If to say that everyone has forgotten or trivialized the essential question of philosophy is not to disqualify, I do not understand what disqualify means. — David Mo
I agree here. My impression, in English translations, is that the capitalisation of “Being” is to set it apart from a “being”. Though it doesn’t seem to me to be very difficult to tell the difference. — Brett
I think it’s virtually impossible to prove something to someone who actively does not believe. I have no trouble with the concept of “Being” and I find it hard to understand why others can’t or won’t. But in some ways you either get it or you don’t. — Brett
Edit: I’m relatively new to Heidegger, but it seems to me that we do wonder about our existence, so that suggests that the meaning of Being is under question. How and why would we instinctively question something we don’t believe exists?
Heidegger is then saying that we should try to discover the meaning of Being through the way we exist and live. — Brett
Einstein wasn't "disqualifying" Newton any more than Heidegger is disqualifying the history of Western thought.
— Xtrix
According to the dictionaries I have consulted, disqualifying means rejecting someone from a "competition" because they have done something wrong. This is what Heidegger did with regard to all philosophy from the Greeks to him. — David Mo
Things are not so drastic in science. Einstein only limited the field of application of Newtonian physics, he did not reject its validity. — David Mo
It cannot be said that Heidegger does not capitalize on the word "being" and that in German all nouns are capitalized. — David Mo
Many translators in English and other languages think — David Mo
Given Heidegger's admiration for the Greeks, — David Mo
For example, the whole search for the Self leads, in his opinion, to the concept of ousía. — David Mo
But, either Heidegger is giving to this term [ousia] a particular sense or he is accepting a totally substantial concept of the Being (which is what ousía means). — David Mo
The former would not be surprising because Heidegger's translations of Greek are quite capricious (he goes so far as to translate techné into "knowledge", which is something any student of philosophy knows not to be the case). The second would be surprising. But, leaving both paths open, Heidegger reserves a possible escape route face of his critics, which may be very intelligent, but not very philosophical. — David Mo
I don’t know why you persist in this. — Brett
This is just one example, but very typical of Heidegger. He is not rejecting, disqualifying, or belittling the Greeks, nor the variations of Greek ontology in the form of Christian theology, — Xtrix
"Techne is generating, building, as a knowing pro-ducing" (p 18). That requires further clarification, of course, but it's hardly him defining it as "knowledge." — Xtrix
[techné]which means neither art nor technology but a kind of knowledge (...) It would require a special study to clarify what is essentially the same in phusis and techne. — Heidegger, Introudction to Metaphysics, p. 18
Heidegger did not consider the Greeks to be competitors. It was the period when, according to him, the question of the Being had been most correctly posed. It is precisely Christian theology that perverts this approach which, in its fairest form, comes from (his version of) Heraclitus and Parmenides. — David Mo
The translator of the edition of the book you recommended that I have consulted has to recognize that Heidegger's version of fragments 1 and 2 of Heraclitus, which is fundamental to him, is "deviated" from the "conventional" version. — David Mo
"Conventional" means the one that true experts in classical philology give. — David Mo
I would like to discuss what an archaic thinker like Heidegger can say to the men of the 21st century. — David Mo
As for "capricious" -- it's hard to take that seriously coming from you (no offense meant),
— Xtrix
Gee, I didn't realize that attacking Heidegger could be an offense to you. You don't take it too personally? — David Mo
Techné, in platonic and post-platonic context does not mean "generating knowledge similar to physis (sic)", but in the sense of an inferior form of praxis. It is not true knowledge, science, which is attributed sensu stricto or by eminence to intellectual thought. It is a clearly derogatory term. To overlook this turns out to be a real manipulation. — David Mo
Ironically, I think Heidegger is the easiest continental thinker to merge with the analytic school in spite of his reputation. — Kmaca
Please give one example where he even implies Christian theology "perverts" the approach of Parmenides and Heraclitus. — Xtrix
From what I've read, nearly all scholars recognize his accuracy in his translation of Greek words — Xtrix
"Hölderlin scholars, especially Berhard Böschenstein, have no trouble showing that Heidegger's readings are often unfounded (...)
In this case, as in the famous "translations" of the Presocratics, Heidegger takes to very violent extremes the hermeneutic paradox according to which the subject of interpretation can "go behind" the text”. George Steiner, Heidegger, 240-41.
“Now, given that Heidegger refuses to call on historical or philological evidence in any decisive way to support his readings, how does he go about establishing a position within the circle, getting into it in the right way, as he put it? He does so principally by summoning the metaphor, and perhaps more
than a metaphor, of hearing. (...) But how do we manage to give ourselves Greek ears? Not by familiarising ourselves with early Greek literature, since that would, once again, be to land in the domain of historiography and philology. Such hearing occurs when we are led by ‘that which calls on us to think in the words’ (WCT: 232)”. (Pattison, GuideBook to the Late Heidegger:138)
Also in the Introduction to Metaphysics, in several passages. This one, for example:“Turning from jugs and shoes to the big picture, Heidegger then adds that the dominion exercised by the matter–form distinction was, historically, significantly enhanced by the way in which it was taken over from Aristotle by medieval Christian theology and applied to the total relation between God and the world, such that the world becomes what God has made for the fulfilment of His purposes, however these are conceived. But this effectively reduces the world to the status of mere instrumentality, a useful means to an end, rather than something of value in itself” (Ibid: 92).
I commend your patience. — 180 Proof
Knowing here does not mean the result of mere observations about something present at hand that was formerly unfamiliar. Such items of information are always just accessory, even if they are indispensable to knowing. Knowing, in the genuine sense of techne, means initially and constantly looking out beyond what, in each case, is directly present at hand." — Xtrix
Please give one example where he even implies Christian theology "perverts" the approach of Parmenides and Heraclitus.
— Xtrix
From what I've read, nearly all scholars recognize his accuracy in his translation of Greek words
— Xtrix
On the fidelity of Heidegger's translations:
"Hölderlin scholars, especially Berhard Böschenstein, have no trouble showing that Heidegger's readings are often unfounded (...)
In this case, as in the famous "translations" of the Presocratics, Heidegger takes to very violent extremes the hermeneutic paradox according to which the subject of interpretation can "go behind" the text”. George Steiner, Heidegger, 240-41.
“Now, given that Heidegger refuses to call on historical or philological evidence in any decisive way to support his readings, how does he go about establishing a position within the circle, getting into it in the right way, as he put it? He does so principally by summoning the metaphor, and perhaps more
than a metaphor, of hearing. (...) But how do we manage to give ourselves Greek ears? Not by familiarising ourselves with early Greek literature, since that would, once again, be to land in the domain of historiography and philology. Such hearing occurs when we are led by ‘that which calls on us to think in the words’ (WCT: 232)”. (Pattison, GuideBook to the Late Heidegger:138)
The experts I have consulted do not agree with you. — David Mo
Some examples of Heidegger's "free interpretation" of the texts can be found in the Introduction to Metaphysics that you recommended, where the absence of any critical apparatus, essential in any serious philological study, is evident. — David Mo
On his opposition to Christian theology, Heidegger maintains that historically the forgetfulness of the Greek ideals that he maintains begins from the moment one passes from Greek to Latin. That is, in the theology of the Western Church at least. Expressions contrary to Christianity can easily be found even in political texts. I am not an expert and I have found several. For example, in a speech in June 1933 Heidegger declared that ‘A fierce battle must be fought’ against the present university situation ‘in the national Socialist spirit, and this spirit cannot be allowed to be suffocated by humanising, Christian ideas that suppress its unconditionality’. — David Mo
Heidegger did not consider the Greeks to be competitors. It was the period when, according to him, the question of the Being had been most correctly posed. It is precisely Christian theology that perverts this approach which, in its fairest form, comes from (his version of) Heraclitus and Parmenides. — David Mo
(I don't need to tell you that Heraclitus, together with Parmenides, are the fundamental thinkers in the "recovery" of the Greek philosophy proposed by Heidegger). — David Mo
NOTE: I am surprised that you – who accused me of not reading Heidegger carefully – have overlooked these passages from a book you recommended. — David Mo
I think this short sentence summarizes Heidegger's position: What I say is not in the text, but the interpretation I make is the good one. Amazing hermeneutic method.If an examination of Aristotle’s text should show that much of what we say here is not to be found there in the text, that would not be an argument against our interpretation — waarala
The two mentioned above are not saying he wasn't accurate, — Xtrix
I beg your pardon! I quoted Heidegger's conclusion that it is blunt in itself:This is to say nothing about Heraclitus and Parmenides, which you also leave out. — Xtrix
Isn't this saying something from Heraclitus?“But it was Christianity that first misinterpreted Heraclitus. The misinterpretation already began with the early church fathers.” (97/133) — David Mo
Regardless, in this context, whether or not his critics disagree with his translations says almost nothing. — Xtrix
I haven't pretended any such thing at all. I'm not an expert on Heidegger and I've said so several times. My knowledge of Heidegger is limited to three books of him, two monographs and about four articles on him. Regarding Introduction to Metaphysics, I am reading it now -due to your kind recommendation- and I comment on what I am reading. I know a little more about Heraclitus and Parmenides and that is why I can criticize the interpretation he gives. Modestly.Now you're shifted tone a bit, feigning expertise — Xtrix
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