grace. In Ancient Greece the swan stood for the soul and was linked to Apollo, the god of the Sun,'

In 85B, Socrates likens himself to the followers of Apollo but speaks for himself at the same time.

Here's another translation by Fowler that supports the Sedley & Long one:

85b] but since they are Apollo's birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans; and am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask what ever questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit.”

There is nothing unclear that I can see.

I checked a few other translations. I think I misread the one I used:

"I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs ..."

This means prophetic powers that are not less than theirs, that is Apollo, not from some other master.