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  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    Power constitutes the subject, while at the same time testifying to the fleeting nature of subjectivity (a non-subjectivity of sorts), since power itself is not an essence, a structure or a ground for anything. It is very much like the Deleuzian rhizome, which has no center and depends on other points of intersection in order to "constitute" itself. To be honest, I always had problems with the notion of gestalt, so I cannot use it as an analogy. But I think the Rhizome exhibits precisely the same "structure" as a set of power-relations.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    Alright so, 1. Foucault is not a structuralist. 2. Foucault goes beyond Heidegger (so not everything that Heidegger stood for is a given for Foucault) 3. That is precisely what power as a partial object implies. It is decentered.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    I don't see how temporality constitutes power, but I do see the reverse. The power-relations in the present determine how we feel, perceive, understand and make sense of time. Resorting to time (or space) as originary pre-given forms or conditions of experience is just another Kantian move, and I think we've had enough of that in western philosophy. I think there is much less danger of obscurantism in Foucaultian conceptions of power-relations than the traditional universalisms or "unities" of meaning, experience, phenomena or space-time etc. Power is a partial-object and it is fragmented. It has no ontology (following the Heideggerian project of the destruction of ontology and western metaphysics), but it has a very specific effect. The fact that the teacher engages in a series of meta-actions to discipline a student is a concrete, observable and detectable effect, but it does not require thereby a foundation or a grounding of meaning or communication. I wouldn't say that there are "differences" but instead, there are relations of power and force and their purpose is to repress differences. And that's where Nietzsche began. But by undermining the relations we can liberate the difference (as with Deleuze, I do not see why we cannot reconcile Derrida with Foucault as well). As far as points B. and C. are concerned, I'm afraid I cannot follow.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    Power does NOT require a foundation. It operates effectively without a ground or an essence. It is not based on anything. I'm sorry, but I do not understand where you are going with this. But I feel the pathos! Excellent.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    I don't see how delving deeper into something is a way of "avoiding" it? Power is not an object, it is a force, a relation and context is everything. It is not "vagueness", I believe it is complexity. Power hides, but it is not undetectable, it is difficult to detect, these are not the same. Resistance in fact, is something that occurs spontaneously, it only needs to be recognized and monopolized, but once it turns into meaningful and conscious action, it is already a real struggle a positive force. In terms of Deleuze, I see a possible reconciliation. If we speak of "unconventional libidinal investments" as things that can occur either spontaneously or consciously we could say that in the first case we have resistance (unconscious deterritorializations) and in the second a determined struggle or movement.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    That's super-general but I'll try to give you some kind of an answer. I just recently quit a job as a content writer in Scaled Access. It paid really nice for a student job. And several months in, I realized that they were no longer giving me any texts to edit (not that that job was dignifying), but they made me compile databases of their clients personal information, not to mention constantly keeping me "on the verge of getting fired" by blaming structural problems (incomplete databases) on me. So I took the chance and wrote a resignation letter to my boss letting them know that they were dishonest, manipulative and exploiting me (my immigrant status) to keep me docile and "productive". I worked with them for almost a year and they never raised my salary. I'm glad I did it, despite having to live off of canned food instead of takeaways. Generally, I found managerial jobs to be demeaning both to those in power and those at the bottom of the corporate ladder. In addition, I learned the true meaning of "purposefully distorted communication", where those at the top deliberately create gaps in communication to blame the ones on the bottom, that way they can always tell them they are not good enough to get a raise. I have several more stories like that and all I know, if I ever enter a corporate establishment again, it will be exclusively as a Trojan Horse.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    I think the Foucaultian response would be "What body?". The body of the corporate establishment? Of the docile worker? The school-boy? The police officer? A woman's body? The body as constituted by the science of biology? Anthropology? But most of all, What body? So I would revert back to objecting against Merleau-Ponty's body-essentialism. And indeed I agree, it makes no sense to speak of A BODY as a universal. We can only address the body in a perspectival manner through an institutional lens.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    That is precisely the type of resistance that I am interested in. I myself have refused many luxuries and comforts to investigate this on my own. Of course it's not the same, and I cannot say that I am poor, in fact, my financial difficulties are a result of the struggles that I engaged with, but it could definitely be the other way around where the financial difficulties are a direct cause and motivation for resistance and that's a more classical Marxian view of resistance.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    I'm afraid I'm not competent enough to talk about Merleau-Ponty just yet, I'm focusing on Husserl. But I do believe that an embodied subject is still a deeply territorialized subject. If I am not mistaken Merleau-Ponty also draws on developments in the natural sciences to boost his ontology of the body. But Foucault's claim would be that the experience of the body can be (is, in fact) as much a product of institutional training as any other. I think overall, phenomenology cannot escape essentialisms and that's Foucault's main bone of contention. Would you disagree? And why this privileging of Merleau-Ponty over Sartre? That's interesting.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    I think the objection from the omnipresence of power can only be used as an effective argument against Foucault, if we forget that for Foucault, power is not identical to domination. Power in itself is not something we want to avoid or neutralize, but something we want to appropriate and "condense" so to speak. The idea is not to get rid of power wherever we see it, but to operate as kind of shockwave which in fact reduces the intensity of a given set of power relations and how they act on subjects.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    That goes without saying, but you see, phenomenology posits a theory of the subject and that offers an epistemic framework for grounding morality later on. I even demonstrate how a phenomenological attitude can lead directly to liberalism. That was Foucault's problem, in France, phenomenology was institutionalized and become another (though quite profound) technique of discipline and governance.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    if power-knowledge is omnipresent and ubiquitous, there is no place
    and discourse for resistance
    I have often heard that criticism myself. Very common in these debates. I'm sure you know Foucault's answer, but it's good to re-iterate. Precisely because power is everywhere, there are infinite forms of resistance and ways to obtain freedom. And I might be wrong on this, but re-reading Foucault is very important. Because as Foucault notes, re-reading discursive texts (he was speaking of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche) means re-writing them. Re-reading Freud means inventing a new psychoanalysis, re-reading Marx a new critique of political economy etc. So I think we should re-read Foucault but not like Academics (i.e. elite bureaucrats), but in a way that re-creates the entire discourse. So in this sense, the answer could be closer and more obvious than it seems.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    Absolutely. Especially the pace at which Foucault's discourse is being appropriated and re-deployed by both governments and corporations. I see research being done in management and corporate governance, even cybersecurity where Foucaultian analysis is used to extend technologies of subjugation instead of resisting them. I am currently "fighting off" phenomenological appropriations where they try to integrate Foucaultian findings with Husserlian phenomenology. It's like fighting shadows, but hopefully it'll prove to be a good exercise.
  • Michel Foucault, History, Genealogy, Counter-Conduct and Techniques of the Self
    Excellent points. I wish I was more up to date with current events. Fortunately I am lucky enough to isolate and just do the research. In a way, this is also a technique of the self, having only to engage in struggles within Academia, but I am hoping to take this research and tackle real world problems. Here's one idea I've been messing with in my article Displacing the Confessional

    But I think no less than cultural trappings we should address explicit institutional trappings (perhaps this still falls within your definition of culture), even Foucault said at one point that acquiring a gay identity and being recognized as a group, far from a final goal or a definitive victory, may turn out to be a bit of a quagmire, as it very often happens that it is precisely recognition or the acquisition of rights that places the subject onto a new plane of power-relations. One may also create a continuous and subversive field of alterity, resulting in a gradual takeover rather than a single decisive battle.

    In terms of peer pressure or conformity, parresia is not even parresia if one's own status, social, financial or other, is not in danger of being undermined. I think we can distinguish various forms of parresia. We could imagine the parresia of a classical revolutionary who speaks truth to power at a certain point but in a way that brings about radical change, or we could conceive of a receding into the self and taking care of oneself and others through particular forms of self-training and self-discipline. The latter is a form of radical depoliticization of the public sphere.

    My point is that "speaking out" or "having an impact" may be a serious political trap unless we qualify these statements. I think the U.S. in particular has an ingenious political field which can create a powerful illusion of change and radical reform, while remaining perfectly within the confines of the status quo. This is another important point for Foucault, the productive element of power.
  • Submit an article for publication
    Hey so, I don't know how to attach files in this forum.
    But if you could visit my medium account (sorry to be "marketing" my work this way), some of my stuff is free to read, if you like any of those articles, feel free to publish them? Or if you have any suggestions as to how we can best communicate on this please let me know.

    https://giorgivachnadze.medium.com/