I put "other," for ontology. Metaphysics is fine too. Asking about what "is," about being and beings, is first philosophy. It's why it begins when Western philosophy begins, in Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus.

Of course they do. — David Mo

Fine -- one reference on where "logos" isn't also "gathering," etc. I've read nothing of the kind. The fact that he's unconventional is well established, and known even by him.

but they say that what Heidegger sees in the text is not in it. — David Mo

No, they don't. At least that's not what I've seen. What they do is disagree with his nuanced way of translating -- which isn't surprising. But I think they're just wrong: take a look at the texts, even those in Intro to Metaphysics, that he discusses. He makes a very convincing case, if one firsts understands the background thought -- otherwise it looks insane.

So here we both, not as philologists, have a choice: go with one group saying one thing, or another group saying another. There is debate about this. I have preferred to read Heidegger, and I've concluded that he's very clear and very illuminating indeed. His neologisms and funny language, which he also injects into his translations (after a lot of explanation and background), are not that difficult once you learn them.

It happens that they are not "his critics", it is practically all the experts on the subject. — David Mo

If that were true, Heidegger wouldn't be but a faint memory. It's not settled, and even if it were one still has to ask: did they truly engage with his thought? Nietzsche faces similar problems, as you know -- being anti-semitic, being used by the Nazis, etc. Hegel faces enormous criticism for his supposed incomprehension, etc. Even if Heidegger was way off in some respects -- and if so, I haven't been presented any evidence of this, just appeals to vague authorities -- that's missing the point really. Take "ousia," conventionally translated "substance." Whether Heidegger is completely wrong in highlighting a nuanced meaning of "ousia," his entire critique is based on how its been translated (and thus interpreted) as what it is. Who could argue with that? He thinks it gets further away from what the word meant in Aristotle's day, but we all agree on how it was translated.

So perhaps first get the general sense of what he's describing, and then we can get into the weeds about accuracy of his own translation.

I'm quite open to the fact that Heidegger could be completely wrong about everything he said. No sunk-cost fallacy here. But it will take some evidence, and I'm not yet convinced with yours. I would be really shocked, too, given my understanding of his thought.

Now you're shifted tone a bit, feigning expertise
— Xtrix
I haven't pretended any such thing at all. I'm not an expert on Heidegger and I've said so several times. My knowledge of Heidegger is limited to three books of him, two monographs and about four articles on him. Regarding Introduction to Metaphysics, I am reading it now -due to your kind recommendation- and I comment on what I am reading. — David Mo

Eh, it sounds to me like you're hit this particular issue more to "refute" than learn. And you may be right, but that attitude is never conducive to truly hearing -- that requires an openness, not blind but deliberate.

As expected, none of them mention Heidegger, which reinforces my initial statement: Heidegger's Greece is only suitable for Heidegger fans. — David Mo

I'm not a "fan" of his per se, but I have read him and have concluded that he's accurate and deep. But taking myself out of the equation: don't you think there's something more than luck or charlatanism involved in Heidegger's name still being around, books being published about him still, etc., if there wasn't something important there? I would check it out more for yourself, make a real effort to understand it, and then see if the critics are correct.

We are all being screwed (to varying degrees) by the financial elites, in a system in which we are all hopelessly complicit. We expect our politicians to do something, but our politicians are too cowardly, or stupid, or "in the pockets of the plutocrats" or just plain impotent to do anything, other than make vague promises, about doing "something". — Janus

That captures it very succinctly. I'm in total agreement, and I think most people are -- both on this Forum and in the country. Polling reflects this, in fact.

Split this off into another thread if you like: I'd love to hear what the brightest minds have to say about our greatest problems and the one greatest problem that is behind them all; overpopulation. — Janus

I tend to agree with you: overpopulation is a problem and one of the causes of existential threats like climate change, but not a major one. In many ways, capitalism is more of a problem than overpopulation, in that respect. More urgent actions need to be taken for destroying or reforming capitalism, and of course on climate change, than anything about overpopulation.

There's also the problem, which barely gets mentioned anymore (since the early 90s), of nuclear weapons -- another existential threat.

Solutions to these problems lies in massive and collective action of world governments. The politicians that constitute the governments are indeed spineless and bought off by the true power of the world: the elites -- i.e., extreme wealth. (How did these extremely wealthy people come to power? That's a long history, but out of feudalism came the rise of big business -- so the merchants have essentially won out and taken over the world. The philosophy that develops with and underlies this rise is capitalism.)

In all this I think the analysis of Karl Marx is accurate and important, although even he couldn't have anticipated the 21st century. We have been living in the age of neoliberalism, the predominant economic philosophy of both major political parties in the world's greatest superpower for the last 40 years. The effects are seen all over the world.

All of this I'm sure you already know.

The solution to all this, as it has always been in any system, is not only to recognize and understand (I think most people do) but to organize. Unfortunately, that's like herding cats in this "individualist" culture, especially amongst more educated people. (They don't have an issue working for wages or taking orders from bosses in a privately owned tyranny, ironically.) They don't want to be robbed of their "individuality." And because of this fact, even though the collection of people that can solve these issues has the intelligence, education, resources, and numbers behind them, no action takes place and the system can afford to ignore them -- and has, repeatedly.

I don't know how to solve that problem, but there's glimmers of hope. I think the 2020s are going to see even more activism than the 2010s, rivaling the 1960s. Younger people are more engaged politically than in the past, and are organizing. People more and more are aware of income inequality and its effects; socialism is becoming less of a taboo, etc. etc.

The real question is: will we have enough time?

I feel fortunate to have read a genuinely philological philosopher's (scholarly, early) study of some 'Presocratics' - Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks - — 180 Proof

Yes, because Nietzsche's work on the Greeks aren't also controversial.

:roll:

Please give one example where he even implies Christian theology "perverts" the approach of Parmenides and Heraclitus.
— Xtrix

From what I've read, nearly all scholars recognize his accuracy in his translation of Greek words
— Xtrix

On the fidelity of Heidegger's translations:

"Hölderlin scholars, especially Berhard Böschenstein, have no trouble showing that Heidegger's readings are often unfounded (...)
In this case, as in the famous "translations" of the Presocratics, Heidegger takes to very violent extremes the hermeneutic paradox according to which the subject of interpretation can "go behind" the text”. George Steiner, Heidegger, 240-41.

“Now, given that Heidegger refuses to call on historical or philological evidence in any decisive way to support his readings, how does he go about establishing a position within the circle, getting into it in the right way, as he put it? He does so principally by summoning the metaphor, and perhaps more
than a metaphor, of hearing. (...) But how do we manage to give ourselves Greek ears? Not by familiarising ourselves with early Greek literature, since that would, once again, be to land in the domain of historiography and philology. Such hearing occurs when we are led by ‘that which calls on us to think in the words’ (WCT: 232)”. (Pattison, GuideBook to the Late Heidegger:138)

The experts I have consulted do not agree with you. — David Mo

Well you have to know what I'm saying before you can state whether they agree or disagree. And so far it's not clear that you do.

The two mentioned above are not saying he wasn't accurate, they're saying he's going to "extremes," etc. You left out, importantly, the rest of what I said. For example, no scholar I've come across disagrees that one meaning of "logos" -- at one point in history, at least -- was "gathering," which is what Heidegger emphasizes. In fact this is close to Proto-Indo-European. It's true that most scholars translate logos as "reason" or "discourse," etc., given the context -- Heidegger is well aware of that. But that's far different from claiming "gathering" is a false reading; it isn't, it's quite accurate.

I wonder how many of these translators have really taken the time to understand Heidegger's thinking -- because without doing so, critiquing his translations is a moot point. Of course his translations are outside the norm -- that's without question.

Gave a good example on this topic.

Regardless, in this context, whether or not his critics disagree with his translations says almost nothing. I'm sure most don't. I'm sure I could find many who do (the translators of IM often say his translations, though idiosyncratic and cumbersome, are fairly accurate). It's not a settled issue. But even if it were -- it doesn't tell you much about Heidegger's thinking. But if it turns out, for example, that "logos" never meant "gathering" at all, or that "aletheia" never meant "unconcealment" -- that would be a real problem indeed. But I'm not seeing that.

Some examples of Heidegger's "free interpretation" of the texts can be found in the Introduction to Metaphysics that you recommended, where the absence of any critical apparatus, essential in any serious philological study, is evident. — David Mo

For example? What "critical apparatus" are you talking about?

On his opposition to Christian theology, Heidegger maintains that historically the forgetfulness of the Greek ideals that he maintains begins from the moment one passes from Greek to Latin. That is, in the theology of the Western Church at least. Expressions contrary to Christianity can easily be found even in political texts. I am not an expert and I have found several. For example, in a speech in June 1933 Heidegger declared that ‘A fierce battle must be fought’ against the present university situation ‘in the national Socialist spirit, and this spirit cannot be allowed to be suffocated by humanising, Christian ideas that suppress its unconditionality’. — David Mo

That's not quite what you said. Politics is not ontology. Fortunately we have a record:

Heidegger did not consider the Greeks to be competitors. It was the period when, according to him, the question of the Being had been most correctly posed. It is precisely Christian theology that perverts this approach which, in its fairest form, comes from (his version of) Heraclitus and Parmenides. — David Mo

My response:

"Please give one example where he even implies Christian theology "perverts" the approach of Parmenides and Heraclitus."

Christianity as a whole (which can mean almost anything), Christian values, and Christian political "ideas" is not what you mentioned. "Perverted" also implies a negative judgment, where Heidegger is simply discussing changes in history (as he sees it). You'll find only the most respect for major Christian thinkers from Augustine to Suarez to Aquinas. But he will say that Christianity does misinterpreted/distort much of Greek philosophy, largely due to Roman translations.

This is to say nothing about Heraclitus and Parmenides, which you also leave out.

The best synopsis of the background history is from page 14:

"In the age of the first and definitive unfolding of Western philosophy among the Greeks, when questioning about beings as such and as a whole received its true inception, beings were called phusis. This fundamental Greek word for beings is usually translated as "nature." We use the Latin translation natura, which really means "to be born," "birth." But with this Latin translation, the originally content of the Greek word phusis is already thrust aside, the authentic philosophical naming force of the Greek word is destroyed. This is true not only of the Latin translation of this word but of all other translations fo Greek philosophical language into Roman. This translation of Greek into Roman was not an arbitrary and innocuous process but was the first stage in the isolation and alienation of the originally essence of Greek philosophy. The Roman translation then became definitive for Christianity and the Christian Middle Ages. The Middle Ages trans-lated themselves into modern philosophy, which moves within the conceptual world of the Middle Ages and then creates those familiar representations and conceptual terms that are used even today to understand the inception of Wester philosophy. This inception is taken as something that we have left behind long ago and supposedly overcome."

That's the background. Now to Christianity more specifically:

"Only with the sophists and Plato was seeming explained as, and thus reduced to, mere seeming. At the same time, Being as idea was elevated to a supersensory realm. The chasm, khorismos, was torn open between the merely apparent beings here below and the real Being somewhere up there. Christian doctrine then established itself in this chasm, while at the same time reinterpreting the Below as the created and the Above as the Creator, and with weapons thus reforged, it set itself against antiquity [as paganism] and distorted it. And so Nietzsche is right to say that Christianity is Platonism for the people."

(I don't need to tell you that Heraclitus, together with Parmenides, are the fundamental thinkers in the "recovery" of the Greek philosophy proposed by Heidegger). — David Mo

And Anaximander, yes. He considers those three the true "primordial" thinkers.

NOTE: I am surprised that you – who accused me of not reading Heidegger carefully – have overlooked these passages from a book you recommended. — David Mo

Hardly. See above.

Remember, you started by admitting you haven't read Heidegger widely, and didn't understand him, and never met someone (one of his "followers") who could explain him succinctly. Now you're shifted tone a bit, feigning expertise, and launching accusations before first demonstrating you have the facts right. There's no way, for example, that you've finished Introduction to Metaphysics -- which should be required reading for anyone new to Heidegger, and which is so dense as to take at least a couple weeks to really absorb.

Doing a Wikipedia search, scrolling down to "criticisms," and using that as a starting point already betrays the bias you have against Heidegger (it oddly cites exactly your "criticisms" and exactly the same critics). So again, if your mind is basically made up that he's a charlatan, so be it. I don't care to change your mind. If however you're sincere in what you originally said -- namely, that you want to understand his thinking -- then pointing to Ayer and Carnap's analytical problems with being as a "subject" is a pretty strange way to begin.

As for "capricious" -- it's hard to take that seriously coming from you (no offense meant),
— Xtrix
Gee, I didn't realize that attacking Heidegger could be an offense to you. You don't take it too personally? — David Mo

No, which is why I said "no offense meant." But then I go on to mention why: you claim his translations are capricious (which you're clearly not yet in a credible position to do, admittedly), but then misrepresenting "techne" as an example, which confirms the point.

If you take offense to that despite my saying "no offense" (and I mean it), I can't help that.

Techné, in platonic and post-platonic context does not mean "generating knowledge similar to physis (sic)", but in the sense of an inferior form of praxis. It is not true knowledge, science, which is attributed sensu stricto or by eminence to intellectual thought. It is a clearly derogatory term. To overlook this turns out to be a real manipulation. — David Mo

Being a "kind of knowledge" is very different from "knowledge," for reasons you just mentioned. He goes on:

"Techne means neither art nor skill, and it means nothing like technology in the modern sense. We translated techne as 'knowing.' But this requires explication. Knowing here does not mean the result of mere observations about something present at hand that was formerly unfamiliar. Such items of information are always just accessory, even if they are indispensable to knowing. Knowing, in the genuine sense of techne, means initially and constantly looking out beyond what, in each case, is directly present at hand." (p 169)

As far as "derogatory term" -- what are you talking about there? Heidegger's use of techne or what your claiming the Greeks use was?



Thank you for that, that was interesting indeed. I think he's exactly right about interpretation and translation. On the other hand, if many scholars thought his analysis of the Greek words was completely bogus, it would certainly give me pause. That's not what I'm seeing, though. Take logos as "gathering" -- scholars don't disagree with Heidegger on this, but they DO disagree with what they consider the appropriate context in which to give this particular meaning.

Ironically, I think Heidegger is the easiest continental thinker to merge with the analytic school in spite of his reputation. — Kmaca

Elaborate please, that's interesting. They seem worlds apart to me.

Heidegger did not consider the Greeks to be competitors. It was the period when, according to him, the question of the Being had been most correctly posed. It is precisely Christian theology that perverts this approach which, in its fairest form, comes from (his version of) Heraclitus and Parmenides. — David Mo

Why do you keep referring to "the Being"? Where does the "the" come in?

Please give one example where he even implies Christian theology "perverts" the approach of Parmenides and Heraclitus.

The translator of the edition of the book you recommended that I have consulted has to recognize that Heidegger's version of fragments 1 and 2 of Heraclitus, which is fundamental to him, is "deviated" from the "conventional" version. — David Mo

True.

"Conventional" means the one that true experts in classical philology give. — David Mo

From what I've read, nearly all scholars recognize his accuracy in his translation of Greek words but also recognize that it's a nuanced and unconventional way of translating things. He discusses logos as length, for example, and only then incorporates his language into a passage of Aristotle or Heraclitus.

The fact that it deviates from convention is irrelevant. HIs entire philosophy and interpretation of history also deviates from convention -- so what? If there's a specific point to be raised, then raise it. Otherwise appealing to authority is useless.

I would like to discuss what an archaic thinker like Heidegger can say to the men of the 21st century. — David Mo

I think there's a great deal to learn, in fact.

No. Stop craving, and becoming attached with, material. Seek what you want, but with equanimity and understanding. — Xtrix

it doesn't have to be material, for example it could be friends — Gitonga

Same thing applies. I was using your word because that's the example you chose.

One shouldn't be attached to family and friends either. One shouldn't be attached to anything in life. Why? Because (1) there's no good reason to be and (2) what good does it do? What does it add? Mostly it adds unnecessary, counterproductive sufferring, and we know this from experience.

So what is meant by "attachment"? It's a clinging to beings of any kind -- material, social, or abstract. What's "clinging"? Identifying with, and thus feeling "ownership" of something ("mine"), which is implies an idea of "me" (selfhood) and which ultimately betrays a belief in permanence.

Chasing pleasant sensations and emotions, or clinging to the phenomena of life, is a guaranteed way to be disappointed. Schopenhauer is pretty convincing here.

It does not mean, however, we have to drop all of our projects in life, become apathetic, commit suicide, withdraw, become passive, or turn into cold, bloodless zombies. I'm much more Aristotelian and Nietzschean when it comes to how one should or shouldn't live -- when it comes to morality.

The synthesis here, in my view, is this: by recognizing craving and aversion are two sides of the same coin, by facing up to this reality (and not fleeing from the reality), you can momentarily get outside of it. In this space of "simple awesome," which is often described in Buddhist literature, you can cultivate yourself -- it's freedom in a sense. Freedom from the past and its accumulation of habits and regrets, freedom from worry about death (the future), and freedom from thinking. You're just "being," and it's exactly the practice (the "exercise") of getting in touch with being that allows you to cultivate your life -- your thoughts, your emotions, and your actions.

Then you can choose your values, rather than have them choose you (in a poetic sense). Meaning you no longer have to fall "victim" to anything, good or bad -- whether depression, being a workaholic, anxiety, mood swings, laziness, lack of attention, sex addiction, being "overly nice," or any other habit or way of being that you've developed in your life.

Nearly everything we do is learned, despite there also being a real "nature" (genetic endowment), with its scope and its limits. If that's true, then if we can understand the process by which we come to acquire our various behaviors through experience, we can also harness and direct that process, shaping it in various ways. This is essentially the goal of psychotherapy, in fact.

Bottom line: don't be reactive, be responsive. Buddhist meditation fits right in with this, just as Hindu yoga fits in with the goal of a healthy body. Better to just do it than debate the philosophy of it.

Einstein wasn't "disqualifying" Newton any more than Heidegger is disqualifying the history of Western thought.
— Xtrix
According to the dictionaries I have consulted, disqualifying means rejecting someone from a "competition" because they have done something wrong. This is what Heidegger did with regard to all philosophy from the Greeks to him. — David Mo

No, he's not. At this point, I'll have to ask you for any textual evidence of this. From what you've given so far, you've misunderstood. See my previous remarks.

Things are not so drastic in science. Einstein only limited the field of application of Newtonian physics, he did not reject its validity. — David Mo

Likewise, Heidegger is not rejecting the validity of presence-at-hand. He'd be rejecting the entire enterprise of science if he did that, and he holds science in high regard (as he holds Aristotle in high regard).

Here's Heidegger himself (emphasis mine):

"Our immersion in the prior view and insight that sustains and guides all our understanding of being is all the more powerful, and at the same time all the more concealed, because the Greeks themselves no longer shed light on this prior line of sight as such. For essential reasons (not due to a failure), they could not shed light on it." (Intro to Metaphysics, bottom of page 124)

This is just one example, but very typical of Heidegger. He is not rejecting, disqualifying, or belittling the Greeks, nor the variations of Greek ontology in the form of Christian theology, modern philosophy since Descartes, or modern science, in any way. If this is what you gather from reading him, you're just mistaken. If you have concrete evidence, I'll take a look, but in all my reading of him I have never gotten the impression of "disqualifying" anything -- unless, as I mentioned, we describe Einstein of "disqualifying" Newton.

It cannot be said that Heidegger does not capitalize on the word "being" and that in German all nouns are capitalized. — David Mo

This is a very confusing sentence, but I'll try to respond: it certainly CAN be said that German nouns are all capitalized. I don't know what you're arguing here. All German nouns are capitalized -- that's just a fact.

If you're not arguing this, I'm not sure what the above is supposed to mean.

Many translators in English and other languages think — David Mo

Yes, and it's a mistake in my view, because of the connotations -- which are never implied in Heidegger.

Given Heidegger's admiration for the Greeks, — David Mo

Which he's supposedly disqualifying?

For example, the whole search for the Self leads, in his opinion, to the concept of ousía. — David Mo

"search for the Self"? What does this mean, and where is it in Intro to Metaphysics (or in Heidegger at all)?

But, either Heidegger is giving to this term [ousia] a particular sense or he is accepting a totally substantial concept of the Being (which is what ousía means). — David Mo

Heidegger has an entire analysis of ousia in that book. It has traditionally been translated as "substance," true. But he will say in Aristotle its meaning was "constant presence," basically -- that which appears and persists. See pages 33 and 61.

The former would not be surprising because Heidegger's translations of Greek are quite capricious (he goes so far as to translate techné into "knowledge", which is something any student of philosophy knows not to be the case). The second would be surprising. But, leaving both paths open, Heidegger reserves a possible escape route face of his critics, which may be very intelligent, but not very philosophical. — David Mo

The "former" what? "Particular sense"? Yes, I mentioned what Heidegger says about ousia.

As for "capricious" -- it's hard to take that seriously coming from you (no offense meant), based on your level of reading and understanding so far of Heidegger, but you're welcome to present an argument as to where he goes wrong. One reason I say this is based on the very example you gave, techne. Heidegger describes it as follows: "Techne is generating, building, as a knowing pro-ducing" (p 18). That requires further clarification, of course, but it's hardly him defining it as "knowledge."

It's easier to learn something if you're not dedicated to "debunking" it beforehand. Try to be open and hear, make sure you understand it, and then make up your mind. I'm not trying to persuade you to "follow" Heidegger; I'm assuming you want to learn about him, as you implied a while back. If you've settled in your mind that he's a charlatan from whom there's very little to learn, and who's not worth the time to read or understand, then this discussion becomes one of me correcting misunderstandings and mistakes. I'm not interested in doing that.

I agree here. My impression, in English translations, is that the capitalisation of “Being” is to set it apart from a “being”. Though it doesn’t seem to me to be very difficult to tell the difference. — Brett

Yes, that's certainly why. But people will mistake the capitalization in the sense of "God," a supreme Being of some kind -- and that's not what's meant. But I agree, it's not that difficult for me either, and in many translations (like Basic Problems of Phenomenology by Hofstadter) that doesn't capitalize it, it's easy to follow.

I think it’s virtually impossible to prove something to someone who actively does not believe. I have no trouble with the concept of “Being” and I find it hard to understand why others can’t or won’t. But in some ways you either get it or you don’t. — Brett

Maybe. But that's education and learning in general. Some people (myself include) will be able to grasp something, others won't. I'm a firm believer that ANYONE can, if the motivation is there to understand AND if they have a good teacher. I am decidedly NOT in favor of obscurantism, and am very sensitive to it; I feel I can very easily tell if someone knows what they're talking about or not, or if they have any interesting things to say. I went into Heidegger thinking that, like I did with Hegel, that he was nearly impossible to read, and not expecting to understand anything due to the convoluted language. But, like with Hegel, I was wrong.

Edit: I’m relatively new to Heidegger, but it seems to me that we do wonder about our existence, so that suggests that the meaning of Being is under question. How and why would we instinctively question something we don’t believe exists?

Heidegger is then saying that we should try to discover the meaning of Being through the way we exist and live. — Brett

Well we should distinguish two different aspects: 1) the pre-ontological (pre-theoretical, pre-reflective, pre-abstract) understanding of being, which you mentioned, and 2) the state we're in when we're analyzing our existence, spurred by the "wonder" you mentioned. (2) is the state all philosophers have been in, according to my reading of Heidegger. This is why they always interpret being from the one particular aspect of time, the present. Thus even "time" itself becomes an present-object, and itself gets interpreted as such (a succession of "nows").

As for (1), you're right: we do have a sense of being, but very rarely do we stop and ponder it intellectually. When we do, it's almost always in the way mentioned above.

The only way to be truly happy is to get what you want otherwise you're just living in self denial. It's how we've evolved. Happiness is a reward mechanism for when we do something to aid our survival which is the only reason you can never be happy permanently. — Gitonga

You're equating happiness with pleasure -- it's not the same thing, neither in Buddhism nor in Aristotle.

This is in reference to how Buddhist say no matter how much material you get you'll never be fully happy so stop chasing material. — Gitonga

No. Stop craving, and becoming attached with, material. Seek what you want, but with equanimity and understanding.

Lol. Well done.

Not once does he disqualify anyone for "not understanding what the Being is,"
— Xtrix
If to say that everyone has forgotten or trivialized the essential question of philosophy is not to disqualify, I do not understand what disqualify means. — David Mo

Disqualify from what? It's not meant to be derogatory, which he says many, many times. In fact he sees it as necessary given philosophy's inception. He has almost only praise for Aristotle, Suarez, Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche.

Einstein wasn't "disqualifying" Newton any more than Heidegger is disqualifying the history of Western thought.

Heidegger argues we all not only have a tacit understanding of being, but that talk about "being" is taken for granted as something obvious;
— Xtrix
In Heidegger's usual contradictory way to have an immediate understanding of what it means to be seems that it is not in contradiction with having forgotten or trivialized the question of being. — David Mo

Sorry, but this is why it helps to read Heidegger. It's not contradictory at all once you get into his language, which I mentioned above. Having a "pre-ontological" understanding of being does not contradict the fact that philosophy, as ontology, and with it the question of the meaning of being, has been almost completely forgotten or trivialized. We can accept or reject Heidegger's argument, but let's at least be clear about the distinctions he's drawing (and then uses quite consistently throughout his works).

To get a brief summary of what?
— Xtrix
Obviously I was asking for a summary of what the fundamental concept of all Heidegger's philosophy can mean: the Being. That being with a capital letter that sometime comes to qualify as "divine". If I remember correctly. — David Mo

A summary of what "being" means -- which you mentioned before and which I thought I addressed already: Heidegger gives no definition. If that's what you're looking for, you won't find it from him or from me.

Regarding the capitalization: that's just a mistake, in my view. It's not capitalized in every text, and I believe it shouldn't be for exactly the reason you mention: it gives the connotation of a "super-thing" of some kind. In German, it's capitalized -- but all nouns are capitalized in German.

Western thought has interpreted being from the "horizon" (standpoint) of time, particularly the present.
— Xtrix
His thesis in Being and Time is that in the Western world, since the Greeks, "being" has been defined in terms of what's present before us,

It seems you're trying to give me the explanation I asked for. The Being would be the "present horizon", which obviously can mean anything. If that is all that can be said about the Being, it is tremendously vague to me. Poetic, but vague. — David Mo

I agree, it is vague. I know it's frustrating, but I have to nitpick here. It's not that being = the present horizon. Rather, it's being argued that in Western thought, it is from the standpoint of the present horizon that we interpret "being", and therefore all beings (plural, as in "entities" or "phenomena"). Hence why when Heidegger traces the history of Western thought, he sees only variations of "present-at-hand" ontologies which deal almost exclusively with beings rather than being itself (which he will, confusingly, call "fundamental ontology"), mainly substance ontology (as the "ousia" of Aristotle gets translated) and it's offshoot: the measurable, calculable ontology of Descartes (the "res" ofres cogitans and res extensa).

That's a mouthful, I'm aware. But it's worth reading a couple times, because it did take me a few minutes to re-read and edit, in all honesty.

But since you refer me to the Introduction to Metaphysics as a key text, I will take a look at it to see if I can find out better. Fortunately I have it at hand. — David Mo

That is fortunate, and please do. Let me know if you find it clearer than Being & Time -- or if my description of it is accurate.

Ayer and Carnap are analytical philosophers, who -- like Russell before them -- never showed they really bothered with Heidegger at all.
— Xtrix
Ayer mentions Heidegger's metaphysics as a "superstition" on page 49 of the Spanish edition of Lenguaje, Verdad y Lógica (Language, Truth and Logic) and refers to Carnap, who analyses the concept of Nothing in Heidegger in section 5 of his article "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language" and concludes that it is the result of a "gross logical error".
I don't know if "bother" is the right word in English, but of course Heidegger's metaphysics didn't appeal to either of them. — David Mo

True, by "bother" there I meant really take him seriously enough to read carefully. Again, I don't blame them for that -- there's plenty of good reasons not to, least of all his Nazi involvement. But given that that's almost certainly true, the little they did write about him isn't all that challenging -- they simply misrepresent what he's saying. But it's been a while since I read either Ayer or Carnap, so I'll take another look -- but that was the impression I got when perusing years ago.

It's not even a "subject."
— Xtrix
Heidegger uses the term "Being" as a subject on countless occasions, adding to it the capital letter, which makes it especially substantial by making it a proper name. — David Mo

But he repeatedly says it's not a "being" (in the sense of an object or entity). It's presupposed in any sentence that uses "am," "is," "are," etc. He speaks of the copula a lot in Intro. to Metaphysics, in fact. And as I mentioned before, all nouns are capitalized in German, and I think it's misleading to capitalize it in translation, when we wouldn't capitalize "Chair" or "Rock."

It seems that the publication of the latest Black Notebooks has left little doubt about Heidegger's anti-Semitism, which had already been denounced by Husserl and Jaspers, among others. — David Mo

I'll take your word for it -- I haven't read them myself. If that's the case, that's disappointing.

Heidegger disqualifies his rivals and the entire universal philosophy for not having understood what the Being is. — David Mo

No, that's simply wrong.
— Xtrix

From the very beginning:

The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question of Being
This question has today been forgotten. Even though in our time we deem it progressive to give our approval to ‘metaphysics’ again, it is held that we have been exempted from the exertions of a newly rekindled gigantomakía peri tés ousías. Yet the question we are touching upon is not just any question. It is one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on or a theme for actual investigation. What these two men achieved was to persist through many alterations and 'retouchings’ down to the ‘logic’ of Hegel. And what they wrested with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena, fragmentary and incipient though it was, has long since become
trivialized.
— Heidegger, Being and Time, #1 — David Mo

Not once does he disqualify anyone for "not understanding what the Being is," in that quotation or anywhere else. Why? It should be obvious in what was said before: he himself provides no definition. But he's not talking about a definition. The very beginning of that paragraph -- and its section title -- explains clearly what he's getting at: the question today has been forgotten. That's not disqualifying anyone, and it's not about "understanding" -- in fact, as I said before, Heidegger argues we all not only have a tacit understanding of being, but that talk about "being" is taken for granted as something obvious; it's gone through many variations, right up to Hegel, as a "theme," and has now become trivialized.

This is what the above means. It has nothing to do with disqualifying anyone, nor about "understanding" being (especially not in your sense, which apparently means providing a definition).

His thesis in Being and Time is that in the Western world, since the Greeks, "being" has been defined in terms of what's present before us, present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) -- he says at one point "presencing." This has given rise, in his view, to Western philosophy and science -- showing up as ousia in Aristotle to the res of Descartes -- a kind of substance ontology. Beings then become "objects," representations, etc.

He does indeed go through the history of this, thoroughly. — Xtrix

Do you have to read all 102 volumes of his complete works to get a brief summary? Gee, it is hard! — David Mo

To get a brief summary of what? The history of the interpretation of being? Because that's what I was referring to in this specific context.

As I mentioned, Introduction to Metaphysics is a good start. As far as "brief," I tried to do that above: Western thought has interpreted being from the "horizon" (standpoint) of time, particularly the present.

I can't make it any more brief without making it a cartoon version. Keep in mind this is one point -- but an important one, and the one I was talking about above.

Anyone who knows about a subject is supposed to be able to give a brief explanation of it, even if it is only approximate, but this is the typical response of Heidegger's followers to any request for clarification. It should not be stressed that I find it very unphilosophical. — David Mo

But you haven't asked anything. A brief explanation of what? His entire philosophy? The history of the interpretation of being? His thoughts about the relation of being and time? The history of the conception of time?

I gave at least one brief synopsis in the very response you're citing:

His thesis in Being and Time is that in the Western world, since the Greeks, "being" has been defined in terms of what's present before us, present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) -- he says at one point "presencing." This has given rise, in his view, to Western philosophy and science -- showing up as ousia in Aristotle to the res of Descartes -- a kind of substance ontology. Beings then become "objects," representations, etc. —

Maybe you don't understand it, in which case the onus is on me to be more clear, but it's certainly brief.

Heidegger does not define or explain anything because there is nothing to define. Carnap and Ayer closed the problem in less than a page. Heidegger confuses the use of "being" as the subject of a sentence with a name of something. Basic logical error into which Parmenides already fell, by the way — David Mo

Ayer and Carnap are analytical philosophers, who -- like Russell before them -- never showed they really bothered with Heidegger at all.

Given that Heidegger says over and over again that being is not a being (an entity), I fail to see how he's "confusing [it] as the subject of a sentence with a name of something." It's not even a "subject."

"Something is happening out there."
"Something smells rotten in Denmark."

Then there is a stuff called "Something" that is at the origin of everything because we can say of everything that is "something". — David Mo

No, not a "stuff." But yes, any time we use "is," we're assuming the being of whatever phenomenon we're talking about. That's fairly trivial.

There's an entire chapter titled "The Grammar and Etymology of Being" in Intro to Metaphysics which you may find interesting. I keep recommending that book to you -- it's all online for free. Doesn't take that long to read, and it's what Heidegger recommends one reads in his preface to the 7th edition (or something close to that) of Being and Time.

But Heidegger makes an ontologically rude mistake. Too much influenced by Parmenides, he believes that the alternative is between Being and Non-Being, — David Mo

"He believes." Where? Where does he say that the "alternative is between being and non-being"?

Your characterization of Parmenides is wrong. Heidegger wrote an entire book on him (lectures), if you care to read about it before speculating about what he "believes." Feel free to cite the text if you find anything close to what you're claiming here.

Honestly, I get the sense you've made up your mind about Heidegger already. You claim you've tried reading him and couldn't make sense of "ten pages," etc. So you rely on secondary sources. That's fine -- be happy in that. But I don't think there's any sense pretending you care to learn anything here -- rather, everything you've said so far indicates an attitude of defending a position (and in my view a very weak one, given your level of study). I'm happy to keep discussing it, but it's worth pointing this out.

That had me laughing. Well done. lol

Eh, Heidi was a provincial philosopher with a couple of interesting ideas here and there. Would give away his entire corpus for a page of Hannah Arendt. — StreetlightX

I like Arendt very much as well. Ironically, I don't think she'd give Heidegger's corpus away though.

I don't have the text in front of me, but thought I'd offer that in the beginning of BT, he gives at least one tentative definition of Being as "that which determines beings in their being," he suggests, as already noted, we already have a preontological understanding of being - ("what is being?" for example, presupposes a direction/horizon for the question and a sense of being in the "is" of the question we are asking), and from the start he repeatedly insists Being should not be thought of as 'a being,' and that Being can not be understood as 'objective presence' which is how philosophy/metaphysics has typically 'covered over/concealed' this character of Being. — Kevin

This is very well said. I wrote something similar just before reading this -- which goes to show Heidegger isn't completely unclear, after all -- even if one rejects his perspective, it's not so murky, provided one puts forth the effort (and I don't blame those who don't).

But he never said clearly what that stupidity consisted of. He never disavowed the assumptions of his philosophy that led him to that "stupidity". He never denied the political basis that led him to glorify Hitler and his party. He always abhorred the Jews, communism and democracy. — David Mo

I agree with everything except "always abhorred the Jews." Husserl and Arendt with both Jews, as you know. Maybe there's some private letters I've missed, but so far as I can tell he wasn't anti-Semitic.

Heidegger disqualifies his rivals and the entire universal philosophy for not having understood what the Being is. — David Mo

No, that's simply wrong.

I have been searching uselessly in Being and Time for an answer to that question. I consulted several qualified commentators (not believers) of his work who told me that, precisely, Heidegger never made something similar to a definition of the Being and even recognized that the Being is an indefinable concept. — David Mo

I don't know exactly why you accuse me of being a "believer" -- but that's nothing but a term of abuse.

What you stated originally was this:

But he ended up recognizing that he had been unable to give an explanation of the problem of Being. — David Mo

An "explanation of the problem of Being" is his entire work of Being and Time. That's not the same as what you're now asking for, which is a definition of being -- what being is. I could have told you, as I have here, for example, that Heidegger never defines being -- somewhat frustratingly for many. But that's completely missing the point. Being -- including human existence -- has been interpreted in various ways throughout history. We also walk around with a "pre-theoretical" (pre-conceptual/abstract), or in his words "pre-ontological" understanding of being -- and this shows up in what we do, given our time and place. Various cultures and various epochs have different understandings of being.

His thesis in Being and Time is that in the Western world, since the Greeks, "being" has been defined in terms of what's present before us, present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) -- he says at one point "presencing." This has given rise, in his view, to Western philosophy and science -- showing up as ousia in Aristotle to the res of Descartes -- a kind of substance ontology. Beings then become "objects," representations, etc.

He does indeed go through the history of this, thoroughly. But if you're looking for a definition of "being" from Heidegger himself, then yes you'll be disappointed. Better to look towards his ideas about disclosure and aletheia, which I think get closer to any kind of definition.

If you have an answer to what the Being is and you can base it on some text of Heidegger, I would be grateful if you could tell me. It will dispel the terrible suspicion that haunts me: that Heidegger did not know what he was talking about. — David Mo

See above -- I can't provide you with it. The closest he comes is saying being is "on the basis of which entities show up as entities," or something to that effect -- which isn't very helpful, I'm sure.

NOTE: A text, please, not a simple quote. — David Mo

Introduction to Metaphysics is where I'd start almost anyone. Much more clear than Being and Time.

Likewise my apologies if that label does not fit the bill. Actually there's probably a decent amount of atheists who are in-the-closet agnostic. — 3017amen

I'm neither -- just as I'm neither about ectoplasm. Until someone explains what it is, I can't be for it, against it, or agnostic about it.

But much like the far right-wing extremist/fundamentalist, the stereotypical atheist comes across as angry and bitter. But let's not derail the thread. — 3017amen

Fair enough.

Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound. It is so timid and dislikes going into the water. — F.N., The Gay Science

Great quote -- also leveled at Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, etc. etc. Not to mention Nietzsche himself -- among other accusations. No need to take this, or secondary sources, seriously. At least not until you've read it yourself, done so carefully, and thought it over. If you can then demonstrate where it's wrong, great -- if you can only give quotes and list names of Heidegger's critics, I'm not interested: I already have a library card, so I can read those people myself. I'm only interested in discussing this with people who have read him -- and thus can substantiate their criticism with evidence (perhaps supplanting this with other sources). I haven't seen this demonstrated yet.

But he ended up recognizing that he had been unable to give an explanation of the problem of Being. — David Mo

An explanation about the problem? I'm not sure what that means. If you mean that he later recognized that he was unable to "reawaken" and "question" the meaning of being, then I see no evidence of that whatsoever. Although Being and Time wasn't finished, he still acknowledges how important the path he took there is in this respect.

In my modest opinion neither he nor those who followed him were able to give an explanation of the fundamental concepts of his doctrine — David Mo

Unable to give an explanation? I've tried a number of times, and I'm happy to answer any questions. It's not so difficult to do once you've gotten into his funny language.

impossible to fully understand ten pages in a row of Being and Time. — David Mo

Difficult, but hardly impossible. In my view, worth the effort.

For all his oompah oompah on "the question of the meaning of being" (or, according to Rorty, "myth of being"), Heidi's daseinanalysis is as autistic as it is solipsistic — 180 Proof

Solipsistic? This entire sentence is so vague it's baffling. How is he solipsistic? Because he focuses on human being? He emphasizes again and again the importance of other people.

And what do you mean by "autistic" in this context?

I often feel with you, 180, that your tone appears critical of Heidegger, and yet there's never anything substantial enough to learn from or push back on. To use a quote that isn't my own, "That isn't even wrong."

I have no way of, or interest in, judging him, except in how it might happen. Someone who seems so tuned into the blinkers we apply to ourselves and yet went wrong himself and then later regarded what he’d done as stupid (I can’t remember the exact words). — Brett

What he'd done -- meaning joining the Nazi party or his earlier work? Because neither is true. He infamously never apologized for being part of the Nazi party, although he once referred to it (in a letter I believe) as a "blunder."

In some ways I can see that being the grounds for people rejecting him and his work; not because he worked with the Nazis but that it blew back on the grounds for his thinking and writing. — Brett

In what way? I'm not sure exactly what you mean here.

Then why are you contributing to the thread...out of boredom? LOL — 3017amen

I confess, pretty much. It caught my eye -- posts aren't normally so almost offensively silly to me.

Since you are not able to answer the question that speaks volumes already. If I was an atheist I wouldn't even be contributing to this thread because it would be meaningless. It seems obvious that any atheist who bothers to care, has no faith in their belief system. — 3017amen

The fact that your mind automatically goes to labeling me "atheist" is yet another reason against you. If you're a teenager or young adult, then my apologies. I assume only older people post here.

My silence is because it's incredibly boring. God is a word, and an essentially meaningless one -- can mean anything you want it to. To say "he/she/it exists" is like asking if ectoplasm exists. These arguments have have been going on for nearly 2000 years, and to think we'll "solve" anything now is ludicrous. If you're new to the question, fine -- but there are more important things to discuss than the "existence" of Shiva, Ba'al, or Yahweh. Who cares?

:roll: :yawn:

HEADLINE: God's existence proven once and for all, on the PhilosophyForum.com, by a guy named "Devans".

Good grief.

I have to look that up. I've never played Final Fantasy, but that's interesting he makes an appearance there.

It intrigues me that someone like Heidegger could focus so fiercely on this idea that forms the basis of everything he thought and then either find that engaging with the Nazis was the logical consequence or live a life completely contrary to the philosophy he worked so hard at. — Brett

It intrigues many people. But I don't fully understand what you mean by "contrary to the philosophy he worked so hard at." Heidegger has no ethical philosophy, really. Later Heidegger is preoccupied with language, technology, and poetry -- but never ethics.

Personally, I don't see that he did anything wrong himself -- he never hurt anybody, so far as I gather. That he was swept up in the political goings-on of the time is no different than being swept up in Trumpian policies -- which are far more dangerous than Hitler (based on his environmental policies alone). Hitler killed millions; Trump is helping to kill off the entire species.

Both are mistakes, no doubt -- but if we have an issue with the German people for going along with Nazism, how will history judge not only our fellow Trump supporters, but also we who are against him - for not doing more?

Besides, in philosophy, science and art you can make significant contributions and yet be a complete jerk or even psychopath. We don't have to like the personality. I'm of the opinion that you can separate the two.

Elaborate please. — 180 Proof

Sure. Heidegger will say, multiple times, that the question of what it means to "be" has been forgotten, essentially since the inception of philosophy with the Greeks (ending with Aristotle). He believes being is that on the basis of which we define ourselves and everything else in the world, and that although the question has been forgotten we still walk around with a "pre-ontological understanding of being" - which has gone through many variations (creature of God, a subject with desires to satisfy, etc) but which has remained Greek through and though.

As far as it being the question of philosophy, he's consistent with that point: he sees philosophy as ontology. "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" Is the question of metaphysics, according to him.

Do I agree with it? Yes I do. It's almost a truism, though. Our concern for various domains of things in the world - all the sciences, all the arts - only happens on the background of "being," and so questioning what "it" is is indeed the core of philosophical thought.

I just thought I'd throw out there that as I recall, there is a footnote to the Stambaugh translation of BT in which Heidegger 'approves' of Nietzsche's characterization of being as a 'vapor' - I don't have a copy in front of me so can't cite the exact page/passage but thought it might be of interest. — Kevin

That's exactly right. He also "approves" of this characterization in Introduction to Metaphysics. What he's clear about is that both our "understanding of being" and the question of being itself has been completely lost, to the point where it has now become, as Nietzsche says, a "vapor" and "mistake."

But obviously, if he agreed completely, there would be no book "Being and Time," so that's worth keeping in mind as well. Being is still worthy of question, and Heidegger considers it the question of philosophy and metaphysics.

That's interesting.

I'm not a physicist - I'm a philosopher, — karl stone

You're neither, actually.

"The theory of relativity in physics does not deal with what time is but deals only with how time, in the sense of a now-sequence, can be measured. [It asks] whether there is an absolute measurement of time, or whether all measurement is necessarily relative, that is, conditioned."

Heidegger is completely wrong abut relativity in general, and space time in particular. Spacetime is a physical reality that is distorted by gravity. This is evident on earth, where two atomic clocks run differently, where one is at sea level, and the other is in plane flying 30,000 feet above. This is called 'time dilation' - and it's a scientifically proven phenomenon. — karl stone

Do you really think Heidegger wasn't aware of time dilation -- that this managed to escape him somehow? Come on. I think it's far more likely you're misunderstanding -- which is in fact the case.

Heidegger never says time dilation isn't a reality. He doesn't make a claim that physics is "wrong" because it assumes a certain conception of time as "now-points." He is simply saying that experiential time (temporality) is different from the time of physics (measured time, based on a conception of "time" as a sequence of now-points). This seems obvious from the quotations above.

Time dilation does, in fact, demonstrate that the measurement of time is conditioned by factors like speed and distance.

Can you give me the source of this please?

What I am confused about is whether, in raising this question, Heidegger is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality, or rather (merely) with the reality of the human experience/condition. That is to say, is Heidegger concerned with what reality is like, in the sense that a physicist can be said to be, or is he concerned with what it is like to be a human being, more in the sense that an existentialist can be said to be? — philosophy

The sense of "reality" itself has a long, checkered history which he discusses in Being and Time.

One thing Heidegger wants to get "beyond" is the subject/object divide, which goes back at least to Descartes' division of the world into the res cogitans (thinking substance, mind) and res extensa (extended substance, objects in space) -- the famous mind/body dualism.

It may seem frustrating, but Heidegger doesn't define "being" at all -- rather he discusses how it has been interpreted throughout Westery history from the Greeks onward. The Greeks, he claims, privileged one aspect of time when interpreting being: the present. Furthermore, time itself (which we, as "caring" beings, embody as "temporality") is also interpreted as a kind of present-at-hand being, a sequence of now-points, since Aristotle.

So to answer you question: he sees being "in general" and human being as interconnected, but mainly focuses on the latter: the temporal "there" (dasein) which understands and interprets being. Hence his "analytic of dasein" as being-in-world, care, and temporality.

Hope that helps.

Why should I keep living, if it’s all meaningless, futile, and pointless? — niki wonoto

From my point of view, you're suffering from a bought of nihilism. I've been there myself. But I have found more and more that those feelings about life's meaninglessness simply disappear when I engaged in something, when I was involved in something -- working towards a goal, especially in collaboration with others.

You mentioned changing the world. Why should that dream be dead? Why is it a pipe dream? Maybe if you mean achieving "peace on earth" in a generation, yeah that's most likely a pipe dream -- so what? You can contribute to this weird, ever-changing phenomena of which you're a part for a very limited amount of time, and help to shape it in the way that's aligned with your values, or you can shrink away from it and resign yourself to wallow in depression while others take the small, local steps that does create change.

The feeling of isolation, helplessness, and meaninglessness you feel is not relegated to you alone -- it's rampant. And it's a product of our current environment, which is encouraged in many societies to make people apathetic, obedient, isolated, and consumeristic. It takes them out of the realm of politics and power. It convinces them that the problems are too overwhelming, that there's nothing they can do about them (so why bother?), etc.

Whether there's a God or not, whether science's story is all there is, whether we go from dust to dust and there's no ultimate meaning in life -- so what? Let's say the "worst" is true. Then what? Kill yourself? Is that really what your gut tells you? How about this: meditate for a while. Feel the sensations of your body and the emotions of depression, sadness, fear that arise. Notice your thoughts AS thoughts, as just an activity -- as one more phenomenon to observe. Try not to "react" to any of it, just look at it. No judgments. When you do so, there's no nihilism, depression, nor is there craving and delusions of grandeur -- there's just whatever it is that's happening. When you reach this state, and really see it, then you realize your sadness is just a product of your thinking and your interpretation -- it's a product of your particular perspective. While it may be true, it is ALSO true that life is full of meaning and purpose, and that there's plenty of things to do indeed -- and is in fact very exciting. So why not be a part of it and view life as a playground? There's literally nothing to lose. And a byproduct is achievement, contribution to a better future, and your own personal growth and happiness.

Nonetheless, in the spirit of laziness, here is a snippet from Lingis, whose argument basically boils down to the fact that being-toward-death cannot do the job that Heidegger wants it to do, — StreetlightX

Fair enough. Heidegger's views on death and anxiety were never very striking to me, nor do i pretend to understand them very well. So if that's where your criticism lies, I wouldn't want to defend it. I will check out the links regardless.

say, with respect to the discussion of etymology more generally - it's probably a good rule of thumb not to trust philosophers with doing it 'accurately'. They all have some kind of agenda and I'd much rather trust an actual philologist or linguist whose discipline it is. — StreetlightX

Yes that's true, but that's what was surprising to me: I didn't think linguists were calling into question what they apparently are (semantic accuracy).

But it's tough with philosophy, as you know. We should be equally skeptical of linguists as well, because without a solid background in philosophical thinking, translations can easily go awry. Aletheia as "truth" (with all our modern ideas associated with it), for example, while certainly accurate, doesn't quite capture its usage 2500 years ago (of course) and so can be misleading, just as translating "episteme" as "science" can be misleading. I'm sure you agree. Regardless, your point is well taken.

think of our dualisms as useful practical tools that harden into metaphysical-strength concrete. — path

It's as if we habitualize a way of interpreting. I'm reminded of those ambiguous pictures where, once you're told what it is beforehand, that's all you can see (like a cat) without a great deal more effort, whereas it could also be interpreted as a candlestick. I think something similar to that happens with our basic preconceptions about the world. The mind-body version of dualism is a good example, particularly in the West. Descartes' influence really can't be overestimated.

Living in the moment is even on our to-do list. — path

That's great! I like that.

Anyway, I'd also like to hear what you have to say about time and about the question of being. — path

I think that time is like saying "life" - it has to be presupposed. It's the background, like light. It's no wonder every Western philosopher grapples with time (and change) in some fashion, but also the contemplatives of the East.

Heidegger's claim is that being (also a background) is opened up (or disclosed) by human being, and since human being is temporality, we interpret it on that basis. In the West, we do so by "presencing." I find that accurate.