I don't think I'm begging the question at all. I think this is a 'net down for your serves' argument - where you get to engage in the most ridiculous, unfounded, unproven, unjustifiable sceptical arguments while demanding of me shy high standards of absolute proof. — karl stone

I'm not asking you to prove that skeptical claims are false; I'm explaining that you haven't proved that skeptical claims are false.

To perhaps better illustrate the difference: I'm not asking you to cook me dinner; I'm explaining that you haven't cooked me dinner.

You're more than welcome to dismiss skeptical claims as being unworthy of consideration (and to refuse to cook me dinner).

I appreciate you don't claim the proposed scenario is true, but you are saying it's justified to some degree — karl stone

I’m not saying that it’s justified. I’m saying that your attempt at a refutation begs the question.

The skeptic claims that that even though it seems that the pain you feel is caused by a fire it’s possible that the fire doesn’t exist and that the pain (and the visual image) is caused by something else (something hidden from us) – or by nothing at all.

And your response is to say that the pain you feel is caused by the fire and so the fire is real?

Do you hear sounds, or simply experience neurons firing? — Harry Hindu

Hearing a sound is the firing of certain neurons.

Just answer the question about what happens when you hear some sound. — Harry Hindu

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hearing

The inner ear consists of the cochlea, which is a spiral-shaped, fluid-filled tube. It is divided lengthwise by the organ of Corti, which is the main organ of mechanical to neural transduction. Inside the organ of Corti is the basilar membrane, a structure that vibrates when waves from the middle ear propagate through the cochlear fluid – endolymph. The basilar membrane is tonotopic, so that each frequency has a characteristic place of resonance along it. Characteristic frequencies are high at the basal entrance to the cochlea, and low at the apex. Basilar membrane motion causes depolarization of the hair cells, specialized auditory receptors located within the organ of Corti. While the hair cells do not produce action potentials themselves, they release neurotransmitter at synapses with the fibers of the auditory nerve, which does produce action potentials. In this way, the patterns of oscillations on the basilar membrane are converted to spatiotemporal patterns of firings which transmit information about the sound to the brainstem.

The sound information from the cochlea travels via the auditory nerve to the cochlear nucleus in the brainstem. From there, the signals are projected to the inferior colliculus in the midbrain tectum. The inferior colliculus integrates auditory input with limited input from other parts of the brain and is involved in subconscious reflexes such as the auditory startle response.

The inferior colliculus in turn projects to the medial geniculate nucleus, a part of the thalamus where sound information is relayed to the primary auditory cortex in the temporal lobe. Sound is believed to first become consciously experienced at the primary auditory cortex. Around the primary auditory cortex lies Wernickes area, a cortical area involved in interpreting sounds that is necessary to understand spoken words.

And from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_brain

Gross movement – such as locomotion and the movement of arms and legs – is generated in the motor cortex, divided into three parts: the primary motor cortex, found in the precentral gyrus and has sections dedicated to the movement of different body parts. These movements are supported and regulated by two other areas, lying anterior to the primary motor cortex: the premotor area and the supplementary motor area. The hands and mouth have a much larger area dedicated to them than other body parts, allowing finer movement; this has been visualised in a motor homunculus. Impulses generated from the motor cortex travel along the corticospinal tract along the front of the medulla and cross over (decussate) at the medullary pyramids. These then travel down the spinal cord, with most connecting to interneurons, in turn connecting to lower motor neurons within the grey matter that then transmit the impulse to move to muscles themselves. The cerebellum and basal ganglia, play a role in fine, complex and coordinated muscle movements. Connections between the cortex and the basal ganglia control muscle tone, posture and movement initiation, and are referred to as the extrapyramidal system.

You're the one that keeps using terms like "material", "physical" and "immaterial", not me. I don't see any use for them. The world is neither physical or non-physical. The mind is neither physical or non-physical. Everything is process-relationships-information. So we're obviously not going to come to some agreement about free speech if we can't agree on the fundamentals of reality and the relationship between mind and world. — Harry Hindu

Then let's try to keep it simple.

Are you a compatibilist or an incompatibilist? If you are an incompatibilist then do you believe that we have libertarian free will or do you believe that we don't have free will? If you believe that we have libertarian free will then do you believe in interactionist dualism?

A thought process is one of the functions of the brain. — Harry Hindu

Which is just to say that a thought process is a particular kind of brain activity. And brain activity just is the configuration and behaviour of neurons.

Trying to explain or predict how the brain's neurons will react to various stimuli is even more difficult than trying to explain or predict the weather. You're certainly not going to get anything close to even a partial answer from even several pages worth of mathematical formulae written by even the most intelligent and knowledgeable neuroscientists. So asking me, here, to explain in a few words why and how different brains and different organisms respond the way they do to the same stimulus is an impossible ask, and also unwarranted.

It is sufficient for my purposes to argue that the body's movements are causally determined by brain activity which is causally influenced (in many cases) by some environmental stimulus, and that there's nothing like an immaterial soul or self or mind that interferes with these natural, causal processes.

I didn't ask about your brain. I asked about your thought process — Harry Hindu

Are they different? As I've mentioned several times, I am assuming that eliminative materialism is correct because NOS4A2 endorses eliminative materialism, and I am arguing with him.

Everything that exists – including the "mind" – is physical. Human behaviour and "decision-making" is ultimately reducible to the movements of matter and energy according to natural, causal laws. If my arm moves it's because it was caused to move by electrical and chemical signals triggered by the behaviour of the neurons in my brain. And the neurons in my brain behave the way they do because they were caused to do so by other neurons and (sometimes) electrical and chemical signals triggered by the behaviour of my sense organs. And the sense organs behave the way they do because they reacted to some external stimulus like light or sound.

There's no immaterial thing like a soul that interferes with the natural behaviour of the physical matter that constitutes my body.

or are you a p-zombie? — Harry Hindu

No. I don't personally endorse eliminative materialism. I'm more partial to mental supervenience. But this works in a one-way direction; brain activity generates mental phenomena, but this mental phenomena doesn't causally affect the brain (and so doesn't causally affect the body).

Wow, it must suck being an evil brain jar demon! Question is, what evidence is there for the existence of such a being? None at all. And it's perverse to multiply entities beyond necessity, according to ye olde Bill of Occam. The method of sceptical doubt taken to such extremes that it undermines the very concept; reality - supposedly being investigated, is the rankest sophistry. — karl stone

I'm not saying that the proposed scenario is true, or even justified. I am simply explaining that your attempt at a refutation begs the question.

If you insist on engaging in such arguments, at least accept their true logical implications, which is solipsism; and inability to know anything beyond the mere fact of your own existence. I think therefore I am, and that's your lot. — karl stone

That is indeed what many skeptics claim. We don't/can't know anything (other than that which is logically necessary).

Why doesn't every human that hears inciting words participate in a riot? — Harry Hindu

Different brains respond differently to the same stimulus.

Much like not every computer displays the letter "A" on the screen when you press the "A" key.

So are you saying this evil demon brain jar keeper can induce you to put your hand in the fire? If so, can he induce you keep it there? Or is it by your own will that you would put your hand in the fire to test reality? — karl stone

I’m saying that there is no fire and no hand. We are brains in a vat and a mad scientist is using diodes to stimulate the appropriate areas of our brain to cause us to see/hallucinate a fire, see/hallucinate our hand in the fire, and feel/hallucinate our hand burning. And when he detects that we intend to remove our hand from the fire he stimulates the appropriate areas of our brain to cause us to see/hallucinate our hand being removed from the fire and stops stimulating the areas of the brain that cause us to feel/hallucinate our hand burning.

Is it by your own will you engage in radical skepticism such that the very concept of reality is undermined? Or do you have no choice but to do so because the evil brain jar demon is prodding the synapses? — karl stone

Could be either. Perhaps the mad scientist is also stimulating the areas of the brain responsible for decision-making. Or perhaps he finds it more entertaining to leave those areas alone.

My answer to the radical skeptic is pain, because it implies an objective reality in terms prior to cogito — karl stone

Why? Perhaps pains are an hallucination. Or, rather, perhaps they are not caused by a real fire in an external physical world but by a mad scientist prodding my envatted brain or by an evil demon?

Yet all this is missing the point that human beings survived, and evolved in relation to a physical reality - of which, we must be able to establish valid knowledge, or would have become extinct. — karl stone

Well this just begs the question. The skeptic questions the existence of the world-as-we-understand-it. Perhaps idealism is correct. Perhaps we’re artificial brains in a vat. Perhaps we’re being deceived by an evil demon.

So to put simply; perhaps we didn’t evolve via natural selection in a physical world in which “accurately” sensing our environment is a requirement for survival.

Of course I’m not suggesting that such doubt is warranted, only that your reasoning against it presupposes its own conclusion.

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? — RogueAI

Or three?

I know that the bicycle was invented by Karl Drais
I know how to ride a bicycle
I know the feeling of falling off a bicycle

Sure, but 'seeing' is the ideal minimum sensory experience, employed for the sake of philosophical simplicity. If still in doubt, touch it, lick it, throw something at it - the screen can be shown to be real by the evidence of the senses. — karl stone

Clearly that’s insufficient as those suffering from
psychosis can see and hear and feel things that aren’t really there.

How do I know that I am not a schizophrenic hallucinating a world?

We (believe we) have rational grounds to trust our sensations.

So we might say that using a name involves a rigid designation — Banno

I wonder how we make sense of such claims as "if I were you then ...." (or to use proper nouns, "if Michael were Banno then...")

Strictly speaking if "I" and "you" are being used here as rigid designators then the antecedent of this conditional is a contradiction and so necessarily false and so the conditional always true. If I were you then I’d be a billionaire!

But this analytic interpretation of the phrase seems misplaced. It's not how we ordinarily understand it. Perhaps we're not using rigid designators, or perhaps rigid designators are not always that rigid.

It is not a coincidence or magical thinking you read my words and respond to them. That’s entirely up to you whether you do or not. It’s magical thinking to believe I cause you to respond. — NOS4A2

"Entirely up to me" and "causally influenced by you" are not mutually exclusive. See compatibilism.

It is a proven physical fact that my brain activity is causally affected by what some external stimulus causes to happen to my sense organs. That's what it means to sense things in the environment.

You're playing word games when you interpret "A causally influences B" as only meaning "B is the immediate effect of A's kinetic energy". It's ridiculous.

Physically speaking, speech doesn't possess enough kinetic energy required to affect the world that the superstitious often claims it does. Speech, for instance, doesn't possess any more kinetic energy than any other articulated guttural sound. Writing doesn't possess any more energy than any other scratches or ink blots on paper. And so on. So the superstitious imply a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality: that symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols. — NOS4A2

Nobody is saying anything like this at all. It's not just about the immediate kinetic energy of an action. This is such an absurd strawman.

There's very little kinetic energy involved when I click the various keys on my computer, but clicking the appropriate keys begins a causal chain of events that influences the words that appear on your screen. There's no magical thinking or superstition involved in acknowledging this basic fact.

It's not a coincidence that the words that appear on your screen correspond to the words that I type. It's not a mere correlation. There is a very real causal connection between the two.

And there's a very real causal connection between sound stimulating an organism's sense organs and the subsequent neurological activity (which is a physical reaction).

That they are a man. Why else would they be calling themselves a man? And yes, many trans-gender people do not like the trans- qualifier. They actually consider themselves a man or a woman. — Harry Hindu

Yet again with the equivocation.

You are correct to say that the transgender man is not a biological man but you are incorrect to suggest that the transgender man believes himself to be a biological man. So your claim that he suffers from a delusion stems from a fallacy.

I assume that @Outlander is making the same mistake.

If gender as social expectations of the sexes is determined by sex and we aren't aware of other sex organs, then how can we learn the characteristics of gender at an early age? How does a toddler learn why some people where dresses and some wear pants if they aren't aware of other sex organs? — Harry Hindu

I don't quite understand your question. Are you suggesting that 3 year olds do in fact know that some of the children in their class have a penis and some have a vagina, and that this biological difference dictates social differences? Or are you suggesting that 3 year olds don't understand that some of the children in their class are called "boys" and some are called "girls", and that those who are called "boys" and those who are called "girls" tend to wear different clothes and play with different toys and are referred to using different pronouns?

If an artificial human isn't a human then artificial penises aren't penises. — Harry Hindu

It doesn’t matter what you call it. Which bathroom should the transgender man who has had genital surgery use? The women's bathroom or the men's bathroom? Given that you mentioned sex parts to explain why we have separate bathrooms for men and women it’s a pertinent question.

Then I don't see anything that has actually contradicted what I have said. — Harry Hindu

I wasn't trying to contradict you. I was just answering your questions.

That doesn't really address my point.

Perhaps it's better explained if we consider the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. Some might say that if the many-worlds interpretation is correct then there is a parallel universe in which I measured a different spin. And I would counter by saying that none of the people who exist in these parallel universes are me. I just am the person who exists in this universe, and any person who exists in a parallel universe and who superficially resembles me – in appearance and name and background – only resembles me and shouldn't be thought of as being me.

So does this same reasoning apply when we talk about possible worlds in modal logic? Does it make sense to say that a single object exists in multiple possible worlds?

From a strictly deterministic stance, how does the determinist account for the difference in output given the same input? — Harry Hindu

I already explained that with the example of the computers. Just apply the same reasoning to a human organism.

That is what I'm trying to focus on - what that difference is. — Harry Hindu

The physical differences between two different human bodies and two different human brains. Refer back to my example of the computers. Some computers might respond to someone pressing the "A" key by displaying the letter "A" on the screen, some might emit a noise, and some might do something else.

A human organism and a computer might each be constituted of different molecules, but these molecules obey the same physical laws regarding cause and effect. If eliminative materialsm is correct then there's nothing like an immaterial soul or mind to interfere with these (deterministic) physical processes.

Whether it is physical (whatever that means) or not is irrelevant. — Harry Hindu

It's entirely relevant. If materialism, and in particular eliminative materialism, is correct then libertarian free will does not exist. All muscle movements in the human body are a causal response to electrical and chemical signals triggered by the brain's neurons, and the brain's neurons trigger these electrical and chemical signals as a causal response to different electrical and chemical signals – some of which are triggered by the sense organs as a causal response to stimulation by light or sound or some other external stimulus.

Software is a physical thing. It's not some immaterial magic.

Is information physical? — Harry Hindu

If eliminative materialism is correct, then yes. What we call "the mind" and "mental processes" either don't exist or are entirely physical.

I don't know why you have to repeat that. I quite explicitly responded to it.

Maybe it has something to do with the information stored in their brains. — Harry Hindu

Yes, but if eliminative materialism is correct then this is properly understood as "it has something to do with the existence and configuration and activity of the brain's neurons".

And like every other physical object in the universe, the brain's neurons' behavior is causally influenced by prior physical events, and in this particular case these prior physical events are often the stimulation of the sense organs.

Yes, but why does each person respond to those same lights, sounds, smells, etc differently? — Harry Hindu

Slightly different biologies. Your eyes are not identical to my eyes and your brain is not identical to my brain.

Exactly - which means that because people respond to the same lights, sounds, smells, etc. differently there must be some other process between some speech being made and one's actions that manifests as that difference in actions after hearing a speech. — Harry Hindu

Yes, that thing being the body and brain of the listener/actor. But it's still the case that the action is a causal response to the stimulation (assuming that eliminative materialism is correct and so that libertarian free will does not exist).

How two different computers respond to their "A" key being pressed depends entirely on their internal mechanics. One computer may display a letter on the screen and the other may emit a noise. Either way, the computer's behaviour is a causal response to someone pushing the "A" key.

On rigid designators, what does it mean for an object in one possible world to be the same object as an object in a different possible world? Is it simply a stipulation?

The question is especially relevant if we claim that the same object can have different properties in different possible worlds. Does it make sense to say that there's a possible world where I'm a black man named "Barack Obama" and who served as the 44th President of the United States? What does it mean for this person to be a possible version of me rather than a possible version of you or a possible version of the actual Barack Obama?

From here you said:

Indeed, if we came across someone who said "I know that there is water in the tap", but became confused when asked to locate and turn the tap on in order to obtain a glass of water, we might well conclude that they said they knew but really didn't.

There seems to be a pretty good argument that "knowing that" is a type of "knowing how".

So given that I say "I know that in a few billion years the Sun will expand and consume the Earth" what is the "knowing how" (comparable to using the tap to fill a glass of water) that demonstrates that I do in fact know what I claim to know?

But on the example of the tap:

1. I know that the tap is working
2. I know that the tap isn't working
3. I know how to use a tap
4. I know how to prove that the tap is working
5. I know how to prove that the tap isn't working
6. I know how to assert the English sentence "(I know that) the tap is working"
7. I know how to assert the English sentence "(I know that) the tap isn't working"

It's entirely possible that (3)-(7) are all true but that (1) and (2) are both false. Therefore (1) and (2) are distinct from (3)-(7).

You just did. — Banno

You're going to have to elaborate. Otherwise it seems that you're just saying that knowing that p is equivalent to knowing how to write "I know that p". Which would be such a cop-out.

There seems to be a pretty good argument that "knowing that" is a type of "knowing how". — Banno

I know that in a few billion years the Sun will expand and consume the Earth.

Not really sure how to make use of this information, but I know it all the same.

But information doesn't become knowledge until it's been verified and incorporated with our data base.

Truth is not the issue. The issue is the difference between belief and knowledge. When you say "justified true belief", that's the same as a belief that has been verified so that it can become knowledge. That's far beyond a simple fact "true information". — Vera Mont

I'm not sure if verification is necessary. It seems like a very strict requirement. If a stranger tells me that their name is John, do I have to verify this (e.g. by checking their ID) before I can be said to know their name?

Born something he (or she, I don't indulge or humor nonsense let alone keep track of such) wasn't. — Outlander

Which is what? Does the transgender man believe himself to be a fish? I need an actual example of a delusion.

All of that is fine, well fine enough, as there's more important things to deal with, up until the point that one considers it logical to permanently and irreversibly alter one's non-disabled and fully healthy body and form, most critically those under the age of what is socially considered a functional and legal adult.. That is what you're blatantly avoiding, my good sir. And I believe you are doing such intentionally for whatever reason that is again up to the public writ-large to determine why and perhaps what should be done as a result. — Outlander

Not every transgender person has gender dysphoria, and according to this, "in studies that assessed transgender men and women as an aggregate, chest surgery has been reported at rates between 8–25%, and genital surgery at 4–13%".

And whether you like it or not, hormone therapy and surgery can be effective treatments. You can't just pretend that gender dysphoria isn't real or can be safely ignored or can only be treated by psychotherapy.

As for "permanently and irreversibly alter[ing] one's non-disabled and fully healthy body and form", well so too is a salpingectomy, but if a woman does not wish to have children and opts to have one then that's her concern and nobody else's, and they ought be allowed to have one.

That you're something you're not. — Outlander

So what does the transgender man falsely believe himself to be?

Dude. That's literally what the whole discussion is about. — Outlander

No, it isn't. Transgender people don't just "wake up one day wanting different body parts for no logical reason".

I'm going to quote from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_identity both for you and for @Harry Hindu because it seems that neither of you actually understand the issue at all.

It is widely agreed that core gender identity is firmly formed by age 3. At this point, children can make firm statements about their gender and tend to choose activities and toys which are considered appropriate for their gender (such as dolls and painting for girls, and tools and rough-housing for boys), although they do not yet fully understand the implications of gender. After age three, it is extremely difficult to change gender identity.

Martin and Ruble conceptualize this process of development as three stages: (1) as toddlers and pre-schoolers, children learn about defined characteristics, which are socialized aspects of gender; (2) around the ages of five to seven years, identity is consolidated and becomes rigid; (3) after this "peak of rigidity", fluidity returns and socially defined gender roles relax somewhat. Barbara Newmann breaks it down into four parts: (1) understanding the concept of gender, (2) learning gender role standards and stereotypes, (3) identifying with parents, and (4) forming gender preference.

...

Although the formation of gender identity is not completely understood, many factors have been suggested as influencing its development. In particular, the extent to which gender identity is determined by nurture (social environmental factors) versus biological factors (which may include non-social environmental factors) is at the core of the ongoing debate in psychology known as "nature versus nurture". There is increasing evidence that the brain is affected by the organizational role of hormones in utero, circulating sex hormones and the expression of certain genes.

Social factors which may influence gender identity include ideas regarding gender roles conveyed by family, authority figures, mass media, and other influential people in a child's life. The social learning theory posits that children furthermore develop their gender identity through observing and imitating gender-linked behaviors, and then being rewarded or punished for behaving that way, thus being shaped by the people surrounding them through trying to imitate and follow them.

Large-scale twin studies suggest that the development of both transgender and cisgender gender identities is due to genetic factors, with a small potential influence of unique environmental factors.

...

Some studies have investigated whether there is a link between biological variables and transgender or transsexual identity. Several studies have shown that sexually dimorphic brain structures in transsexuals are shifted away from what is associated with their birth sex and towards what is associated with their preferred sex. The volume of the central subdivision of the bed nucleus of a stria terminalis or BSTc (a constituent of the basal ganglia of the brain which is affected by prenatal androgens) of transsexual women has been suggested to be similar to women's and unlike men's, but the relationship between BSTc volume and gender identity is still unclear. Similar brain structure differences have been noted between gay and heterosexual men, and between lesbian and heterosexual women. Transsexuality has a genetic component.

Research suggests that the same hormones that promote the differentiation of sex organs in utero also elicit puberty and influence the development of gender identity. Different amounts of these male or female sex hormones can result in behavior and external genitalia that do not match the norm of their sex assigned at birth, and in acting and looking like their identified gender.

For better or for worse, societies tend to establish gender roles – norms of behaviour deemed appropriate or desirable for individuals based on their biological sex, but norms of behaviour which don't actually have anything to do with biological sex at all.

In the very early years of human development – and in particular at a time when we're unlikely to even be aware of sex organs different from our own – we come to identify as "belonging" to one of these gender roles. The particular gender role that we come to identify as belonging to is determined in part by our genetics, hormones, and brain structure.

And sometimes a biological boy comes to identify as belonging to the gender role typically associated with biological girls, and sometimes a biological girl comes to identify as belonging to the gender role typically associated with biological boys – and this is not wrong because these gender roles are a social construct that have no direct connection to DNA or reproductive organs at all.

But when you grow up and start physically and irreversibly altering your body over a delusion — Outlander

What delusion?

Some dude who just woke up one day wanting different body parts for no logical reason, that's just not something that needs to be taken seriously. — Outlander

It's also not something that actually happens. This is a ridiculous strawman.

Define "artificial". — Harry Hindu

The result of genital surgery.

Which bathroom should an android with an artificial penis use? — Harry Hindu

Androids aren't people, they're machines. So there's no "should" or "shouldn't". We can do whatever we like. We could make androids use bathrooms only for androids or we could make them use whichever bathroom is closest or we could make androids with an artificial penis use the men's bathroom.

Or we could just not create androids that need to urinate?

What is the point of this question?

It doesn't show anything specific, which is what I'm asking for. — Harry Hindu

Because there is no specific thing. Society and culture is complex. The social and cultural differences between men and women (or third genders) changes over time and from place to place. And again, there's no set of necessary and sufficient conditions even at a singular time and place.

Do you deny that there are social differences between men and women, independent of their karyotype and genitals? Are we are gender-blind outside of reproduction and reproductive health?

And some people that are not transgender have had genital surgery, as you have pointed out and apparently forgotten. So what does gender status have to do with using the bathroom if gender has nothing to do with biology? Why is it so important that trans people get to use the bathroom rather than the non-trans that have had surgery? It must be because you continue to conflate sex with gender in one moment then claim they are separate in another. — Harry Hindu

What are you talking about?

You claimed that sex parts dictate which bathroom one can use such that people with a penis use one bathroom and people with a vagina use another bathroom.

I just want to know if you accept that a transgender man with an artifical penis should use the men's bathroom.

It's a simple "yes" or "no" answer.

Aren't they saying they are psychologically and culturally male/female? Isn't that the point of contention here? I'm still waiting on specific examples. — Harry Hindu

I've linked to various articles that explain gender, gender roles, gender expression, and gender identity. Do the reading.

Your conflating sex and gender again. — Harry Hindu

No, I'm not. I am simply acknowledging the fact that some transgender people have genital surgery. According to this, 25-50% of transgender men have genital surgery and 4-13% of transgender women have genital surgery.

So, if bathroom usage is dictated by sex parts – which is your claim, not mine – then do you accept that transgender men who have had genital surgery should use the men's bathroom and transgender women who have had genital surgery should use the women's bathroom?

By having genital surgery the trans-person is asserting their gender is determined by their sex. — Harry Hindu

No they're not. The transgender woman is fully aware that she is biologically male and the transgender man is fully aware that he is biologically female.

The very fact that they identity as being transgender is an acknowledgement that their gender is not the typical gender of their biological sex.

Now, what about trans people that haven't had surgery? Which bathroom should they use? — Harry Hindu

Transgender women should use the women's bathroom and transgender men should use the men's bathroom.

And what are they saying determines their gender - which social, psychological, cultural, and behavioral aspects are they referring to - specifically? — Harry Hindu

There's no list of necessary and sufficient conditions. I've linked you to the relevant places that explain it in more detail:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_role
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_expression
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_identity

So, just to be clear, in talking about people that have had genital surgery, we're talking about intersex people, not trans-gendered people. — Harry Hindu

And what about trans people who have had genital surgery?

you are the one going on about bathrooms — Harry Hindu

Because that’s what we were both discussing. You said "we separate bathrooms by sex because it is an area where we uncover our sex parts."

I just want to understand how artificial sex parts factor into your separation.

I'm talking about the relationship between gender and sex. — Harry Hindu

And that's been addressed several times before.

Sex "is the biological trait that determines whether a sexually reproducing organism produces male or female gametes."

Gender "is the range of social, psychological, cultural, and behavioral aspects of being a man (or boy), woman (or girl), or third gender."

In most cases one's gender is determined by one's sex, but given the existence of transgender people – and societies with more than two genders – this is not a necessity.