Like Plato & Kant, due to the Materialistic bias of our language, I have been forced to borrow or invent new words (neologisms) to describe Metaphysical*1 concepts that don't make sense in Physical terms. In my Enformationism thesis, I describe those "occult entities" as Virtual or Potential things. I'm appropriating terms that scientists use to describe not-yet-real particles and incomplete electrical circuits for use as metaphors of un-real Forms. At my advanced age, I am still learning the lingo.This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating ‘somewhere else’ in ‘another world,’ a ‘Platonic heaven.’ It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by reason. — Eric D Perl, Thinking Being, p28
So much of this has actually filtered through to the way we understand the world today - after all the Greek philosophers are foundational to Western culture. So to understand principles, to see why things are the way they are, is to see a 'higher reality' in the sense that it gives you a firmer grasp of reality than those who merely see particular circumstances. Indeed the scientific attitude is grounded in it, with the caveat that all of Plato's writings convey a qualitative dimension generally absent from post-Galilean science. — Wayfarer
God-like powers without personhood*1 is what we call Nature, Universe, Cosmos . Traditional polytheistic notions of gods --- (Zeus {weather} ; Ceres {grain} ; Persephone {seasons} ; Bacchus {wine, orchards} --- gave unique personalities to sub-components of Nature-in-general. Viewed as the impersonal physical universe though, Nature doesn't do anything in particular, but everything in general. So, it's the specialized aspects of Nature that seem more personal and intentional : as when lightening strikes your house.Personally I find most philosophers’ conceptions of God are hollow shells that barely outline any type of entity; or they are anthropomorphic wishful thinking, slapping a face and personality on something that did not ask for it, like “being” or “the one” or “necessity”.
My sense is, if it’s a question of God, it is a question of personhood, — Fire Ologist
Thanks for that insight. I hope you'll pardon me for my layman's playful use of less technical terms for discussing "spooky" invisible concepts that are only apparent to highly intelligent beings. Although Principles are of primary importance for philosophers, they may be un-intelligible to non-philosophers. I suppose that all humans have some minimal ability to broadly categorize their environment, but only a few go so far as to break it down into fundamental (essential) concepts for understanding (intellectual comprehension). For example, most people can count up to ten, but only a few can deal with infinities & differentials.↪Gnomon
Plato’s so-called ‘Forms’ might be better understood as principles of intelligibility —not ghostly objects in another realm, but the structural grounds that make anything knowable or what it is. To know something is to grasp its principle, to see what makes it what it is.
And they’re neither objective - existing in the domain of objects - nor subjective - matters of personal predilection. That is why they manifest as universals — Wayfarer
Yes. I'm sure you are not used to thinking of Forms in such irreverent terms. But my ignorant subjective/objective question about ideal Forms vs real Things, is "which is the caricature, and which is the original"? Did Plato discover the Forms, or did he invent them? It's just a rhetorical thought, no need to answer. :wink:Your depiction of the forms is something of a caricature. All I can say is, do more readings. — Wayfarer
What I'm still struggling with is the Subjective vs Objective nature of the Forms. Sure, Plato assures us that there is an ideal Concept, Pattern, Design of everything, but not in the Real world, so why should we believe him? As a professional designer myself, I like the idea that there is a perfect house for this couple, for example. But I've never even come close.While Moses's revelation is of eternal commandments, Plato's noetic apprehension of the Forms (especially the Form of the Good) is more intellectual ascent. — Wayfarer
Ha! I didn't mean to equate them as "historical types", such as a messianic prophet. I imagined them as more like analogous divine intermediary types, handing down the Truth of God (Laws vs Forms) to ordinary mortals.Many would say that Plato and Moses were completely different historical types — Wayfarer
Philosophy Now magazine (April 2025) presents the Question of the Month : Is Morality Objective or Subjective? And one writer said "Objective moral principles are necessary to reconcile worldviews". So, it occurred to me that his theory of universal Forms might have been an attempt to objectify-by-edict ("thus saith the Lord") mandatory ethical rules that would otherwise be endlessly debatable.So does the distrust of Platonism really come down to the fact that Plato's 'ideas' are not things that exist in space and time, and that the only reality they could possess are conceptual? — Wayfarer
Yes. And the Quantum physics of early 20th century seems to have required a Philosophical return to Platonic logistikon*1 (reasoning ability) after years of reliance on technological mēkhanikos*2. When subatomic particles proved to be too small for their devices to resolve, scientists were forced to resort to statistical math*3 to determine the structure & properties of unseen things. Thus, modern Physics became more Theoretical, and less Empirical. For example, Einstein & Planck didn't work in gadget-filled laboratories, but in pencil & chalk provisioned offices.The concept of Forms in Plato is not about invisible particles or mathematical abstractions per se, but about the intellect’s ability to grasp stable, intelligible principles that underlie the flux of experience. — Wayfarer
In quantum physics today, the "smallest units of matter" (e.g. quarks, preons) are statistical probabilities rather than physical objects. Yet, the units of Statistics are data : bits of Information. And the four main types of statistical data are nominal, ordinal, discrete, and continuous. All of which are categories of mental concepts, not instances of material objects*1.I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato's sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.
I agree. The ancient Greeks didn't have the technology to dissect real material things into their substantial elements (e.g. Atoms). So instead, they tried to analyze Reality into the Ideal/Mathematical essences of the world (e.g. Forms). We now call that "pursuit" of abstraction Philosophy. Over time though, technological inventions, such as the telescope and microscope, allowed Natural investigators to actually see what before could only be envisioned via Mathematics and imagined by Reason.In this way, it is the pursuit of the ideal that allows us to calculate the behavior of objects in motion sufficiently enough to visit other bodies in space. In my view, by doing so humanity clearly demonstrated that the ideal was real. — David Hubbs
Those who hope for salvation in an Ideal ghost-populated harp-strumming Heaven, might view worldly Realism*1 as a threat to their faith. And secular philosophers, who imagine that Plato's realm of Ideals & Forms is a remote-but-actual parallel word, might view Nominalism*2 as a threat to their worldview. Personally, I don't fit either of those categorical -isms, so I don't feel jeopardized by either belief system.I'm hoping someone can point me in the direction of those who see realism as a threat, and we can continue this ancient battle on an even footing. — NOS4A2
Even though Positivism & Empiricism, postulated as-if universal principles, fail their own test, they still serve as good rules of thumb for Scientific investigations into the material world. But, when Philosophical theories & principles are judged by that pragmatic criteria, they miss the the point of philosophizing : to go beyond the limits of the senses using Logical inference, not mechanical magnification. :smile:A basic criticism of positivism, particularly logical positivism and its central Verification Principle, is that the principle itself fails to meet its own criterion for meaningfulness. — Wayfarer
Ironically, although Strings are defined as vanishingly small --- smaller than sub-atomic particles --- they are still assumed to be material & physical, not just mathematical. The image below indicates that some physicists imagine Strings as physical things : building blocks of Quarks, which themselves present no physical evidence to support their theoretical existence.I believe that string theory is closest one can approach the Forms in terms of mathematics and physics as one would or could imagine. It's the only field in physics that is entirely dependent on mathematical relations. — Shawn

Yes. Plato used the formal structure of geometry (e.g. triangles) to describe the Truth & Utility of immaterial Ideas relative to material Objects*1. Likewise, modern quantum physics deals with the invisible structure of matter that can only be known by means of mathematics*2. Hence, we accept the statistical wave nature of subatomic "particles" as True, even though they don't behave like ordinary matter (e.g. quantum tunneling ; two-slit experiment).1. The Forms are a separate domain of discourse, which one is only able to grasp with understanding of mathematics. — Shawn
Since I'm an old fogy, defining Essences in the infinite (undefinable) context of zillions of possible (not yet real) worlds just hyperbolically complicates the concept for me. Why not just define Forms in terms of concepts, patterns & meanings (Essences) in human minds, in the only uni-verse (one world) we know anything about? {i.e. parsimony} Wouldn't plain old Aristotelian Logic suffice to deal with that narrow definition*1?There is a clear way of talking about essences, as those properties had by an object in every possible world in which it exists. We can deal with the consequences of essences using this stipulation. — Banno
Due to my academic laziness, has decided not to take me on as an apprentice in the monk-like vocation of Modal Logic. Which is fine by me, since he never explained what it has to do with the topic of this thread. I am somewhat interested in understanding Plato's Forms in a modern context. But as a retired philosophical dabbler, not a full-time professional scholar, I don't have the time or need or interest to invest in a "more formalized system of reasoning"*1.Because it is—or was—embodied in a living philosophy, not merely in the textbooks of scholars. And indeed, the origin of those schools of thought does trace back to the Platonist tradition (in the broad sense), but philosophy as a way of life, not just an academic pursuit. — Wayfarer
Wayfarer doesn't seem to be offended by my skeptical questions & confused responses, or postulated alternatives. Maybe his pedagogical posts are flexible and open to interpretation, not take it or leave it. However, I do sometimes read a big “sigh” between the lines, when I just don't get it.↪Gnomon
You've made your mind up about modal logic, before you understood it. As a result you are "unavailable for learning".
]Not much point in my continuing in an attempt to to teach you, then. — Banno
Sorry for nit-picking. But "might have been" is a retrospective acknowledgement that the Possible world (mode of being) did not, in fact, become an actual world ; hence remains an ontological non-existent no-when non-entity : an immaterial idea. So, we are back to an abstract timeless imaginary scenario.The qualification "might have been" seems to imply that the imaginary "things" did not come to be (to exist), hence not ontologically real — Gnomon
Not always. The might come to pass. They do this when the possible world is the actual world. — Banno
Thanks for the Stairway to Heaven overview. However, I still find the term "degrees of Reality" hard to fathom. It seems to imply that each Stage of Spirituality is a different Reality*1 : subjective state of existence? But, at my advanced age, I can look back and see (imagine) multiple stages of Intellectual (spiritual?) development. But the various phases seem to occur within the same single over-arching Reality : objective sum of all that exists.Each level includes but transcends the previous—forming a natural hierarchy where higher beings realise a greater degree of actuality and potentiality. — Wayfarer
Sorry to come back to this mind-warping concept, spinning off from Plato's spooky Forms. But how does the notion of "degrees of reality" differ from the "stipulated models" & "possible worlds" in Banno's post*1 to tim wood? Also how does Lewis' notion of Possible Worlds as "real concrete places"*2 compare to "degrees of reality"? Are they the same "possible worlds" that populate the MWI model*3 of pop-up Possible universes created by quantum measurements? Are they all Real to the same degree?As I’ve mentioned several times in this thread and elsewhere, this depends on the understanding that there are degrees of reality (or realness? — Wayfarer
Note --- The qualification "might have been" seems to imply that the imaginary "things" did not come to be (to exist), hence not ontologically real . . . . at least in our little corner of the Multiverse. :cool:They are just stipulated models of how things might have been. So I might not have written this post - that can be modelled as that there is a possible world in which I didn't write this post. It's that simple. — Banno
From my brief exposure to the concept of Nominalism, I get the impression that it is often used as a slur. For example, "Liberal" is generally non-threatening, while "Radical" implies a destructive intent. But Trump tweets tend to equate the terms. Likewise, "Abstractionism" merely distinguishes mental representations from the objective referent, while "Nominalism" is interpreted as denial of Truth, Beauty & Goodness. In the first sense, I may be a Nominalist, but in the second sense, I am definitely not a denier of Universal concepts. So, what was Pierce going-on about? :smile:Nominalism rejects the existence of universals and abstract entities and other artificial creations, or any combination of the above. — NOS4A2
I wasn't familiar with the notion of "degrees of reality", so I Googled it*1. I had always assumed only two degrees : Real or Ideal, Actual or Possible. Multiple in-between degrees seems overly complicated ; like Many Worlds models of reality. What do we gain by sub-dividing Reality into multi-level hierarchies? Doesn't that notion make pragmatic Scientific work into guesswork? It certainly confuses me. Maybe this neither-here-nor-there (watered-down reality) interpretation of Plato is what causes to exasperate "Meh!". Does my stubborn two-degree worldview mean that "I'll only consider stuff that reinforces the views I already have"? :smile:As I’ve mentioned several times in this thread and elsewhere, this depends on the understanding that there are degrees of reality (or realness?) — Wayfarer
One common interpretation of Plato seems to be that Forms exist as abstract ideas in the Mind of God*2, not as surreal things or ghostly shapes in a Platonic Heavenly place. This metaphor of a two level hierarchy is easier for me to understand : it's either Real (objective ; physical) or Ideal (subjective ; metaphysical). Am I missing something important in-between those philosophical categories? :smile:But in the examples you’ve given, I already see the kinds of mistakes that I think have crept in to the interpretations of Plato through centuries of interpretation. Chief amongst them is the idea that the ‘forms’ exist in some ‘ethereal realm’, a ‘Platonic heaven’ which is ‘separate’ from the ‘real world’, and also that ‘form’ can be understood as an ideal shape, which I think is completely mistaken. — Wayfarer
Plato sometimes referred to his Ideal realm as "more real" than material reality. His cave & shadow metaphor illustrated that concept. But I interpret his "eternal realities", not to mean more material & physical, but as more important for the theoretical purposes of philosophers.Your own response*1 to the OP erroneously implies that Plato was talking about Ideal Forms as-if they were real physical objects*2. I never interpreted his theory that way*3. — Gnomon
Yes. For the same reason I ignore 99.99 percent of all technical philosophical papers.↪Wayfarer , ↪Gnomon
Ok, so you both will ignore the limits of Aristotelian modal logic becasue understanding the wider formal modal logic would require some effort. — Banno
I apologize for sticking my modular brain into modes that I have little interest in or understanding of : e.g. Modal Metaphysics*1. But this post was inspired by an article in the April/May issue of Philosophy Now magazine. It's a review of a book by Phil. professor James Tartaglia : Inner Space Philosophy. "Inner Space" of course refers to Consciousness, with its metaphysical ideas & subjective abstractions, as contrasted with the Real World out there, and its physical things & material objects. This thread seems to have split along the typical adversarial lines of real Physics (outer) vs ideal Metaphysics (inner), each of which may make some of us "uncomfortable" due to opposing worldviews, or indifferent due to irrelevance.But Banno's Rule applies: It is always easier to critique something if you begin by not understanding it. Your dismissal of modal metaphysics as “verbal” is a textbook case of strategic misunderstanding. You are trying to cut off a conversation that makes you uncomfortable, that cuts against your own views. — Banno
The notion of Possible Worlds*1 is way off my radar. But I Googled the term, and Lewis' definition seems to imply that the biblical Heaven is a logically possible, and "real concrete", place in the conceptual cosmos. If so, then Pascal's wager would make practical sense : to bet on heaven, as the payoff for long-suffering Earthly faith & worship. How else could you manage to leave the imperfect phenomenal world behind, and transport to a perfect noumenal world : a stipulated model? Don't bother to correct me, if I misunderstood. I'm content with my so-so Actual World. :joke:Possible worlds are not so hard to understand. They are just stipulated models of how things might have been. — Banno
That's OK by me. I am not a professional philosopher, or an academic logician. So I have no need or desire to engage with "more recent material". On the forum, I am content to let better informed (erudite) posters, such as yourself, dumb it down for me.Basically, if you are going to follow only logics from 2000 years ago, you will not be able to engage effectively with more... recent material. — Banno
2500 years ago, Plato & Aristotle created the Big Picture of reality that we call Philosophy. It was mostly focused on Universals & Generalizations. But modern science is focused on the itsy-bitsy details. And many TPF posters today seem to have a case of Physics Envy. So, they tend to "dive into the details" to the point that their threads lose track of the original point in question. Hence, we need an Ariadne's red thread to find our way out of the labyrinth.In many discussions I hear people always dive into details and see the discussions go south.
How important are details? — Jan
I haven't read the article, but the abstract*1 seems to make sense, from a peculiar perspective. For example, Nature only knows linear Cause & Effect or Input & Output. Yet the mind of homo sapiens adds an intermediate state of subjective self awareness. I wouldn't call that temporary side-track (recursion) a "collapse" of causation, but merely a way of making use of Energy-as-Information*2*3.Here is a theory of consciousness that I just published on Akademia: https://www.academia.edu/129143983/Consciousness_as_a_collapse_of_causality — Wolfgang
proposed that we use Spinoza's definition of Substance*1, which seems to describe God as the ultimate Essence : all possible modes of being. If so, then the modern sense of material Substance applies to only a subset of all possible modes. Logical Essence (attributes & modes) is another category of God Stuff that Descartes labelled res cogitans. :smile:Whereas ouisia - being - I instead address via the term "essence". — javra
Good choice. I didn't really notice, until composing this post, the interchangeability of 'essence' and 'substance', but I think the former is far less prone to equivocation. We still use 'essence' (as in, 'the essence of the matter') in a way that is more in line with the earlier use. — Wayfarer
Yes. Aristotle may have created the one of first Tables of Elements : Gas, Liquid, Solid, Interactive. Perhaps the 'scientific revolution' has merely added footnotes to Aristotle : Atomic Number. :nerd:I do think modern science has come close to functionally defining the essences of material things in the Periodic Table of the Elements. — Gnomon
It is no coincidence that Greek science and philosophy laid the earliest foundations for the 'scientific revolution', so-called. — Wayfarer
Thanks, but I'm not familiar with Kripke, and Modal Logic is over my head. Aristotelian Logic is more like common sense (the actual world) to me. He simply wants to define a Thing in a way that won't be confused with another Thing : its conceptual Essence*1. Physicists & Chemists are content to define a Thing by its unique physical characteristics (periodic table). But shouldn't Philosophers be more concerned with a Thing's abstract conceptual features (Form), and their meaning to a regular person?↪Gnomon
In Kripke - that is, in the standard accepted modern model of modal logic - the essential properties of some thing are those had by it in every possible world. — Banno
I wouldn't call myself an Essentialist in any formal or doctrinal sense. But I do think modern science has come close to functionally defining the essences of material things in the Periodic Table of the Elements. Each element has properties*1 that are both necessary to the functions (e.g. human uses) of the element, and that are mentally meaningful (as qualia) to the scientists who make practical use of those essential patterns of properties, and their functional relationships to other elements (H + O + O = H2O). Such practical & aesthetic essences describe their role in Physics, Chemistry, and sometimes even in Psychology....other essentialists... — Apustimelogist
Is that "other" advised? As in, would you consider yourself an 'essentialist'? If so, may I ask what would that involve - that things have a set of characteristics which make them what they are, and that the task of science and philosophy is their discovery and expression? Or that essence precedes existence? — Banno

Apparently CSP's philosophy divides the conceptual-symbolic world into three categories instead of the "standard" dualities. I haven't been able to overlay (without overlaps) his triads onto my simpler & more traditional Real vs Ideal classifications. For example : 1) Firstness = Potential, Possible, Ideal? ; Secondness = Causation, Actualization, Realization? ; Thirdness = Mind, Ideas, Concepts, Symbols, Patterns?Interesting thoughts. I would say that Peirce is a significantly unique thinker, in that he defies a lot of the standard categories. He is certainly a mediator between contemporary philosophy and Aristotelian realism. I also tend to see him as transcending the idealism-materialism dichotomy, although here we run into the difficulty of slippery definitions, particularly with respect to idealism. — Leontiskos
I don't know much about CSP, and his abstruse philosophy & vocabulary, but I am generally familiar with his most famous ideas*1. However, I get the impression that his general worldview is similar to my own pragmatic-theoretic BothAnd philosophy*2. It attempts to reconcile reductive realistic Science with holistic idealistic Philosophy, and sensory Materialism with experiential Idealism.I don't know if I would wholeheartedly endorse CSP. He is very concerned to make his thought consistent with science, which is indeed important, but 19th century science tended pretty hard towards reductionism and smallism, and sometimes his moves seem to be in line with this (perhaps because of the quite dominant idea that to be "scientific" is to be reductive. He has a reductive account of essence and substantial form, or of natural kinds, but I don't think one actually needs to be reductive here and loses much if one is. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes. Even the scientific "underpinnings" for some counterintuitive conclusions remain debatable, long after they are accepted as doctrine. For example, some of Einstein's worldview shattering "facts", although supported by mathematical & physical evidence, still must be somewhat taken on Faith, because for Reason it doesn't add-up. We may not understand how invisible intangible insubstantial causal Energy can transform, like alchemical magic, into passive massive Matter. But much of modern science is grounded in that equation. For doers, it works. But for thinkers, it's still only a theory. :wink:↪Gnomon
Well, philosophy tries to get at the underpinnings of empirical thoughts and thoughts in general. That makes it different to the empirical sciences, and also considerably more difficult. Unlike scientists, philosophers don't have the benefit of being able to look around to see if they are right. — Banno
Nobody here. I feel you. My worldview evolved from tepid Spiritualism as a child, to agnostic Materialism as a young adult, to a variety of -isms as a mature philosophical seeker. Since my knowledge & understanding of the worldwide variety-of-views is minimal, I cannot be dogmatic about any of them.That mention in passing of the distinction between reality and existence is one which I will guarantee you, nobody (or almost nobody) on this forum will recognise. (And I know this from long experience.) — Wayfarer
That sounds like a negative assessment of theoretical Philosophy compared to empirical Science. Scientists "justify" their work by getting observable physical results. But Philosophers by giving intellectual logical reasons. For example, Descartes' Mind/Body dualism, and cogito ergo sum have no material evidence, and ultimately only a transcendental argument : God. Yet, if the philosopher gives valid reasons for his postulated Universal Concept (e.g. God ; Forms), then he feels justified for his if-then conclusion. Ooops, there's that non-factual "F" word again*1.This might be the key here. Those who "feel an need for Universal Concepts" will make an unjustified jump to them. It'll be a transcendental argument: things are thus-and-so; the only way they can be thus-and-so is if this Universal Concept is in play; therefore... — Banno
That's an objective practical (scientific ; material) way to look at it. But a subjective theoretical (philosophical ; mental) perspective might include personal experiences that are meaningful, even if not practical . So, the physical Utility of a thing is a different conceptual category from the Meaning of the thing, relative to the observer. Hence, we are back to the old Mind/Body duality. :wink:The admonition is that in order to understand meaning, look to use. In order to understand what folk think, look to what they do. And here, include what they say as a part of what they do. — Banno
Since I have no formal training in philosophy, many of its technical terms*1 are fuzzy for me. I'm pursuing this Idealistic angle on Forms*2 for my own benefit, not to convince you. Hence, my impractical question, inspired by your pragmatic/analytic*3 approach : why do some of us feel a need for Universal Concepts, when others find Particular Percepts sufficient for survival? What we sense is what is real, what we imagine is fictional. Why then, are some people motivated to seek-out feckless Fiction, when placid animals seem to be content with pragmatic Facts? In other words, Why do Philosophy?↪Gnomon
If you are saying that meaning is seen in what we do, then we agree. There's no need to invoke forms to explain what we do. We can just act. — Banno

Why should there be a thing that is common to all our uses of a word? — Banno
