Okay. Well at first blush it seems like you may be willing to balance suffering and other considerations in a way that schopenhauer1 is not. — Leontiskos

As I saw it, he was saying something very similar to me. He was saying those other considerations (not just purely pleasure) matter not against the one consideration that matters- suffering.

There must be more suffering before the arguments in favor of antinatalism become plausible. Is that right?

But if it is right then it seems like suffering does not always trump any other consideration, for the suffering of the pinprick does not trump the consideration of other pleasures. — Leontiskos

I think it would clearer to say that "the sum total of suffering ensured by living a human life outweights any version of hte calculus a ANist can provide".

I.e, on our understanding of suffering, pleasure and how to balance them (those terms are obviously lacking nuance) we cannot find a reason to risk the most likely outcome - that one's sum total of suffering vastly out-weights the other considerations in one's life. To bring a person into existence when there is a very high - almost inescapable - chance their life will be, on balance, bad for them, is wrong. (i would think that statement stands to reason - you need not agree, but it explains the position I think).

Being an AN is a result of running the calc, and never coming out with 'life' as the winner. Not that its pre-decided. Obviously, that would be stupid. But if its a 2/98 chance, i'm going to force someone into the race.

If suffering always trumps any other consideration — Leontiskos

It only does so once the calc is run. The statement is not meant to be a position of it's own. It's more "I've run this calc 60,000 times and zero came up on the side of procreation". Again, disagree, sure, but it's wrong to take this as a position rather than what causes the position to be taken up.

you may be willing to balance suffering and other considerations in a way that schopenhauer1 is not. — Leontiskos

Possibly. Reading down just this page I get the feeling he's just being imprecise in a way that sort of hides what I'm saying about in some more let's say confident language.

Fair enough, slightly different than what I meant but in the ballpark. My way of interpreting the balancing is more deontological I think than your approach which is more perhaps consequential but this just shows the diversity of AN whilst basically agreeing on the same foundation @Leontiskos

Being an AN is a result of running the calc, and never coming out with 'life' as the winner. Not that its pre-decided. — AmadeusD

Okay, interesting. I do see this as a more conservative version of antinatalism than schopenhauer1 holds.

It only does so once the calc is run. The statement is not meant to be a position of it's own. It's more "I've run this calc 60,000 times and zero came up on the side of procreation". — AmadeusD

And I see this as substantially different from schopenhauer1. This is something like consequentialist antinatalism as opposed to deontological antinatalism, and it does seem more rational and plausible to me. It certainly does not fall victim to the two counterarguments I formulated for schopenhauer1's position.

Edit:

My way of interpreting the balancing is more deontological I think than your approach which is more perhaps consequential — schopenhauer1

Yes.

And I see this as substantially different from schopenhauer1. This is something like consequentialist antinatalism as opposed to deontological antinatalism, and it does seem more rational and plausible to me. It certainly does not fall victim to the two counterarguments I formulated for schopenhauer1's position. — Leontiskos

This would I would think fall more into those objections as presumably, some condition of life would simply need it to be 51% good to procreate when you run the calculus. To me that’s a limited natalism. That’s actually a weaker/more conservative position than negative utilitarianism. A negative utilitarian would say for example, to cause the least amount of preventable harm the situation, especially because it’s very doable, unlike post-birth scenarios. I just don’t think the aggregate approach is amenable to certain ethics- even NU should be geared towards individuals. Not using people for a great calculus machine aggregating all suffering from everywhere seems to be a good start. [but a calculus for preventing an individuals suffering makes sense].

I would say that it is also undisputed that in the pinprick world there will be suffering, at least until you give an actual explanation for why a pinprick does not count as suffering. The prima facie answer is that it does count as suffering. — Leontiskos

Learning is also a kind of 'suffering' too. The impossibility of clarity for the term 'suffering' makes AN a particular kind of subjective view. Like most items in ethics it is more or less opinion.

Personally, I see that version (deontastic!) as inapt. It essentially says
"there's a risk, so don't" which I can't quite see as a good enough reason not to procreate. The A-symmetry seems to rely on the consequentialist concept, even if the actual justification is more broad (i.e to live is to suffer. We shouldn't cause others to suffer. Don't have kids). I think I see why Leontiskos had a problem with this. It's more-or-less arbitrarily nihilistic. I think the consequentialist description overcomes some objections that are in concept, rather than execution. I wouldn't say life simply is suffering. I would say it is most likely the vast, vast, vast (perhaps 99.85%) of people born will, on balance, suffer more than they enjoy their life. Therefore, the possibility (0.15%) of a life worth living tells us not to create lives, on balance rather than because life is awful prima facie.

And I see this as substantially different from schopenhauer1. This is something like consequentialist antinatalism as opposed to deontological antinatalism, and it does seem more rational and plausible to me. It certainly does not fall victim to the two counterarguments I formulated for schopenhauer1's position. — Leontiskos

This would I would think fall more into those objections... — schopenhauer1

Nah. Note, for example, that the reductio objection that we have been considering recently simply has no force at all against Amadeus' position. Amadeus' position does not support the conclusion (3) as Benatar's does.

This also conveniently shows that the objection is not ad hoc, it is not superfluous, and it does not prove too much. Instead it is tailor-fit to your own account in a way that does not necessarily fit alternative antinatalist accounts.

You'd have to qualify "foundation" but there are MANY foundational ethical frameworks for which AN conclusions have been drawn or at least "fit into", such as deontological ones (which I hold). Many fall under a negative utilitarian variety. Others are vaguely consequential (environmental ones, probably ones least like the ones I hold). One can even argue for a virtue theory version, that can correspond with Schopenhauer's notion of compassion being THE only real moral sentiment (because it sees everyone as what they truly are.. fellow-sufferers). In this theory, anti-procreation would be a natural course of a virtuous (i.e. compassionate) person. They see what befalls man, and wants to prevent it. In this sense, AN can also be philosophical pessimistic in its foundation. That is to say, there is something INHERENTLY negative about existence that makes it fundamentally never redeemable through social, personal, or political actions. This goes to a vaguely existential understanding of the situation. — schopenhauer1

Well, I see what you mean, but AN makes the claim that 'giving birth is intrinsically bad'. This is an ethical evaluation and quite clearly is incompatible with a 'subjectivist' view of ethics, for instance. Viirtue ethics is probably the best 'foundation' of ethics in general. We might assume that, say, a good action is both good for the recipient of the action and for the agent himself/herself. So, yes, compassion is a good ground for ethics and I agree with Schopenhauer.
It's also compatible IMO with a 'deontological' view: being compassionate is also a duty to both oneself and to others - one should/must seek the good for oneself and others.

'Giving birth' is tricky here because the 'human being' doesn't exist (unless one believes in some kind of existence before birth*, but let's assume that this is not the case). Let's say that we cannot know the 'final outcome'** of the future person life (i.e. if that individual will be satisfied with life or irreversibily unhappy), in this case, clearly we must admit that, after all, we can't say that 'giving birth' is a good act. In this sense I agree with the antinatalists. However, I am not sure if 'giving birth' qualifies as a 'bad' act, even when one considers the future individual.

So deontology generally puts the locus of ethics at the individual level (not all the time, but most.. things like rights/duties). To me, the outcome doesn't matter. That is to say, we don't have a duty towards the outcome of "preserving humanity". Humanity isn't a subject for ethical concern. Rather, we have ethical considerations of individuals and their suffering, or right thereof not to be unnecessarily and non-consentingly caused the situations/conditions wherewith (ALL!) suffering takes place. That is not your right to confer for someone else. And there is no symmetrical duties/obligations for creating happiness, especially with understanding that there is no one who exists to be deprived of happiness you would not be thus conferring. — schopenhauer1

Probably, 'deontological' was the wrong word. I believe, however, that ethics itself is intrinsically social. Ethical agency doens't seem to me to make sense without a community. In other words, if, say, 'I act in order to bring the good to myself and to others', then I cannot 'ignore' the presently existent human beings and the human community in general. If one accepts that seeking the 'good' is also a social 'enterprise', then trying to preserve society seems, after all, a 'good' act. If one believes that, clearly there is a contrast with AN.


*For instance, Hindu, Jain and Buddhists believers in reincarnation/rebirth see the 'birth as a human' as something good, precisely because it gives the chance to get better rebirths and liberation. So, if this belief were true, then antinatalism would be wrong.
**As in the other thread, if one believes (as say Christian universalists) that in the 'end' 'all will be well', then of course IMO life would be good for everyone (ultimately).

Well, not sure of your point. If, say, one has no economical problems, would you still think that 'giving birth' is morally wrong?

Also, generally antinatalists argue that 'giving birth' is wrong becuase it is a choice that affects others (in unknown ways) not becuase it undermines our 'self-preservation'. At best your argument is for a personal choice of not giving birth.

Well, not sure of your point. If, say, one has no economical problems, would you still think that 'giving birth' is morally wrong? — boundless

It is not about economic problems but legal ones. You are very likely to end up at some point becoming the noncustodial parent of the child. That is a stupid hobby.

Above a certain national divorce rate, it looks like a bad decision to have children with a person of that particular nationality:

https://divorce.com/blog/divorce-rates-in-the-world/

It is preferable to pick a country with a much lower divorce rate, choose a romantic interest there, and have children there instead.

I ruthlessly discriminate against anybody from a high divorce rate country. So, yes, I consider it to be morally wrong to have children with these people. Better safe than sorry.

Nah. Note, for example, that the reductio objection that we have been considering recently simply has no force at all against Amadeus' position. Amadeus' position does not support the conclusion (3) as Benatar's does. — Leontiskos

What are you talking about? It’s either effectively the same (a threshold needs to be met, but empirically, this seems to never be the case..and this always wrong de facto) or its premises are wrong (that the threshold is met or can at some point be met).

Also your non sequitur tying 3 has no support. If the threshold is never met, 3 effectively always stands (it’s good no one suffers..as the threshold represents “suffers” here or “pain”). True it’s not as digital as deontology, but the aggregate amount of “too much pain that this life holds” seems to be his definition of suffering.

But this isn't an argument for antinatalism. Antinatalism is the view that is morally wrong to give birth. You are merely saying that in some circustances one might choose to not have children.

I would say it is most likely the vast, vast, vast (perhaps 99.85%) of people born will, on balance, suffer more than they enjoy their life. — AmadeusD

Why not check rather than pulling numbers out your arse?

Two thirds of adults globally (64%) report being happy: 14% very much so and 50% rather so. Countries with the highest proportion of adults considering themselves as very happy are Canada (29%), Australia, Saudi Arabia and India (28% each), Great Britain and the United States (27% each).

Can I do anything I want to you based on percentages, or do you have a right to not be so callously violated, disregarding your autonomy and the principle of non-harm? That's also why I bring in the idea of "unnecessary suffering." There was no mitigation—if you're going to spin it in some political aggregate way, that government force X, or parents force X. In this decision, no mitigation was needed because it was completely unnecessary to cause the harm in the first place. And obviously, even if you try to give me parenting/government examples, I can just give you slippery slope arguments about causing harm that statistically has positive outcomes but violates individual non-harm and autonomy principles.

36% chance of creating an unhappy person then.

This average happiness is potentially overshadowed by life's inevitable suffering - "Nearly 1 in 2 people born in the UK in 1961 will be diagnosed with some form of cancer during their lifetime", "12.7% of all deaths registered in the UK in 2018 were from dementia and Alzheimer disease".

@AmadeusD may not be too far off:

I would say it is most likely the vast, vast, vast (perhaps 99.85%) of people born will, on balance, suffer more than they enjoy their life — AmadeusD

What are you talking about? It’s either effectively the same (a threshold needs to be met... — schopenhauer1

What are you talking about? The reductio objection has nothing at all to do with a threshold, and that is the problem. For Benatar's argument even a pinprick suffices to trigger antinatalism—ad hoc counterarguments aside. The objection requires only the presence of suffering, not a threshold. The whole premise of the objection is that Benatar's argument absurdly greenlights antinatalism even when suffering is outstripped by happiness by 1,000 miles.

Amadeus rightly notes that any position which assumes antinatalism before considering the balance between suffering and other considerations "would be stupid":

Being an AN is a result of running the calc, and never coming out with 'life' as the winner. Not that its pre-decided. Obviously, that would be stupid. — AmadeusD

His key distinction is between suffering trumping other considerations before a balance-analysis, and suffering outweighing other considerations after a balance-analysis. The deontological antinatalist is committed to the former, which Amadeus disagrees with.

This average happiness is potentially overshadowed by life's inevitable suffering - "Nearly 1 in 2 people born in the UK in 1961 will be diagnosed with some form of cancer during their lifetime" — Down The Rabbit Hole

Apokrisis' statistic already included such folks. It was baked in.

The consequentialist antinatalist apparently thinks that if we polled everyone on their deathbed and asked them if life was worth living or they wished they had never been born, the vast majority* would wish they had never been born.

* For Amadeus this is something like "99.85%"

Your second paragraph suggests you understand what I was getting at. Of those polled only a fraction would have been people experiencing the suffering at the end of life.

99.85% does seem rather high, but I don't think it unreasonable to determine the majority of people have net bad lives.

I don't think it unreasonable to determine the majority of people have net bad lives. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Do you think it is unreasonable to determine that the majority of people would rather had never been born?

Amadeus rightly notes that any position which assumes antinatalism before considering the balance between suffering and other considerations "would be stupid": — Leontiskos

But then thinking that nothing in this actual world does or ever will meet that threshold, effectively makes this a nonissue.

The deontological antinatalist is committed to the former, which Amadeus disagrees with. — Leontiskos

I am fine with that. But I gave my thoughts on pinprick world. It’s either not suffering as we normally define it, or indeed, since no one is obligated to bring happiness only prevent suffering in this instance, it can be defended. Why would it matter if no one existed in the first place? The problem is using Benatar as if he’s purely doing hedonic calculus and not explaining the difference of good and bad in respect to non-existence. Not existing hurts no actual person, only existing does.

Either way, Benatar goes out of the way tgat even if you don’t bite the bullet in pinprick scenario, THIS world is not that world hence he has a litany of follow-up empirical evidence of how we are often mistaken psychologically and empirically just how bad it is in regards to present pain and pain reflected or projected.

If you are talking about a poll like the one that showed 64% happy - 36% unhappy, ostensibly, the percentage of people that would rather they had never been born would be lower than the unhappy 36%, when considering things like unhappy people that prefer to have been born "otherwise they wouldn't have had their children" etc.

My same objection to the happiness poll would apply to the birth preference one though. I don't know how many of those suffering at end of life wish they had never been born.

Further, I would rather prevent a life of suffering in spite of a future person's preference. There are many people that hurt themselves, and society determines it just to thwart their preference.

99.85% does seem rather high, but I don't think it unreasonable to determine the majority of people have net bad lives. — Down The Rabbit Hole

The case against antinatalism is not about its logic. That is all too easy to dismiss. It is about people confirming themselves in the social role of being victims of life itself. It is about the nonsense of forming a communal identity around a justification for not feeling better about their world.

Suffering can't be avoided so one can't be criticised for not even trying.

This thought used to be framed as existentialism and nihilism. Now it is framed in this really bullshit legalism of existence being an unconsented fact. Of no person having a right to impose a burden on another.

Systems of laws arise out of the need to organise successful human communities and not the other way around. If you think there is a problem, changing the system is what you should strive for.

But systems of laws recognise rights and responsibilities. They are based on a pragmatic balance between individual wants and communal needs. Burdens will be imposed. All that is asked is that they are reasonable.

"Nearly 1 in 2 people born in the UK in 1961 will be diagnosed with some form of cancer during their lifetime", "12.7% of all deaths registered in the UK in 2018 were from dementia and Alzheimer disease". — Down The Rabbit Hole

In modern society, what are we truly the victim of? The industrial food industry. Big pharma. The banking industry. The atomising effects of neo-liberal economics and social policy.

If you live a healthy life, the odds of metabolic diseases are greatly cut. We can live in ways that avoid cancer and dementia. But also a lot of that is down to the fact we now all live so long.

What are the actual death bed regrets of people? They are about not doing more to be part of a personally meaningful community. About not getting out and living life more.

So from a moral philosophy point of view, there are some real issues to be addressed. The modern world has many pluses compared to other times, but also plenty of questionable economic and political settings.

You know something has to be out of balance when most folk are more familiar with Kim Kardashian's intimate life than they are with their next door neighbour's.

In this context – life as something to be lived – antinatalism is just whiny bullshit. A wet legalistic self-justification.

Sure, the decision to be a parent ought to be taken with a clear-eyed view of the risk/reward balance. Studies show that 10% of parents in developed countries wished their kids had never been born. :grin:

But taking a rational view of life is the habit we would want to encourage. People who can cope with balancing complex risk/reward decisions and so likely to make the best of their lives as well as of their communities.

Ethical agency doens't seem to me to make sense without a community. In other words, if, say, 'I act in order to bring the good to myself and to others', then I cannot 'ignore' the presently existent human beings and the human community in general. — boundless

I agree with that. Ethics is born, or created, in between, or out of, two or more people.

To me, the outcome doesn't matter. That is to say, we don't have a duty towards the outcome of "preserving humanity". Humanity isn't a subject for ethical concern. — schopenhauer1

In my view, saying “ethics” is to call up a community, such as “humanity.” So it doesn’t make sense (to me) to talk about AN without talking about both humanity and the individual; otherwise we aren’t doing ethics (or even psychology).

Humanity can be limited to all of those humans alive now, but this humanity is where any ethic is inflicted upon the universe. This ethics only emerges among humans (at least emerges as a topic of discussion only humans currently call “ethics”).

We, here on this thread, are building an ethical discussion. This is where ethics lives. Both within each individual as you read, and among us now exchanging these words of ethical wisdom.

Ethics itself, like this thread, is particular to humans, and out of this, the ANist shows that consent and suffering are paramount considerations, and out of these that we (humanity as each individual) must not procreate.

I still find AN difficult to fully grasp in its use of ethical reasoning to promote a world bereft of ethical reasoning, a world bereft of human procreation (humans being the creatures who use “ethical reasoning” as a thing).

I agree we are broken. I agree suffering is unavoidable and ubiquitous. And I agree compasssion is essential to ethics, a good, a virtue to be cultivated. And I agree it is “good” not to inflict suffering without consent. But I don’t see anything reasonable about eliminating the infliction of suffering by eliminating the ethics and compassion (along with the human species) that show us suffering is something to be compassionate about in the first place. It makes ethics itself potentially unethical, or non-sensical. It is either suicidal or nihilistic, not simply “good” anymore as “good” is no longer good.

When we end human procreation, we end the existence of compassion in the same universe that led us to be “ethical” and not procreate in the first place.

It’s like this: we all get together write a rule down and all sign it with full consent and the rule is “all of those who make rules must not procreate.” There need be no “good” in the rule or “reason” why the rule is written, because all “good” and “reason” will cease to provide account of anything at all where all those who make rules do not procreate.

Anyone actually bothering to take such a poll must be bored. It is surprising that that many say they are happy :D

@Leontiskos You might want to quiz them regarding their views on their views becoming legally binding or not. You will probably find another disparity there.

I agree with that. Ethics is born, or created, in between, or out of, two or more people. — Fire Ologist

Right. Also IMO human beings are, so to speak, essentially social. Ethics, in particular, seems to me based on how an individual relates to other individuals. Making an ethical claim by 'abstracting' oneself or another person from the social context seems to me a contradiction.

BTW, I don't think that we must have kids. But I think that the antinatalist ethical 'prohibition' to have kids is wrong. One can choose to not have kids and making arguments for that choices, sure. But saying that it is always ethically wrong to give birth is a different matter.

I see the consequentialist antinatalist rationale as something like this:

1. If we polled everyone on their deathbed, X% would wish they had never been born
2. Therefore, X% of potential future persons would not want to be born
3. Therefore, we should not give birth to new human beings

Further, I would rather prevent a life of suffering in spite of a future person's preference. There are many people that hurt themselves, and society determines it just to thwart their preference. — Down The Rabbit Hole

You seem to be saying, "It looks like X isn't going to be high enough to justify (3), therefore we can't give them a choice." This is a bit like the father at the theme park who reasons, "My daughter wants to go on this ride, and if she goes on it she will probably enjoy it, so I can't let her go on it." This is reminiscent of the "paternalism" that schopenhauer1 claims to oppose.

My same objection to the happiness poll would apply to the birth preference one though. I don't know how many of those suffering at end of life wish they had never been born. — Down The Rabbit Hole

The imaginary poll is taken at end of life:

The consequentialist antinatalist apparently thinks that if we polled everyone on their deathbed and asked them if life was worth living or they wished they had never been born, the vast majority* would wish they had never been born. — Leontiskos

I am fine with that. But I gave my thoughts on pinprick world. — schopenhauer1

They have all been addressed.

It’s either not suffering as we normally define it — schopenhauer1

Pain isn't suffering? This is ad hoc, and it brings with it more problems:

It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos

-

since no one is obligated to bring happiness only prevent suffering in this instance, it can be defended. — schopenhauer1

Again, completely irrelevant:

Put differently, "If we omit the pinprick from (1) then (3) does not follow from (2)." I agree and I have not said otherwise. — Leontiskos

-

The problem is using Benatar as if he’s purely doing hedonic calculus — schopenhauer1

Again, there is nothing about balancing or hedonic calculus involved in the objection. At this point your reading comprehension is coming into question.

Either way, Benatar goes out of the way tgat even if you don’t bite the bullet in pinprick scenario, THIS world is not that world... — schopenhauer1

Again:

What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to. — Leontiskos

The point can be rephrased in any number of ways. "The woman learns that any children she has will inherit her extremely painful disease. Should she bear children?" "The antinatalist learns that any child she has will experience a pinprick of pain. Is this sufficient to exclude children?" To be blunt, the idea here is that your argument is stupid because it justifies stupid decisions. It makes no sense to say, "Ah well the advice does justify stupid decisions, but it is still good and reasonable advice."

he has a litany of follow-up empirical evidence of how we are often mistaken psychologically and empirically just how bad it is in regards to present pain and pain reflected or projected. — schopenhauer1

...and paternalistic gaslighting is the icing on the cake. "Humans think life is good even in spite of the pain, but they're wrong so we're going to exterminate the race through lack of births." What is the difference between this and genocidal insanity?

Pain isn't suffering? This is ad hoc, and it brings with it more problems:

It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos

Pain vs. Suffering certainly does bring on debate. Does a pinprick followed by no other suffering (necessary or contingent) count as suffering? Well, interestingly, one can argue that the pinprick being the ONLY version of suffering, as the mark-for-what-suffering-is revolves solely on that, might be considered the worst thing ever because it literally is in that world. So, perhaps from the perspective of Pinprick World, this threshold itself would be suffering, and thus indefensible to enact upon on another.

Of course I can cut all this short and just go with my #2 response which is that people should not be unnecessarily harmed and non-consented under any circumstance. Nothing wrong with that. And you can make a whole incredulous response to this, but then you never really addressed how it is that non-existence hurts anyone.

But, even if that sort of response seems off to you because it is so rigid, all you need is as I said, that the "Threshold never reaches the level of pinprick world". And you may say that a future point would lead there, but then you are using people in the meantime to get there- and indeed, it would be generations to get there. Notice, you can say two pinpricks, three... and increase it, but even if you were to increase it by a factor of 100s but still less suffering than our world, that isn't currently our world, and using people to get there would nullify it.

The point can be rephrased in any number of ways. "The woman learns that any children she has will inherit her extremely painful disease. Should she bear children?" "The antinatalist learns that any child she has will experience a pinprick of pain. Is this sufficient to exclude children?" To be blunt, the idea here is that your argument is stupid because it justifies stupid decisions. It makes no sense to say, "Ah well the advice does justify stupid decisions, but it is still good and reasonable advice." — Leontiskos

No you are assuming some baseline "common sense" sensibility beyond the violation. This just Kant-objections redux. There's a reason why 1st degree murder and 2nd degree and 3rd degree murder is considered murder yet have different blameworthiness/punishment aspects to them. There's a difference between murder and manslaughter as well. So is pinprick world akin to manslaughter as opposed to murder? Perhaps, the situation might be "wrong" in some very abstract sense, but there can be allowed degrees of it. In your world, which is a ridiculous reduction. For example, in your world there is no gambling with lives aspect, whereby there can be varying amounts of pains and pleasures. It's all the same amount of pain and all the same outcomes. That drastically changes how that world operates compared to ours. Yet you claim that it's a "reductio" rather than being so irrevocably different that they count as different kinds, not just degrees. I am pushing back on that. At some point, for example, murder is no longer murder, though someone might have died, and someone was involved.

...and paternalistic gaslighting is the icing on the cake. "Humans think life is good even in spite of the pain, but they're wrong so we're going to exterminate the race through lack of births." What is the difference between this and genocidal insanity? — Leontiskos

Yeah this is certainly strawmanning the argument to a laughable level. "We are going to exterminate the through lack of births..." sounds like the goal of AN is to exterminate the race rather than prevent a violation of suffering/non-consent.

I can think of my own thought experiments for you here:

I have a game that I think is worthwhile for other people to play. I enter you into the game without your consent. In the game, you may have good moments, but there are also some tragic ones, harmful ones, and throughout the game, you are put through a lots of negative experiences. In order to escape the game, the person can only kill themselves. They are in it permanently. Are you justified to put someone through that game because you think it is good for them?