(5) Dasein is mature; there's little discussion of learning and socialisation.

Seeing a human being as "a Dasein" misses out a lot which is relevant...
— fdrake

That sums up my thoughts rather nicely as well... — creativesoul

But he made clear this is an existential analytic with the question of the meaning of being as an aim. So plenty will be left out of this, necessarily.

My own understanding of Sorge as Heidegger used it would be "having an interest in," as opposed to having zero interest in. And this at all kinds of levels, some of which Heidegger troubled to focus on and explicate. — tim wood

It's true that "care" and "concern" do have unintended connotations, although I wouldn't say he's misunderstanding the world. But I agree with you that it's much more related to "comportment" towards both present-at-hand entities and towards ready-to-hand equipment. All are tied in some basic way towards our purposes, projects, "needs," and engagements -- there's no way to understand it otherwise.

In some ways it's an accident of history that that particular book became so central (his lectures leading up to it just weren't available, even if they are often clearer and one can follow the genesis of his thought.) — path

That's true, but remember that this is because he didn't publish anything else until much later. In any case, I only mentioned Being & Time because it's the most likely thing anyone has read or has access to, and because I doubt very many will have read his other works and exclude that from the list.

Anyway I think I could add something to an informal conversation. — path

Well then, welcome!

I'm almost finished reading Being and Time. I think "care" is properly translated. Caring, or giving a fuck, is the essence of the world — Gregory

Sorge is the German word. I don't mind it either as far as translations go. One can talk about "concern" as well, but always within the context of a larger"for-the-sake-of-which" in which we're always acting. I always want to equate this concept with "willing," but so far in my reading that doesn't really cut it. Heidegger actually seems to think of "care" as more broad than "willing" or "wishing."

Regardless, after flushing out the "structure" of being-there (existence, human being) as being-in-the-world, this gets reinterpreted as "care" in a three-fold way, which as you know itself later gets reinterpreted as temporality, which is ultimately the basis for any interpretation or meaning of "being" in general and human being. So it's an important concept indeed.

The OP's question assumes Heidegger is a figure of special interest to us. — TheMadFool

Not really. I'm asking about Heidegger's thought, not Heidegger as an individual personality. In fact, I think his personal biography often works against him due to his being a Nazi for a while, as you know. That being said, yes I don't consider him a "god" any more than Kant or Newton or Einstein. This thread wasn't intended as a venue for hero worship.

Personal experience; division 1 B&T is one of the most eye opening things I've read in metaphysics. The formal structure of experiential time in Div 2 is profound. — fdrake

I like your use of "experiential time" for "temporality."

Have some frustrations with him:

(1) Scientific/conceptual knowledge being relegated to a present at hand understanding and away from the "core tasks" of philosophy. — fdrake

I think he includes most of philosophy in this relegation as well, and so nearly all of Western thought since the inception of philosophy with the Greeks. His main thesis is that the question of the meaning of being has been forgotten, that it's been covered over as self-evident or useless or indefinable, and that even the desire for stating this question is lacking.

So it's not only a matter of science, which Heidegger has great respect for -- it's all of Western metaphysics at least since Aristotle.

(2) How he approached the history of ideas is very fecund (retrojecting; linking discourse analysis and metaphysics), how he equated that with the history of the understanding of being is not. — fdrake

I don't quite understand what you mean here. Can you elaborate?

(3) Little to no politics and social stuff. — fdrake

I agree -- I would have liked to see more there, but that never seemed to be his focus and he only makes thin connections to politics. Even in his Nietzsche lectures, you would expect more -- but his focus remains with ontology even there.

(4) There's a lot of "formal structure" that piggybacks off suggestive examples that maybe don't generalise as far as he wants ("ontological moods", the centrality of anxiety and being toward death). — fdrake

Again here I'm not quite sure what you mean.

(5) Dasein is mature; there's little discussion of learning and socialisation. — fdrake

That's true, although he does talk much about the "They" or "Das Man," which takes for granted culture, socialization, norms, conformity, etc.

it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy.....
— Mww

I think we can, metaphysically.
— Xtrix

How would that be arranged, that escape?

ontology of "mind" and "nature" (....) I don't think is the unmitigated foundation of all being, or even of all knowledge -- although almost ertainly for modern philosophy and science.
— Xtrix

Ontology of mind and body? The study of the origin and existence of mind and body?

If the mind/body dualism isn’t thought to be the foundation of all knowledge, but almost certainly the foundation of modern philosophic and scientific knowledge, suggests there is yet another kind of knowledge that isn’t grounded in philosophic or scientific principles. What form would such knowledge have?

Nevertheless, I agree the study of the mind/body dualism isn’t sufficient to ground knowledge of any kind; it merely serves to establish the theoretical conditions under which the possibility of it may be given. — Mww

I consider the "mind/body" dichotomy of Descartes a dualist substance ontology. The "res" is precisely that in Latin (or at least how it's often translated).

This being the foundation of modern philosophy and science just means this is the framework modern science and philosophy uses. There was thinking and philosophy before Descartes, of course. In fact, Descartes was heavily influenced by Scholasticism, as you know -- and so I don't think it's a suggestion of a kind of knowledge other than philosophical or scientific knowledge, but rather a different kind of philosophy, a different ontology.

I don't think to myself "here I am as an individual engaged in this activity"
— Xtrix

Of course not, it is impossible. Human thoughts are always singular and successive; engagement in any activity, except pure reflex and sheer accident, requires thought, so I cannot think myself thinking. I can think myself possibly engaged, or I can think myself having been engaged, but never think myself simultaneously thinking with respect to a present engagement. — Mww

That's interesting. I imagine you're right -- and so a different word for whatever is going on internally, while fully engaged in an activity, should probably be invoked here. I use "junk thought," but that has negative connotations. What's really happening is we're simply drifting on a kind of unfocused autopilot. But you're right, it's certainly not the kind of thing we have in mind when we use "thought" (as abstract, rational thinking).

the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted
— Xtrix

That can never fly as a philosophical principle, for such should then be the case that anything that is, thinks. — Mww

Yes, I didn't mean that exactly. What I'm saying there is that the "sum" is even more primordial than "thought," and thus the Cogito should be inverted in that sense. I didn't mean to imply everything that "is" is a conscious, thinking being.

Ya know....poor ol’ Rene, sometimes so demonized. Given that the primary source for that infamous missive is “Principles of Philosophy”, 1, 7, one is well-advised to continue on through 8, in which he tells us what he means by “mind” from which we derive the “I”, and 9, in which he tells us what he means by “thought”. Taken as a whole, the only thing claimed to exist necessarily, is the “I” itself....not the body, not anything else. If that is the case, you have no warrant to claim being “thrown into a world and start with it” with the same absolute certainty as the existence of the thinking self demands. — Mww

Here I'm taking Descartes' use of "thinking" (cogitares) as what he mentions in the Principles: essentially conscious awareness. So "I am consciously aware, therefore I am" still privileges conscious awareness over being. It's not that we exist because we're conscious, we are able to think and perceive and sense because we "are," because we exist. Even an infant, prior to thought or language, exists. A zygote exists, etc.

As soon as you posit an "I" that thinks, or an "I" that is a conscious subject, you're only positing a certain conception of a being, and so presupposing the existence of some-thing that you're now labeling "I."

we start with (and "in") being (as human beings) and with (and "in") time.
— Xtrix

I dunno, man. We can only start with or in time, if it is possible to prove with apodeitic certainty we are not ourselves responsible for the creation of time as a mere conception. — Mww

That's interesting, but how would you go about "proving" it? I think it's clear we've invented a lot about "time" in terms of measurement -- seconds, minutes, predictable changes, etc -- but I think there's a more "existential" way to look at the basis for these measurements, and the ordinary conception of time. Aristotle's essay on time in the Physics is an important point to see where our concept of "time" comes from, in part.

By "existential way" I mean by looking at what we do as human beings. We do appear to be, any way you slice it, temporal beings. Phenomena changes all around us "in" time. I think that's why both Western and Eastern philosophies so often emphasize time as being fundamental. It's fundamental in science as well, but in a different way -- quantitatively. But Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger -- then in the East with Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc. All emphasize time and change.

If we cannot do that, we can see it is impossible for us to be started with....to be initialized by.....that which wouldn’t even exist if not for us. The ol’ cart before the horse routine, doncha know. — Mww

I see what you mean, yes. In that case I'd say that time is embedded in our existence -- we exist as temporality and interpret the world (and "being" and "time" itself) on this basis. This is why I used quotation marks when saying "in" time -- I don't believe time is a container of some kind, or an object, or some kind of clock in our heads.

This probably sounds absurd or confusing. Heidegger is much better at the analysis than I am, but I don't want to simply quote from an "authority." This is the best I can do!

We can explain this type of thing using the subject/object distinction, but this assumes a lot of things (....) leading to problems that have been with us for a long time.
— Xtrix

No doubt; the dyed-in-the-wool physicalist won’t grant the time of day to “mind”, which is fine, there being no such real empirical thing. Which just makes philosophy that much more fun......how to close explanatory gaps by making sense out of something we can never put our fingers on. — Mww

That's interesting as well. When you say "physicalist," I view that as almost synonymous with "naturalism" and "materialism" really. It all amounts to very similar concepts: what we can "know" with our senses, with empirical data, is all that can be known -- and that the world is made of substance, matter, "physical" particles (atoms, etc), and so on. This has to be true in some way. I'm no mystic. But on the other hand, perhaps we've gotten too complacent in our accepting of this approach.

we may be entering back into the subject/object dichotomy.
— Xtrix

I submit it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy, or dualism. Can’t re-enter what’s never been vacated. Metaphysically speaking, of course. — Mww

I think we can, metaphysically. The Cartesian ontology of "mind" and "nature" ("body" -- res extensa), while like I said is powerful and important, I don't think is the unmitigated foundation of all being, or even of all knowledge -- although almost ertainly for modern philosophy and science.

But even on a mundane, everyday level, it's not as if we're subjects contemplating objects -- we're not seeing ourselves that way. I don't think to myself "here I am as an individual engaged in this activity" -- in fact much of what I'm doing is often completely habitual and second-nature (mostly unconscious).

We can explain this type of thing using the subject/object distinction, but this assumes a lot of things -- like an "I," an "external world," an "inner and outer," etc. --in turn leading to problems that have been with us for a long time.

I think there are alternative analyses that get closer to the phenomena, are more accurate, more holistic, and (possibly) more useful. Again, here I mean Nietzsche, but especially Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and even Dreyfus and Kierkegaard perhaps. I'd include Pascal, but I still haven't got through all of the Pensees -- however I feel he'd shy away from the Cartesian ontology, from what I've read so far.

So as not to be mysterious: the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted -- we start with (and "in") being (as human beings) and with (and "in") time. Thus we're thrown into a world and start with it -- i.e., with the "am", the "sum" of the Cogito ergo sum. I am, therefore I think (in the sense of not only abstract thought but conscious awareness generally).

Maybe it’s as simple as finding no profit in questioning the experience of our observations. — Mww

No doubt there's much truth in that.

But what does philosophy really "think" if not existence, if not "being" in the broadest sense?
— Xtrix

Relations? And if it is humans that are asking, then that which is asked about must ultimately reduce to a relation between it and humans. It follows that at least some fundamental genus of philosophy relates what is, to what we think of it. — Mww

So you mean a kind of relation between "thinking" and "being," or more of a questioner in relation to what's questioned?

I would say "what is" and what we "think of it" does seem to be a very fundamental and important distinction. I also think perhaps here we may be entering back into the subject/object dichotomy.

It's the last part that has me thinking you're more of a positivist.
— Xtrix

That's because you don't know what positivism is. (Make a note of that). — David Mo

:roll: Okay...

If I were a positivist I would say that all possible knowledge comes down to science and that all human problems can be solved by science. — David Mo

Yes...

That's not what I'm saying. — David Mo

Fair enough. Notice I said "more of a positivist" -- meaning more in alignment with that tradition, not necessarily encapsulated by it. I still think that's accurate, but I see my ambiguity now.

I'm saying that all "objective" knowledge -about facts in the world- comes down to science. Which leaves the field open for other types of knowledge, including philosophy. What I agree with the positivists is that metaphysics, more specifically ontology, is a false science that has done much damage to the reputation of philosophy. But Kant already said this in his Critique of Pure Reason: a scandal. And he was not a positivist. — David Mo

Fine -- you're not a positivist. That's not the important point here -- I'm not interested in labeling anyone and being satisfied with that. But it's in part this area of agreement, towards ontology and metaphysics, that led me to associate your perspective more closely with this tradition than, say, what's called "continental" philosophy (I agree in advance: a pretty vacuous term, but I think you'll take my meaning). Maybe analytical philosophy would have been a more accurate term, who knows. But that misses the point entirely -- I only bring up these broad labels to demonstrate what very different perspectives we're approaching this issue ("What is philosophy?" "What is science?") with.

And of course I agree with you, and Kant, and Nietzsche in fact, that metaphysics and ontology (at least as commonly understood) have been both damaging and rife with confusions. Heidegger in fact agrees as well. This is not a shift in position -- it simply means that what started in the inception of Western philosophy, with the presocratics, Plato, and Aristotle, has gradually become more and more confused, and it's important to re-awaken the "question of being" again.

Of course, if you put norms and language into being, everything is being and your definition is perfectly useless. — David Mo

I haven't attempted to define being in general. But every particular being or class of beings "is," including language and norms. A pre-theoretical understanding of being permeates everything we do and everything we think; philosophy thinks and interprets being. That shouldn't be controversial.

And because Aristotle wrote on ethics, logic, biology, etc., doesn't mean he's excluded from this definition.

Well then please point them out -- I'm happy to learn.
— Xtrix
I'm sorry I don't have time for the huge task of correcting your comments. I'm probably not qualified either. — David Mo

But qualified enough to recognize them.

But if this is any indication: you did not understand (I think you still do not) the concept of intuition in Kantian philosophy and its consequences in contemporary philosophy. — David Mo

I don't remember discussing the Kantian use of intuition in this thread. I don't see how I can be mistaken about something I've made no claims about.

Nor did you know the importance of controlled experimentation in the emergence of the New Science. — David Mo

Who doesn't know that? Where did I say that experimentation wasn't an important factor in science, or the beginning or modern science? Of course it's important. You're projecting a position on to me which I simply don't hold. I never said it wasn't important, I said that making it the basis for a "scientific method" which is supposed to separate science and philosophy is unconvincing, no matter how often it's repeated, and that there are plenty of exceptions in science -- i.e., where controlled experimentation isn't used or isn't possible.

That's not saying experimentation isn't important, whether in the 17th century or now.

You claim to be Heideggerian, but you do not handle the concepts of the ontological and ontic as Heidegger does. — David Mo

I do. You're simply wrong. I've explained the distinction a couple of times very clearly: the ontological concerns being as such, the ontical concerns beings.

Here's a quote from Heidegger himself, lengthy but helpful:

"We must be able to bring out clearly the difference between being and beings in order to make something like being the theme of inquiry. This distinction is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology and thus of philosophy itself is first of all attained. It is a distinction which is first and foremost constitutive for ontology. We call it the ontological difference--the differentiation between being and beings. Only by making this distinction -- krinein in Greek -- not between being and another being but between being and beings do we first enter the field of philosophical research. Only by taking this critical stance do we keep our standing inside the field of philosophy. Therefore, in distinction from the sciences of the things that are, of beings, ontology, or philosophy in general, is the critical science, or the science of the inverted world. With this distinction between being and beings and the selection of being as theme we depart in principle from the domain of beings. We surmount it, transcend it." (Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 17)

I find very interesting the study of ancient philosophy. It is a sensitive subject to me for family reasons. But if you don't understand that current philosophy is very different you are lost. And what I was trying is to speak of philosophy now. What philosophers do now? — David Mo

Which is fine, but you know as well as I that we cannot understand what philosophers do now without a historical context as well. It's like studying the human being without any attempt to understand evolution, or growth and development.

A lot of questions. But not relevant until someone tells us what "consciousness" is. It's like asking the difference between rocks and ectoplasm.

All that to say this: I’m pretty sure scientists don’t care all that much about being qua being, and I’m almost positive Everydayman doesn’t give a damn about it at all. — Mww

And probably many whom we call "philosophers" today. I hope that's not true, but it may very well be. In school I encountered plenty of philosophy teachers, but for the most part they were interpreting and popularizing the great thinkers of the past and their texts, almost as part of a "history of philosophy," but with no clear indication that they ever thought "being" for themselves. I think that's a shame.

philosophy is ontological while science is ontical. That's not the same thing, no, but you can't do one without the other.
— Xtrix
No science deals with the Being as a Being. — David Mo

Right, because being isn't a being (an entity) at all.

Each science has its own particular field. If you think the opposite, give an example. — David Mo

I don't.

Do you know of any scientific article published in a scientific journal dedicated to the Being as a Being? — David Mo

No, because I have no idea what "the Being" would mean, nor why it's capitalized.

Therefore, scientists who study a parcel of reality (I prefer to talk about reality than about the undefined Heideggerian Being) do not care at all about the "being as being". They work on atomic particles, allergies, nebulae or electric cars. And nothing else. — David Mo

That's probably true in most cases, yes. Most scientists are really not interesting in philosophy. But I think that's a very unfortunate mistake.

It's also interesting you use "reality" -- Heidegger has a lot to say about that concept and its history as well.

If you want to say that at certain levels scientists are interested on questions traditionally attributed to philosophy, the concept of matter, of truth or the role of induction in science, this may be true. It is also true that these questions cannot be answered today without scientific knowledge. — David Mo

It's the last part that has me thinking you're more of a positivist. But of course it depends on what you mean by "scientific knowledge." If you mean objective truth, or finding mechanical or material causes, rules, principles, etc., then no -- science simply can't explain everything, given its ontology (for example, the being of the "ready-to-hand" -- our dealings with equipment, our concern, our purposes, etc). If by science we mean "trying to understand the world," then sure -- no questions can be answered without science.

So citing what "contemporary philosophers do" is a good argument against philosophy being ontological. Why?
— Xtrix

Because if you exclude by definition most of the class of objects that are usually called X, what the hell should we call them? That's what's called making a persuasive definition. An anti-philosophical vice. — David Mo

Making a persuasive definition is an anti-philosophical vice? That's puzzling, if that's what you're saying.

But as far as the first sentence goes -- I'm not necessarily excluding anything. Whatever we call "x," we look to history, to etymology, to our own experiences, and see if the term has a broader meaning that includes X as a subset, whether it's being mis-labeled or misunderstood, how the meaning has evolved, etc.

When you do that with the word "philosophy," for example, you see how the meaning has changed in part by the influence of the sciences, in part by professionalization and specialization, university departments and majors, etc. Most of those we call "philosophers" of the past weren't professors of philosophy, after all -- with obvious exceptions (Kant, Hegel, etc). So who cares about professorships and Ph.D.s? If they're not saying anything new or interesting about the core of philosophy, or haven't at least thought the question of being through for themselves, then we may still label them as "doing" philosophy, but to me it's a pretty strange thing. It's the difference between teaching literature and writing.

So while we shouldn't exclude anything on the basis of what it has been in the past (as I think you believe I'm doing), we also shouldn't exclude what's past simply because it doesn't correspond to what's contemporaneous.

Philosophy is what contemporary philosophers do. This is essentially your response to my (and Heidegger's) statement that philosophy is ontological.
— Xtrix

If you define philosophy as ontology (which I don't know if it's Heidegger's or your own invention) — David Mo

It's Heidegger's.

you leave out of philosophy most of today's philosophers, who don't talk about being as such, but about particular issues such as ethics, for example. — David Mo

But if they're philosophers, then they don't study ethics or beauty or knowledge in a vacuum. If they do, then yes I wouldn't consider them philosophers at all. I'd call them perhaps "teachers" or even "scientists," concerned with whatever domain of beings they're interested in without any questioning of being.

An important clarification, though: The best philosophers (if I could make a value judgment) are not exclusively concerned with 'being,' of course -- in that case I'd be arguing that Plato and Aristotle aren't philosophers, since they engaged in political theory, ethics, aesthetics, etc. Is that what you think I'm arguing?

Your definition is exclusive, that is, a bad definition. — David Mo

I don't think I'm doing that in the sense you mean. One can certainly study mainly ethics, or optics, or aesthetics, or civil engineering, anything else one pleases and still be a philosopher. This is what I was referring to above.

But regardless: what definition doesn't exclude something? (Besides "being" perhaps.) If all definitions that exclude something are "bad," then nearly all definitions are bad. "Tree" is bad -- it excludes bushes. And rocks.

If I've made mistakes, you've certainly not demonstrated them in this discussion
— Xtrix
I could point out a few things you've written that an expert in philosophy would not have said. — David Mo

Well then please point them out -- I'm happy to learn.

You haven't studied philosophy in a faculty and it shows. It's not serious. — David Mo

You mean as part of a faculty? Or in a university? Yes, I'm not part of any university faculty, that's true. I did, however, study philosophy in college, but only as a minor concentration.

I don't see how this is relevant, though, until it's clear where I go astray. In fact, most of what I've said is quasi (if not at times verbatim) Martin Heidegger, who was a tenured professor (if that's important to you) and, in my opinion at least, a very important philosopher indeed. So it's not about my credentials, really. Yet I repeat: I don't see where my mistakes are.

I've read everything you've written in response to me, and carefully, and have responded in turn. I mentioned one clear error I can recall: writing "Aristarchus." I'm fairly confident that what you claim are mistakes are simply your misreadings (of which there are plenty of examples in this thread).

Otherwise my point stands. And again -- happy to stand corrected.

I'm not a philosopher by profession either, and this is not a forum for professionals. But I'm not trying to belittle amateurs like me. It's not humility. It's common sense. Because sometimes they can show me that I'm arguing about things that I don't master and if I've pretended before that I'm the wisest I'd be very embarrassed. It's a matter of self-esteem. — David Mo

Sure. But why do you associate this with me? If I've "belittled" anyone it wasn't intended, and I've never claimed to be the "wisest" person.

Therefore, you try to cheat. You take some philosophers of the past who were also scientists-when science and philosophy were not clearly differentiated, as Pfhorrest told you- and put their books under the old name of "philosophia naturalis". Of course this is not a special subject of study. There is no faculty of Philosophia Naturalis in the world. No subject, no science. If you want to invent a name for this nothing I suggest "Totumlogy". or "Totum Revolutum". Because for the "science" of Being as Being there is already a name: Ontology. And it has nothing to do with Physics or Biology, but it is a particular branch of philosophy. Well differentiated, by the way. It is a name from the times when many priests disguised as philosophers were trying to say the scientists and free thinkers what they could think and what they couldn't. A timeworn name, it is clear. I think this is the main reason why today is not a very popular name among philosophers. — David Mo

I don't put their books under "natural philosophy," they do. If nothing else, is that not an interesting historical fact? Just take it as that alone. That doesn't mean I'm saying philosophy and science are the same thing. Philosophy and natural philosophy aren't the same thing either.

I don't understand what you mean by "there is no faculty of [natural philosophy] in the world." There's clearly a faculty of the human mind (call it the "science-forming capacity") that's conceiving an idea of "nature" and attempting to understand it in various domains, like "life" (biology), "stars and planets" (astronomy), "matter" (chemistry), "language" (linguistics), etc. All of these things scientists would say are part of nature -- unless they're "magic." So I don't see your point. Call it natural science if you want -- makes no difference.

As for ontology -- yes it is often viewed as another branch of philosophy. But what does philosophy really "think" if not existence, if not "being" in the broadest sense? How can philosophy not be ontological in that case? And if this isn't happening, and the focus is solely on a domain of beings -- then the pursuit is ontical. Natural philosophy (or natural science) is one such domain, along with all subdomains. But an interpretation of being pervades all of these fields regardless of whether it's questioned or thought about at all.

However, apart from the intuitive clarity with which one immediately sees that science and philosophy are not the same, according to the author of the text, I think I have given you plenty of reasons to justify that distinction. But you have preferred not to see them. Don't blame me. — David Mo

I have heard you loud and clear. You've said repeatedly that mathematicization and experimentation are key features of at least modern science. I myself gave a list of possible attributes of science, which you stated you thought were accurate. But I could have "intuitions" about things and make attempts at "defining" them as well -- like "energy" (how much stamina I have at any point) or "work" (somewhere you spend 40 hours a week) or "the meaning of life," etc. All the while giving perfectly sensible reasons. But that doesn't mean I'm using "energy" or "work" as it's used in physics. In fact, the guy next to me on the train could come up with a different definition based on his intuitions.

There is no rule for you to differentiate philosophy from science because when some more or less precise criteria are given - even by yourself - you turn a blind eye. — David Mo

Because I (1) don't believe any of those criteria are "precise," and (2) I see both philosophy and science as also similar in certain respects: like the use of abstraction, de-"worlding," assuming a subject/object dichotomy, assuming the "world as rational" or that we're the rational animal, and (most importantly) treating the world as a present-at-hand "fact" -- meaning privileging the present -- e.g., the "unchanging," the "permanent," the constant, the "persistent," etc. -- or, from the history of philosophy, the "idea," "substance" (ουσια), "God," "matter," etc.

To define science or philosophy is to do so already in a philosophical tradition (inheritance from history) -- we all have our influences and assumptions, we all use the words and concepts of the past. I feel like you're minimizing or ignoring this point, and so trying (like others on this thread) to offer a definition of philosophy (and science) without explaining the larger philosophical context in which you're giving said definition. Now if I were to guess -- based on your mention of Wittgenstein, your wanting to clearly separate science and philosophy, and your boredom with, or outright derision of, Heidegger -- I would imagine you yourself would acknowledge more affinity to the analytic philosophers -- perhaps Russell, Quine...maybe Tarski, Kripke, etc. Is that not so?

I think at this point it would do well to flush out that larger context, given that we've now written plenty of words about what we think science and philosophy are. Without that context, and the extra work it entails, one can define things any way one likes -- or even appeal to the dictionary. I don't think that's very interesting -- we'll run in circles.

Maybe this is all a matter of common sense. Don't be so dismissive of common sense, because even philosophers use it. — David Mo

The "come on" was perhaps too colloquial, but what I meant there is that we cannot only appeal to intuition when attempting to formulate a technical notion, which is partly how I see the question of this thread, namely "What is a good technical definition of philosophy?" Many have offered very interesting answers -- but like in science, while common sense notions may be important (in folk science, psychology, etc), within an explanatory theory, they cannot be the final word. I'm sure you agree with this.

So then we have to ask: what is your "theory" or perspective, in which you're defining a technical notion, like "philosophy" and "science" themselves?

If we're not asking ourselves that question, or we don't fully understand it (perhaps in part by ignoring history), then we turn that perspective into a matter of faith, as it's off limits to inquiry.

I've been clear from fairly early on from what perspective I approach these issues, and even put a label on myself: I approach all of this very much as a "Heideggerian" -- which I think is a very important and enriching perspective, but could also be completely wrong. Nevertheless, Heidegger is a central influence.

Since it is from within this framework that I start giving a definition of "philosophy" or "science," and both these and peripheral notions are defined very differently than yours, I think we're often talking past one another. You're coming at the same words from a very different tradition.

Philosophy isn't a subject so much as an activity, in which muddled ways of saying things are exposed and analysed.
— Banno

Spot on.

To be more precise it is a mind activity. An activity of expressing your mind. The output of philosophical thought is information about the mind activity of the philosopher. — Pop

What Banno is presenting, if I had to pick a category, is similar to what's called "analytic philosophy," of which I imagine you're familiar. Personally, the traditions of materialism, empiricism, positivism, naturalism, analytical and perhaps "linguistic" philosophy and even what's called "scientism" (not meant pejoratively) seem to share many features in common, and are all incredibly powerful perspectives.

What you say is similar. There's an emphasis on concepts of "mind" and "information" (of which I assume you're using as a synonym for "knowledge", but correct me if I'm wrong), and you seem to agree about the muddled ways of "saying things" (which I read as "propositions") and the identifying, analyzing, and clarifying of those assertions being central to the mind activity we're calling "philosophy."

If I've got all that right, then I think this conception of philosophy is in that tradition and is a very important and very powerful interpretation.

“Baseless” is maybe a bit too harsh, but the point is that Democritus wasn’t presenting something that we today would call a scientific theory, with proposed observable consequences that could (dis)prove it. Nor was he engaging in a priori reasoning about abstract concepts. He was just saying “hey I think the world is like this”. That’s fine for his time, I don’t knock the guy, it’s just neither good science nor good philosophy by today standards. — Pfhorrest

Well I don't necessarily agree with that characterization, but I understand what you're getting at. Again I'd revert back to what I said before: appealing to common notions of what philosophy does now doesn't prove much and is in fact what we've all been trying to define. You notice there are multiple definitions, so it's not as if we're in total agreement even today.

"Science" wasn't even a word until I believe the 15th century. That doesn't prove much either.

In general, that kind of baseless speculation is seen as fitting of neither science nor philosophy today. — Pfhorrest

I don't know why you say "baseless" -- it was speculation on what the world is made of based on at least some observation, experience, deduction. And however we classify it, it turned out to be very close to what we currently believe about matter.

Well that's debatable too. Is logic a kind of philosophy? Many have tried to reduce mathematics, at least arithmetic, to logic.
— Xtrix

Logic is a tool of both mathematics and philosophy. That bit of overlap doesn’t mean the two are the same though. — Pfhorrest

When have I said they're the same? I fully concede that mathematics and logic are different things, regardless of any reduction.

Likewise Newton’s Principia is not a work of philosophy as we now use the word, even though it has “Natural Philosophy” in the title, because what was once called “natural philosophy” is now considered a different field outside of philosophy in today’s sense of the word: something we call “science” instead. — Pfhorrest

But that's the point of this discussion, to find out what we mean by philosophy right now. I fully agree that how we think of philosophy now is different than in the past -- that doesn't make it correct.

So I'm interested in what the moderators think of the following:

Fuck fuckity fuck fuck 'em both. Pair of cunt white supremacists that deserve each other. — StreetlightX

This doesn't violate any forum guidelines? If you can ban people for not capitalizing their words, what happens in this case? And how is this person allowed to be a moderator in the first place?

I've seen this behavior repeatedly from this person. What is the protocol? I genuinely ask.

Tangent, but; do you think there are interesting philosophical questions about the metaphysics of objects that don't strongly emphasize human interaction with the objects, or the fact that it's a human asking the question? — fdrake

Yes to both, if I'm understanding you correctly.

Speculating about an indivisible unit which constitutes the world was what Democritus was doing
— Xtrix

Democritus lived in a time before philosophy and science were clearly differentiated. — Pfhorrest

True, but this is completely irrelevant.

Pythagoras did mathematics under the name of “philosophy” too. That doesn’t mean that, today, math is just a kind of philosophy. — Pfhorrest

Well that's debatable too. Is logic a kind of philosophy? Many have tried to reduce mathematics, at least arithmetic, to logic.

No, that’s just science, presuming they aim for the things they speculate about to be testable and eventually tested, and aren’t just armchair positing things to be so without respect for whether observation agrees or not. — Pfhorrest

And the latter is what philosophers supposedly do?

on this hand, fact, on the other, soaring speculation
— Xtrix

I think you missed my entire point, which is that philosophy done properly isn’t at all about speculating on the same subject matters that science investigates. — Pfhorrest

Science investigates domains of beings in nature -- physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology. Hence branches of natural philosophy -- which is indeed different from "general" philosophy in the sense of dealing with being. The "natural" part indicates a difference: the investigating, thinking about, speculating about, hypothesizing about, etc -- "natural" beings, beings in "nature" (which in the modern sense means essentially matter in motion; from the same word we get "physics").

The subject matter of natural philosophy is indeed different, but in itself has a philosophical basis -- in this case, "nature."

Such speculation is either philosophy overstepping its bounds, or badly done attempts at science. That kind of baseless speculation is neither proper philosophy nor proper science. Science investigates the same subject matter in a better way. Philosophy investigates a different subject matter entirely: higher-order question about conducting such investigations. — Pfhorrest

Speculating about an indivisible unit which constitutes the world was what Democritus was doing -- I assume you don't call this science. Certainly testable, however. Turns out, centuries later, albeit very differently formulated, we have come around to a similar view. Both the same subject matter: what the world is made of. However you'd like to categorize it is irrelevant -- call what Democritus was doing "philosophy" or "speculation" or primitive science, or anything you like -- but they're not separate subjects.

Speculative philosophy happens when philosophy tries to cross over into the domain of science, without “doing as the scientists do” when there. If your philosophy is making claims of the kind that science could possibly prove wrong, your philosophy is overstepping its bounds. — Pfhorrest

If "speculative philosophy" is making claims about the world that can be proven wrong, it's natural philosophy. Science engages in speculations all the time -- in hypothesizing, in explanatory theories, etc. Sometimes it takes years to test these ideas. Is this all "speculative philosophy" until an experiment is conducted?

You claim there's a clear line, but I see little evidence for one. I see only a matter of definition, with questionable motivation: on this hand, fact, on the other, soaring speculation. Think that way if you must.

The relationship between philosophy and science is not one of two different approaches to the same questions. Rather, philosophy is (in part) about the questions that underlie science’s approach to its questions. Philosophy is (in part) meta-science: the study of how to do the things science is trying to do and why to do them that way instead of some other way. — Pfhorrest

OR -- philosophy is ontological while science is ontical. That's not the same thing, no, but you can't do one without the other.

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being.
— Xtrix
By the way, this is not a good distinction. Most contemporary philosophy does not deal with Being as Being, but with particular branches: philosophy of science, anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, etc. You have an archaic concept of philosophy as the old metaphysics.
— David Mo

And this is not a good argument. — Xtrix

It's a very good argument that you only solve by getting rid of most of the contemporary philosophers. If you give a definition of philosophy that does not correspond to what philosophers do, you eliminate the philosophers and the definition fits you. — David Mo

So citing what "contemporary philosophers do" is a good argument against philosophy being ontological. Why? Who's to say they're doing philosophy anything? You? Academia? Degrees?

Regardless, I'm sure there's plenty of interest in ontology in contemporary scholarship, just as there is in the sciences. So what? This isn't even an argument, really -- it's just a fatuous remark.

The dog is an animal that flies low when it rains.
Hey, dogs don't fly.
I'm not interested in dogs that don't fly.

That way it's easy to make "natural philosophy" dictionaries. — David Mo

Philosophy is what contemporary philosophers do. This is essentially your response to my (and Heidegger's) statement that philosophy is ontological. If you can't see how this is, at best, irrelevant -- I won't bother explaining it.

You have to know something about these subjects beforehand, and this means not only knowing the questions and problems about which they're concerned, but their history as well.
— Xtrix
Because of the mistakes you make, I don't see that you know so much about the history of philosophy in general and of that of the last centuries in particular to give lessons to others. — David Mo

If I've made mistakes, you've certainly not demonstrated them in this discussion -- except perhaps writing "Aristarchus" instead of "Eratosthenes," which I conceded. The rest is your illusion, including the remarks about Descartes, which I anticipated immediately after giving that example and which you ignored.

You've repeatedly misunderstood what I've said, however, even after I clearly laid out what I was NOT saying to aid clarification.

You've chosen the worst example of all for your interests. Descartes was fully aware of the difference between his metaphysics and his treatise on optics. — David Mo

Yes, because there is a difference: one is concerned with beings and beings as such, one is part of natural philosophy, namely the questioning, theoretical and experimental attempt to understand light and vision. The latter has now been classified as "science," and the former to "philosophy" -- mainly in academia and mainly for practical purposes. But not because of an adherence to a mythical method. There are many methods in our attempts to understand the world -- theoretical methods, experimental methods, social methods, etc. To argue that Descartes stopped doing philosophy the moment he started experimenting with light is fine, but the fundamental beliefs, conceptual and theoretical aspects don't therefore disappear. So at best we can say he was doing natural philosophy, namely the science of optics. You can't do science without philosophy, even if defined by the aspects I mentioned.

Because if they are so clearly distinct, why the confusion about which is which?
— Xtrix
Just because France and Spain have relations does not mean that they are the same state. Ditto for philosophy and science. — David Mo

I'm not saying philosophy and science are the same.

You can define them any way you like, without evidence, and be satisfied with that. If you want them to be completely separate, that's fine. It says more about your psychology than anything about philosophy or science, though. As I said, personally I think it's a minor issue and rather silly. If it has any impact at all, I think it's a poor one -- namely that scientists are dismissive of the philosophical underpinnings of their technical work.

The term intuitive in philosophy does not mean apparent as opposite to essential. Intuitive is immediate, without the need for supporting reasoning. — David Mo

So we're now appealing to intuition and common sense? Come on. I prefer a historical perspective, with plenty of evidence.

In any case you yourself contributed some characteristics which do not intuitively point out the difference between philosophy and science. Let's stick to them. I'm doing it and it seems like I'm creating some problems for you that you don't know how to solve. — David Mo

Oh, is that what's happening? Too bad for me.

I don't see any unsolvable problems that you're presenting. The point stands exactly as it was at the beginning of this digression: philosophy and science do appear very different, but there's no rule or method to determine which is which -- nor should there be, in my view. If we in the 21st century want to take seriously the clear lines drawn by schools and believe this has some bearing on how human beings approach the world, that's fine. I don't take that seriously. Historically speaking, science has developed as different from philosophy for many reasons, but they can never be separated completely in my view -- even if we accept the inductive method. Unless of course we want to relegate philosophy to the realm of the superstitious.

Whatever Descartes was doing, or Galileo, or Newton, they themselves viewed as "natural philosophy." They're usually agreed to be the founders of modern science. We don't have to take this seriously, and things have certainly changed in the last 400 years, but I'm far more inclined to take them seriously when determining how to categorize human inquiry than I am the modern university curricula and the widespread scientism of our day.

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being.
— Xtrix
By the way, this is not a good distinction. Most contemporary philosophy does not deal with Being as Being, but with particular branches: philosophy of science, anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, etc. You have an archaic concept of philosophy as the old metaphysics. — David Mo

And this is not a good argument.

It's not "archaic" because no one has described philosophy that way -- besides Heidegger, perhaps. Is the 20th century archaic?

I'm not concerned with what "most contemporary philosophers" write about. I'm not convinced there are many philosophers, although there are plenty of philosophy scholars, historians, lecturers, etc. Regardless -- let them do what they want, much of it is decent work.

Experimentation is often involved in the natural sciences, but a great deal isn't. Controlled, careful observation is also important. I'd say the peer review process is also a very important one. Falsiability, predictive power, duplicability, the use of mathematics, and so on...all very important. — Xtrix

You're falling into an absolute contradiction. — David Mo

That doesn't sound too good for me.

A clear distinction cannot be vague. Clear and vague are antonyms. — David Mo

Really? I could have sworn they were synonyms.

But seriously - yes, of course you're right, but I don't recall saying that the distinction between philosophy and science is a clear one. It may appear clear, it may be "intuitively" clear -- we may feel it in our guts that a very clear distinction exists -- all that I agree with: it does feel that way. But is it in fact clear? No. Especially when a "method" is invoked that is supposed to account for this "clear distinction." On closer inspection, it's rather vague, rather fuzzy, the boundaries are blurred, and the motivation for wanting there to be a clear demarcation line is itself questionable.

All of the factors I mentioned above do indeed seem to be involved in what science "is."

There is no science of the Being qua Being, but many philosophers (in the past) dealt with it. — David Mo

There is: ontology - the science of being.

There is no philosopher (qua philosopher) who supports his philosophy with experimentation, who expresses his theories in a mathematical way or who makes precise predictions. If you know of a book on philosophy written in this way I would like to know about it. — David Mo

Principles of Philosophy, by Descartes. But it doesn't matter anyway, because the "qua philosopher" part is nonsense. You simply want to confine philosophy to speculations -- which we all can do if we choose to. But as I've repeatedly said, I think at best it's questionable to do so.

So in that case, anything Descartes or Liebniz or anyone else writes that's mathematical or experimental or predictive will simply not qualify as philosophy.

If I'm archaic, you're certainly taking the current university department organization too seriously. Modern physics is indeed different than modern philosophy -- but back in the 17th century what Newton was doing was considered natural philosophy. So pick your starting point -- are you talking about what "philosophers and scientists do NOW," as you stated at the beginning of this discussion, or about what they did in the 17th and 18th centuries? If the latter, then you won't have to go far looking for books. Unless of evaluate the writings using a 21st century criterion -- in which case you'll have to sort out Newton's "science" from his "philosophy," as well as Descartes' and Galileo's. But that's anachronistic, and no better than my claiming because their writings were considered natural philosophy then that it should be considered natural philosophy now -- as you alleged I was doing before. (And I do think there's something to it, but as long as we're ruling it out...)

I know you believe there was, at one time, a point where "philosophy" (all the soaring speculations that seem laughable today, like monads -- by your interpretation) and "science" (an activity characterized by a method involving experimentation and mathematics) parted ways. I believe this is a matter of definition mainly due to increased specialization, a division of labor within academia that, as I've said before, is fine for organizing college majors and departments, but really shouldn't be taken that seriously.

The fact that some connection can be established between philosophy and the natural sciences (in the field of theoretical physics, or the interpretation of scientific theories, for example), that there is an undefinition in some special cases does not support your theory that science and philosophy are not clearly differentiated activities. — David Mo

It does.

It certainly doesn't support your thesis. Because if they are so clearly distinct, why the confusion about which is which?

They are, and the obsession to erase all distinction lies in the hidden attempt to grant philosophy powers that it does not have. — David Mo

No obsession. Personally it's a minor issue. Since "philosophy" and "science" aren't clearly understood as practices anyway, there's little point in arguing about whether they're separate, interconnected, or the same. You have to know something about these subjects beforehand, and this means not only knowing the questions and problems about which they're concerned, but their history as well. I see little understanding of either, both in the general culture and on this very forum, so once again we're left with people throwing "definitions" around without a context, based solely on "intuitions" and maybe a few philosophy books.

"Natural philosophy" is still a fine way to think about it -- If it was good enough for Galileo and Newton, it's good enough for me. Science deals with nature, in a reflective, abstract way. Sometimes they perform experiments, sometimes they don't. Sometimes they simply cannot perform the obvious experiments (in studying the human language capacity, for example). The very term "nature" comes from philosophy, as a Latin translation of the Greek term for being, "phusis." Nature is now conceived as matter in motion, as atoms and molecules, acted on by forces.

It's not about giving philosophy more "power" -- this is exactly what underlies your intense desire for a clear distinction, a kind of fear of religious-like superstition and mysticism creeping into the "truth" and "facts" that science gives us.

So again, by all means define them any way you like. As far as making a compelling argument, I'm not at all convinced. But maybe I'm just archaic!

How someone who treats the sociopath in office like a cult leader isn't embarrassed to make a joke like this isn't surprising. You don't see the irony, I suppose.

The difference between ontical and ontological in Heidegger is as confusing as everything about him. I'd like to know how you understand it. — David Mo

But without quoting him. ;)

Heidegger can be confusing, no doubt. A lot of the difficulty is the translation from German to English. But this is one case where he's clear. The "ontological difference" is how he refers to it: the difference is between being and beings.

Science is "ontical" in that it studies various domains of beings: nature, matter, life, humans, etc

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being.

If you have understood that, you will arrive at a clear difference between philosophy and science in terms of method: the use of controlled experimentation (or controlled observation in its absence) to test the validity of statements.
Not that the scientific method is reduced to that. But it is a first step. — David Mo

Experimentation is often involved in the natural sciences, but a great deal isn't. Controlled, careful observation is also important. I'd say the peer review process is also a very important one. Falsiability, predictive power, duplicability, the use of mathematics, and so on...all very important.

All are features of reflective thought aimed at understanding aspects of the ontical world, which is also deeply interconnected with philosophy. Where the "switchover" is said to take place - exactly where the demarcation line is - is completely unknown and, frankly, both a fruitless and pointless pursuit. It's only a vaguely defined word, and the human pursuit of understanding the world around us goes on one way or another, whether we say "natural philosophy" or "science" or episteme.

Chomsky's not a historian. — David Mo

Yes, he is. His writings are not restricted to the history of science.

you had quoted him correctly you — David Mo

I never quoted him.

"Intuitively fairly clear." Sure, who would disagree?
— Xtrix
So you recognize that there is a clear difference between the method of science and that of philosophy? Case closed. — David Mo

It appears "intuitively fairly clear," yes. That's not saying much, nor did I ever claim there were no differences or that it doesn't indeed seem that they are district from one another.

You still haven't shown there is a method.
— Xtrix
Hey, didn't you say there was a clear difference between the scientific method of experimentation and observation? Now there is no difference? — David Mo

There is no method that accounts for the distinction, intuitive or otherwise. There certainly are differences and plenty of examples of such. I've said that from the beginning.

So they apply this "method" how? Unconsciously?
— Xtrix
One can speak in prose without knowing the difference between prose and poetry. . Moliére. — David Mo

So they're using this method, but it's invisible. And they started to do so around the 16th century - unconsciously.

Sounds less like a method and more like a mode of thought.

And if you don't know exactly what Putnam is saying, why do you quote him? — David Mo

I quoted Putnam because you asked for one, and seemingly never watched the video - which I said from the start was merely an introduction to the philosophy of science. Putnam has a number of books on the subject, if you're interested. Philosophy in the Age of Science: Physics, Mathematics and Skepticism is a decent start.

Your quote from Putnam is nothing more than a series of opinions poured out on a television show, which is not very interesting unless they are more reasoned. — David Mo

If you watch the entire video, there's much more context and it's well reasoned indeed -- unlike, say, your claims about "experimentation and mathematization" being the essence of the so-called "method."

Stating "that's just your opinion" is a true sign that one has no argument left. As is attacking the format. (Who cares if it's television or not?)

You can apply the concept of science to whatever you want. You can apply it to the ritual dance of the geese in heat, if you like. As you expand it it will become more and more vague until it becomes meaningless. If you want you can put philosophy, science, alchemy, parapsychology and Donald Trump's twitters in the same bag. But that only serves to create confusion. — David Mo

I agree wholeheartedly. That would be meaningless indeed.

For example, Putnam repeatedly speaks of philosophy and science as two different things. What is the basis for this difference? That's what's interesting. — David Mo

I think so to. They have similarities and differences. But like I've said before, a major difference is that one is ontological, the other ontical. Here I agree with Heidegger. Given this provisional distinction, the questions, problems, methods, observations, data collection, experimentation, mathematical formulations, etc, of physics, chemistry, biology, neuroscience, linguistics, etc, are certainly not philosophy, even though they have an ontological basis.

You may disagree with the wording, but fundamentally I'm sure you agree. That leaves us only in disagreement about the existence of a scientific method as being the distinguishing factor between philosophy and science. I don't see us coming to a consensus on that point, but I'll gladly stipulate its existence if that's helpful to moving the discussion further along - it makes no real difference to me. The topic of the thread is "What is philosophy?"

To loop it back to where this digression started:

Philosophy is not religion
— Pfhorrest

Philosophy is not science
— Pfhorrest

See, here it's tricky in my view. On the one hand, of course philosophy isn't science or religion -- they differ in many ways. But on the other hand, they deal with very similar questions. — Xtrix

But like many things, we don't have a real rule or solid "definition" for determining which is which -- although we may feel like there's one. — Xtrix

I see no reason to change these statements.

I've read about Chomsky in both linguistics and politics. If you go to this bibliography and to Chomsky's official website at MIT, you will see how these are the subjects of his work. I don't know that he has written an article on science and Galileo - a book, of course not - but if you have that reference I would like to know about it. — David Mo

https://chomsky.info/201401__/

Chomsky is also a historian. There are others, and videos online as well. He discusses the mechanical philosophy of the early scientific revolution, and how the concept of mind-body dissolves when it's realized that there is no concept of "body" after Newton.

I can link up others if you're interested, but I'd have to look for them.

And a word of advice: you should be careful about your risky claims about what your opponent has or has not read. The shot may hit you in your own foot. — David Mo

In that case there's no risk: I'd be happy to be proven wrong. It's less work for me if my interlocutor knows whathe or she is talking about.

Basic confusion: hypothesis can be speculation, but what differentiates it from metaphysical speculation is that it can be proven through experience. — David Mo

All you're doing is defining anything that can't be "proven" as "metaphysical." In that case, monads are either still a metaphysical proposition, or they've been disproven and thus were never metaphysical.

That's a matter of definition, and in my view quite a useless one.

Saying "mathematization" repeatedly is likewise vague and devoid of context.
— Xtrix
Don't you know what it's like to write a formula mathematically? — David Mo

This is irrelevant, but yes. I also know that plenty of science goes on without mathematical formulas. So again, context matters.

What Muhadhdhab Al-Deen Al-Baghdadi was doing was not experimentation, but observation. — David Mo

Oy. Okay. See my prior post about examples being dismissed. You've defined it all out of existence. So have it your way: no experiments or science happened prior to the 16th century and the development of the "new science." In that case, Archimedes, Aristarchus, etc, were all doing something else- call it "primitive science" or whatever you like. I have no qualms with defining things however we like. I can also claim there was no real transportation prior to the development of the car if I chose to. Would make sense given that premise.

I'm also very impressed that you put his full name. I'm sure you didn't look that one up. ;)

The observational/experimental distinction would probably be difficult to make precise 1, as the notion of an ‘intervention’ is not easily defined, but it is intuitively fairly clear, and is frequently invoked by scientists — Samir Okasha: Experiment, Observation and the Confirmation of Laws

"Intuitively fairly clear." Sure, who would disagree?

I am not giving you more details of the article because it is one of hundreds you can find on this subject in an academic search engine. — David Mo

The implication being that I wasn't aware of this until you cited it? What were you saying before about "risky" assumptions?

You are attacking a vision of the scientific method that did not defend even its worst enemy: Willard Van Orman Quine. — David Mo

This is incoherent. Could you rephrase?

. It is absurd to pretend that all scientists "consciously" apply the scientific method. No one defends such a thing. — David Mo

So they apply this "method" how? Unconsciously?

Or, perhaps, the notion of a "method" is honorific to begin with?

If you can't offer something else, I'm afraid there's little to discuss here. — David Mo

What's becoming more interesting to me is your attachment to such a notion.

You still haven't shown there is a method. Now you're saying there is one and it's not used consciously. Before you said you want to restrict this to "natural sciences," that there are always exceptions, etc. So what's left other than what I initially stated: it's fine to talk about, and there are indeed examples, but we shouldn't take it too seriously.

What’s the difference? Rules may become public, but they never initialize publicly. — Mww

They do initialize publicly. Rules get created or destroyed all the time based on experiences. The 3-second violation in basketball was created based on what was happening in the game - namely, players hanging out under the hoop.

This happens all the time. If this counts as "a priori," what isn't a priori?

Therefore, they exist only because they had at one time been thought by rational agency, hence they are a priori in origin — Mww

That doesn't make them a priori in origin at all. It simply means a human mind conceived them at one point. If we count any rule as a priori that human beings think up, then my rule of not eating after 8pm is an a priori truth. That's a strange way of describing things.

Besides, experience is certainly involved in rule formation in many respects, like cooking or sports. They're not created by deduction alone and are certainly not true by necessity, as 2+2=4 is.

I'm really interested in knowing the medieval experiments you're talking about. I'm not joking. — David Mo

Not until the late middle ages do you have experiments in medicine. Al-Baghdadi and others performed interesting studies in anatomy and physiology, although with very different assumptions.

If there are experiments during the 7th or 8th centuries, I'm not aware of them. But I wouldn't be shocked to find it happening, even in monasteries.

You mentioned a number yourself during the Greek and Roman eras. But I already anticipate any examples, say from Archimedes or whomever, being disqualified as they were, as they won't meet your post hoc criteria. (Incidentally, as many experiments from the modern era don't ether.)

So if Eratosthenes or Aristarchus weren't scientists or weren't "doing" science, and weren't performing experiments in the right way or the making the "right" observations, etc., because of some notion of "mathematicization" or whatever you like, then so be it. All that proves to me is that the notion of "science" has become completely useless -- even restricted to the "natural sciences."

While waiting for you to concretize your criticisms I will advance you that they have a flaw in principle: if you recognize that science and philosophy are not the same, it will be because they have different methods. Why else?

I would appreciate it if you would repeat the reference where Putnam says that science does not follow inductive methods. I can't find it. — David Mo

No one is saying science doesn't often involve inductive methods. There are all kinds of methods used in the sciences -- for example, the questions, problems, and methods of climatology are very different from those of archeology, geology, or linguistics -- so what?

In any case, here's what Putnam says:

“People talk about the scientific method as a kind of fiction, but I think that even in physics where you do get experiments and tests that pretty much fit the textbooks, there’s a great deal that doesn’t and a great deal that shouldn’t.” —

And further:

Bryan Magee: "What’s the point of continuing to use the category, or the notion, or the term “science” anyway? Does it any longer clearly demarcate something differentiable from everything else?" —

Putnam: “I don’t think it does. If you’re going to distinguish science from non-science, that makes a lot of sense if you still have this old view that there’s this 'inductive method' and that what makes something science is that it uses it and uses it pretty consciously and pretty deliberately, and that what makes something non-science is either that it uses it entirely unconsciously (as in learning how to cook, you’re not thinking about inductive logic) or perhaps doesn’t use it at all, as metaphysics was alleged not to use it at all (I think unfairly). But both say that there’s a sharp line between practical knowledge and science and to say that the method which is supposed to draw this line is rather fuzzy, something we can state exactly— and attempts to state it by the way have been very much a failure still; inductive logic cannot be, say, programmed on a computer the way deductive logic can be programmed on a computer. I think the development of deductive logic in the last 100 years, and the development of the computer, have really brought home very dramatically just what a different state we’re in with respect to proof in the mathematical sciences which we can state rigorous canons for, and proof in what used to be called the inductive sciences, where we can state general maxims but you really have to use intuition, general know-how, and so on, in applying them.” —

I think that's exactly right.

I realize that, yes. “Rule”, ”being”.......one no more a mere a priori human logical construct than the other. — Mww

Then we really are using "rule" in radically different ways. I don't see the rules of chess being a priori, whether held consciously or implicitly. I assume you're referring now to the rules of physics and the like?

If you want to deny that sciences are inductive and methodical you are alone. — David Mo

It can be, and there are examples. But there's no method to distinguish science.

Chomsky is speaking of linguistic and social sciences, Kuhn speaks only of periods of scientific revolutions and Feyerabend is a rara avis without many influence in philosophy of science. — David Mo

You haven't read any of them, I see. Chomsky is not talking about linguistics and the social sciences, for example. When he talks of science, he's going back to Galileo and discusses mainly the development of physics.

Regardless, if you want an entire list I'll provide one, as perhaps the names I mentioned don't count somehow. But I'm far from alone. Again, Putnam's introduction is a good one: few creative scientists accept such a thing as an "inductive method."

suppose you must know what it means that "natural philosophy" includes the sciences. If you don't know it, the idea is "a little" confusing in your head. — David Mo

This is incoherent.

central in Leibniz and one hundred percent metaphysical. — David Mo

Lots of things are speculative, until confirmed. Many hypotheses are speculative. The fact that some turn out to be completely wrong is part of science. To call all ideas (like geocentrism) that have been proven wrong "metaphysics" and thus philosophy, and everything else " science" is again simply a matter of definition, and quite useless in my view. But if it makes you happy, carry on.

Don't quote Heidegger to me, please. After fighting hard with his unpalatable Being and Time I learned that he himself acknowledged that he didn't know what Being was. For gurus, the ones from India. — David Mo

Not sure what that last sentence means.

True, Heidegger doesn't give an easy answer about what being "is," because "it" isn't a thing. He never "acknowledged" anything like that, however. It's a silly statement.

Sorry about your struggles with being and time; you're in good company. It's actually a fascinating work, and no wonder (to me) why it's considered the great work of the 20th century.

It all comes down to vague quotes and vague disqualifications. — David Mo

No, you're thinking of yourself and the scientific method. Saying "mathematization" repeatedly is likewise vague and devoid of context.

Philosophy is always involved in science; this doesn't mean they're the same. — Xtrix

Again, the sciences being different[..] as branches of ontology (philosophy) — Xtrix

Philosophy does not includes the natural sciences. — David Mo

I'm not sure what "include" means here. I'm not saying the questions and problems of physics is "philosophical" work. As I said, they're different, but they're connected. Natural philosophy, which we now call the various branches of science, always presupposes something about the world.

Or perhaps a better way to put it: philosophy is ontological, the sciences are ontical. But that doesn't make the work of biologists, physicists, chemists, or anthropologists "philosophy."

Moreover, you give it a totally inappropriate name of scholastic origin: ontology. Ontology was the science of being qua being. Totally speculative. It was substituted little by little by natural sciences -mathematics is another thing-, which do not speak of the being as being but of concrete aspects of reality. — David Mo

A very common view of the history of science and a rather common attitude about "being," which in fact was anticipated by Heidegger nearly a century ago:

"That which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method."

"It has been maintained that 'being' is the 'most universal' concept[...]that it is indefinable, [...] and that it is held to be self-evident."

He goes through these one by one, and then asks whether instead the question of being is rather than the most abstract and speculative actually the most concrete thing.

So not "totally speculative" at all -- in fact we live with a "vague, average" understanding (pre-theoretical understanding) of it every day.

And if there is one I would like you to give an example.Because vagueness like "science and philosophy" are "careful" doesn't say anything. And to say that philosophy is "precise" requires saying in what way. My mother is also serious and precise in making chocolate cake and we're not going to say she's a philosopher or a scientist. Words are meant to clarify similarities and differences, not to make indiscernible molasses. — David Mo

We're in a different state or mode of being when doing philosophy and science -- that doesn't mean all rationality, logic, problem solving, clarity of terms, etc., are only philosophy or science. You could very easily be following rules in cooking -- recipes are exactly that. Of course that's not philosophy. But it's also a very different state than an expert chef who needs no recipe, much like Hendrix or Clapton didn't need to remember their guitar lessons when playing. They're different states. This is the only point. And as it happens, the state we're in when "doing" science is the former state, not the latter. Ditto with science. This does not make them the same.

Leibniz was halfway between metaphysics and modern science. — David Mo

I'm glad you've retracted your statement that Leibniz was a 'metaphysicist.' But I'm afraid the story you tell about the history of science and philosophy is pretty confused. It's not worth pursuing other than to re-state the idea that there's no such thing as a "method" that got created or discovered some time in the 16th century. Or at least I see no evidence of that. There are many factors involved, historical, technological, cultural, etc., but defining something out in space and saying "this is the method" while it's still a rather controversial topic in the philosophy of science just isn't interesting.

Today's philosophers usually know where the limits of philosophy lie better than you do. — David Mo

Yes -- the philosophers of science also notice something about science as well: that a "method" is an illusion that even few scientists accept.

As for the limits of philosophy - I've already mentioned, philosophy is not physics or biology. Philosophy is ontological; it thinks being.

Before the New Science, the scientific method of experimentation was not used. — David Mo

There were plenty of experiments before the 16th century, long before any myth about a special method that scientists employ in order to be "counted" as science.

the Pythagoreans experimented on sounds and the length of strings. But they did not create a method that applied to all fields of natural knowledge. — David Mo

True. But neither did anyone else.

That's why it's not the same as the hypothetical deductive method that Galileo devised and Newton perfected. — David Mo

Or the mechanical philosophy that Galileo accepted and Newton (unintentionally) destroyed.

Also, see https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-009-9799-8_1

The same questioning, observation, experimentation was being done in antiquity. Many things were different. But to ask whether these examples were "really" science or not and then coming up with some post hoc explanation for why it isn't (or is) is a waste of time. Call it whatever you like. If you prefer to believe in the invention of a special recipe that coronates an activity "Science," you're welcome. You're not alone. It's completely unconvincing to me but, most importantly, completely irrelevant.

Let's call anything prior to the 16th century "old science" - if it makes us happy. Maybe it's useful for teaching, like dating the fall of Rome or determining the "beginning" of the Renaissance. We can define things any way we like.

But the simple fact remains: human beings care about understanding the world, and have been asking questions about it for thousands of years. If we want to say none of it counts as philosophy because they didn't have university departments, or "science" because they didn't have laboratories, that's our privilegby . But forgive me if I don't take it seriously.

This explains Eratosthenes' success in calculating the circumference of the Earth (you were wrong: it wasn't Aristarchus). — David Mo

Yes, my mistake.

But they limited themselves to the mathematical formulation of the problems and their application to observation. They did not move on to the method of confirming legal hypotheses, which is that of the New Science. — David Mo

Again the issue here is whether this method really defines science. Turns out it doesn't. So there's no sense going on as if this is premise I accept.

By your homegrown definition, archeology is certainly excluded as a science. Where economics falls is questionable. But who really cares anyway? Most physicists will probably tell you sociology isn't a science. Medicine is another matter. Astronomy another. Etc.

But again this misses the point. This isn't about science but about what philosophy is. Turns out they're not completely unrelated, but not the same either.

If you agree with this point, either we have reached an agreement or we have had a misunderstanding. — David Mo

I agree that human behavior is complex. Maybe it's helpful to state clearly what I'm not saying:

I'm not saying the sciences don't exist.
I'm not saying rules and rationality don't exist or don't play a large role in human life; they do.
I'm not saying that philosophy and science are the same thing.
I'm not saying that sensation and perception are the same thing.
I'm not saying that the everyday lived mode where we mostly find ourselves and the rational, abstract mode are completely separate (nor are philosophy and science).

What I am saying is that modern science is not always easily separated from philosophy, especially in its basic concepts, and in fact presupposes what's called "philosophical," and especially that what makes science what it is is not a special inductive method, however popular that idea is. Incidentally, on this last point especially I'm not alone -- so if it's modern scholarship that impresses you, there's plenty of it. I gave you a link to a discussion about the philosophy of science with Hilary Putnam, for example -- but there are many others who argue that the concept of an inductive method is shaky indeed. Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn (to a degree), Chomsky, etc., and plenty of others have interesting things to say about it.