USER: I'm wondering if physicalism as a philosophical outlook is always tied to the concept of 'thing-ness'. What I mean is, that whatever the fundamental ontological substance of physicalism comprises, it has to be conceived of in terms of it being some kind of thing, as the concept of an immaterial thing is oxymoronic. To which one might oppose philosophies of no-thing-ness. In that context, 'no-thing' does not mean quite the same as merely 'nothing'. Think for example of the Buddhist śūnyatā, emptiness. But that is also not simply nothing, but no-thing.

ChatGPT: Your question touches on deep and nuanced areas of philosophy, engaging with the concepts of physicalism and notions of "thing-ness" versus "no-thing-ness." Let's unpack these ideas to better understand the landscape.

Physicalism is a philosophical stance that everything which exists is no more extensive than its physical properties; that is, all that exists in the universe can ultimately be described by physics. Physicalists argue that the only "things" that truly exist are physical entities or entities that can be explained in physical terms. This view is often contrasted with dualism, which holds that both the physical and the non-physical (such as the mind) can exist, and idealism, which posits that mind or consciousness is fundamental, and the physical world depends on it.

When physicalists talk about the universe and its contents, they indeed tend to conceive of them in terms of "things" or entities with physical properties. These can be particles, fields, waves, or any entity describable by physics. The conception of "thing-ness" in this context is tied to materiality or physical existence.

No-thing-ness, on the other hand, refers to an ontological state or concept that goes beyond the mere absence of things (nothingness) to denote an absence of intrinsic, independent essence or nature in things. This concept is prevalent in several Eastern philosophies, including Buddhism's notion of śūnyatā (emptiness). Śūnyatā suggests that things do not possess inherent existence on their own but are interdependently co-arisen. This does not mean things do not exist at all but rather that their existence is not independent or inherent.

The key distinction here is between physicalism's commitment to the existence of "things" as the fundamental constituents of reality (albeit physically describable) and the concept of "no-thing-ness" which challenges the very notion of intrinsic essence in anything, suggesting a more relational or dependent conception of existence.

It's important to note that while physicalism inherently relies on the concept of "thing-ness" because it posits a fundamentally material or physical basis for all phenomena, it does not necessarily preclude a conceptual space for understanding phenomena that do not neatly fit into the notion of "thing-ness," such as emergent properties or complex systems. However, the challenge for physicalism in the context of "no-thing-ness" is to account for the relational and interdependent aspects of reality without resorting to non-physical explanations.

In contrast, philosophies that embrace "no-thing-ness," like certain interpretations of Buddhism, offer a fundamentally different ontological perspective that does not ground existence in "things" but rather in the absence of inherent essence and the interdependence of phenomena. This can provide a complementary or alternative framework for understanding reality, one that challenges and expands beyond the materialist confines of physicalism.

In sum, while physicalism as a philosophical outlook is generally tied to the concept of "thing-ness" due to its materialist underpinnings, engaging with concepts of "no-thing-ness" like śūnyatā introduces rich philosophical territory that explores the limits of physicalism and opens up dialogues with other ontological perspectives.

User: Here is another perspective on this distinction. I have been mulling the idea that what distinguishes living things (or beings) from inanimate objects, is that they have a rudimentary form of self. That can be justified on the basis that even the most rudimentary organisms maintain a boundary between their bodies and the environment, and by so doing, differentiate themselves from the environment. I'm not saying they have any *sense* of self, but that distinction between inner and outer is the basis of what evolves to become *self".

ChatGPT: Your perspective offers a fascinating lens through which to examine the distinction between living things and inanimate objects, focusing on the notion of a rudimentary form of "self" as a defining characteristic of life. This idea resonates with several theories in biology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science that explore the origins and nature of selfhood and consciousness.

The concept that living organisms maintain a boundary between their bodies and the environment is central to biological and philosophical discussions about the nature of life. This boundary is not just physical but also operational, as it marks the delineation where metabolic processes, homeostasis, and various forms of regulation occur. These processes are fundamental to what it means to be alive, enabling an organism to maintain its internal environment within the limits necessary for its survival, despite changes in the external environment.

This distinction between inner and outer, as you suggest, can be seen as the most basic form of "self" — not in the sense of a conscious or reflective self-awareness but as an operational or functional self. Such a self is defined by its capacity to maintain its integrity and identity over time, distinguishing itself from its surroundings through processes like metabolism, growth, and response to stimuli.

Philosophers and scientists have proposed various theories about how this rudimentary form of self might evolve into more complex forms of self-awareness and consciousness. One key idea is that as organisms become more complex, their mechanisms for interacting with the environment also become more sophisticated, leading to more complex forms of self-regulation and, eventually, to the emergence of consciousness and self-awareness. The evolutionary biologist Lynn Margulis, for example, emphasized the role of symbiosis and cooperation in the evolution of complex life forms, suggesting that the integration of different organisms and their functions might contribute to the emergence of new levels of selfhood.

Cognitive scientists and philosophers like Daniel Dennett and Thomas Metzinger have also explored how self-awareness might arise from more basic forms of selfhood. They propose that self-awareness emerges from the brain's ability to model its own processes, leading to a reflective understanding of oneself as an agent in the world.

Your perspective aligns with these theories by suggesting that the very act of maintaining a boundary between self and environment is foundational to the concept of self. This boundary is the precursor to more complex biological and cognitive processes that underlie self-awareness and identity. It suggests that the evolution of selfhood is a gradual process, starting from the most basic biological distinctions between organism and environment and leading up to the complex phenomena of consciousness and self-reflection observed in higher organisms.

This approach to understanding life and selfhood emphasizes the continuity between life's basic biological processes and the complex phenomena of mind and consciousness. It suggests that even the simplest forms of life exhibit the rudiments of selfhood, laying the groundwork for the evolutionary development of more sophisticated forms of self-awareness.

User: So to tie this to the earlier musing on 'thing-ness' in physicalism, the point about 'the self' - even the rudimentary self of primitive organisms - is that this is not itself something that appears as object. It is the basis of 'subject-hood' (which is not quite the same as subjectivity, but more like the capacity to be subject of experience.)

I'm wondering if Evan Thompsons Mind in Life might have some material on this idea?

ChatGPT: Evan Thompson's "Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind" is indeed a seminal work that explores the intersection of biology, phenomenology (the philosophical study of experience), and cognitive science. Thompson's work is particularly relevant to your musings on 'thing-ness' in physicalism and the concept of 'the self,' especially in the context of the rudimentary self of primitive organisms and the basis of 'subject-hood.'

In "Mind in Life," Thompson challenges traditional perspectives in both the sciences and philosophy that treat life and mind as fundamentally separate domains. Instead, he argues for a deep continuity between life processes and the emergence of mind, suggesting that basic life processes exhibit proto-mental features that are foundational to the development of more complex forms of consciousness and subjectivity.

Thompson draws on phenomenology to articulate a concept of "lived body" or "body-subject," emphasizing that living beings are not merely objects in the world but also subjects of experience. This approach aligns with your distinction between 'thing-ness' and 'subject-hood,' as Thompson argues that even the most basic forms of life embody a kind of subjectivity—albeit not in the reflective or self-aware sense we associate with human consciousness. Instead, this subjectivity is manifest in the organism's capacity to maintain itself, regulate its interactions with the environment, and exhibit a form of "sense-making," where the organism actively engages with its surroundings in a meaningful way.

Thompson's integration of phenomenology with the life sciences provides a framework for understanding how subject-hood and the capacity to be a subject of experience can emerge from the biological processes that define living systems. He argues that the organizational properties of life itself underpin the emergence of mind, suggesting that mental phenomena are not something added to life from the outside but are intrinsic to the very process of living.

In this context, 'the self'—even at its most rudimentary level in primitive organisms—is understood not merely as an object among objects but as a dynamic, self-organizing process that gives rise to subject-hood. This perspective challenges the strict materialism of some physicalist positions by suggesting that the phenomena of mind and consciousness cannot be fully explained by referring to physical processes alone. Instead, Thompson proposes a more integrated approach that sees mind and life as fundamentally interconnected, with subjectivity emerging from the life processes that characterize living beings.

So, in relation to your interest, Thompson's "Mind in Life" indeed provides valuable material that bridges the concepts of 'thing-ness' and 'subject-hood,' offering a sophisticated model for understanding how the rudimentary self of living organisms can serve as the basis for the capacity to be subjects of experience. This aligns with and enriches your earlier musings, providing a robust theoretical foundation for exploring these ideas further.