You quoted me in this post, but don't address noumena at all -- which is what I was questioning. I appreciate the attempt, and don't want to be accused of "cantankerousness," but I still fail to see what role the noumenon plays if it's not representations and not the thing-in-itself.

(1)

Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. — Mww

Ok, sure.

(2)

Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. — Mww

Of course.

Here's where you make the jump I just am not seeing:

Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. — Mww

Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. What we perceive -- our representations, our sensations in time and space -- are phenomena. You grant this.

If something is perceived, it's phenomena. To say the thing in itself is perceived is therefore saying it's a phenomenon or representation of some kind. It's not. Kant's postulating something that may be "outside" our representations, apart from spatial and temporal forms. This is what "in itself" means -- in itself as opposed to the forms of our knowing anything (in space and time). Sensations, and hence perceptions, are spatial and temporal, and hence representation, and hence phenomena. So we can't "sense" the thing-in-itself, we can't "perceive" it, we can't "know" it. This is why the concept of thing-in-itself has been so controversial for so long.

Human beings have scope and limits, and the thing in itself has always appeared to me to mean simply whatever there is outside this scope.

That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. — Mww

You just said perception is an affect of our sensations, of our senses. Some sensations and perceptions are "unknown"? I still don't see your point I'm afraid.

That which is conceived can be talked about. To be conceived does not require existence. — Mww

Sure.

We perceive the thing-in itself. We don’t perceive noumena because there is nothing in the human faculty of representation that allows for it. — Mww

In my reading we don't strictly perceive either. Our perceptions, our representations on the occasion of sense, are phenomena. What's represented apart from our spatial-temporal "cognoscitive powers" is noumenon, the thing-in-itself. We don't perceive it, because we have no knowledge of it -- what we perceive is whatever shows up for us in time and space: representations. You see what I'm saying?

If you're just using "perception" in the same way I'm using "representation," then sure, representations of something makes sense -- but we have no idea what that something is, and as soon as we try to attribute to it any property whatsoever we're assigning to it something spatial-temporal -- that's the whole point of bringing in the "in itself."

Again, I think your own passage says it nicely:

objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility... — Mww

(1) Outward objects = representations of our sensibilities.
(2) Objects in themselves = quite unknown. (Notice he doesn't say they're "unknown, yet we perceive them." That would make them representations of our sensibilities [1].)

Now what about "inner objects" like thoughts and the like? Maybe this is what you're getting at. I would argue they're phenomena as well, but perhaps that's off topic.

Just saw this:

Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous, and there is textual evidence for this relationship.[14] However, Stephen Palmquist holds that "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only loosely synonymous, inasmuch as they represent the same concept viewed from two different perspectives,[15][16] and other scholars also argue that they are not identical.[17] Schopenhauer criticised Kant for changing the meaning of "noumenon". However, this opinion is far from unanimous.[18] Kant's writings show points of difference between noumena and things-in-themselves. For instance, he regards things-in-themselves as existing:

...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.[19]

He is much more doubtful about noumena:

But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition.[20]

A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing-in-itself is that to call something a noumenon is to claim a kind of knowledge, whereas Kant insisted that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the thing-in-itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But Stephen Palmquist explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the thing-in-itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.[21]

So, again, it's more controversial than I thought. But I'm still not seeing much textual evidence to support many of the claims being made here.

What's another word for thinking about an object not as one of the senses but of a thing-in-itself? Answer: noumenon.

"The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself[...]"

Seems pretty clear here.

The importance of the distinction as I understand it lies in Kant's desire to remain a certain kind of realist (an 'empirical realist', as he famously calls himself). As is well known, Kant is keen to distinguish himself from idealism of Berkeley, and does so precisely by positing the thing-in-itself which gives rise to appearance. The importance of the fact that the TII is not relative to us (or to our transcendental constitution) means that in some way, the universe exists 'out there' regardless of whether we are there to cognize it or not. — StreetlightX

Sure. What I'm failing to see is where noumena play a role if they're not representations and not the thing-in-itself. If noumenon is used as word for the "boundary" between phenomena and the thing-in-itself, I'm just not yet convinced by that. Kant, in many passages, also clearly links both the noumenon and the thing in itself -- one passage was already cited earlier. It would be hard to square the two interpretations.

Maybe I'm just hopeless, but I'm still not understanding exactly where noumena are supposed to fit in your (and others') readings.

God, soul, Universe as Totality... It can be thought, but not known. It is thought as a mere boundary of what I cannot know. My intelect push me to it, but knowledge fails because only phenomena can be known. — David Mo

Things we think aren't phenomena? "God" and "soul" and the "Universe" are not phenomena or knowledge? Than how can you speak about them at all?

If you're not including thoughts as phenomena, I don't agree with that at all. If Kant says that somewhere I missed, I think it's just a mistake.

I read the exact quotation and yet I don't see your point. Kant is discussing the limits of what we can know and is equating the thing-in-itself with the noumenon in that passage, in my reading. It's actually a little baffling that you you interpret it as supporting you, but so it goes.

It exists. It must, or we would have no perception of it. — Mww

Then in this sense both thing-in-itself and noumenon exists, otherwise we wouldn't say anything about either. Although to use "perception" is misleading -- we don't strictly perceive either.

The thing in itself isn't generated by our faculties limits, or anything to do with us, rather it's that which generates whatever appears to us — fdrake

So the thing in itself is what's represented, though we don't know what it is "in itself." Fine. Either the same is true of noumena, or else noumena are representations of some kind, which would make them phenomena. If noumena are something in between, it's not been demonstrated here.

The distinction between boundary (noumenon) and what lays outside the boundary (thing in itself), what lays within the boundary are phenomena and appearances. — fdrake

"Distinction between the boundary" is meaningless to me. There's phenomena and noumena, in my reading. In yours, there's phenomena, noumena, and the thing in itself. Fine. But I'm not seeing it in anything that's been quoted from Kant so far.

More specifically, noumena are intelligible objects that are not sensible — StreetlightX

OK. Examples of such intelligible objects would be what exactly? And whatever is given as an example, is this not therefore phenomenal (as objects)? I see the difference being made between understanding and sensibility, but my point is that it's completely irrelevant. Why? Because both the noumenon and the thing in itself are unknowns -- in any way other than that they're unknown. If you're arguing one is known in some other way, then it's no longer unknown.

The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible — fdrake

So does the thing-in-itself. Anything beyond space and time, the forms of sensibility, is unknown.

it's generated through our faculties' limits — fdrake

As is the thing-in-itself.

he thing-in-itself is the name for being insofar as it is not conditioned by our faculties; it is that which exceeds the limitations of our faculties. — fdrake

So the noumenon doesn't exceed our faculties? But the thing-in-itself does.
Both are unknowable, yet both are somehow different unknowable things.
One is a limit of sensibility and for us, the other is a limit of our faculties and outside us.

I just see no evidence for these positions whatsoever. I realize now it is held by quite a few people, but in my view it's a mistake. But at this point whatever the supposed difference is between noumenon and thing-in-itself, we can't say a word about either because they're beyond time and space, which is the basis for knowing anything at all. So, I guess, who cares?

and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real. — Mww

"Real" in what sense exactly? That aliens could see it differently from our perceptions?

That's such a misreading of Kant. But have it your way.

I see from this discussion that apparently this point is more controversial than I realized. Nevertheless, if we all agree that both the noumenon and the thing-in-itself are unknowable, doesn't this make them essentially the same?

The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible (it belongs to the order of the intelligible).
The thing in itself marks the limit of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. — StreetlightX

I don't understand "belongs to the order of the intelligible." Is this saying it's intelligible in some other way than the thing-in-itself?

Noumena are "for-us", while things-in-themselves are indifferent to sensibility. — StreetlightX

What possible good is it to say that noumena are "for us"? In what way are they for us? Something unknown, whether in reference to our "understanding" or our "sensibilities" or our "capacities for knowledge" are still unknowns and unknowable. They're "intelligible" in the same way, therefore: as unknowns. But that seems to be the extent of it.

Maybe you're right and there's a subtle difference here, but I'm not seeing it. And "cantankerous" as I'm accused of being, I'm actually really trying to see the point -- I have no stock in being right or wrong about this side discussion.

To summarize:

The noumenon (the unknown) is "internal" because it's "cognitated" by the pure understanding. The thing in itself (the unknown) is "external" because it's an object of sensibility.

Does anyone on here take this seriously?

Maybe no one's even listening. I don't blame them, given how ridiculous the above forumlation is -- without one citation of support.

That you don’t know he talks about the thing-in-itself in another section, describing it as the real, albeit known object of sensibility, — Mww

No, he doesn't talk about that -- because what you're saying makes absolutely no sense. Which isn't a surprise. And if what he talks about "later" is so very important to your point, then why leave it out? Especially when the point was to demonstrate how the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon" are supposedly different? Kind of a crucial missing piece there. And no, I don't have the Critique of Pure Reason memorized. If you have a point to make, the make it. So far you haven't. And you certainly haven't earned being taken on faith. Cite the passage or shut up. You're boring me.

and here, on noumena, he talks of the pure understanding cogitating noumena in the same way it cogitates the thing-in-itself. — Mww

You really have no clue.

Here's what Kant is saying, for anyone else listening: The noumenon (the thing in itself) is simply that beyond our sensations and perceptions in time and space and hence unknowable -- yet not self-contradictory. That's it. If the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon" are different in any way, it's not indicated here, never mind one being "external" and the other "internal."

Reading comprehension wasn't your strong suit I see. Pity.

The only justification for conceiving noumena is because we are not entitled to claim our form of cognition is the only kind there is. — Mww

I congratulate you on one true statement. This is indeed what Kant is driving at in the passage. It's also simply repeating, almost verbatim, what he stated.

Also:

for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks — Mww

(My italics)

He's literally saying what I've been asserting twice in a passage you have chosen. And yet you still maintain that somehow he's saying the thing in itself is "external" and the noumenon "necessarily within us." That's telling.

The point doesn’t stand; I specifically said I gave no quotes on the distinction. The claim I referenced has to do with the phenomena/representation distinction. — Mww

Yes, you said you gave no quotes AFTER saying you cite Kant while I cite wikipedia regarding noumenon and the thing in itself, which you initially claimed was "ridiculous." How about going back and reading.

The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. — Mww

(Bold mine)

Exactly right.

Yet:

Noumena is not thing-in-itself. — Mww

First, Kant doesn't say noumena, he says noumenon and thing-in-itself, in the passage cited. Let's at least be clear. Pluralizing one and not the other is unclear. Notice when he does mention noumena (plural), he also pluralizes "phenomenon."

Second, look at the quote. Breaking it down further: the conception of a noumenon - a thing which must be cogitated NOT as an object of sense [representation] but as a thing in itself. I don't know how much more clear that can be. And this is your citation, remember.

Thing-in-itself is external to us, noumena are intellectual intuitions given from pure understanding, thus necessarily within us. — Mww

This is NOT what Kant says, as demonstrated by your own citation. Noumenon is no more "within us" than the thing-in-itself. There's no indication that there's a difference -- in fact Kant is literally saying they're the same thing in this passage.

What Kant is getting at in this passage is whether the thing-in-itself (the noumenon) is contradictory. Nowhere does he say the thing in itself is "external" and the noumenon "within us." Nowhere. You added that in yourself. Nor should you expect this, since the point he's making isn't even to differentiate the two -- it's justifying the use of the conception of "noumenon."

You told me this was all basic stuff, but you didn’t seem to understand any of it. — Mww

I would be embarrassed if I were in your positron. I hope others are reading this -- I'd like others' opinions of this passage. At the very least, it certainly doesn't support any notion that noumenon and thing in itself are different things - which is your claim. Quite the opposite, actually. Despite this embarrassment -- since you obviously don't see it -- you feel entitled about how little I understand? As my nephew would say: "that's cringe."

Happy now? — Mww

I get no joy in being proven right over and over again. I'd much rather learn something new.

OK. I already referenced that sentence myself in the former post. That doesn't make it Lockean. But regardless, I'll rephrase: subjects have representations, some of which we call the outside world.

All my quotes are right out of CPR 1787. — Mww

Yes, and say nothing about the phenomenon being different from representation. But in any case, that's not what I was referring to. I asked for citations regarding:

The "thing in itself" and "noumenon" is essentially the same thing, yes. If you have evidence otherwise, I'd be glad to hear it. — Xtrix

Which you then claim you gave, while I merely cite Wikipedia.

So the point stands: you haven't.

What I mean is, that to say that there's a representation of, or a representation and, is suggestive of representative realism, which is more like Locke's philosophy. — Wayfarer

When do I say "representation of" or "representation and"? I'd like to see the context that was "suggestive" of this.

I think the correct description of Kant's view is that they're not representations, they're phenomena, appearance. — Wayfarer

OK. This differs how from the following:

I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object). — Xtrix

(Which is where this diversion started.)

If there's any "difference" at all, it's simply that phenomena usually refer to something "outside" the subject -- i.e., the object. But this, in turn, is only known as representation -- or appearance, if you prefer. Makes no difference. Now, what the phenomenon or object is in itself we can't know and can say nothing about, because our world is the world of representation (meaning nothing other than sensations in time and space, activity of the brain). If representations "of" something - apart from what they are -makes any sense, it's of something we can't fully know since our understanding and knowledge is bounded by time and space.

This is why Schopenhauer titles his book "World as Will and Representation." He identifies the thing in itself with the will, whereas Kant said there's nothing to be said about it. Was Schopenhauer way off base as well?

Not once did I bring up Locke in this discussion.

To summarize this non-exchange:

Phenomena and representation are different qualifications of the same thing, that being the external object. Representations are general things known to reason a priori, phenomena are unknown particulars. — Mww

Again: what "qualifications"?

Representations are not what's a priori -- the forms of intuition are.
Phenomena are not unknown particulars -- this is simply meaningless.

I really hope you don't teach.

You use wiki, I use Kant. — Mww

No, you haven't. If you'd like to, feel free. I won't hold my breath.

And actually I've used both Kant and Schopenhauer. You've made a claim about phenomena and representations being different, refused to provide any relevant evidence to support the claim, told me to find it myself, then changed the subject. Now you want to behave as an adolescent. That's fine. Doesn't change the facts.

I refer again to https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/369165 . (For anyone serious who's interested in Kant's transcendental idealism.)

Representations and phenomena are the same thing, and beyond this the thing in itself. There is no phenomena as "unknown external object" -- that's the noumenon.

And that's where it stands thus far.

This is Locke’s representative realism, not Kant. — Wayfarer

Brilliant analysis.

Hmmmm......here’s ridiculous: the claim, or even the intimation, that because noumena and the thing in itself are both unknowable to or by means of the human system, they are therefore the same thing. — Mww

I guess Kant is ridiculous then.

The "thing in itself" and "noumenon" is essentially the same thing, yes. If you have evidence otherwise, I'd be glad to hear it. Even a simple Wikipedia search admits it's pretty open-ended:

"In Kantian philosophy, the unknowable noumenon is often linked to the unknowable "thing-in-itself" (in Kant's German, Ding an sich), although how to characterize the nature of the relationship is a question still open to some controversy."

I could be completely wrong, but to say it's ridiculous is just nonsense. I see no evidence so far that I am wrong, of course -- except for your armchair philosophy.

If it was crucial, why didn’t he talk about it, other than to say there’s nothing there to talk about? — Mww

Oh lord. Is this a joke?

Hell.....I can do this chit all day. — Mww

You mean talk nonsense? Yes, that's obvious.

I notice also you're trying to avoid defending your ridiculous claims about phenomena. Which is a smart move on your part, to avoid further embarrassment.

For those interested:

Kant:

"Accordingly, it is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things a priori, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not at the are in themselves[...]" Prolegomena, p. 17

The "thing-in-itself" is a crucial part of Kant's philosophy.

Thus,

And forget noumena; the notion of them is utterly irrelevant in discussions by humans about humans. — Mww

Is a bit ridiculous. And probably the source of his confusion.

Find your own. — Mww

Yeah, I figured as much.

I'm sorry you're so confused about this. Perhaps studying Kant would help.

And I don't have to "find my own" because you won't find your conception of "phenomena" in Kant anywhere.

The forms of sensibility are time and space. These are a priori. We can't experience anything at all except through these forms. Matter, causality, phenomena or objects of any kind are experienced through these forms -- as representations. Beyond these representations is the unknown and unknowable -- the noumenon, the thing in itself.

This is Kant. To say phenomena is in some Twilight realm and "really exist" outside our representations is a complete misunderstanding. To say phenomena is just a "qualification" of an "external object" is likewise a misunderstanding -- any object whatsoever is an entity, a being, a phenomenon -- we only experience this as representation. What is the object, the phenomenon, the "external world" in itself? The noumenon.

I sometimes can't believe this is a philosophy forum.

Phenomena and representation are different qualifications of the same thing, that being the external object. — Mww

Different qualifications of the "external object"? What does "different qualifications" mean? So phenomena and representation are different or not? If not, which is what you seemed to be saying, then how do they differ? If they're the same, then that's exactly what I said above.

Representations are general things known a priori, phenomena are unknown particulars. — Mww

This is completely wrong. Find me one supporting sentence from Kant that states this. The phenomena being "unknown particulars" is meaningless. If it's phenomena, it's representation.

we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. — Mww

How this got started.

If not phenomena, then what is phenomena? Something "undetermined." But not an unknown thing in itself. Something between that is undifferentiated but with which we have representations of (which is the thing in itself in Kant). Then I hear something about physical objects.

Your whole thesis is confused. The onus is on you to demonstrate where Kant says there's some other realm between the known and unknown where this phenomena supposedly lies (since it's not "representation" according to you, yet we can still talk about it). Maybe the Twilight Zone?

Correct. Representations for us, re: the human cognitive system. That does not say anything whatsoever about the object itself. — Mww

Meaning the thing-in-itself, the noumenon. Yes, of course. Representations "for us" is redundant.

But they are real physical objects nonetheless. — Mww

What does the "they" refer to? The representations or the "object itself"?

The quotes you provide say exactly what I've said all along: phenomena and representation are the same thing, otherwise there would be no need for the idea of the thing in itself. Are you failing to grasp this or what? At this point I'm not sure what you're arguing, because you're making the case for me.

Your Schopenhauer is pre-dated by: — Mww

Yes, true...and?

Agreed. Makes me wonder why you’re having so much trouble with it. — Mww

Oh I see, it's in fact I who am having trouble. How Trumpian.

But that assumes our representations are not based on something related existing outside and independent of the knowing subject. — Marchesk

No. That would be the thing-in-itself which we cannot know, since everything we can know are representations (from "sensibility" in space and time). Any story you make up about what the thing-in-itself itself comes from your experience of the world. Schopenhauer claims it's the "will," for example. To say it's "physical objects" or anything like that is already missing the point -- they too are representations.

If your system says phenomena are experienced through representations, so be it. Just don’t call it the Kantian system. — Mww

It's precisely the Kantian system. How else is phenomena experienced?

Real physical objects external to us, are experienced through our representations. — Mww

This is not Kant at all. Nor would he ever make any such claims. In that case the "real physical objects" would be the noumenon. If they're physical objects, or anything else whatsoever, then they're representations.

Again, this is introductory stuff. Not difficult. See the Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Aesthetic.

Or, if you like, Schopenhauer puts it clearly:

"What is extended in space, and hence the objective, material world in general, exists as such simply and solely in our representation, and that it is false and indeed absurd to attribute to it, as such, an existence outside all representation and independent of the knowing subject, and so to assume a matter positively and absolutely existing in itself."

True, but that doesn’t say phenomena are representations. If it did, it would be tautological, re: the phenomenal world is the world of phenomena. Thus, to have meaning, either it is not the world of representations, or phenomena are not representations. Take your pick. — Mww

In Kant, phenomena are only experienced through our representations. What is the object "beyond" our representations? The ding an sich, the noumenon. So yes, the world and the phenomena of the world are representations. Saying phenomena is something other than or different from our representations, which is what you're arguing, is to speak about the noumenon, which is unknowable in Kant. Phenomena that isn't representation and isn't noumenal is meaningless.

In terms of "the philosophical basis for modern science" (which was also being discussed) what has Kant contributed? — Galuchat

Now you're diverting. There's plenty that can be said about Kant's influence on modern science. But first one needs to understand Kant. Saying it's mere "physicalist pap" shows you're not worth having that discussion with, however.

Welcome to my ignore list. — SophistiCat

I'm devastated.

Kant was what was being discussed. Try to keep up. Go hero-worship somewhere else.

I'm not a Kantian nor do I advocate for Kant's philosophy. But let's at least understand what he was saying.

It's not physicalist. Read some Kant and get back to me.

From the Kantian epistemological thesis, yes, it is a mistake: we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. — Mww

Of course they are.

Phenomena are “...undetermined objects of empirical intuition...”, thus not technically representations. — Mww

The phenomenal world is the world of representations. All else is noumenonal, the thing in itself. This isn't that hard.

It is not clear what this question is asking. — SophistiCat

Funny, no one else seems to be struggling with it. I guess that makes you special. Congrats.

The point of this question, which lists a hodgepodge of enduring conditions and potential threats, is also unclear. — SophistiCat

No it isn't. Maybe to you -- although I doubt you're being sincere -- but not to anyone else. The point was stated in the post: I'm interested to get a sense of what people would choose, if they had to. Of course I could write a thousand different qualifications and include a thousand other problems -- that goes without saying, but I was assuming we're all adults.

There's always at least one person who wants to play Socrates and claim fake confusion. So boring. Nonetheless, if something as clear and straightforward as this is really that confusing to you, feel free to simply ignore it and go on your merry way.

That’s mistaken I believe. The ‘phenomenon’ is all there is for us - as opposed to the negative sense of noumenon. He is explicit enough about that I felt? — I like sushi

Yes. So what’s “mistaken” exactly? That Kant believed in an outside world? I’m not seeing your point.

ir enough - I agree that dualism has had a significant influence in those areas. But my impression was that it is also commonly thought to be a mistaken view. See, for example, Dennett's Cartesian Theater criticism. — Andrew M

I’m not sure about mistaken, but simply one formulation which happens to be the most dominant in the west.

Can you be more specific? How does falsifiability and paradigm shift, for example, imply a subject/object dualism? — Andrew M

Both deal with scientific theories, and a knowing subject is thus assumed.

And again, I’m not necessarily talking about mind/body dualism. I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object).