True- not meant as an exhaustive list, of course. Just off the top of my head. But you’re right, that could be a big problem - or a blessing. It’s hard to know at this point.

I’m a triggered snowflake, Sean Hannity. There, now go rest easy in your reality.

Science is successful in telling us all that stuff. — Marchesk

Science is successful in telling us stuff about stuff, and by stuff we mean everything.

So science is good at telling us that everything is everything. That galaxies and brain waves etc exist.

I’m getting bored.

Climate denier who’s not read a word of Chomsky. Got it.

You cracked the case. Good for you.

Also- epidemics, war, etc, effect the third world quite a lot I’d say. But I don’t have access to your very credible, very edgy sources.

You need to get your head out of your daily diet of media hysteria. — fishfry

Yes, and be more like you and your ilk— ignoramuses who feel superior believing they have special knowledge. So edgy, so adolescent.

Please substantially tell us and the science community how climate change is “hysteria.” I eagerly await enlightenment.

Science is successful at telling us that this “stuff” is galaxies, cells, brain activity? Or is “stuff” now something else?

Now THOSE are problems. Worrying about crap you read in the mainstream media is a fool's game. I suggest that in the new year we all try to focus on what's real and what's merely illusion. — fishfry

So climate change and nuclear weapons are mainstream media illusions, and the “real” problems are that many people can’t eat or find clean water.

What a stupid, stupid position.

So literally everything? Fine. Good observation.

I would say we’re beings among other beings. “Stuff” is misleading.

Maybe. He won by a few thousand votes in normally blue states and lost by 3 million in the popular. Hardly a guarantee.

"Physical," "material," "body," etc., are honorific terms. They used to have a technical notion within mechanical philosophy of the 16th and 17th centuries. They no longer do. Thus, "material world," "material reality," "physical world," etc., is completely meaningless. As is the mind/body "problem."

Fair enough. Glad to help.

Within a LARGER scope, it could be meaningless or not, depending on your metaphysical position, which ultimately can be no more than belief. Within the scope of science, the concept of an atom does have meaning, or we wouldnt be able to make sense of scientific theories. — ernestm

It's quite true that an atom makes sense in chemistry and physics. That has nothing to do with "material," which is meaningless. It used to have a meaning in science, in Newton's day, in terms of the mechanical philosophy, as "body," -- but that was abandoned long ago.

So to say

...such words refer to a scientific model to explain the observed material world, and not the material world itself. — ernestm

really doesn't mean anything at all.

ooh. I didnt know that. I'll do some reading on it, thank you ) — ernestm

Can't tell if this is sarcastic.

But it doesn't matter, because such words refer to a scientific model to explain the observed material world, and not the material world itself. — ernestm

The term "material" is meaningless. Hence also the "material world."

Thats not empirically true. The USA and Nicaragua are the only two nations which did not sign up to the Paris Accord. Everyone else generally agrees the planet is warming up. — ernestm

I think every country, including this one, has a majority of people who believe the climate is changing and it's man-made. That's not my point. Also, Brazil is in the Paris Accord as well -- as is the US (until later this year). That's meaningless. My point is the percentage of people who deny it's happening altogether are going to be found in larger numbers in fossil-fuel exporting countries. And that's indeed what you find. Empirically.

It seems mostly unique to the USA. — ernestm

I'm not sure if that's true, but the level to which the propaganda is implemented is probably unique. Nevertheless, other countries whose economies depend of the exporting of fossil fuels are also persuadable. Brazil, Russia, Australia, Britain, etc.

The thing is quite a few members on here are ordinary language philosophy fans, and not great fans of metaphysics, so discussing the usage of words is important to them, since they're convinced philosophy goes wrong with a misuse of language, particularly when it comes to ontology. — Marchesk

Discussing words, their origins and the history of their meaning, is indeed important. That's not being done here. To resort to the dictionary is as useless here as it is in physics, as I mentioned before. No one cares about how "energy" is used in everyday discourse if you're discussing physics. Likewise, no one cares here either -- unless it somehow plays into a deeper analysis of the etymology of the word (in this case "being") in the context of the history of ontology (which is what we're concerned with). But that hasn't been done.

I think we experience the world as if there is a subjective/objective divide, but the ontological situation is unclear, because we don't know the nature of consciousness. However, we're made of the same stuff as everything else, so I tend to think it's an epistemological divide. — Marchesk

What "stuff" would that be? Atoms?

Carrying this to its logical conclusion, taking into account your other thread on the problems the world is facing, it seems that the scientific bent of the human mind, albeit only expressed in a minority but widely claimed by all, which is the quintessence of the subject-object distinction, is actually an indication that the world has broken and is now present-at-hand. — TheMadFool

Give me an example where it does make sense. — TheMadFool

Well to say the world is "present-at-hand" simply means the theoretical, "rational" mode of being (which underlies science) where things show up as "before us"in the present moment -- as objects with properties, usually. Hubert Dreyfus often says the hammer becomes a "wooden stick with a metal blob at the end" -- a piece of equipment that has a certain weight, color, etc.

None of this is relevant when the activity of hammering is going transparently well -- or take your driving example, which is a good one. That would be ready-to-hand activity.

Given this, I think you mean to say that the current reliance on science shows how this present-at-hand mode of being is taking over the world?

I voted political corruption, by which I mean not just occasional bribes, but the way the powers that be serve elite interests and not 'the people'. This leads to many of the other problems on the list. And many problems not on the list. In my version of 'corruption' one can be utterly corrupt and not break a single law. — Coben

Can't necessarily argue with that.

I voted climate change, but if I had two choices over-population would have been #2. — Wayfarer

Likewise -- although I'm a little less certain about overpopulation these days. I would put nuclear weapons as second. It's still a much bigger threat than most people realize, even with the end of the Cold War.

I'm surprised at the choices, isn't it obvious that climate change is the most pressing, — Punshhh

I'm a bit surprised as well, although people have given good reasons for the other choices.

I would say climate change is the most urgent problem we face currently, but it's certainly connected to overpopulation and political corruption. Again, my biggest surprise is only one vote (so far) for nuclear weapons.

No one cares how the word is (mostly) used in English. Least of all me. I'm talking ontology. Do we walk into a physics lecture and gripe about their "counterintuitive" use of the word "energy" or "work"?

I'm continually discouraged by the lack of any familiarity with ontology in this thread. I was hopeful in the philosophy forum, members would be somewhat educated in philosophy.

I really hope this is all a big lie and science is wrong. If it is I will be happy. In my opinion we should heed the warning regardless. — Lif3r

This is an excellent point. I'm in continual awe of the power of the fossil fuel industry's propaganda.

Well reminds me of driving. When traffic is flowing smoothly we're completely unconscious of the act - the car and the driver are one. The instant something unexpected happens the driver becomes aware of driving the car. Carrying this to its logical conclusion, taking into account your other thread on the problems the world is facing, it seems that the scientific bent of the human mind, albeit only expressed in a minority but widely claimed by all, which is the quintessence of the subject-object distinction, is actually an indication that the world has broken and is now present-at-hand. It makes sense since morality, something that has been on our minds for over 2000 years, is about oughts, as if to say the world is busted and needs repair. — TheMadFool

Fair enough. I don't feel the use of "present-at-hand" makes much sense in this context, but I get your meaning.

Very interesting so far. I would have expected nuclear weapons to come up higher!

Well, that’s just not so. Maybe you’re not a native English speaker? Buildings and furniture are structures and artefacts. The point is that beings are not things or objects, but are subjects of experience, which is demonstrably not the case for inanimate objects — Wayfarer

Yes, it is so I'm afraid. Except in your world, where you reserve "being" for sentience, and cite the English dictionary.

The entirety of that quote:

Buildings and office furniture are certainly beings. No one is saying they're sentient beings. How is this hard for you to understand? Possibly because you not only ignore ontology,but you ignore me and everyone else on this thread who continually try to tell you that "being" as "conscious being" is your peculiar terminology. — Xtrix

(Bold mine)

The fact that you only quoted the first sentence already proves my point. You're a joke.

Next up: let's go to a physics forum and explain that the way we use the term "energy" in English just doesn't line up with how physicists use it. Then cite the dictionary. Bam!

Buildings and office furniture are not 'beings'. If a building burns down - unfortunately this has happened more than a thousand times in my part of the world in the last few weeks - we don't say that the building and its contents 'died. But if it contains living beings - animals or people - then we say 'they died'. Is it strange to say that? Does saying that amount to 'ignoring ontology'? How is this 'ignoring metaphysics'? — Wayfarer

Buildings and office furniture are certainly beings. No one is saying they're sentient beings. How is this hard for you to understand? Possibly because you not only ignore ontology, but you ignore me and everyone else on this thread who continually try to tell you that "being" as "conscious being" is your peculiar terminology.

You don't have to go far back in the history of ontology -- just look at Heidegger, who you quote.

Maybe someone should have been around to tell him that in English, "being" is usually used, in common interaction, to refer to "sentient things," hmm? What a profound realization he would have had.

What do you make of this gloss of Heidegger's work: — Wayfarer

A very decent summary from someone who's clearly read Heidegger. Something I can't say about you.

Note, 'our kind of Being', capitalised. What do you make of that? — Wayfarer

What do I make of what? The capitalization? In Being and Time, and in other translations, "being" is usually capitalized -- and it's unfortunate, in my view. It implies some kind of "God"-like "special" entity or something. In German, all nouns are capitalized, so it's misleading to reserve "being" for special importance.

Anway, I've been told I'm 'peddling nonsense' a number of times in this thread already, which I think is completely untrue, but I will go and do some more reading and contemplation and will take a time out for a while. Bye. — Wayfarer

You're peddling nonsense in the case of reserving the word "being" for "conscious being," citing the English dictionary as support, and then basically saying this in turn lends proof to your belief that consciousness and being are the same thing. You've got to do better sir. This would fail as a dissertation, a master's thesis, an honors thesis, and probably as a Presidential tweet (alright, maybe not THAT bad).

For example? — Wayfarer

See Heidegger, "Introduction to Metaphysics," p. 88 (in German) or p.122 (English). It's available online for free.

The very idea of a conscious entity (a conscious, "rational" being) as sui generis and the "problem of consciousness" itself are, at bottom, taking up the tradition of substance ontology and, I would argue, presuppose the subject/object distinction.

Oh, I'm sorry, then. I thought this was a philosophical discussion. I will, however, be edified in my newfound knowledge that buildings are beings. So long. — Wayfarer

The fact that you find so strange the idea of a building as a being, or a chair, or a rock, or literally anything at all, is puzzling. Unless you've managed to ignore ontology (and metaphysics) altogether.

And yes, it is a philosophical discussion - not a venue to talk nonsense, which is what you're doing.

Don't you think that the issue of the 'hard problem of consciousness' and Chalmer's argument as to why the natural sciences can't sufficiently describe the nature of experience is basically an argument about ontology? — Wayfarer

Since you ask me what I think, I think it's a complete waste of time, and one would do well to skip Nagel and Dennett (who I like personally) and Chalmers altogether. And no, it's not ontology. They're discussing consciousness, not being.

Consciousness or mind or rationality is that which discloses meaning, which makes it possible to define, consider, or analyse anything in the first place. Yet we don't actually know what it is, just as Nagel remarks in his OP. — Wayfarer

If we don't know what it is, then it isn't simply "that which discloses meaning." No one is interested in defining something out in space. It's armchair philosophy. I can choose to define consciousness as the light of Zorthar. Who cares?

So I am arguing is that the very element or aspect of reality which both these passages are referring to as 'what it is like' or 'the point of view of the subject' is actually 'being', and that attribute is why living creatures are called 'beings'. In the broadest sense, 'being' is the capacity for experience, which is found in the simplest of organisms, but which reaches the plateau of self-aware, rational being in human beings. — Wayfarer

So consciousness (of any kind) is "being," which is why (as you claim) we only refer to sentient beings as "beings." But this (1) completely ignores the field of ontology and the Greek sense of being and (2) is simply subjectivizing the word.

"Beings" are everywhere, conscious or not. Even in English. I'm sorry you don't like that, but it's true. If you want to reserve the word "being" for conscious beings, fine -- then everything else let's call "things" or "entities." Makes no difference.

You're well within the ontological distinction of "being and thinking," which has a long tradition.

Your argument, once the smoke is cleared, is not very interesting. Citing an English dictionary does not an argument make.

There is no issue that they exist, but they're not referred to as 'beings', and this is philosophically significant. — Wayfarer

How? And according to whom? The English word "being" and how it's used most of the time tells us what about the state of ontology exactly?

My argument is that the loss this distinction is a characteristic of modernity, generally, and the significance of the elision is more than semantic, but is a symptom of what has been described as the 'forgetting of Being'. — Wayfarer

So because most of the time, in everyday usage, we use the word "things" instead of "beings" for inanimate objects (as a matter of fact, for any object whatsoever), this is an example of the "forgetfulness of being" of modernity? Is that really what you're arguing?

"Forgetfulness of being" is indeed an interesting subject -- in Heidegger. But he's not meaning it in the way you are.

I don't give much weight to the distinction, at least whenever I think it's relevant. I think that it generates intractable access problems (how does a mind move a body?); — fdrake

Well that's slightly different. Notice I didn't put "mind/body" in the title. To equate the subject with a "mind" is a different topic. But your point is taken nonetheless. I don't give it particular weight either.

You probably mean objects incapable of being subjects. They will be machines by definition, no matter what. Or do you mean, that we are not machines, or fundamentally distinct from machines? If so, how? — simeonz

Depends on what you mean by "machine," but yes I think that we're not only machines in the traditional sense. How so would require a separate thread regarding human nature, of which there's much to say. But quickly: I like Heidegger's conception of the being for which being itself is an issue.

It is not obvious to me what does it mean for something to "acquire" consciousnesses. Is this a behavior modification or substance change or some other metaphysical phenomenon? Because stated in this way, how does one challenge any claim that something has or hasn't acquired consciousness. Also, it isn't clear to me what consciousness denotes - a behavioral pattern, a type of experience, etc. If it is a type of experience, how can a person know that it exists outside of their own being - i.e. the solipsism style argument. — simeonz

True, no one has pinned down what consciousness means yet as a technical notion. Hence the use of quotation marks.

Is time relevant? Or do you mean that the emergence of such advanced AGI is suspect to you for some fundamental reason? — simeonz

What's relevant is that we don't know what consciousness is, and computers are non-human objects. So to answer your question more clearly: no, there's no problem here.

I think it's more accurate to say that scientists will articulate justifications for scientific inquiry in the abstract in terms of something resembling the subject object distinction based on how common and pervasively applied a metaphysical intuition it is, rather than saying anything about whether the subject object distinction is really relevant to their work. — fdrake

Yes and no. I agree most scientists would repeat something like this as a philosophical grounding of their work, especially in the cognitive sciences, and that it does't really matter to the particulars of their research. But on the other hand, the particulars are seen in the light of fundamental notions, even if taken for granted and completely unexamined as they usually are. Every science has an ontological basis.

I think the subject/object distinction is one such fundamental notion for science, a variation of Kant, who took up Descartes' ontology, who in turn took up the Scholastic tradition, which of course was influenced by the Greeks.

It may not seem to matter, and it's often hard to care when modern science is so successful -- especially in terms of technology -- but the philosophical underpinnings are still worth questioning. I started this thread to see how many still question this particular notion, and as you can see, not many really do -- yourself included. That's interesting.

I never claimed this. I have said 'being' in the noun form refers to living creatures. — Wayfarer

In common usage (maybe), which is completely useless to this discussion.

So in some ways, the term 'ontology' applies to the 'discipline of the study of Being' in a manner that includes, or at least implies, the first person perspective. And I think that is crucial to understanding what 'ontology' really is about — Wayfarer

And what would that be exactly?

The Greek sense of being was phusis and, later, ousia. Neither privileges the first person perspective. A casual glance at an online etymology site just doesn’t tell you much.

I'm no Wittgenstein but check out language as Andrew M suggested. All languages I know of have a subject-verb-object structure and m — TheMadFool

I’m not talking about grammar or world languages. I’m talking ontology. It’s discouraging that this has to be explained, repeatedly, in a philosophy forum.

What would it mean to say that there's no subject-object distinction? — TheMadFool

In my view it would mean that we’re not engaged with the world in a particular way (in this case, as “abstract thinking”). Heidegger would say something similar, only as a “present-at-hand” mode of being.

Once you’re in this mode, then a subject contemplating objects as a fundamental distinction can commence. But this is a “privative” mode- what human beings do for the most part does not involve subjects and objects at all.

hat about AGI in computers. Hypothetically — simeonz

I’d consider them machines. Maybe in the future they’ll acquire “consciousness” of some kind, but we’re a long way out from that.