So it all comes back to: there is no appreciable difference between the verbs 'to be' and 'to exist'. Everyone here generally accepts that, but I dissent. I'm quite happy to leave it at that. I will not push the point in future.

Backing up a little, I'm confused by this:

To use "beings" to refer to anything which can be said to be, whether animate or not, is consistent with a fundamental difference between...subjects of experience and things that are not subjects of experience. — Jamal

So, how can using the same word for both 'subjects' and 'non-subjects' be 'consistent with a fundamental difference'. If it's the same word, and refers to both classes, then how can it convey 'a fundamental difference'? Or did you mean to write, 'is consistent with there being no fundamental difference between...'

So, what do you think is the philosophical signficance of the fact that 'man alone' is capable of 'encountering the question of being', and that no other beings are able to do that. Do you think this is a significant distinction?

If we look around at beings in general—from particles to planets, ants to apes—it is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be - Heidegger. — Jamal

Note that Heidegger singles out 'human beings', because they alone are able to encounter the question of 'what it means to be'. No other beings - particles and planets, ants and apes - are able to do this. To all intents, that is the same distinction I was seeking to make.

What's going on here is the battle between 'being' as entity and 'being' as person is being fought as a proxy for the battle for primacy between phenomenological existence and material matter as the proper subject of ontology. — Isaac

Close. Originally the starting point of the debate was my claim that the term 'ontology' refers to 'the meaning of being', and not to 'the analysis of what exists'. (I'm quite aware, for example, that ontology is used in computer networks for the classification of the various kinds of devices that comprise it. I'm sure, though I don't know for certain, there are many other scientific ontologies as well.)

I claimed that 'ontology' was originally derived from the first-person participle of being - which is 'I am'. This is the claim which a former mod took strong exception to as an 'eccentric' or 'idiosyncratic' definition. Fair enough with respect to the 'first person case', but it is a fact that 'ontology' is derived from the Greek verb 'to be', and, as Charles Kahn's analysis shows, it has a different (and much broader) set of meanings to 'to exist'.

The philosophical point of that, is that the natural sciences, which are concerned with 'what exists', are not concerned with 'the meaning of being' in the philosophical sense. (Which is not a slight to the natural sciences, only a matter of demarcation.)

If we restrict world to linguistic, perceptual or abstract entities, then sure. But he says consciousness is a precondition of “being.” If by ‘being’ he means the world of aforementioned entities, then sure. But I’m not convinced of this.

I think he’s taking an idealist view, basically. — Mikie

Finally. This is all I was getting at.

Sure. All I’ve said all along is that in common speech, beings are differentiated from things. But then I’ve used that to argue for there being a real distinction which is what seemed to trigger the whole debate. The meta-question, if you like, is what is the source of that controversy. Why does it matter that beings are or are not different from things?

I was not referring to 'being' as a verb, as already stated a number of times, but of the distinction between beings (as a general noun) and things (as a general noun). I'm not denyinig that 'existent things are' or 'all things exist' or anything of the kind nor that anything that is, is existent, or 'has being', or that philosophers often discuss 'being in general', meaning 'everything that exists'.

But as for the simple distinction between beings and things, I was returned this result:

Q: What is the difference between things and beings?

A: Things refer to inanimate objects, physical entities, or concepts that lack life or consciousness. They can include tangible objects such as rocks, buildings, and machines, as well as intangible concepts such as ideas, theories, and laws.

On the other hand, beings refer to living entities, whether they are animals, humans, or other organisms, that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act. Beings can experience emotions, make choices, and interact with the world around them.

In summary, the main difference between things and beings is that things are inanimate and lack life and consciousness, while beings are living entities that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act. — ChatGPT

Which I take to be the regular meanings of the terms - 'language being use', and all that. And the further claim that this distinction in common language reflects an intuition which maybe no longer so obvious in current culture (and is being completely ignored in the foregoing discussion).

Without consciousness to disclose it, being would be "blind", hidden; nothing would appear. That's why he states the caveat "practically speaking". — Janus

:up: Agree. So - can you see how I am trying to relate this to the designation of humans as 'beings'? i.e. that the human psyche is indispensable to the disclosure of being. So would such a state of 'blindness', to press the metaphor, even be 'a state of being'? Would one refer to 'the state of being' of the early universe? I think not.

As also evidenced in this passage:

What is more, most of the natural sciences try to represent the results of their investigations as though these had come into existence without man’s intervention, in such a way that the collaboration of the psyche – an indispensable factor – remains invisible. (An exception to this is modern physics, which recognizes that the observed is not independent of the observer.) So in this respect, too, science conveys a picture of the world from which a real human psyche appears to be excluded – the very antithesis of the “humanities.” — Carl Jung, The Hidden Self

Two questions about this: in what sense is the psyche (what Aristotle would call 'the soul') an 'indispensable factor', and why does he cite 'modern physics' as an exception?

As I asked already, does Jung mean by this that consciousness is a pre-condition for the existence of rocks?
— Wayfarer

Yes.

Rocks are part of the world, right? So no world, no rocks. — Mikie

So you agree then that the world is created by consciousness.

You asked for citations and I provided them. Are you saying that the quotations do not show that it's normal, standard, conventional, and traditional that "beings" in philosophy are whatever can be said to be? — Jamal

None of them directly refer to inanimate things as beings. They're discussions of 'the nature of being' in which context everything is subsumed under the heading 'beings', in the sense of 'things that exist'. But none of them equivocate 'beings' and 'inanimate things'. In fact you even acknowledge it:

I don't know the reason for the general avoidance of "beings" in translations of Aristotle. — Jamal

I'm saying that this is the reason!. And even supporting it with another of your citations about 'the great chain of being' which provides the basis for the ancient and medieval distinction between non-living and living of various degrees (vegetative, animal, human). You won't find anything in there to support the contention of rocks being conscious. (It is of course a truism that the whole idea of the great chain of being is now considered thoroughly obsolete in modern philosophy, but there's where the distinction originates.)

Please consider the quote in the original post again:

Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being. — Carl Jung

My question was an attempt to spell out why Jung would say this. I was attempting to interpret the OP. As I asked already, does Jung mean by this that consciousness is a pre-condition for the existence of rocks? I think that it is clearly an absurd suggestion. So what does he mean 'consciousness is a pre-condition of being'? I was trying to elucidate the philosophical implication of the term human being in response to the use of 'being' in this quotation. And so far, I don't think any light has been cast on that whatever.

(Now, I really do have to log out for at least the working day, I have major work commitments. And I'm really not being stubborn, but I refuse to admit to an error that I haven't made.)

I see where you're coming from, but my point still stands (and stands well-supported now I think). — Jamal

Well, we'll just have to agree to disagree on that, but it's been good discussion.
I think the materials you cited locate the source of the debate, which is in the rejection of 'levels of being', don't you think?

(I'm going to be scarce for a few days due to work stuff.)

There are pages and pages of this, but I have other sources aside from the SEP if you need — Jamal

These are all relevant citations, but I'm afraid that they don't prove the contention that no distinction is made in philosophy between 'beings' and 'things'.

The plural neuter form of the participle, ta onta, occurs frequently to indicate things, things that are, beings (but we have tended to avoid the translation 'beings') — Early Greek Philosophy, Volume I: Introductory and Reference Materials

I don't know the reason for the general avoidance of "beings" in translations of Aristotle. — Jamal

Probably for the reasons that I have given.

The natural scientist studies them as things that are subject to the laws of nature, as things that move and undergo change. That is, the natural scientist studies things qua movable (i.e., in so far as they are subject to change). The mathematician studies things qua countable and measurable. The metaphysician, on the other hand, studies them in a more general and abstract way — SEP: Aristotle’s Metaphysics

Note the distinction here between 'things' subject to the laws of nature and 'beings' in a more general sense. What has been translated as 'substantia' in Latin, and thence 'substance' in English, was 'ouisia' in Aristotle. So the metaphysican studies 'the being' of things, how they 'come to be'. (This is the substance of The Greek Verb to Be and the Meaning of Being by Kahn, although he mainly concentrates on Aristotle's predecessors.)

The correlatives form, therefore, a complex structure that is reproduced throughout the ladder and in each one of the beings, from God to a stone, to ontologically explain the continuity among all beings. In each one of them, the chain of the whole of creation is reproduced. — SEP: Ramon Llull

This is a reference to 'the Great Chain of Being'. In that chain, each step represents an ontological level or plane of being. Minerals and inorganic matter at the bottom is, in this scheme, the least real, then ascending through vegetable, animal, human, angels, and God.



This is generally considered archaic in modern philosophy. According to materialism only the bottom rung (matter-energy) is considered real, with everything else derived from it by some unexplained power (usually generally designated under the heading of 'evolution'). My general view is that the whole notion the vertical dimension of Being was abandoned in the advent of modernity, which is why the distinctions of different levels of being, and the distinction between things and beings, is no longer intelligible.

Only because it’s been muddied.

which is kind of ironic because Buddhists are intent on extinguishing sentience. — praxis

You should tell that to all those Buddhist activists who go around liberating caged animals.

Do you have the quote? — Noble Dust

The passage from which the thread title is extracted, is as follows:

Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being. — Carl Jung

Straw poll: who else participating in this thread accepts that rocks are beings?

(It seems we might be being infiltrated by panpsychists ;-) )

Rocks are beings. — Mikie

So how does this stack up against Jung’s idea that the thread is opened with? Doesn’t this imply that Jung is saying that consciousness is a precondition for the existence of rocks? Is that what you think he means?

But I do rather resent being asked for citations. — Jamal

Don't worry about it, then. A sentence would do, anything you can think of where a classical philosophy text refers to inanimate objects as 'beings'.

Have a look at these blog posts

https://thepietythatliesbetween.blogspot.com/2010/06/what-is-naturalism-part-ii-kants.html

https://thepietythatliesbetween.blogspot.com/2010/06/what-is-naturalism-part-iii-quest-for.html

Physicalists and such people reduce the difference between sentient individuals (e.g., humans) and non-sentient individuals (e.g., trees) to a difference in degree, rejecting the idea that they are different in kind. — Jamal

That is an oversimplification. It is an axiom of materialism that there is only one substance, in the philosophical sense, which is matter (nowadays matter-energy). It is assumed by many whether they consciously articulate it or not. Accordingly, there can be no ontological distinction between things and beings, as an ontological distinction would mean a different kind of being, which materialism can't allow. (For further elaboration I'll refer back to the article linked in this post.)

traditionally in philosophy, anything that can be said to be is a being. — Jamal

That is one I will need a citation for.

Notice in the Brittannica snippet you cited:

"For Aristotle, “being” is whatever is anything whatever. Whenever Aristotle explains the meaning of being, he does so by explaining the sense of the Greek verb to be. Being contains whatever items can be the subjects of true propositions containing the word is, whether…"

The reference here is not to *a* being, but to being. Is there a citation where Aristotle refers to anything inanimate as 'a being'?

The Brittanica article that contains the quote from Aristotle, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Being

is quite a good jumping-off point for the history of the idea in philosophy.

you have said to people, for example, that inanimate things are not beings, in conversations about metaphysics, where "beings" standardly refers to anything which can be said to be. — Jamal

I will henceforth agree that anything that exists can be called an existent or an existing thing and that of anything that exists that it can be said to be. I'll add that as a caveat in all such discussions. Would that help?

Don't know about that. See this.

I've already agreed that being and existence are different concepts. — Jamal

That is only what I tried to argue in the first place!

What is your reason for telling [Aristotle] he is wrong? (As you have told people here many times) — Jamal

I don't think I've done that, anywhere. That snippet you provided about Aristotle claims that his books of the Metaphysics are 'among the most difficult' in the Western corpus, but then, the belief is now that all this is superseded, Aristotelian metaphysics is the preserve of churchmen and academics. It is in that context that I made the point about the difference between the classical and modern understanding of the question of the nature of being. The modern understanding is that this is largely a scientific matter, as some contributors here have already asserted.

I don't recall telling anyone that they're wrong, but I will continue to argue that eliding the distinction between beings and things results in treating humans (and other sentient beings) as objects, and that this is deeply embedded in our way of thinking. (So saying that trees are beings might be a step in the right direction, although it would have major ramifications for the forestry industry!) This is very much one of the themes in The Hidden Self. There is a lot of critical commentary on the 'objectification' of humans by science, which brackets out the fundamentally subjective dimension of existence.

I don't think I've been aggressive — Jamal

I agree. It's simply a robust exchange of views. And I acknowledge that my philosophical approach rubs a lot of people up the wrong way.

only sentient individuals are beings. — Jamal

What I said was that 'beings are subjects of experience'. That, of course, is not the only meaning of 'being' or 'to be', which is not and has never been at issue. You and I and the cat on the mat and the tree and the rock are all existents - we all exist. But the cat and you and I are also subjects of experience, and it's a difference that makes a difference.

The starting point of this whole debate was years ago, when I opined that the noun 'ontology' ought not to be understood simply as 'the classification of what exists'. That, I said, was properly the domain of the natural sciences, whereas ontology was originally conceived strictly as 'the meaning of "being"', while noting in passing that a source I had found (no longer extant) said that the etymology of the term 'ontology' was derived from the first-person participle of the verb 'to be' - which is 'I am'. I took that to mean that it refers to an exploration of the meaning of being, in terms different to those accepted by the natural sciences, which naturally pursues science along objective criteria. This is what provoked an (one could only say) hysterical denunciation from a former member here. I was then sent the Charles Kahn article The Greek Verb To Be and the Problem of Being, which, as I already showed, clearly demonstrates that 'ontology' as classically understood embraced a wider range of meanings than the modern notion of 'to exist'. And the fact that this is no longer understood by analytical philosophers is no credit to them, simply a reflection of the zeitgeist.

You could have correctly said 'the differentiation of existence and existents is also explicit in Heidegger". — Janus

Sure. I accept that. I've never claimed any expertise in Heidegger, but 180 brought it up. I know that he placed humans in a priviledged position regarding Dasein and I think he would differentiate sentient beings from things. (I'm reading up on What Is a Thing but I must admit hesitancy about Heidegger due to his nazism.)

Use it how you like, but make it clear if you're not using it in the way it's used in traditional metaphysics. — Jamal

Whereas you are?

I can say that rocks are beings and also say they're conscious, — Jamal

As a naturalist I find that B is most consistent internally as well as with all that we know scientifically – publicly – about narure so far. — 180 Proof

Of course. But what I keep trying, and failing, to explain to you, is basically summarised by this point that I've already posted, from Jung, in the essay we're discussing:

What is more, most of the natural sciences try to represent the results of their investigations as though these had come into existence without man’s intervention, in such a way that the collaboration of the psyche – an indispensable factor – remains invisible. (An exception to this is modern physics, which recognizes that the observed is not independent of the observer.) So in this respect, too, science conveys a picture of the world from which a real human psyche appears to be excluded – the very antithesis of the “humanities.” — Carl Jung

Most naturalism falls into this trap - it thinks that 'the universe' would exist just as it is, were there no subject to experience it. But it doesn't see the way in which 'the subject' actually brings the Universe into being through providing the perspective within which the very ideas of 'existence' and 'non-existence' are meaningful in the first place. 'Materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets himself', said Schopenhauer. This is why I keep saying that the naturalist view depends on the framework of conscious experience within which it is formulated and which precedes it, but then it pretends that it is seeing reality as it is, as if it has entirely cut off the subjective, rather than just bracketing it out. This is 'the blind spot of science'.



What is needed is a change of perspective, something like a gestalt shift, which is more than a matter of propositional knowledge.

Using "being" in reference to a sentient or conscious entity, e.g. human being, is perfectly reasonable in philosophy or everyday speech. — T Clark

Of course. That's what I've said. 'A being' is a subject of experience. The verb 'to be' has many other meanings, including 'whatever exists'. That is the sense in which Mikie and Jamal believe it should be used, but I'm saying it is not adequate to interpret the meaning of the word 'being' as is used in the quotation from Carl Jung.

At the very least, would you accept the idea is completely foreign to Kant? — Paine

It's certainly not articulated by Kant, I would agree with that. But then, if you adapt the idea of the collective unconscious, it's not difficult to see, for example, mythologies as being an expression of it.

How far removed would the conception of a collective unconscious be from Schopenhauer's conception of 'the Will'? I doesn't strike me as much of an incongruity.

your idiosyncratic usage of "being" — 180 Proof

I say that beings are subjects of experience, which is a simple fact. As for the various meanings of the verb 'to be', it's a different matter, but it's not relevant to the question implied in the OP.

The main problem I see with this schema is that there is a strong tendency to describe the objective world in terms of what it would "look like" for a subjective observer that, contradictorily, lacks objective being. This is the "view from nowhere," "view from everywhere," or "God's eye view." — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up: This point is also made in The Hidden Self:

What is more, most of the natural sciences try to represent the results of their investigations as though these had come into existence without man’s intervention, in such a way that the collaboration of the psyche – an indispensable factor – remains invisible. (An exception to this is modern physics, which recognizes that the observed is not independent of the observer.) So in this respect, too, science conveys a picture of the world from which a real human psyche appears to be excluded – the very antithesis of the “humanities.” — Carl Jung

This is why a lot of what is paraded around by the media prophets of scientism as secular humanism is anything but humanistic. (It's also why books about 'quantum consciousness' have come into existence.)

The victory of Hegel over Kant dealt the gravest blow to reason and to the further development of the German and, ultimately, of the European mind, all the more dangerous as Hegel was a psychologist in disguise who projected great truths out of the subjective sphere into a cosmos he himself had created - Jung, On the Nature of the Psyche, 358 — "

I have read some articles suggesting that Kant and Schopenhauer anticipate Freud's discovery of the unconscious - which seems fairly obvious when you think about it. For Kant, much of what we think we know is determined by categorial structures that lie beneath the threshold of conscious awareness. For Schopenhauer, transcendence can be sought through art as a symbolic form of the Sublime. Whereas Hegel attempts to explain everything, to make it all explicit, but in so doing, 'projected great truths out of the subjective sphere into a cosmos he himself had created.' It seems a sound analysis to me.



The differentiation of Being and things is also explicit in Heidegger:

The formidable task that Heidegger sets himself in Being and Time is to respond to the question ‘What is Being’? This ‘Question of Being’ has a long heritage in the Western philosophical tradition, but for Heidegger, to merely ask what is Being? is problematic, as that emphasis tends to objectify Being as a ‘thing' – that is to say, it separates off ‘Being’ (whatever it is) from the questioner of Being. ” — Heidegger's Ways of Being

Bolds added. I see the effort to equate being with the simply existent as an attempt to short-circuit the whole question of 'the meaning of being'.

One motivation for suggesting that mind or consciousness precedes being is the view that it seems impossible that consciousness emerges from systems the components of which are severally non-conscious. However it seems to me there is a similar problem with putting consciousness as primary, namely his hard to see how extension, locality, differentiation and so on can emerge from consciousness alone — bert1

There is a theme in the perennial philosophies, 'nature knows herself in the human' - the 'human as microcosm' of the Hermetics, the 'primordial human' of the Rg Veda. I think this is much nearer Jung's point. The various creation mythologies can then be read as a symbolic representation of the emergence of intentionality ('breathes life into clay'). The mistake of materialism is to assume that this is consequential rather than causal.

In other words, Kahn is not supporting you on the specific issue of the use of "being". — Jamal

How so? I had argued that the meaning of being as understood in ontology (derived from the Greek 'to be') is different to our usage of the verb 'to exist', and that is what Kahn says. (Although if rocks could talk, maybe they'd say something different.)

And again, anything that exists can be said to be, but that does not exhaust the meaning of being.

Over and definitely out :wink:

You might also recall the many heated arguments I got into with a former mod over this topic. He sent me a copy of an apparently classic academic paper on it, The Greek Verb to Be and the Problem of Being, Charles Kahn. He never acknowledged it, but this paper supports my argument that the Greek verb 'to be' has a far greater range of meanings than our verb 'to exist', for example:

These remarks are intended to render plausible my claim that, for the philosophical usage of the verb, the most fundamental value of 'einai' when used alone
(without predicates) is not 'to exist' but 'to be so' or 'to be the case'....

.... This intrinsically stable and lasting character of Being in Greek - which makes it so appropriate as the object of knowing and the correlative of truth - distinguishes it in a radical way from our modern notion of existence...The connotations of enduring stability which are inseparable from the meaning of 'einai' thus serve to distinguish the Greek concept of being from certain features of our modern notion of existence. — Charles Kahn

You mean, ‘on thephilosophyforum’. :wink:

Well, sure, but it's well known that one of the bases of Aristotle's metaphysics was precisely the elaboration of the different meanings of the verb 'to be'. And that Franz Brentano's doctoral thesis was on the different meanings of 'to be' in Aristotle, which was a seminal influence on Heidegger who devoted his philosophical career to 'the meaning of being' and 'forgetfulness of being'.

I'm only claiming that beings are subjects of experience, whereas things are not. I don't even know how this is contestable or why there's an argument about it. Even the chatbots get it.

Q: What is the difference between things and beings?

A: Things refer to inanimate objects, physical entities, or concepts that lack life or consciousness. They can include tangible objects such as rocks, buildings, and machines, as well as intangible concepts such as ideas, theories, and laws.

On the other hand, beings refer to living entities, whether they are animals, humans, or other organisms, that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act. Beings can experience emotions, make choices, and interact with the world around them.

In summary, the main difference between things and beings is that things are inanimate and lack life and consciousness, while beings are living entities that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act. — ChatGPT

that’s how it’s always been used in philosophy. — Jamal

Can you point to a specific example?

Or are you saying that only consciousnesses are, whereas inanimate objects merely exist? I doubt you want to go down that route. I think you probably agree that inanimate things are, even though this is plainly, linguistically, in contradiction to your wish to restrict being to animate individuals. — Jamal

I think it's a fair analysis. It's not that I find it annoying, but I'm at a loss that the distinction accorded to beings as distinct from things seems to me Ontology 101, and conversely, the denial of that distinction seems Materialism 101, as to me, treating humans (and sentient beings generally) as objects is one of the symptoms of the dehumanising effects of materialism (as Jung might also say).

'To be' has various meanings - it can mean 'anything that is' or 'anything that has existence'. But in this case, and considering the context of the quote, I was referring to what is designated as 'a being'. That is a different case of the use of the word 'being' to the general sense of 'anything that exists'. When we talk of 'a being' as a noun then we're designating the subject of that sentence as 'a being'. And of course, beings and things both exist, but that is not the point at issue.

And no, I don't think that inanimate objects are individuals - unless you're including artefacts, which are, of course, manufactured by individuals. I suppose you could refer to an individual tree, or mountain, or river, but I don't know what special significance that has. I don't think you would refer to trees, mountains or rivers as beings, would you? Perhaps if you held to some form of folk religion you might.

But then, also consider the origin of the original post. The preceding sentence is

Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being. — Carl Jung

So in this sense 'being' does have a meaning which is not conveyed by 'the sum of everything that exists', as Jung is more or less arguing for an idealist philosophy. (Furthermore, I think this is deeply connected to why humans are called 'beings'.) I've read quite a bit of that text in the intervening hours, and he has a bit more to say on it, but overall it's about the dangers to individuation posed by mass culture and mass political and religious movements - rather similar in tone to Erich Fromm's 'Escape from Freedom' which must have been published around the same time.

The OP plainly doesn't want to go down this road so I'll leave it at that.

To provide a bit more context, here is the sentence you quote with the preceding sentence:

Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being. — Jung

(Emphasis in original). I don't know if he's expressing a 'standard metaphysical view'.

It's worth noting that the OP refers to one part of one video, which is part of a series of video presentations comprising an entire course on 'analytic idealism', which can be accessed freely here. To get a fair idea of what Kastrup is talking about, it's probably better to be aware of the context, rather than 'kicking the ball around' on the basis of a brief excerpt.

I guess I don't see the difference between "beings" and "things”. — T Clark

Beings have the capacity for experience - often the adjective 'sentient' is also added. Inanimate objects do not. In fact it suggests what I think is a pretty succinct definition for consciousness, i.e. 'the capacity for experience'.

I think making the distinction between beings and things is part of a different discussion — T Clark

Customarily, the subject matter of ontology, which is suggested by the thread title.

Very clever experiments but I did notice

As to how the day-to-day reality of objects that we observe, such as furniture and fruit, emerges from such a different and exotic quantum world, that remains a mystery. — Macro-Weirdness: Quantum Microphone Puts Naked-Eye Object in 2 Places at Once

Until I get there I do not know. She resides in that mystical state of superposition, being both there and not there. But I have calculated the probability and it has come out .7 in favor of her standing there and .3 her not. — jgill

It's not a valid analogy, though. The strangeness of the observer problem in physics is that the act of observation itself is instrumental in determination of the outcome. The proper analogy would be that, prior to you seeing your wife, she didn't exist in any specific location at all, she's not simply in an unknown location.

The answer to the question as to where the particle is, prior to measuring its whereabouts, just IS the probability equation, it has no particular existence but only the probability of existence. That's the point.

Show me a macroscopic entity existing in superposition.

That shouldn't suggest an "extraspatiotemporal" limbo world where tree potentialities exist and evolve until they are actualized as trees in our "spatiotemporal" world. — Andrew M

As I thought had been established, the interference pattern in the double-slit experiments is independent of time and space (shown by its rate independence), thus indicating an extraspatiotemporal cause. It might be the same principle as an acorn becoming an oak, but on a far more pervasive and subtle level of existence. Put another way, the possibility equation really does describe 'degrees of reality' which are not actualised until a measurement is made. Hence the 'nothing exists until it is measured', of Neils Bohr.