Sage advice from the Buddha: watch your breath. Don’t pursue chains of thought, or allow yourself to be seized by emotion. Know that everything is transient. Carry on.

I encourage any Q-physicist reading this post to consider enrolling in this course — jgill

If you mean this https://www.conted.ox.ac.uk/courses/reality-being-and-existence-an-introduction-to-metaphysics-online - I've had that course bookmarked a long while but have never found the time to enroll. But I agree, I think it looks a worthwhile undertaking.

There is for Aristotle no "equal itself" existing by itself timeless and unchanging. — Fooloso4

I’m very aware the ‘problem of reification’ when this discussion comes up. I know that Aristotle is said to have ‘immanetized the Forms’ but I don’t believe that by so doing he denied their reality. But I will do some more reading on it. I think I will also create a new thread on Gerson's essay Platonism vs Naturalism, for which there is a video of his reading of it.

FIrst rate. I have encountered the Comford book before and will re-visit it. (I love the image of the tethered goat although of course Jurassic Park comes to mind which is wildly anachronistic.) But much to chew over there, I will return to those points.

I'm posting irregularly at the moment due to work commitments. Appreciate the feedback

Nature doesn't create good and bad people; it creates biological strategies, which are then moulded by social contexts and judged through ideological lenses. — Baden

But that's the defiency of naturalism, and the hope that naturalism will provide some kind of moral compass. At best, as you say, it can provide a means of orienting yourself to your social context, hopefully positive. But nature is indifferent to good or bad, there's only the well-adapted, and then those who aren't - presumably departed.

I think it's necessary to peer behind all of the socially-conditioned concepts of "theism" to ascertain if there really is a true good, a true north which the ethical compass must orient towards. Of course as soon as you say that, it sounds like an appeal to religion, and is then opposed on those very grounds. But if there is to be any kind of real ethical principle, then I don't see how it can be avoided. Perhaps it can be re-articulated or re-mapped as existentialism attempts to do but deep down it's grappling with the same level of elemental truth - suffering is bad, love is good, life is transient, success is perishing, all we hold dear will pass. And so on.

One of the essays I often hark back to is Anything But Human, by Richard Polt, a Heidegger scholar, arguing against the reductionism of much modern thinking. He makes no appeal to theism, yet strangely his ideas, like those of Heidegger, echo those concerns in a more contemporary idiom. Because absent "theism" - a word I'm sure only sprang into popular usage with the Internet, as that to which "atheism" is a foil - then what is it to be human, other than a highly-evolved animal or not-very-efficient computer?

Wherever I turn, the popular media, scientists and even fellow philosophers are telling me that I’m a machine or a beast. My ethics can be illuminated by the behavior of termites. My brain is a sloppy computer with a flicker of consciousness and the illusion of free will. I’m anything but human.

Maybe the rejection of "theism" often, maybe always, results in the loss of something more than an archaic social institution. Maybe "atheism" is right, but whether it is or not, it ought to be of concern to everyone.

I don't find the argument persuasive. — Fooloso4

I find it more than persuasive, I'm compelled by it. And why? Because, in the broadest sense, as soon as you appeal to reason then you're already relying on something very like the knowledge of the forms.

Lloyd Gerson in his seminal paper Platonism vs Naturalism, put it like this:

...in thinking*, [says Aristotle] the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a Form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

*I take this to mean 'thinking' in the sense of discursive reason, not simply idle mental contents.

Another Aristotelian says:

For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real). — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

Examples could be multiplied indefinitely but these suffice to make my point.

(It's also significant that the arguments all go back to anamnesis, the doctrine of recollection. There is, of course, the suggestion of what the soul knew, prior to 'falling' into this life. But a naturalistic account might be provided by, for example, Chomsky's 'universal grammar', although that's a topic for another thread.)

'argument from imperfection' anticipates Kant's Transcendental Arguments.
— Wayfarer

Sure reads that way. — Mww

I'm beginning to see the connection. Still working on it.

'What did you do the cat, Erwin? Looks half dead!' ~ Ms Schrodinger.

Please elucidate the training program in metaphysics I would need to complete to be considered competent in metaphysics. Be specific as possible. — jgill

I don't know if there's a course about it, but there are a number of books by qualified quantum physicists who are deeply versed in it, beginning with Werner Heisenberg's Physics and Philosophy. There's Bernard D'Espagnat, who studied under the quantum pioneers and was a senior scientist at CERN, whose books also include one called Physics and Philosophy. Shimon Malin, Nature Loves to Hide, is another. Another two recent books that I've read cover-to-cover are Quantum, Manjit Kumar, and Uncertainty, David Lindley. There's a writer called Tim Maudlin who writes on the metaphysics of physics. I'm sure there'd be graduate course on physics and metaphysics floating around which makes reference to one or more of these books. There's probably a bunch of lectures on Youtube. Michel Bitbol's lecture on Kantian Quantum Physics is a good one.

'Whenever I hear of Schrodinger's cat, I reach for my gun' ~ Stephen Hawking.

Rather than looking at it in terms of empiricism, I look at it in terms of practice. A carpenter determines that two boards are of equal length. If they are not then one will either not fit or be too loose. A merchant puts things on a scale. They are of equal weight or not. They either balance or not. Rather than thinking of it in terms of equality they might be thought of in terms of bigger and smaller or the same. — Fooloso4

That is discussed in the Dialogue. But a distinction is explicitly made between the equality of sensibles and absolute equality, which are said to be of different kinds. Through the comparison of larger and smaller, equal or not equal, we are reminded of the idea of equal, which we already have at time of birth but have forgotten. But the suggestion is not that we arrive at the idea of equality by seeing empirical objects of equal size, because empirical objects are not absolute, which the idea of equality is.

“Whence did we derive the knowledge of it [i.e. equality]? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?”

“Certainly.”

“Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?”

“No, Socrates, never.”

“Then,” said he, “those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract.”

“Not at all, I should say, Socrates.”

“But from those equals,” said he, “which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?”

“Very true,” he replied.

“And it is either like them or unlike them?”

“Certainly.”

“It makes no difference,” said he. “Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection.”

“Surely.”

“Now then,” said he, “do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?”

“They fall very far short of it,” said he.

“Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, 'This thing that I see aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it, he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?”

“We must.”

“Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?”

“It certainly is.”

“Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, ‘All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.’”

“That is true.”

“And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike.”

“Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument.”

“Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?”

“Yes.”

“Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it.”

“That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates.”

“And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?”

[75c] “Certainly.”
“But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?”

“Yes.

“Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born.”

“It does.”

“Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of absolute in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth.”

“That is true.”

“And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?”

“Certainly, Socrates,” said he.

“But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?”

“Assuredly.” — Phaedo

//incidentally, this, and the Meno, is practically the origin of the idea of the philosophical a priori, is it not?//

For example, part of the meaning of modern atheism are the unsustainable life-styles we associate with consumer-capitalism, life-styles that Baby Boomers in particular often justify on the basis of their metaphysical belief that "you only live once" . Atheism both drives, and is driven by, consumer capitalism, e.g. retailers preaching to us that we must live this 'one' life to the fullest.

If my opinion is correct, then the rise of sustainable environmentalism throughout the world will be correlated with a rejection of today's widespread atheistic beliefs for metaphysical belief systems that give moral incentive for individuals to live sustainably. — sime

:100:

I don't find the argument persuasive. Socrates says he is not talking about one thing being equal to another (74a), but I think that is where we get the idea from. We can see that one thing is larger than or more than another. The less the difference the closer they come to being equal. — Fooloso4

I suggest you're not finding it persuasive for the reason that the empirical philosophers always give in such instances - that it is derived from experience. The counter to that is that we already have to have the conception of Equals to arrive at such judgements. It's similar to Mills argument that we derive the basic concepts of arithmetic from experience. But the counter to that is we can't recognise numbers until we are able to count, so the ability must precede the experience for us to recognise it as number. Leaving aside that some animals can recognise small groups of numbers ('count') no amount of experience will impart to a non-rational intelligence what the abstract concept of Equals conveys.

There is nothing in empirical existence which directly corresponds with '='. The fact that we use it all of the time in maths, in a vernacular sense in ordinary speech, doesn't detract from that, rather it reinforces the point that it is part of the innate architecture of reason, which Plato in particular did so much to articulate.

An abstract ideal, in this case equality which is indeed different than being equal. is not properly a knowledge but more an intellectual presupposition, later to be transformed into Aristotle’s categories, thus not technically derivable from instances of perception. — Mww

That is much nearer the mark. And those categories persist, with only very minor modifications, in Kant. And indeed I think the 'argument from imperfection' anticipates Kant's Transcendental Arguments.

The first thing that comes to mind for me is that while no two sticks are equal to one another, they are equal to themselves. So Socrates is equal to Socrates -- the actualization of the relationship of equality is that relationship which any individual has with itself. — Moliere

I don't know if that is signicant, is it? I mean in later logic, there is the law of identity, that A=A, but I again that also appeals to the concept of Equals.

I don't see that at all
— Wayfarer

Don't see what? — frank

Any basis for your response to fooloso4's posts. If you say they're neo-platonic, or Protestant. then produce an argument for that. As for 'having one religion based on Platonism', aside from being a pretty big claim, it doesn't amount to any kind of argument, either.

Any comments on the Argument from Imperfection?

there's an argument in the Phaedo (which I don't recall being discussed in the thread on that dialogue) called The Argument from Imperfection (reference). Basically this revolves around the 'idea of Equals'. It points out that there is no physical instantiation or example of 'Equals'. It argues that things that we see as equal - two sticks, or two stones - are not really equal but merely alike. Plato argues that the ability to grasp 'Equal' amounts to grasping the Form of Equal, which is something that is done solely by the Intellect, not by sensory apprehension.

That argument has intuitive appeal to me, because I believe that it is indeed true that 'Equal' has no physical instantiation, and yet it is a fundamental element of mathematical and indeed general reasoning. — Wayfarer

It seems germane to the topic.

Well it's an optimistic attitude. Actually it was advocated by Augustine, although it's fallen into disfavour since.

Interesting. That wiki article on pandeism says in part:

Weinstein examines the philosophy of 9th century theologian Johannes Scotus Eriugena, who proposed that "God has created the world out of his own being", and identifies this as a form of pandeism, noting in particular that Eriugena's vision of God was one which does not know what it is, and learns this through the process of existing as its creation. In his great work, De divisione naturae (also called Periphyseon, probably completed around 867 AD), Eriugena proposed that the nature of the universe is divisible into four distinct classes:

1 – that which creates and is not created;
2 – that which is created and creates;
3 – that which is created and does not create;
4 – that which neither is created nor creates.

The first stage is God as the ground or origin of all things; the second is the world of Platonic ideals or forms; the third is the wholly physical manifestation of our Universe, which "does not create"; the last is God as the final end or goal of all things, that into which the world of created things ultimately returns to completeness with the additional knowledge of having experienced this world. A contemporary statement of this idea is that: "Since God is not a being, he is therefore not intelligible... This means not only that we cannot understand him, but also that he cannot understand himself. Creation is a kind of divine effort by God to understand himself, to see himself in a mirror." French journalist Jean-Jacques Gabut agreed, writing that "a certain pantheism, or rather pandeism, emerges from his work where Neo-Platonic inspiration perfectly complements the strict Christian orthodoxy." Eriugena himself denied that he was a pantheist.

(Presumably because to have affirmed it would be to court heresy, which I think he was suspected of and which in his time amounted to a death sentence.)

Dermot Moran has a book on the influence of Eriugena on German Idealism (via the medieval mystics).

I must admit, it was one of those books I bought, or was given, but still sits unread on my shelf. But I understand the point is pretty central to her thesis. Of course hankering for the past is not something I would encourage, but it's an understandable attitude. But I also wonder if fundamentalism is not actually a personality profile - the desire for the certainty of view, of being on the right side, and so on.

Fair point, but Spinoza says many things which I don't expect I would see from the pens of atheists. Besides, whilst he was often accused of atheism, he denied it. In the Ethics, Spinoza finds lasting happiness only in the “intellectual love of God”, which is the mystical, non-dual vision of the single “Substance” (I think 'subject' would be better here') underlying everything and everyone. The non-dual nature of this vision is clearly announced by Spinoza when he says that “[t]he mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself” (Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 36). Since, for Spinoza, God is the Whole that includes everything, it also includes your love for God, and thus God can be said to love Itself through you.

Absolute evil is the reflection/mirror image of... — Agent Smith

according to some doctrines, evil cannot be absolute, for it comprises the privation of the good.

What about the category of ‘the sacred’? Is that also rejected?

Origen and Augustine both condemned fundamentalism in the first and fourth centuries AD, respectively. Nowadays, it's mainly a revolt against the unprecedented range and speed of change in modern culture.

I expect that anyone who believes in life everlasting would not be materialistic, for instance, yet Christians, at least in the US, seem quite ordinary in that regard. — praxis

I expect that a good number of conscientious Christians don't spend a lot of time arguing.

Secular means 'pertaining to the state'. Concerns things like making the trains run on time and building bridges and the like. A secular state allows for the practice of any religion or none, despite the fact that it is routinely interpreted to mean that 'none' is better than 'any'.

The irony in this statement is that it seems to be based on you thinking that you know what science can and cannot ascertain, rather than leaving it as an open question to be determined by further inquiry. — Janus

It's not just my opinion. I think what is known as the 'Copenhagen interpretation' and also QBism both acknowledge this. Remember Heisdenberg's ''What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.' I think the 'Copenhagen intepretation' (which is not a theory or an hypothesis but an attitude) is very mindful of what can't be said on the basis of quantum physics. Whereas those interpretations that insist on preserving so-called 'objectivity' are then obliged to posit infinitely dividing universes to accomodate their requirements.

I don't see that at all. I get a lot from Fooloso4's posts, but mainly I get how little I know about Plato, and the Herculean task of becoming more familiar with the labyrinthine layers of meaning.

A general question I have is this: I think there is a widespread mistake in the understanding of the term 'Forms'. I think it's almost universally taken to be something like shape - after all, in English, 'shape' and 'form' are very close in meaning. But I would have thought that a better modern interpretation would be something like 'principle'.

For instance, there's an argument in the Phaedo (which I don't recall being discussed in the thread on that dialogue) called The Argument from Imperfection (reference). Basically this revolves around the 'idea of Equals'. It points out that there is no physical instantiation or example of 'Equals'. It argues that things that we see as equal - two sticks, or two stones - are not really equal but merely alike. Plato argues that the ability to grasp 'Equal' amounts to grasping the Form of Equal, which is something that is done solely by the Intellect, not by sensory apprehension.

That argument has intuitive appeal to me, because I believe that it is indeed true that 'Equal' has no physical instantiation, and yet it is a fundamental element of mathematical and indeed general reasoning.

If you're not inclined to believe it, no argument will suffice. I read somewhere that Aquinas's 'five proofs' and other such arguments were never intended as apologetics or conversion devices but as edifying exercises for the faithful.

I have some experience with Pure Land Buddhism. This is very much a faith-based religion, where enlightenment is realised through recitation of the name of Amidha Buddha. One of their articles of faith is 'not engaging in religious disputes'. Probably wise.

I sometimes reflect on the asymmetry between atheism and theism. As far as believers are concerned, God is not a social theory or internet talking point, but the most important fact about life. For them, 'life everlasting' is real, and so the lack of it is a real loss, an inestimable tragedy. Whereas for atheism, it's only a matter of a false belief, which can't have any significance beyond the sociological or affective, because it doesn't stand for anything real in the first place. And I can't see any way to square that circle.

it doesn’t accept the basic premise that there is a world out there and that our job is to understand it. — Why QBism is completely empty - Mateus Araújo

I'm still persuaded by Pienaar. This 'basic premise', the division of self and world, is after all what is being called into question, and with good reason, as we are not ultimately outside of or apart from reality. Reality includes the observer, who is the subject of experience, the being to whom the world is meaningful. Pienaar's remarks about Cartesianism also make sense to me, see the Cartesian Anxiety.

Well, yes, but it's often difficult to make the case. It's also not true, as that article I lnked above, that Wittgenstein should be interepreted as a positivist, despite the fact that the Vienna Circle held him in awe. I also found this abstract although I'm not really interested in all the ins and outs.

I made the OP as a pretty straight-ahead positivist. Positivism generally expresses contempt for metaphysics as meaningless words. Originally it was a term coined by Auguste Comte who founded social sciences, but it was also the focus of the Vienna Circle school which was influential between the wars, and A. J. (Freddie) Ayer, whose book Language Truth and Logic was also very influential in 1940's 'Oxbridge'.

For a while. However after some time, people began to realise that the underlying argument of positivism was circular, because positivism itself was no more amenable to their verificationist criteria than their ostensible targets. As David Stove pointed out, if you read the concluding sentence of Hume's 'Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding':

"If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning, concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

then ask yourself of the volume you have just finished, 'Does it contain....'

And the answer is in the negative. (Hume has been called the 'godfather of positivism'.) As Stove always then delighted in pointing out, positivism is like the uroboros, the mythical snake that consumes it's own tail. 'The hardest part', he would say with a wry grin 'is the last bite'.

I too learned a lot from Tobias posts on the previous forum.

Zettel is not around any more, but if he was, I'd point him to Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Folly of Logical Positivism.

Well the way I see it, as one delves deeper into oneself more primitive wants or needs become the motivations for various things we hold true to our identity. For example: I go to the gym to workout, which follows that I do so because I want to be revered, which follows that I do so because I want women to want me, Which follows that I just want sex. — john27

In Freudian theory, that would be the 'id', 'the primitive and instinctual part of the mind that contains sexual and aggressive drives and hidden memories'. Nothing to do with 'perversion' as such although how it's channelled or expressed may be the result of a perversion.

or maybe that God and the angels argue about it now. — Interpretive cards (MWI, Bohm, Copenhagen: collect ’em all) - Scott Aaronson

Incidentally, the oft-ridiculed Medieval meme of ‘how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?’ actually started about a debate as to whether two incorporeal intelligences can occupy the same location. Somehow, this reminds me of 'super-position'. (Although perhaps the very possibility is excluded by the medieval equivalent of Pauli's principle, although I haven't dug that deep into it.)

I'd also be interested to hear your opinion on whether identity is linked with perversion, or vice versa. — john27

I'm sure we'd all be interested to hear on opinion on this, as currently the implication completely escapes me.

I think we’re all wresting with these things. It’s one of the main reasons that we’re members of a philosophy forum.

I think it’s possible to be critical without being totally cynical. I am disappointed to learn about this aspect of Descartes’ character, but that doesn’t mean I want him struck from the history books. Understanding something of Descartes’ philosophy is important for understanding modern culture. But I agree, there’s plenty to be critical of. As that passage says, at the very least, Descartes ought to have known better, and many purported devotees of his ‘mechanist’ philosophy used it to justify enormous suffering.

(By way of antidote to the above, see this tear-jerker:

https://wapo.st/3Y1hqOb

Reflecting on my own experience on forums, I’ve become upset mainly when I’m enthusiastic about an idea or perspective and others pour cold water on it. There have been times when I’ve been seriously perturbed by online debates. Debates about religion, philosophy and politics are often like that, one of the reasons that it has been considered poor etiquette to broach political and religious topics on social occasions (although of course this being a forum that is what is expected). But then learning to deal with adverse reactions has also been an important learning, and detachment is an important attribute. One of the best lecturers I had in philosophy had an uncanny ability to present differing philosophical perspectives in a way that was sympathetic to both sides without ever really needing to signal what he himself thought was right. He just laid out the cases, anticipated objections, summarised the issues. I admired that in him.

It’s also a factor that we live in a period of intense polarisation of views - culture wars, and the like. Many people hold very strongly to ideas that others may feel are absurd or dangerous. Anti-religious ideologues may see all religion as superstition, and fundamentalists may see science as the work of the devil. And so on. It’s one of the background factors in today’s culture. Again it’s where an element of detachment is important - doesn’t mean being apathetic, but learning to make dispassionate judgements.

Well, you know, Zen Buddhists are famous for eschewing all written teachings yet their canon comprises thousands of volumes.

And I generally agree with Aaronson’s descriptive categories. I am very impressed with Christian Fuchs’ philosophy of QBism which I guess puts me in the second category. Deutsch et al seem to want to preserve the principle of objectivity above all else.

Yes, Copenhagen can be understood as the operational interpretation - shut-up-and-calculate. — Andrew M

I’m sure that’s not right, either. That infamous phrase was, I believe, coined by David Mermin, mainly in respect to the attitudes of the many working physicists who were employed in roles that require expert knowledge of quantum physics and couldn’t afford to spend time wondering about the implications.

Likewise, Bohr was often misinterpreted as being a positivist, but that is far from the case. Heisenberg relates a story where Bohr lectured the Vienna Circle positivists on the implications of quantum mechanics, and afterwards they all politely applauded and murmured approval. This is when Bohr uttered the often-quoted remark that ‘if you are not shocked by quantum physics, then you cannot have understood it.’

Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Pauli, and others of that generation were deeply cultured individuals with deep knowledge of philosophy both Eastern and Western. The ‘shut up and calculate’ generation were mainly Americans after WW2. Totally different mindset.

Here is a passage from the web page that calls into question Descartes’ participation in the torture of dogs. It is by one Kevin R. D. Shepherd who seems a reputable source. I agree with the sentiment.

As a philosopher, Descartes surely ought to have been more resistant to fashionable cruelty of the leisured class of scientists active in his own time. His inclination to the contrary places him in the same category as reprehensible events of the 1660s, when thirty vivisections were conducted in the presence of assembled members of the Royal Society in London.

A well known early report of brutal Cartesian vivisectionists at the Port Royal School, in Paris, has aroused differences of interpretation. One commentary says the report “may not be trustworthy.” That account was written years after the events described. However, there are other reports of animal experiments in the late seventeenth century, along with implications that Cartesian mechanists made no attempt to minimise animal suffering, believing that this was an illusion (Boden 2006:72-3).

The Port Royal report describes dogs being nailed alive to boards for dissection. This was during the 1650s. The callous behaviour is very easy to credit, as the Jansenist milieu under discussion is known to have been influenced by Cartesian attitudes, via leading figures at the Port Royal School and related Abbey. Someone had taught the pupils a Cartesian approach to supposed automata. The report was included in the Memoires of Nicolas Fontaine (1625-1709), a contribution which is very difficult to ignore (on the Port Royal School, see Delforges 1985).

Vivisection increased substantially as a consequence of Cartesian doctrine, being avidly practised by the Royal Society. This organisation was founded by a group of scientists including Robert Boyle (1627-91) and Robert Hooke (1635-1703). Their crimes are on record, including the injection of poisons, ever since a favoured device of laboratory personnel. Dogs, sheep, and other animals were the victims. Hooke is known to have vivisected a dog in 1667, and in this respect was a virtual blood brother of Descartes.

Hooke’s prestigious colleague Robert Boyle was an ardent defender of vivisection, viewing critics as sentimentalists. How tough and supremely insensitive the empiricists were. The objectors were here viewed as “a discouraging impediment to the empire of man over the inferior creatures of God” (Boden 2006:73).

The question as to whether observation must consist of a conscious act is a contentious one.

In 1958, Schrödinger, inspired by Schopenhauer from youth, published his lectures Mind and Matter. Here he argued that there is a difference between measuring instruments and human observation: a thermometer’s registration cannot be considered an act of observation, as it contains no meaning in itself. Thus, consciousness is needed to make physical reality meaningful. As Schrödinger concluded, "Some of you, I am sure, will call this mysticism.…’ — “Quantum Mysticism, Gone but not Forgotten

I think for me the vivisection example is still enough — Moliere

Of course, it’s abhorrent, but it is still a niche below nailing dogs to boards and flaying them alive while saying their cries of agony are like squeaky wheels. I’m beginning to think that it’s an Internet myth.

Makes one wonder about the agenda residing in those that promote undocumented nonsense, resting assured somebody or other will take it for gospel. — Mww

As said above, I’m coming to the view that the passage referenced by the RealClearScience page that I quoted is not true. It’s the old story, don’t believe everything you read on the Internet, although the subsequent discussion of treatment of animals and the implications of Descartes’ dualism remains interesting in its own right.

For those who might have missed it - from further reading, I think the story about Descartes deliberately torturing dogs as a public display is not true according to two sources I link to in this post. He did have an interest in, and sometimes participated in, vivisection (dissection of live animals) but that is a different matter to public displays of torturing animals.

From a little further reading reveals the suggestion that the previously-mentioned acts of 'hammering dogs to boards' was actually carried out not by Descartes but by pupils at a college influenced by Cartesian ideas. However the same source also notes that Descartes was interested in vivisection and anatomical examination of animals alive and dead. Another source says that the report about maltreatment of dogs was written long after the events and may not be trustworthy.

It seems to me that on further reading, the story about Descartes appalling treatment of dogs is apocryphal at best, but that he certainly was interested in vivisection, not least because of his theory that the mind and the body interacted via the pituitary gland.

But, as far as the story that opened this thread is concerned, unless someone has better information, I'm somewhat relieved to report that it probably is not true.

In the article Descartes on Animals in the Philosophical Quarterly, Peter Harrison argues that the view that Descartes denied feelings to animals is mistaken. — RussellA

I did find a copy of that work, and scanned it, but it doesn't make any mention of the allegations that I found in the post I linked to, about Descartes actually mounting demonstrations of torturing dogs. Towards the very end, Harrison says 'Whether Descartes' hypothesis encouraged such practices as vivisection remains an open question', so presumably Harrison is not aware of such claims. Now this thread has attracted so much attention, I'll put some more time into double-checking the substance of it.