The Trial
by Franz Kafka

It strikes me that the idealized concept of capitalism, predicated on free trade and the free market, really only exists its immature state. As it matures, it begins to undermine the very conditions that define it.

The forces that drive capitalism inevitably lead to monopolization and market-manipulation. Capitalism, in maturing, transforms into something fundamentally opposed to its original principles (as Marx thought).

This is horrifically evident, and even more horrifically ignored. The conspiracy of greed runs deep in the human soul.

The Social Contract
by Jean-Jacques Rousseau

re-reading....

Further to the op....from the introduction to Behemoth - which is an analysis of the fascist playbook:

"the Third Reich developed into a “task state,” in which specific goals were entrusted to prized individuals outfitted with special authority in a fashion that cut across bureaucratic domains and the lines of organization charts"

If prized individual with special authority cutting across bureaucratic domains doesn't describe Elon Musk's role then I don't know what does.

Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944
by Franz L. Neumann

Capitalist Democracy versus Democratic Capitalism

I am, as I am myself discovering, very much a disciple of John Dewey, a champion of democracy and the foremost pragmatic philosopher and educator of the early twentieth century.

On the antagonistic relationship of modern democracy and modern capitalism, Dewey writes:

"Power today resides in control of the means of production, exchange, publicity, transportation, and communication. Who ever owns them rules the life of the country...by necessity."

Therefore, says Dewey, in order for there to be a true democracy, there must be a change in the direction of control, from "capitalist democracy" to "democratic capitalism." Whence,

"The people will rule when they have power, [when] they own and control the land, the banks, the producing and distributing agencies of the nation. Ravings about Bolshevism, Communism, Socialism are irrelevant to the axiomatic truth of this statement. They come either from...ignorance or from the deliberate desire of those in power...to perpetuate their privilege."

I'm making an argument that "the moral floor" is sinking, or too low, if you are only required to act in accordance with it. The minimum effort is not enough to attain what the minimum effort aims for, a kind world. — fdrake

That seems true. Morality ought to be melioristic. And in a sense, the whole idea of a moral ought is essentially supererogatory. I can see construing the low bar of duty as what has been recognized as a utilitarian-heuristic. But if that standard of action is not having adequate effect, that is when a new morality is called for. I guess the question is, who will acknowledge the superior moral imperative?

I would say it is constitutive of the nature of morality that it evolves, a la Jung (Answer to Job) and Kierkegaard (Fear and Trembling). The exemplary which is effected can eventually become the new standard. Some people need to actually see what is possible before they are willing to entertain it. Pace Kierkegaard's "knight of faith," although I would tend to apply a secular-moral gloss. Faith doesn't have to be faith in god; it could be faith in truth, or reason, or good.

The rub I was pointing at is that such actions are necessary to bring it about. — fdrake

I think you could see "duty" as the moral floor, below which we should not sink, whereas the supererogatory is the moral ceiling, towards which we aspire. They are exemplary actions, by definition. People do not have to be exemplary. But they can be. They have that capability.

By and large, people who perform supererogatory acts do not do so because ideologically compelled, but from a deep, personal commitment to universal values. So attempting to cast the supererogatory as a kind of duty or compulsion seems inaccurate.

"There is no democracy with a class of 'over-integrated' haves (who are no longer under the effective control of the law, but control the law) and 'under-integrated' have-nots (who are under the control, but no lunger under the protection of the law).
~Brunkhorst, CTLR, p. 313

If you mean how is he enacting the fascist playbook, by

Radically expanding executive powers, attempting to dismantle the division of powers and co-opt judicial regulation. — Pantagruel

If you mean where does lack of critical awareness fit in, in getting him elected.

Principles of International Law
by Jeremy Bentham

Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy
by William Barrett

Reason is the collective-cumulative product of human interactions, in other words, of social evolution. Which often evolves dialectically, through the juxtaposition of contradictory positions (Hegel).

Critique and negation of norms....must count as a critique of validity claims....the conflict over normative validity is constitutive of social evolution. (Brunkhorst,Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions)

This aligns with my earlier example and explanation, which I think is rather clearer in the context of the OP. To impugn someone's rationality is, by definition, to impugn their beliefs. You cannot make pretense of some sacrosanct faculty called "reason" when normative beliefs are at least as constitutive to the holistic process and project of thought and communication as is reason.

Peirce says that man is a symbol. He is not reducing the meaning of human existence to propositions. Rather, he is expanding and enhancing the dimensions of symbolicity.

I would also add, reason cannot be the foundation of morality insofar as reason is itself subject to moral constraints and conditions. A discrete or siloed view of reason and morality does justice to neither.

I think the point to bear in mind is that there is definitely not a consensus that reason operates independently of emotion in the human psyche. There is a holistic thinking process that includes the complete spectrum of human mental states, including logic, emotion, and imagination.

External perception on the moral case -> Feelings and Beliefs on the case -> Reasoning -> Moral Judgement. — Corvus

So reasoning is a little black box then? Are you in some sense reducing reasoning to logic? As far as I know, there is no consensus on the nature of reasoning (such as is implied by your axiom) that would allow it to be so neatly distinguished from the elements of morality to allow it to be decisively identified as the basis of morality.

just said, moral judgements must be based on reason. — Corvus

Yes, I know. And as I pointed out, moral judgements, insofar as they may influence actions, which is their entire purpose, cannot be reasonably thought to be solely a function of reason.

Hence they are not in the domain of truth and falsity of knowledge values. When you believe in something, it could be either grounded or groundless and justified or unfounded. Likewise when you feel angry or feel someone is bad, there is no truth or falsity value in the feeling. You either have the feeling or not.

Moral judgements are objective knowledge that is either true or false. Yes, they can be true or false too. But because they can be true or false, they are knowledge and objective.

Beliefs and emotions are subjective, hence folks can have them or not have them. There is no ground for them being true or false. They are not moral truths. They are just feelings and beliefs. — Corvus

This claim is inaccurate because you are saying that reason ought to inform morality, and ought implies can. If people are only capable of acting psychologistically (which seems as though it might be true by definition) then saying that they ought to act rationally instead is either by definition impossible or else it is highly unlikely. In either of which cases it fails as a norm.

f someone said to you, "I believe that you have insulted my intelligence. Therefore I feel you are evil and bad." How do you justify that claim? — Corvus

If you are talking about constructing a rational (qua logically and/or semantically sound) argument or claim then I guess you would say something like, I believe that people who insult me are evil. You insulted me, therefore you are evil. And that is the whole point, isn't it? There is no universal standard of rationality. Rationality is what emerges in and through discourse. And what makes a claim rational is, by definition, beyond mere rationality. Theories of communicative action would align with this perspective.

To impugn someone's rationality is, by definition, to impugn their beliefs, as my rational-defense claim illustrates.

Beliefs based on feelings and opinions and interests are blind and misleading. — Corvus

I believe that it is right to treat people with empathy. That is neither blind, nor misleading. Reason is not the one single governing faculty. Nothing about human psychology even vaguely supports the hypothesis that it is. Emotions are not "misleading" - they are a huge and significant characteristic of what it means to be human. Which is why belief is its own thing, and human behaviour an amalgam of emotion, reason and...belief.

Going back to the OP, we seem to be in agreement on the point that believing in God does not resolve moral conflict. However, you seem to be claiming that feelings, beliefs, opinions and interests are the basis of morality. Whereas my point is that pure reason is the foundation of morality. — Corvus

Reason can only guide you in making a choice. Committing to the choice will always be an act of belief. Reason absent committed belief is just rhetoric. Which is why belief - in whatever it may be - is always the foundation of every person's moral choices.

Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: Evolutionary Perspectives
by Hauke Brunkhorst

C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite is deservedly a classic. All of the characteristics Mills describes of the worst types of abuses by the worst types of men can be seen in even starker relief against the backdrop of the tableau of modern politics.

Matter is not what we experience. Rather, matter is our explanation of what we experience.
We experience only sensations: physical sensations, emotional sensations, and mental sensations.
Other explanations of experience include Descartes' Evil Demon, hard solipsism, brain in a vat, etc.
Matter is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is a very good explanation of what we experience.
Newtonian Mechanics is not true. Perhaps, the matter explanation is also not true.
Thoughts? — Art48

Yes, objective reality is an inference. So it really devolves into a question of certainty.

My question would be whether cogito ergo sum represents (subjective) certainty of our own objective existence. In which case matter might get to go along for the ride.

Lately my tastes in fiction have had a leaning to the fantastical, and Gogol definitely leans in that direction, melding the commonplace and the supernatural.

The Overcoat and Other Tales of Good and Evil
by Nikolai Gogol

Dead Souls was the first thing I read by him several years ago. I'm sifting my shelves for unread books and found two collections of his short stories. I just read Amerika and Madman really reminded me of Kafka.

Enjoy!

Diary of a Madman and Other Stories
by Nikolai Gogol

we cannot transcend these to reach some putative 'really real' or 'ultimate realm'. — Tom Storm

But even if we cannot reach such a realm (pure objectivity) can we "aim" at such a realm, attempt to achieve an "objective" perspective? Is "communicative action" founded on the presupposition of objectivity? Maybe transcendence is not the goal, but the process.

The Power Elite
by C. Wright Mills

Also by Habermas was daunting and incredibly dense. Best to be acquainted with Jaspers' theory of the axial age prior to tackling it. I'm going to wait a bit before tackling volume two (volume three won't be published until June anyway...).

My take on postmodernity is more of a generalized socio-historical observation, not so much the theme as the context of Habermas' new book. The idea of critiquing grand narratives I would say relates more to the manifestation of the pluralistic and decentralized postmodern perspective to (what I would call the self-conscious phenomenon of) post-metaphysical thinking. And post-metaphysical thinking is the primary theme of the book.

If I had to comment on the idea of the rejection of grand narratives, I'd align that more with an ongoing failure to successfully integrate the critical element of the mythical, so what I would consider a defect of post-metaphysical thought. A self-conscious movement that denies what it is perhaps?

Yes, I view postmodernity as symptomatic of a more general set of social themes rather the the explicitly literary-artistic focused usage of postmodernism, which sounds more like what you are describing. Certainly in either case it supports a range of interpretations. Rejection of grand narratives isn't the same as saying there are no big questions though.

I think that is a hallmark of every social movement, that it casts itself as an answer to all big the questions, no? And the nature of the movement is what it considers those to be....

I refer you to my previous observations:

I believe, however, that evolution is ongoing. We are evolving as a species to a kind of "species being". Not just in the practical-social sense described by Marx, but perhaps in a kind of evolutionary-cognitive sense. Our species has reached a tipping-point, as defined by the scope and scale of our mastery over our environment. Either we continue to evolve into a truly "human" species, a humane species, or we bring about our own extinction, as a mere consequence of having failed to achieve the ethical awareness necessary to adequately manage our own technology. — Pantagruel

The sense in which post-modernism is a reactionary response is really just its essential nature as part of a dialectical evolution. It can be seen as a variety of inversions of the rational and objective. The individual becomes decentered or pluralized.

Do you hold that post-modernism is a bad thing? Might it not also be a way we can use to think more interestingly outside of our habitual foundationalist posturing and dualistic thinking? Post-modernism is so ubiquitously detested, I can't help but think it must be onto something. — Tom Storm

I don't think it in itself good or bad - it is just a label that has been applied to a type of reactionary response to a recent phase of psycho-social evolution. That said, I think it highlights a schism in the modern (post-modern) mind and is a symptom of an associated socio-cultural condition, which is one of instability. The idea that mankind has reached some kind of tipping point.

We should remember that the good old days were not all that good. Slavery, exploitation, and oppression were ok with full support by traditional institutions, family, community and religion. There were at least as many wars then as there are now, although the ones we have now are more dangerous. People died of diseases that are easily treated. Life expectancy has increased dramatically. Were things better then than they are now? Good question. — T Clark

Aha.

People having a connection to an inner core of value is not the same thing as saying that those core values were themselves inherently correct. Obviously, as our experience of the universe deepens, our understanding and appreciation of the nature of core values will also evolve. This is exactly the challenge I think. We are not moving backwards to old values, but forward to new ones. It merely happens that certain institutions historically embodied certain kinds of values. They may again, even if the institutions and the values they align are not precisely the same.

My take is that, per the theme of my original post, the dominant social trend can be understood in terms of a relative alignment with or alienation from a "value-core". So everything you said is undoubtedly true, but it is a description of a problem that has been in a state of evolution since....way back when. Hopefully, the more we can understand the nature of that problem, the better we are able to put our energies into efforts that address it.

I agree that rule has historically been rule by a dominant minority. I believe, however, that evolution is ongoing. We are evolving as a species to a kind of "species being". Not just in the practical-social sense described by Marx, but perhaps in a kind of evolutionary-cognitive sense. Our species has reached a tipping-point, as defined by the scope and scale of our mastery over our environment. Either we continue to evolve into a truly "human" species, a humane species, or we bring about our own extinction, as a mere consequence of having failed to achieve the ethical awareness necessary to adequately manage our own technology.

So are you hoping for a synthesis after the thesis of modernity and anti-thesis of post-modernity? — ssu

I think that we are due for a new phase. The moral vacuity of pure technology is not only becoming evident, it is precipitating crises across many domains. The night before I wrote those reflections I dreamt I was searching for Hegel among bookshelves, amidst turmoil.

Look at the kind of anti-leadership that is being spawned. People think they live in a democracy because they hear the word used. Yet everywhere they look is evidence that their most cherished institutions are nothing but toys for plutocrats. Is this truly how people think democracy should work? Privileged selection of candidates and flawed electoral processes, all to subserve corporate interests. Hmmm.

“We have all got to exert ourselves a little to keep sane, and call things by the same names as other people call them by.”
~George Eliot