The Greeks did not have "knowledge of the truth" as if there's truth "out there" to be known.
— Xtrix

Later it becomes a matter of logos as assertion, as correct propositions and correspondence of that which is present-at-hand.
— Xtrix

Let us see:

At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle.
— Heidegger: Being and Time, Oxford, 2001, p. 225/268

(I have highlighted in bold letter some words that may help you understand what you seem unable to understand). — David Mo

Says the person who doesn't understand.

How exactly you misinterpret this as going against what I was quoted saying above shows you really don't know what you're talking about. My statements stand.

There is no "knowledge of the truth" mentioned, at all. What he's talking about there is a pre-ontological understanding of being, a "primordial understanding of truth," which co-existed with what later evolved as assertion, correctness, etc. That's why he says this understanding "held its own" against the concealment implicit in their ontology. Do you know what that means? I'll give you a hint: it has something to do with time.

For Heidegger (except in his last phase of his life, which is not that of the text we are commenting) truth is revelation (aletheia). And the opposite of truth is concealment. The primordial truth is the truth of Being. — David Mo

Eh. Heidegger never puts it as "truth of being." The truth is unconcealedness, yes. This relates to logos and phusis, as well -- as gathering, emerging, enduring. An openness or disclosure of being.

That “primordial” means Heidegger's idea that Being can only be understood through what is everyday and "close" to us. That is not a subjective truth. It is the knowledge of something that is there. As the text clearly states, the early Greeks had an understanding of that truth in contrast to those who began to hide their ontology. Aristotle is mentioned in the text, although elsewhere Heidegger situates Plato as the first to begin the concealment. In this sense, the Aristotelian metaphysics and its consequences in all the western metaphysics are blind to the truth of Being. — David Mo

He doesn't say "knowledge," he says "understanding." "Knowledge" is also a loaded term, and thus he avoids it. There is a "sense" of a being that's pre-theoretical, pre-ontological, pre-epistemological, that we all have as human beings.

"Blind to the truth of being." No. But the question of being has been forgotten and concealed. In Plato and Aristotle, the question was still very much alive -- but the concealment was beginning to take root. See 'Restriction of Being' chapter of Introduction to Metaphysics.

Regardless, even Parmenides was "presencing." Heidegger wants to acknowledge that and attempt to get beyond it. So while the Greeks asked the question about being, and had a primordial understanding of truth, the seed was always there (necessarily) for concealment. In that sense, Aquinas is just as "wrong" as Parmenides. They both view being as something present-at-hand.

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. (Being and Time p. 11/31; italics by Heidegger)

And that's why I asked you what it means to be blind to one thing. How can a philosophy that's blind to the most fundamental be "correct"? What the hell do you think it means to be blind? — David Mo

Here he is talking about ontology, particularly in relation to the sciences. Blind and perverted from its ownmost aim -- yes, that's true. This has nothing to do with your claim. Descartes and others do indeed clarify the meaning of being, but it's just a new variation on the tradition of presence. So "God" or the "res cogitans" are ontological interpretations, but within a tradition that Heidegger wants to get beyond. This doesn't mean they're "wrong" interpretations. Wrong would make no sense in this context. Why? Because there is no "right" way to interpret being. To translate it this way is pure confusion. Hence why he never claims this. There is certainly blind/misguided ways to do ontology, however -- for example, by not even clarifying the meaning of being, or not realizing that this is your "fundamental task." But this is in relation to what ontology's aim is -- which is the question of being. It's not a statement about the various interpretations of being in the history of Western philosophy. And it's certainly not saying they're all "wrong."

I wish, instead of beating around the bush, you'd answer this. And if you bring up your famous contexts, to explain what context might be there that makes being blind “correct”. — David Mo

I'm not saying it's correct. I'm also not saying the entire history of Western philosophy is "correct" either. See above. "Right" and "wrong" simply do not apply in this analysis. This is why he talks so much about hermeneutics -- the emphasis is on questioning, meaning, and interpretations. Not to go through them and point out how they're all "wrong," but to elucidate the various interpretations, how they've changed through time, and where they originated. This would have made up the second part of Being and Time, which was never published. Rather, see "Basic Problems of Phenomenology."

For a person who has spent many years studying Heidegger, you make primary mistakes. According Heidegger, present-at-hand is a deficient or secondary mode of knowledge. To put it as an example of “correct” knowledge is a macroscopic error on your part. — David Mo

I guarantee you that Heidegger never says "deficient." You and your true/false judgments are just childish. He will also NEVER describe it as a "mode of knowledge." This already shows how stuck you are in epistemology and analytic philosophy generally.

Regardless, I never once said that the present-at-hand is "correct" knowledge or anything like that. Yes, it is a founded mode of being. When things break down, etc. First and foremost, we're engaged, coping beings interacting with the world, with equipment and with each other.

Perhaps deign to read before launching accusations about "macroscopic" errors.

Some passages to chew on:

"Because Being cannot be grasped except by taking time into consideration, the answer to the question of Being cannot lie in any proposition that is blind and isolated. The answer is not properly conceived if what it asserts propositionally is just passed along, especially if it gets circulated as a free-floating result, so that we merely get informed about a 'standpoint' which may perhaps differ from the way this has hitherto been treated. Whether the answer is a 'new' one remains quite superficial and is of no importance. Its positive character must lie in its being ancient enough for us to learn to conceive the possibilities which the 'Ancients' have made ready for us. In its ownmost meaning this answer tells us that concrete ontological research must begin with an investigative inquiry which keeps within the horizon we have laid bare; and this is all that is tells us." - B&T p. 19/40

And here is essentially the entire book:

"We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as its optically constitutive state. Dasein is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being. Keeping this interconnection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light -- and genuinely conceived --as the horizon for all understand of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understand of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being." -- p. 17/39

No mention of "right" or "wrong," just a very clear thesis: up to the present day, time has been the horizon (the standpoint) of understanding and interpreting "being." Since the Greeks, this means parousia (presence); "idea" as prototype in Plato and "ousia" in Aristotle.

It's obvious why you want to ignore this and continue on about your childish point of "rightness" and "wrongness" (which is never in Heidegger, but which you want to try cramming in), but if you read this carefully it becomes obvious what's happening.

Or you can keep beleiving Heidegger thinks he's "right" and that almost everything else in Western philosophy is "in the main" simply "wrong." Go on framing it in that way if it helps you. Doesn't mean I have to take it seriously. Especially since you've given no evidence whatsoever that demonstrates it, other than pure misunderstanding of what he's talking about.

That's funny.

I really wish I could read it all in German!

The advent of beings lies in the destiny of being.
— Heidegger: Letter on Humanism, Op. Cit. p. 252

A property is nothing more than an attribute, a quality, like the ability to do something. If you say that X is y or that X possesses y, y is the property of X. Although Heidegger denies that Being is an entity like other entities, he attributes certain properties to it. — David Mo

No, he doesn't. Nor does he interpret or define being.

The "destiny of being" is meaningless until the context is provided. To believe Heidegger is treating "being" as an entity, or a being, and attaching a "destiny" to it as a property, is simply a mistake. Thinking being, interpreting being, etc., has a destiny -- Dasein has a destiny, and is historical. This is all related to his idea of time. It has nothing to do with an object with properties, which goes against everything he writes.

That advent of Being is the destiny that governs history. Notice that it is not beings that rule that destiny, but Being, which as such is placed as something different and above them. That is, supernatural. — David Mo

So now being is supernatural, according to you. "Different and above" beings? This makes no sense whatsoever.

Since being is not an object or a being, it is not "different and above" beings. The fact that any being is implies being. Another way to say it: Being (capitalized, for no reason) is the is-ness of any thing (any being) at all. You're continually getting confused about this. There is no set of "things" in the universe or nature and then Being, which is somehow "outside," "above," or "beyond" it all. If this is what comes to mind, it's a mistake.

Therefore, despite Heidegger's statement that Being is not God, he speaks of it in such a way that one cannot conclude but that it is a kind of divinity. Perhaps not a personalized god, but an entity of supernatural powers. — David Mo

Almost laughable. Stop reading secondary sources. If you want to pretend Heidegger is essetnially a crypto-Christian, that's your business.

Heidegger does not usually use the word "wrong". — David Mo

Exactly.

accuse someone of being blind or corrupting the matter is to be wrong. — David Mo

Someone? Who? Descartes? Kant? Aristotle?

Once again: translations have been wrong, or in error -- the way of Greeks understood beings (phusis) has been mistranslated and therefore misunderstood, corrupted, etc. That is far different from saying "the Christians were wrong and Parmenides was right," which is exactly what you want to interpret Heidegger as saying. "In the main." And you're wrong.

Any concealing or downgraded translation of Heraclitus and Parmenides in terms of substantia meant the loss of the right way of understanding Being. — David Mo

The "right way." It's almost laughable to put it like this.
— Xtrix
Well, you're laughing at Heidegger himself. — David Mo

Before even reading your quote, based on past behavior, I can predict that it will not contain anything like what you wrote above. Let's see...

The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein' s very understanding of Being-that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle. At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle. — Heidegger: Being and Time, Oxford, 2001, p. 225/268

Exactly.

It is clear from this text that the Greeks had a knowledge of truth that was later lost. That knowledge of truth is something like a way or pathway that was blocked. That this path was the right one and to which we must return Heidegger says so until he gets tired. It's absurd to have to repeat it so many times. — David Mo

It's absurd that you misinterpret this in such a way.

Here he is talking about truth as aletheia, which the early Greeks had and which we've lost. Why? Because our understanding of truth is much different, and phenomena get interpreted as something present-at-hand (one line above the cited passage).

The Greeks did not have "knowledge of the truth" as if there's truth "out there" to be known. Truth is unconcealment, an emerging (phusis). Later it becomes a matter of logos as assertion, as correct propositions and correspondence of that which is present-at-hand. None of this has anything to do what your claim that the Greeks had the "right way of understanding Being." Being is not even mentioned here -- the issue is truth and the analysis of the "traditional conception of truth" and its derivatives.

As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to?
— Xtrix
For example: — David Mo

The human being is rather "thrown" by being itself into the truth of being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of being, in order that beings might appear in the light of being as the beings they are. Human being do not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the clearing of being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of being. — Heidegger: Letter on Humanism, Op. Cit. p. 252

Where does he "attribute to being" powers "beyond the natural" here? That's not what this passage says at all.

It's hard to attribute anything to Being, since being "itself" has no attributes. You keep wanting to think it's "God," or a mysterious "force," or something like that. But that's a tired, common reading of Heidegger. Completely untrue, to boot. He says nothing whatever, including in your irrelevant quotation (number 33, congratulations), about "powers of being." Being has no "powers." This is more of your own imagination.

How anyone could think, even after reading the little of Heidegger you have read (haphazardly, with the intention of confirming prior beliefs), that he says that Western metaphysics is "wrong," that the early Greeks were "right," and that being has properties, including "powers beyond nature," is pretty surprising. You've added this on yourself -- again, because you made up your mind a long time ago about Heidegger. It's a pity that this mentality blocks your understanding. I'd say "keep reading," but that's pointless -- and I should have realized that from the beginning.

Let me save you further trouble: Heidegger is a mystic and a charlatan who wanted to be the philosopher-savior of the Western world. And a Nazi to boot. He can rightfully be ignored, especially since he gave up on his project later in life.

There. Now you don't have to further burden yourself with this guy.

"Being must be explained beyond intuition." Again, this really goes against everything Heidegger writes.
— Xtrix

Again, you don't know Heidegger well :

Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self­ evident. Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, some use is made of 'Being'; and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands "The sky is blue', 'I am merry', and the like. But here we have an average kind of intelligibility, which merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible. It makes manifest that in any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities-even in any Being towards entities as entities-there lies a priori an enigma.The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the mean­ing of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again.
— Heidegger: B&T, p. 4/27 — David Mo

No, you weren't clear. Notice he doesn't once mention "intuition," which is a loaded term. If by "intuition" you're referring to the "pre-ontological understanding of being," then yes -- we shouldn't simply accept that understanding, and should raise the question of the meaning of being again. Fine. Be more clear next time.

Xtrix,

I think a lot of readers would say it was Heidegger who is from another planet. But, no, he was part of a tradition which he both parasited upon and abused. If you do not know the difference between induction and reduction you don't know enough philosophy to read any of it at all. Mind is far vaster place than you seem comfortable with. Whatever.

I gave you a statement: “Every utterance is unique.” What do you not understand in this? I must confess, I mean “unique” in the strict sense. If “Being” is as Heidegger claims, what is unique is either what “Being” is, or it is nothing at all. As Goethe claimed, you can't be hammer and anvil too. But if presence is a future emancipated from its past, then the unique is the emancipator that is the only presence. Presence, that is, because the future can only remembrance that unique act in contrariety to the stricture of its past in recognition of the value that emancipation is to it. It's a simple enough question, then, do you understand what uniqueness really is, and why it is conclusive proof Heidegger made a hash of everything he turned his mind to? — Gary M Washburn

You really do live in your own world, don't you? I haven't come across someone so delusional on this forum yet, so thank you for providing that experience.

Any concealing or downgraded translation of Heraclitus and Parmenides in terms of substantia meant the loss of the right way of understanding Being. — David Mo

The "right way." It's almost laughable to put it like this.

Your thesis: Parmenides and Heraclitus had it "right" (though we're not sure what the "it" refers to), and those after them have it "wrong." Excellent analysis. But not once in Heidegger. Which is why in all of your 32 references it's not once claimed.

As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to? There's no way Heidegger "attributes" anything to Being, because being HAS NO attributes. It has no properties. It has no traits. It is not even an "it."
— Xtrix

That is why Heidegger says that it is destiny, the key to being saved, that it is revealed or hidden, that it dwells in the languge, that is the truth, etc., etc. Of course, that's not having properties. I suppose Heidegger calls it something else, proclaims it to be the "true" meaning and is so calm. Privileges of quackery jargon. — David Mo

You don't have a clue about what you're talking about. Again. Quite boring.

Now it's simply "quackery jargon," which you believed from the beginning, prior to your very thorough and open-minded two-week investigation into Heidegger. Again, excellent analysis.

"The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity." -- B/T, p. 26

Objects and substances (beings) have properties. Being has no properties. What you referred to above is ridiculous -- he never refers to being as a "destiny" as though this a property of some kind, that's competely meaningless. You're confusing being and beings. Beings are revealed or hidden. Heidegger discusses this a lot. Of course, you have to read him first.

So there you go -- I've highlighted a bunch of "negative" words for you.
— Xtrix
Leaving aside the fact that here another subject is raised that is not Western metaphysics. the text you quote would work against your argument! Or is being dangerous not negative? — David Mo

I anticipated this, and even said so:

So there you go -- I've highlighted a bunch of "negative" words for you. If you truly believe, given what he's talking about here, that it relates to what you're claiming -- as I anticipate you will -- then you're completely off track. — Xtrix

Kind of funny. Thanks for proving my point.

It's a stupid decision, yes. Completely ignorant choice. But that doesn't make them stupid and dull people -- it means they're making a mistake.

I say it here, and I'd say it your face as well tough guy.

I wonder what the logic was here. How does she appeal to anyone besides establishment Democrats? A California lawyer. Not seeing the strategy.

I still think what's most shocking is the 8 people on this site who said they'd vote for Donald Trump.

Xtrix,

Not off topic at all. Just not within the limits you arbitrarily set. — Gary M Washburn

The limits I set is that this thread is about Martin Heidegger's philosophy. That's not arbitrary, it's the topic I chose. Are we free to talk about life on Mars? Sure. But that's off topic. Likewise, nearly everything you've said is off-topic -- and both incoherent and boring, to boot.

I'll skip the rest.

Heidegger offers no interpretation of being
— Xtrix

If you mean he doesn't offer any coherent interpretation, fine. But that doesn't stop him from attributing to Being a number of powers that go beyond the natural. — David Mo

No, he offers no interpretation period.

As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to? There's no way Heidegger "attributes" anything to Being, because being HAS NO attributes. It has no properties. It has no traits. It is not even an "it." Being is not a being. It is not an object. It is not an entity.

This is elementary in Heidegger. But feel free to explain. What, in your opinion, is he "attributing" to being?

As he says in Being and Time, Being must be explained beyond the intuition, because the existing explanations have hidden the truth of Being. — David Mo

"Being must be explained beyond intuition." Again, this really goes against everything Heidegger writes.

Being is interpreted as presence in the Western tradition. That has become self-evident and unquestioned. Heidegger wants to re-awaken the question again, through phenomenology (basically the analysis of what's "hidden") of our existence and through the "deconstruction" of the history of Western thought. Where do attributes and explanations come into play?

"In the main they are wrong." You simply don't know what you're talking about.
— Xtrix

I think this is exactly your case:

You're a good disciple of Heidegger: you've decided that words don't mean what they usually mean but what you want them to mean. That's why you don't care what the dictionaries and everyone who has studied Heidegger say. — David Mo

"Everyone who has studied Heidegger." First of all, I've studied Heidegger. I care about my own reading of him, yes. More so than secondary sources. If they have evidence, I'll gladly hear it. You certainly have not provided it. Secondly, "everyone" is a sweeping generalization with no basis in fact. Dreyfus, Carmen, Blattner, Kelley, etc. etc., hardly agree with your assessment.

Of course, the criterion of authority is not an argument in itself, but there are times when it is useful. It's useful in the face of a question we don't know. When talking about nuclear physics, most human beings have no choice but to trust what the scientists say. When all the experts on Heidegger say one thing contrary to what you say you would do well to meditate a little on your position. Especially when you are not able to present a single text that supports your position and you say it because you want to. — David Mo

Again, see above regarding "all the experts." But not only does the text not support your assertion, neither do the experts.

And I've quoted MULTIPLE texts that demonstrate exactly the opposite of what you're saying. I even linked you a video from Heidegger's own mouth about how he "does not mean by that anything negative." I suppose that was ignored, which isn't surprising.

And your whole excuse is that "free from something" is a "technical" term whose meaning only you know. Don't make me laugh. Where did you get your knowledge? If you don't back up your interpretation with commentators' texts or Heidegger's, where does your interpretation come from? Is it a metaphysical intuition? — David Mo

It comes from Heidegger's text, which I've quoted dozens of times. Of course he's arguing we should free ourselves from the tradition. That's not in question. What's in question is your taking that to mean the history of philosophy is somehow "wrong" in Heidegger's eyes, and yet haven't "presented a single text that supports your position," not surprisingly -- because he never says it. Your "deducing" it from the text is your own business. I've provided plenty of explanation as to why that's not the case -- which you've (also not surprisingly) ignored. That's also your business, not mine. If you care to learn, then learn to listen. If you care to pretend to be an expert out of ego, then do it elsewhere.

I got tired of providing you with Heidegger's negative terms regarding the western metaphysical tradition, — David Mo

And I get tired repeatedly telling you that these terms pertain to translations of Greek words, not to what you're claiming. If you still don't understand that, that's also your problem, not mine.

I think I must have put here a dozen examples taken from Heidegger's own books. I repeat some of them to refresh your memory, which seems to be somewhat weak.

Deteriorating, collapsing, falling down, inadequately formulated, forgotten, distortions, taken over dogmatically, concealments, baleful prejudice, failed to determine, falsified, misses its sense entirely, falsified from the bottom up, degeneration, blocked, forgotten, erroneous — David Mo

Yes, and which ones are referring to "Western philosophy", exactly? Don't bother, I already know. See above.

If you want to believe that listing a bunch of words, without context, lends credence to your claims that Heidegger believes the Western interpretations of being have been "wrong," you're welcome to.

"Firstly I have to correct the question with regard to the way in which you talked about the 'downfall of Being'. For that is not meant in a negative manner. I do not speak about a 'downfall' of Being, but rather about the fate of Being insofar as it hides itself more and more in comparison to the Openness of Being with the Greeks." -- Martin Heidegger

Again, the above quotation is Heidegger, not me. What do you make of it? Is he simply confused? True, maybe you, in your extensive study, understand Heidegger better than me -- and better than Heidegger.

All of them constitute a "radical" criticism, that is to say, in its root, to the western metaphysics, which, according to Heidegger has undertaken a wrong way of which it is necessary to get rid of. Of course, according to your metaphysical intuition they do not mean "wrong". They're just for show. — David Mo

Let me try this way. If Western metaphysics is "wrong" -- then what's "right"? Parmenides and Heraclitus? What were their interpretations of being? They certainly asked the question -- but so did Plato and Aristotle. Where is the textual support for this assertion, if in fact this is what you believe?

But you just respond like a litany (mantra, if you like) that they don't mean what they obviously say. But you cannot present a single text in your favour. — David Mo

I have provide multiple texts in my favor. But if I were using your method, I'd simply pick "positive" words from Being and Time and make a list of them, context-free.

So far all you've proven is that you can list words that Heidegger uses. You've had several opportunities to show where he says the interpretations of being are "wrong." Where? I'll give you another shot. But I won't hold my breath, because there are none. You've taken other words, like "falsified from the bottom up" (pertaining to translations, as I've repeatedly 100 times), and claimed it as proof that the tradition is "wrong," which is never said. That's all you've done.

So this debate is not a real debate. It is pure stubbornness on your part. — David Mo

The stubbornness is with you. I've said from the beginning it was a nit-picking point, said numerous things which are far more substantial (and even re-posted them to get it back on track), and yet you've focused, laser-like, on this one narrow and boring issue. The fact that you refuse to understand it, "stubbornly," is your own issue. The fact that I won't let it slide, even something as trivial as this, is what's truly bothering you -- but I do so repeatedly because it's simply incorrect. You should be adult enough to see it. But you won't, because you want to believe you're an expert in something you're not. As I've been very honest about: I know Heidegger better than you. It's not because I'm smarter, it's because I've spent more time reading him. You refuse to accept this and learn from me. That's also your business.

Probably because you presented yourself as someone who knew Heidegger's work well and this is not true. If you have read one or two texts that you did not understand or did not want to understand. There's not much to present you as an authority on the subject. — David Mo

I never said I was an authority. But do I understand Heidegger better than you? Yes, and it's clear to me. It'd be clear to Heidegger scholars as well.

You started this thread by saying:
I want to be clear that I consider Heidegger to be a great thinker and teacher, and that I've learned a great deal from his writings and interviews
— Xtrix

You don't look like you've demonstrated that much knowledge of Heidegger to me. Actually, almost nothing. I think the two months I've been reviewing Heidegger has been more productive than your whole life as a Heideggerian. I've presented at least ten times more Heidegger's texts here than you have. A clear indication. — David Mo

Not my whole life. The spring of last year until the present I've been carefully and seriously reading Heidegger. I have well over a dozen books. I've listened to many lectures as well.

You don't really think that, and you know it. Your ego is just getting the best of you, and now you're regressing into a childlike tantrum. Carry on if you must, but I suggest not letting emotion get the better of you.

It's also ironic that the person accusing me of not understanding Heidegger has admittedly read far less, and has very explicitly started from an approach of debunking/refuting rather than attempting to understand (which has consistently lead to false, speculative, and unsubstantiated claims, both about what Heidegger says and about his character).

_________

To recap. Your claim is that (1) Heidegger believes Western philosophy (since at least Parmenides and Heraclitus), in the sense of its interpretations of being (since ousia), is "wrong" ("in the main").

It's a simple claim, and it's simply wrong. Heidegger does not say this, nor does he believe it. In fact, as I've quoted above, goes out of his way to say there is nothing negative meant in his assessment. These interpretations are not inaccurate or incorrect -- in fact these terms don't even apply. They are simply historical facts (as he sees it). What you've given as examples are related to translations, mainly of Greek words (e.g., aletheia, logos, phusis, doxa, etc), which Heidegger indeed believes are wrong, inaccurate, and incorrect. You take these and conflate them with (1) above. That's simply not the case.

Here's an example of why you go awry (emphasis mine):

"There are various ways in which phenomena can be covered up. In the first place, a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that is is still quite undiscovered. It is neither known nor unknown. Moreover, a phenomenon can be buried over. This means that is has at some time been discovered but has deteriorated [verfiel] to the point of getting covered up again. This covering-up can become complete; or rather--and as a rule-- what has been discovered earlier may still be visible, though only as a semblance. Yet so much semblance, so much 'Being.' This covering-up as a 'disguising' is both the most frequent and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn." -- B&T, p. 60

So there you go -- I've highlighted a bunch of "negative" words for you. If you truly believe, given what he's talking about here, that it relates to what you're claiming -- as I anticipate you will -- then you're completely off track.

But carry on.

I've considered myself a pessimist now, and I'm 38 years old. To be honest, it leads me to being severely depressed & suicidal; there is not a single day now where I don't think of death, and even suicide personally. — niki wonoto

Although admittedly, my pessimistic outlook were perhaps mostly & originally also caused by what I've considered myself & my life to be a failure. — niki wonoto

Why do you consider it a failure? According to what standard? Your own or others? If your own, why do you hold those standards and not others? Some might say you're a success. You need a standard on which to judge failure or success, and it helps by starting with a particular area. Narrow it down a little. Are you a "failure" in finance, health, relationships, education, work, job?

38 seems a little young to be pessimistic. I read Schopenhauer in my early 30s, but never became suicidal. A good antidote to pessimism is realizing what Nietzsche pointed out: it's simply one perspective, betraying a physiological disposition more than anything else. He was responding directly to Schopenhauer.

Is this world really that awful or painful? For some people, some of the time. But not for most. If you live in the United States or in Europe, you're far more privileged than most of the world, and in fact most people in history. Most of these "other" people are too busy to be depressed or pessimistic. We in the West, with our technology and higher standard of living, have the time to say "It's not good enough."The point being: it's something learned, and it can be un-learned. First and foremost, stop reading things that confirm and reinforce your depression -- that's no different than political information silos.

There are plenty of opportunities in life, and you can make what you wish of it. Not happy with yourself? Well, suicide is an option -- true. But if death doesn't scare you, what the hell if holding you back in LIFE? Loss? Rejection? Failing? Compared to voluntary, eternal non-existence, none of these things seem all that bad.

There are also practical measures you can take to beat depression (and pessimism) if you really are motivated. Meditation is a great one for that. There's plenty of resources online. But be forewarned: it's hard work. Exercise helps a lot. Diet too. Having good friends, and generally a strong social support system is also very beneficial -- most suicides and depression stems from isolation and loneliness. Having an idea of what you want out of life -- working towards something -- is crucial as well. What do you care about? Get engaged with others and work towards that.

All of these things, individually or (better) in combination will pull you out of depression. If you're extremely depressed and suicidal, then see a therapist. Meds can really help, at least as training wheels.

Cheers.

“They encounter a sick man or an old man or a corpse, and immediately they say, 'Life is refuted.' But only they themselves are refuted, and their eyes, which see only this one face of existence.” -- Nietzsche

There is nothing I equate "Being" with because that would be to predicate upon the form of predication. Neither can the form or idea of predication be intransitive. It is a passive verb, or, at most, a part of a middle voice, not an active agent in the real. "Being" is not a pronoun! By 'better', I simply mean more meaningful. or even more what meaning, and worth, is. The only agency in reality is a departure that has no "da" unless what remains is burdened with a responsibility that the worth of the departed be recognized. That departure is the only act of being, and that response is what love really is. There can be no anticipating it or finding it in time, because it is not being there at all. And what does "da" mean? For one thing, it really is neither here nor there, and if context determines for us what we think it means it can hardly be objective. The plain fact of the matter is the more we map our whereabouts the less present we are there. Proximally and for the most part, if I may, all systems of navigation are quite explicitly a means of passing through and leaving, not of being there at all. And if you mean to leave you are not really there. "Da" is intrinsically vague and ambiguous, and vagueness and ambiguity is what "Being" is. The capitalization does not give it agency. — Gary M Washburn

I never once mentioned agency.
I never once mentioned "love."

"Vagueness and ambiguity is what 'being' is" is more nonsense, so I assume one of your "original" thoughts.

Learn to use the "quote" feature so people know what the hell you're talking about. Otherwise you're a massive bore.

The term "Aletheia" came up at some point. Fact is, Lethe is the river all souls must drink from entering Hades, for forgetfulness. A-letheia, therefore, means, simply, the unforgotten or un-forgetfulness. — Gary M Washburn

So far the only coherent (and accurate) thing you've said.

Scholars are in general agreement that Heidegger's grasp of Greek is bogus. — Gary M Washburn

What scholars? Provide reference to these scholars.

Sorry if I'm not getting through to you, but I am quite certain the fault is not wholly mine. — Gary M Washburn

No, I'm quite certain it is. You keep rambling off topic, and it's boring. If you simply want to hear yourself talk, let me know so I can ignore you. By adding "Xtrix" at the beginning of your post, I assume it's related to me somehow. So far that really hasn't been the case, as you've simply meandered into irrelevancies. You remind me of Harding from One Flew Over the Cuckoos Nest.

Re-read what I wrote and try again.

If you want to say that Heidegger's words against metaphysical Western tradition (degenerated, deteriorate, concealing, dogmatic, etc.) are not negative I think we have different dictionaries. And so it is impossible any serious discussion.
— David Mo

Not different -- he just never applies it in the way you're saying. As I've gone over with you several times now, there's a distinction to be drawn between translations and the entirety of Western thought. He does not believe the latter is "wrong" -- but rather that an essential thing has been overlooked: that all of our various ways of interpreting being has been on the basis of the present -- and that perhaps it's time to go to the "things themselves" (the cry of phenomenology) by understanding and overthrowing this tradition. — Xtrix

This, along with every other substantive comment I've made, naturally gets ignored in favor of:

Kind of a weak appeal to authority.
— Xtrix
If you don't mind being alone in the face of danger, go ahead. But Gary Cooper only wins in the movies. — David Mo

He doesn't say "get rid of," he says we must "free ourselves" from
— Xtrix

From Cambridge dictionary of English:
Synonym of free from/of sth. : removing and getting rid of things.

This is my dictionary, what is your dictionary? I'm afraid it's not an English dictionary. — David Mo

So now you've apparently been reduced to appeals to authority and, as I've discussed elsewhere, appeals to dictionaries. Pity.

You won't find any negativity in Heidegger beyond perhaps harsh critiques of translations -- and rarely at that. Your own projections are exactly that: your own. This "true/false", "good/bad," "right/wrong" way of analyzing history and philosophy is childish and, more importantly, completely misses Heidegger's point. I suggest going back to the drawing board on that one.

But again it's worth pointing out that this is a trivial issue. One you happen to be wrong about and can't bring yourself to admit to, but since you evidently have nothing left to contribute beyond that you carry on anyway. Well, carry on some more if you must.

I don't think you're saying that necessarily...but think about it: if they're all "wrong" in their interpretation of being and beings and of time, then what value do they have?
— Xtrix
I think I've explained this, but here we go.

If they have any, it will not be as paths to the truth of Being, guides of the thinker. They will be partial and secondary successes. In the main they are wrong. That's not I who say this. Heidegger repeatedly says it, as anyone who's read only one of his books can be aware. — David Mo

No, he doesn't. Why? Because "paths to the truth of Being" is meaningless, for anyone who's read Heidegger. Openness of being is the truth, and thus we all possess it, in a "pre-ontological understanding." Being is not an object.

Secondly, "wrong" is never said in Heidegger when referring to the interpretation of being, as I have shown. Never. Not once. Ever. That's your fantasy. I'll repeat once again, for the now perhaps tenth time, so you can selectively leave it out of your quotations: Heidegger offers no interpretation of being. He's talking about the history of the interpretation, the meaning, of being, and the asking of the question of the meaning of being. The early Greeks did ask that question, and it has since become trivialized and concealed. The interpretation of being has been through-and-through Greek, as presence, but has gone through many variations, from the Christian to the modern age. These interpretations are not "wrong," which is why Heidegger never says that, but they do indeed forget the asking of the question and so, at their core, take up a thoroughly Greek intepretation: namely, ousia -- presence.

"In the main they are wrong." You simply don't know what you're talking about. Mainly due to the fact that you want to paint a picture of Heidegger as a person with a god-complex who wants to position himself as a savior of some kind. With that picture in mind, yes I'm sure it's very easy to project onto his writings something like "All of Western philosophy is wrong, in the main." But it's utter nonsense.

Perhaps read Heidegger for longer than a couple weeks.

My instructor was a recognized expert in Heidegger who conducted well attended seminars on him, and Plato, at a major eastern university. When her class tied itself in knots trying to work out what “Being” is she would sometimes forcefully pronounce that '“Being” is better than nothing!' But is it? — Gary M Washburn

I don't understand what "better" signifies here, nor what you mean by "being" and "nothing." So there's no way to talk about it. It's clear you're not using any of these terms in reference to Heidegger, since you've made clear you haven't read him and have no interested in doing so. So your own very free-thinking observations and questions look juvenile to me, in that context. It's good to ask those questions regardless, and I wish you well in your pursuit of them.

In fact, she drove herself insane, and ultimately to an early grave, believing that, and reiterating it ever more forcefully. But aren't there times, admittedly rare and very painful times, when nothing is better than something? When “Being” just isn't worth it? If so, it takes courage, honesty, and a great deal of discipline to recognize this. To tell me you cannot see any meaning in my responses is not an argument against me. And it bespeaks an astonishing lack of interest in what you seem to be claiming to be deeply invested in. I understand that you initiated this thread, and expect a certain control over its conduct. But if that expectation extends to dismissing strong counter-views I can only conclude your interest is not as intense as you suppose. — Gary M Washburn

Your writing is incoherent and completely off-topic and, thus, inappropriate. That's what I object to, first and foremost.

Now you seem to be equating "Being" with life, and asking if there aren't some times in life where death is better than life. That's been asked many times by many people, and it's a good question and an important one -- but that's completely irrelevant to this thread. Do you understand?

My interests in Heidegger and the question of being has nothing to do with what you're talking about. You're off in your own world. To flatter yourself by saying you offer "strong counter-views" should be embarrassing. You've not demonstrated the least bit of understanding of Heidegger, the topic of this thread, and have even gone on to say you have no interest in doing so. If you want to share your questions and views on various topics, you're welcome to. Why come here to do so? That's what I'm not seeing and what you're apparently not understanding.

This, by the way, is the subject of Hess's impressive book, and of all the other sources I have cited, which you seem to suppose have no bearing upon the question of the meaning of “Being”. Another resource is a movie called “Cloud Atlas”, in which rebels against oppressive regimes find themselves together over great stretches of time, never really successful in their own time, but ultimately more real and worthwhile together, though never meeting, than any of them is in their own time. Something like this is how recognizing that nothingness is sometimes is better than “Being”, and that our enjoining in recognizing this is much more worthy of us than asserting it can never mean anything, as Heidegger does. — Gary M Washburn

(1) Your use of "Being" is not that of Heidegger's. Heidegger in fact offers no interpretation whatsoever.
(2) Heidegger never, not once, claims that being "never means anything." That's a completely ridiculous statement, given that you've read him at all. But since you haven't, I suppose it's forgivable.
(3) "Being" is not synonymous with "life" or "consciousness," so why keep using it this way?

So, if the above is to the point at all, "Being" is and can only be a kind of decadence. And the world is the circumstance and language of that decadence. The quotidian is endemic to "Being". There simply is no enduring what worth is. And so, "Being" always forecloses itself against it. — Gary M Washburn

Complete gibberish.

You're dancing on a tightrope.

Your objections to my interpretation of Heidegger (by the way, this is the standard interpretation) are only based on words. — David Mo

"Standard interpretation" to claim that Heidegger believes all of Western philosophy, excluding the preSocratic Greeks, are "wrong"? What can I say -- if that's true, so much for the "standard interpretation." Kind of a weak appeal to authority.

But yes, I am taking issue with words. I said so from the beginning. They're rather "nit-picky" but relevant nevertheless.

If you want to say that Heidegger's words against metaphysical Western tradition (degenerated, deteriorate, concealing, dogmatic, etc.) are not negative I think we have different dictionaries. And so it is impossible any serious discussion. — David Mo

Not different -- he just never applies it in the way you're saying. As I've gone over with you several times now, there's a distinction to be drawn between translations and the entirety of Western thought. He does not believe the latter is "wrong" -- but rather that an essential thing has been overlooked: that all of our various ways of interpreting being has been on the basis of the present -- and that perhaps it's time to go to the "things themselves" (the cry of phenomenology) by understanding and overthrowing this tradition.

Or maybe Heidegger thinks Plato and Aristotle and Descartes and Kant are all completely "wrong." Have it your way. But there's no evidence of it.

Thinking is l'engagement by and for the truth of being. The history of Being is never past but stands ever before us; it sustains and defines every condition et situation humaine. In order to learn how to experience the aforementioned essence of thinking purely, and that means at the same time to carry it through, we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thinking. The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato and Aristotle. They take thinking itself to be a techné, a process of deliberation in service to doing and making. — Heidegger: Letter on Humanism.

Thank you for this. It says it better than I could have. I read it AFTER I wrote what I wrote above.

If getting rid of does not imply a negative evaluation, tell me which dictionary you use. — David Mo

He doesn't say "get rid of," he says we must "free ourselves" from an interpretation of thinking that "has its beginnings" in Plato and Aristotle. Just as we must about time. Just as we must about being. Just as we must about truth. Etc.

What dictionary are you using where this somehow becomes a negative judgment? Un-doing and un-learning what we've learned from a long tradition, in order to open new horizons of thinking, hardly means that what was learned is without merit or greatness. In fact Heidegger praises Kant, Hegel, Aristotle, etc., many many times. Odd for a bunch of wrong-headed people who have mislead us for so long, no?

If you are accusing me of saying that Heidegger's negative evaluation of Western metaphysics implies that nothing it says has any value, I would ask you to read what I write. — David Mo

I don't think you're saying that necessarily...but think about it: if they're all "wrong" in their interpretation of being and beings and of time, then what value do they have?

Doesn't matter though, because he isn't saying that in the first place.

First you have to tell us what "God" is.

But I wonder why you say "perverted the question"
— Xtrix

The answer is in the very texts by Heidegger and his commentators that I have quoted here.
For example:

"The verb 'verfallen' is one which Heidegger will use many times. Though we shall usually translate it simply as 'fall', it has the connotation of deteriorating, collapsing, or falling down". (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Being and Time, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, p. 42, footnote). — David Mo

"Falling" has nothing to do with the question of being. This is out of context.

"Greek ontology and its history which, in their numerous filiations and distortions, determine the conceptual character of philosophy even today-prove that when Dasein understands either itself or Being in general, it does so in terms of the 'world', and that the ontology which has thus arisen has deteriorated [ verfallt] to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident -merely material for reworking". (Heidegger: B&T, p. 22/43)

If you don't like the word "degenerate," you can take "pervert" or " deteriorated". I don't see the difference. Anyway, the word "degenerate" is also used by Heidegger (Ibid, p. 36/61, for ex.). And "peverted" on a B&T quote I placed above.

Why does Heidegger say this? We should ask him. In my opinion, he wasn't clear. But in his words, it seems that substantialism is to blame for this degeneration, perversion, deterioration or fall. Because it turns the mystery of being into an intelligible "thing". And what is understood made it nervous. He was into mystery, poetry, fog and vagueness. —

Yes, the question has "deteriorated" and become reduced to something self-evident. "When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed." (B&T p. 43)

It's worth remembering what we're talking about:

Heidegger respected Aristotle and Kant - I am not so sure about Descartes - but he thought that they were part of a philosophical tradition that perverted the question of Being, which is the mother of all questions. — David Mo

But I wonder why you say "perverted the question" -- I think they've simply overlooked the question. — Xtrix

I stand by that. You'll not find Heidegger saying that these men "perverted" the question of being -- why? Because they never asked it or, better, they overlooked it. Take this example regarding Kant:

"There were two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem of Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme..." (p 45 B&T)

It's hard to pervert the question when it's become so concealed, so taken for granted, that it's no longer even asked.

"Instead of this, Kant took over Descartes' position quite dogmatically, notwithstanding all the essential respects in which he had gone beyond him." (p 45)

The question of the meaning of Being has been neglected and concealed since the inception of Western philosophy, which ended in Aristotle. Even in Aristotle it was becoming concealed and transforming from phusis to idea and ousia. This is the point. We can negatively judge all philosophy afterwards if we choose, but that's our business. No need to project it on to Heidegger -- he doesn't do this. He's simply pointing out that it's happened. He offers no interpretation himself, and if he did he would hardly call it the "correct" interpretation. Rather, he further points out that all interpretations in the Western tradition have inadvertently made their interpretations on the basis of temporality, which is what we are as human beings. Human beings -- our perspectives, values, interpretations, words -- is where all of this philosophizing comes out of. If we are temporal creatures, then it's fairly easy to see, once it's pointed out, that our understanding of what it means to "be" human, and what it means to "be" anything at all, is filtered through our temporal lens. Kant pointed this out in his own way. In the Western world, Heidegger argues, it's been especially from the "present" that Being gets interpreted -- ousia as parousia (constant presence). "Time" itself has been interpreted from temporality (experiential time, lived time) and has thus been likewise concealed in its phenomenological basis. But none of this has anything to do with accusations of perversion, "incorrectness," falsity, etc. It's simply one way that one group of human beings, 2500 years ago, interpreted the world. If in the present day we want to find new directions and new values, we have to shake off this tradition by recognizing this fact and thus opening new horizons for thinking.

I struggle to see how phenomenology could be considered objective and noumenology could be considered subjective, as Heidegger claims. — gurk

Heidegger never claims this.



Excellent response.

I hear you. It looks like Biden is pretty malleable, and so hopefully we can push him on progressive policies once he's in office. But one thing has become clear: four more years of Trump and we're toast.

No, it isn't. Looking under a rock is not science. If we define that as "science," then apes do science as well. It's an absurd definition.
— Xtrix
Then apes do science. — Harry Hindu

OK! Would you excuse me for a minute...

A year and a half! Wow! I may have written more than you've read. I might not be any more impressed if you said a decade and a half. But, keep reading, and keep a sharp eye on how your reading changes over a lifetime. Then maybe you'll recognize what the real question is. — Gary M Washburn

I said I've been reading Heidegger (carefully) for a 1 and a half. Philosophy generally has been a lifelong interest on mine. Try reading more carefully.

Heidegger strikes me as the kid who doesn't like his role in the game and takes the ball away, expecting to be begged for his return, under his terms. I gave up on Heidegger when the Neitzsche series came out. What a hatchet job! — Gary M Washburn

Yes, I'm sure you waded through the hundreds of pages of Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche very carefully and that was the deciding factor in avoiding him. A "hatchet job" -- excellent critique.

Stop being a child. If you have anything interesting to say, please say it soon.

So, no, I am not going to go chapter and verse. — Gary M Washburn

In other words, you can't back up anything you say. What a shocker.

I don't believe for one minute that you've read any Heidegger, given the nonsense you've been talking. Secondary interpretations, however -- maybe you've done a little perusing.

So given that this thread is about Heidegger, and that I was clear from the beginning that one should have at least read Being and Time, your incoherent ramblings are welcome elsewhere.

I suggest you read Plato's Gorgias. — Gary M Washburn

I suggest you read Heidegger.

So, if you cannot explain yourself except by reiterating the assertion that is at issue, then let me try. — Gary M Washburn

Explain what? You haven't asked anything -- you've simply made incoherent statements.

What is at stake is the articulation of the worth of time. That articulation only comes in sudden bursts of intensity or moment. It always leaves nothing, no term in any language, no issue in any life, unmoved and unaltered. And until this is recognizable in a way no "Being" can remembrance there is no worth in "Being" at all. — Gary M Washburn

This is complete gibberish. "Articulation of the worth of time"? This is completely meaningless, and not ONCE in Heidegger. The "worth of time" means nothing whatsoever.

Heidegger talks a great deal about time as the horizon of interpreting Being, which I can explain to you if you want to learn about it, since you've not read him: Heidegger's thesis in Being and Time is that from the Greeks onwards, "being" has been interpreted on the basis of one mode of time -- the present. It has been called "ousia" in Aristotle, and has gone through variations since then. "Ousia" Heidegger links to "parousia," which means constant presence. It gets translated as "substance." Being gets objectified in the same way we objectify objects in our environment when things break down -- like a hammer. The hammer becomes an object with properties when we're looking at it scientifically or philosophically, in an abstract or theoretical way, which Heidegger calls "presence-at-hand." This same mode of abstract thinking or "presencing" is the mode we're in when thinking theoretically, which is the state of philosophy and science and has been since the inception of Western philosophy in the Greeks.

So it is on the basis of TIME that Being has been interpreted for 2,500 years. TIME, however, has also been interpreted as a being, as an entity -- as a sequence of "nows," as a kind of number line, as measurable motion -- which itself is a present-at-hand, theoretical kind of "being," and so another object of thought. This is not how Heidegger sees time. This very concept also dates back to Aristotle and his essay on time in the lectures on Physics, and Heidegger goes over this in lectures after B+T, in "Basic Problems of Phenomenology" and others. So rather than confusingly using "time" in discussing where this very concept emerges from (which is the human being), Heidegger uses "temporality" instead. Temporality is one way of interpreting what a human being is -- through its activity.

We are caring, willing, feeling beings -- and are always moving towards ("towards which"), on the way to something, doing things now for something later ("for the sake of which"), etc; striving, future-oriented beings with unconscious goals and plans -- displayed through our actions, habits, skilsl, and "average everyday" activity. (Aristotle in many ways has this "right" and you can see the influence on Heidegger.) Looking at average everyday activity phenomenologically (looking at what's hidden), which is mostly ready-to-hand activity (coping, engaged action), we see that human beings are mostly "care" (Sorge), and that "care" is essentially temporal -- e.g., "anticipating" something involves feeling, desiring, and willing, and where we conceptualize "future." It's not only "thinking time," in the traditional sense of "thought" as logic, rules, and theory.

The common concept of "time" is thus grounded in our being, which is caring: "anticipation" can be thought of as the future, as something not yet happening.

There's much more to say about it, but this is a general outline. All of which can be supported with actual passages from Heidegger, and all of which is far more interesting and clear than your unlettered incoherence.

I guess I'm not getting the ball back. I'm not your enemy. I know what it is like to become addicted to Heidegger talk. It was like rehab getting out of it. And I was helped because I was all along pursuing a strain of thought of my own. If the book is getting in the way of thinking for yourself it's time to put the book aside. — Gary M Washburn

I don't consider you my enemy, nor do I treat Heidegger as ultimate truth. I have, however, made a genuine effort to understand his thinking -- as I have done with Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Chomsky, etc. I started this thread to discuss it with anyone who has done likewise. You have shown you're simply not one of them. I haven't said this very nicely, it's true -- but I'm not always a nice guy. So it bothers you that I say this, but it's still true -- so you instead project onto me that I'm a blind follower of Heidegger, as if in a cult. Makes it very easy to ignore the fact that you don't know the material. Creationists say the same thing to me when talking about evolution -- they make the claim that I've been brainwashed by Darwin. It's predictable and boring.

Either you've read Heidegger or you haven't. It's easy to bullshit in philosophy, but I give no quarter for it here: here, in this thread, you actually have to do some work. David Mo, who I obviously have little agreement with, has at least made the effort to read. You have not. And it shows. Simple as that. Spin it how you will to save face, I don't care.

Not arbitrary at all -- ordinary usage.

"There is ongoing disagreement (and no general consensus) as to whether animism is merely a singular, broadly encompassing religious belief[49] or a worldview in and of itself, comprising many diverse mythologies found worldwide in many diverse cultures."

I think the latter is clearly the case.

But again, to retroactively call tool-making and cave art "science" or animistic beliefs "religious discussion" is a just confusion.

Discussions of animistic beliefs aren't religious discussions? What an odd thing to claim. — RogueAI

That's hardly "religion." Again, maybe a kind of "primitive" religion, meaning a system of beliefs, but that's not at all the same as later, codified systems that appeared.

To claim people were sitting around having "religious discussions" is kind of ridiculous. It's simply what everyone believed.

So why take that perspective? That's what I'm asking. What is it that appeals to you about it, or are you just offering it as an option? — Isaac

A bit of both. It seems almost like a truism to me. "Good" and "bad" aren't magic words, we use them all the time in everyday activity as a shorthand for evaluating our actions, and whether or not those actions take us towards or away from our goals, ideals, objectives, ends, etc. I don't see what's troublesome about it.

If one wants to be healthy, then you do xyz. If one wants to be happy (depending on what we mean by this), you do xyz.
— Xtrix

Right. Why do we need any more than this? Why associate either of those things with a universal concept, they work perfectly well as modalities. — Isaac

Are both desirable ends? Yes. Thus, actions which lead towards these ends are therefore good or bad, right or wrong -- within that context. The meaning is the same -- they're just different words to judge actions. A "moral" action, according to this perspective, is one that aligns with one's values and goals -- be it health or happiness.

Nothing "more" is added.

I'm asking why we would do that 'if'. To say 'if' implies we have a choice (ie we might not make that association), I just don't understand why you think we would choose to make that association, what does it gain us? — Isaac

To associate happiness with "good"? Because by doing so you can have a "science" of morality, which has been rejected for a long time.

To determine what the "right" action is, you have to have a context in which judge it. You have to have a goal of some kind. If one wants to be healthy, then you do xyz. If one wants to be happy (depending on what we mean by this), you do xyz.

I'm not seeing where you think an unnecessary step arises. Why associate "health" and "good"?

Here's another incoherent question: Which one of us is us? Which "being" is what "Being" is? — Gary M Washburn

"Being" belongs to any entity whatsoever, including humans. It's the "is-ness" of anything that exists, or that is.

So which one of us is "us" doesn't really make much sense. Every one of us, as individual entities, is just as much a "being" or "exists" as much as that tree or that rock or anything else.

His answer was to seek some lost ancient or antecedent completeness that we can somehow revive or reinvigorate to heal the wound of reduction — Gary M Washburn

OK -- references please. Because I've read a lot of Heidegger for the last year and a half and this looks like complete nonsense to me.

Have you read Heidegger? What have you read? Upon what are you basing your interpretations?

I, for one, am not allowing the mistakes of past thinkers to hand around my neck like a millstone. — Gary M Washburn

Good for you.

but he thought that they were part of a philosophical tradition that perverted the question of Being, which is the mother of all questions. Of course, Parmenides and Heraclitus are an important part of the philosophical tradition, but they were not part of this misleading tradition. — David Mo

This is much better, in my view, than what you've said before. But I wonder why you say "perverted the question" -- I think they've simply overlooked the question. Heidegger says Kant basically took Descartes' position on that question, and Descartes in turn assumed the Scholastic framework. So neither really addressed the question at all. That's not really perverting it, it's not even addressing it. By that point the question had been essentially taken for granted as "self-evident," or "God," or substance, etc. You see what I mean? Again I'm nit-picking, but it's important to careful here.

Right. Now do that without the morality. Science can tell us what produces happiness (I don't really agree with this, but for the sake of argument...). If we want happiness we can consult science to find out how to get it.

Why have we gone through the additional stage of equating happiness with "good", what purpose did that bit serve? — Isaac

"Good" as something valuable or desirable, a positive outcome of some kind. As opposed to bad, which is something undesirable, which one should like to avoid. It's another way of saying what we want or strive for versus what we wish to ignore or avoid, in my view. Traditionally, it's been thought that science has nothing whatever to say about values -- the is/ought claim of Hume and others.

But again, I don't see myself (or Aristotle) equating happiness with "good" per se. In his philosophy, happiness is perhaps the highest good in a hierarchical structure, but a cup of tea is good too. It's just a catch-all term to connect all actions, a way to encompass all actions in terms of what their striving for, ultimately. One may or may not accept this formulation, but it's fairly straightforward.

No, it isn't. Looking under a rock is not science. If we define that as "science," then apes do science as well. It's an absurd definition.

Looking under a rock CAN be science. It isn't always science and it isn't always not science. The scientific method wasn't codified until recently, but I don't think you can invent something without doing science. It might be really primitive science, but the essence will still be there: hypothesis, experimentation, analysis, and conclusion. How would one develop, say a canoe, without doing all that? — RogueAI

With trial and error, intuition, know-how, etc. We can call that "primitive science" if we want to, but that's so far from what is meant by "science" these days that it's very misleading. It makes nearly everything humans do "primitive science."

To say this equates to "philosophy, science, and logic" is pure confusion.

I don't see any reason to assume the homo sapiens of any given time period were any less intelligent than we are. I'm sure, at the very least, they had metaphysical discussions about the nature of reality, religious discussions, and ethical dilemmas to sort out. — RogueAI

I never said they were "less intelligent." But they were not doing philosophy, science, or logic any more than they were doing civil engineering or computer science. Sure, one way to look at it is that all of this comes out of the human mind and human creativity, it involves thought and language, etc. In that respect, we've been essentially the same species for 200,000 or so years. But again, to retroactively call tool-making and cave art "science" or animistic beliefs "religious discussion" is a just confusion. Let's not do that, for clarity's sake.

Yes, I understood that, I was wondering why you'd want to do that. We can already study human well-being and carry out any activities that such a study might reveal as benefitting human well-being. What's the advantage in equating such behaviours with 'morality'? — Isaac

I don't really understand what you mean. I'm not equating behavior with morality. Morality as judgment of "good" and "bad," or "right" and "wrong" applied to behavior (actions) is done all the time. We're constantly making those judgments. The question is "What is good?" If we say happiness (in terms of flourishing or well-being) is "good," then science can certainly help us discern "right" from "wrong."

If you can't think for yourself reading philosophy, any philosophy, is not going to make you a thinker. If a poster won't let me distinguish between a cited author, my own original take of the same ideas, and his or her way of understanding anything at all, then there is no discussion. And I suppose that is how all these threads end. — Gary M Washburn

"My own original take on the same ideas." First you have to know what those ideas are, and you haven't shown the slightest degree of understanding any of it -- and that's the point of this thread: Martin Heidegger. Like most people who want to hear themselves talk, any discussion that requires real work (i.e., having to back up your assertions with textual evidence, and thus the painful task of reading) you eschew. That's fine. Start your own thread and discuss whatever you want. Personally I think your writing is completely confused and nearly incoherent.

Or you can continue playing the victim by complaining about what a misunderstood free-thinking genius you are. Your call.

How the hell can we remembrance what we never knew and what is unprecedented in being? — Gary M Washburn

This is exactly what I mean by incoherent. First, is "remembrance" a typo or used in a special sense? Do you mean "remember"? If so, I've addressed this before. The whole sentence is meaningless. For example, "what is unprecedented in being"? What does that mean? What's unprecedented "in being"? What does "in being" even mean? Are you talking about being in general or about beings (entities)? What exactly in Heidegger are you responding to? Where does he say we need to "remember" being? Etc. etc.

Is "Being", before after all, what reason infers from antecedence? — Gary M Washburn

Are you even capable of formulating a coherent sentence? Or is this incoherence deliberate?

What remembrance the unprecedented? — Gary M Washburn

Literally gibberish.

Later Heidegger is pandering to his last and final refuge, the ineffable interest of practitioners of Zen. That is, his later terms of "Being" are meant as a "koan". Shock and awe, not understanding. — Gary M Washburn

You don't have a clue about what you're talking about, and it's both obvious and embarrassing. If you wish to learn about Heidegger, stop talking and listen -- or ask questions. You're in no position to make assertions of any kind.

Why would we need to link morality to human well-being in order to open up a field in which we can study it scientifically? Why don't we just study human well-being? — Isaac

By "it" I was there referring to morality. The argument is that there is no fact/value or is/ought distinction, and that morality can be based in science if we simply accept a concept of "well-being" as we accept "health" in medicine.

Sounds like Aristotle, in many ways. Eudaimonia gets translated as "happiness," but flourishing is better. In that sense, human beings should strive for this and actions can be judged on its basis. However, that's not saying a whole lot -- what gets considered "flourishing" becomes an issue in itself, not to mention all the lies told to people by priests and authorities who want to simply promote a morality to enhance or maintain their power.

But overall I think it's a good start. Someone was making noises like this a while back; it may have been Sam Harris. Trying to link morality to human well-being, in the same sense as "health" in medicine, thus being able to open up a field in which we can study it scientifically. All interesting stuff.

According to Heidegger, taking up the line of Parmenides and Heraclitus, which is what he was doing. According to Heidegger. Because the path that begins with Plato and continues with Aristotle, the Latin scholastic, Descartes or Kant was a wrong path. — David Mo

Parmenides also interpreted being as presence, as did Heraclitus. This was the inception. They thought and questioned being, but they did so from the perspective of one mode of time: the present. This is not "right" or "wrong."

Now about this point I'm not 100% sure. This is from my reading. But if it's true that Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus are not within the tradition, that would be very surprising to me. If you can find references to this that I've overlooked, I welcome it. I still doubt very much that you'll find anything about "right" and "wrong," however. Below is a relevant passage about Parmenides:

"Legein itself--or rather noein, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being--has the Temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. Those entities which show themselves in this and for it, and which are understood as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; that is, they are conceived as presence (ousia)." (Being and Time, p. 48 -- the BOLD is mine)

...no negative assessments of Aristotle or Descartes — Xtrix

How can we continue to argue if you say that accusing someone of being blind, of degenerating the sense of philosophy and hiding the real issue are not "negative assessments"? There's no way to argue with that. — David Mo

I've explained why, many times. I've cited Heidegger saying he "does not mean anything negative" -- many times. I have said before that there is certainly a "wrong" and "right" way to translate words (in terms of accuracy or correctness) -- many times. But you will only find the utmost respect for Aristotle and Descartes from Heidegger. If you want to continue to project your negativity, that's your business.

I can argue as long as you want, but not in terms you demand. You might as well offer the slave all the work he can manage, so long as he does it under your supervision and conditions. I can justify everything I say, but you don't want to know what I mean, because that would entail admitting ways of discussing the same issues in terms not under your control, or that there are ways of doing fundamental philosophy Heidegger language cannot help you with. — Gary M Washburn

This thread is about Heidegger. As I said from the very beginning, a pre-requisite should be at least a reading of Being and Time. If you want to give rambling, irrelevant lectures you're free to do so elsewhere. If you want to discuss Heidegger, then do so with sources. To equate this with slavery is embarrassing.

I cannot respect a thinker so attached to sources that nothing original speaks to them at all. — Gary M Washburn

Have you read Plato's Ion? — Gary M Washburn

Science has gone on since the first hominid began using tools. Looking under a rock is just as scientific as looking through a telescope. — Harry Hindu

No, it isn't. Looking under a rock is not science. If we define that as "science," then apes do science as well. It's an absurd definition.

Philosophy has been going on ever since humans created art and buried their dead. And logical and illogical thinking have occured since thinking began, just as tyrannosaurus rexes and triceratops existed before they were identified and given names as such. I never said logic equates to all thinking - just a certain type of thinking.

Ever since we started thinking we've known that there are errors in our thinking. Aristotle simply laid out the various ways we can avoid those errors. — Harry Hindu

No, this is completely wrong.

Logic is a branch of philosophy, which is what the above poster is talking about. Philosophy has not been going on since humans "created art" -- that's as meaningless as to say science was going on. All we know with high likelihood is that there was creativity present, that these early people (say 100,000 years ago) had language, and that thinking was going on.

To say this equates to "philosophy, science, and logic" is pure confusion.