Buying meat contributes to suffering and death.

Are you arguing that, like other animals, we are too stupid to make moral decisions?

More redundant than nonsensical. The word Carnot cycle already summons the idea of efficient (100% efficiency to be exact), so "efficient Carnot cycle" is pleonastic, while perfect Carnot cycle is not. — Lionino

If a Carnot cycle is, by definition, 100% efficient, isn't saying "perfect Carnot cycle" redundant too?

For objects defined by their final cause (a lift is that which works as a lift), the goal is already implicit when you use the word. — Lionino

As you say, the word "lift" has its job in the name. Would any lift that can lift be a perfect lift?

I don't think most people would call a really slow, smelly, uncomfortable, ugly lift "perfect".

Isn't narrowing our judgment of perfection to the lift lifting, itself subjective?

But as Lionino explained in his Carnot cycle example there are certain operations that are produced which are perfect with little room for dispute so how do you account for that ? — kindred

While value judgments are ultimately subjective, including perfection, you can say something is objectively perfect for a specific goal. In the Carnot cycle example the goal is the most efficient cycle.

We have to define a goal for there to be any objectivity.

If Civilians are an important part of the war effort then to win the war you must eliminate all important means of the enemies war effort this includes civillians. — Vishagan

You could be facing an enemy with the same value for civilian life, that is only attacking your military targets, or beat an enemy that is willing to kill your civilians by attacking their military targets and having a larger, more powerful military.

Though ultimately people will pick government that promise to protect them by any means necessary.

I think the least problematic answer to these type of thought experiments is that the object goes where the parts go, and only where the parts go. However if consciousness is not an object, it is more difficult.

In reference to the last question I’d say no because I think animal exploitation is wrong and we can still have pleasure, convenience and entertainment without them. — Captain Homicide

Do you still contribute to the animal farming industry though, or have you walked away from Omelas?

Once citizens are old enough to know the truth, most, though initially shocked and disgusted, ultimately acquiesce to this one injustice that secures the happiness of the rest of the city. However, some citizens, young and old, walk away from the city after seeing the child — Down The Rabbit Hole

I think The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas can be applied to many moral questions. "The city's constant state of serenity and splendor requires that a single unfortunate child be kept in perpetual filth, darkness, and misery. Once citizens are old enough to know the truth, most, though initially shocked and disgusted, ultimately acquiesce to this one injustice that secures the happiness of the rest of the city. However, some citizens, young and old, walk away from the city after seeing the child".

Is the life of suffering experienced by factory farmed animals permissible for the pleasure it brings us?

The problem is there being so many different definitions.

I searched "moral nihilism definition" on Microsoft's AI and it replied "Moral nihilism is a philosophical concept that posits that there is no objective morality, and that moral statements are neither true nor false". I searched "Non-cognitivism definition" and it replied "Non-cognitivism is a meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions and thus cannot be true or false".

Both the moral nihilist and non-cognitivist believe that ethical sentences cannot be true or false. The non-cognitivist goes one step further by giving a reason for this (that they do not express propositions).

Isn't this right? And wouldn't this justify calling non-cognitivism a flavour of moral nihilism?

I enjoyed it. I'm a bit of a fanboy and have a copy of all the volumes of his autobiography too.

He wrote History of Western Philosophy in the last two years of the war '44 and '45, so it's a lot newer than Problems of Philosophy which wasn't published until 1912. I'm sure his views changed quite a bit over that more than 30 year difference.

Bertrand Russell "Problems of philosophy" is a nice short intro. It's old but philosophy doesn't change much so it doesn't matter. — bert1

I was going to say Russell's "History of Western Philosophy". I've been meaning to start it again.

No, moral non-cognitivism is a flavor of moral anti-realism, not moral nihilism. — Bob Ross

I would have said this:

the view that moral statements cannot be true or false and are just an emotional expression — Down The Rabbit Hole

Is a flavour of this:

the view that there is no right or wrong answers to moral questions — Down The Rabbit Hole

Maybe the literature considers them separate.

The main two arguments I have came across in favor of moral nihilism is that 1. moral thinking differs between cultures and people, so it is a subjective practice, and 2. that there is nothing tangible to attach moral facts too, therefore they do not exist. The main Idea between these two ideas is that morality was created by intelligent life, therefore it is a subjective practice that doesn't have any basis. — Lexa

Our moral values are just the result of our emotional state, which is no reason to believe anything - especially when we have competing values with others such as consequentialism versus deontology.

they could opt for a different flavor of moral anti-realism than moral nihilism (such as non-cognitivism or subjectivism). — Bob Ross

Non-cognitivism is under the umbrella of moral nihilism? The former is the view that moral statements cannot be true or false and are just an emotional expression. The latter is the view that there is no right or wrong answers to moral questions.

What is the fundamental difference between information processed by a mechanical computer and a brain? How can there be a fundamental difference in what is happening if all we are is mechanistic? — Restitutor

I wouldn't have thought that there is much difference. A self-aware machine would have to have a feedback mechanism. Experts are looking to create this:

"The final step of AI development is to build systems that can form representations about themselves. Ultimately, we AI researchers will have to not only understand consciousness, but build machines that have it. This is, in a sense, an extension of the “theory of mind” possessed by Type III artificial intelligences. Consciousness is also called “self-awareness” for a reason. (“I want that item” is a very different statement from “I know I want that item.”) Conscious beings are aware of themselves, know about their internal states, and are able to predict feelings of others".

Not only would you expect better of your own elected representatives that have been voted in by you and your peers, this is the most realistic thing you have control over. It's hard enough to effect change in your own country through campaigning for the attention of your fellow citizens that would most share your values. It's almost, if not, a waste of time to try and change the values of people living on foreign lands. It makes sense that people are most critical of their fellow citizens and representatives they elect.

But outside the mind, what connects atom A to atom B but not to atom C?

If there is nothing outside the mind that preferentially connects atom A to any other particular atom, then objects as we know them don't exist outside the mind.

Outside our minds, atoms exist but not objects (treating the "atom" as a figure of speech for something that does physically exist) — RussellA

Mereological nihilism? I've been meaning to look into it if you could recommend any books or resources.

Actually I didn't want to raise a tricky ethical question in that thread, because it is in the Politics and Current Affairs section. — Leontiskos

Fair enough.

I think it could make a difference. We distinguish combatants from civilians, but then there are murky areas such as civilians who are proximate to the war, producing arms or some such. Thus insofar as someone is associated with the war, they are not a mere civilian. So if a compatriot hostage is more closely associated with the war/fighting than a neutral or opposed hostage, then a relevant difference could arise. What is at stake is probably a form of collectivism, and it may be contingent on whether the compatriot hostage is in general agreement with their possessor's tactics (i.e. if they think to themselves, "I am not opposed to using compatriots as human shields, but don't use me!"). — Leontiskos

From a utilitarian point of view, you could say the sympathiser is worth less on the basis that they hold more negative utility, and from a deontological point of view, you could say that the sympathiser is less deserving. There will be a minority of people that hold the belief that everyone is equal no matter what.

so it goes both ways, "the wars you don't fight," become an issue as well. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. It's complicated as you have to measure not only the likely consequence of each course of action (or lack thereof), but how certain you are of those consequences. Makes questions like the one posed in the OP and the Israel/Gaza question extremely difficult, if not impossible, to answer.

A related question with respect to the Israel-Palestine conflict is whether it is illicit to indirectly kill those whom the enemy has taken hostage as human shields; along with the secondary question of whether the fact that the human shield is the enemy's compatriot makes a difference. — Leontiskos

The second question is an interesting one - think the difference between it being a Palestinian hostage or an Israeli hostage. Would and should both hostages be treated equal?

Anyway, I'll try and stay on topic as there's another thread on Israel/Gaza.

The idea of bombing civilians with any kind of bomb would strike most sensitive people as immoral. — frank

What if bombing runs where civilians were going to be killed as a by-product, were necessary to win WW2? I don't see evidence that they were, but I think most people would still say they were justified.

I'm guessing the situation in Israel/Gaza is what you and @RogueAI were discussing, or the situation spurred you to this question? Another tough one. For me, I think you have to look at the consequences.

As long as we are all opposed to death and suffering, advocates of a course of action that causes it have to provide justification.

Is there justification for nuking? If so, is there justification for nuking twice? (Many say no to the second question) The answer would depend on whether the war would have ended without it or them, and if so how costly ending the war would be without using it or them.

As such, were (are) they successful? The USSR is kaput, but China is successful. The USSR was able to marshal its resources to turn back and defeat the Nazi invaders, no small accomplishment. — BC

The USSR's huge contribution to the war was one of things at the forefront of my mind, along with it beating the west to space.

The answer to why it failed looks quite complicated, but arguably it survived long enough for us to say it is an example of a non-capitalist country that is strong and powerful.

I don't count the USSR or PRC as communist or socialist, despite their names. Cuba gave it a go but did so in a particularly disadvantageous environment (enforced by the US). Venezuela? — BC

From the link provided by @Vera Mont it doesn't look like Venezuela was given a fair chance either.

The Scandinavian countries have elements of capitalism and socialism in a democratic political system. That might be as close as we get to socialism. — BC

That might be where we first see UBI. Even if a nation is not in favour of guaranteeing its citizens enough to stay alive, UBI may become the cheaper option as automation continues to accelerate.

Not so much, if you consider the amount of outside interference to make sure they failed. — Vera Mont

Yes, that's what complicates the question even more - all of the communist countries mentioned in my OP were being undermined by the western capitalist countries both overtly and covertly. I knew about Cuba, but reading your second link about Venezuela, it's almost unbelievable how cruel the west were.

As for the USSR, I have seen from interviews a lot of people in the poorer regions look back fondly on it.

What makes anyone think that there is a system that works? What even is the measure or criterion of 'working'? What constitutes failure? Are you and yours the measure of success? — unenlightened

While it's a matter of perspective, some examples are more explicit.

Considering the USSR ceased to exist, I think it is safe to say that it failed. The question is, did it fail because of its economic system.

Economic crises in countries such as Cuba and Venezuela hint to communism's failure, but these must be measured in degree and number against the crises experienced in countries with alternative systems (namely capitalism).

Even if The Chinese Communist Party is now only communist in name, The Chinese Communist Party proper survived for around 70 years, as did the USSR. Does this speak to communism being fiscally workable, or does their failures speak to it being fiscally unworkable?

So, maybe I do somehow continue to exist. — Art48

Given an infinite duration, if the same matter combines in the same pattern, maybe we keep being reborn.

However, I am also aware that moral relativism comes with it an objection that there can be no moral progress, and so that undermines any idea of making suggestion as core to this would be that there is no increased in 'goodness' by making the above changes - there is no room for progress.
Furthermore, my own arguments as to why we should be using moral relativism in this case (it increases autonomy, respect and dignity at the end of life) are all undermined by my previous argument that 'goodness' is not fixed and therefore the qualities that i am trying to promote are not inherently good. — AlexMcGram

I think it would depend on your position:

(1) There is no basis to say that anything is good or bad

OR

(2) Good and bad are relative to the individual

If the latter, ostensibly not just goodness itself, but the degree of goodness is relative. By providing more options, you are providing opportunity for the subjective goodness for that person to increase?

If there are no right and wrong answers to moral questions, how can we say god is wrong, bad, or evil? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Surely some will say whatever it is that God does, says, or commands is good and not evil, no? But the actions and outcomes say otherwise, at least from the human perspective.

The bigger question then is, "If a morality is alien to human sensibilities, what would make that justifiably moral?". — schopenhauer1

The outcomes are merely not to our taste. I don't see a basis for saying that they're wrong, bad, or evil.

There could also be a God who commands what is good and what is bad, which we are not privy to. Who are we to demand for God to give us answers. It's not like we can say it is wrong for God not to give us answers.

Our perspective is irrelevant either way.

Yes. However, if we were to stick with god for a minute- what does a world with evil and mediocre outcomes reveal for its inhabitants (at least on Earth)? Have you ever noticed oddities in timing? An empty park that has one person in it that you collide with nonetheless? Things like this? There are oddities of life whereby the coincidences are higher than would be expected... One could weave a tale of a god who likes chaos and thrives in it. — schopenhauer1

It does feel like the world is conspiring against me every now and again. But over the course of a lifetime extremely rare events are going to happen.

If the creator is all-knowing, their actions are hard to forgive. However, if the creators were just reckless, or even just naive, there is room for forgiveness.

If there are no right and wrong answers to moral questions, how can we say god is wrong, bad, or evil?

I can see the point hiding underneath the question though. Even if there is no cruel god bringing us into this world of suffering, humans brought us here. If you feel it cruel for a god to bring us into this world, to be consistent you would have to say it was cruel for humans to bring us into this world.

I would think a nomadic lifestyle is similar to travelling/backpacking. While I enjoyed the experience, I eventually missed the comforts and security of home, and it felt like a relief to come back.

Even the cogito could be wrong?

We could be il-logical and therefore mistaken that to think we must exist. Or we could be in some kind of illusion such as a simulation with fabricated rules of logic. The cogito is built upon the unprovable assumption that we are thinking logically and our rules of logic are correct.

How can you even prove that disembodied brains are possible? The only examples of brains that we have are as parts of bodies. I can't see how anyone could argue that they are more likely without first establishing that they are possible, and so far I don't think anyone has done that. — GRWelsh

Yes, that's a strong objection.

Disembodied brains can exist, but they don't last long. I think I read that upon decapitation consciousness lasts for up to 10 seconds, and brain death occurs within 3-6 minutes.

Say viable brains with false memories appear as a result of quantum fluctuations - they only need to last momentarily for you to be having the experience you are having now. As your memories could be false, you don't know that you existed before this moment.

How would you calculate density for a infinite number of things (e.g., Boltzmann brains) in an infinitely large space? — RogueAI

Good question. It may be that density has no meaning within infinity.

Are we not material? Or did our consciousness arise unnaturally? — Patterner

I think consciousness is most likely either a property of matter or arises from it. Some people believe there is a non-material substance (such as a soul) that combines with the material to make consciousness.

If Boltzmann Objects could exist, if the universe was infinitely old, we'd see billions of odd things floating around. So either they can't exist, or the universe is not infinitely old. — Patterner

Science suggests this bubble was started by a big bang about 14 billion years ago. Boltzmann Brains could have existed before our big bang, either in previous bubbles or from a quantum fluctuation. Or if there is a multiverse, there could be infinite Boltzmann Brains existing right now. We wouldn't see them from our bubble.

I grew up on TOS. I know a lot of people find it unwatchable because of the effects, but it and TNG are my favorites. Then Voyager. — Patterner

I'm not of that generation, but I can respect the nostalgia.

As your tastes are similar to mine, you must be a Stargate fan. SG1 if my favourite Sci-fi series.

How do you account for 'paradox' in your 'every possibility that can happen, will happen in time.'
If I state 'The only true existent regarding Boltzmann brains is that they have no true existent.'
Is that statement true given a very large or even infinite duration of time? — universeness

(Unless all of this suddenly appeared from literally nothing, was created by god/s, or is an illusion) we know that patterns are spat out from something, like a QRF, or infinite universe/s (whether cyclical or a multiverse). Provided it's possible for Boltzmann brains to form, in an objective sense, they will almost certainly exist.

The question is how likely are we to be a Boltzmann brain. The Sean Carroll objection, that other posters have picked up on, suggests we cannot sensibly measure. As by doing so would be from the assumption that we are not a Boltzmann brain with false memories. I think @noAxioms is suggesting that our theory of how patterns form is more important than the fact there has been an infinite duration. And @RogueAI is saying from the view that material cannot naturally give rise to consciousness, Boltzmann brains cannot exist in any event.

I enjoyed TNG the most, followed by Voyager I think. I was just getting into Discovery and Netflix took it off :sad: I won't spoil Picard Season 3 for you, but it gets a lot better. There's some nice surprises.

Blame @Patterner for setting me off. That said, better my thread than @Bartricks'.

Well, Shatner's a classic, but Patick Stewart is my favourite captain of all time.

Have you finished the new Star Trek: Picard? I've still got two episodes to go.

You'll have to fight @universeness for it.

You need to be careful about what exactly "equally likely to occur" means in this context. The way cosmologists might pose this question is: "Given an observer, is it more likely to be a regular observer (a human or a similarly evolved creature) or a freak observer like a Boltzmann Brain?" This is a tricky epistemological question involving concepts like reference class, self-location and self-selection. — SophistiCat

Intuitively though it seems that simply adding "more of the same" to the world (more space or more time or more observers) should not make a difference to a generic observation made by a particular observer at a particular place at a particular time, so the challenge to epistemologists is to explain just how this challenge is only a seeming one. (Bostrom purports to meet it with his Self-Sampling Assumption, which he also uses elsewhere to analyze puzzles like Boltzmann Brains.) — SophistiCat

Yes, I think our meaning of "equally likely to occur" is pivotal. A more agreeable meaning may be from The Principle of Indifference: "A rule for assigning epistemic probabilities. It assumes that if you have multiple plausible scenarios, you should assume each is equally likely till you have evidence otherwise".