1. If the goal of religion is to understand, then the infinite God needed to provide methods of enlightenment for our finite human minds to achieve the goal.
2. If the infinite God needed to provide methods of enlightenment for our finite human minds, then we must have been created to be receptive to understanding.
3. If the goal of religion is to understand, then we must have been created to be receptive to understanding. (1,2 HS) — Mackensie

While I can see how "neurological fine-tuning" would make sense as far as a God-given ability to see his revelation (a la sensus devinitatus), I think you would also have to consider how this ability of the brain would still hold if God did not exist. As @VagabondSpectre mentioned above, we would still have the biological tendencies that would allow for "neurological fine-tuning". My counter-argument is as follows:
1. If there is no God that created us purposefully, then all that explains our existence, as we are, is natural selection.
2. If natural selection means that only those creatures that have the abilities and properties necessary and beneficial for survival and reproduction will survive, then the ability of the brain to create connections that help with survival is a trait beneficial to those who have it.
2a. The inability of the brain to adjust leads to lack of adaptability, which is detrimental to survival.
2b. In the case of religion, believing in a common God with others has been shown to improve health
as well as fosters a community, both of which are beneficial to survival.
2c. This trait will increase in populations as time goes on as surviving humans will live to pass it on
while non-trait-having humans will not.
3. Therefore, if God does not exist, the ability of the brain to rewire itself is not surprising, and can be used to reinforce a belief in a non-existent God.

As such, I don't see much use in this argument as far as trying to convince nonbelievers, although you never did claim that purpose for this. I also think this phenomenon call be attributed in part to apophenia, the human bias to perceive patterns in unrelated events. A thing I do want to mention, though, is that there was a recent study that showed that people who are better at implicit pattern recognition were more likely to hold stronger beliefs in God. There are a few different ways to interpret this idea respective to these other ideas and concepts, but even so, I don't think the idea of neurological fine-tuning adds to evidence for theism.

What is rightness? What is correctness? If we’re all shaped by our own experiences, assumptions, and biases, what meaning, then, does the word “absolute truth” hold? — Abdul

The idea of right or wrong really depends on whether you are theistic or atheistic. If you are theistic or an adherent to some sort of spiritual system (e.g. Buddhism which does not have a god), you would say that there is some kind of moral law that stays the same regardless of spatial-temporal location. If you are atheistic, some people, like Rosenberg, argue that our idea of morality is simply made up-there is no right or wrong, those ideas were simply conceived through evolution/natural selection over time because they increased our chances of survival and producing offspring. In this case, nihilism is the only real option.

I think that some of your argument is based on a hasty definition of god that does not quite account for some of the other factors that are needed in a fully-fleshed argument. First of all, the definition of a god that you give needs amending. A god is not just something that is worshiped, the idea of worship of gods comes from the idea that the god is worthy of worship due to its power, knowledge, goodness, etc. Once this is clarified, some of the other questions or objections you raise fall into place. If you believe that God deserves worship, it is implied that it is because you believe they are greater than you in some way, which includes the idea that they would know something that you do not-that is, the absolute truth. In addition, the idea of God is also a catch-all of sorts in explaining many of the seemingly unexplainable things in life; as such, the way that this idea of a greater being will naturally manifest itself in different ways. But in a way, people do not necessarily choose which God or gods they believe in, as you claim. People believe based on whichever one makes the most sense to them, or they simply don't believe at all. And by virtue of being able to not believe at all, IF God is real in the sense of the amended definition I stated above, someone not believing would not then render him powerless as you claim.

@Mackensie : Bertrand Russell's Conclusion

From your post:

1. If a belief is widespread, there must be something reasonable in believing in it.
2. The Soviet Union had widespread beliefs.
3. These beliefs resulted in many atrocities against other human beings.
4. When a belief causes widespread harm to other people, it is not reasonable.
5. Therefore, even if a belief is widespread, it is not always reasonable.

A regimented summary of my argument is as follows.
1. When a belief is widespread, it is not inherently unreasonable.
2. It is a widespread belief to stop, drop and roll if your clothing catches on fire.
3. It is reasonable to not want your clothing to be on fire.
4. Not all widespread belief is inherently unreasonable.

Some reasons why theism, a widespread belief, is not unreasonable.
The Soviet Union as a generalization of an unreasonable, widespread belief is not a proper analogy to theism."

My objection to your argument:
My question is, regarding your conclusion and Russell's conclusion, do they not claim the same thing? Russell claims that just because a belief is widespread does not necessarily mean it is reasonable; your claim is that just because a belief is widespread does not necessarily mean it is not reasonable. You are both claiming that the popularity of a belief does not automatically mean it is either reasonable or unreasonable, you both just approached the same claim from different directions. I think you took Russell's claim to be much more binary than it is, at least in how you transitioned from his conclusion to yours. Your counter-argument would work if Russell claimed that all widespread beliefs are not reasonable, but his claim of them not necessarily being reasonable is more conservative.
However, I do agree with your objection about how using the Soviet Union as an example cannot be a proper analogy. Russell claims that when a belief causes widespread harm to others, it is not reasonable. The disanalogy here, though, is the bridge between belief and practice/actions, which you sort of implied in your reasoning but is not entirely obvious. The people of the Soviet Union holding their beliefs of equality is not inherently harmful; it is the way that these beliefs were the basis upon which misguided regulations and laws were carried out that caused this harm to others. The ill-thought-out actions were the cause of harm, not the holding of a belief in itself (unless, of course, that belief implies the need to harm others, which is a different case, as you demonstrate). Anyways, as far as you laid out Russell's argument and your counter-argument and other objections, I think that your numerically-laid-out argument, in the end, is moot since I do not think it really serves as a counter-argument, but pointing out the false analogy serves to undermine his argument, at least as you laid it out here, in the end.

However, can sensus divinitatis really be used in argument for the existence of God? A feeling does not necessarily prove the existence of something. The joy of looking at a Christmas tree in anticipation of Santa Clause does not prove the existence of Santa. This feeling is tied, instead, to one of expectation or hope but not of truth — Play-doh

Sensus divinitatis is not, in itself, meant to prove that a God exists. Instead, it is can be used to support the idea that, if God exists, he would have given humans a way to comprehend that he exists. If sensus divinitatis is real in the sense that it was God-given to humans, atheists would still be able to experience the phenomenon since it is a universally human thing. But since atheists do not believe in a God, they would have to contribute this feeling to something, thus thinking that it is purely because of "innate attraction to beauty". The argument for feeling as evidence for existence is contingent on whether the thing whose existence is in question could or would give the ability to feel the phenomenon for a purpose. In your example of the Christmas tree and Santa, the difference between this and sensus devinitatis and God is that, in this case, you could say that this feeling of joy is not given to you by Santa, since even if Santa were real, he probably would not grant the ability to humans to feel joy every time they looked at a Christmas tree because there would be no reason to give this ability. In the case of sensus devinitatis, the ability to feel this is caused or is an ability given by God for the purpose of acknowledging his existence.

As far as involving the fine-tuning argument, I think that while, yes, the idea of our existence based on slim chance can be scary and could drive people to theism with no other reasoning, it still begs the question of how we can exist regardless of theism- the probability that the universe could simply not exist or if another universe exactly like ours could exist. The fine-tuning argument is used in conjunction with other arguments in support of theism, which in total can provide enough reasoning to believe in a God.