Gods no! That would be too sensible....

Yeah, probably just one kind of public toilet for all sans urinal and with sanitary pad disposal would do the trick. Everyone would then have cubicles for privacy as is the case in women's toilets.

Because sex separation is based on biology. Women's bathrooms do not have urinals. Females have periods that they need to take care of. Heterosexual norms put female nakedness at risk to male nakedness. — Philosophim

Female toilets provide facilities for taking care of tampons and sanitary pads and male toilets have urinals because men can piss conveniently standing up. Those facts have nothing to do with the issue. I don't even know what your last sentence is intended to mean.

So you are saying it is ok for someone to deceive another person, and as long as they are not caught, the deception is ok? — Philosophim

It's a trivial point since no one really knows in public toilets (except at the urinal) what another's sex is. Also you haven't said where it is written that the division of toilets is one of sex rather than gender.

It's a non-issue because your sex is your own business. You have provided no argument as to why it is important outside of women's sport. People don't generally know what sex the others in a woman's toilet is. Do you object to transmen using men's toilets?

Who says public toilets are separated by sex, not gender? Is it written somewhere? On toilets perhaps?

In any case if a transwoman looks like a woman how are the others in the toilet to know she is not a woman? Women don't see each other's genitals in public toilets. So, what's the problem.

If a transwoman looks like a man, so what? Some women look like men. People in women's toilet have no way of knowing what sex the others are...that is possible, if impolite, only in men's toilets. It's a non-issue.

What actual problem is there with a transwoman using women's public toilets (which is what I assume you are referring to)?

I suggest if you cannot imagine a level of interest sufficient to have motivated the OP, you are not paying attention to the world around you. This has been a hot-button issue for years. Largely in feminist circles. — AmadeusD

Sure, but those for whom it is an issue because they are trans are unfortunate victims of unthinking prejudice. For the rest, it is an issue for those who are prejudiced and moralizing on account of their prejudice. The point is that an OP like this, and online philosophy forum discussion, will not change anything much.

As I said earlier, apart from transwomen in womens' sport, it is a very simple issue―people just need to live and let live, but of course they won't until the prejudices die a natural death.

:lol: :up:

Another technicality. For a thing to be something in itself is just to be a thing in itself, and while it is necessary to say such a thing exists, it is not necessary to say it is real. — Mww

To say something exists necessarily involves saying it is real, as far as i can tell. I mean, you might say that the category <real> subsumes the category <exists> so that there are real things such as universals, numbers, identities, laws of nature and so on which are real, but do not exist, but I can't make sense of the idea that something could exist and yet not be real (in the ontological sense―something might exist and yet be fake, for instance).

To do so is to contradict the category, insofar as reality is the conjunction of a thing with perception and we never perceive things-in-themselves. From which follows it must be that the thing of the thing in itself, is that which is in conjunction with perception, and the thing is real to us. — Mww

You are stipulating a tendentious definition of real―a definition which is not in accordance with common usage. If the thing of the thing in itself is real as perceived, and it necessarily exists else we could not perceive it, how could it make sense to say it is not real in itself?

The main point is that things must be real, insofar as they appear to the senses, but things-in-themselves, insofar as they are as they are in-themselves they do not appear to our senses, so the major criteria for being real, is absent. — Mww

So, here is the same mistake. The major criteria for things being real, according to common usage, is that they exist, not that they be perceived (although the latter, if hallucinations be not counted as perceptions, is another criterion).

I know you don't like OLP, but it does have a point, which is that if we are free to use terms however idiosyncratically we like, then that pretty much enables us to say whatever we like without the risk of being wrong. There is no absolute fact of the matter as to the meaning of the terms we use in philosophy, so most common usage is the only guide we have.

Philosophy has always grappled with the 'meaning of Being', explicitly or otherwise. — Wayfarer

I'd say it's more the case that it has grappled with the meaninglessness of being. Only certain philosophers have bothered to try to deal with, as Aristotle says "being as being". Heidegger comes to mind, but he anthropomorphizes being as "Dasein". I don't deny it's one way of looking at it, and perhaps not without some interest, but there is no one "correct" way to think about being. There are only ways that make sense in various contexts, and ways that make no sense at all.

You're not thinking philosophically, but like an engineer. — Wayfarer

And in saying that you're pontificating like a fool.

Yes, I know what you mean. The world is a collection of things and nothing over and above that―so I was speaking somewhat sloppily. The point remains in relation to objects (things) considered variously by Kant as "for us" and "in themselves". If things are actually something in themselves then it follows that they are real in themselves. If they are for us mixed up with, mediated by, our ideas, then they are ideal for us. I'm just playfully flipping the script in a way that for me at least makes sense.

I guess the point is that 'woman' is used to denote both sex and gender, and sex and gender have traditionally been considered to be the same thing. Now the two are being teased apart, so 'woman' is now used to denote gender that is decoupled from biological sex. I agree it's a non-issue, and I can't imagine a level of interest sufficient to have motivated the OP. That said, it seems to have garnered some interest.

It's not that 'nobody can describe pain satisfactorily. It's being pointed to as an 'explanatory gap' - 'look, no matter how sophisticated your scientific model, it doesn't capture or convey the felt experience of pain, or anything else.' — Wayfarer

It's not an explanatory gap. Science doesn't purport to explain the "felt experience" of anything. Phenomenology purports to do that. But it really can't either, because it is a simple fact that feelings cannot be adequately described. Poetic language may be able to evoke them, and that's about the best you're gonna get.

Yeah, that is ironic, hence ill-warranted “revolution”. — Mww

I thought that might be what you had in mind.

That’s just logic, right? Principle of Complementarity? So two aspects of thought, yes, but the subject was two aspects of the world. Not sure complementarity works there. — Mww

I can't remember from my long ago readings of Kant and his commentators, whether he ever explicitly states that, despite the fact that we think of the world dualistically as "for us" and "in itself", the world is really one (non-dual).

The puzzle for me is what it could really mean to say the world is empirically real and yet transcendentally ideal. I always thought it would be more accurate to say it is empirically ideal and transcendentally real―in that what it is for us is always mixed up with our ideas, whereas what it is in itself has nothing to do with our ideas.

If by appearance you mean some kind of a picture or moving pictures (images) etc, then that's out of question. The representation only comes about when your sensible intuitions + understanding + affections of senses work together. In other words, you need a schema of imagination. — Sirius

We see a visual field that has within it objects. For me the question for Kant is whether we see the actual objects or merely mental representations of the objects. It's like the debate between direct and indirect realism. The former say that we see the actual objects and the latter say we see representations of the objects, but that the representations present us with aspects of the objects. However, the aspects are relational in that they only show us the results of the objects' affects on our bodies, and show us nothing of how the objects are in themselves.

Appealing to Sheldrake's academic credentials seems irrelevant. The question is whether he did experimental work that directly and plausibly supported his hypothesis. He might have, but I'm not aware of it, and I'm not interested enough in the question to research it.

Michael Levin’s work is often said to be “non-standard” or “post-genomic,” but his research programme presupposes a kind of naturalised Platonism - not in a mystical sense, but in the straightforward biological sense that forms, patterns, and target morphologies have real causal powers. — Wayfarer

The results of his research do seem to point to forms having causal efficacy. I wondered, when I was taught in school that DNA contained the "blueprint" for building organisms, taking into account the unimaginable complexity of animal anatomy and physiology, how that could possibly work, and it certainly wasn't comprehensively explained.

I wouldn't say his research program presupposes platonism, but that its results might lead to considering something like that as a possible explanation. It's going to be interesting to see what comes out of his research, and how it is received. Jaimungal is already saying he should get a Nobel prize.

Pretty easy to see the 2-aspect condition of one world, n’est ce pas? — Mww

I always thought there was a certain irony in referring to Kant's project as a "Copernican revolution", since Copernicus removed us from the centre of things and Kant does precisely the opposite.

I think it is easy for us to see things in terms of two aspects since our natively dualistic mode of thought, consequent of the binary nature of language (or vice versa―"chicken or egg") ensures that every thought inevitably produces its opposite.

No doubt derivations from Descartes and Spinoza, respectively. I read Kant as contra the latter (re: "pure reason") and yet inconsistently far more the former (along with Plato's "Allegory of the Cave"). — 180 Proof

I tend to agree. I hadn't ever thought of the tie-in with Descartes and Spinoza, but it seems to make good sense. It's hard to see how Kant's project does not result in the world of human experience being counterposed to the world of the "in-itself".

You bet! I've been taking in his lectures the last few months. He has a role in the story I'm writing (under an alias, of course.) — Wayfarer

You ae writing the story under an alias or Levin appears in the story under an alias? (I'm guessing the latter, but the ambiguity...)

Actually I should clarify what I said above about Sheldrake - morphic resonance is Sheldrake’s controversial idea. The morphogenetic field is a related but different idea which is part of mainstream biology. Nevertheless Sheldrake is enamoured of Levin’s work for its holistic and non-reductionist approach. — Wayfarer

Yes, I read the Sheldrake book introducing the idea of morphic resonance in the 80s. It was purporting to explain how, among other things, magpies in England began piercing the aluminum milk bottle tops in England in order to drink the milk around the same time as they did in Europe. That's the only example I can remember, because a few years before that I had been a milkman briefly and the magpies here (although classed in a related, but different, genus) I had observed to be doing the same thing.

The point about Levin's work and his speculations, though, is that they have evolved in the context of solid scientific research., whereas Sheldrake's work was much less determined by observational and experimental evidence.

I don't accept that I misrepresented Janus' contributions, even though my description of them as naturalist empiricism was rejected. That is Janus' basic stance, whether he acknowledges it or not. — Wayfarer

This is not unexpected. I have noted over many years that you can never admit you were wrong.

Maybe constructive agreement, in the search for truth, has always been elusive & arduous. — Gnomon

I don't think it is to be expected, or even desired. Since we are diverse individuals, with different experiences, different views work for different people. What is desirable though, is honest acknowledgement of what the other is actually saying.

It seems to me that you are in agreement. As long as you both accept there is something going on there that we haven’t quite got to the bottom of yet. — Punshhh

No doubt we agree about that. About how it might be gotten to the bottom of, not so much, though.

The participation of transwomen in women's' sports is a contentious and difficult issue to solve. The only real problem there is the question of competitive advantage. Otherwise I don't see much of a problem outside of some people's inflexible and ill-considered traditional attitudes.

I do defend Aristotelian or scholastic or (some forms of) Platonic realism, in that I believe that there are real intelligibles, that are not the product of the mind, but can only be grasped by the mind. — Wayfarer

I have no problem with you defending that view. I also believe that things are only intelligible in terms of generalities― forms, relations and attributes. It is the question of what those generalities consist in that is at issue, and I don't think the answer to it can ever be demonstrated such as to garner universal consent. So, I don't hold a firm view in that regard, as I consider the question to be empirically and logically undecidable. It doesn't follow that I think the question is meaningless―I don't. Thus I am not a positivist.

The 'abstraction away' from the sensory impression of a triangle is the kind of argument that empiricists appeal to. — Wayfarer

Yes, but as I said I was not defending that empiricist view, but merely presenting it as a rational, reasonable alternative.

It is very close to the kinds of arguments you often articulate. If that is offensive, I didn't mean it to be, so, sorry for that. It was an effort to contextualise the kinds of arguments we're presenting - Neo-Aristotelian vs Empirical. — Wayfarer

Fair enough, no need to apologize. There really do seem to be, at this stage of human understanding, only two alternatives. Each alternative has its own difficulties. You might be interested in the fascinating work of the biologist Michael Levin, who posits a kind of platonic space at work in nature. I asked Claude to give an account of it to save myself the trouble. Here it is:

Michael Levin, a biologist at Tufts University, uses the term "platonic space" to describe an abstract, goal-oriented space in which biological systems navigate and problem-solve. Here are the key aspects:
The Core Idea: Platonic space refers to a space of possible configurations or states defined by functional goals rather than physical implementation. For example, a developing embryo might be navigating toward a specific anatomical target state (like "correct frog anatomy"), and this target exists as a point in an abstract space of possible body plans.
Problem-Solving Without Explicit Instructions: Levin argues that biological systems—from cells to tissues to organisms—don't follow rigid, pre-programmed instructions but instead solve problems by navigating toward goals in this abstract space. The system "knows" what the goal state looks like (in some information-theoretic sense) and can find multiple different paths to reach it, even when obstacles are encountered.
Scale-Free Cognition: This concept connects to Levin's broader thesis that cognition and goal-directedness exist at multiple scales—not just in brains, but in cells, tissues, and even subcellular systems. Each level has its own "platonic space" of possible states it's trying to navigate.
Plasticity and Robustness: The platonic space framework helps explain why biological systems are so robust and plastic—if you perturb development, organisms often still reach the correct end state because they're navigating toward a goal in abstract space rather than executing a fixed sequence of steps.

So what you really meant by 'the natural attitude' was 'naturlaism'. You frequently appeal to naturalism and/or natural science is the 'court of appeal' for normative claims. Again, this is not meant as a pejorative or personal criticism, it is demonstrably what you're saying. — Wayfarer

I actually don't say that science can adjudicate when it comes to aesthetics or ethics, in fact I say the opposite―so I'm not really sure what you are referring to.

. As one of the modern Buddhist scholars I follow, David Loy, put it, 'The main problem with our usual understanding of secularity is that it is taken-for-granted, so we are not aware that it is a worldview. It is an ideology that pretends to be the everyday world we live in. Most of us assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed.” — Wayfarer

I'm familiar with Loy―I read and enjoyed his book on non-duality, which I mostly agreed with. I see secularity or naturalism as being simply the attitude we would have if we were not culturally inducted into
religious views. I believe that religious views IF TAKEN LITERALLY do seem at best underdetermined, and at worst absurd, to the modern mind. I think most people, who haven't thought about it much, do by default take religious views literally if they are emotionally inclined to do more than pay mere lip service to them by, for example, just showing up at church or upholding religious festivals.

It's hard to see how we might support the idea that the world is different than it just appears to us to be, except that we might intuitively feel that the appearance is not all there is, even if we cannot say precisely what more is going on. Religions do generally purport to be saying precisely what more is going on.

This is where I highlight the problem: claiming one or the other as true; claiming the truth of both, or claiming the futility of everything. That's the problem.

For the first time in history, an external, universal, generally accepted authority (God, Reason, Inevitable Progress) has disappeared, one that would say, "None of this is accidental; it's all part of a greater, meaningful plan."

Before, Chaos was an accident amidst necessity (God, Law). Now, Order is perceived as a short-lived, fragile, localized accident amidst universal, fundamental Chaos.

And at the center of this is a contemporary, raised on the positivist notions of the 19th century. — Astorre

I don't see the rejection of any notion of personal growth as being inevitable on the assumption that order evolves out of chaos. After all, it is well known, unarguably true, that altered states of consciousness and profound insights are possible outside the context of any religion or assumption of a predetermined cosmic order.

I also don't agree that all or even most of modern secular philosophy is positivistic. It is one thing to say that publicly determinable, that is intersubjectively confirmable, truth is only possible in respect of empirical observations and mathematics and logic, and quite another to say that any proposition outside of those domains is literally meaningless. The latter is positivistic, not so the former. It seems to be very difficult to get some to see the distinction, though.

In any case these abstruse philosophical considerations do not concern that many people. Anyway traditional religion and all kinds of New Age spiritualism are both alive and well in the world, and there don't seem to be raging controversies concerning those and the more materialistic worldviews going on except in fora like these.

Sorry for the confusion. I should have added there's no room for Kantian "thing in itself" for Schopenhauer. In other words, that which is not an aspect of this world as representation or will but beyond — Sirius

Thanks, that makes sense now.

From this, it should be clear that Schopenhauer not only attributed the 2 world view to Kant, but sought to correct it. So in order to understand Kant himself, you can't rely on Schopenhauer. Unfortunately, a lot of people are still told to understand Kant through him & this has led to the popularization of 2 aspect reading of Kant. — Sirius

It's a little unclear as to whether you are meaning to equate the two, but I had thought that the "2 world view" and the "2 aspect view" were competing interpretations in Kant scholarship.

First of all, this world being representation is a claim of Schopenhauer, not of Kant. In no place does Kant claim we have no understanding of the world outside of perception. We do. Our intuition of space & time & even matter (substance) falls under that. Their mode of existence is related to how we condition our experience. — Sirius

Right, though it does seem easy to read the Kantian idea that all we perceive are appearances as equivalent to "all we perceive are representations". That said, I don't doubt there are nuanced differences, but it is long since I studied Kant's work, and I never studied it intensively or extensively.

Kant's a priori categories of judgement and pure forms of intuition (space and time) although said to be prior to experience, have always seemed to me to be derived by post-experiential phenomenological reflection on perceptual experience and judgement, and to thus be "prior" only in the sense that once these forms and categories are established perceptions can be universally characterized in terms of them without continually checking them anew.

Of course you can. Saying that it is an appeal to empiricism is not a personal insult. It's a common philosophical attitude, and you're appealing to it. — Wayfarer

Firstly, I'm not appealing to it, and this is what you constantly fail to understand. Secondly I don't take it as a personal insult, but as an attempt to refute by association. There is no need to mention John Stuart Mill or anyone else, when all I'm doing is presenting what I see as a perfectly reasonable alternative view. I present such an alternative view as counterpoint to your seeming presupposition that the view you favour is the only one which is not self-refuting.

Nothing I have said relies upon or implies that "comparing ideas, considering arguments, making a case in your mind" can be usefully explained in terms of brain activity.
— Janus

Except for

I see no reason why the conscious experience of anything, even of a thought itself, could not be a neural process which we do not consciously experience as such.
— Janus

Whether or not it would be reasonable to say that they have pre-linguistic concepts of patterns would be a matter of whether you believe concepts are embodied in neural patterns or not.
— Janus — Wayfarer

Except that I have not claimed that "the experience of anything, even a thought itself" is nothing but "a neural process which we do not consciously experience as such". You read it that way because you are antagonistic to such a view. I am not antagonistic to alternative views, but only to the tendentious claim that the view you don't favour is self-refuting.

As to the last-quoted, all I'm saying is that the idea that animals might have pre-linguistic concepts of patterns only seems unreasonable given certain presuppositions, i.e. that conceptualization must be linguistically mediated.

I took this to be a reference to Husserl, as he is associated with that expression. The reason I cited him is not 'an argument from authority'. It is more along the lines of citing a well-known philosopher, so as to establish the point at issue is not a personal idisyncracy. — Wayfarer

Husserl writes against the natural attitude, but he is referring to something else―that is the assumption that there is a mind-independent external world―and If you had read what I wrote closely you would see that I was referring to something else, namely the attitude that we ought to argue only on the grounds of what nature presents to us, not on traditional or scriptural authority or personal intuitions, which might purport to pertain to something beyond nature.

As I said recently in another post, I tend to feel that there is something more going on, but I don't claim as a reason for anyone else to believe anything, and I don't allow that feeling to crystallize in me as a firm belief that I feel compelled to defend. I am open-minded on the subject―that is, I don't come down on either side. If I defend anything it is only open-mindedness. The "something more" might turn out to be something we had hitherto failed to understand about matter―otherwise it is hard to see just how it will be able to be demonstrated to be something immaterial.

But by all means continue to misunderstand and misrepresent me―you've been doing it for long enough now, and I've grown tired of trying to set you straight on what I am saying.

Is there an underlying problem, though? I mean, of course there are many problems with human life―both in individual lives and in the collective life. The idea "underlying problem" seems to suggest an overarching problem. Some will say the overarching problem is religion or the human tendency to form dogmatic ideologies, and of course, others will say the overarching problem is the loss of religion. Both of these viewpoints seem to me wrongheaded.

I would say that if there is one main problem, the best candidate would be a widespread inability to reflect and think critically, and the consequent tendency for people to succumb unthinkingly to their fear of others, and their tendency to always try to find someone else to blame when things go wrong. But then one could also add greed and hunger for power to the list ( although perhps they are functions of the last-mentioned).

One could also add the incapacity to feel empathy and compassion. Or again the overemphasis on competition over cooperation (at least in the Western capitalist so-called democracies). Another major problem is human exceptionalism and the consequent lack of concern for other species and ecosystems.

Noumena is in the plural. If it's just that which is unknown or beyond naming, then why does it have a singular & plural form which Kant uses (knowingly) throughout his book ?

The claim that the thing in itself is distinct from the noumenon is also very weak. Throughout CPR, Kant refers to things in themselves, not just thing in itself

I see this common misinterpretation of Kant a result of Schopenhauer's conscious reinterpretation of Kant gaining currency in the public imagination. Unfortunately, even this involves misunderstandings since Schopenhauer has no room for "thing in itself" in his philosophy — Sirius

Schopenhauer criticizes Kant for referring to things-in-themselves on the grounds that if, as Kant asserts, there is no space and time outside of perception, then there can be no diversity. So, if I recall correctly, Schopenhauer refers to the noumenon as Will and claims that we can know it as such. For me, this makes no sense either, since even willing would seem to presuppose diversity.

I think you may be mistaken when you say Schopenhauer has no room for the thing-in-itself in his philosophy as I seem to remember that he constantly refers to the Will as the thing-in-itself. I could be wrong about that though since it is long since I read the work, and also I read an English translation.

I do endeavour to address your arguments with courtesy, reciprocation would be appreciated. — Wayfarer

That is the John Stuart Mill argument, standard empiricism, 'all knowledge comes from experience'. Against that, is the fact that rational thought is the capacity to grasp 'a triangle is a plane bounded by three interesecting straight lines'. A non-rational animal, a dog or a chimp, can be conditioned to respond to a triangular shape, but it will never grasp the idea of a triangle — Wayfarer

Strangely, I don't believe you because you try to dismiss what I've said by framing it as an empiricist argument, when all I've presented is an alternative view. Unfortunately your dogma apparently does not allow you to be open to alternative views. I can reasonably say that the ability to grasp a triangle as a plane bounded by three intersecting straight lines just is a matter of abstracting away from a recognized pattern and stating it as a specification or rule.

Visually enabled animals can unquestionably recognize all kinds of patterns, but of course they cannot linguistically specify the concepts of those patterns, Whether or not it would be reasonable to say that they have pre-linguistic concepts of patterns would be a matter of whether you believe concepts are embodied in neural patterns or not.

Whenever you say that, you are comparing ideas, considering arguments, making a case in your mind. Of course that entails brain activity, but to try and explain it in terms of brain activity is another matter entirely. — Wayfarer

Nothing I have said relies upon or implies that "comparing ideas, considering arguments, making a case in your mind" can be usefully explained in terms of brain activity. So, again you misrepresent.

Not so. The 'natural attitude' is a specific reference to Husserl's criticism of naturalism. — Wayfarer

And again you misrepresent and bring in something completely irrelevant. I was not referring to Husserl when I wrote "the natural attitude". Husserl can claim no ownership of that phrase, not least because he wrote in German. You seem to be incapable of just having an engaged discussion without resorting to mischaracterizing anything you disagree with as some "bogeyman" of an argument that you take for granted has long been refuted, or trotting out one of your favorite quotes from those you have accepted as authoritative. I'm not interested in that style of engagement. I'd rather you addressed what I wrote point by point and in your own words. Your monomaniacal repetitions of your own prejudices as if they are absolute truths are tedious in the extreme. You would have to be one of the most closedminded interlocutors I have ever encountered.

Besides, your own entries are shot through with plenty of dogma, first and foremost that science is the only court of appeal for normative judgement in any matters whatever. — Wayfarer

Another misrepresentation, making it look as if you are just plain lying or do not read what I write closely. That is not what I believe at all. Cite something where I have actually said, or even unambiguously implied, that. Put up or shut up. I won't be responding to you again if you don't up your game.

Yes, the object itself. OK, the topic I linked is more about there being no physical boundary for an object itself — noAxioms

Rocks have physical boundaries―namely where the surface meets the air or water and the ground. The boundaries may not be precise on the atomic level, but a boundary does not have to be absolutely precise for us to be able to identify an object.

The identity is more a question of: Is this rock the same one it was yesterday? What if I chip a bit off? — noAxioms

"This rock"! If it is this rock yesterday and today it is the same rock. Which rock did you chip a bit off? This rock or that rock? If you break a rock in half then it is the same rock now in two pieces
from one perspective, or from another it is two smaller rocks. It all depends on how you frame it―there is no context-independent fact of the matter.

I don't think it follows, but the convention typically chosen by anybody is a mind dependent one. There are very few definitions that are not. "Is part of the universe" is heavily mind dependent, especially because of 'the' in there, implying that our universe is special because it's the one we see. — noAxioms

Conventions? You are talking about descriptions or specifications, not about the objects described or specified. The objects are not conventions either.

:roll: When you stop with the shitty misrepresentations of what I've said I might respond.

Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. — Edward Feser

The idea of a perfect geometrical figure can be understood to be simply an abstraction away from the inevitable imperfections in any geometrical physical construction.

Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism v Naturalism

All we have to think about is what we perceive and possible explanations for what is perceived (I include here bodily sensation, proprioception, interoception, fantasy, dreams. memories, thoughts themselves and anything else we can become aware of.

I see no reason why the conscious experience of anything, even of a thought itself, could not be a neural process which we do not consciously experience as such. That it may not appear to as such cannot constitute a convincing refutation of that possibility―it would be an argument from incredulity. Of course it is also possible that "something else" might be going on.

The problem is that we have no way of gaining purchase on what that 'something else" might be. We are all free to choose what to believe about that, or else abstain from coming down on one side or the other. The latter is my own preference, even though my intuitive feeling is that something else is going on. I abstain from forming specific views based on that intuitive feeling because any and every view of it I can imagine, or have ever heard of, seems underdetermined.

abstraction away from the inevitable imperfections in any physical geometrical construction.

:lol: Well might you smirk, having (I imagine) smelt the lingering odor of performative contradiction in what I said.

This is caricature. Paradigms like physicalism are not applied "to philosophy" but interpretively / methodologically to experience, science, historiography, law, pedagogy, religion, etc. — 180 Proof

:up: Exactly! There is a certain (willful?) blindness afflicting those who want to reduce and understand the world in terms of "isms". The so-called "natural attitude" just consists in the refusal to submit one's thinking, experience and understanding to any dogma, and the "interpretive/ methodological" application "to science, historiography, law, pedagogy religion, etc." is simply the extension of that free-mindedness to the human disciplines.

10. Maybe someone else I missed. — Astorre

You missed "those who, instead of focusing on understanding and creatively managing their own experience, attempt to categorize and explain what others are doing in order to convince themselves that they they can stand above, and look down upon, the fray".

I’ll call anyone what they wish to be called. I’ll call you Janus the Great if you prefer— but before I actually believe it, I’d need to see some evidence or a convincing argument. In a trans case, I’ve yet to see such an argument. — Mikie

I'm wondering what you are yet to see a convincing argument for. The question "are transwomen women" is meaningless unless we are told what 'women' is supposed to mean in the context of the question. A "transwoman" is already presupposed by the terminology of the question itself to be a kind of 'woman'.

If people adhering to different definitions of the terms 'woman' or 'man' believe there is but one correct definition, and that it is the one they hold, as though there could be some determinable fact of the matter, then they are arguing with closed minds and will inevitably talk past one another.

I mean a mental construct, with no corresponding physical thing. I've done a whole topic for instance on identity (of beings, rocks, whatever) being such an ideal. — noAxioms

I don't understand what you mean. Isn't the identity of a rock simply whatever name or description I give it in order to identify it? Or else it is just the rock itself?

No, I'd have put it in quotes like that if I was talking about the word. I've done other topics on that as well, where i query what somebody means when they suggest mind independent existence of something, and it typically turns out to be quite mind dependent upon analysis. — noAxioms

It seems obvious that any name or description of anything, the identification of it, is mind-dependent, but does it follow that the thing itself is mind dependent? Perhaps 'identity' does not have to possess a single meaning but could be counted as applying to both name (or identifying description) and object, no?

I may not be an idealist, but I've come to terms with 'existence' being an ideal, which is awfully dang close to being an idealist I guess. Personal identity is certainly an ideal, with no physical correspondence. It's a very useful ideal, but that's a relation, not any kind of objective thing. — noAxioms

Do you mean 'idea' when you write "ideal"? Do you mean that 'existence' is an idea or concept, but existence is not? If so, there is nothing idealist about that position.

I'd like to entertain this notion for a while before I reject it (if that's what I end up doing).

I think we mostly agree. — Tom Storm

That seems to me a fair-minded plan―I think I would probably agree with you about how far it goes. I used to say that the human world is a collective representation―a kind of shared Umwelt, and I still think that. That is one side of the story for me. The other side is that we also live in a much larger world containing countless animal (and perhaps even plant) Umwelts. It seems to me a strange, but apparently true, thought that without percipients the whole vast world is blind, deaf and dumb―a silent tale signifying nothing.

Whether it follows or not may not be the issue. Also, what is meant by “reveals nothing”? And what is meant by “out there”? — Tom Storm

When I say "it doesn't follow" I just mean that it is not deductively certain. "Out there" to me means outside my body.

I don’t think this makes much difference. Animals respond to shapes, movement, shadows, and food sources, patterns trigger responses. But what does this really say about reality itself? We all evolved from a common origin and "materials", so we likely share similar hard wiring, even if it has been organized radically differently over time. I really don't know how much animal comparisons give us. — Tom Storm

So, animals also see shapes. movement, shadows and food sources; in other words the same patterns we do. We see the fruit on the tree as food source and so do rats, bats, birds and insects as any orchardist can attest.

The story that says we all evolved from a common origin is a realist story. Also that we may see things in similar or different ways, says nothing about what things will be seen where and when. As the fruit example show, even insects see fruit as a food source. It is the shared nature of the world that points to realism, to the idea that there really are things out there which are perceived by us and animals in understandable ways. I am not concerned about the final, unknowable metaphysical explanation for why and how those things fundamentally exist. They might be material existents or ideas in the mind of God. How could we know for certain? The question is: which explanation seems the more plausible to me or to you.

I don't object to other worldviews...what I find objectionable is the dogmatic attitude that says that the alternative worldviews is self-refuting, that demands that you must see things the way I do, that there is only one right way to view the world.

This is not off-topic...the Enlightenment was a response to centuries of Christian dogma and persecution of dissenters. I find moral crusades objectionable because they fail to respect human diversity. Scientism is also a dogma...the pendulum always swings too far in the opposite direction it seems. The human condition is characterized by uncertainty.

I tend to agree with that approach, but it seems to me there are nuances. It is unarguable that everything we consciously perceive is the result of an almost unimaginably complex process of pre-cognitive processing, so our perceptions are models of the things that affect our bodies. Does it follow that what we perceive reveals nothing about what is "out there"?

I don't see how that follows. It also doesn't strictly follow that what we perceive reveals "exactly" what is out there either, but given our ability to navigate very successfully in the world I think it is most likely that what we perceive is in accordance with what is out there, including our own bodies, the structures of which are also, relative to conscious perception "out there".

It doesn't follow that things out there are exactly as we perceive them (naive realism) since we know by studying animals that their perceptual setups are different, sometimes very different, even though analogous, to ours. So, it seems most reasonable to think that we and the other animals perceive both what is possible given our various perceptual systems, and also selectively perceive what is of most significance.

So, I think constructivism goes too far, and is too human-centric. There is a distinction between the countless "Umwelts" out there, both human and animal, and the greater world within which all those Umwelts exist.

I can relate to that...I always want to be in a position to be able to say something more interesting...more interesting that is, than what I have been able to say.