↪ — Banno

Nice synopsis.

"Water is H₂O" is another unfortunate example where Kripke takes a "holiday" with language. Consider the following quote from N&N, "Let's consider how this applies to the type of identity statements expressing scientific discoveries that talked about before - say, that water is H₂O. It certainly represents a discovery that water is H₂O. We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps, (though the taste may usually be due to impurities). If there were a substance, even actually, which had completely different atomic structure from that of water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say that some water wasn't H₂O? I think not."

In fact, the scientific discovery is not "water is H₂O", but that the substance (whether liquid, solid or gas) we often call "water" we often detect H₂O molecules. Additionally, that substance we call water is not just H₂O molecules, but made up of multitude of compounds, mineral, ion, etc. Not only it is made up of a multitude of different molecules, but that composition can change from thing to thing we call or refer to as "water". So, when any one refers "water", am I referring to only H₂O, or all of molecules that make up any given thing called "water"? Due to multiple uses of "water", and multiple things we use "water" to refer to or could refer to, it is an error to say "water is H₂O" is discover scientically. Lastly, could we say that "some water wasn't H₂O". Yes, in fact we can and do say this, D₂O is called "heavy water" is the scientific community.

So, what is Kripke's error in this example? I believe he ignores the common uses of the word of "water" along with what actually science discovers about "water". What use he has in mind for "water" is how we use the word(symbol) "H₂O"; thus, what he is expressing is "H₂O is H₂O" which is not an a posteriori necessity.

Does this throw some doubt on Kripke's philosophical theory, or just show what he is saying is just trivial, or both?

I would recommend reading Norman Malcolm’s paper on “Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat”. Taking a later Wittgenstein approach, Malcolm shows Kripke’s views are not coherent which he also believes sheds doubt on the correctness of his theory. One of the issues Malcolm raises is Kripke’s confusing with the distinction between feeling heat and feeling hot. Also, Malcolm shows how Kripke incorrectly describes how people originally identified heat, specifically, somehow picking out a ‘certain sensation’ instead of learn it from a community of people. Lastly, Malcolm does an forceful job of showing the ‘Martian’ example as incoherent.

I like this quote from Wittgenstein in Culture and Value, “People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don’t understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, and as long as we still have the adjectives ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’, as long as we continue to talk of river of time, of an expanse of space, etc. etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what’s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because in so far as people think they can see the “ limits of human understanding”, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.”

Is it the colours here that are the simples? Or are the colours irrelevant, and the fact that there are squares instead of circles what is important? Or that the grid is three by three, and not two by four? The point is that what is significant here is far from clear until one understands what is at stake. — Banno

Maybe one of the most profound passages in Investigations that seems most do not appreciate. It dissolves away much of philosophy’s pretentious foundations.

Not only do we see this idea in popularized science, but has been firmly imbedded in philosophical circles. Whether D.C. Williams theory of the manifold(“The world manifold of occurrences, each eternally determinate at its own place and date….”), McTaggart’s eternal/nontemporal ordering of events ( C-series), or Quine’s eternally ordered series.

Sometimes a question makes sense, or sometimes a question compels one to give it sense so to continue the dialogue; otherwise, we are talking nonsense.

Determinism could be problematic concept. I would say in three areas, explanatory power, falsification, and rationality.

1. Does determinism explain? Prima facie, it seems so, however, let's look at it a particular way. Many who hold deterministic views propose a "block universe" where past, present, and future exist simultaneously, eternal and unchanging. But if this is so, how does an edge of a block, explain the edge of the other side? What if we introduce an equation, say volume of the block, does that not explain the edges? Or, are we just describing? It seems that the explanation has transformed into a description. If free will is an illusion, is not explanatory causal chains an illusion as well, simply replaced by ordered sequences that are described?

2. Can determinism be falsified? How are we to disprove determinism. What will count against such an idea? If event A is the cause of event B, and I find one instance where event A did not cause event B, would this count? But in practice, would we not appeal to a lack of information with regards to A, something that was missed, somehow we did not define A accurately. It seems we can just ad hoc our way in excusing instances that may falsify determinism. What if event A is the cause of event B one time, and event C another time, and this pattern repeats, ad infinitum. Is this not indeterminism? But who said that could not count as deterministic?

3. Is determinism about what is rational? I would say no, determinism is about what is non-rational. And this is a problem with our notion of being rational. As rational beings we count on our reason and logic to evaluate arguments, positions, views, etc; however, determinism robs us of this intellectual position and reduces us to determined states of affairs following one after another. So, not only is "free will" illusionary but our rationality too.

In conclusion, determinism does not explain, cannot be proved or disproved, and undermines our rationality. So what should we do? Ignore determinism, and continue to utilize the concept of "free will" that has served humanity well for centuries.

You shouldn't raise questions about things you don't really have an interest in. — Constance

“We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.” From Mill, On Liberty

It is far more direct and reasonable to posit that abstractions such as property, marriage, and complex numbers are stuff we made up than to imagine them exiting in the way chairs and trees do, but in some parallel reality. — Banno

As an ultimately abstract entity, I enjoy the company of so many numerous abstract entities. We often discuss if there really are concrete objects, but conclude they are just grammatical fictions.

They are in you and in me; they created us, body and mind; and their preservation is the ultimate rationale for our existence. They have come a long way, those replicators. Now they go by the name of genes, and we are their survival machines." — Andrew4Handel

Nice, anthropomorphize DNA, I think I heard this story before

To think, I might be sitting next to unactualized possibles, the conversations to be ……

e are however social creatures such that our sensations are not prior to but partially constitutive of a mind embedded in a world. You are not just sitting in your head with a bunch of Kant's a priori scripts, looking out at a world to which you have no direct access. — Banno

Can I get an “Amen”!

If determinism trumps rationalism, then any argument that purports to show that determinism trumps rationalism may be invalid; we may only think it's invalid because it is determined that we do so. Thus the position 'determinism trumps rationalism' undermines itself. — Herg

You got it, and you were determine to say that.

Determinism it giveth and it taketh away.

You are neither engaging with his argument nor mine — Bartricks

I find P.F Strawson defense of free will more compelling that Galen, but fundamentally, all Galen can say is that at some point in the past I was determine to take such a position. Determinism trumps rationalism.

Strawson believes that to be morally responsible you need to have created yourself. And he believes that is impossible. That's his justification for 3. — Bartricks

This excludes every child that learns from their parents, that is convenient.

I think Galen was not convince of this argument
, but was caused by his rebellion to his father, P.F Strawson, who defended free will. I think he would have to agree to stay consistent with his argument.

So what if God actually appeared before me and intimated HER eternal grandeur and power? Language does not prohibit this — Constance

Language does not prohibit hallucinations either.

They rest on intuitions about logic — Constance

So if p then q, p, therefore q is based on intuition. I don’t think we are using “intuition” correctly.

As an empiricist philosopher, Quine was bound to a scientific consensus — Constance

No, I would say he was bound by the success of make predictions of future stimuli.

And again, ALL we ever encounter in the world, is phenomena. — Constance

This is incorrect, we encounter trees, apples, humans. Also,it does not make sense to say ALL we ever encounter in the phenomena, is phenomena.

All inquiry ABOUT these claims leads to indeterminacy. — Constance

In science, there is a certain inaccuracy with measurements. Is this a concern? Should it impede progress? No, they march forward. They apply the measurement, where there is practical gain, and live with the uncertainty, or strive to improve. Some philosophers could learn from this example.

I don't believe Popper ever really understood Wittgenstein, and neither did Russell. — Sam26

Popper thought the Wittgenstein did grasp propositions of natural science. Specifically, as you say, he was interested in demarcating sense from nonsense. However, for Popper the demarcating of science from pseudo science was the more fruitful direction. And this was achieved by his falsification idea rather than verification of states of affair. Although, I don’t believe he was very familiar with later Wittgenstein so he never directly critique it.

Another difference I believe was Popper thought there were real philosophical problems, while later Wittgenstein did not.

And finally, "...the truth [my emphasis] of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and eadefinitive — Sam26

True nonsense that is unassailable and definitive. Of course you can’t argue nonsense. (This is essentially Karl Popper’s argument against the Tractatus)

I sometimes read that Wittgenstein showed great intellectual honesty with his conclusions on how to view his work. But was there a more honest or better path to take than giving us this ladder metaphor.

Could he have simply said that what I describe here in this book is accurate and thus true? Or that I have demonstrated something as true and sensical that is not necessarily proposition of natural science?

Or maybe the honest conclusion is to recognize the failure of the attempt of the Tractatus which he eventually did.

That is, I can't know what the tree objectively is and I can't know what you're talking about in an objective way. — Hanover

Yep, it is not that you can’t know, it is that you don't know. You don't know because you don't know what counts as a objective tree. And just because there are illusions and hallucinations does not mean there is something behind those objects that we are familiar with.

But I think this chase for the tree’s objectivity has another problem. There is the illusion of searching for something fundamental like searching for the bottom of the sea. This is not some empirical discovery but creation of a concept that humans give meaning to.

Well, according to Galen I say what I say about this argument because of the way I am. So, if you want to ultimately understand what caused me to say “I am caused to will”, you will have to go back in the causal train in which I believe we have no hope to determine.

So, the puzzle is 1. does the argument provide the reason to accept the conclusion? or 2. should we go with some arational natural cause

I agree we are caused, but to will. And what you will, well take responsibility for.

Galen Strawson's argument against free will, and if not, why? — Sargon

I disagree with this argument because we are caused to will.

All I have ever asked of analytic philosophy is to simply tell me how foundational matters are worked out — Constance

"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is." Wittgenstein PI124

Not sure about the point. Obviously, science's problems are not philosophy's. Scientists continuing "doing what they are doing"does nothing to address philosophical problems. — Constance

To say that science needs a foundation that only phenomenology can supply because there appears to be a "philosophical problem"-yet science manages to successfully march forward with progress- is itself the problem you should examine. Your longing for foundations is due to what Wittgenstein said "when language goes on holiday"

So, you have to climb the ladder first until you see the new way of how sense and nonsense emerge or dissolve after reading the Tractatus. — Shawn

Let us continue to see what the author had to say about his first book.

1. In the Preface of PI, Wittgenstein says, "For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book."
(Tractatus)

2. PI 24 "It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of words and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language (Including the author of the Tractates Logic-Philosophicus.)"

3. PI 114 "(Tractatus 4.5) 'The general form of propositions is This is how things are'. That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one merely tracing round the frame through which we look it."

Just to list the more explicit entries.

I guess when he spoke of “silence” he meant something else too because you still have a lot to say.

I think in terms of how Wittgenstein approached the analysis of meaning in the Tractatus is most compatible with science. Thus, (and it's only my opinion here), that the logic of the Tractatus is most in correspondence with the language of science; but, that's just my personal liking I'm disclosing here, despite what you think of the superiority of the Investigations over the Tractatus. — Shawn

I suppose you like it but don't believe it since you continue to ignore 7. "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." Just a joke.

And 6.53 "The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. proposition of natural science..." and 6.54 "My proposition are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless..." So, you like this approach because Wittgenstein admits his words are nonsense, and through nonsense you will see the world right.

So, his approach to meaning and the underlying structure of language is shown to be meaningless and nonsense by his approach.

No wonder Wittgenstein spent the last twenty years untangling this approach.

He knew, as Heidegger did, that foundationally all roads lead to indeterminacy. — Constance

And yet science continues to make successful predictions and enhance understanding.

All we ever really see, encounter, understand, deal with intellectually, pragmatically, and so on, is phenomena. — Constance

Maybe to phenomenologist, and for Quine sensory surfaces, but most scientists they continues doing what they are doing without worrying about phenomenologist's subjective content, or Quine's cultural posits, pragmatically speaking.

but unfortunately, even those who have studied Wittgenstein for years can't seem to untie some of the knots. It could be argued that even Wittgenstein was confused on some level, viz., on the reach of language. — Sam26

Yep, you can see in Wittgenstein’s writings he spent the last twenty years of his life trying to untangle the knot called Tractatus.

Causal explanations in scientific settings, moving down the line to physics, which is the resting place for inquiry. How THAT can account for things like value and knowledge I would like to know. How is a causal relationship an epistemic one? — Constance

Let's consider this from Quine (from Two Dogmas), " As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries - not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posit comparable, epistemologically, to gods of Homer, and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proven more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience."

So how does Quine come to such a position. (From the Pursuit of Truth): "From impacts on our sensory surfaces, we in our collective and cumulative creativity down the generations have projected our systematic theory of the external world. Our system is proving successful in predicting subsequent sensory input." And thus we have the start of Quine's naturalized epistemology. In a nut shell, our information about the world comes only through impacts on our sensory receptors. In contrast, I presume, phenomenology starts with appearance of things, or things as they appear in our experience, from a first person point of view, then attempt to define the phenomena on which knowledge claims rest or achieve some sot of knowledge of consciousness.

To continue with this thought, if I ask someone “do you know how to ride a bike”, and she proceeds to repeat the manual on how to ride a bike. Does she have knowledge, or just demonstrated recall of a manual? I give her a bike and she cannot ride it, she does not know how to ride a bike.

You think like this because you likely think like Quine and his ilk think, that scientific models of what things are and how to talk about them are models for philosophical thinking. One has to think, if you will, out of the box. — Constance

I think Quine would think that philosophy is continuous with science, but in a more general way. So his “ilk” would be Einstein, Newton, and Bohr.

I like this quote from Wittgenstein in Culture and Value, “People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don’t understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, and as long as we still have the adjectives ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’, as long as we continue to talk of river of time, of an expanse of space, etc. etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what’s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because in so far as people think they can see the “ limits of human understanding”, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.”

Yes, we experience only fleeting images, impressions and sensations, and out of that common experience we construct the collective representation which is the world of stable objects and entities. — Janus

I believe you have this backwards. First, we come to learn a language from our follow human beings in world of stable objects and entities. Afterwards, we begins to learn more sophisticated concepts like images, impression and sensation against this stable background.

Sure, they are not determinate things, else they could be talked about, but they are not nothing. You seem to be developing the nasty habit of picking up the fruit which has already fallen; not a habit conducive to fruitful conversation. — Janus

Wittgenstein PI 304 "And you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing.- Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either. The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here."

and PI 293 "The thing is the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something for the box might even be empty.-No, one can divide through by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." (The box in this case is some inner world of sensations.)

No, you're still misunderstanding. I am telling you that there are things I cannot tell you, not trying, per impossibile, to tell you what I cannot tell you. And of course the things I cannot tell you cannot be part of the conversation, but the fact that there are things I cannot tell you can be, and should be an important part of the human conversation. — Janus

Yes, the important part of the conversation is the language game that gives rise to such conversation, the language and actions that take place in the stream of life.

That, indeed, seems to be what ↪Janus is claiming... or reporting. He is trying to tell us of something of which he cannot tell us. And like the beetle it must drop out of the conversation. So one could not claim, for example, that one is following in the footsteps of other phenomenologists, because to do so would be to say that there was something shared, or at least something similar, in the face of the claim that despite this it is ineffable. So that internalise is esoteric, mystical.

Now that's not so far from Wittgenstein, except that the phenomenologists seem to insist on continuing the impossible conversation were Wittgenstein would be silent, choosing instead to enact, and perhaps show by enacting. — Banno

Well put. I eagerly await the response. As I wait, I shall meditate.

Public narrative? The question here is the public narrative embodied in the subject, the historically constructed individual, the center of institutions embedded in language and culture that we call a self--what happens when this kind of entity examines the foundations of being a human being. We encounter phenomena first. Period. The social and the real are first order terms that begs the further foundational questions. — Constance

“We encounter phenomena first. Period.” Wow, this sounds so definitive. Can’t be argued without sounding absurd. Let me try. What do we humans encounter first? I would say a very hostile world in which we need to survive. We encounter objects that we need to run or hide from, we encounter objects that will aid in our survival. To call this ‘phenomena’ sounds like a cold abstract thing that is ruminated on rather than experienced.

“…examines the foundations of being a human being”, is this discovered like a pair of shoes hidden in a closet? Or just created by a phenomenologist that gets everyone to go along with it? Or maybe its just what Wittgenstein said about “absolute simple objects”: “But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our sentence consists of four letters or nine? And which are its elements, the type of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstanding in any particular case? PI

If I seem to be having an experience then I am having an experience: I can only see absurdity in trying to deny that; in saying "I don't really have an experience". — Janus

I am going to try to give this idea of “seeming to have a experience” some sense. But we will have to accept that a human is just a machine and that there is a world that we experience. Lets assume there is a color detecting machine. You place a red object in front of it and on its screen it will report what color the object is. The machine goes on working fine but one day it reports that the object is red when no object was placed in front of it. Do we want to say the machine seems to experience red? Or would it better to say it is broken and needs to be fixed? What about human making such a claim of experiencing red when there is no red object? Does the human seem to have the experience or is just broken?

and mostly suspicion. — Banno

Correction from the “public realm”…thats how it should be