(“...Empirical psychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics (...). It is a stranger who has been long a guest; and we make it welcome to stay, until it can take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology...”) — Mww

Interesting. Reference please?

If rules don’t play a part, how does one even become an expert? — Mww

By simply doing things in a different way. This sounds like a cop out, and indeed it is in a sense because it's an open question. I think we're finding out more and more about what's happening in the brain when one is in "flow" for example. But to talk about driving, tying your shoelaces, or even walking as "rule following," even if pushed into some unconscious realm, seems to me of no value. But I grant you that mine is the minority position.

"it's something that does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground."(Being & Time, p. 35.)
— Xtrix

Seems like “rule” would fit into that definition just fine. — Mww

But here Heidegger is talking about being, not rules.

Two previous data:
Where does he say experience is "based on" memory?
— Xtrix

Aristotle, Metaphysics A1. 980aff. : "It is from memory that men acquire experience", — David Mo

This is meaningless without a context. We have memory - experience is what's happening right now, shaped in part by past experiences.

As you can see, the distinction between sensation and perception — David Mo

You didn't say sensation, you said a "sense" of the door. That's not the same thing.

Again I'll repeat in case you didn't catch it: my background is in psychology, and my profession is psychotherapy. I say this to prove nothing except to save you from unnecessary exposition. Better to assume I know as much as an undergraduate.

If this is so, a radical distinction cannot be made between the lived world and the rational-abstract world. Both form part of a complex and inseparable world. And if I understand you correctly, this is what you denied at the beginning of our discussion. — David Mo

No radical distinction, just very different modes of being.

In an obtuse fashion that might be a statement of the issue with which philosophy deals, but it's not philosophy. Philosophy isn't a subject so much as an activity, in which muddled ways of saying things are exposed and analysed. — Banno

:ok:

This isn't saying much. But yes, I agree it's an activity - the activity of thinking being.

Returning to the thread's main topic again, the proposal I put forth earlier was not mine, but Heidegger's. I wanted to gauge reaction to it. Other than "clarify your terms," there hasn't been much reaction, which is surprising -- because it's a bold claim indeed. As a reminder of the claim: "Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology" and "Philosophy is the science of being."

I agree with Heidegger also that ontology and "metaphysics" are essentially the same thing. So in a way, philosophy = metaphysics = ontology. Philosophy is the science of being, "science" here indicating a theoretical, interpretative (hermeneutic), phenomenological inquiry. In fact, "Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible." Phenomenology is the method of ontology (i.e., philosophy).

So what is "phenomenology"? Seems obvious: the study of phenomena. But "phenomena" in what sense? In the sense of not only what shows itself in appearance -- but rather "it's something that does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground." (Being & Time, p. 35.)

So the subject of phenomenology is something that does not show itself but can be made to show itself. It's all the things we take for granted, are not conscious of, are utterly mundane, routine, habitual, etc. -- it's what's hidden in this sense, in the sense of being overlooked and "transparent." In a word, it's not "just this being or that, but rather the being of beings" that is phenomenology's aim. It studies the background (because being is usually concealed) and does so through hermeneutics. This makes sense if it is to be considered the method of philosophy, which likewise "studies" being.

So to summarize:

“Negatively, this means that philosophy is not a science of beings but of being or, as the Greek expression goes, ontology.” (p. 11 of Basic Problems of Phenomenology)

Regarding science:

“All the propositions of the non-philosophical sciences, including those of mathematics, are positive propositions. Hence, to distinguish them from philosophy, we shall call all non-philosophical sciences positive sciences. Positive sciences deal with what is, with beings; that is to say, they always deal with specific domains, for instance, nature. Within a given domain scientific research again cuts out particular spheres: nature as physically material lifeless nature and nature as living nature.” (p. 13)

Two things: something is stored somewhere, and, nothing is ever learned twice. — Mww

I don't know -- things can certainly be re-learned. The second premise only follows from the first -- because if something is stored somewhere, the rest is a matter of "recall" of some kind. But again, I'm rejecting the first claim. The phrase "something is stored somewhere" really isn't saying much, or at least isn't any different than saying what I mentioned earlier: rules have gone to some underground cache.

It's not that this formulation is absurd, it's that I see no evidence for it. The rules and principles of theory, reason, and other cognitive functions we use when dealing with the world consciously, scientifically, explicitly, etc. -- for example when we're formally learning a new skill (like driving, hammering, playing basketball) -- just do not seem to play any role once we've reached expertise. You see this when observing people in "flow," you see it in brain studies (different regions are being used than when problem-solving), and you hear it from experts themselves in that they don't have to "think" at all.

Where rules fit into all this I don't know, unless we view the mind as a computer that compiles data. It's very true that the brain and nervous system are involved, but bringing in the concepts we use to describe rational, conscious, theoretical, rule-following just doesn't work.

I agree, in accordance with the theoretical tenet that reason is a conscious mental activity. That which happens on the other side, is not reason per se. Precursor to reason, ground of reason, that which makes reason possible.....take your pick. — Mww

All good, really. In Heidegger, it's evident in the "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit) activity of dealing with equipment.

The brain stores stuff, but it is only because of our own need to understand each other, that “rules” is the name given to that which is stored. If neural pathways are the means for storage of “rules”, and we are hardy aware of our neural pathways and the employment of them in the facilitation of extant knowledge rather than re-learning from each successive set of empirical stimuli.....what is it that is completely wrong? — Mww

The use of "rules" really. Neural pathways are certainly involved, but to say the rules are "stored" there is the wrong picture of the mind. It's a kind of computer model of the mind, which is why AI continually fails. May sound nit-picky, but I think it matters.

Whatever it is that changes the brain from a theoretical understanding of driving (rules, principles, etc) to the everyday driving we all engage in (i.e., once the skill has been acquired), I just don't see how the former somehow goes "underground" and is thus stored in the brain. It reminds me a bit of Plato's theory of recollection.

There is a transcendental argument which says reason is the entirety of the human cognitive system, from perception to knowledge, so at least some people think reason, or at least some part of the system to which it belongs, may be something that is happening when we’re not aware of it. — Mww

Sure. I think it's an unjustified move, but I'm aware it exists -- in fact it's probably the predominant view.

Granting all that, the assertion that we reason constantly becomes clear, for otherwise we must have a system informing us of that which we already know, and a separate and distinct system informing us of that which we do not know. Just because we reason much faster under conditions of extant experience, as opposed to having to process new representations in order to cognize merely a possible experience, doesn’t mean we’re not using reason in same way. — Mww

Yes, this is exactly the above: reason now become "implicit reason," working below consciousness somehow. So it's like saying when we learn something, we have to learn the rules and put conscious effort into practicing -- but then once we master the skill (let's say driving), the rules become stored in the brain somewhere, working unconsciously.

I think that's completely wrong.

this "intelligent biological creature" is still more intelligent than anything else in the animal kingdom, if only for the simple fact that we all have the faculty of language.
— Xtrix

We have no right to make that claim, that doesn’t smack of anthropomorphism — Mww

Fair enough. I'll rephrase: we're the only biological creature with the faculty of language. "Intelligence" is another matter -- look at who we've elected President.

I think you've lost sight of what we were discussing. We were discussing whether it's possible to capture the singular without prior abstractions. What I'm telling you is that our perception of the world is determined by our previous preconceptions. — David Mo

That's not what we're discussing - it's what you keep interjecting.

You don't have a sense of a door, but you perceive a door in a complex of sensations and preconceptions that implicit memory provides. Please note "implicit" and don't turn to me for reflection. — David Mo

"You don't have a sense of a door" but "perceive the door" -- I won't try figuring out your semantics here.

No one is arguing about the neuropsychological processes involved in perception. I mentioned before that there's no reason to believe the brain isn't involved in these activities. But it's not "reason," nor is it "implicit reason." It's not that it's impossible to talk about the phenomena this way, but it's not what you see when you observe activities like hammering, driving, etc. To say reason is still involved, but it's just "unconscious, implicit reason" is a move that I see no evidence for. Reason and consciousness just aren't involved in any way.

Procedural memory is a different matter. but it doesn't get us to reason, comparison, or even "remembering." Talking about "preconceptions" in this context is likewise unjustified and misleading.

The world we live in is not naively given, but is mediated by our conceptualisation and assessment of it. That is, by the world in our own way a priori, with Kant's permission. — David Mo

No one is arguing for naive realism.

By the way, Aristotle is the first to point out that experience is based on memory. You see, even your idols take away your reason. — David Mo

Where does he say experience is "based on" memory?

No one is arguing that human being's don't have memory, nor "procedural memory," nor "muscle memory." If that's all you're trying to show, then I agree wholeheartedly.

That at certain levels of science there is an interaction between science and philosophy does not mean that they are the same. — David Mo

It's not that they're the same - as I've said before, there's also plenty of examples where they're quite different- given the common notions about what they are. But they're not separate either, nor is there any clear way of determining a boundary. Philosophy is always involved in science; this doesn't mean they're the same.

It's worth remembering that both activities come from the human mind. They both attempt to question and understand the world consciously. Both are very careful, try to be precise, etc.

Whether a question like "Why does the cup fall but the steam rise?" can be classified as "doing" philosophy or doing science is a silly endeavor. You, and others like you, want to relegate philosophy to being completely theoretical, and so as soon as one tests ideas in any way the activity suddenly "switches" over to science. If that's how we choose to define things, that's fine. But as I've already said, I see no motivation in doing so beyond education curricula and to clarify division of labor. There's no method that is agreed upon anyway, philosophy and science often interact as you say, etc - so who cares?

Again, the sciences being different of as branches of ontology (philosophy) is perfectly good for specialization purposes and ease of communicating what one is studying. Very useful to universities, etc. But we shouldn't take it too seriously.

Leibniz was a metaphysicist, and you won't tell me that monads are a scientific concept. ( — David Mo

The distinction is pointless. There's little evidence for monads in Leibniz' s formulation, if that's what you mean. Of course it's easy to make fun of minds far greater than your own after centuries of new knowledge, but the proposal wasn't unreasonable at the time. Not a huge leap from monads to atoms if you think about it.

Also, to simply declare Leibniz was this or that is pretty ridiculous. What was the invention of the step reckoner, or calculus for that matter - metaphysics? "Leibniz was a metaphysicist" - sure. And also a mathematician, logician, inventor, natural scientist, and even to some a computer science pioneer.

That technology has nothing to do with philosophy is demonstrated by the fact that those who work in it do not employ a single concept of philosophy. In fact, the vast majority of scientists today have no idea about philosophy. — David Mo

Baseless assertion. But let's take it as true - so what? Computer programmers don't need to know anything about quantum mechanics or electrical engineering. Doesn't mean electrical engineering isn't at work.

Aristarchus may be considered a scientist, but not in the same way as Galileo. The proof is that his heliocentric theory did not go beyond being a hypothesis until the New Science appeared in the Renaissance. (You could have chosen a better example). — David Mo

It's perhaps a bad example if all you know about him is what you read for a few minutes on Wikipedia. But take a look at how he calculated, with great accuracy, earth's circumfrence. Was that an accident? Was it not science? Was it not the "same" science as Galileo's thought experiments of frictionless planes?

Also, the fact that a hypothesis isn't confirmed until a later period says absolutely nothing about whether something is science or not.

If Aristarchus wasn't "doing" science, neither was Copernicus or Galileo. But there is one major difference: Galileo had a telescope.

That New Science can be clearly defined as different from the previous one because it is based on two new concepts: controlled experimentation and mathematization of variables. — David Mo

At long last, you alone have solved the mystery.

But seriously: experiments were performed long before the Renaissance. Galileo in fact performed very few, if any, experiments. Most were thought experiments. Mathematics has been used since the Egyptians and Babylonians.

I keep repeating: it's just not so simple. Here's a decent introduction: https://youtu.be/et8kDNF_nEc

I've never once claimed they were the same. The policies are different, and even if by a small degree, in an otherwise powerful country this makes a large impact.

Possibly you don't recognize that what used to be the Republican party now is in and part of the Democrat party. — tim wood

Sure, there's been a rightward shift for years. Democrats are now "moderate republicans," and what's called republican is now pure neoliberal with, at least after 2011 and the Tea Party influence, a touch of utter craziness. Its result is this surreal state we're living it with Trump as president.

Message me.

I'll be holding my nose too, buddy. Believe me. Same in 2016, same in 2012 and 2008 and 2004, etc. I wanted Bernie and I loathe the DNC and most democrats. If there's one thing I resent the Republicans for, personally, is that they've gone so extreme that they make voting for them impossible. And so we're essentially forced to caucus with Democrats.

I think anguish is caused by reading Sartre--dread being caused by thinking about reading Sartre, as I noted previously. Behold this knowledge of the causes of anguish and dread. — Ciceronianus the White

That had me chuckling a little.

I see reason....as....abstract thought.
— Xtrix

So reason plays an important role, but it's not the only one.
— Xtrix

In the synthesis of the two, are we not then left with one of two inevitable conclusions: either there are times in our conscious living when we don’t think, or, the constant mental activity called thought, implied by being conscious, isn’t necessarily reason? — Mww

An important quesiton. I think the latter is the case. If reason is abstract thought, then all this means is that what we call "thinking" is not always conscious, abstract thinking (reasoning). I think we all see this is the case if we introspect a little -- we're always talking to ourselves, for example. We're in the past, remembering things, we're imagining things, projecting in the future, a tune is "stuck in our head," etc. -- it's a fragmented, messy affair. Hardly "reasoning," but still considered thought nonetheless. I call it "junk thought," but I'm sure there're better terms for it. Some researchers in psychology (neuroscience) call it a "default network" -- daydreaming being a key element of this.

I agree reason is conscious abstract thought, but I rather think we reason constantly, all else being given, whether or not we are aware of it, which makes explicit that not only does reason have an important role, it is the necessarily determinant one. Without it, we have no justification in calling ourselves human, as opposed to merely existing as some kind of intelligent biological creature. — Mww

I would nit-pick a little here and say that if you agree reason is conscious abstract thought, then if something is happening when we're not aware of it -- is that still "reason"?

In any case, I didn't quite understand the entirety of your first sentence. As for the second, I think we certainly can call ourselves human -- just with the caveat that we're not always rational. Besides, this "intelligent biological creature" is still more intelligent than anything else in the animal kingdom, if for no other reason than the simple fact that we all have the faculty of language.

Aristotle places metaphysics at the top of his classification of forms of knowledge. — David Mo

No, he doesn't. Aristotle talks about φθσισ. You have to remember that "metaphysics" is a later designation, and has connotations that simply can't be applied to Aristotle if we're at all serious about trying to understand his thought.

It's not that I have to "remember" how to drive a car -- I just do it. I don't have to think about it at all;
— Xtrix
Of course you remember when you open a door. It is your memories that allow you to recognize what is in front of you as a door and not a wall. — David Mo

Remembering and memory, at least in psychology (and as they're commonly understood), play no role opening a door any more than they have a role in breathing. If we want to argue that we have to "remember" each time we walk, or drive, or eat, it's a very strange way to look at things. It's far too abstract. If you say that it's not abstract, but simply compiled somewhere in the brain, and still call it "remembering," it's very misleading. I have to "remember" my to-to list, which the best route is to get to Cape Cod, and what this person's favorite ice cream is -- I'm not doing that when driving, in fact it's so transparent I can think and talk about anything I want. Am I still subconsciously "remembering"?

I don't see why we would need to invoke this term, given the above.

This indicates a kind of computer model view of the human mind. I reject that wholeheartedly.

If you hadn't had previous training you couldn't drive in an unreflective way. — David Mo

Very true. At least when it comes to driving, playing basketball, etc. Whether things like acquiring language requires "training" is another matter.

What I'm trying to explain to you is that there is a form of non-reflective "consciousness" that conceptualizes sensations to turn them into perceptions. — David Mo

Yes, I'm quite familiar with the arguments your presenting, which are mistakes. It's not "consciousness" at all.

What the central nervous system does with perception is an interesting topic; but again, not relevant here, any more than the the way the visual system creates images from sensations of light is relevant.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty has some interesting things to say about this in his Phenomenology of Perception, in fact. — Xtrix

Indeed, Merleau-Ponty has a lot to say for me when she discusses the merely automatic character of conditioned reflexes. In the Phenomenology of Perception, to be exact. — David Mo

Well he was a man, but maybe that was a typo. And yes, he has very interesting things to say about that indeed. Have you really read the book? Because it undermines everything you've said so far about consciousness and "implicit" abstraction.

And when did the change occur between then and now? When was this special method "discovered"?
— Xtrix
In the renaissance. — David Mo

I already mentioned Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, and others of the early scientific revolution. Remember the renaissance itself, including these men, was influenced by Greek thought. It's no surprise the Bacon and Galileo reference Aristotle so often, for example. So were the Greeks not doing science? Again, I always like to ask about Aristarchus. Was he not doing science? He didn't have the technology of later generations, of course, and he certainly lived before this special method was "discovered" in the Renaissance. But if he wasn't "doing" science, then it simply proves that we shouldn't take very seriously how we in the 21st century choose to define it. Which is my point.

Science is still natural philosophy, in my view.
— Xtrix
There's little motivation for such an unjustified demarcation.
— Xtrix
Do you think a philosopher can teach atomic physics only through philosophy? Do you think philosophy is what has created the technified world in which we live? Just to cite two obvious differences. — David Mo

"Only through philosophy" is meaningless. Yes I think philosophers can contribute to science and often have been scientists and mathematicians. Kant taught astronomy, Descartes founded analytic geometry, Leibniz invented calculus, etc. etc. Even more recently, take a look at Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Planck, et al. Were they "only" doing science? Not at all: they actively engaged in philosophical thought and were explicit in who their influences were. That's in part what made them so trailblazing, I'd argue.

And yes, of course "philosophy" has created the technological world in which we live. One simply has to reject confining "philosophy" to 20th century university departments, completely separated from the "science" being done in other departments.

If you live in a world where science and philosophy are the same, you are a bit old-fashioned. You are a few centuries out of date. — David Mo

Yet no one can explain what the "scientific method" is, including you. And this is what's supposed to separate "doing science" from "doing philosophy." I'd be happy to be proven wrong. Poppers and others have tried to show how science differs from other activities, but I don't find much of that convincing. It also differs quite a lot from what you've claimed.

In reality, there's simply attempts to understand the world -- the rest is fine for abstraction and categorizing for convenience.

I understand that someone may express doubts that the scientific method can be defined rigidly (nobody pretends such a thing today) but to pretend that the method of philosophy and science are the same is an absurdity. — David Mo

People do indeed pretend that it can be rigidly defined. But if it isn't, and so philosophy and science as currently understood often interact simultaneously in thought and inquiry, then it's also absurd to talk about the absurdity that these "methods" are the "same."

The sciences study various domains of beings -- life, nature, rocks, stars, cells, etc. Philosophy is the study of being -- ontology in the Greek sense. This is the only "difference" I can see, and even here it's very difficult indeed to mark a clear distinction.

I'll go ahead and be "reprehensible." It's the fact that you think it's your right to judge that keeps me on the sidelines. You all think you're the judge, jury, and executioner. But it's your funeral. — neonspectraltoast

What a silly argument. It's your funeral, too. So you're willing to shoot yourself in the foot because some people online are mean and judgmental? Who cares about that? There's only one thing that matters: are they right? If it's pure name-calling, just ignore them. If they're giving facts and evidence and also being cantankerous, then ignore the latter and look at the facts.

Speaking for myself: I don't think you're reprehensible. I don't think people voting for Trump are evil, I don't think people voting third party are evil, etc. I certainly understand their frustration and wholeheartedly agree that Biden is a very weak candidate indeed. I say that those voting third party or not voting, when their stated goals are the same as mine, are assisting Trump in getting re-elected. I don't think it's evil or reprehensible, I just think it's an easily demonstrable mistake.

The entire argument hinges on what your goals are. The example I always use is climate change. If you profess to care about this issue, then it follows you should vote Biden. Why? Because when you look at the policies of Trump compared to what Biden is proposing or what Obama did, it's clear which is better for the environment. That's not saying much, given Trump's policies, but it's at least "better."

So it follows for other policies as well. I reject that Biden and Trump are the same person with the same policies, and I reject that not voting or voting third party does any good whatsoever to change the DNC -- there's no evidence for that. I also reject the short-term argument, which completely ignores the very small window we have for addressing the climate crisis, and the re-shaping of the judiciary (which will have effects that will be felt for generations).

Nothing like defining yourself by countersignalling signals. Some would think that this way-of-living suggests a resentment that has metastasized - why would anyone base their choices around reactions to others' choices otherwise? — csalisbury

This has become the essence of the Republican party and supporters of Trump. Hate the liberals so much (thanks mainstream media -- i.e., conservative radio, Fox News, etc) that we'll destroy ourselves, our future, any notion of "truth" or expertise, etc.

It's certainly sad.

What role does reason play....wherein lays its weight....in humans generally, from a psychological point of view? — Mww

I can't speak for psychology generally, but my own view is that it plays a role when things break down, when we are consciously solving problems and making plans, etc. Much of our activity is seen as unconscious within psychology, as seen here for example -- a pretty well-known study.

Of course your question depends on what you mean by "reason." I see reason, rationality, and logic as meaning essentially the same thing in our Western tradition: conscious, abstract thought. Consequently, it's pretty clear that abstract thought is essential for philosophy and science and so is very important indeed, as it is in our daily lives as human beings. But we shouldn't forget that although it's a powerful mode of being, it is still, as Heidegger says, "a founded mode," and leaves out what we are "proximally and for the most part" in our "average everydayness." In other words, by viewing the world objectively, we have to leave out all of the aspects of life in which we spend most of our time and out of which we begin to philosophize to begin with.

So reason plays an important role, but it's not the only one. Therefore, to say we're a rational animal, as has been a common interpretation since Aristotle, isn't wrong. But the ζοον part is still there nonetheless, and shouldn't be forgotten or interpreted through the lens of "reason." Our instincts, habits, skills, our engagement with equipment, etc. - it does no good to describe these in rational terms.

Context here is important:

Maybe we simply have to say "So much the worse for definitions," and leave it to intuition and specific situations.
— Xtrix

You can't avoid definitions. If you don't make them explicit, they will work in the background. And this is a source of pseudo-problems.
— David Mo

It depends on what you mean. In explicit, theoretical understanding -- that's certainly true. In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional.
— Xtrix

Again, this is exactly right.

So you can indeed avoid definitions, because we're simply not thinking this way in most of our everyday lives. We can discuss "meaning," but that's a different and more complicated story in linguistics. — Xtrix

Do you disagree with what I have said? Do you have another concept of definition or meaning? — David Mo

"Meaning," I repeat, is an interesting topic in linguistics and worth looking into. You can define it any way you like -- so that they're in the head or not in the head (as Putnam argued, for example). What we usually refer to when using "meaning" is a person's intentions -- "What did you mean by that?"

Meanings are often tied up with values, interests, goals, feelings, intuitions, etc. It can also mean a definition of a word, like we find in a dictionary. In the latter usage, there's no evidence to suggest this is how we "think" in our everyday activities. Which gets back to:

The lived world isn't "concrete"? Experience isn't concrete? On the contrary, it's the most "concrete" thing we have.
— Xtrix
Every experience is concrete. There is no such thing as the experience of the universal. Your mistake consists in believing that the universal categories do not intervene in experience. — David Mo

That's not what I'm saying. There's certainly a place for that.

Look for the difference between sensation and perception in contemporary psychology — David Mo

One, my background is in psychology. Two, your comment isn't relevant.

We don't have to remember them, draw conclusions about them, or evaluate them at all -- we just do them.
— Xtrix

If you didn't remember how you opened past doors you couldn't open this door. If you did not compare the shape of the present door with others you have seen, you could not open this door. If you were not able to reason why the door has not been opened you would not be able to realize that it is because someone has thrown away the key. That these thoughts are not made explicit is frequent, but they work in your head constantly. — David Mo

No, they don't. This is the mistake. I don't have to do any of the above to open a door. All of what you mentioned are phenomena that occur in the human mind when it's in a completely different mode -- a consciously aware, rational mode, where we need to "recall" something, compare and contrast, deduce, etc. That's not what's happening in opening a door. It's like saying "muscle memory" involves the muscles activity "remembering" what to do. For that matter, why not apply these terms to reflexes as well? Would that even be coherent?

In fact there's all kinds of actions we perform on a daily basis that simply don't involve any of the above factors. It's not that I have to "remember" how to drive a car -- I just do it. I don't have to think about it at all; I can be carrying on a conversation, thinking about physics, making plans for the future, etc. To describe these activities using the terms we apply to conscious, rational activity is at best very misleading, and at worst incoherent.

In other words, we know something happens in the brain and nervous system when it comes to habits and skills, but to invoke the terms we use for conscious, rational, abstract activity to explain it is the wrong way forward.

You are constantly thinking when you go to the dentist's office, when you park your car in the garage, when you bake a chicken, when you invite your friends over for a barbecue, when you read a book, when you get restless because your wife hasn't come home, etc. These are thoughts that do not require special concentration. In many cases you are not aware of yourself thinking about them, but they are working permanently, without you being able to avoid them. —

Sure. And this is a radically different kind of thinking than philosophical or scientific thinking, as you know. Likewise with activity. To say there's some kind of "thinking" involved in these activities is like saying there's "thinking" involved in our breathing. Sometimes you can become conscious of breathing and control it to a degree, but mostly it's completely unconscious and does not involve thoughts at all.

Ditto for walking, talking, hammering, or driving a car. All of these we had to learn at some point, and some (like driving and riding a bicycle) even required formal teaching, following rules, repetition, etc. But once those rules are used, they are not then compiled somewhere in the brain, being "invisibly" used once we achieve mastery -- they're just gone. Maurice Merleau-Ponty has some interesting things to say about this in his Phenomenology of Perception, in fact.

In other cases, the failure of this way of thinking -almost reflex- forces you to think about your way of reasoning about the problem. This is less common, but it also occurs abundantly in everyday life. You begin to think "How come...", "Why did she...?" And on a higher level when someone tells you, "You have no reason to think that..."

You can see how reason has weight in our daily life. —

Of course reason has weight in our daily lives. I'm not claiming otherwise.

Many of Aristotle's particular claims have been shown to be incorrect, sure.
— Xtrix
Wittgenstein does not dismantle particular claims of Aristotle, but the heart of Aristotle's philosophy: metaphysics. — David Mo

Metaphysics isn't the heart of Aristotle's philosophy. The term "metaphysics" itself means "after the physics lectures." Take a look at Aristotle's physics. I haven't read much Wittgenstein, but I doubt he's "dismantled" much there. My hunch is he's very much moving in the space Aristotle opened up, but if he did dismantle it -- good for him. Not an easy task.

The fact that there are exceptions to a definition does not invalidate it. It is difficult to find a word that does not have margins of vagueness. But that natural science is based on controlled experimentation and observation and philosophy doesn't so, is a clear enough difference. Of course, if you go back to antiquity and the Middle Ages, where modern science did not exist, the confusion between philosophy and science is almost absolute. But we are in the 21st century of the Common Era and we talk about the difference between philosophy and science now. — David Mo

And when did the change occur between then and now? When was this special method "discovered"? By our current standards, what was Aristarchus and Newton doing?

Exceptions don't invalidate the definition, but in this case they make it rather arbitrary. There's little motivation for such an unjustified demarcation. All it does is drill into kids' heads that there is a special method that people consciously follow which makes them "scientists." And this simply isn't true.

Science is still natural philosophy, in my view. The fact that Galileo and Descartes lived around the time of Francis Bacon and the rise of inductive logic, and that we've become nervous about Christian dogma and superstition creeping up into our attempts to understand the world, doesn't justify such rigid categorization. It's fine for university curricula -- but it has no bearing on the real world.

Also, I'm glad to have given you an outlet for your series Forrest. Very interesting indeed.

Well your system is fine -- as long as we don't take it too seriously.

On the contrary, it is consciousness that we have, if we mean by this our lived world -- our experiences, our being
— Xtrix
You put a lot of things into your concept of consciousness. It is not the same to have perceptions as to capture the 'I'. Among other things because you do not grasp your "self" in the same way that you perceive a phenomenon. What is an empty abstraction is not the concept of consciousness, but the way you use it. It does not refer to anything concrete. The opposition between reason and consciousness that you make is meaningless. — David Mo

The lived world isn't "concrete"? Experience isn't concrete? On the contrary, it's the most "concrete" thing we have.

I disagree that I put a lot "into" the concept of consciousness -- which is not well defined in any sense: most of our decisions and our lives are probably un-conscious. So in that case I'm actually leaving a lot out when I say consciousness is our "lived world."

For the rest, it would be good for you to distinguish between discursive reason and reason. In your daily life you are constantly using reason. Even when you perceive things. You evaluate, compare, remember, draw conclusions... Making syllogisms is another thing. Of course. — David Mo

That's a common assumption, and in my view a common mistake. I don't believe we use "reason" either in the sense of syllogism or in the sense you're using it at all. That's just not what you see in everyday actions. We don't have to remember them, draw conclusions about them, or evaluate them at all -- we just do them. Take turning a doorknob, driving a car, walking, or the hundreds of habits and skills we use on a daily basis as examples. When you look at it, it's just a mistake to project "reason" on them. There's certainly a place for that -- and usually when something goes wrong, we have to concentrate and problem-solve, etc. Again, this is not so much my ideas as they are Heidegger's -- but the examples are mine (he uses "hammering").

So philosophy, in your view, is restricted to the a priori. Since anything a priori does not rely on empirical observation or experimentation, it's quite a stretch to associate it with "evidence." If it's a priori, it needs no evidence.
— Xtrix

The “evidence” part was just distinguishing it from religion. I said “reasons or evidence” then. Distinguishing it from science further narrows that down to basically “reason”. — Pfhorrest

OK. So then philosophy is the use of reason, in the sense of the a priori, and science likewise uses reason but also observation, experimentation, etc?

This, again, assumes a scientific method, and no one so far has demonstrated there is one -- as far as I can tell.
— Xtrix

That there are various scientific methods according to the various sciences and that they are the best way to present evidence about facts seems to me unquestionable. If you know of another method, I can reconsider my position. — David Mo

But you're not demonstrating that there is one, you're just taking it as a given that there is. I don't see it -- I don't see a special method that accounts for the success of the sciences or allows us to easily differentiate "it" from anything else, philosophy or otherwise. You can try, and many have, to formulate one, coming up with a list of factors -- observation, experimentation, predictability, peer review, data collection, hypothesis, theory, etc. -- and of course there are plenty of examples. But there are plenty of exceptions as well. Better to just think of this human activity we call "science" as all of the above -- a rational, reflective, thoughtful inquiry into the world -- which does not consciously follow any kind of "method" at all, other than perhaps attempting to understand the world sensibly.

That's not to say "science" isn't a useful concept, but simply that there's no "method" that distinguishes it from "non-science." Again I like to bring up Aristarchus -- was he doing "science"? Who knows.

To this day we're in the shadow of Aristotle
— Xtrix
You don't say. Did Wittgenstein believe in prime mover and prima materia? First news.
You're exaggerating a little. — David Mo

Not really. Many of Aristotle's particular claims have been shown to be incorrect, sure. So what? That's not quite what I mean by being "in the shadow" of this man, as you know.

In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional.
— Xtrix
The definition is only the use of the word. You may be aware of how you use it or not, but you cannot stop using it one way or another. That is its meaning. — David Mo

Context here is important:

Maybe we simply have to say "So much the worse for definitions," and leave it to intuition and specific situations.
— Xtrix

You can't avoid definitions. If you don't make them explicit, they will work in the background. And this is a source of pseudo-problems.
— David Mo

It depends on what you mean. In explicit, theoretical understanding -- that's certainly true. In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional. — Xtrix

Again, this is exactly right.

So you can indeed avoid definitions, because we're simply not thinking this way in most of our everyday lives. We can discuss "meaning," but that's a different and more complicated story in linguistics.

I don't see why "opposite." They're just different.
— Xtrix

Well, didn't you say they were the same? Are they the same or are they different? Because the same and different are opposites. Or aren't they? — David Mo

I never made a claim about St. Teresa and Plato -- you did. You said they inhabited opposite worlds, I'm saying they simply have different perspectives and hence make very different interpretations and, therefore, inhabit very different worlds. I don't see a justification for them being "opposite."

Philosophy doesn't appeal to empirical observation? What would be considered "evidence" in that case?
— Xtrix

A priori argument. — Pfhorrest

So philosophy, in your view, is restricted to the a priori. Since anything a priori does not rely on empirical observation or experimentation, it's quite a stretch to associate it with "evidence." If it's a priori, it needs no evidence.

You're taking epistemological positions for granted, though. — Pfhorrest

In the context of the meaning of being (which I argue is what philosophy thinks). But in that case the nature of ἐπιστήμη is not being used in the sense you're using it, nor is "truth."
— Xtrix

No, in the context of whether all philosophy starts with assumed axioms. — Pfhorrest

I don't recall saying all philosophy starts with axioms. Remember what I said:

There is no way around it -- you have to start somewhere. Any proposition in philosophy presupposes something, and in the end it does in fact come down to matters of belief. These core beliefs I call "axioms," but call it whatever you want. It's not that they're unquestionable -- it's that you have to accept them only in order to proceed. —

This includes your proposition about critical rationalism. There are plenty of suppositions there as well, namely about knowledge and truth. The point was made in the context of what "faith" means. Thus even the proposition of what constitutes "faith" is based on a number of suppositions, which if we keep questioning will eventually come down to matters we simply accept.

All of this is in the domain of abstract thought, however -- with its words, definitions, concepts, propositions, categories, syllogisms, etc. -- everything we consider rational, reasonable, logical. Within this "theoretical" domain arises these questions and propositions about knowledge, beauty, truth, etc. While we may claim this is the only way to truth, the fact that it is a particular mode of the human being, and an exceptional one at that, should tell you that a great deal gets left out of the picture. We know this is true in science, but it's true in traditional philosophy as well.

Whether or not there's an afterlife isn't relevant.
— Xtrix

We’re not talking about an afterlife, but about continuing in more of the same kind of life again. If all of one’s conscious existence ceased permanently at death, that would guarantee an end to dukkha. It’s only against the prospect of that going on indefinitely that any special escape is needed. — Pfhorrest

From my reading, there's no mention of any kind of "conscious existence" going on. Other people go on, the world goes on, conscious life in general goes on. True enough. But what matters is what you do in this life, not what happens after you die: the point is to remove suffering -- that's all. All other ideas about samsara, reincarnation, karma, etc., aren't necessary to achieve nirvana in the here and now. Things change (anicca), there is suffering (dukkha), and there is really no "self" (anatta), all of which can be recognized right here and now in experience, through meditation (part of the eightfold path to nirvana, to the cessation of craving and desire) -- open to everyone. There's no forcing, there's no asking for accepting any of these "truths" on faith, etc.

I've found the Buddha was wrong about very little. A lot gets translated poorly -- like "life is suffering," etc. I don't think that's true, nor do I see them as "against" all "wanting" whatsoever (what about the "want" or the "desire" to not be suffering?). Nietzsche considered Buddhism a decadent religion, like Christianity (albeit a more sophisticated and mature one) based on these translations. But I digress.

That's like saying light is "what we gaze upon or look for". I don't think so. Rather: we see, as Plato might say, by light - by seeing, so to speak - which is not "given", not "seen" as such. — 180 Proof

It's not what we gaze upon or look for per se, because it's often in the background -- but it can be understood, hence why we have a concept of "light." As an analogy, light is the basis on which anything becomes visible. It's against this background, often overlooked and never itself seen as light, that we're able to make out anything visible at all.

The analogy fails in the this respect: light, unlike being, is not a given -- some people are blind. It is, however, a given for anything visible.

Yes, being is presupposed -- it's what's thought and questioned.

By "presupposed" I understand, instead, conditions[...]which must obtain for 'thoughts and questions' to make sense, and not "what's thought and questioned" itself. Being is not a supposition - answer to the question "what is real?" (caveat: Heideggerian "what is" is a gnomic sentence-fragment, and not a question). — 180 Proof

Being is presupposed in that sense, yes -- as the condition of the possibility of understanding anything at all. It is embedded in our language as well, as in the copula. It's not a supposition or an answer to a question.

You're taking epistemological positions for granted, though. — Pfhorrest

In the context of the meaning of being (which I argue is what philosophy thinks). But in that case the nature of ἐπιστήμη is not being used in the sense you're using it, nor is "truth."

Anatta is the cure to samsara. If there was no samsara to worry about, there would be no need for a special path to anatta: everyone would get there inevitably when they died. If it were not thought possible to maintain some (however false) sense of self through the cycle of death and rebirth, and so to continue suffering beyond death, then the way to end suffering would be simple: just die. It's only against that background presumption of samsara that Buddhism makes any sense. — Pfhorrest

That's just not true. It's against the background of dukkha that Buddhism makes sense. It's clear in the teaching: there is suffering. This is the very first noble truth. The way out of suffering is the eightfold path, which is based around vipassana meditation (panja) and sila (ethical conduct). Whether or not there's an afterlife isn't relevant. Rather if you want to be happy, do this.

What remains still as philosophy is demarcated from science in that while philosophy relies only upon reason or evidence to reach its conclusions, rather than appeals to faith, as an activity it does not appeal to empirical observation either, even though within philosophy one may conclude that empirical observation is the correct way to reach conclusions about reality. — Pfhorrest

Philosophy doesn't appeal to empirical observation? What would be considered "evidence" in that case?

I just don't think it's this straightforward. If we decide we want to define philosophy in his way, I fail to see the motivation for it. You're quite right that science was natural philosophy, with "nature" as physics, and physics as a variation of the res extensa- substance that's extended in space. I don't see much reason for so rigidly separating the two, despite claims of a special method. It betrays a reaction to Christianity and has hints of scientism.

I agree that the real (i.e. MEon, or other-than-being) is fundamental, not as an object of "science" (i.e. academic) but as the immanent horizon, or enabling-constraint, of struggle (i.e. existential). — 180 Proof

I think I agree with this, although I have no way of completely understanding your terminology here until it's further explained. Yes, "being" and "reality" I too would argue are not simply objects of science -- they're what we philosophize out of and about. In that case, being is a given.

It's the activity of interpreting being through theories and concepts.
Okay, better - "being" as presupposed by "theories and concepts" (Collingwood? Spinoza?) — 180 Proof

Glad you approve. :) Yes, being is presupposed -- it's what's thought and questioned.

or

"Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology."

Agree? Disagree? Incoherent?

Incoherent. Seems (implicitly) 'epistemically anthropocentric', or idealist-essentialist (re: hypostatization). — 180 Proof

This one is harder, yes. It depends in this case on what I mean by "phenomenology" first and foremost. Phenomenology is a method, in this case the method for the science of being (ontology). The "universal" here indicates not some being (as in a particular being) or some group or class of beings (entities) like trees, dogs, planets, nature, beauty, mathematics -- but rather being itself.

This consciousness you speak of is nothing more than an abstraction.
So reason may be imperfect, but it's what we have and we should resign ourselves to it. Polishing it, perfecting it, handling it, but not inventing alternatives that are more lying than reason itself. — David Mo

On the contrary, it is consciousness that we have, if we mean by this our lived world -- our experiences, our being -- and reason in the sense of concepts, categories, words, and logic that is far more often "lying." If consciousness is an abstraction, so is reason itself.

When we're being the rational animal, we're leaving out how we mostly function in the world. It's like saying "thought" is only abstract thought. That's not the type of "thought" that goes through our heads 99% of the time when we're talking to ourselves and visualizing fragments of images. Likewise rationality, or reason, is one faculty of the human being -- and a very important one. But I think we should let go of seeing the human being as simply the animal with reason, especially if by reason we mean the above aspects.

They are not the same worlds but opposite worlds. — David Mo

I don't see why "opposite." They're just different. Not all differences are opposites.

We have to be careful, though, not to equate philosophy with some kind of therapy. In some cases, philosophical thought aims simply at understanding the world or an aspect of the world, like a hammer or a tree, without any real thought of morality or health per se. It still comes out of the human mind, with a human desire to understand, but that's still very different from questions regarding a good or healthy or happy life.

I like all of that very much. So by "kind of medicine" you mean in the sense of what's indicated in those passages. In that case, that's surely true.

But insofar as "science" presupposes "being", "the science of being", at best, begs the question, no? — 180 Proof

Good point -- it does indeed. Why? Because before we even "do" philosophy or science, we're in a world, we exist in a world, and with a pre-theoretical understanding of ourselves (and everything else that exists). Since it's from here which we start to philosophize, it is a sort of turning on itself.

That's foundationalism, which is far from uncontroversial. — Pfhorrest

Foundationalism concerns knowledge, yes, which has a long history in epistemology. I'm not concerned with epistemology.

As I said, you can instead -- as critical rationalism would have it -- start with a survey of possibilities, reduce to absurdity some of them, and then proceed from whatever is left. — Pfhorrest

You're still starting as a human being interested in these questions, yes? So whether you start inductively or deductively doesn't much matter to me. Both presuppose a human being making an inquiry or attempting to understand the world somehow. Whether or not that's "belief" or "faith" is questionable perhaps, but in any case it's a given. We can challenge whether or not we exist, of course, but I've always considered that an absurdity.

Just believing something yourself without adequate reason isn’t faith. To quote myself elsewhere:

I also don't mean just holding some opinion "on faith", as in without sufficient reason; I don't think you need reasons simply to hold an opinion yourself. I am only against appeals to faith, by which I mean I am against assertions — statements not merely to the effect that one is of some opinion oneself, but that it is the correct opinion, that everyone should adopt — that are made arbitrarily; not for any reason, not "because of..." anything, but "just because"; assertions that some claim is true because it just is, with no further justification to back that claim up. — Pfhorrest

That's a little more specific, and I happen to agree with it. I don't see why the term need apply only to factual statements. In my tentative semantics, "faith" is belief without evidence (or reason), whether personal opinions or universal prescriptions. Hence a little more general, and in that case, having "faith" in the airplane pilot or a belief that human beings are essentially "good" are matters of faith.

As for Buddhism -- no Buddhist, that I'm aware of, asks you to accept the "wisdom of Siddhartha" on faith. Quite the opposite.
— Xtrix

I am not aware of any Buddhist arguing for Buddhist principles in a way meant to convince someone who doesn’t already believe them. It’s all meant to be taken as self-evident wisdom that just needed someone wise enough to point it out, and now that it’s been pointed out, you’ve just got to either accept it and find peace or go on suffering in your miserable unenlightened life. — Pfhorrest

That's not what Buddhists argue at all -- if they ever do argue. The 4 Noble Truths, for example, are indeed seen as "truths," but nowhere does Buddha or Buddha's adherents ever ask one to accept them on faith. Rather, you can see for yourself through meditation, which is experiential. You can accept or reject it on this basis alone.

The Buddhist ideas (in some traditions) of reincarnation really have nothing to do with the supernatural, any more than a cloud becoming rain is supernatural.
— Xtrix

The idea of any kind of self surviving death to live another miserable life of suffering is sort of a key motivating factor in Buddhism — Pfhorrest

Not "any kind of self." Buddhists don't believe your individual personality survives after death. They do believe in continuation and transformation, as a cloud to rain or a dead leaf into soil, etc. At least in the variations I'm familiar with. I know in parts of Thailand they practically worship Buddha as a god, his statues are everywhere, and so maybe you can find beliefs in an afterlife there -- but from what I've read in the Sutras, Buddha himself never discusses the 'self' surviving or anything spooky like that. In fact, non-self is a basic tenant (anatta).

Philosophy ends when science establishes the facts. This has been the case since the time when science got a reliable method. Therefore, I do not include the philosophy of the past in my demarcation criteria. Aristotle is not Wittgenstein. — David Mo

This, again, assumes a scientific method, and no one so far has demonstrated there is one -- as far as I can tell. I'd be happy to be proven wrong.

Aristotle certainly is not Wittgenstein. The "philosophy of the past" has to be included in anything we discuss about philosophy. I see no way around it. To this day we're in the shadow of Aristotle -- including Wittgenstein. If we forget or disregard the "tradition," the development of Western thought, then we run into many risks indeed. And again, the best scientists are the ones who engage with this thought.

On spirituality: it is a vague word. It sounds like religion without god. I don't include spirituality as a kind of philosophy. — David Mo

"Religion" and "spirituality" are older than philosophy, certainly. But philosophy deals with the same questions. It's not always easy to decipher one from the other. Rather than defining things any way we like, it seems as if we know the difference when we see it in specific cases.

Maybe we simply have to say "So much the worse for definitions," and leave it to intuition and specific situations.
— Xtrix

You can't avoid definitions. If you don't make them explicit, they will work in the background. And this is a source of pseudo-problems. — David Mo

It depends on what you mean. In explicit, theoretical understanding -- that's certainly true. In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional.

On the other hand, even "formal" philosophy starts with axioms of some kind.
— Xtrix

Not necessarily. It can start with a survey of possibilities, reduce to absurdity some of them, and then proceed from whatever is left. I’d argue that to just put forth some unquestionable axioms simply is religion. — Pfhorrest

There is no way around it -- you have to start somewhere. Any proposition in philosophy presupposes something, and in the end it does in fact come down to matters of belief. These core beliefs I call "axioms," but call it whatever you want. It's not that they're unquestionable -- it's that you have to accept them only in order to proceed. Take Euclid's axioms in geometry, for example. Of course we can still question these, maybe even reject them -- it's not a dogma. Yet if you don't accept them, at least temporarily, the rest won't be very interesting or even coherent.

The same is true of philosophy -- it doesn't start from nowhere.

Yes, religion is anything that appeals to faith. And it’s not only claims about the supernatural that appeal to faith. Buddhism just stipulates its principles and asks you to accept them. Even if those principles make no appeal to the supernatural (which, inasmuch as they talk about reincarnation and escaping the cycle thereof, they actually do), just asking us to accept them on faith in the wisdom of Siddhartha makes it a religion still. — Pfhorrest

If we choose to define "religion" as anything that appeals to faith, then we should discuss exactly what we mean by faith. I say it's belief without evidence. But in that case, many things we do on a daily basis involves a good deal of faith as well, yet I wouldn't call it religion.

As for Buddhism -- no Buddhist, that I'm aware of, asks you to accept the "wisdom of Siddhartha" on faith. Quite the opposite.

The Buddhist ideas (in some traditions) of reincarnation really have nothing to do with the supernatural, any more than a cloud becoming rain is supernatural.