hat said, your comment about Kant's "confusing equivocation" raised the question in my simple mind : is there a third (non-quibbling) Ontological category of knowledge, other than Phenomenal (sensory) & Noumenal (inference) : perhaps Intuition (sixth sense) that bypasses both paths to knowledge? — Gnomon

In esoteric philosophy there are said to be forms of gnosis or Jñāna or direct insight. They're very difficult to assess for pretty obvious reasons, as esoteric philosophy is, well, esoteric. I sometimes have the intuition that there is a missing element in Kant's philosophy corresponding to an absence of this kind of insight, but I'm not able to really pinpoint or articulate it as after all we're dealing here with some of the most difficult questions of philosophy.

That table is from the wikipedia article on ‘the analogy of the divided line’ in the Republic. It is in the section adjacent to the Parable of the Cave. It’s certainly relevant, but it was Plato’s rather than Aristotle’s.

Thanks, that is a difficult passage, although something that comes to mind is Werner Heisenberg's appeal to Aristotle's 'potentia' as a way to understand the nature of the sub-atomic realm. See Quantum Mysteries Dissolve if Possibilities are Realities (although I won't comment further for fear of dragging the thread into the insoluble conundrums of modern physics, other than to say that said conundrums show that metaphysics is far from dead.)

But, then one can ask, in what sense can P, a proposition made up of words, correspond with reality made up of objects? — 013zen

Yes, that's the point I was trying to make, and you've addressed it well.

Isn't there an especial significance attached to what is 'self-moving'? That applies to organisms, generally, which distinguishes them from artifacts, which exist because of an external cause i.e. the builder.

The Aristotelian tradition draws a distinction between three basic types of living substance. These form a hierarchy in which each type incorporates the basic powers of the types below it but also adds something novel of its own to them. The most basic kind of life is vegetative life, which involves the capacities of a living thing to take in nutrients, to go through a growth cycle, and to reproduce itself. Plants are obvious examples, but other forms of life, such as fungi, are also vegetative in the relevant sense. The second kind of life is animal life, which includes the vegetative capacities of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, but in addition involves the capacities of a thing to take in information through speciali]ed sense organs and to move itself around, where the sensory input and behavioral output is mediated by appetitive drives such as the desire to pursue something pleasant or to avoid something painful. These distinctively animal capacities are not only additional to and irreducible to the vegetative capacities, but also transform the latter. For example, nutrition in animals participates in their sensory, appetitive, and locomotive capacities insofar as they have to seek out food, take enMoyment in eating it, and so forth.

The third kind of life is the rational kind, which is the distinctively human form of life. This form of life incorporates both the vegetative and animal capacities, and adds to them the intellectual powers of forming abstract concepts, putting them together into propositions, and reasoning logically from one proposition to another, and also the volitional power to will or choose in light of what the intellect understands. These additional capacities are not only additional to and irreducible to the vegetative and animal capacities, but transform the latter. Given human rationality, a vegetative function like nutrition takes on the cultural significance we attach to the eating of meals; the reproductive capacity comes to be associated with romantic love and the institution of marriage; sensory experience comes to be infused with conceptual content; and so forth. — Aristotle's Revenge, Edward Feser, p 54-55

Thanks. But, can you clarify Kant's "equivocation" for me? — Gnomon

This is a thread about Aristotle's Metaphysics. There are two fairly recent threads on Kant which might be more suitable for discussion of that isssue:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14993/kant-and-the-unattainable-goal-of-empirical-investigation/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14616/kant-on-synthetic-a-prior-knowledge-and-experience

Perl's book, mentioned above, traces the origin of the Platonic forms or ideas with Parmenides and how it is developed first by Plato and then Aristotle. Kant is much later and belongs to the modern period.

I will say something about my understanding of 'noumenal' but within that context. According to the Wiki article on noumenon, it is derived from 'object of nous', 'nous' being that seminal word in Greek philosophy translated as 'intellect'. But like a lot of those basic terms of philosophy the connotations and implications have shifted over the centuries. 'Nous' in the Aristotelian sense has a much more active role.

From the wiki article on nous

In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. For Aristotle discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways. (Wayfarer: this is a reference to "universals".) Derived from this it was also sometimes argued, in classical and medieval philosophy, that the individual nous must require help of a spiritual and divine type. By this type of account, it also came to be argued that the human understanding (nous) somehow stems from this cosmic nous, which is however not just a recipient of order, but a creator of it.

From David Bentley Hart:

In the pre-modern vision of things, the cosmos had been seen as an inherently purposive structure of diverse but integrally inseparable rational relations — for instance, the Aristotelian aitia, which are conventionally translated as “causes,” but which are nothing like the uniform material “causes” of the mechanistic philosophy. And so the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect. Hence the mind, rather than an anomalous tenant of an alien universe, was instead the most concentrated and luminous expression of nature’s deepest essence. This is why it could pass with such wanton liberty through the “veil of Isis” and ever deeper into nature’s inner mysteries.

Within this context, 'noumenal' means, basically, 'grasped by reason' while sensible means 'grasped by the sense organs'. In hylomorphic dualism, this means that nous apprehends the form or essence of a particular - what is really is - and the senses perceive its material appearance. That's the interplay of 'reality and appearance'. Again from the article on Noumenon:

Platonic Ideas and Forms are noumena, and phenomena are things displaying themselves to the senses... This dichotomy is the most characteristic feature of Plato's dualism; that noumena and the noumenal world are objects of the highest knowledge, truths, and values is Plato's principal legacy to philosophy. — Honderich, Ted, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy

According to Aristotelian philosophy (and others may correct me here if I'm wrong) animals, generally, only see the material forms of things as they lack reason, which is the ability to see the forms, principles or essence of things. (Hence Aristotle's designation of humans as 'rational animals'.) This is of course nowadays regarded as archaic and superseded. I believe there's a valid distinction being made but this is a constant source of controversy, not to mention repeated references to the cleverness of Caledonian crows.

And scientific dogmatism, those who insist that only what appears to 5 of the human senses can be data for constructing knowledge; ignoring that knowledge is constructed, and the data gathered was not immediate to the senses, but already mediated by mind and re-presented as if direct from the senses. — ENOAH

:ok:

Thank you, I shall have a look.

While we’re at it - the other obvious point is that Trump has no platform. He has no policies or policy proposals. His ‘campaign speeches’ only consist of grievances, threats and lies. No rational argument can be given for why he should be considered a candidate, beyond the fact of his identity.

The hush money case is a chickenshit case. Bragg's office already looked at it and decided it was a loser. They didn't bring the case. Then the Biden administration actively worked with Bragg's office to revive and prosecute the case. — fishfry

Not true. It was a very tawdry case but the facts presented to an impartial jury resulted in a guilty verdict. The Office of the President had nothing whatever to do with it, that is a MAGA lie. Here’s a factual account of the background to the case (gift link.)

Trump is facing numerous other felony indictments plus hundreds of millions of dollars in civil penalties. Regrettably many of these cases don’t look like starting before the election but in any case, his political fate will be decided at the ballot box, and despite all the hype, I believe he will be soundly beaten in November.

But what is really depressing is that Trump and his minions are actively attacking the rule of law and the constitutional order, every day. They are spewing lies and spawning attacks on jury members, voting office workers, and many other federal and state officials. And yet the representatives of one of the two major political parties in America are now all in on it and coming out in support of what amounts to a political personality cult. We are witnessing a real struggle for the survival of democracy in America. It’s no longer just a contest between Democrats and Republicans. Democracy itself is on the ballot.

Aristotle ruled out "prime matter" as an incoherent concept with his cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not so. Aristotle did not rule out the concept of “prime matter” as incoherent with his cosmological argument. In fact, “prime matter” is a fundamental concept in his metaphysics.

Aristotle’s concept of prime matter (hylē) refers to the underlying substratum that has no form or qualities of its own but can receive various forms. It is pure potentiality, capable of becoming any form. This is crucial to his hylomorphic theory, where everything in the natural world is a composite of form (morphē) and matter (hylē).

In his cosmological argument, particularly in the “Physics” and “Metaphysics,” Aristotle posits the existence of an unmoved mover, a necessary being that causes motion* without itself being moved. This unmoved mover is pure actuality**, having no potentiality. The concept of prime matter, in contrast, is pure potentiality and plays a different role in his metaphysical framework.

Thus, far from ruling out prime matter as incoherent, Aristotle integrates it as a core component of his explanation of change and substance. The cosmological argument addresses the existence of a first cause, which is separate from the notion of prime matter but does not negate it.

——

*’Motion’ in Aristotle means something different than modern physics ‘velocity’. Aristotle’s notion of motion is broader and more encompassing, dealing with the transition from potentiality to actuality in various aspects, not limited to spatial movement. This understanding of motion as a change of state is a fundamental difference from the modern physics definition, which typically focuses on the change in an object’s position over time (velocity).

** ‘Pure actuality’ can be traced back to Parmenides vision of ‘what is’ as being above or beyond the change and decay of concrete particulars. As modified first by Plato and then Aristotle, ideas are eternal and changeless, in which particulars ‘participate’. Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not posit a separate realm of Forms but argued that the form and matter coexist in the same substance. However, he maintained that the highest forms of being, such as the unmoved mover, are pure actuality, embodying eternal and changeless existence.

Numbers are not "real" in any natural sense, but "ideal" in the sense that we abstract those bare bones (ding an sich) from fleshly experience with multiple objects. Numbers are transcendental place-holders for abstract values. Those ideal tokens are not "products of any one mind", but are universal truths that logical minds have access to. — Gnomon

I would agree with that description, although not with the equivocation with ‘ding an sich’. That is owed to Kant’s confusing equivocation of ‘thing in itself’ with ‘noumenal’ which actually have two different meanings.

There is an expression in classical philosophy ’the eye of reason’, which refers to that kind of insight - things which can only be grasped by a rational mind. (There’s also ‘the eye of the heart’ which is ‘higher’ again but this is more associated with esoteric philosophy.)

The common error with understanding these principles, is to try and imagine their objects as ‘existing somewhere’. They don’t exist in the sense that sensible objects exist. And as today’s culture is overwhelmingly oriented to sense-experience (‘empiricism’), then they don’t exist at all. This is why empiricist philosophers reject Platonic realism - their metaphysical framework has no conceptual space to allow for the reality of anything other than sense-objects or mathematical abstractions that are grounded in them. They have a ‘flat ontology’ which can’t deal with levels of being. (This is what Vervaeke refers to by ‘levelling up’.)

There’s a book called Thinking Being: Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition, Eric D. Perl. It’s expensive and out-of-print but there’s an online copy posted here.. See Chapter 2: Plato, Section 3 The Meaning of Separation which succinctly explains the meaning of ‘forms’ and why they must not be understood as inhabiting a separate realm (as distinct from a separate level of being, which is completely different. Again, it is a problem of trying to transpose an hierarchical to a flat ontology.)

Is there such a thing as health? Of course there is. Can you see it? Of course not. This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating ‘somewhere else’ in ‘another world,’ a ‘Platonic heaven.’ It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by thought. If, taking any of these examples—say, justice, health, or strength—we ask, “How big is it? What color is it?How much does it weigh?”we are obviously asking the wrong kind of question. Forms are ideas, not in the sense of concepts or abstractions, but in that they are realities apprehended by thought rather than by sense.’ — Eric D Perl, op cit

Did Ariistotle really (actually) know what he was talking about? — Gnomon

Do you know what he was talking about? Actually as far as a synopsis of his metaphysics of form and matter, the above title provides quite a good synoptic overview.

Post verdict all the MAGA Republicans are fuming about a 'dark day for America'. If it weren't so serious, it would be laughable - the way Trump has so deftly converted the Republican Party from being law-and-order conservatives, to an angry mob that routinely denigrates the justice system, the FBI, and the Constitution, in service to a personality cult.

But on the positive side

perhaps the most important outcome of this trial is not the verdict, which Trump immediately called a “disgrace” after it was delivered. It is that the system worked. Judge Merchan served admirably, in the face of threats and intimidation from the defendant and his supporters, and bent over backwards to protect Mr. Trump’s due process rights.

The jury appears to have stayed focused and attentive throughout the proceeding, and was careful in reviewing both the judge’s instructions and evidence, making sure they understood the testimony that was presented before them.

The attorneys at the District Attorney’s office who tried the case also faced threats and intimidation and did their job in the face of such threats. Even Mr. Trump’s defense attorneys behaved admirably... — The Daily Beast

It's encouraging how many times the electoral system and the judicial system have stood up to Trump's attacks. He's lost a lot of lawsuits, and has now been convicted of crimes. If the trend continues, and even if it takes some years, he will be convicted of many more. The wheels may be turning slowly, but they’re turning.

Probably that case can be made. I'm the first to admit that I don't have deep or extensive knowledge of the field of scholastic philosophy. I'm only speaking at a high level of generalisation: simply that numbers, universals, and other kinds of what used to be called 'intelligible objects' are real. They're not the product of the mind but can only be grasped by reason. That's what makes this a metaphysical question! In that, I'm agreeing with the argument that Maritain articulates in the essay I linked. Again, I'm first to admit I'm not well-read in Jacques Maritain, but the general drift of his argument about the deprecation of universals by empiricism is what interests me. (He says at the outset 'I myself am an Aristotelian', hence the relevance to Aristotle's metaphysics.)

I take the problem of theory ladeness to not imply that objective reality is in any sense dependent upon our observation; rather, it is our understanding that hinges on our theory. — 013zen

My point was rather that they are inter-woven and that the separation of subject and object is not so clear cut.

We find in Thomism, the expression of the 'union of knower and known' which harks back to Aristotle. For Aristotle, perception of the intelligible forms was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. As a theory of predication, it is foundational to how the intellect sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way. By virtue of this, we see types, kinds, similarities and differences and the many other elements which are foundational to the exercise of reason.

1. Did we invent math
2. Is the information gained by applying math invented?

The difference is the system and the information gained from the application of that system. The latter relies on reality existing as it does to furnish any information. We didn't invent the length, so to speak, but we did invent the ruler. — 013zen

The 'maths invented or discovered' is as you say a perennial debate. Best I can tell is that there are elements of both. But I think the uneasiness over the question goes back to the underlying sense that we have, of 'the world' being divided between 'the mind' (in here) and 'reality' (out there) - to put it in very blunt terms. The difficulty for naturalism is the difficulty of discerning the sense in which number can be located in an empirical sense, as Piggliuci says: numbers (and so on) stand over and above time and space. And empiricism can't cope with that, as he says: it has to ground knowledge in sensory experience, and whatever can't be understood that way must be in the mind. Again, the supposed separation or dichotomy of mind and world is pre-supposed by this. Whereas the way I think of it is that number (and the like) are 'transjective', which is rather an awkward neologism, but is meant to designate 'transcending the subject/object distinction'. They are elements of a kind of transpersonal faculty, viz, reason.

You might find this essay of Jacques Maritain informative, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism in which he argues for the continuing relevance of universals as follows:

For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And his field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge.

Why is it that only Thomists (and therefore, presumably, mainly Catholics) possess a philosophical framework which enables this distinction between the rational and empirical, and which recognises the foundational role of universals? Seems to me that Thomas Aquinas preserves an element of the Greek 'philosophia perennis', as represented in Aristotle, which has subsequently been rejected or lost to the philosophical culture of the West, to its overall detriment.

'The test for us as a nation begins now' ~ Rachel Maddow. Makes the points that Trump's playbook is to discredit the principle of trial by jury and the justice system, in the same way he is trying to discredit the constitution and the political order, and that his lackeys in Congress and in the public are all in on supporting these attempts.

Maddow and MSNBC generally are doing a stellar job articulating the clear and present danger that Trump/MAGA presents to the rule of law and Constitutional democracy, and those engaged in upholding and defending it.

'Trump, a self-proclaimed wannabe autocrat, has made his own criminal case an attack on the rule of law from the start. It is incredibly dangerous to have someone who is supported by a significant percentage of the American people focus on degrading an important American norm. When Trump calls the justice system “corrupt” and “conflicted,” he undermines one of the central tenets of our rule of law: the right to a fair trial. This explains why Trump effectively attempted to undermine a verdict before it was even passed down. He has sought to damage the institution of our justice system from the start. And he has succeeded in chipping away at its perceived legitimacy, long before any verdict was handed down.
...
So what happens now? Now that we have a verdict in the case, there’s a good chance Trump will play it as being what he expected, and even wanted. We should expect him to go scorched-earth, because he so often does. We know he will try to weaponize this verdict and craft it into an assault on the rule of law, on the judge and the jury and on New York County District Attorney Alvin Bragg.

No matter what the outcome, Trump was always going to try to use candidate Trump to help defendant Trump. And any verdict was destined to be molded into his branded narrative of persecution, witch hunts and a fight against the political system. Of that we can be certain" ~ MSNBC

Long ago philosophy perceived the essence of our process of thought to lie in the fact that we attach to the various real objects around us particular physical attributes – our concepts – and by means of these try to represent the objects to our minds ~ Boltzmann — 013zen

I have learned from philosophy of science that the 'particular physical attributes' that are 'attached' (or imputed) to objects, are derived from Galileo's 'primary qualities'. These include mass, velocity, etc:

We cannot conceive a corporeal substance without a determinate figure, size, position, motion/rest, and number; nor can we imagine bodies separated from any of these attributes. Galileo calls them “primary affections” of matter.'

....He argues that the appearance of a body corresponds to the properties of the body that are its cause. It is not up to philosophy to say how various apearances are related to the affections of the objects we perceive; rather it requires the technical methods of natural philosophy. For example, to avoid being deceived by the broken visual appearance of an oar half in water, we need to find the physical cause of the appearance. This will show that the visual appearance is correct. — SEP, Primary and Secondary Qualities

These primary qualities are those that are measurable, hence their significance in Galileo's epistemology. The fact that they're objectively measurable, or the same for all observers, is what is signficant about them. This is one of the foundations of scientific method, isn't it? Measurement being fundamental to that. But I question the sense in which 'objective measurements' are concepts. I would have thought the hypothesis is the concept, the predictions of which are measured against observation.

On this view our thoughts stand to things in the same relation as models to the objects they represent ~ Bolzmann. — 013zen

Isn't this proposal subject to criticisms of 'correspondence theory of truth'? 'According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense. 1- In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison? 2- The making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is "true"? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief. (Randall, J. & Buchler, J.; Philosophy: An Introduction. p133)

Thanks,pleased to have some elements of agreement. I've been reading Deacon's Incomplete Nature which I think also has relevance to this subject.

Thanks, I recall those exchanges! I do admit I have a tendency to trot out the same well-worn quotes from my scrapbook when the opportunity arises. The theme I'm exploring is the idea of universals as transjective constituents of rational ideation.

How does the above quote differ from this by Varela? — Joshs

Because Dennett’s quote references organic molecules, and Varela’s references ‘simple agents’. If ‘simple agents’ are e.g. cellular, then they’re already at a different ontological level to organic molecules. Dennett’s model is strictly reductionist with solely bottom-up causality. As soon as you take emergence into account, and the top-down causality associated with strong emergence (in Vervaeke’s terms), then it’s already radically different to the ‘flat ontology’ of reductionism (the thrust of the first 20 minutes of the Vervaeke keynote I listed to today.) I’m starting to get Vervaeke’s idea of ‘levelling up’ in which each level, such as the sub-atomic, molecular, and organic, reveals different facts or truths about reality. These levels are not isolated but mutually influence each other, forming an interconnected web of existence. And they’re emphatically not reducible to lower levels, such as the atomic or molecular. This perspective helps in understanding the complex, multi-layered nature of reality and how various levels of being are interdependent, shaping and being shaped by one another. This perspective mirrors Plotinus’ view that all levels of reality are part of a continuous, dynamic process of emanation and return to the One, emphasizing the unity and interrelation of all aspects of existence. There’s nothing like that in Dennett’s model. In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Dennett argues that the complexity of biological and cognitive phenomena can be explained solely through natural, evolutionary processes that build up from simple to complex structures (“cranes”) without invoking any mysterious, top-down causation (“skyhooks”).

In short: chalk and cheese.

If you haven’t seen Vervaeke’s interview of Evan Thompson, I recommend it — Joshs

I’ve found one, at least, which starts with a discussion of Thompson’s latest book, The Blind Spot. I started a thread on the precursor article to the book five years ago and it was thoroughly bollocked at the time for being ‘click bait’ and a sad error of judgement by an otherwise profound philosopher (although I think that reaction was primarily because it was me who posted it. I’ll have to listen later, I’ve already had enough Vervaeke for one day.)

There's a passage I quote frequently from this paper, which has always seemed significant to me, but mostly elicits shrugs:

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

It is also central to Aquinas' epistemology:

...if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality. — Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan

There's a deep conversation here between Vervaeke and an Elizabeth Oldfield about Vervaeke's thoughts on God, religion and everything.

https://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/comment/2023/11/08/john-vervaeke-on-fundamentalism-trauma-and-embodying-wisdom

He was brought up in a fundamentalist family, but later in life discovered he was actually the progeny of an illegitimate relationship, which was highly traumatic. He then turned 'east' but also deeply into science.

Some snippets:

God is where we find a relationship between sacredness and ultimacy. And like you said, I think that’s inherently relational. But I’m using that as a stand–in for whatever. My partner is sacred to me, because I have that connection. But I do not think – although there’s mysterious depths to her that I can never fully grasp – I do not think of her as Ultimate Reality. And so, I think we have notions, and they could be Tao, or Brahman, or Śūnyatā (vacuity), of ultimacy. And then, if we have sacred experiences of the ultimacy, that’s sort of the epitome of what I think you’re putting your finger on.

The cognitive revolution was based on the idea that humans are not stimulus–response machines, they’re meaning–making entities.

I cultivated a professional persona that compensates for that [shyness]. And I’m in this persona right now. So, as long as I’m in this persona, I’m well, but if you put me in a context where that persona is not appropriate, like a traditional party at somebody’s house, I become sort of indistinguishable from a potted plant.

If people come to my work and find a way to “rehome” – and I’m going to use that as a strong verb, rehome – in one of the legacy religions, great! I am not anti–religious.

--

Varela and Thompson have no interest in abandoning naturalism and the Darwinian framework that explains the genesis of organisms and human cognition. — Joshs

I don't challenge naturalism on empirical grounds, but a distinction can be made between biology and biological reductionism. The empirical facts of evolution and the development of species are a field of study, but a lot is read into it, and inferred from it, due to the overvaluing of science, the kind of 'evolution as a religion' attitude that Mary Midgely and others have criticized. Again, Dennett is a poster-boy for that kind of scientism, Varela and Thompson have a different attitude altogether. (You know that Varela collaborated with the Dalai Lama and other Buddhist scholars and practitioners to explore the intersections between cognitive science and Buddhist philosophy. This collaboration was part of the Mind and Life Institute, which he co-founded in 1987 to foster dialogue between science and Buddhism. In the later years of his life, Varela took formal Buddhist vows.)

The irreducible unit of a dynamical system is the assembly as an agential , ‘subjective’ whole. — Joshs

Why the scare quotes around subjective? It is either subjective or it's not. That attempt to generalise or fudge subjectivity into, well, everything, seems another version of pan-psychism to me.

Here's another thing Vervaeke says in that interview:

I do a lot of work on kinds of knowing other than propositional knowing. And maybe at some point we can talk about that procedural, perspectival, participatory, and that cognition is embodied, embedded, enacted, extended. So the theory is actually pointing away from an over–intellectualised, over–individualised understanding of meaning, cognition, intelligence, rationale. The evidence is growing, the theoretical argument, the evidence is growing.

I think that the kind of cosmic consciousness that I'm drawn to - the unitive vision, the mystical experience - is something in this register. It's not propositional knowledge, and if it's put into bald propositional form, it comes across as nonsense. It's a re-orientation, a different way of being and seeing. Isn't Heidegger also about that? The video posted above, The Philosophical Silk Road, is also replete with references to it.

What is the Buddhist view about creating life? If they see life as just suffering and the ultimate goal is ending the cycle of suffering, death, birth - "extinction" - (as far as I understand), then wouldn't they be anti-natalist? — Apustimelogist

'Early' Buddhism certainly saw existence as a malaise, a woeful condition to be escaped by the renunciation of the world. However the 'new' Buddhism - not that it's new today, as it developed around the first century CE - introduced a different perspective, that of the Mahāyāna, or 'Greater Vehicle', which recognised that Bodhisattvas (wisdom-beings) might be born voluntarily for the benefit of sentient beings:

How rebirth takes place

There are two ways in which someone can take rebirth after death: rebirth under the sway of karma and destructive emotions and rebirth through the power of compassion and prayer. Regarding the first, due to ignorance negative and positive karma are created and their imprints remain on the consciousness. These are reactivated through craving and grasping, propelling us into the next life. We then take rebirth involuntarily in higher or lower realms. This is the way ordinary beings circle incessantly through existence like the turning of a wheel. Even under such circumstances ordinary beings can engage diligently with a positive aspiration in virtuous practices in their day-to-day lives. They familiarise themselves with virtue that at the time of death can be reactivated providing the means for them to take rebirth in a higher realm of existence. On the other hand, superior Bodhisattvas, who have attained the path of seeing, are not reborn through the force of their karma and destructive emotions, but due to the power of their compassion for sentient beings and based on their prayers to benefit others. They are able to choose their place and time of birth as well as their future parents. Such a rebirth, which is solely for the benefit of others, is rebirth through the force of compassion and prayer. — HH The Dalai Lama, 'Reincarnation'

Thanks, well said. I will consider that in my ongoing readings. But I still see Dennett and Dawkins as representing the cause of the meaning crisis, not the solution to it. There's nothing like the blatant hostility towards every and anything deemed 'religious' in those other writers, that is evident throughout their polemics.

I will add, ‘cosmos’ means ‘ordered whole’. According to Alexander Koyré, philosopher of science, the advent of modern science put an end to that sense of cosmos. The cosmos is no longer seen as an ordered whole but rather as an infinite, homogenous space characterised by mathematical laws and devoid of inherent meaning. So we still talk of a ‘scientific cosmology’ but in some ways it is an oxymoron.

She sounds interesting. Seems a flavor of panpsychism. One of the emerging alternatives. We live in interesting times!

And I’ll correct something I said above - Descartes himself, of course, would never accept that ‘the real universe’ comprised only the physical. But the way he conceived the model lead to the ‘ghost in the machine‘ critique because of the inherent implausibility of a ‘spiritual substance’.

Just ordered the Pickstock book, hardcover, dammit :fear:

I will add that the entire picture of molecules which 'do things', and create the only 'sense of agency' that meaningfully exists in the Universe, is painfully and self-evidently rooted in the (false) Cartesian dichotomy of 'matter and spirit'. So 'the real Universe', in that view, comprises solely the fundamental units of the physical sciences (and to hell with 'quantum wierdness' :rage: ), which (somehow) gives rise to what appears as mind or experience, even if nobody can quite figure out how that happened (it's a hard problem!) or what purpose the nature of first-person experience might serve.

I take Dennett as a textbook example of scientific materialism, which I think is impossible to reconcile with any 'sense of the sacred' (and which is perfectly consistent with his role as 'evangelical atheist'.) According to his neo-Darwinian philosophy, that sense, like anything, can only be explained in terms of its value for group or social cohesion, as there is no grounding to its existence save that provided on the molecular level. Whatever can’t be reduced to that has no real existence. Let there be no ambiguity about this:

…through the microscope of molecular biology, we get to witness the birth of agency, in the first macromolecules that have enough complexity to ‘do things.’ … There is something alien and vaguely repellent about the quasi-agency we discover at this level — all that purposive hustle and bustle, and yet there’s nobody home.” Then, after describing a marvelous bit of highly organized and seemingly meaningful biological activity, Dennett concludes:

Love it or hate it, phenomena like this exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe. — From Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, quoted by Steve Talbott on 'The Illusion of Randomness'

As to the ‘meaning crisis’, I take Vervaeke at face value (even though I haven’t listened to the whole series). He locates the crisis the loss of the sense that the Cosmos is meaningful. He's not a religious polemicist but an academic scholar with a broad range of interests. He frequently refers to a kind of neo-neo-platonist cosmology, summarized here and in the associated lecture. He is critical of physicalist reductionism, and I think there's plenty of daylight between he and Dennett on that score. Everything in that lecture says that top-down is an equal and important factor, which Dennett contemptuously dismisses as 'sky-hooks'.

I notice this talk references the theological philosopher Catherine Pickstock, who's come up on my radar:



'The grammar of knowing and the grammar of being must be very similar (even if the content is different)' he says at around 49:22 in reference to Pickstock, who's most recent book is Aspects of Truth : A New Religious Metaphysics.

If you haven’t seen Vervaeke’s interview of Evan Thompson, I recommend it. — Joshs

I'll watch it. I've listened to the interview between Vervaeke and Kastrup on Kurt Jaimungal's podcast a couple of times. Overall, my philosophy is much nearer Kastrup than Vervaeke, but then, I also think there's much less daylight between them, than between either of them and Dennett. I value Vervaeke even where I diverge from him, for the breadth of scope and the seriousness of his approach. (I went back to find the Kastrup-Vervaeke interview, but found there's an entire playlist. I can't recall which one I listened to but I think it was the first in the series.)

Anatta (no-self) is major theme in Buddhism. The passage that @Joshs provides is a good example. ¹ As it happens, this was also the subject of my MA thesis in Buddhist Studies, so here I'll share some of my thesis work on that issue.

Despite the frequent association of the term with Buddhism, I think the principle of no-self is very easily misconstrued. Consider this verse from the early Buddhist texts. ²

Then the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: "Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?"

When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.

"Then is there no self?"

A second time, the Blessed One was silent.

Then Vacchagotta the wanderer got up from his seat and left.

The 'wanderer Vachagotta' is a figure in these texts associated with the posing of philosophical questions. The Buddha's non-response in such circumstances is generally designated a 'noble silence' wherein he declines to answer questions positively or negatively. ³

The verse continues:

Then, not long after Vacchagotta the wanderer had left, Ven. Ananda said to the Blessed One, "Why, lord, did the Blessed One not answer when asked a question by Vacchagotta the wanderer?"

"Ananda, if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism [the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, would that be in keeping with the arising of knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?"

"No, lord."

"And if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would become even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'"

By not affirming or denying the existence of a self, the Buddha avoids reinforcing a dualistic view that could lead to further attachment or confusion which leads to the formation of dogmatic views (ditthi) in either a positive (religious) or negative (nihilist) sense.³ In Theravada Buddhism, this insight is foundational, directing the mind towards the non-conceptual understanding that the self is a dynamic process comprising the conjugation of aggregates (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness).

But it's important to understand what, exactly, is being denied, and I think there is a good deal of confusion over this, even amongst the highly educated. (It was a constant source of argument on DharmaWheel where I was mod for a time.) In the thesis, I present several passages of the kind of 'eternal unchanging self' that the Buddha rejects.

The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, set firmly as a post. And though these beings rush around, circulate, pass away and re-arise, but this remains eternally. (DN1.1.32) ⁴

Here, the ‘this’ which 'remains eternally' is believed to be something enduring, within which ‘beings rush around, circulate and re-arise’. This arises from the Vedic principle of sat as being ‘what really exists’, distinguished from asat, illusory or unreal. Hence in this formulation, sat is what is ‘eternal, unchangeable, set firmly as a post’, and thus distinguishable from saṃsāra or maya.

In another verse, the Alagaddūpama Sutta criticizes those who think:

This is the self, this is the world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, not subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity’ - this too he regards thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’.

This is designated as 'eternalism', one of the two 'extreme views' associated with death and re-birth. The other 'extreme view' is nihilism, that the body is a purely material phenomenon and that there are no consequences for actions after death ⁵

But - this is the crucial point, not generally acknowledged in my view - in none of this is agency denied. How could it be, in a doctrine to which karma is central? There is a verse in which the Buddha explicitly denies the claim that there is no agent (self-doer or other-doer, i.e. self and other, see Attakārī Sutta.)

What is denied is the eternally-existing, unchangeable self posited by the Brahmins. And also that there is, anywhere, an unchanging element, thing or being - hence the designation of 'all dharmas' ('dharmas' here meaning 'experienced realities') as anatta, devoid of self (and also anicca, impermanent, and dukkha, unsatisfying.) In the Buddha's context, what I think he was rejecting was the religious view that through the right sacrificial practices, one could secure favourable re-births indefinitely or dwell in an eternal heaven. But he also rejects the view that physical death terminates the process that gives rise to individual existence in the first place. Getting insight into that process unties the Gordian knot of existence. And yes, that is hard to fathom!

-----

Notes:

1. The text cited is from The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. It was a hugely influential book originally published in 1991, revised edition 2015, which combined insights from cognitive science, phenomenology and Buddhist abhidharma (philosophical psychology). Worth noting that more recently Evan Thompson has published Why I am Not a Buddhist, in which he explains why he doesn't designate himself Buddhist, although he maintains a 'friendly' attitude to Buddhism and continues to draw on its insights. Thompson is now Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University.

2. The 'early Buddhist texts' refer to the Pali canon, which are the texts of the Theravada Buddhism. The Pali language is an extinct dialect which is only preserved in these texts, although it is closely related to Sanskrit, in which the later Mahāyāna corpus was preserved. Translations of the Pali texts are preserved in the Mahāyāna corpus as the 'nikayas' or 'agamas' along with the Mahāyāna Sutras which are not recognised in Theravada Buddhism.

3. In this there is a correspondence to the 'aporia' of the Platonic dialogues, which are in effect invitations for the questioner/listener to consider a matter more deeply. There are a list of questions categorised as 'undeclared' which occupy this category, with Vachagotta representing the usual protagonist in such dialogues. These have been compared to Kant's 'antinomies of reason'.

4. Note here the phrase 'self-and-world' which are often written as a pair, which suggests the 'co-arising of subject and object', also a theme in phenomenology. I've never quite got to the bottom of the Pali term which is translated as 'self-and-world'.

5. @Tom Storm - Dennett's materialism would be categorised as a form of nihilism, according to the Brahmajala Sutta, 'the Net of Views', which meticulously documents the 64 (magic number!) varieties of eternalist and nihilist views. It is the first and longest text of the Pali suttas. Materialists such as Dennett were well-known in the Buddha's day and were represented in the texts by various figures, including one Prince Payasi, who had condemned prisoners put to death inside a clay jar, weighed before and after their deaths, to try and ascertain whether the release of their soul could be detected by the scales.

See also

Anatta-lakkhana Sutta

Gallagher offers that Varela’s incorporation of buddhist themes of mindfulness gives enactivism a way to make skilled coping about more than cleverness. We can see it instead as directed by an ethical knowhow that achieves a benevolent posture through the giving up of egoistic habits of grasping. The awareness of the no self within the self leads to a compassionate stance toward others. This seems to be where spirituality comes into play for Varela and Thompson, and it illustrates how the progress of a science can come around to affirming what the spiritual disciplines knew. — Joshs

Beautifully said thank you.

Thanks for the affirmation! on both counts.

Hope you dont log out too soon. — Joshs

I keep saying I will, but then, as Michael Corleone put it....

And that project you're working on sound fascinating.

Meanwhile I'm going to work through Vervaeke's original series - it's the kind of material you can listen to on walks or driving, and I'm doing a fair amount of both. I'm not 'fixating' on him or anything, it's just that he's got a real 'integral' approach, and he's very learned. He's kind of doing what Ken Wilber tried to do, but Wilber was always an outsider to the academy.

"As it happens, the very first post I entered on the predecessor forum to this one, was about what I now understand to be Platonic realism, i.e. that abstracta (in that case numbers), are real but not materially existent. I've discussed and debated the issue many times but I find that it's neither well understood nor widely supported - principally because it is obviously incompatible with physicalism.
— Wayfarer

This is very interesting...

I've heard a line of reasoning that reminds me of this....I think it might have been Searle? Well, regardless...they made a case that there are things that are:

1. Epistemically objective
2. Epistemically subjective

3. Ontologically objective
4. Ontologically subjective

Something could be ontologically subjective which has a different mode of existence than ontologically objective things. But, this is not to say that they cannot also be epistemically objective. — 013zen

'Objective' always tends to mean 'mind independent'. 'Subjective' tends to mean 'in the mind, mind dependent.' It seems natural to depict it this way as we see ourselves as subjects in a domain of objects.

But what this doesn't see, is the sense in which the objective realm is also mind-dependent. And that comes into relief when you consider things like the role of mathematics in physics and science generally. On the one hand, the phenomena of the natural sciences are independent of observation - they continue to exist independently of being observed. But on the other hand, in order to analyse them and incorporate them in theory, we are highly dependent on theoretical constructs which in some important sense (as Einstein said) dictate what it is we are seeing. The distinction which seems so clear-cut, is not actually so, because we're not actually outside of or apart from the world that natural science seeks to know. That has become evident in science in the observer problem in physics, but it's also manifest in many of the analyses of philosophy of science.

So, I wonder if real numbers are either subjective or objective. I mean, they're not to be found anywhere in the world, as such. Nor are they products of the mind, as they are the same for all who can count. That is the sense in which 'intelligible objects' are transcendent - they transcend the subject/object division. And not seeing that is part of the consequences of the decline of realism. The culture doesn't have a way of thinking about transcendentals. From an article on What is Math that I frequently cite in this context:

scholars—especially those working in other branches of science—view Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?

Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York, was initially attracted to Platonism—but has since come to see it as problematic. If something doesn’t have a physical existence, he asks, then what kind of existence could it possibly have? “If one ‘goes Platonic’ with math,” writes Pigliucci, empiricism “goes out the window.” (If the proof of the Pythagorean theorem exists outside of space and time, why not the “golden rule,” or even the divinity of Jesus Christ?)

Speaks volumes, in my opinion.

I think a modern notion of forms is defensible. The forms are simply the arrangement of quarks, leptons, and bosons that make up protons and neutrons, or the form that a carbon atom takes, etc — 013zen

I think that was the view defended by D M Armstrong, 'Materialist Theory of Mind'. But I think it's a reification, an attempt to understand ideas in a quasi- or pseudo-scientific framework and fit them into the procrustean bed of naturalism. My somewhat revisionist interpretation of the forms or ideas, is that they're more like principles - perhaps logical principles, like the LEM, for example (or the principle of triangularity or circularity, for others). In what sense can these principles be said to exist? Only as an 'object of intellect', in the Greek sense (that is, they are real as noumenal objects). Our thinking is suffused with and dependent on these kinds of principles in order to make sense of experience, but again, they're not 'out there' in the world. They're not objective, but we rely on them to determine what is objective. But again, the culture we're in doesn't have a way of framing transcendentals, because of the historic rejection of metaphysics. (Not for a minute claiming there should be a 'return' to traditionalism, but a re-interpretation of these fundamental issues.)

I don't think Aristotle is wrong about that, either. I understand much of his actual science is outmoded - no surprise there - but elements of the metaphysics and other aspects of his philosophy are still current (or in fact timeless). I've learned that there's been a minor revival of interest in Aristotle's biology, due to the inescapable teleological features of, well, all living things. Edward Feser has a book on the revival, Aristotle's Revenge.

As it happens, the very first post I entered on the predecessor forum to this one, was about what I now understand to be Platonic realism, i.e. that abstracta (in that case numbers), are real but not materially existent. I've discussed and debated the issue many times but I find that it's neither well understood nor widely supported - principally because it is obviously incompatible with physicalism.

In any case, after much more reading and deliberation, I decided that some form of scholastic realism - realism concerning universals - simply must be true, for the reasons you've sketched out. What I'm referring to as the calamity of the decline of Greek metaphysics is subject of some influential books. One is Ideas have Consequences, which was a surprise best-seller by a Uni of Chicago English professor in the post-war period. It is all about the longer-term consequences of the decline of metaphysics:

Like Macbeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter with the witches on the heath? It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence. — Richard Weaver

(This book is rather unfortunately nowadays associated with American political conservatism, with which I have no affinity, but I believe his basic argument still stands.)

Another more recent book is The Theological Origins of Modernity, Michael Allen Gillespie, around 2008. THere's a snynopsis here.

Then there are Lloyd Gerson's books, the most recent being Platonism and Naturalism: The Possibility of Philosophy. Gerson's books are not very approachable for the lay reader as they are aimed very much at his academic peers, but he too supports Aristotelian or scholastic realism. But his main argument is to the incompatibility of Platonism and Naturalism, and the contention that Platonism is coterminous with philosophy proper. (Rather a good online lecture on this book here.)

Finally an essay called What's Wrong with Ockham - actually the source of that Weaver quote - which is on Academia (originally published on a now extinct website.) It too is a dense scholarly work, but the concluding section on what was lost with the Aristotelian 'aitia' (fourfold causation) is important:

Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.

In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom.

I am surprised to have discovered these sources, because they're mainly associated with Catholicism - Edward Feser and author of that last paper are Catholic professors - but I'm myself not Catholic. But I like to think of it as a uniquely Western manifestation of the philosophia perennis, which apart from the kinds of sources I've referred to, is nowadays mainly lost and forgotten.

Sorry about such a long and dense post, but it's a very large topic.

What happened to the hippies of '67? — Apustimelogist

One of them started Apple Computer..

I suspect Vervaeke sits with all those theorists and self-help folk who seek to offer a remedy for common anxiety. — Tom Storm

And I think that's a very small-minded way of looking at it. Vervaeke’s opus is nearer my interests than most of what is written about here, and he's a legitimate academic, he's not fringe or crank. He dialogues with a lot of interesting people and they cover a lot of topics in depth. The reason he's developed a following is because he's saying something that needs to be said, and that a lot of people needed to hear, shame folks here don't appreciate that, but nothing I can say is likely to change it.

Anyway, I'm logging out for a while, posting here has become too much of a habit, and it profiteth nothing. I need to develop some other interests.

I don't know where you sourced that quote. As explained in the OP: John Vernaeke is a professor of psychology at the University of Toronto. He currently teaches courses on thinking and reasoning with an emphasis on cognitive development, intelligence, rationality, mindfulness, and the psychology of wisdom.

Vervaeke is the director of University of Toronto’s Consciousness and Wisdom Studies Laboratory and its Cognitive Science program, where he teaches Introduction to Cognitive Science and The Cognitive Science of Consciousness, emphasizing the 4E model, which contends that cognition and consciousness are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended beyond the brain.

Vervaeke has taught courses on Buddhism and Cognitive Science in the Buddhism, Psychology, and Mental Health program for 15 years.

some here seem to think of materialism, (better known now as physicalism or naturalism) as superficial and untenable nonsense — Tom Storm

I see physicalism as the implicit consensus, the common-sense understanding of life and mind, that is one of the consequences of Enlightenment rationalism. Vervaeke addresses it indirectly - the initial lecture series that became popular on Youtube was called 'Awakening from the Meaning Crisis', described as follows:

We are in the midst of a mental health crisis. There are increases in anxiety disorders, depression, despair, and suicide rates are going up in North America, parts of Europe, and other parts of the world. This mental health crisis is itself due to, and engaged with, crises in the environment and the political system, those in turn are enmeshed within a deeper cultural historical crisis that John Vervaeke calls “The Meaning Crisis”. It’s more and more pervasive throughout our lives. And there’s a sense of drowning in this old ocean of bullshit. And we have to understand, why is this the case? And what can we do about it?

Today, there is an increase of people feeling very disconnected from themselves, from each other, from the world, and from a viable and foreseeable future. Let’s discuss this, let’s work on it together, let’s rationally reflect on it. Getting out of this problem is going to be tremendously difficult. It’s going to require significant transformations in our cognition, our culture, our communities. And in order to move forward in such a difficult manner, we have to reach more deeply into our past to salvage the resources we can for such an amazing challenge.

That links to a series of 51 lectures which can be found here:

This series provides a historical genealogy – beginning 40,000 years ago – that explores the rise and fall of meaning in the West, and the philosophy, religion and science that nurtured it. Vervaeke examines how human beings evolved to be meaning-making creatures, and why this is so essential to our culture and cognition. The series explores how the decline of meaningful worldviews has paved the way for various modern ailments, such as our political, environmental and mental health crises, and the rising suicide rates in North America and around the world.

At the very least, it's worth scrolling through the lecture titles. My view is, that it is extraordinarily relevant to what we are always discussing on thephilosophyforum, in fact for the next few months I'm going to spend more time listening and less posting.

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly and could mean nothing to those who have not experienced it, in the sense that they could have no idea what it means, but they certainly could imagine many things. — Janus

It’s worth recalling the origin of ‘enlightenment’. It was used by the Pali Text Society to translate ‘bodhi’ from the Buddhist texts. Elsewhere that word is translated as ‘wisdom’ which doesn’t carry the same rather portentous connotations. I suppose that the idea of ‘conversion’ - something like a Road to Damascus experience - is then also imputed to it. But perhaps in reality it is something rather more prosaic. That is more like the Sōtō Zen attitude of ‘ordinary mind’.

(Here, I’m actually reminding myself.)

Namely, knowledge of universals or what is common to all particular instances.

It seems as though Aristotle is telling us what he takes wisdom to consist in. — 013zen

While I agree, recall that modern culture is generally nominalist and empiricist. There are still advocates of scholastic realism and hylomorphism but they're mainly Catholic philosophers or specialised academics. (See this index.) As far as the mainstream of philosophy is concerned, Aristotelian metaphysics was retired pretty well around the same time as Aristotelian physics, with the scientific revolution and the abandonment of geocentrism.

This is a theme I have been pursuing but I'm woefully under-prepared to really tackle it. But it's based on my belief that the decline of scholastic metaphysics was a momentous and generally calamitous change in Western culture. I'm always harking back to the supposedly spiritual elements of Greek philosophy but they get pretty short shrift on this forum and elsewhere.