No, because "inauthentic/authentic time" is meaningless.
— Xtrix

For Heidegger it's meaningingless? He says "the facticity of Being is essentially distinguished from the factuality of something objectively present. Existing Being does not encounter itself as something objectively present within the world." This might be a starting point to seeing a difference in time-structure. — Gregory

He's making a distinction between the present-at-hand, "objectively present" mode of being, the being of "objects" in our environment, and ourselves (Dasein). He's not talking about temporality here, and certainly not about authentic or inauthentic temporality -- which is meaningless.

"The problem of possible wholeness of the being, who we ourselves actually are, exists justifiably IF care, as the fundamental constitution of Being, 'is connected' with DEATH as the most extreme possibility OF this Being."

So there is possibility of Being in death. Heidegger doesn't say we then go from Being to infinite nothingness. He doesn't speak of ETERNAL life at all. But Being does not leave us in death — Gregory

Page number?

This passage in itself says nothing about what you're thinking. Death is connected to "this being," meaning Dasein. Yes, dasein lives with the knowledge that it will eventually die. Death is the end of possibilities in Heidegger. There's nothing about an afterlife anywhere.

"..death is the ownmost nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and not to be bypssed possibility OF Being".

All these quotes are from B&T — Gregory

Where? Pages are helpful.

"Possibility of being" is in relation to dasein -- and yes, in that case death is, as I mentioned above, the most extreme possibility -- the possibility which cancels all possibilities.

You're just misreading it, I'm afraid.

Heidegger specifically spoke of relativity. Being Kantian, time does not have parts. SO would inauthentic time be Newton's and authentic be Kant's? I suppose. — Gregory

No, because "inauthentic/authentic time" is meaningless. Heidegger rarely spoke about relativity.

Heidegger says in B&T that death is a possibility FOR being. I guess this implies an afterlife where we experience time truly instead.of in an illusion. Any comments? — Gregory

You'll have to provide some quotations, because I see nothing about an afterlife in Heidegger -- ever.

This is exactly what you do from here. Nothing you say refers to my objection. You recite what you more or less know and forget the terms of our debate. — David Mo

Because the "terms" are based on no understanding of Heidegger's concepts, hence why I have to go back over and over to them. If you understood them, you'd quickly see how the "terms" melt away. Regardless:

Notice he doesn't mention temporality here.
— Xtrix
I suggest that you read the context of the texts I have provided. — David Mo

As far as I see, he never once mentions "authentic temporality." That doesn't make sense. What you're referring to is being-towards-death, which is a different topic.

I don't see it as a mess really.
— Xtrix
Because you don't pay attention to what I say and you respond to something else that comes to mind. The problem is not that they form a unity (at least not the one I was aiming at) but that in that unity the future is defined in terms of having been (past). — David Mo

All three ecstases are defined in terms of the others. The past, therefore, is just as much defined by the future as the future is in terms of the past. Take a look at the quote you provided again, then the following:

"Thus we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded ithe totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling -- that is, the unity o the care-structure." (B&T p. 350/401 -- emphasis Heidegger's)

The entire paragraph is helpful, but I don't feel like typing it all out.

"Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a 'succession'. The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been." (ibid. p 350/401)

This is a mess because Heidegger identifies past, present and future in a "unity". To build that unity he equates the future with "having been", that is, what is normally understood as the past. And the present is "liberated" from itself we don't quite know how nor from what. In other words, the construction of that unity destroys the common meaning of the word "time", without proposing an intelligible alternative. — David Mo

He does not "equate" it, he's saying it's all happening at once and so should not be thought of as "later" or "not-yet." Likewise, the past is very much dependent on the future -- and if you look at how we live, or even how we think about our history or world history, our current values and goals plays a huge role in how we interpret the past. It's not a construction, it's a description. And it is indeed an intelligible alternative -- it makes good sense, in fact -- at least to me. Does it "destroy" the common meaning of the word "time"? Sure it does, of time as a sequence of "nows" that we measure, quantitatively, with clocks and calendars, etc. That "ordinary conception of time" has been destroyed isn't a criticism.

Ley us see:
His letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards. If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein's Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible only as something futural [[i]als zukünftiges[/i]], in the sense which we have now indicated, and which we have still to define more closely. (B&T: 326/372-3)

Two things are clear here: There is an authentic and an inauthentic temporality and both are based on "futural”. But what temporality means is gibberish. — David Mo

Not really. Notice he doesn't mention temporality here. Being-towards-death is a separate, but related, issue. It's true that it deals with the future, but that doesn't mean it's synonymous with "temporality," which he'll later talk about in terms of "ecstases," etc.

The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" (or better, which "is in the process of having been") releases from itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as "temporality" (B&T: 326/374)

This is a mess because Heidegger identifies past, present and future in a "unity". — David Mo

I don't see it as a mess really. What I gather here is his claiming that, in ordinary experience, all three are happening essentially at once, and only in detached, abstract thinking do they become separate "things" on a number line which happen in a sequence. It always has struck me as quasi-Buddhist, but I think they emphasize more that the "past" and "future" are indeed separate but illusory and that only the present matters.

In any case, again and again it's always helpful to keep in mind the separation of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand" modes of being, ordinary everyday (average) experience, and contrasting with what the "tradition" (which has always privileged abstract, theoretical thinking and "logic") claims "time" and "being" are (i.e., how they get interpreted). By using phenomenology as a method, and as something that essentially studies the "hidden" or "concealedness" of things, Heidegger is trying to throw out all traditional concepts and describe "being-in-the-world" anew -- hence "Dasein" and "temporality" and "unconcealedness," etc.

To take Being and Time in reverse order: we essentially are temporality (as beings), which manifests are "care," which shows up in average everyday experiences as the "ready-to-hand" activities we're mostly engaged in and which are transparent to us because they're so "close," and have thus been ignored by the tradition. He layers these analyses, I think rather poorly, in the first two Divisions, but this (in my view) remains the thesis, apart from his "deconstruction" of the history of time and Being.

Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception
— Xtrix

What is pure perception? An intellectual vision, since it is pure. But there is nothing in Parmenides that suggests contemplation in the sense of intuitive grasping (I use intuition in the Kantian sense), but reasoning. Of course, if we equate every thought with "pure perception" everything is "vision". But it is an unjustifiable assimilation that only serves to create confusion of language. — David Mo

"Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. — Xtrix

This "beholding" and "discovering" is related to aletheia, to unconcealedness, to "disclosure" or "open-ness" of the world. Remember this is what Heidegger asserts that the tradition has always believed, but with the emphasis on what's present before us. What he will constantly emphasize, however, is absence -- that which withdraws, conceals, and hides.

George Steiner is my main guide to (not) understanding Heidegger. In his own words, the subject of time "is watertight even by Heideggerian standards". Indeed, Heidegger creates around the concept of temporality a tangle of metaphors, neologisms and undefined concepts that make what he says unintelligible. A labyrinth only suitable for lovers of the cabala and masochists. :yum: — David Mo

Not easy, but I wouldn't say unintelligible. That "projection" and "anticipation" are the basis for ordinary concepts about the "future" as a "not-yet-now" isn't all that hard to understand: our experience and involvement in the world ("being-in-the-world") is where we always start from when we begin to philosophize -- but like when a hammer breaks down, it's a different mode of being than when simply acting.

What I am clear about is that Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic temporality. — David Mo

Maybe you could explain it to me then, because this is something I'm certainly not clear on. I'm not even sure if "authentic temporality" really makes sense. Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic, but I don't see how these ideas apply to temporality as Dasein's being.

I agree with what you've written on this thread. I think for Heidegger, time is meditation on being by the Kantian self — Gregory

I'm not sure what this means exactly, but perhaps it's true.

Whether Heidegger considers Parmenides as part of this I'm not sure
— Xtrix
What do you mean, we don't know? The text we are discussing accuses Parmenides of having directly raised the problem of Being in temporal (present) mode. — David Mo

Very true, but I was referring to:

He [Heidegger] thought that all the metaphysical tradition was infected by the ontical. — David Mo

Whether Parmenides is part of the tradition of mistaking being for a being, or focusing entirely on "beings" (the ontical) is not clear to me, I'd have to go back and check a number of books, but my sense is that Heidegger considers Parmenides to be a true "thinker," a primordial one, one who raises the question of Being.

"Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding. This thesis has remained the foundation of western philosophy ever since [Parmenides]." (B&T, p. 215/171 -- context is important here, the brackets are mine but if you read the previous part he's referring to Parmenides' famous 'For thinking and being are the same' sentence, although 'thinking' here is interpreted by Heidegger as 'to perceive with the eyes" as the footnote explains.)

But this is why I said "It comes down to how we're defining time."
— Xtrix

I don't know how time can be defined without reference to change, evolution or whatever you want to call it. I would like to know how you do it. Seriously. — David Mo

Well not me, really, but Heidegger -- or at least my take on him. He sees Aristotle as treating "time" as something already present-at-hand, as something measurable, as change in the sense of a sequence of "nows" -- I think of a moving point on a number line, for example. One of the basis units of physics, as you know, is the unit fo time: the second, as measured by a repetitive, consistent change (something to do with caesium, but I won't pretend to understand it).

What Heidegger will say, however, is that this understanding of time is itself grounded in our "temporality," which in B&T is tied to Sorge, care. We're projecting, anticipating, expecting -- that's the "future." He'll call the past/present/future different "ecstases," but that temporality is really a unity and happening all at once, so that there is no "before" and "after," really. So in a weird way, there is no "time" without humans:

"Strictly speaking we cannot say: There was a time when man was not. At all times man was and is and will be, because time temporalities itself only insofar as man is." (Intro to Metaphysics, p. 71)

"There is no nature-time, since all time belongs essential to Dasein." (Basic Problems, p. 262)

All of this is admittedly very strange, but I wonder: what do you think he's driving at in Being and Time? He says from the beginning that "time" will have to be re-interpreted, that a new understanding of it needs to be "explicated," etc. His thesis stands or falls on whether he's adequately describing things, and so this is why "time" is particularly relevant here -- if he's wrong about "time," then he's completely useless (in my view).

Says who? Why should we start with the assumption that "reality" means anything that "exists" independently of our "minds"?
— Xtrix

If that's false then dreams must be real. — TheMadFool

Begging the question. Dreams are real, in my view. They're just as much part of the world as anything else -- different than waking life, but certainly still there.

I think we should move on from Descartes.

being real - as in existing independently of X's mind — TheMadFool

Says who? Why should we start with the assumption that "reality" means anything that "exists" independently of our "minds"?

If I visualize a triangle, it's not that the triangle is somewhere "outside" myself that can decay, but neither is anything in tho
— Xtrix
Math is not based on what we visualize or imagine. Mathematical proofs are based on formal criteria, independent of empirical intuition. That's why there are totally counterintuitive mathematics. The same for logic. — David Mo

I didn't say mathematics is based on visualization or imagination. On the other hand, there are formal principles involved in vision as well -- yet without the triggering effect of experience we wouldn't know what they are. Regardless, assuming arithmetic is a completely formal system, it's still a part of the human mind. As is logic. As is language.

The life of human being is subject to temporality. But he can formulate propositions that refer to non-temporal objects. — David Mo

Again, "non-temporal object" is meaningless until we explain what "temporal" means. If we define "temporal" as something that moves/changes, then no -- abstractions aren't, in that sense, temporal objects. Quite true. But this is why I said "It comes down to how we're defining time."

Summarizing: I think Parmenides was trying to do an a-temporal and counterintuitive theory of Being and Heidegger misunderstood him because he had a preconceived idea. He thought that all the metaphysical tradition was infected by the ontical. — David Mo

"Ontical," in Heidegger, refers to beings (plural). That metaphysics has lost the question of Being itself, according to Heidegger, is quite true -- in the sense that "Being" gets interpreted as *a* being -- as permanence, as becoming, as Idea (enduring prototype), as ousia (substance). Whether Heidegger considers Parmenides as part of this I'm not sure. It seems Parmenides was truly doing ontology and raising the question of Being, but leaving unquestioned (phenomenologically) the perspective which guided his questioning. According to Heidegger, that concealed perspective was temporality.

Before continuing, I have to same I'm a little disappointed -- you seem to have avoided a large part of my post, which was aiming at understanding your position. I'll assume I have described your position (fairly) accurately.

Let us accept that every human being live in the experience of time (temporality). This is not the same than saying that every human proposition implies time because it is based on existence of things (presence).
"A is A" is not a temporal assertion. It is assumed to refer to objects without circumstances of present, past and future. Very different to say "The corpse was on the table". This is temporal because I can ask "When?" and I understand that it is different to "The corpse is on the table" or "We will put the corpse on the table". But asking "When A is A?" has no sense. You are badly asking. The answer is: "Under any circumstance of time and space" This is to say, without any circumstance of time and space. — David Mo

Seems to me that you are taking the propositions of logic to be timeless, in a sense. In that case, the same applies to arithmetic, which is also not temporal assertions. But these formal propositions and assertions are still coming out of the human mind -- I think we both agree with that. If the human mind is essentially temporal, and if the symbols of logic and mathematics are themselves beings which occur in the mind (in thought, reason, etc.), it's difficult to see how they're somehow beyond or outside time -- unless of course by "time" we mean the time of physics, in which case we mean essentially change/motion, and of course A = A doesn't change or move. So again it really all depends on what we mean by "time." Which is why I bring it up so much.

But this is very different from saying that we cannot formulate propositions that escape the a priori conditions of temporality. We can and do so constantly. In fact, Heidegger claims that it must be done, since he accuses Parmenides of defining being in terms of temporality, in terms of the present. But what I doubt is that both Parmenides' and Heidegger's metaphysical statements are referential, that they refer to something real. They are simple escapes from reality. Very typical of myth, religion and poetry. — David Mo

"Real" is problematic for me. Is discussing Being any less "real" than laws of logic? I also think ideas of referentiality are questionable.

Logic, math, language, etc., are all involved in thought. Thinking is a human activity (maybe exclusively, maybe not), along with feeling, willing, etc. Thoughts occur at some point in time -- so even the "objects" or "representations" of thought arise in a present. If I visualize a triangle, it's not that the triangle is somewhere "outside" myself that can decay, but neither is anything in thought. So yes, in that case almost anything we think or imagine is "timeless" -- they never change, they never move, they never decay. In that case the moon illusion is also timeless, in a sense -- it's in our heads as perception, and always has been, even though it is indeed an illusion.

But this opens up many questions as well, particularly about what we mean by "thinking," which is also an important one. Heidegger, in Intro to Metaphysics, talks at length about thought as traditionally associated with what you're talking about -- namely, with logic -- and goes on to claim that the distinction between being and thinking is the dominant one in the West.

This was back in January. I wonder if "epidemics" would receive at least one vote now? My how things change.

George Steiner: Heidegger, p. 153

The fatal deception of metaphysical-philosophical thought has been to consider Being as a kind of eternal "being before the eyes" (Vorhandesein). Already Saint Augustine had called attention against the obsessive concupiscentia oculorum of the philosophers, their Platonic insistence on the "vision" of the essence of things instead of living them with patience and with an existential commitment that implied the temporarily limited nature of being.

I think this brief fragment says much more than your twists and turns in the void. — David Mo

Well what can I say? I'm glad you find this person a better communicator. I agree with the above wholeheartedly.

Parmenides' concept of being is not based on any "vision" or "presence" as he says. It is the fruit of a rational analysis -by the Goddess- of the discourse of men. This analysis does not focus on any contemplation or vision, but on a Truth of proto-logical order: it is not possible that the non-being is. Where is the vision here? — David Mo

No "vision" perhaps, but certainly thought, perception and interpretation. As you say, "rational analysis." Well Heidegger would say "Where is this rational analysis/thinking/interpreting coming from, if not the human being?" So if (1) this is an interpretation of Being, (2) we assume Parmenides is a human being (Dasein), (3) the Heideggerian interpretation of the "essence" of Dasein is its "existence" (it's "there-ness," its "being-in-the-world"), (4) that this "existence" manifests itself in the ready-to-hand, involved engagement with the world and with others (as its common and typical everyday "average" mode), and lastly that (5) this involved engagement is connected to plans and goals ("for the sake of which...", "in order to," "towards which"), which can be re-interpreted as "projecting" (i.e., towards a future), then (6) we see that the essence of the being (Dasein) asking the question of Being is essentially a caring-temporal one.

Very long winded, I know. But each step is in this layered analysis is very important. All Heidegger is really doing is focusing more on the practical, everyday stuff -- in a reaction to logic and analysis, like many others have done (the Pragmatists, other "existentialist" thinkers, etc) -- and doing so with a phenomenological method that focuses on absence and withdrawal, the "transparent" stuff that gets overlooked, the "hidden," the "concealed." In his hands, Kant's thesis still stands but in his phenomenological/hermeneutic anlaysis "time" becomes something very different, all with the incorporation of Nietzsche's "perspectivism."

Briefer: According to Heidegger, since Parmenides is a human being, and ontologically "human being" means "temporality" (again, in his formulation), then he cannot escape interpreting "Being" in terms of ("on the basis of") this temporality. I think B&T page 46-47/25 says it clearly, but especially Intro to Metaphysics page 157, as I think I quoted elsewhere, with reference to page 127 (concerning what is meant by "perspective").

From 157:

But why time, precisely? Because in the inception of Western philosophy, the perspective that guides the opening up of Being is time, but in such a way that this perspective as such still remained and had to remain concealed. [...] But this "time" still has not been unfolded in its essence, nor can it be unfolded (on the basis and within the purview of "physics"). For as soon as meditation on the essence of time begins, at the end of Greek philosophy with Aristotle, time itself must be taken as something that is somehow coming to presence, ousia tis. This is expressed in the fact that time is conceived on the basis of the "now," that which is in each case uniquely present. The past is the "no-longer-now," the future is the "not-yet-now." Being in the sense of presence at hand (presence) becomes the perspective for the determination of time. But time does not become the perspective that is especially selected for the interpretation of being. —

(Italics all Heidegger's)

Again, long winded but maybe helpful.

1. Time is not only present. A present without past or future does not pass and therefore is the lack of time: eternal immobility. — David Mo

There's two claims here.

1) I agree time is not only present -- but I never claimed that.

2) I noticed you mentioned "does not pass" and "eternal immobility." That's interesting. In this case your conception of time is equivalent to (or closely associated with) change (becoming, happening, or the Buddhist "impermanence" [arising and passing]) and/or motion (mobile vs. immobile). Am I misinterpreting? I think the latter is the basic formulation of time in physics, and an important one.

2. Parmenides defended that Being is eternal in this sense. — David Mo

That change is impossible, because nothing truly arises or passes -- or put another way, that there is only being, and no such thing as non-being (and thus no arising and passing, since for something to arise it has to arise from non-being into being, or pass out of being into non-being, which is impossible). Hence, as Zeno later points out (as you mentioned), no such thing as motion either.

This is my understanding of the standard interpretation of Parmenides from most scholars, or at least from the (limited) secondary sources I've read. You subscribe to this view, in my understanding- perhaps put in slightly different terms, but nonetheless essentially accurate?

I want to at least get all this correct, otherwise going on further is fruitless.

3. It cannot be said, as Heidegger (you) claims, that Parmenides' concept of Being is temporal. Unless Heidegger (you) twist the word time to make it say something else and then say that others do not know what the word means. I wouldn't be surprised. It is the quintessential Heideggerian method. — David Mo

Well I would lose the term "twist," and I would also reject that me or Heidegger would have deride someone for "not knowing what the word means." I have indeed mentioned that you don't fully understand (yet) what Heidegger is meaning with "time" and "temporality," yes. For good reason: it's not an easy topic. It's still very difficult for me in many ways, and there's no doubt I don't have it all 100% accurate.

4. In the same sense, Parmenides represents a tradition that worries his followers, especially Plato and Aristotle who try to correct him. They cannot be expected to be mere continuators of his concept of Being. But this is another issue. — David Mo

I don't think they're continuators of his concept of Being at all. I think you're right when you say both Plato and Aristotle tried to "correct" him, or at least synthesize or appropriate his thought. The "being of beings" in Plato and Aristotle are very different from Parmenides, without a doubt.

"YouTube" Heidegger?
— Xtrix
Apart from the Introduction to Metaphysics and some loose lines, your recommendations are excerpts from an interview and a Dreyfuss course on Heidegger. Both on Youtube. Draw your own conclusions. — David Mo

I don't understand -- I have now twice given you several relevant books. Why ignore this? And yes, I really have read these. Here's a third attempt:

"Parmenides, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The History of the Concept of Time, Basic Questions of Philosophy, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and even Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. This of course assumes you've truly and carefully read Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics"

Obviously that's a lot of reading, but you'll find very quickly in each of these from the outline and indexes what you're looking for regarding Parmenides, time, and the history of philosophy.

Someone walks up to a protester, a so-called Trump supporter, executes him, and rather than condemn the act we condemn the partisanship. Brains rotting from the inside out. — NOS4A2

No, it's the fact that you're deluded in your partisanship, hence why the selective outrage.

Indeed.

Question:
What does Parmenides have to do with presence and time?
Answer:
In any case, Parmenides is still "presencing",
— Xtrix
Is that what you call a response? To repeat the question? — David Mo

I'm sure it appears that way. The reason it appears this way is that you don't understand what "presencing" means, in Heideggerian terminology. Presencing is related to aletheia, to phusis -- that which is unconcealed, that which emerges and endures. The connection to "time"? Fairly obvious: "presence" is something present. The present is a dimension of time. Again, "time" has to be explained further -- hence Being and Time. Heidegger differentiates between "time" and "temporality," which has to be understood. You don't seem interested in understanding this distinction. Fine -- in that case, you get your answer in one step.

So where's the connection between presencing (in the present) and Parmenides? You quoted a relevant passage from Being and Time. Heidegger is claiming that Parmenides was likewise in this "mode" when philosophizing. I think the point is a truism -- or a "banality" if you like, until we find out why pointing this out is relevant. Heidegger spends hundreds of pages elaborating on it, especially regarding time (yet you go on to question why I continually bring this up, as if it were irrelevant) and how on its basis Being gets interpreted. The "seeds" of the meaning of Being as "ousia" (and hence substance, nature, object, etc) were already there with Parmenides, as the beginning of the great tradition (which he claims is now in its end, or has peaked with Hegel and came to an end with Nietzsche). Its important to understand this tradition and what it's come to if we're interested in understanding our modern situation and the possibilities of the future. This is Heidegger in a nutshell. This is why there's so much time spent on the Greeks and on history (of ontology and of the concept of time).

Stop strutting around. Your Youtube Heidegger doesn't interest me. — David Mo

Hmm...

If you want truly want to learn about what Heidegger thinks of Parmenides, since you refuse to learn from me (after all, I "don't understand" any of it) then here are the relevant texts: Parmenides, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The History of the Concept of Time, Basic Questions of Philosophy, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and even Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. This of course assumes you've truly and carefully read Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics, which I highly doubt. — Xtrix

"YouTube" Heidegger?

So what to look for next? — Ansiktsburk

In terms of?

To say that Heidegger talks a lot about it and that to understand it you have to read everything Heidegger is not to explain anything. — David Mo

That's not what was said.

I didn't mention "the world," I mentioned time, in response to your ridiculous claim that Parmenides was "outside time."
— Xtrix
You confuse two different things again:
Parmenides was a man of (his) time (or world, which is the same in common language). "He was not an angel," you said.
Parmenides thought that Being is timeless (eternal and immobile). What I said. — David Mo

What you said:

There is no presence, no temporality. Parmenides’ thought is produced outside of time and the narration of the poem is a mytho-poetic artifice. — David Mo

Parmenides thought that being is timeless. He "produced" this thought "outside of time." That's what you said. And it's ridiculous. Next time try harder to be clear if this isn't what you meant.

You don't understand Heidegger.
— Xtrix
Surely not. — David Mo

As you've demonstrated very well. The reasons are obvious, too. Not from a lack of intelligence, but from a lack of openness to learning (from him and from me). Pity.

But neither do you. You are not able to answer a single one of my questions and objections. — David Mo

:yawn: Ok bud, whatever you say. There's no such thing as "expertise," I guess. You're like arguing against climate change deniers -- do a little perusing of data, then use it to justify what you already wanted to believe to begin with. What a shocker that the notion of Heidegger you began with hasn't changed. And of course, the person who has studied much longer and more carefully (and open-mindedly) than you "doesn't understand." Standard fare. :yawn:

Regardless, if I don't understand Heidegger, it's surely not been you who have shown that. Nor are you in any position to judge it.

Parmenides was "presencing," and what was disclosed to him was being. Ditto Heraclitus. Both men, as human beings, thought/wrote/interpreted being from the perspective of time -- namely, the present, that which is present before us, that which appears, that which is uncovered and unconcealed. All of the Greeks took "time" as the perspective in which they interpreted themselves and the world, without knowing it. "Time", as pointed out by Kant, is a form of our sensibility, along with space -- in Heidegger's hands it becomes something much different than this Aristotelian "time" which Kant presupposed -- it becomes temporality, which is what Being and Time is about -- namely, interpreting the human being (Dasein) in its average everydayness, which brings out the ontological structures of this entity, as care. Care (Sorge) is reinterpreted as temporality.
— Xtrix

Why are you telling this? — David Mo

Because if you don't understand it, it's no wonder you don't understand his views on Parmenides, phusis, aletheia, the history of Western thought, etc. But you can do on believing you do -- not my business.

Answer my questions and stop tracing texts that you do not understand. — David Mo

I repeat:

If you don't see any of this and consistently keeping it in mind, you're avoiding Heidegger. You're just focusing on isolated features. And it's boring. — Xtrix

Your "questions" have been answered. Multiple times. As I said, if you don't understand them, that's not a surprise...

It is not true that you have established the relationship between Parmenides, presence and time. — David Mo

First you have to understand what "presence" and "time" mean in Heidegger. When you can explain that to me, you'll see understand the already given answer:

No imbroglio. The above says most of it. With regard to "time" (in terms of the common notion since Aristotle's essay), Heidegger will talk at length about. As the Wiki article mentions, correctly, he has a different analysis, which he calls "temporality." — Xtrix

In any case, Parmenides is still "presencing," and this is why the "ground of the collapse" was embedded in the inception. It's not meant as a criticism, but as a description (interpretation) of history. It's also much different from later interpretations and questioning, and one in which we should return. Why? Because Parmenides "indicates Being itself in view of Being and from within Being" (IM p. 102). Still, the seeds of concealment were there from the beginning: "...in the inception of Western philosophy, the perspective that guides the opening up of Being is time, but in such a way that this perspective as such still remained and had to remain concealed." (IM p. 220) The underline is mine. — Xtrix

If you fail to see the connection between "presence" and (common) "time," and how this relates to Parmenides (when you yourself quoted a relevant passage), and furthermore why it's important to understand Heidegger's thesis about Western thought and temporality -- then that's your business. If I thought for a second that further elaborate explanation would actually get through to you, I'd do so. But it won't -- you've already taken a position on Heidegger, and that position has become dogma. Feigning a desire to learn by asking questions you don't understand simply because it's a topic you think you're well versed in (Parmenides) is not of interest to me. You've already taken up enough of my time with digressions about how "wrong" Heidegger thinks Western thought was -- again because you can't keep up with the conversation otherwise. I won't be sucked in again. If you want truly want to learn about what Heidegger thinks of Parmenides, since you refuse to learn from me (after all, I "don't understand" any of it) then here are the relevant texts: Parmenides, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The History of the Concept of Time, Basic Questions of Philosophy, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and even Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. This of course assumes you've truly and carefully read Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics, which I highly doubt. There are also free UC Berkley courses available by Hubert Dreyfus et al., which go through the text carefully and which is a good introduction to Heidegger. Good luck.

That which is present-at-hand is a theoretical object, something that is "extant" or, as Heidegger says, is tied up with what is traditionally meant by "existentia" (basically "substance") [p. 42/67]. Presence-at-hand is a related term, the mode (or attitude) we're in when looking at the world in such a way -- apart from being involved in it with equipment (the "ready-to-hand").
— Xtrix

On the page you mention Heidegger does not give any definition. He simply relates (tantamount) present-at-hand to the classical term existentia. He gives no further explanation and the comparison is not too clarifying, since that term was used in different ways from Aristotle to Ockham.
If you want a definition you'll have to go elsewhere. — David Mo

Heidegger talks about the present-at-hand all over Being and Time. You have to read it to understand it. If you're looking for a place where he "defines" it the a format that's suitable to you, then you probably won't find it, as "x = y." But it's obvious from anyone who's read him what it means, as I explained above (which is uncontroversial in secondary scholarship, even among those who are critical).

The above explanation stands.

I did; you haven't understood it.
— Xtrix

To explain the relationship between three terms you must be able to link them together (Parménides, presence and time) in a sequence or proposition. You did not. — David Mo

Yes, I did. Again, your failure to understand what is being said is not my problem. The cause is that you showed up to this thread (and to Heidegger) not to understand but to defend a position you've already settled upon, that of Carnap, Russell, etc.

Interestingly enough, it is in this commentary that you attempt an explanation. And it is remarkably... naive? insufficient? I will explain it to you. — David Mo

:lol:

Yes, because you've definitely earned the right to give lectures about Heidegger so far. :roll:

Before accusing others of being naive, try to make sure you're not making a complete fool of yourself first. Which you've done over and over again, particularly with your childish reading of Heidegger's views on the history of Western thought.

Logical reasoning? This is your interpretation?
— Xtrix

Of course, that is my interpretation of Parmenides. An interpretation in which I follow the immense majority of experts. I don't risk anything. — David Mo

Yes, you risk nothing indeed by parroting the common reading of Parmenides.

The identification of the goddess of Parmenides with the goddess Truth is a typical case. — David Mo

It also has the benefit of being accurate. But you wouldn't know one way or another, having read so little. Set up more straw men -- I'm not interested. You haven't demonstrated you've understood Heidegger.

It seems a typically childish game: "What does a cheesecake look like at speed?" Heidegger in its pure state. — David Mo

Yes, you've really nailed it. Run along back to the others. Come back when you're serious about learning something -- the way most adults approach a topic.

On the other hand, Heidegger may not use the term contemplation. But since he uses metaphors such as illumination or unveiling which involve contemplation, — David Mo

It doesn't involve contemplation any more than vision involves "contemplation."

You don't understand Heidegger.

In the first case, to say that Parmenides' ideas come from the world in which he lives is probably true, — David Mo

I didn't mention "the world," I mentioned time, in response to your ridiculous claim that Parmenides was "outside time."


Parmenides was "presencing," and what was disclosed to him was being. Ditto Heraclitus. Both men, as human beings, thought/wrote/interpreted being from the perspective of time -- namely, the present, that which is present before us, that which appears, that which is uncovered and unconcealed. All of the Greeks took "time" as the perspective in which they interpreted themselves and the world, without knowing it. "Time", as pointed out by Kant, is a form of our sensibility, along with space -- in Heidegger's hands it becomes something much different than this Aristotelian "time" which Kant presupposed -- it becomes temporality, which is what Being and Time is about -- namely, interpreting the human being (Dasein) in its average everydayness, which brings out the ontological structures of this entity, as care. Care (Sorge) is reinterpreted as temporality.

If you don't see any of this and consistently keeping it in mind, you're avoiding Heidegger. You're just focusing on isolated features. And it's boring.

Come back when you've shown you understood a word of what you've read. Before that, however, it's important to approach a thinker with an open mind. That's what this thread was supposed to be about -- not a defense of a position long ago decided from secondary sources.

Now, you can explain this imbroglio between presence-at-hand, time and Parmenides
— David Mo

I asked you for a clarification that you have not given. — David Mo

I did; you haven't understood it.

It seems that you are in another "stage" (that of the clouds). Instead, I am going to explain it in a less "nebulous" way than yours. — David Mo

You accuse me and Heidegger of being "in the clouds," then go on to offer an analysis of these "clouds" which you admittedly don't understand. Rather you make several utterly false statements and then try to "clean up" Heidegger to essentially be more Cartesian. Much like Sartre. To demonstrate:

No one should look up the definition of "present-at-hand" in Heidegger. It is not given, at least in the texts I have consulted. — David Mo

Have you consulted Being and Time?

That which is present-at-hand is a theoretical object, something that is "extant" or, as Heidegger says, is tied up with what is traditionally meant by "existentia" (basically "substance") [p. 42/67]. Presence-at-hand is a related term, the mode (or attitude) we're in when looking at the world in such a way -- apart from being involved in it with equipment (the "ready-to-hand").

1. Present-at-hand: ambiguity of meanings: a) pure theoretical "contemplation" - as opposed to "ready-to-hand" which includes the interaction of the subject (Dasein) with the world; b) the placing of the subject in front of the objects of the world (the "objective" point of view). — David Mo

No ambiguity -- (a) and (b) are the same thing. Your injecting "subject/object" into this is one example of making Heidegger Cartesian. There's a reason he uses "dasein."

2. Presence: quality of being present to human understanding. Ambiguity: a) the subject is placed in front of the object of knowledge; b) the object of knowledge is placed now (present time as different from past and future). — David Mo

Again, both say the same thing.

Side note: the entire subject/object dichotomy (or mind/body) is likewise conceived within this mode (i.e., within the theoretical, present-at-hand). Only when one is taking away from everyday "coping," and looks out "objectively" at the world does the world become "substance" or "object," and thus the entity "looking out" becomes a "subject." When you're trying to catch the bus, this is not one's experience.

Heidegger's argument synthesized: Truth is presented to Parmenides > It is something that is presented as pure presence independent of the practical relationship that one may have > It is the truth about something (Being) > Being is now (present)> It is contemplated in the mode of Time. — David Mo

No. Truth is "there," it opens, it is "disclosed." Aletheia is the truth. The goddess is the truth. It's not "contemplated" -- I don't know where you came up with this one, because it's not in Heidegger. The truth is aletheia -- unconcealment, disclosure. Indeed it must occur in the "present" -- because Parmenides is a human being. Unless he "stepped outside" of life itself, whatever he "saw" happened in the present. Unless he's an angel. Everything happens in the "present" -- the rest is separated by thinking, and has a long history which, as you know, has largely been determined by the Physics of Aristotle, which interprets "time" as a sequence of "nows." Which is a perfectly fine conception, and a very powerful one -- just as the mind/body, subject/object distinction is. Just as "substance" and "nature" is. Just as modern science is.

So yes, if Parmenides was a human being -- and not a magical angel -- he lived and breathed as a human being, and whatever he experienced was experienced "in time" (not the time of physics, but experienced time, which in Heidegger is "temporality"). So of course it's in the "present."

Critical analysis:

Heidegger's first omission: Parmenides does not “contemplate” Being. — David Mo

Nice job knocking down the pins you yourself set up. But since it's not what Heidegger is saying, completely irrelevant. Might as well be playing chess with yourself and congratulating yourself on the win.

Parmenides is taught by the Goddess. (Suppose the Goddess is a metaphor. Instead, we could suppose that Parmenides is giving a theological content to his poem and the presence of the Goddess is literal. This is not the general interpretation nor Heidegger's - I think - so I overlook it). — David Mo

You "think"? Heidegger is emphatically against the interpretation of the goddess as "literal." (Parmenides, p. 8-11; 14-16). "To make of 'the truth' a goddess amounts to turning the mere not on of something, namely the concept of the essence of truth, in a 'personality.'" (p.10)

In the non/theological context of the poem, what the figure of the Goddess means is an illumination. — David Mo

Yes. It is illumination (or un-concealedness) itself.

The Goddess does not induce Parmenides to the contemplation/presence of any object of knowledge, as Heidegger claims. — David Mo

Where is Heidegger claiming this? I'll save you the trouble: he doesn't. Another straw man. You're confusing the fact that what is revealed is revealed in the "present" must mean that "being" becomes a present-at-hand "object" -- this is not the case. As I said before, everything happens in the present, whether we're aware of it or not (off thinking about the future or the past). Just introspect or meditate for a while and see for yourself. What "time" is it? It's now -- the present. Not "now" as an object-point, not "now" as a second hand on a clock.

This is why I say you're not on the level to understand Heidegger -- there's too much more reading you have to do.

The Goddess leads Parmenides to the truth not by the presence of something, but by the force of a logical reasoning: Only Being is and non-being is not (variant of the identity principle). — David Mo

Logical reasoning? This is your interpretation?

Therefore, Heidegger's identification of Parmenides' vision in the literal sense is out of place. There is no presence, no temporality. Parmenides’ thought is produced outside of time and the narration of the poem is a mytho-poetic artifice. — David Mo

Almost laughable. "Outside of time," eh? So Parmenides was an angel. "No presence, no temporality" -- so no human being, either. Where exactly did this "logical reasoning" take place, then? In heaven? Clearly not in the 6th century BC, as it was "outside of time" (both temporality and world-time, apparently). Come on.

It's fairly obvious you must be equating "time" with "motion" and "becoming," but even this view of time is contradictory in this context.

Second omission: This is riveted by the Goddess when she states that if the non-being is not there can be no change or time since it is impossible to move from something that is to what is not, or vice versa. Time is expressly refuted in Parmenides' poem. Being is one and immobile. — David Mo

The old "being and becoming" interpretation. :yawn:

Heidegger has a lot to say about this -- if you read him.

At the beginning of our discussion you tried to give me lessons because, according to you, I did not read Heidegger directly but through second-hand sources. Now you are going to Wikipedia, which is not a second-hand font. It's fourth or fifth hand. It's fun. But where have you put your principles? — David Mo

I said it was due to time constraints. You asked what "presence-at-hand" means, which I've talked about before and which, had you read Heidegger, you'd know. Rather than go through and type out relevant paragraphs, I thought the Wikipedia article was accurate and approved of it as at least an introduction to the term (if indeed you're not familiar with it).

Also, I'll thank you to give the name or the article when quoting an encyclopedia. It's the right way to do it and it helps to locate the exact citation. Also, this helps to find the original text. — David Mo

You're right. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_of_presence

I have done the homework for you --you're welcome:

That is why Aristotle no longer ‘has any understanding’ of it [dialectics], for he has put it on a more radical footing and raised it to a new level [aufhob]. Légein itself--or rather noéin –, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being-has the Temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. Those entities which show themselves i n this and for it, and which are understood as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; that is, they are conceived as presence ( ousía ) . (B&T: 26/48) — David Mo

Funny you say that -- I quoted this text twice before in reference to Parmenides.

Now, you can explain this imbroglio between presence-at-hand, time and Parmenides and I will explain you where Heidegger conceals the very thought of Parmenides. In two points, at least. — David Mo

No imbroglio. The above says most of it. With regard to "time" (in terms of the common notion since Aristotle's essay), Heidegger will talk at length about. As the Wiki article mentions, correctly, he has a different analysis, which he calls "temporality."

In the beginning, phusis and logos meant something very different than what they meant later on in the inception. They both had to do with unconcealment, as an emerging and a gathering, respectively. This is where Parmenides began, with aletheia. As you know from reading Intro to Metaphysics, phusis became "idea" and logos became assertion/category, which Heidegger claims sets the stage for Being to be interpreted as "substance" and later "object," apart from the thinking subject. He will claim that the distinction (or "restriction") between "being and thinking" has dominated Western thought since (IM p. 208).

Specifically regarding Parmenides, pages 101-103 is a good start. From Parmenides (and the "inception") onwards, the question of being becomes concealed. A relevant passage below:

"Now the collapse of unconcealment, as we briefly call this happening, does not originate from a mere deficiency, from an inability to sustain any longer that which, with this essence, was given to historical humanity to preserve. The ground of the collapse lies first in the greatness of the inception and in the essence of the inception itself. ["Fall" and "collapse" create an illusion of negativity only in a superficial exposition.]" (IM p. 204)

Notice the part in brackets -- it's as if he's specifically talking to someone like yourself.

In any case, Parmenides is still "presencing," and this is why the "ground of the collapse" was embedded in the inception. It's not meant as a criticism, but as a description (interpretation) of history. It's also much different from later interpretations and questioning, and one in which we should return. Why? Because Parmenides "indicates Being itself in view of Being and from within Being" (IM p. 102). Still, the seeds of concealment were there from the beginning: "...in the inception of Western philosophy, the perspective that guides the opening up of Being is time, but in such a way that this perspective as such still remained and had to remain concealed." (IM p. 220) The underline is mine.

This is why "time" becomes relevant. An interesting thesis, worth mulling over. None of this can be understood fully if taken in isolation. You have to first take up Heidegger's terminology, which his difficult. You're simply not at that stage yet.

I would like to save intelligent young people some time. You can forgo Heidegger, he was essentially something very strange (a philosophical mystic?). — JerseyFlight

Says many other people who haven't read a word of Heidegger. I'll save intelligent people more time: before forming an opinion about a thinker, best to read him carefully. Otherwise, best not to comment.

He does indeed interpret being in temporal terms -- not in the common understanding of "time," but in "presencing" (as Heidegger mentions) in terms of the present-at-hand
— Xtrix
Can you define what this "presence-at-hand" is and what it has to do with time and Parmenides? — David Mo

Presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) means the theoretical attitude we take when viewing the world, detached from everyday involvement and engagement. It's the basis for science but also for (Western) philosophy -- it emphasizes things as they are present before for us, as something to analyze, as a problem, etc. Normally this occurs when a piece of equipment (e.g., a hammer) breaks down -- it stops becoming something we use transparently, and now becomes an object with properties that we must fix. Ditto a car, bicycle, computer, etc.

Shamefully, due to time constraints, I'll quote Wikipedia, as in this case they're pretty accurate:

In Being and Time (1927; transl. 1962), Martin Heidegger argues that the concept of time prevalent in all Western thought has largely remained unchanged since the definition offered by Aristotle in the Physics. Heidegger says, "Aristotle's essay on time is the first detailed Interpretation of this phenomenon [time] which has come down to us. Every subsequent account of time, including Henri Bergson's, has been essentially determined by it."[2] Aristotle defined time as "the number of movement in respect of before and after".[3] By defining time in this way Aristotle privileges what is present-at-hand, namely the "presence" of time. Heidegger argues in response that "entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the 'Present'".[2] Central to Heidegger's own philosophical project is the attempt to gain a more authentic understanding of time. Heidegger considers time to be the unity of three ecstases: the past, the present, and the future. —

Heidegger sees Parmenides as already conducting his thinking on this background of the present-at-hand.

Parmenides thinks being, but is still guided in his interpretation of it by temporality (as anyone has to be, as Dasein -- who's meaning is temporality), in the sense of "presencing", which has dominated ever since.
— Xtrix

Look at my previous comment to Gregory. Parmenides does not think in terms of temporality since Being is immobile and eternal. — David Mo

He does indeed interpret being in temporal terms -- not in the common understanding of "time," but in "presencing" (as Heidegger mentions) in terms of the present-at-hand, he certainly does. Heidegger believes this is the ontological structure of Dasein, who asks the question of being. It's not a criticism of Parmenides, who was a human being.

"Temporality" (in Heidegger) does not equate with "becoming" or have anything to do with "mobility."

You misinterpret the quote about the Olympics. — David Mo

No, you're misinterpreting it. Again:

"Since the essence of man, for the Greeks, is not determined as subject, a knowledge of the historical beginning of the Occident is difficult and unsettling for modern "thought," assuming that modern "lived experience" is not simply interpreted back into the Greek world, as if modern man enjoyed a relation of personal intimacy with Hellenism for the simple reason that he organizes "Olympic games" periodically in the main cities of the planet. For here only the facade of the borrowed word is Greek. This is not in any way meant to be derogatory toward the Olympics themselves; it is only censorious of the mistaken opinion that they bear any relation to the Greek essence."

He is using the Olympics as an example only, to demonstrate our distance from the Greeks (hence why "modern 'thought'" finds it difficult to comprehend the Greek's notion of the essence of man -- as it was not "determined as subject.").

I don't see anything controversial or very hard to understand about the above passage.

Heidegger does not think that the solution lies in simply repeating the thought of the Greeks. Like all attempts, including his own, they do not definitively resolve the question of being. But their approach to them is closer to the fundamental question of any thought, then he recommends that we must go back to take it as a starting point for a new beginning. — David Mo

Approach to "them"? I'm not sure about what that refers to -- the problems of philosophy generally?

Regardless, I'm glad you agree. We need to go back to the beginning in order to find new horizons.

Because while an interpretation may very well be perverted regarding it's interpretation of what the Greeks originally believed (and hence "wrong" as incorrect, inaccurate, etc), in and of itself it is just as "valid" to interpret Being as "God,"
— Xtrix

Greek thought is not wrong like that of metaphysics in general. But I doubt that Heidegger thought it was "valid" to interpret Being as God. Heidegger's theological position in his final stage is confusing enough to reach any convincing conclusions. His followers have found in it a poetic license or a theology. It may be one or the other. But I don't think there is a quote in Being and Time that supports the idea you expound. I'm almost certain of it. Nor later either, except in some marginal writing. Can you provide a quotation on this? It would be interesting to discuss this subject. — David Mo

Perhaps "valid" is the wrong word. It depends of course on what we mean by "God," which as you know is a complicated history. I don't think that Spinoza's God or Anselm's God would "bother" him much. But who knows -- the only point is that this is one possible interpretation, and one word for basically the same thing (using the philosopher's notion, not an invisible sky-father) as "being," as an infinite entity of some kind.

Heidegger is not against science or technology. He's not against God or substance, either.
— Xtrix

In short, the difference between the correct ontology of the Greeks and the erroneous one of the later metaphysicists is well condensed in this quotation:

Because something ontical is made to underlie the ontological, the expression "substantia" functions sometimes with a signification which is ontological, sometimes with one which is ontical, but mostly with one which is hazily ontico-ontological. Behind this slight difference of signification, however, there lies hidden a failure to master the basic problem of Being. To treat this adequately, we must 'track down' the equivocations in the right way. (94/127) — David Mo

You're simply misreading it. But I feel like we're going in circles, and it's boring. Interpret it your way; I remain unconvinced.

Got it.

Peterson has no model of anything. It'll change as the wind blows. Total pseudo-intellectualism and charlatanism. Has many strident followers, I'm sure. So does Trump. If you take it seriously, that's your business.

I think time is better spent elsewhere.
— Xtrix

That is just the knowledge I am trying to get at, how did you determine this? — JerseyFlight

How do I determine that time is better spent doing something other than "debating" people on an Internet forum? Because I'm an adult. Take your Socratic questioning elsewhere -- I'm bored.

Yes, as long as we don't make that the full time job. If we chase every crazy claim, "debating" and "refuting," etc., we go nowhere. It's best to have a positive direction, a plan, a better way of life, a better way of thinking, etc., and let people join in with that -- questioning ourselves and correcting mistakes along the way, but not getting sidetracked by "debunking" things (unless there's a real chance that it helps). The same is true of "debate" -- a ridiculous concept, really.
— Xtrix

What positive direction do you believe in? — fdrake

Depends on what we're supposedly reacting against. If it's climate denial, for example, simply present the evidence -- that's a positive direction forward. If its pseudo-intellectualism, then counter it with actual intellectualism (re: Peterson), etc. Not complicated.

What other people like him could I follow? — rickyk95

Noam Chomsky -- superior in almost every way. A true intellectual. I love Sam, but he only approaches Chomsky's level.

Then clearly you assign a limit of time to effectiveness. This seems most strange to me, as I am still being affected by thinkers who are long dead that never even spoke to me. Also, this must mean, if one cannot "see it," then it must not be there, but what if it is there, but one cannot see it? What if one's intellectual labor only bears fruit in the distant future? Clearly you would not call this an impossibility? It would seem the history of culture stands against it. What if the intellectual decided not to speak because he could not see that his work would have value in the future? It seems you are simply telling me to order my intellectual life according to what I feel? — JerseyFlight

:yawn:

If you want to spend your time arguing with people about Jordan Peterson on an Internet forum, you're welcome to. Maybe little things like that help, and someone has to do it I suppose. I do not recommend it, however -- I think time is better spent elsewhere.

Cheers.

When he's talking to those who can think and hear.
— Xtrix

How does he know when this is the case? And further, does this have to happen within a set perimeter of time? — JerseyFlight

You'll know when you see it. If you're not able to tell, then you're the one who can't think. There are no recipes or algorithms or equations to figure it out.

As per your revision: "Also, it's a relative thing -- it may not be a complete waste to teach someone something for 10 years, and then finally have them understand it or change their mind."

If it is a relative thing then how do you know what you're talking about? I thought I heard you say, "they're really just wasting their time -- no one is changing their minds and nothing is getting done." How do you know this? — JerseyFlight

See above. True, maybe there's some use in banging your head against a brick wall as well. How do you know for certain it won't do any good? Etc.

But much like political hobbyism, one can think they're doing a great deal when they're really just wasting their time
— Xtrix

How does a thinker know when he's not wasting time? — JerseyFlight

When he's talking to those who can think and hear. Also, it's a relative thing -- it may not be a complete waste to teach someone something for 10 years, and then finally have them understand it or change their mind. But compared to other endeavors, perhaps it's not the best use of one's time.

I agree, we do need to do all these things. But we must also refute error, if we do not it will gain simply because it's attempt to deceive goes unchallenged and the ignorant have no defense against it. As intellectuals we have a social responsibility in this direction. — JerseyFlight

Yes, as long as we don't make that the full time job. If we chase every crazy claim, "debating" and "refuting," etc., we go nowhere. It's best to have a positive direction, a plan, a better way of life, a better way of thinking, etc., and let people join in with that -- questioning ourselves and correcting mistakes along the way, but not getting sidetracked by "debunking" things (unless there's a real chance that it helps). The same is true of "debate" -- a ridiculous concept, really.



No -- Sizek is another posturing charlatan.

Turns out, most people are -- we already have the numbers in this country and around the world. Better to shore up these people and get to work collectively than bother with a minority of those who are too far gone to be rescued.
— Xtrix

Here, my friend, your optimism is misplaced. — JerseyFlight

No, it isn't. Because it's not about optimism or pessimism -- it's just a matter of fact: we have the numbers. On almost every issue, from climate change to nuclear weapons to healthcare to Jordan Peterson and QAnon (in the last two cases, the vast majority disapprove).

Hitler brought himself into power through the zealous actions of a minority. Ayn Rand and Milton Friedman shifted the entire nature of American economics in the direction of capitalism. When they were on the scene intellectuals said the same things about them that you are now saying about Peterson. Our resistance to this kind of stuff matters. I do not do it because it brings me pleasure or I have some kind of obsession, I do it because ideology is dangerous, it destroys lives and sabotages democratic freedom, paving the way to irreparable systems of violence. — JerseyFlight

Like I said, it's fine to do if you think it's beneficial. But much like political hobbyism, one can think they're doing a great deal when they're really just wasting their time -- no one is changing their minds and nothing is getting done. Better to seek real power in terms of politics, and to organize with like-minded individuals (of which there are many) to enact real change and prevent the next Hitler or Friedman or whomever.

The attitude you embody, though it truly does come from a place of higher critical intelligence, fails to see that Peterson is doing damage in culture. Whether one likes it or not, he has become relevant, people are influenced by him, they look up to him and see him as the very thing he is not, an intellectual example. When intellectuals like yourself withdraw from the advancing public discourse, the narrative is lost to people like Peterson, it regresses. — JerseyFlight

Maybe. But you could say the same about many other issues as well -- Creationism, QAnon conspiracies, 9/11 truthers, Anti-vaxxers, climate change deniers, etc. If we spend all of our time doing battle with this nonsense, we'll never move on. It's a bottomless bit. We'd have better luck trying to argue people out of Christianity or Islam -- which is to say, very little.

It's a strange phenomenon these days: once someone has locked into a dogma, it's like a black hole -- there's no coming out of it. One wonders what attracts people to these black holes in the first place, but that's why we need to stick to rational argument, evidence, science, etc. -- and hope most people are sane enough to accept reality. Turns out, most people are -- we already have the numbers in this country and around the world. Better to shore up these people and get to work collectively than bother with a minority of those who are too far gone to be rescued.

Bravo. Exactly right. But still not worth your time writing it.

My advice: don't waste any time on Jordan Peterson, whether as criticism or not. Better off digging a ditch and filling it back up.

has nothing to do with your claim. Why? Because here Heidegger is talking about Dasein, and specifically about how to analyze it
— Xtrix
I'm sorry to say you didn't understand the meaning of my quote. I had included it so that you would see that your idea that Heidegger does not speak of a knowledge, interpretation, etc. that is "right" is false. The term "right", although rarely used in Being and Time, also appears in the sense of "correct".


I take this opportunity to remind you that Dasein's Being is the center of the research on Being in the mentioned book, to the point that it displaces other considerations of Being.
"Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being". (T&B: 12/32) — David Mo

Yes? I really don't see what you're driving at anymore.

I'm not doing an exegesis of Heidegger, but a critique. This criticism refers to his use and abuse of language. If he says that to understand is not to know, I would think it was nonsense. Can you separate the two things? — David Mo

I think you can, yes. One may speak of an "understanding" of driving or hammering. To claim that these activities, when conducted in a ready-to-hand manner (in a sense "unconsciously" or transparently), involve "knowledge" is misleading. Because to "know" something, traditionally, is something a conscious, thinking mind does or has. But what if the thinking mind were playing no part whatsoever in the activity? So that one does not need to "recall" knowledge or even be thinking about what one is doing at all. Should we still call this "knowledge"? Ultimately, we have to ask what is meant by "knowledge," and that takes us into history and etymology. Which is why I mentioned using the word is complicated and why Heidegger eschews it.

Or we can interpret this as his saying "The Greeks had the truth of being,
— Xtrix

Who said that? I am not. It is one thing for them to be closer to the knowledge of Being and another for them to have the knowledge of Being. My on words: "If the truth is the unveiling of Being, the Presocratics were much closer to it". — David Mo

I understand. But again, what on earth is "knowledge of Being"? Again, this leads us off into Heidegger's (unconventional) definitions of "truth" and "knowledge." I suppose if truth is unconealedness, than the early Greeks were perhaps less "concealing" of being, and hence somehow (in this idiosyncratic usage) "more in the truth" than others -- but I don't see Heidegger ever really saying that explicitly. I can see now where you might think that, but again it comes down to textual evidence. I don't see it in Being and Time or in Heidegger generally, as you do, but we have to ask ourselves if this is a better way to think about it. I think it just shows that the Greeks and the later Greeks (and then Romans and Christians) had very different meanings for "truth," and nothing more. Interpretations on truth, like that on "being," "time," or any of the other (originally Greek) concepts and words, are varied and evolve in time (in history).

If Heidegger makes any kind of value judgment, I think he does so in relation to the questioning of being. The questioning was greatest with the originary thinkers, he believes. He often says that the inception was the greatest era, and it ended with Plato and Aristotle (thus they are part of this great inception), and that it has "degenerated' ever since in terms of the core aim of philosophy (ontology), which is the question of being. But I do not believe he thinks of this in terms of "right and wrong" or "true and false," even in his own usage.

He does, however, believe the results of various understandings (results in terms of what "shows up" in a culture which holds this understanding/interpretation of being), which he says in our own epoch have resulted in technological nihilism (chasing of beings without any grounding in or sense of being whatsoever), are certainly open to moral judgment -- and if we consider our present age as "bad" in the Nietzschean sense of "decline," then we must overcome it by overcoming what has led to it, which is our traditional, philosophical/religious "background." This is background goes back to the Greeks and, however great they were and however great the "inception" is, it still needs to be examined and ultimately overcome (although we at least need to first get back to their questioning, which we don't even do anymore).

If the truth is the unveiling of Being, — David Mo

It isn't.
— Xtrix
It is. — David Mo

Truth is what is unconcealed. Only beings become unconcealed. Being itself isn't an object to be un-concealed. If you mean that being permeates all beings, and is "revealed" in its being-ness through beings, then yes, truth is the unveiling of Being. I wonder if that's what you meant, though.

We are not discussing the meaning of Heidegger's philosophy, but a series of partial issues that do not need the understanding of time to be resolved.

The preeminence of Greek thought.
The concept of truth.
The criticism of Western metaphysics. — David Mo

Time is related to all three.

To bring up the subject of time now is to try to deflect the question. — David Mo

No, it's to show that you don't understand the entire context of Heidegger's thinking. I do this only to demonstrate why you're so often misunderstanding various passages.

And no, Parmenides is not "guided by things." The claim in that passage is that he is guided by legein, or "noein," which is the simple awareness of something present-at-hand.
— Xtrix
Heidegger calls this mode of Being presence-at-hand, and he sometimes refers to present-at-hand entities as ‘Things’.
— Wheeler, Michael, Martin Heidegger, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Is it clear enough?
As you can see in the previous text, present-at-hand is equivalent to beings or things in the empirical world.
For Parmenides there are two different ways of knowledge: that of reason and that of opinion. The one of reason affirms that only the Being exists. That of opinion says that multiple and different things exist, but this is what the Goddess advises against as mere appearance.
Heidegger says that Parmenides is guided by things (“presents-at-hand”; see above!). There is a contradiction with Parmenides’ theory that he does not explain.
That from the things present-at-hand cannot be passed to Being or Dasein, is clearly expressed in a text that we have already commented. — David Mo

As I've said before, this is actually difficult and interesting. You bring up a good point and it's now given me pause. Here's my take: presence-at-hand is the mode of being of objects (things), yes. But it's certainly true that Parmenides also thinks/questions Being "in general", not simply beings (things). That has to be true, based on everything we've seen Heidegger say about Parmenides. I'm sure you agree. So while later thinkers may interpret Being as A being, as a "thing" like a substance or God or the totality of things in "nature," Parmenides thinks being, but is still guided in his interpretation of it by temporality (as anyone has to be, as Dasein -- who's meaning is temporality), in the sense of "presencing", which has dominated ever since.

I can't say for certain if Heidegger is clear on this, because I haven't read all of the "Parmenides" lectures. He certainly does revere Parmenides, and wants us to get back to this "great inception" and to the questioning of Being, but I think it's also true that he believes we need to do so in order to overcome it, as this is the "birth certificate" of our tradition, which dominates to this very day.

You most certainly can, because that's in essence the heart of Western philosophy: presence. Heidegger says so himself -- i.e., that this has been how Being has been interpreted since the early Greeks.
— Xtrix
And perverted because of its interpretation as substance.

Greece after the Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity—has asserted a metaphysics and, therefore, is placed in a specific relationship to what-is as a whole. Metaphysics inquires about the being of beings, but it reduces being to a being; it does not think of being as being. Insofar as being itself is obliterated in it, metaphysics is nihilism. The metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche. Consequently, Heidegger tries to demonstrate the nihilism of metaphysics in his account of the history of being, which he considers as the history of being’s oblivion. His attempt to overcome metaphysics is not based on a common-sense positing of a different set of values or the setting out of an alternative worldview, but rather is related to his concept of history, the central theme of which is the repetition of the possibilities for existence. This repetition consists in thinking being back to the primordial beginning of the West—to the early Greek experience of being as presencing—and repeating this beginning, so that the Western world can begin anew.
— W. J. Korab-Karpowicz: Martin Heidegger (1889—1976), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

*********** — David Mo

OK, try to hear me: I'm distinguishing between two claims. One is that every interpretation of being (including as "substance") since the early Greeks is essentially "wrong," and the other is that the Greek understanding of being has been "perverted," "diminished," etc. I agree he says the latter, I disagree about the former. Why? Because while an interpretation may very well be perverted regarding it's interpretation of what the Greeks originally believed (and hence "wrong" as incorrect, inaccurate, etc), in and of itself it is just as "valid" to interpret Being as "God," -- or Brahmin, for that matter (in Hinduism). Despite nothing like what the Greeks meant, these interpretations are nevertheless essentially Greek. Heidegger says this many times. So if they're "perverted," there's also something fundamentally "Greek" about them as well. What is it that's remained? That temporal standpoint -- the interpreting of Being in terms of time (namely, the present). This is why I keep bringing up time.

So it does no good to say "Descartes has a perverted interpretation of Being," or anything like that -- unless it's in comparison to what the Greeks believed (according to Heidegger) and described as "phusis," just as our later sense of "truth" is perverted in this case. Doesn't that mean logic is "wrong" or perverted? I don't think so, no. Nor is science, for that matter. Heidegger is not against science or technology. He's not against God or substance, either. But he is against looking back at the Greeks and interpreting them as being the "first scientists" retroactively, holding our current conceptions in mind. That's a completely wrong thing to do.

Maybe that helps. Again, fairly trivial because even if we go with your interpretation, what makes the early Greeks "right" besides their questioning? Because they too interpret Being as "presence," according to Heidegger. We should go back to them in order to shake off our pre-conceptions and all the baggage of our tradition so that we may "begin anew," as Korab-Karpowicz correctly says above -- but I don't think he's according that any ultimate truth lies in their interpretation.

There is a very simple question that you will never answer: What is the difference between being wrong and being blind and hiding the question that really matters? Is not the wrong question a mistake that prevents you from giving the right answer? — David Mo

I tried answering above. I don't think there *IS* a "right answer." If we are really doing ontology, then the aim of ontology is the question of being, so in that case to question being is the "correct" method of ontology (phenomenology). The early Greeks had the question right, and so were doing ontology -- their answers aren't a matter of right or wrong, however. So, again, is science "wrong" in its answers? Not at all. But it does not ask the question of being -- it studies beings (entities, things). According to you, all of science would be "wrong" because it doesn't question being. I do not see Heidegger saying that, nor do I think you believe that. Science never claims to be ontology. Even if it did, it wouldn't falsify its answers and results.

Two relevant passage:

"Since the essence of man, for the Greeks, is not determined as subject, a knowledge of the historical beginning of the Occident is difficult and unsettling for modern "thought," assuming that modern "lived experience" is not simply interpreted back into the Greek world, as if modern man enjoyed a relation of personal intimacy with Hellenism for the simple reason that he organizes "Olympic games" periodically in the main cities of the planet. For here only the facade of the borrowed word is Greek. This is not in any way meant to be derogatory toward the Olympics themselves; it is only censorious of the mistaken opinion that they bear an relation to the Greek essence." (Parmenides, p 165 -- emphasis mine) —

Replace "Olympics" here with "logic," "truth," "substance," etc. The same applies -- our modern conceptions are NOT Greek, just as our modern Olympics are not (except in word only), but in themselves they're fine. Heidegger only is "censorious" of the attributing to the Greeks this modern meaning and thus to the belief that what we believe is what the Greeks believed.

"In thus demonstrating the origin of our basic ontological concepts by an investigation in which their 'birth certificate' is displayed, we have nothing to do with a viscous relativizing of ontological standpoints. But this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits; these in turn are given facticly in the way the question is formulated at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is thus bounded off. On its negative side, this destruction does not relate itself towards the past; its criticism is aimed at 'today' and at the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology, whether it is headed towards doxography, towards intellectual history, or towards a history of problems. But to bury the past in nullity is not the purpose of this destruction; its aim is positive; its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect." B/T p. 23/44 —

Remember that "Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and per­ verted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task".
I bet you are unable to answer this simple and straightforward question without beating about the bush. — David Mo

Ok, straightforward answer: there is no difference. But where we apply "wrong" and "blind" is what matters. Do we apply it to science? I don't think we do. Do we apply it to ontology? Yes, in the context of it's goal. So if we define ontology's "aim" as clarifying the meaning of Being, and it doesn't do so, then it is indeed "blind and perverted to its ownmost aim." I don't see how we can jump from this to saying "Descartes' interpretation of Being as essentially ens infitinum is wrong, blind and perverted." It's a powerful ontology, and a very useful one-- at least in terms of the mind/body, subject/object duality (which is still a dominant view in the sciences). It does overlook a number of things, but so do the early Greeks (they overlook their guiding line of temporality). It is also hampered by much more traditional baggage and rather than question being, it 'takes over' a medieval understanding of being.

The sciences are also limited and also don't raise the ontological question. Does this make it all "wrong"? No. Does it make Descartes interpretations "wrong"? Again, I don't think so -- because what would be right? Phusis is "right" and the res cogitans is "wrong"? I don't think so. Furthermore, Heidegger never puts it like this.

Most people voted "don't care." You really should. The science is pretty clear about what humanity is facing, and it will effect all of us and all of our children. I'm talking specifically about climate change. This election is too important not to care.

Anyway, your maniacal repetition that Heidegger does not present the understanding of Being in the sense of right and wrong, is strongly refuted by this little phrase:

Only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its Being. No matter how provisional our analysis may be, it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly.
— Heidegger: (T&B, 43/69) — David Mo

Thankfully, because I have read Being and Time multiple times, especially part 1, it's very easy for me to see -- without even looking at it -- that this, once again, has nothing to do with your claim. Why? Because here Heidegger is talking about Dasein, and specifically about how to analyze it -- namely, through phenomenology, which he argues is the proper method for doing so. A couple of sentences above, which you deliberately leave out:


"Dasein does not have the kind of being which belongs to something merely present-at-hand within the world, nor does it ever have it. So neither is it to be presented thematically as something we come across in the same way as we come across what is present-at-hand. The right way of presenting it is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is itself an essential part of the ontological analytic of this entity. Only by presenting this entity in the right way..." [Italics mine -- p 43/68-69)


So again, that has NOTHING whatsoever to do with the "pre-ontological understanding of Being," it has to do with the method of analyzing Dasein; furthermore, it has absolutely nothing to do with the claim that Western metaphysics (philosophy) is "wrong" ("in the main"). Even if Heidegger had believed what you're projecting onto him, this quotation tells us nothing about it.

It's almost as if you're searching for something to prove your thesis, context be damned. My suggestion: try reading the first two introductions in their entirety. And then read them again. It's helpful to do so. Stop combing the first 100 pages for something that proves your thesis -- you won't find it. Trust me. Why? Because it isn't there, and never has been. You're misunderstanding Heidegger.

There is no "knowledge of the truth" mentioned, at all.
— Xtrix

It is impossible to understand something without having knowledge about it. If the early Greeks had a primordial understanding of the question of Being, they knew something important about it, which lost the later metaphysics. This is Heidegger’s Bible. — David Mo

He doesn't use the word "knowledge" for many reasons, as I mentioned above. Mainly because it's been understood, since a least Descartes and the dominance of epistemology, in the context of a subject "knowing" an object. But leaving that aside -- it's quite true that the early Greeks questioned Being, and that this questioning has been forgotten.

I'm not sure why "Bible" comes into play, besides being part of your project to paint Heidegger as a closet Christian who wants to set himself up as philosophy's savior. Which is very strange.

n the age of the first and definitive unfolding of Western philosophy among the Greeks, when questioning about beings as such and as a whole received its true inception, beings were called phusis.
This fundamental Greek word for beings is usually translated as "nature." We use the Latin translation natura, which really means "to be born," ''birth." But with this Latin translation, the originary content of the Greek word phusis is already thrust aside, the authentic philosophical naming force of the Greek word is destroyed. This is true not only of the Latin translation of this word but of all other translations of Greek philosophical language into Roman — Heidegger: ItM:10/14

I noticed you bolded the first "true," but not the second. Might as well bold the word any time he uses it -- it would be just as relevant. Which is to say, not at all.

The above is absolutely correct. The fact that you believe this supports your thesis is baffling. I've said over and over again that translations can certainly be "wrong."

If we pay attention to what has been said, then we will discover the inner connection between Being and seeming. But we can grasp this connection fully only if we understand "Being" in a correspondingly originary way, and here this means in a Greek way. — Ibid:76/106

Absolutely.

Heidegger never puts it as "truth of being."
— Xtrix
With those or similar words he says it repeatedly. — David Mo

No; he doesn't.

If the truth is the unveiling of Being, — David Mo

It isn't.

That's why Heidegger comes back and interprets his texts over and over again. If not, why does he do it? Is it not because he hopes to regain a path (beginning or way in his words) that has been lost? — David Mo

Yes, he hopes to re-awaken the question of the meaning of Being, which the early Greeks had and which has since been forgotten. Their interpretation of Being as "presence," however, is exactly what permeates all of Western thought, through multiple variations. So what gets lost/degenerated? The questioning itself. Which we should return to by understanding our tradition's origins in Parmenides/Heraclitus/Anaximander.

Or we can interpret this as his saying "The Greeks had the truth of being, and the truth has been lost." But this isn't supported by the text.

Aquinas is just as "wrong" as Parmenides. They both view being as something present-at-hand.
— Xtrix

Absolutely not. I have you presented a Heidegger's text against the perversion of Parmenides and Heraclitus by the Latin metaphysics (see above). Aquinas is a perfect example of substantialism that is the main concealment of Being in the Medieval philosophy. You cannot put them at the same level. — David Mo

You most certainly can, because that's in essence the heart of Western philosophy: presence. Heidegger says so himself -- i.e., that this has been how Being has been interpreted since the early Greeks. Thus, if substantialism is "wrong," then Parmenides is fundamentally "wrong" as well. You see how silly this reading of Heidegger is, I think.

Neither are "wrong." Parmenides questioned being; Aquinas was stuck in a tradition laid down by the Greeks, as was all of Scholasticism. In that sense, Parmenides is clearly the more "originary" thinker.

Heidegger says (T&B: 26/48) that Parmenides is guided by things for his interpretation of Being. Let us leave aside that this phrase is quite strange, since Parmenides denies the existence of everything that is not the unique Being. — David Mo

"Denies the existence of everything"? Everything has being. All that "exists" has being. Whatever "is" has being. What you're talking about is incoherent. The phrase "the unique Being" is also completely meaningless.

And no, Parmenides is not "guided by things." The claim in that passage is that he is guided by legein, or "noein," which is the simple awareness of something present-at-hand. This of course has the temporal structure of "making present." Once again, presence is emphasized -- just as I had indicated above. Later, beings are conceived as ousia. This is all right in the very passage you cite.

About the presence-at-hand things you should read this.

Heidegger, then, denies that the categories of subject and object characterize our most basic way of encountering entities. He maintains, however, that they apply to a derivative kind of encounter. When Dasein engages in, for example, the practices of natural science, when sensing takes place purely in the service of reflective or philosophical contemplation, or when philosophers claim to have identified certain context-free metaphysical building blocks of the universe (e.g., points of pure extension, monads), the entities under study are phenomenologically removed from the settings of everyday equipmental practice and are thereby revealed as fully fledged independent objects, that is, as the bearers of certain context-general determinate or measurable properties (size in metres, weight in kilos etc.). Heidegger calls this mode of Being presence-at-hand, and he sometimes refers to present-at-hand entities as ‘Things’.
— Wheeler, Michael, Martin Heidegger, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — David Mo

That's absolutely right. I prefer "entities" over "things," but the point is the same.

That is, a secondary knowledge because Being that is obviously not a “thing” and the knowledge of Being is the sine quanon condition, the most universal, etc. As Heidegger is never clear I am not sure if presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand knowledge can be preliminary steps to Being. But what they are not is the primordial knowledge that conditions everything else, that is, the knowledge of Being. — David Mo

(1) It's not "knowledge" at all. Stop projecting your own words -- Heidegger eschews them for good reason.

(2) "Preliminary steps to Being" is completely meaningless.

(3) What exactly are you arguing against? Being gets interpreted on the basis of time -- i.e., the present. Presence-at-hand is the mode of being we are in, as human beings, usually when things break down or we're in "reflective or philosophical contemplation," as Wheeler (correctly) says above. This mode of interpreting Being has been the dominant one since the beginning. This is the entire thesis. This is why the book is called "Being and Time." It has nothing to do with "knowledge," or "right and wrong," or "properties of Being," or some kind of ultimate, supreme, supernatural "force" out there that we can "know" somehow. All of that is added on by you, and is a complete misunderstanding.

...Oh, I forgot. I don't know what your cryptic reference to time is about. It's not what we're discussing. — David Mo

It's exactly what we're discussing, because we're discussing Heidegger, and you cannot possibly understand him if you don't understand his claims about time. It's not surprising you have no clue what it means. See (3) above.

Worth repeating:

"We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as its optically constitutive state. Dasein is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being. Keeping this interconnection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light -- and genuinely conceived --as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being." -- p. 17/39 —

Do you really understand this?

Xtrix,

Unsurprisingly, you did not respond to my question. — Gary M Washburn

Okay, I'll make it simple for you:

Uniqueness cannot exist in a Heideggerian world. — Gary M Washburn

No one is talking about "uniqueness." Absolutely no one. It wasn't mentioned here, it's not mentioned in Heidegger, and it has nothing to do with anything.

I didn't read the rest of your post. Learn to say something coherent in the first few lines -- otherwise I'm not interested in wasting my time on utter nonsense.