I don't think we are disagreeing. I did say " no reason to think that we must be able to...". not "there is no reason to think it is possible that we might ...".

Yes, definitely true; but I guess the exact ways people say the microworld is strange depense on their interpretation of quantun mechanics. — Apustimelogist

I agree, but I think all interpretations are, in their different ways, attempts to imagine what is observed in terms of our macro world understandings of phenomena. Of course we have nothing else to work with, but for me the point is that there is no reason to think that we must be able to make the microworld phenomena intelligible to us in ways we can visualize.

And I think the implications of that for philosophy are pretty much nothing beyond the realization that we cannot expect to be able to visualize the behavior of microworld phenomena in ways that make intuitive sense to us. So, "shut up and calculate" is a good sense attitude, it seems to me. Although I also think there is some value in the kinds of speculation QM brings up in a creative imagination sense. It might be a fertile ground for fiction for example.

I mean the counter-intuitive, puzzling nature of QM phenomena should be no surprise given that our expectations regarding how things should behave have been conditioned by our experience of macro phenomena.

The kind of non-realism Gnomon expresses about position and momentum is the same kind of non-realism as in the non-realism / non-locality issue. — Apustimelogist

Why should we think that the microworld must be real in the same sense, that is behave in the same way, as the macroworld?

And "I am projecting", this because you say so. — javra

No, you are projecting because you are imputing motivations to what I said which were not there. It seems obvious you cannot carry on challenging conversations without becoming offended. That's why I said it's best to stop. I have no desire to hurt your feelings.

If life sooner or later necessarily result in nothingness, what is its point in its occurrence to begin with? Its not an issue of opinion but of logic. Something with a point has a purpose. (Unless we play footloose with terms again). The point of life is ... ? — javra

I haven't claimed there is an overall point to life. In fact quite the opposite—it is up to each of us to decide what the point of our lives is. Or else simply live your life, enjoy it and follow your interests and passions; I suppose that would be a point in itself.

Simply because your question directly insinuates that my reply was pompous charlatanry - thereby taking a serious jab at my character. And in this, I stand by my right to feel insulted. Only human, don't you know. There a difference between being thick-skinned and being thick. — javra

You are projecting—my question insinuated nothing, I was simply trying to get a clear answer from you. Anyway, if you are going to take exchanges of ideas on a philosophy forum personally, then I think it's best to stop.

OK. I have no more questions for you.

In virtue of Buddhism being a soteriological school of thought. — javra

So the meaning of life lies in an afterlife or in nirvana (is it eternal life or extinction?).

No. Because it is a can of worms. Why do you respond this way? Other than to insult. — javra

Why are you so ready to feel insulted. The aim is to question and challnege not to insult. Are you not comfortable with your ideas being questioned and challenged?

The notion of energy stems from Aristotle. Energy/work without purpose/telos as concept is thoroughly modern, utterly physicalist/materialist, and it need not be. But then to you energy would then be one of those transcendental issues that wouldn't be natural. And so forth. — javra

I'm not concerning myself with ancient conceptions of energy. Energy is what does work, work that might be either purposeful or purposeless. In science we have the four fundamental forces (energies). I see energy as entirely immanent; in fact, I can make no sense of the idea of transcendental energy.

You never posed a friggin question. You affirmed a truth, and this as though it were incontrovertible. As per the quote above.

As to how do I know that I as a transcendental ego am more that a mere idea: I am a subject of awareness that can hold awareness of, for example, ideas - farts as another example - thereby making my being as subject of awareness more than an idea. — javra

I did not affirm a truth, I posed the question as to how we could ever know that the transcendental ego is more than merely an idea. When I said that it merely an idea, I meant that it cannot be anything more than an idea for us because there is no imaginable way to test whether it is more than an idea. There is no need to get angry or offended. we are just here discussing ideas, so what's the problem?

I don't understand your answer above. It just sounds stipulative rather than being any kind of means to knowledge.

I don't think I understand you. It looks to me like this says the inability to explain it in physical terms is not important to the question of whether or not it can be explained in physical terms. — Patterner

No, it says that the inability to explain something in terms of physics does not entail that the thing to be explained is non-physical.

I don't imagine the mental is completely independent of the physical. I don't think we can remove mass or charge from particles, and I don't think we can remove proto-consciousness from them, either. — Patterner

Mass and charge are detectable in particles. Proto-consciousness in particles is purely speculative ,and in fact we don't really have any idea what it could look like.

I don't think physical properties can account for consciousness, so there must be something else at work. — Patterner

You don't think consciousness could evolve in a merely physical world? You don't believe it could just on account of the fact that it seems to be inexplicable? Have you considered the possibility that it is not mind and matter itself which are incompatible, but just our conceptions of mind and matter which seem incompatible,

As you acknowledge there is no way to test the idea that they are not compatible anyway. Even if you could somehow confirm that mind could not possibly have evolved from physical matter, what difference would that knowledge make to your life as lived?

As with most versions of Buddhism for example, I strongly disagree. — javra

So you think Buddhism gives life meaning? In virtue of what? Rebirth? Karma? Even if those, what guarantors their universality? Merely learning to let go of attachments cannot be an overarching meaning to life itself, since there are very good personal reasons for attempting to do this.

Playing footloose with what the term "nihilism" signifies. For my part, I've already specified what I intended it to mean in this context. Basically, that of existential nihilism: the interpretation of life being inherently pointless. — javra

Pointless according to who? Is not the idea that life is basically pointless not merely a subjective opinion? What about such things as enjoyment, interest, creativity and even survival? Is there no point to any of those just because life is thought to be a merely physical phenomenon? And even if life were basically mind (whatever that could mean) rather than basically matter or energy, how would that fact alone give it more point? These are the same questions I already asked that you did not even attempt to answer.

A can of worms that, so I'll leave it be. — javra

Why? Because you cannot come up with a response?

We can have no way of discerning the difference between a) the self/ego which knows (aka the transcendental ego) and b) the self/ego which is known by (a) (aka the empirical ego)? And this even in principle? — javra

Of course we can and do make conceptual distinctions between empirical and transcendental notions of the self or ego. My question was as to how we could possibly know that the transcendental ego is anything more than an idea.

Whereas "my body is tall (therefore I am tall)" can be cogent, "my awareness/mind is tall (therefore I am tall)" can't. Or is this something we could have no way to know about as well. — javra

I don't see how that argument, which merely gives an example of a category error, show us anything. It would be a category error to say that my farts are tall, or my breath is tall, or my digestion is tall. I'm sure there are plenty of other examples.

For instance, the idea of a world where there is nothing after death, where limitations are imposed by natural laws, and where there is no transformative reconciliation with the ground of being, may feel ugly to some people - much the way a painting by Francis Bacon might unsettle or alarm some. — Tom Storm

I find some cathedrals (for example Chartres) beautiful and many others merely impressive. St Peters I found to be a mixture of beauty and impressiveness (due to the sheer scale) .Perhaps when it comes to the natural world it's the vision of dissolution and death that disturbs some people.

The issue I here responded to was of a difference that makes a difference between physicalism and non-physicalism. Nothing of your statements dispels the apparent reality that physicalism entails nihilism whereas non-physicalism does not. And to most people out there, this logical difference between the two is both sharp and substantial ... as well as bearing some weight on the issue of how one ought to best live one's life. — javra

I think you are talking about theism because even if the world were simply non-physical and/ or held in some universal mind, that does not on its own lend it an overarching meaning. You need to add a God that cares for us, has a purpose for us, and the promise of a better life to come and personal immortality to give that overarching universal meaning.

Also I don't agree that physicalism leads to nihilism. Ironically I think it is religion that leads to nihilism by positing one meaning for all and thus nihilating the creative possibility that people have to find their own meanings by which to direct their lives.

If nature consists of that which is visible and measurable in quantifiable ways, then is the mind and, more specifically, that which we address as I-ness which is aware of its own mind and its many aspects (thoughts, ideas, intentions, emotions, etc.) not natural? For the latter is neither visible nor measurable in quantifiable ways. Hence notions such as that of the transcendental ego. — javra

Energy itself is not measurable except by gauging its effects. If you accept the idea that consciousness is not anything over and above neural activity, then its effects are measurable. The transcendental ego is arguably merely an idea. Even if it were more than merely an idea we could have no way to tell.

I have often thought that one of the reasons people are attracted to superphysical ideas is their aesthetic appeal. It perhaps seems more harmonious to imagine that there is a transcendent realm, something grander and more meaningful beyond the physical world. I have noticed how often advocates of the transcendent describe the physicalist position as an ugly worldview - stunted, disenchanted, devoid of mystery, limiting. — Tom Storm

I think this is right. The aesthetic appeal is important. I'm reminded of the sublime aesthetics of the great cathedrals and Christian rituals.

I don't view the physical world as ugly, disenchanted or devoid of mystery, though. I think it is beautiful and enchanting in its diversity and complexity of form, and full of mystery. And when you think about it the beauty of the cathedrals and rituals are themselves physical beauty. It's a beauty that seems to point beyond itself. to be sure, but I think all beauty does that, insofar as we don't really know why or how it is that things can be beautiful. I wonder some animals experience beauty. The ritual nest-making and extraordinary plumage of some birds seems to suggest that they do.

Nice saying! I think we are all here on account of the magnitude (apart from the sciences, and even there) of human ignorance. Hopefully we are all here to learn and change our ideas when we encounter ideas that explore deeper and make more sense than what we might presently believe.

Idealism or Deism would make no material difference in your life. But it might make a philosophical difference. What difference does your participation in a philosophical forum make in how you live your life? Personally, I have no ambition to change the world, just myself . . . . to change my mind, and the meaning of my life. :smile: — Gnomon

To me the only different participating in a philosophical forum could make would be to sharpen and clarify my ideas and also lead me to be more open to alternatives to my own thinking. I have changed my mind on metaphysical matters several times since first participating on philosophy forums, when I have encountered ideas that seem to go deeper and be more plausible.

I find it interesting that some secular philosophers, like AC Grayling, have left behind the word physicalism these days and use the term naturalism. Any thoughts on this word? The problem for me is that how do we draw a distinction between a natural and a supernatural world if physicalism isn't a distinguishing factor? If idealism is true than this is part of naturalism? — Tom Storm

How to make a distinction between natural and supernatural—it seems to come down to the idea that over and above the natural visible world is an invisible spiritual world. I have long wondered whether the latter is imagined on account of dreams. The standard story seems to be that the invisible world of the supernatural (gods, demons, spirits and other immaterial entities) is imagined as an explanation for what would have seemed to the early humans to be invisible forces, and that idea seems reasonably plausible too.

If the supernatural is an invisible world, then it seems to follow that it can be accessed (although modern thinking would say peopled) only by the imagination. Being imagined as an invisible world would seem to lead to the idea of immateriality as well. So I think you are right. The association between a natural visible world and physicalism, and the association between a supernatural invisible world and ant-physicalism both seem natural.

Should we follow our intuitions, our natural imaginative inclinations in deciding what is a valid and/ or plausible ontology? Or should we apply critical thought and the correctives of logical and empirical knowledge to our pre-critical inclinations? That is the question, and the further question is ' does it matter?'.

When people take their own ideas, what seems self-evident to them, too seriously it seems that culture wars are looming. For some on both sides this is can become a moral crusade. To my way of thinking that is definitely a negative—it is social consequences that matter, and divisive thinking is that last thing needed toady IMO.

What if Mind, not Matter, is the explanation for everything in the world? :smile: — Gnomon

Leaving aside the possibility that such a mind is an omniscient, omnipotent God who will judge us and accordingly determine the nature of our life after this one, what difference do you think it would make to how we live our lives?

Nothing about the physical properties and laws of physics suggests subjective experience. — Patterner

I agree. But why should anything about physical properties and the laws of physics suggest subjective experience? They are different areas of investigation. I don't believe physics or neuroscience will ever be able to explain how the physical gives rise to experience, because experience cannot be rigorously observed together with observing neural processes. We cannot observe neural processes in vivo, we can only measure their effects via fMRI and EEG technologies etc.

To me the lack of explainability of experience in physical terms is not a central criterion in deciding whether experience and consciousness of that experience is just a manifestation of physical processes . QM shows us physical phenomena which are not explainable in terms of our macro physical concepts, and it just isn't the right tool for explaining something like consciousness beyond underpinning neuroscientific investigations of the physical properties and functions of the brain.

The real question is as to what else consciousness could be if not physical. You can say it's mental, but then does not the mental as far as we know supervene on the physical? We can imagine the logical possibility that the mental is somehow completely independent, but that is just a logical possibility we seem to have no evidence to believe in. And that logical possibility seems vacuous unless mind is posited as another substance, and then we have dualism.

If we posit one (neutral) substance that manifests both physical and mental attributes that might make more sense. But to assert that mind is ubiquitously inherent in or alongside matter from the beginning doesn't eliminate the problem of imagining what that mind looks like. It could not be anything like the intuitive introspectively derived notion we have of our own minds. The problem I've always had with panpsychism (such as Strawson postulates) is that I can get no idea of what it looks like.

I think you are right here: the firefighter’s duty would be to help put out fires and help people vacant the premises—not necessarily to save everyone. — Bob Ross

If the firefighter can save everyone then s/he has a duty to do that. You cannot have a duty to do the impossible, so it follows that if it is impossible to save everyone, then the firefighter cannot have a duty to do that.

Calling the view you disagree with 'naive "folk" understanding' and 'vague intuition' is not arguing against that attitude. It literally is that attitude. — Patterner

It's no different than referring to commonsense realism as "naive realism". I think naive realism is the default pre-critical attitude which we all have to the world. At the same time, I think naive idealism ( in the sense of anti-physicalism) is the default pre-critical attitude we all have towards the nature of mind and consciousness. Probably people are pre-critically naive dualists in that they hold to naive realism about the world and naive idealism about the mind. It is only once critical thought is brought to bear on that unexamined dualism that the "interaction problem" gives us pause.

Whatever the true nature of what we call the physical is, my point is that there has never been any suggestion that consciousness has any of its characteristics. — Patterner

This is only so as long as you hold to the naive understanding of consciousness. Once you admit, even though consciousness does not intuitively seem to be a physical phenomenon, the possibility that it might nonetheless really be nothing more than that, then you open your mind to possibilities other than what simply seems intuitively obvious.

All that said, the real problem is that we have no way of testing any metaphysical hypothesis, whether that be physicalism or idealism or whatever. We have no way of determining whether any of our hypotheses have any real bearing on the ultimate nature of reality, or even whether the very idea of questioning the ultimate nature of reality is coherent given that a determinable answer seems to be impossible in principle.

So, perhaps we are reduced to just trying to address what is the most useful or interesting way to talk about things. How do you imagine we might go about finding out whether consciousness is non-physical or not? Do you believe there is some fact of the matter we might one day discover?

Makes sense to me.

It should be obvious to you that I'm asking if you think it follows.

1. If "the King of France is bald" is true then "the King of France exists" is true — Michael

What about 'If "the king of France is bald" is false then " the King of France exists" is true?

He doesn't say that "physicalism is inconsistent" as a scientific approach. But that it is incomplete as a philosophical approach. — Gnomon

Non-reductive and/ or non-eliminative physicalism are not incomplete, any more than any metaphysical hypothesis is incomplete. The Churchlands argue consistently and extensively for eliminative physicalism, and they are professional philosophers, so it cannot be ruled out as a philosophical approach either. The reality is that we don't and can't know what the case is when it comes to metaphysics,

Yes, if the first even prime greater than 100 didn't exist, you couldn't be writing about it. — RussellA

He could have said "the first even prime number greater than 2". No such thing, 2 is the only even prime number because all other even numbers are divisible by 2.

So in our understanding of the Universe we should recognize the existence of something other than matter. We can call that something spirit, but if we do we should remember that in Buddhism, the word "spirit" is a figurative expression for value or meaning. We do not say that spirit exists in reality; we use the concept only figuratively. — Three Philosophies, One Reality

Right, but it is obvious that value and meaning are felt, in their various ways, by sentient beings. No one can sensibly deny that fact. We might be deterministic organisms, but we will never feel ourselves to be so, and it what we feel about ourselves and our lives that counts when it comes to quality of life.

Also we don't know and can never know the truth about whether or not we are deterministic beings, so the question is of little importance except perhaps in the moral domain. In that connection itt can be argued that the libertarian model of free will leads to unnecessary and unwarranted feelings of guilt and pride and blame and a desire for revenge against those who transgress moral codes

I wouldn't be so dismissive of people like Chalmers and Nagel. — Patterner

I'm not dismissive of them. I've read both years ago. I just don't find their arguments as compelling as I once did. Wayfarer wonders why I spend time arguing about things I say "don't matter". What I'm arguing against is the idea that the truth of idealism is obvious and that physicalism is inconsistent or incoherent. Such facile attempts to dismiss opponent's views and the lack of ability to recognize that others can be totally familiar with the same arguments as you are and yet disagree about what they demonstrate is what I argue against. And what often goes together with that attitude: the assumption that if the other disagrees then the other must not really understand the arguments, is also what I continually argue against.

Therefore, "if it cannot be directly observed and measured" I would say that the "activity" is immaterial, not non-physical. Hence, "neural activity" is a process-of-change in a material substrate, not a material object itself. — Gnomon

I wouldn't use that terminology, but I don't disagree with what I take to be the thrust of what you are saying.

When I say "use" I count interest, creativity and joy as uses. I was referring to accumulating factoids for the sake of impressing others or winning arguments. We don't have time in our lives to take in more than the tiniest fraction of the sum of human knowledge, so it's wise to be selective.

As to the question of the nature of consciousness—we have the scientific studies on one hand and the naive "folk" understanding on the other. As to which to rely on, I will choose the former because I don't think intuition is an especially reliable guide to understanding the nature of things. But that's just me—others will make up their own minds, hopefully being as free from confirmation bias as possible.

If others seek clarification about a point, why do not simply give an answer to clear it up? I feel no need to avoid interaction, as though there is some toxicity there that I need to avoid.

Is it your own mind, or someone else's mind which you posited?  How did you do that, if that operation had been done? — Corvus

I asked @Clearbury that same question and s/he got all huffy and claimed I didn't understand their version of solipsism. It seems that Clearbury is not at all clear on that point, so s/he wants to bury it so that others won't notice the central problem with the OP, namely the lack os a clear account of how s/he understands solipsism.

What you are saying seems to amount to saying that in the absence of minds such as ours no truth claims can be made. When humanity is gone there will still be gold, but there will not be any claim that there is gold.

The question then seems to be will there be a truth that there is gold in the absence of the possibility of any truth claims? If you want to answer 'yes' then you must think that truth is something more than merely the property of true sentences.

If you think truth is dependent on minds rather than sentences, that is on judgements rather than just propositions, then in the absence of human minds some other mind must be posited. God, for example. I think this is what @Leontiskos thinks. But what if there is no God?

By "this" you mean consciousness? We don't even fully understand or definitely know what causation, or anything else, is. We have a "folk" understanding of what we think consciousness is. There is not only a naive realism, but also a naive idealism. How are we going to find out the truth of these matters? Even scientific theories are defeasible.

A book 'contains meaning' only insofar as it is read and understood by a subject capable of interpreting its content. Furthermore, different readers may interpret the same information in diverse ways, highlighting the subjective and contextual nature of meaning-making. — Wayfarer

Of course. Different neural networks will interact with books in different ways. Why would you expect it to be otherwise? Even different LLMs produce their own unique and unpredictable thoughts, and they are not even conscious in the way we naively think of ourselves as being conscious.

Neural activity is electrical and chemical signals moving along the neurons. That is consciousness? — Patterner

That is the question. It's not how we intuitively think of consciousness of course. Hence the conundrum. We know what consciousness feels like. But that is a different question than what it actually is. Probably cannot ever be definitively answered.

Energy is particles in motion. We know which particles move in which medium. We can measure how fast they move. It's all physical. — Patterner

We cannot see particles, we can only measure their effects. We don't even really know excatly what electrons are. Are they what constitutes fields or are they merely excitations of a field? How will we find out?

I have not heard an explanation for how consciousness reduces to physics. — Patterner

If consciousness is neural activity, then it reduces to physics or at least chemistry. How can we ever be sure about that? It doesn't seem possible, because there is no way to observe consciousness being reducible to physics. So we are left with inference. Much of science is like this. You no coubt know the well worn Humean point about causation itself being impossible to directly observe.

It's ironic that you think consciousness is entirely physical, but would like it to be otherwise in the hopes of an afterlife, while I think consciousness has a non-physical component, but don't want an afterlife. But, of course, you're right. What will be will be. — Patterner

I don't want an afterlife. I just want as much of life as I can get. I also think one measure of a good life is being able to die well. Clinging to anything is not a good idea. I don't cling to the idea of consciousness being physical, it just seems the most likely to me. Somone earlier mentioned Peirce's "matter is effete mind". He nonetheless believed that the universe existed prior to humans. He was basically a kind of panpsychist. I don't think that position is incompatible with thinking that consciousness is a physical phenomenon.

You ask this in a philosophy forum?? :grin: Knowledge for knowledge's sake is reason enough for most anything, imo. — Patterner

Philosophy is defined as love of wisdom. Is it wise to simply accumulate knowledge for its own sake? That almost sounds like accumulating money for its own sake. What is the point of knowledge you cannot use?

What you say is not true. We can measure neural activity. Of course, you will say that isn't consciousness, but that is just an assumption—assuming what is to be proved.

Or think of energy itself—it can only be measured in terms of its effects. If it cannot be directly observed and measured, will you say it is non-physical?

Some of us suggest the possibility that our physical sciences cannot answer every question about reality. — Patterner

I agree if by science you mean physics. I think there are many questions about for example human and animal behavior that cannot be answered by physics. Different paradigms. But questions about animal behavior can be answered by ethology and questions about human behavior can be answered by anthropology, sociology and psychology and even chemistry. Do you think of those as sciences?

Just as a matter of interest do you care whether consciousness is physical or not? Personally, I'd rather it wasn't physical because then there might be some hope that this life is not all we get. I've made my peace with the idea that this life is most probably all we get, but whatever the case is, I don't think it matters what I think about it. What will be will be.

Beyond those kinds of concerns do you think the answer to whether consciousness is physical or not could matter for any other reason?

I'm saying the neurological account is not necessarily physicalist. It's a leap from saying that there are neurological processes involved, to materialist philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer

There is a leap from any empirical account to any metaphysical claim. We really ought to suspend judgement in the absence of any firm metaphysical ground at all. If we wish to make a leap it ought to be what is considered to be the inference to the best explanation. Of course for whatever reasons we are not all going to agree what is the best inference. I'm merely telling you that if I am pressed to say which I think is the best inference, then I'll choose physicalism, but I'm not wedded to it. My natural inclination is to suspend judgement and in my day to day life that is just what I do, because the issue is of little or no importance—little relevance to how I live my life.

So get this clear - you believe that to question physicalism requires positing of another realm? You said it: do you believe it? — Wayfarer

Physicalism is the claim that the fundamental nature of everything is energy. Physics understands matter and energy to be one and the same. What is the other alternative to the realm of the physical? I would say it is the realm of the mind. But we know nothing of mind beyond our own introspective intuitions about our own minds. Of the physical we know a whole world which, being investigated, has yielded a vast body of coherent and consistent scientific knowledge.

Science tells us the universe existed long before humans. I see no reason to doubt that. If that is so, then mind cannot be fundamental unless something like panpsychism is true, or there is a god or universal mind that keeps what appears to us as the [physical world in place. I just don't find those explanations rationally compelling, although I am attracted to them in an imaginative way.

I learned a lot from Apokrisis, including the whole field of biosemiotics, which I've read quite a bit about by now. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I've read some of Salthe and some of Deacon and some of Hoffmeyer and others over the last ten years or so since first encountering Apo. But I don't count myself as an expert. I can understand the arguments, but I don't have the background to assess their veracity. so I maintain an open mind. I don't recall any of them questioning naturalism or physicalism. If you can cite some passages from those writers or others that do then I'll certainly consider them.

What is the alternative to physicalism to explain the fact that we share a world with each other and the animals other than the old "universal mind" model? Nothing else works, even Kastrup admits that. I am not completely close-minded to the possibility of that, but I honestly do see it to be of much less plausibility than naturalism. I'd actually rather believe in the universal mind model, but unfortunately, I just don't find it compelling enough.

To me the Lewontin passage is tendentious babble—nothing substantive to be found there.

I dispute that the brain is physical. The human brain, in context, is the most complex natural phenomenon known to science, with more neural connections than stars in the sky. — Wayfarer

The criterion of what is physical is that its activities have measurable effects. The brain ticks that box. I get that our experience doesn't intuitively seem to be physical. Intuitive understanding is not always a good guide to the nature of things,

substantive evidence or reason — Janus

See the original post. — Wayfarer

I read it before, and I just looked at it again, I know all those arguments like the proverbial back of my hand. They are trivial truisms—they simply say that without the mind, without percipients, there would be no world appearing. How could I take issue with such a tautology, other than to point out its vacuity.

If you think that because no world would appear to humans if humans didn't exist that it follows that human consciousness is fundamental to reality, I can only wonder what has happened to your critical thinking skills. Maybe they have become buried beneath your confirmation bias.

Brandolini's law, also known as the bullshit asymmetry principle, is an internet adage coined in 2013 by Alberto Brandolini, an Italian programmer, that emphasizes the effort of debunking misinformation, in comparison to the relative ease of creating it in the first place. The law states:

The amount of energy needed to refute bullshit is an order of magnitude bigger than that needed to produce it.

I like that. It reminds me of an injunction sometimes attributed to Mark Twain and other times to George Carlin (roughly paraphrased): " Never argue with a fool because they will bring you down to their level and then beat you with experience".

I'm saying the neurological account is not necessarily physicalist. — Wayfarer

It deals with the brain, which is physical and uses physical methods to study it.

Because you often express it. You said it in the post I responded to - 'what are we to do, believe there is "another realm?" — Wayfarer

So what? I have no fear of other realms. I love imagining them, but I don't count such creative imaginings as anything more than fiction. What's wrong with fiction? Nothing in my book.

However, if we are to be justified in thinking that such imaginings are anything more than fictions then we need some substantive evidence or compelling reason for thinking so. That is just what you apparently cannot provide.

Being personally convinced of something does not constitute any good reason for others to believe what you do. You apparently find that hard to understand. It actually seems to be a kind of narcissism, when it blinds you to the fact that others can disagree with you while understanding your position. I don't see you understanding that. It's a shame.

A pretty poor post, I have to say. — Wayfarer

:rofl: Nice try, but I'm not biting. Desperation breeds denigration it seems.

Just because something can be attributed to neurobiology, doesn't necessarily mean it can be understood solely through a physicalist lens. — Wayfarer

And I haven't anywhere said that it definitely can or that it definitely cannot. One thing I know is that the way perceptual experience might seem to us cannot be explained in terms of a mechanical model of physicality. @Apokrisis always said it can be understood in terms of a semiotic model of physicality, if I read him right. I don't have the background to properly assess the soundness of Apo's posts, and I freely admit that.

As you kind of admit, the problem is that to question the physicalist account is to open the door to - well, what, exactly? — Wayfarer

If you wish to question the neurological account, which is a physicalist account insofar as it looks for explanations in terms of neural patterns and activity, then you need to come up with a compelling alternative.

That is what you have constantly failed to do. Instead, you say proponents of physicalism are suffering from fear of religion. Your view is so skewed that you cannot see the possibility that other find religious explanations simply uncompelling.,

Your anachronistic mechanistic model of physicalism is merely the pet strawman you love to keep knocking down. I know all the kinds of arguments you marshal—for years I used to deploy them myself against physicalism. Eventually I came to see that those arguments are merely reactive, not constructive. They don't proceed from a desire to know the truth, but from a need to destroy what threatens to undermine what you wish to be the case.

It really is a staggering irony that you want to dismiss physicalist's arguments by attempting to denigrate them as being psychologically motivated by a fear of something which you obviously desperately need, and need to justify, and they don't—namely religion. Your arguments are motivated by a fear of letting go of religion. I have an open mind, which you obviously do not.

If it is not the meaning of the words that affects you in a certain way, could random words affect you in that same way? — Patterner

It seems reasonable to think that when we learn a language we learn not only words but the logic (grammar) which determines how words may be grouped together in sentences. If, having learnt a language we have established neural networks that embody that learning then the words, or better sentences and passages, activate these networks and result in the apprehension of their meaning—an interpretation.

Now of course I'm not absolutely certain that is how that works but it seems most consistent with the findings of neuroscience. What else do we have to go on? Do you think our vague intuitions that meaning cannot be physical are reliable sources of understanding and knowledge?

Let's say the semantic and the neurological are not separate at all. We don't understand how they go together, so our first pre-critical thought is that meaning cannot be an attribute of physical (neuronal) processes. Perhaps we just don't understand the physical well enough. What's the alternative? Posit the existence of another realm?

I really am not interested in discussing things with someone who is hellbent on mischaracterizing the view I am defending. — Clearbury

That's up to you of course. But I'm not interested in mischaracterizing your view of solipsism, but in understanding what it consists in. So far, I don't understand your understanding of solipsism.

Is the one mind yours or mine or both? Is it a universal mind of which we are all part?

Of course if there is only one mind the idea that there are many minds is an illusion.

What ↪Wayfarer said is true, but what you interpreted is not what he meant. The "shapes" on a computer screen are indeed physical, but it's their meta-physical*1 meaning (forms) that might affect you : — Gnomon

I am affected physically by what is said (sound) or what I read (light) and this causes changes in the body and the brain, and those changes are my interpretation of the meaning of what I have heard or seen.

You might not agree with this picture of what is happening, but nothing is missing, except of course complete understanding, which shouldn't be a surprise since we don't completely understand anything.

No, mainly on account of the kinds of things they post. — Wayfarer

I think it is mighty presumptuous of you to think that people have "forgotten themselves" just because they think the physicalist account is the most plausible. Seems to me that attitude refects nothing other than your own prejudices.

Aren't you saying the equivalent of, "I don't think comets make any difference, as long as they don't crash into us and negatively impact significant issues"? — Patterner

No, I'm not saying anything like your 'comet' analogy.
What we believe will be determinitive of what we do, broadly speaking. I just don't conceive of our thoughts, feelings, beliefs and desires as being non-physical or immaterial (in either sense). In fact it is on account of their physicality that they can be causally efficacious. Otherwise we would be looking at dualism which comes with the interaction problem.

I'm a materialist and I haven't forgotten myself—I just think of myself as material because I cannot find any immaterial modality of being in myself.

Do you believe that all materialists have forgotten themselves just because Schopenhauer said so?

You question that we have these experiences? — Patterner

I don't question the idea that we experience things.

In response to your question about people being emotionally affected by things that are said to them or by things they believe; I don't deny any of that—I just think it is all physical processes. So, I'm not understanding your puzzlement. I'm not totally wedded to believing that it is all physical processes, that just seems to me the more plausible option. I don't believe there is any determinable fact of the matter about all this.

Right, and furthermore, as you also often say, it doesn’t matter anyway. — Wayfarer

I don't see the point of this comment. Is it meant to be some kind of criticism? When I say it doesn't matter what I believe I mean that I cannot help being convinced by what I am convinced by, and I also believe that is the case with all of us. We don't choose to find most plausible what we do find most plausible, we just find it most plausible. Although maybe some people are more motivated by what they want to be true than by concerns about plausibility—I don't deny that..

Different people may be more or less free of confirmation bias, but it doesn't follow that they have any choice in the matter of whether or not they are affected by it. People don't always understand their own motivations. I don't deny the possibility that I don't understand my own motivations. I am always willing to change my mind, which I have done a few times in the years since I've been participating in philosophy forums, as well as prior to that, ever since I began thinking about these things and reading philosophy. I wonder if you have ever changed your mind. I've seen no evidence of it.